International Journal of East Asia Studies, 22(1) (2018), 72-93.

U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia

During the Obama Administration:
More Hard or Soft Power?

Chamaiporn Siangyen1

1
Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand

This article is part of a master’s thesis entitled “U.S. Smart Power

in Southeast Asia: More Hard or Soft Power?”.

Corresponding Author:
Chamaiporn Siangyen, Faculty of Political Science,
Thammasat University, Bangkok 10200, Thailand
E-mail: [email protected]

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 Abstract

This article examines the U.S. smart power strategy employed in Southeast
Asia by the Obama government. It argues that, even though under the leadership of
Obama the United States claimed to pursue a new and softer approach to reengag-
ing Southeast Asian states, the U.S. rebalancing strategy did not in fact differ much
from that of the Bush administration. Evidence shows that, although the Obama ad-
ministration professed to change to a smart power framework, considerably more
resources were still allocated to hard power than soft power. Hence, the essence of
American smart power, as conducted by President Obama, was predominantly an
extension of the hard power policies of his predecessor.

Keywords: smart power, rebalancing strategy,

Southeast Asia, U.S. foreign policy

73
 บทคัดย่อ

บทความนี้ มี เ ป้ า หมายในการศึ ก ษายุ ท ธศาสตร์ อ� ำ นาจฉลาด (smart power) ของ

สหรัฐอเมริกา ซึ่งรัฐบาลโอบามาน�ำมาใช้ในภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ บทความนี้เสนอว่า แม้
สหรัฐอเมริกาภายใต้การบริหารของประธานาธิบดีโอบามาจะอ้างว่าได้ใช้วิธีการใหม่และนุ่มนวลใน
การด�ำเนินนโยบายต่างประเทศเพื่อกระชับความสัมพันธ์กับประเทศในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ แต่
ในความเป็นจริงยุทธศาสตร์ปรับสมดุล (rebalancing strategy) ของรัฐบาลโอบามานั้นมิได้มีความ
แตกต่างมากจากนโยบายของรัฐบาลจอร์จ ดับเบิลยู บุช หลักฐานจากการวิจัยพบว่าภายใต้กรอบ
นโยบายอ�ำนาจฉลาดนั้น ทรัพยากรจ�ำนวนมากได้ถูกจัดสรรเพื่อน�ำมาด�ำเนินนโยบายอ�ำนาจแข็ง
(hard power) มากกว่าอ�ำนาจอ่อน (soft power) ดังนัน้ อาจกล่าวได้วา่ สาระส�ำคัญของอ�ำนาจฉลาด
(smart power) ของสหรัฐอเมริกาภายใต้รฐั บาลโอบามา เป็นส่วนขยายของนโยบายอ�ำนาจแข็ง (hard
power) ของรัฐบาลจอร์จ ดับเบิลยู บุช

ค�ำส�ำคัญ: อ�ำนาจฉลาด, ยุทธศาสตร์ปรับสมดุล,

เอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้, นโยบายต่างประเทศของสหรัฐอเมริกา

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

Introduction

The presidency of Barack Obama appeared to mark a shift in U.S. foreign

policy from the Bush administration. Under the banners of “hope” and “change”,
Obama proposed to set a new tone for U.S. foreign policy by using smart power in
the Asia-Pacific region. The proposal was broadly welcomed by American people
and media, especially those dissatisfied with Bush’s unilateral approaches. During
his first few months in office, President Obama’s efforts in distancing himself from
his predecessor’s approach to foreign policy led some political observers to believe
that Obama’s new smart power strategy would be principally dominated by the use
of soft power. Adding to this, during his first 100 days in office Obama received pos-
itive press feedback for moving quickly on key foreign policy agendas. Renowned
CNN correspondent Christine Amanpour commended Obama for laying the ground
for a new direction of U.S. foreign policy, especially in dealing with Iran and North
Korea on nuclear issues, ordering a close of Guantanamo Bay detention center and
pledging to end the U.S. war in Iraq (Amanpour, 2009). The Guardian also report-
ed positively on the Obama government’s increasing engagement with Myanmar,
which was regarded as a significant change from the previous government (MacAs-
kill, 2009). However, despite such initial enthusiasm, documentary analysis shows
that U.S. smart power, as employed by the Obama administration, was essentially a
continuation of Bush-era hard power, without significant increase in the use of soft
power resources.

