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IOS Assignment

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Abhiranjan Sinha
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
16 views

IOS Assignment

ios assignment

Uploaded by

Abhiranjan Sinha
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Introduction

The process of Statutory Interpretation is maintained by interpreting the courts and applying
the legislation. In any cases that involve statutes, interpretation is required. In the case of this
question, the principle of Ejusdem Genres evolved. Although the words of the law in many
cases leave room for ambiguity and vagueness that needs to be clarified by the judge. To find
the definitions of statutes, judges use various techniques and methods of statutory
interpretation, including conventionally acceptable canons of statutory interpretation,
legislative history, and reason. Rules of statutory interpretation can be applied by the
judiciary not only in their application to legislation enacted by the legislature but also to
delegated legislation, such as that of administrative agents, in common law jurisdictions. This
maxim has come from the Latin word and is also known as the rule of construction which
means it gives the direction to the court about how they have performed certain functions. In
Latin terms, it is known as "same kind" all the statues which are written loosely are
interpreted. It is important to apply the Ejusdem Generis rule with great care since it means a
deviation from the natural sense of words to give them a definition for the legislature's
supposed purpose. The law must be governed by the basic rule that laws must be construed to
achieve the purpose sought. The rule identifies that all the words identified are part of one
genus, which determines the conclusion that the general words can only fall on that genus. In
this case, the principle was not applied in the same way when it said the court would not alter
the statute if the meaning was clear and plain. In the case of Maharashtra University of
Health and others v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & Others the meaning of this principle
was described as the rule of interpretation of statutes to be considered in our legislation.
When the statute is written in plain language court should not intently invoke any word to it.

Background (Previous Case)


In the case of Collector of Customs, Bombay vs M/S. Grasim Industries Limited 1 it was
appealed If the combustion chamber hydrochloric acid synthesis unit is classifiable under
heading 84.17(1) or heading 68.01/16(1) of the Customs Tariff Act 1975. The judgment of
this case was passed on 11th May 2020. It was held by the court that, they are specifically
classifiable under heading 84.17(1) of the CTA given the finding reported by the Tribunal
that the goods in question constitute a complete unit, a system, and are not made solely of
graphite. We thus find no illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal. The appeal fails and
expenses are accordingly dismissed.

Facts

Facts of the present case: An assessee (appellant) placed an order for the supply of 14,700
Karbate Tubes which were made from artificial graphite infused with phenolic resin. They
were supplied in April and July 1992. The order was passed by the Assistant Collector of
Customs and goods were classified under the sub heading of Chapter 6815.10 of the Customs
Tariff Act, 1962. The demand for Appraiser was confirmed. But the importer classified the
goods under sub-heading 8419.50 of the Customs Tariff Act,1975. Since the assessee had not
received any relief after challenging in front of the collector then this matter was taken
further to the custom, excise, gold control appellant tribunal in New Delhi. The decision of
putting karate tubes under the defined act was challenged. The matter was sent to the larger
bench where they held that goods are rightly classified under section chapter 68, not chapter
84 as the views were differentiating of two members in the tribunal. The appeal made was
held dismissed.

Issues

Karabate Tubes made of artificial graphite infused with phenolic resin falls under the
subheading of chapter 6815.10 or 8419.50 of Custom Tariff Act,1975?

Contentions
1
(2000) 5 SCC 177
It was submitted that the Karabate Tube consisting of the artificial graphite cannot come
within the purview of tariff 68.15. It was further submitted before the court of law that the
tube which is liable to be interrogated falls under the Chapter 84 which would embrace Heat
exchangers excluding Note 1(a) of Chapter 84 and should stand classified under the entry of
Chapter 84.19. It was further alleged that Karbate tubes are non-electric articles comprising
of graphite made of artificial graphite and are classified under Chapter subheading 6815.10. It
was further held that, while this is a part of machinery which is otherwise capable of
attracting subheading 8419.50, the same does not apply given the exclusion in Chapter 84 of
Note 1(a). Along with Note 1(a) of Chapter 84, it has been contended to the court by the
principle of Ejusdem Generis it was argued that articles which are similar to grindstones or
milestones must not be included. It was also contented by them that if the legislature intended
then they must have focused on Note 1(a) with different angle all articles of Chapter 68
instead of the expression which is used in present. It is further submitted that the words given
in the provision clearly speak. If the interpretation is done according to the assessee, then it
would result in deleting or adding words which is not acceptable and the entire provision
would get transformed.

Ascending and Descending Opinion

When the court in this case said that, if the words have clarity and they are unambiguous then
no amendments and alterations will be made. Several precedents were used in this case: -

In the case of Crawford v. Spooner2 it was held by the privy council that they cannot accept
the flawed phrasing of an Act by the Legislature, they cannot introduce or mend and cover-up
shortcomings that are left there by construction. There should be no attempt to replace or
paraphrase the general application in the case of an ordinary word. The same was held in few
more cases such as Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India 3 , Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr4 and many more.

In the case of Collector of Customs v. Grasim Industries 5 it was held by the court that in
statutes the words used cannot be inessential and pointless. All the matters of interpretation
must be given due attention and no word should be read or interpreted separately. All the

2
(1846) 6 Moore PC 1
3
(2002) 3 SCC 722
4
1997 (6) SCC 312
5
(2000) 5 SCC 177
words must be given equal attention as each word has a different meaning. There must not be
any addition or substitution of words.

