Occena v Icamina, GR 82416, Jan 22, 1990 offense against the state because of the disturbance of the

social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person

Facts: On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena injured by the crime. As a general rule, a person who is found
instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or
Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison, Province of Antique, society in which he lives and the individual member of the
Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral society or private person who was injured or damaged by the
Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina punishable act or omission. There is here an offended party,
Vegafria which caused great and irreparable damage and whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages
injury to his person and honor. Private respondent as accused in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by
therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at private respondent.
which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate
civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private Maximo v Gerochi, GR L-47994-97, Sept 24, 1986
prosecutor. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the
offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a Facts: The case is Lidelia Maximo v. Honorable Judge Nicolas
fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in Gerochi, Jr. and Conchita Panghilason, decided on September
case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were 24, 1986. Lidelia Maximo sought to compel Judge Nicolas
awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that Gerochi, Jr. to include civil liability in the acquittal judgment for
"the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the Conchita Panghilason. Panghilason was charged with estafa
evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages." for issuing four dishonored checks totaling P35,586.00 to
Maximo for rice purchases. The checks were returned due to
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of insufficient funds or closed accounts, and Panghilason did not
damages arising from the remarks uttered by private redeem them after notification. On December 5, 1977, the trial
respondent. court acquitted Panghilason, stating the prosecution failed to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and suggested any
Held: SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Article 2219, par. (7) obligation was civil. Maximo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in to order Panghilason to pay civil damages, which the court
case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This denied, asserting civil liability could not be awarded post-
provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a acquittal.
case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party Maximo then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended
party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused requires to
damages. Also, article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which file a separate civil action to order payment of civil damages.
provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. The court states that a person who is Held: The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. The court states
criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the that if an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow
standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be
awarded in the same judgment. Citing the case of Padilla v repaired. On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages
CA, the court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and before the Court a quo was instituted by [respondent] Antonio
still order payment of civil damages already proved in the San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to
same case without need for a separate civil action. It was Mabel Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of the
further reiterated in the case of Pp v Jalandoni where the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs.
accused formally admitted the amount of civil damages. The
rationale behind the ruling in the Padilla case is that the civil Issue: Whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was
case have already been established in the criminal correctly denied by the RTC.
proceedings where the accused was acquitted therefore there
is no need to require a separate civil action. To require a Held: The SC grants the appeal. However, the court was
separate civil action simply because the accused was constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and the petitioners in their counterclaim. The petitioners'
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant less counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed
of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. by the RTC and the CA despite their failure to reserve the right
to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they had
Supreme Transportation Lines, Inc v Andres, GR 200444, brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not
Aug 15, 2018 they could recover damages upon their counterclaim presents
a different story, as they should first show that they will not
Facts: On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, recover damages twice for the same incident. In this case, the
Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages
Bus, owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along from the respondent was not controlling considering that the
Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban Norte, criminal case against the respondent's driver had already been
Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. concluded. It remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate
While traversing Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus that the RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages in
sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel Tours the criminal case. The error committed by the CA emanated
Bus immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process, it from its failure to take into consideration that the omission of
hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and registered in the the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., could give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto, but also to
and driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the opposite lane. Because of the strong impact of the the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both
incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of the road obligations rested on the common element of negligence.
and the Mabel Tour Bus continuously moved until it hit a Article 2177 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 111 of the
passenger jeepney that was parked on the side of the road Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both
which later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but all the criminal and civil actions simultaneously. Therefore, the
vehicles were damaged. [Respondent] then brought the Mabel petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy
Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have it by which to enforce their claim in the event of favorable
decisions in both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the it is not the nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a
Civil Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the worthless check that B.P. 22 punishes. On appeal, the CA
same act or omission. affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of
Bernardo v Ppl, GR 182210, Oct 05, 2015 imprisonment and in lieu thereof, imposed a P460,000.00 fine.
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo
Facts: In June 1991, Respondent Bernardo obtained a loan failed to adduce sufficient evidence of payment. The CA
from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag in the further held that the 90-day period within which to present a
amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on check under B.P. 22 is not an element of the crime hence this
November 30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a promissory petition.
note Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the
couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused-appellant
corresponding interest at 12% per annum payable upon Bernardo extinguished her civil liability.
default. As additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the
owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title. Prior to Held: The SC denied the petition of the heirs of Bernardo and
the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from affirmed with modification the ruling of the CA. The court
Bumanglag to use as a collateral in another transaction. In states that the death of an accused pending appeal
place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag five (5) Far extinguishes her criminal liability and the corresponding civil
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks, posted on liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death
different dates in June 1992. In September 1992, Bumanglag amounts to an acquittal of the accused. The independent civil
deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery
dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed." therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a
Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing her of the separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against action may be enforced against the estate of the accused. In
Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include
five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22. During trial, after the the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two
prosecution rested its case, Bernardo took the witness stand separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. This rule
only 2 years after, to present her defense evidence. Bernardo was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been
argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as
because the questioned checks were presented beyond the collectors. As a necessary consequence of this special rule,
90-day period provided under the law. She also denied having the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless
received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22;
essential to prove the material element of knowledge of the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the
insufficiency of funds. RTC then ruled finding Bernardo guilty action. The independent civil liability based on contract, which
of five counts of violation of B.P. 22 stating that she failed to was deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may
substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled that still be enforced against her estate in the present case. The
court thus rule on the present action to determine Bumanglag's declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not
civil liability. before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when
the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in
court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of
any person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage
‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
Mercado v Tan, GR 137110, Aug 1, 2000 Issue: Whether or not respondent Tan is entitled for her claim
of damages and attorney’s fees.
Facts: Accused Mercado and Complainant Tan got married on
June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Branch 7 by Judge Held: The SC denied the petition. The court states that the
Ibanez. As entered in said document, the status of accused statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that
was ‘single’. At the time of the celebration of the wedding with there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
complainant, accused was actually a married man, having marriage -- has been cast aside by new provision in Article 40
been in lawful wedlock with Oliva in a marriage ceremony of the Family Code. Art. 40 states that The absolute nullity of a
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Canares, CFI Branch previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
14, Cebu City. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City void. Such declaration is now necessary before one can
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted in the contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, the court
institution of the present case before this Court against said hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. In
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
Information dated January 22, 1993. More than a month after although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva and in a Decision dated May 6, letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a
1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. RTC then committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
convicted accused of the crime bigamy for having contracted a Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial
second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial.
on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then.
in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976
at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally As for the issue, she did not appeal the ruling of the CA
dissolved. CA affirmed with the decision of the trial court against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from
stating that Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute this Court. Her claim that she was not aware of his previous
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with his first wife.
such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment Respondent Tan therefore cannot claim damages in this case
where she was fully conscious of the situation of Petitioner Issue: Whether or not the reservation made by the private
Mercado and the consequences of her act. prosecutor during the criminal proceedings timely and effective
in allowing the appellant to pursue a separate civil action?