What is Smart Power?

The concept of smart power was initially introduced to the International Re-
lations (IR) community in 2003 by Joseph Nye, an American political scientist who
was Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration. The concept
was broadly defined as a mix of hard and soft power. In 2007, a more compre-
hensive explanation of smart power was put forward in a report by the Center for
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Commission on smart power, co-chaired by
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye. The report describes ‘smart power’ as follows:

“Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both.
Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool
kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is
an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also in-

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vests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand

American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action” (Armit-
age & Nye, 2007).

In other words, smart power emphasizes the necessity of matching a strong

military with strong partnerships, alliances, and institutions. Smart power also con-
sists of public diplomacy, cultural and educational exchanges, development assis-
tance, and disaster relief (Nye, 2009). The smart power framework encourages a
state to invest in both hard and soft power to ensure accomplishment of its foreign
policy goals. According to its proponents, a well-crafted smart power strategy com-
prises clear objectives, practical implementation plans, and sufficient hard and soft
power resources and recognizes that policymakers must take into account the geo-
political context of the country or region where the strategy is to be employed.

The CSIS report suggested that, in order to regain America’s positive im-
age in the ASEAN region following the end of Bush’s presidency, the United States
should develop a strategy to reengage key regional countries and institutions such
as ASEAN. In this way, the U.S could promote regional peace and stability through
cooperation, particularly where there were shared interests. Consequently, in 2009,
the Obama government adopted some of the CSIS Commission’s recommendations
as part of its official approach toward the Asia Pacific region.

Turning the Strategy into Practice:

The ‘3D’ Approach: Defense, Development, and Diplomacy

President Obama appointed Hilary Clinton as Secretary of State, with the

task to oversee the formulation and implementation of smart power policy. During
her testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2009, Secretary
Clinton articulated that smart power would be at the heart of American foreign
policy. The smart power strategy was articulated as a ‘3D’ Framework: Defense, De-
velopment, and Diplomacy. The framework was officially introduced to the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC) as the administration’s primary foreign policy ap-
proach,

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

“The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplo-
macy, and development. The men and women in our armed forces perform
their duties with courage and skill, putting their lives on the line time and
time again on behalf of our nation. And in many regions, they serve alongside
civilians from the State Department and USAID, as well as other government
agencies, like USDA. We work with the military in two crucial ways. First, ci-
vilians complement and build upon our military’s efforts in conflict areas like
Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, they use diplomatic and development tools to
build more stable and peaceful societies, hopefully to avert or end conflict that
is far less costly in lives and dollars than military actions.” — Secretary Hilary
Clinton’s testimony to SAC, April 30, 2009

According to Secretary Clinton, the Obama administration intended to put

its key principles into practice to solve modern transnational challenges in the 21st
century and at the same time to advance American national interests overseas. She
further stated that both hard and soft power resources would be integrated into the
policy and that the U.S. military would play a crucial role in implementing the poli-
cy, not only in the area of security, but also in diplomacy and development.

Three key governmental agencies, namely the Department of State (DoS), the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department
of Defense (DoD) were assigned to implement the 3D policy. However, due to their
differing internal planning processes, finding a common ground for these agencies
to develop a unified plan was challenging. As a result, the 3D Planning Group was
created to develop a guideline that would help these agencies understand each oth-
er’s roles and plans. The guideline served as a tool to unite their efforts in order to
improve the effectiveness of their interventions (USAID, 2012). The essence of each
‘D’ of the framework is examined in more depth in the following sections.

Defense

President Obama’s decision to apply a smart power strategy towards the

Asia Pacific demonstrated a reprioritization of Washington’s geopolitical interests,
particularly in the security realm. In an attempt to reverse the perception of U.S.
neglect of the region, President Obama increased the U.S. defense budget to nearly
US$700 billion in 2010 (see Figure 1), a sizable amount of which was allocated to in-
tensifying bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

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International Journal of East Asia Studies, 22(1) (2018)

Figure 1. U.S. Defense Budget (Source: The U.S. Department of Defense)

During his remarks to the Australian Parliament in 2011, President Obama

reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to maintaining its military presence in
the region and pledged to deploy up to 2,500 U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia, by
2017.