In the case of Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association 6 and Navinchandra
Mafatlal v. CIT7 they also relied on the judgment of United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum 8 which
stated the rule of Ejusdem Generis has to be only applicable to particular words, class, or
genus which are to be followed by the general words.

In the case of Allen v. Emmerson 9 it was held that to invoke the rule of Ejusdem Generis
there must be a different genus or category.

Judgment

The apex court, while observing to this case said, Given the normative analysis, there can be
no reluctance in holding that the products in question which fall within Heading 84.17(1) of
the Customs Tariff Act, unless it is shown that they are millstones, grindstone articles falling
within Chapter 68 which must be excluded from Heading 84.17(1) of the Customs Tariff Act
given Note 1(a) of Chapter 84. All the headings have been studied carefully by the various
sub-headings of Chapter 68 of the Customs Tariff Act and we think that goods that fall under
the category of 68 do not have any substance. The plea of the appellant was held
unsustainable because the issue which was revolving in the case was different in totality and
to draw an analogy that Note 1(a) refers to articles that are millstones, grindstones, or similar,
the sentence underlined should not be read out of context. The court also gave its opinion as
that no word can be said to be pointless and meaningless which is used in the statute.

While interpreting the matter or an issue the focus must be on all the word not on word
neither one word should be given enough attention nor less attention, hence no words should
be read in the isolation. Every word is to be read in the general sense and should be related to
the context in which it is used.

Also, the application of Ejusdem Generis is in the question of whether there it is there or not.
This rule is applicable when general words are accompanied by specific words belonging to a
class, group, or genus. In such a scenario, the general words are understood to be confined to
6
(2002) 4 SCC 275
7
AIR 1995 SC 58
8
AIR 1941 FC 16
9
1944 KB 365
objects of the same sort as those mentioned. Given the other rules of interpretation, the rule
represents an effort to settle mismatch between the particular and general words that gives
effect to all terms in a statute if possible, that a statute is to be interpreted as a whole and that
no words in a statute should be pointless or unnecessary and each word should be read
together.

Therefore, it was stated that Note 1(a) of Chapter 84 is clear and explicit, it does not follow
the general word hence it does say about the class, category, or genus. The rule of Ejusdem
Generis has no application.

The aftermath of the case

In this case, the court's major consideration was to determine the actual meaning of the
words. After the judgment of this case was found several other cases relied on its judgment,
Viji Joseph vs P. Chander in this case, the court referred to the point that when the rule which
is to be said is to be on specific words which are related to the category, class, and genus.
This principle should be used with a lot of carefulness. In addition, cases were elaborated on
Ejusdem Generis where this principle will not be applied. Not in every case, this principle is
used it depends as to when words are read in isolation the meaning of the sentence changes
hence in most of the statutes and while interpreting it is preferred that all the words are read
together. This rule fails or does not apply if the specific word does not apply to a different
word. It is not universally applied. Addition and subtraction of the words make it
meaningless hence should not be done.

Analysis on the judgment

I completely believe in the judgment of this case since when we look over the language
headings of head 68.15 and subheading 6815.10 and chapter 84 of the 16th section of Custom
and Tariff Act,1975 that is-

"Stone article or other mineral substance not stated elsewhere included."

"Graphite or other carbon non-electrical articles."

"Components of nuclear reactors, boilers, equipment, and electronic appliances"


Milestone grindstone and other articles falling in Chapter 68 cannot be exempted from the
heading 84.17, the Custom and Tariff Act, 1975. Words such as 'similar' and 'like' have been
taken in the wrong direction here. And as the language of heading was clear hence it should
be amended or interpreted.

Considering that the purpose sought to be accomplished by the enactment is available, the
Court can safely put on the rule of simple construction and law-making intent. Reading the
provisions of the act does not mandatorily require the Court, in plain and simple words, to
insert or remove words or over-elaboration of the language of the section. Rather than
creating any hindrance to its implementation by unduly aggravating the possibility of the act,
there must be provisions of the act being given their full procedure.

Words are sometimes shaped and imprecise meanings are taken out. Here, as ordered by the
apex court, we shall not dig too much into the words in this case. Just read the sentence
together. The description of sections, headings, and subheadings shall be clear. Every word
has its different meaning, and when it reads together in a different context, it differs and
sometimes creates chaos hence in order to avoid this kind of confusion, the court should not
focus more on each word or ignore any, an equal balance must be given to every word since
in the statutory provisions, each word has its meaning, and it should be discarded considering
that it does not make sense. The court should not interpret it and amend it because after
amending it, it will lose its essence when the provisions are clear and there is no confusion.

Conclusion

Every word in the provision is important and the court interprets these provisions if they find
it ambiguous and unclear but if the lines and provisions are clear then a court should not
interpret or make changes in that provisions or words because the crux and implications of
the provision will be lost hence it did so then it will be applied in that way only and with this,
the integrity of the law and its essence would be doubted and its purpose would not be met.
Therefore, the principle of Ejusdem Generis must be applied only when required.

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