Ruling: The court granted the motion for reconsideration,

setting aside its original decision and remanding the case for
Tactaquin v Palileo, GR L-20865, Dec 29, 1967 further proceedings. The court determined that the private
prosecutor's reservation of the right to civil liability was made
Facts: Tactaquin filed a civil case against Palileo to seek before the judgment was rendered in the criminal case, thus it
damages for the death of her daughter and her own injuries was timely and legally effective. The court emphasized that
after a car crash on June 16, 1961, caused by Palileo’s this reservation effectively removed the question of civil liability
reckless driving occurred in Mrulas, Valenzuela, Bulacan. from the criminal case, rendering the portion of the judgment
Palileo was found guilty in a criminal case of homicide through concerning civil indemnity a nullity.
reckless imprudence and serious physical injuries, and he was
sentenced to prison and ordered to pay damages. The court reiterated the principle that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
After the criminal case, Palileo filed a motion to dismiss the impliedly instituted unless the offended party expressly waives
civil case, claiming it was barred by the final judgment in the it or reserves the right to institute it separately. The court
criminal case. The lower court agreed and dismissed the civil concluded that since the appellant had reserved her right to
case. Tactaquin appealed, arguing that she had reserved the file a separate civil action, she lost her standing to intervene in
right to file a separate civil case during the criminal trial. the criminal case regarding civil indemnity.

In the original ruling, the court upheld the dismissal, asserting

that the civil action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
However, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that a reservation to file a separate civil action was
made during the criminal proceedings, which should exempt
her from the application of res judicata.