“As we consider the future of our armed forces, we’ve begun a review that will
identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priori-
ties and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must
know. As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to
make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result,
reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the
expense of the Asia Pacific.” (Manyin et al., 2012)

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

The U.S. rebalancing to Asia Pacific also meant increasing its military pres-
ence in South Asian coastal areas. Therefore, once the decade-long military oper-
ations in Iraq and Afghanistan started to wind down, the Obama administration
relocated U.S. military forces and equipment to the region. Consequently, the 2012
DoD Strategic Guidance identified Asia as “a naval theater of operations”, where the
U.S. military presence would be more flexible and broadly distributed, particularly
in the southern part of the western Pacific (Manyin et al.,2012). The size of the U.S.
overseas-based naval force in the Asia Pacific region was expected to increase from
50% to 60% of overall forces (Sutter et al, 2013). Similar to the Navy, the U.S. Air
Force also planned to increase its focus in the Asia Pacific region to up to 60% of its
capacities (Sutter et al, 2013).

To intensify security cooperation with its Southeast Asian friends and allies,
the United States gradually increased its budget for military activities in the region
(see Figure 2). Military exercises and various training programs on counterterror-
ism were frequently conducted in key countries including Australia, Japan, South
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore.

Figure 2. U.S. Budget for military activities implemented by DoD in ASEAN countries
(Source: USAID)

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As a result of this increased focus, relationships between the United States

and key ASEAN countries began to flourish. For example, U.S.-Vietnam relations sig-
nificantly improved following Secretary Clinton’s visit to Hanoi in July 2010, leading
to Washington and Hanoi jointly developing the 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Defense Poli-
cy Dialogue (Baviera, 2015). The Obama administration then lifted the U.S. ban on
arms sales to Vietnam in 2016. Comparably, Indonesia received U.S. security assis-
tance in developing its Maritime Surveillance System (MSS), consisting of 18 coastal
surveillance stations, 11 ship-based radars, two regional and two fleet command
centers in 2011(U.S. Department of Defense, 2015). Furthermore, in 2015, President
Obama granted $11 million to Indonesia to implement capacity building programs
to protect its maritime areas and natural resources. In addition, in 2012 the United
States and Singapore initiated the Strategic Partnership Dialogue as a platform to
strengthen partnership and development programs in the Asia Pacific (U.S. Depart-
ment of State, 2016).

At the regional level, Secretary Clinton announced at the 2010 ASEAN Re-
gional Forum in Vietnam that the United States had a national interest in freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea. She urged the claimants to these waters to re-
solve their disputes through peaceful, diplomatic means (U.S. Department of State,
2010). In the same year, a newly developed Air-Sea Base (ASB) Concept, capable of
disrupting the command, communication, and computer systems of an adversary
and destroying weapon launchers, was presented as part of the Quadrennial De-
fense Review (Sutter et al, 2013). Observers argue that the goal of ASB, to a certain
extent, was to counter China’s growing anti-access/area denial or A2/AD capabilities
in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the contested areas of the South China Sea (Manyin
et al.,2012). On top of this, the Obama administration’s involvement in the region
extended to various non-traditional security areas, including Humanitarian Assis-
tance and Disaster Relief (HADR), military medicine, and peacekeeping (Sung-han,
2015).

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Development

By “development”, this article refers to the U.S. policies relevant to development

issues, ranging from U.S. foreign assistance to economic cooperation in Southeast
Asia.

U.S. Foreign Assistance

President Obama’s approach to development was founded on the idea that

relations between the U.S. and the Asia Pacific needed to be strengthened at the
state-to-state as well as people-to-people levels. Elevated as one of the core pillars
of the U.S. 3D approach, development programs in the region were predominantly
implemented by the Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID). Development initiatives and programs represent
American soft power due to their focus on promoting democratic values and most
U.S. development assistance programs towards Southeast Asia tended to focus on
non-traditional security and democratic capacity building.

