Court Of Justice: Hon’ble Supreme Court

Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 1

Decided on: 9 July, 1997

Bench : Sujata V. Manohar, B.N.Kirpal, J.S. Verma(Cj)

The effect of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the Act is that any person who is confined in
prison while serving a sentence of imprisonment on his conviction for any offence or is under
lawful confinement in a prison or in a police custody for any reason is not entitled to vote in
an election, but this restriction does not apply to a person subjected to any kind of preventive
detention. Article 14 permits reasonable classification which has a rational nexus with the
object of classification. The question is whether the classification made by sub-section (5) of
Section 62 is reasonable or not.

There are provisions made in the election law which exclude persons with criminal
background of the kind specified therein, from the election scene as candidates and voters.
The object is to prevent criminalisation of politics and maintain probity in elections. Any
provision enacted with a view to promote this object must be welcomed and upheld as
subserving the constitutional purpose. The elbow room available to the legislature in
classification depends on the context and the object for enactment of the provision. The
existing conditions in which the law has to be applied cannot be ignored in adjudging its
validity because it is relatable to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
Criminalisation of politics is the bane of society and negation of democracy. It is subversive
of free and fair elections which is a basic feature of the Constitution. Thus, a provision made
in the election law to promote the object of free and fair elections and facilitate maintenance
of law and order which are the essence of democracy must, therefore, be so viewed. More
elbow room to the legislature for classification has to be available to achieve the professed
object.

A person who is in prison as a result of his own conduct and is, therefore, deprived of his
liberty during the period of his imprisonment cannot claim equal freedom of movement,
speech and expression with the others who are not in prison. The classification of persons in
and out of prison separately is reasonable. Restriction on voting of a person in prison results
automatically from his confinement as a logical consequence of imprisonment. A person not
subjected to such a restriction is free to vote or not to vote depending on whether he wants to
go to vote or not, even he may choose not to go and cast his vote. In view of the restriction on
movement of a prisoner, he cannot claim that he should be provided the facility to go and
vote. Moreover, if the object is to keep persons with criminal background away from the
election scene, a provision imposing a restriction on a prisoner to vote cannot be called
unreasonable.

The right to vote is a statutory right and not a common law right because of which it depends
on the nature of right conferred by the statute. The right to vote is subject to the limitations
imposed by the statute which can be exercised only in the manner provided by the statute;

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and the challenge to any provision in the statute prescribing the nature of right to elect cannot
be made with reference to a fundamental right in the Constitution. The very basis of
challenge to the validity of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the Act is, therefore not available
and this petition must fail.

Court Of Justice: Hon’ble Supreme Court

Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of income tax, Delhi and rajasthan and Ors.
(1959) Supp 1 SCC 528

Decided on: 19 Nov, 1958

Bench : Bench :N.H. Bhagwati, S.K.Das, J.L. Kapoor ,K. Subba Rao,S.R. Das (C.j)

It is the first of the five articles grouped together under the heading "Right to Equality". The
underlying object of this article is undoubtedly to secure to all persons, citizens or non-
citizens, the equality of status and of opportunity referred to in the glorious Preamble of our
Constitution. It combines the English doctrine of the rule of law and the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment to the American Federal Constitution which enjoins that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". There
can, therefore, be no doubt or dispute that this article is founded on a sound public policy
recognised and valued in all civilised States. Coming then to the language of the article it
must be noted, first and foremost that this article is, in form, an admonition addressed to the
State and does not directly purport to confer any right on any person as some of the other
articles e.g. Article 19, do. The obligation thus imposed on the State, no doubt, enures for the
benefit of all persons, for, as a necessary result of the operation of this article, they all enjoy
equality before the law. That is, however, the indirect, though necessary and inevitable, result
of the mandate. The command of the article is directed to the State and the reality of the
obligation thus imposed on the State is the measure of the fundamental right which every
person within the territory of India is to enjoy. The next thing to notice is that the benefit of
this article is not limited to citizens, but is available to any person within the territory of
India. In the third place it is to be observed that, by virtue of Article 12, "the State" which is,
by Article 14, forbidden to discriminate between persons includes the Government and
Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the States and all local
or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India. Article 14, therefore, is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the executive
organs of the State and the other subordinate authorities. As regards the legislative organ of
the State, the fundamental right is further consolidated and protected by the provisions of
Article 13. Clause (1) of that article provides that all laws in force in the territories of India
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, insofar as they are inconsistent
with the provisions of Part III shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be void. Likewise
clause (2) of this article prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by the same Part and follows it up by saying that any law made
in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. It will be

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observed that, so far as this article is concerned, there is no relaxation of the restriction
imposed by it such as there are in some of the other articles e.g. Article 19 clauses (2) to (6).
Our right to equality before the law is thus completely and without any exception secured
from all legislative discrimination. It is not necessary, for the purpose of this appeal to
consider whether an executive order is a "law" within the meaning of Article 13, for even
without the aid of Article 13 our right to the equal protection of the law is protected against
the vagaries, if any, of the executive Government also. In this connection the observations of
Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria are
apposite. Said His Lordship at p. 670 that in accordance with British jurisprudence no
member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except
when he can support the legality of his act before a court of justice. That apart, the very
language of Article 14 of the Constitution expressly directs that "the State", which by Article
12 includes the executive organ, shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the law. Thus Article 14 protects us from both legislative and executive
tyranny by way of discrimination.

Court Of Justice: Hon’ble Supreme Court

Budan Singh and Ors. v. Nabi Bux and Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 481

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