President Obama employed soft power through various diplomacy and de-
velopment initiatives in targeted countries as a means to advance American demo-
cratic values. His vision on these core values was highlighted in a speech delivered
in Cairo in 2009, where he stated,

“America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we
would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an
unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak
your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of
law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent
and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are
not just American ideas they are human rights. And that is why we will sup-
port them everywhere.” (USAID, 2016)

Consequently, the 2010 and 2015 NSS’s underlined the importance of democ-
racy and human rights promotion, as the administration believed its national inter-
ests would be more secure when other countries respected these values (U.S. Na-
tional Security Strategies, 2010 & 2015). Various U.S. government agencies worked

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closely, not only with their foreign government counterparts, but also civil society,
communities and citizens, to ensure free and fair electoral processes, good gover-
nance, independent judicial processes and freedom of expression (U.S. National Se-
curity Strategies, 2010 & 2015). The United States also used private diplomacy, at
times in partnership with international organizations, civil society and the business
sector, to advocate for human rights in some undemocratic countries, including
Myanmar (U.S. National Security Strategies, 2010 & 2015).

Thus, most development assistance programs in Southeast Asia tended to

focus on non-traditional security and democratic capacity building. On average,
a non-strategic country received democracy and governance funds to a value of
around $5 million each year (U.S. National Security Strategies, 2010 & 2015). In June
2013, USAID launched a Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Strategy
focusing on four key strategic areas:

1. promote participatory, representative and inclusive political processes

and government institutions;

2. foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and

to the law;

3. protect and promote universally recognized human rights; and

4. improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG princi-

ples and practices across USAID’s development portfolio (USAID, 2016).

As an example, USAID supported participatory political processes in Cam-

bodia. To raise awareness among voters, a hotline was established to provide them
with information on candidates and voting procedures. Approximately 680,000 call-
ers contacted the hotline between 2013-2014. As part of the preparations for the
2018 general election, the system has since been handed over to the nation’s politi-
cal parties (USAID, 2016). In 2012, USAID launched two TV programs, the “Next Gen-
eration” and “Youth Leadership Challenge”, to engage young Cambodians on social,
civic and political issues (USAID, n.d.). Furthermore, USAID assisted the country in
organizing its first law conference on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Trans-
sexual and Intersexed (LGBTI) rights, to create a platform for lawyers, students,
advocates, activists, and government officials to discuss related matters.

In the Philippines, USAID emphasized improving education for children and

contributed approximately $40 million per year to the Philippine Government’s
fund for collaborative research and scholarships with American universities. Mean-

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

while, in Indonesia, the programs undertaken by USAID mainly focused on improv-

ing anti-corruption mechanisms. The Agency set up anti-corruption legal clinics at
Indonesian law faculties and delivered training courses to Indonesian civil society
organizations on how to monitor and report on the quality of public services, in-
cluding governance, citizen rights, and education (USAID, n.d.).

The Obama administration, through USAID, worked with the Thai govern-
ment to tackle a number of issues such as natural resource management, human
and wildlife trafficking, resolution of political conflict and increased citizen partic-
ipation in political processes (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2015). The
United States also supported U.S. Peace Corps volunteers in Thailand to work with
Thai communities on pro motion of life skills and leadership, reproductive health,
and civic engagement and volunteering (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
2015). In Vietnam, USAID cooperated with other U.S. government agencies to pro-
mote participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and improve opportunities for
American businesses to access Vietnam’s market. An example of a regional pro-
gram representing U.S. efforts in development is the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI),
which was proposed in 2009. The LMI addresses developmental challenges in the
areas of environment, health, education and infrastructure development in Cambo-
dia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam (Campbell & Andrews, 2013).

Economic Cooperation

The U.S. pivot to Asia Pacific was perceived as a smart and timely move to
boost economic ties with emerging economies and to regain its political influence.
The United States is one of the largest foreign investors and trading partners in the
Philippines (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2015). In 2011, the U.S.-Philip-
pines Partnership for Growth framework was launched to promote inclusive and
sustainable economic growth. In addition, with the support of Secretary John Kerry,
the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines worked closely with the Philippine government
to address key environment, science, technology, and health issues such as final-
izing its accession to the “Ports States Measures Agreement on Illegal, Unregulated,
and Unreported Fishing” (U.S. Department of States, 2016).

In Thailand, the Obama administration launched the 2011 Thai-U.S. Cre-

ative Partnership, an initiative that brought government agencies, businesses and
universities together to promote new opportunities in the areas of information
technology, design and arts, clean energy and green technology, health, food and
agro-technology, and entrepreneurship (U.S. Department of States. (2016). More-

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over, a U.S.-Thailand agreement on science and technology cooperation was signed

in 2013 to increase cooperation in joint research programs and to protect intellec-
tual property rights. In 2014, it was reported that bilateral trade between Thailand
and the United States was more than US$44 billion. In addition, foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) from the United States to Thailand was about $14 billion (Marwah,
2016). It was reported that the amount of annual investment from the United states
into East Asia increased from $22.5 billion in 2009 to $41.4 billion in 2011. More-
over, from the beginning of the Obama administration, the trade in goods between
the U.S. and ASEAN countries expanded by 55% and over 500,000 jobs were created
in the United States (The White House, 2016).

Despite the Obama government’s claim to have made soft power one of the key
elements in the U.S. rebalancing strategy, Figures 3 and 4 reveal that the amount of
foreign assistance budget allocated to economic and development activities in the
ASEAN region was inconsistent, when compared to the budget for military assis-
tance.

Figure 3. U.S. foreign economic and development assistance budget for ASEAN coun-
tries (Source: USAID)

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

Figure 4. U.S. budget allocation for democratic and civil society program in South-
east Asia (Source: USAID)

Diplomacy

Increasing U.S. Presence in Southeast Asia

At the beginning of his presidency, President Obama elevated the impor-

tance of U.S. visibility in the region by having Secretary of State Clinton visit several
countries in East Asia and the Pacific. Figure 5 reveals that Secretary of State Clin-
ton made official visits to the region more often than either of her two predeces-
sors, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. Correspondingly, in his first year in office,
President Obama with met all leaders of the ASEAN countries. Figure 6 shows that
President Obama also made more official visits to the ASEAN nations than President
George W. Bush.

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Figure 5. The Number of Official Visits made by the U.S. Secretaries of States to
Southeast Asia between 2001-2016 (Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs, United States Department of State)

Figure 6. The Number of Official Visits made by the U.S. Presidents to Southeast Asia
between 2001-2016 (Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

States Department of State)

Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Relations

At the regional level, the Obama administration further enhanced the U.S.
friendship with ASEAN by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
2009. Since then, the United States has been a regular attendee of ASEAN regional
events including the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and
ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus, to discuss pressing political issues such
as maritime security and non-proliferation. President Obama attended the EAS an-
nually from 2011, except in 2013 when the U.S. Federal Government had domestic
problems leading to a government shutdown.

The United States established its Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in 2010 and
appointed its first Resident Ambassador and Military Advisor/Liaison Officer to
ASEAN in 2011, with the aim to increase its presence and advance American inter-
ests in the region (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.). The Obama administration also in-
stigated the U.S.-ASEAN Summits to strengthen diplomatic ties with the countries in
Southeast Asia. In total, four U.S.-ASEAN summits were held while President Obama
was in office.

The first U.S.-ASEAN Summit was held in Brunei in October 2013. Secretary
of State John Kerry attended the event and reassured the ASEAN member states that
Southeast Asia remained a top priority for the United States.

“The partnership that we share with ASEAN remains a top priority for the
Obama Administration, and the ties among our nations – I think all of you
know this from the engagement that we have on individual basis with you,
as well as collectively through ASEAN – that those ties have been strong for
decades now. And we know that strengthening those ties on security issues, on
economic issues, and more on our people-to-people relationships, are a critical
part of President Obama’s rebalance to Asia. That rebalance is a commitment,
it is there to stay, and will continue into the future” (U.S. Mission to ASEAN,
n.d.).

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The second U.S.-ASEAN summit was held in November 2014 in Nay Pyi Taw,
Myanmar. President Obama participated in the forum and emphasized the impor-
tance of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship, especially in the security, economic, and de-
velopment sectors, highlighting initiatives such as the ASEAN Expanded Economic
Engagement (E3), Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC), etc. At the third U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in 2015, Washington
elevated the U.S.-ASEAN relationship to a strategic partnership focusing on political,
security, and economic issues. The fourth U.S.-ASEAN Summit took place in Septem-
ber 2016 in Laos. More importantly, prior to this President Obama hosted a special
U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Sunnylands, California on 15-16 February 2016, aiming to
further enhance the strategic partnership between the United States and the ASEAN
nations (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.).

Furthermore, Washington has supported the “Shangri-La Dialogue”, a meet-

ing among regional defense officials held at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) in Singapore on an annual basis. Taking advantage of being one of
the key supporters of the dialogue, U.S. defense officials have often used the forum
to put forward their security interests and policies. In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel attended the event and reaffirmed the Unites States’ strong
commitment to maintaining regional security through ASEAN and ASEAN-led re-
gional bodies. Also importantly, Secretary Hagel invited ASEAN defense ministers
to a meeting in Hawaii in 2014 (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.).

Promoting People-to-People Diplomacy

As part of his approach to people-to-people diplomacy, President Obama

launched the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) in 2013. This pro-
gram was designed to build the capacities of young leaders from the ten ASEAN
countries in identifying challenges in their region and finding creative solutions to
those problems. Since 2014, approximately 3,000 young Southeast Asia leaders have
been trained in the program (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.). As of December 2016,
according the U.S. Mission to ASEAN, as many as 100,000 American and Southeast
Asian nationals aged between 18-35 years old have participated in YSEALI. In ad-
dition, over 2,700 students were supported by the Obama administration through
educational exchange programs (U.S. Mission to ASEAN, n.d.). However, when com-
pared to previous years, Figure 7 reveals that, despite the Obama administration’s
pledge to increase the use of soft power and people-to-people diplomacy, the bud-
gets for educational and cultural exchange programs have mostly remained the
same since 2011.

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

Figure 7. U.S. Budget for Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs (Source: USAID)

Overall, based on the evidence obtained through documentary analysis,

the U.S. smart power strategy consisted of more hard power than soft power and
continued - or in fact increased - the focus on hard power. President Obama put
immense efforts in redistributing military forces and equipment to strategic loca-
tions such as Australia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam as well as build-
ing the capacity of the military forces of U.S. allies and partners. In comparison to
hard power, there were far fewer resources allocated to U.S. soft power initiatives
and these resources maintained similar levels to the previous administration. Even
though the Obama administration declared its intention to exercise more soft pow-
er in the region and rebuild America’s reputation in Asia Pacific, the most notable
soft power was displayed through the official visits made by President Obama and
his Secretaries across the region. In addition, most foreign development assistance
and educational exchange programs were continuations of those of the Clinton and
Bush administrations.

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International Journal of East Asia Studies, 22(1) (2018)

Conclusion

Under the leadership of President Obama, the U.S. smart power strategy
was formulated as a ‘new approach’ called “3D: Defense, Development and Diplo-
macy”. Although at the beginning of his presidency Obama asserted his intent to
combine soft and hard power in U.S. foreign policy, indications of an increased use
of U.S. soft power are rather limited. The most notable evidence is an increased
number of official visits by President Obama and his Secretaries to the Asia Pacif-
ic during his first term. Overall, defense cooperation programs remained the core
of U.S. foreign policy and between 2009-2015 the allocated defense budget largely
remained the same, particularly in the Asia Pacific. In fact, the Obama administra-
tion’s overall defense budget was higher than that of the Bush administration.

In conclusion, the U.S. smart power strategy in Southeast Asia has not been a
balance of hard and soft power, but rather has predominantly employed hard pow-
er. The U.S. role was confined to the security realm while, by and large, failing to
deliver on promises regarding increased development and economic cooperation.
There was a considerably wide gap between hard power and soft power resourc-
es allocated to the region and tellingly, the United States was unable to effectively
elevate diplomacy beyond increasing the number of official visits and delivering
standard foreign development assistance and educational exchange programs.

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 U.S. Smart Power in Southeast Asia During the Obama Administration: More Hard or Soft Power?

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