During the trial of the criminal case, the appellee initially

pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty. At this
juncture, the private prosecutor made a statement reserving
the right to civil liability, which was duly recorded by the court.
Despite this reservation, the court proceeded to render
judgment, which included a determination of civil indemnity.
Roa v De La Cruz, 107 Phil 8, Feb 13, 1960 arising from the defendant's actions, thus tying her rights in
this respect to her actions in the criminal context.
Facts: Maria C. Roa, the plaintiff and appellant, initiated a
criminal case against Segunda de la Cruz, one of the accused,
for serious oral defamation. In the course of the trial, Roa
intervened as a private prosecutor but did not explicitly reserve The court further clarified that under Article 33 of the Civil
her right to pursue a separate civil action for damages. The Code, while a separate civil action for defamation can indeed
court ultimately found de la Cruz guilty of slight slander, proceed independently from the criminal prosecution, such
imposing a fine of P50.00 but did not grant Roa any damages. action is contingent on whether the offended party has
reserved their right to pursue it. Roa's lack of reservation
indicated that she opted for her civil claims to be addressed
within the framework of the criminal trial.
Subsequently, on May 28, 1957, Roa filed a civil action against
de la Cruz and her husband Juan Aguas, seeking P28,000.00 Moreover, the ruling established that a judgment on the merits
in moral and exemplary damages based on the same in a criminal case precludes further actions on the same cause
defamatory remarks that were the subject of the criminal case. of action under the principle of res judicata. The finality of the
In response, the defendants moved to dismiss Roa’s complaint criminal judgment meant that any matters related to Roa's
on the grounds of prior judgment, asserting that it was barred claim for damages which could have been raised in the
by the prior criminal conviction. The trial court agreed and criminal proceedings were conclusively determined, barring
dismissed the case, citing that Roa’s intervention in the the civil suit.
criminal case barred her from pursuing a separate civil action.
Roa's motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading her
to appeal the dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the intervention of petitioner in the

criminal prosecution, without a reservation to file a civil suit,
barred her from pursuing a separate civil action for damages.

Ruling: The court upheld the trial court's dismissal of Roa's

civil complaint, emphasizing that her intervention in the
criminal proceedings—without reserving the right to file a
separate civil action—effectively barred her from doing so
later. The court explained that the injured party's intervention
in a criminal case serves the purpose of claiming damages
Reyes v Sempio-Diy, GR 71914, Jan 29, 1986 The critical difference was that in Reyes' case, the nature of
the proceedings concluded prematurely without an opportunity
Facts: The case involves a direct appeal from a resolution of to present evidence or make a reservation for a separate civil
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon that dismissed Civil Case action due to Malicsi's immediate guilty plea.
No. 357-MN, a separate civil action initiated by Zenaida Cruz
Reyes against Cristina Malicsi and her husband for damages
arising from defamatory statements made by Cristina Malicsi.
The statements were the basis of the criminal charge of The court also reaffirmed that under Article 33 of the Civil
intriguing against honor lodged against Malicsi in Criminal Code, a separate civil action for damages could be initiated
Case No. 23633 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, even without a reservation in the earlier criminal case. The
where Reyes was represented by private prosecutor Atty. ruling underscored that procedural rules cannot amend
Barayang. substantive law; hence, the failure to reserve did not bar
Reyes from her action for damages.
Cristina Malicsi pleaded guilty to the charge and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00. However, Reyes was
unable to present evidence of damages in the criminal case
due to the immediate sentencing following the plea, nor did
she reserve the right to file a separate civil action for damages
at that time. Subsequently, Reyes filed her civil case for
damages, which led to the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court. The decision cited the precedent set in the case of Roa
vs. de la Cruz, which established that a party intervening in a
criminal case through a private prosecutor effectively waives
the right to file a separate civil suit for damages unless a
reservation is made.

Issue: Whether or not the intervention by a private prosecutor

in the criminal case, coupled with her failure to reserve the
right to file a separate civil action for damages, bars her from
pursuing her claim in a subsequent civil suit.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of Reyes, granting her appeal

and ordering the Regional Trial Court to proceed with Civil
Case No. 357-MN. The court's reasoning highlighted the
distinction between the facts of her case and the Roa case.
Carandang v Hon. Santiago, GR L-8238, May 25, 1955 reasoned that the language of Article 33 should be interpreted
to permit a civil action for any bodily injury, not just those
Facts: Cesar M. Carandang initiated a civil case against classified under the specific crime of physical injuries. The
Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents in the Court of First court emphasized that the terms "defamation," "fraud," and
Instance of Manila, seeking damages for bodily injuries he "physical injuries" were used in a general sense, and it would
sustained due to a criminal act committed by Tomas Valenton, be inconsistent to apply a technical interpretation to "physical
Jr. Valenton had been convicted of frustrated homicide against injuries" while using ordinary meanings for the other terms.
Carandang by the Court of First Instance of Batangas on
September 1, 1953, and subsequently appealed the conviction The court also noted that the Code Commission's intent was to
to the Court of Appeals. allow civil actions for bodily harm similar to tort actions in
American law, which would encompass cases of frustrated
After the defendants filed their answer to Carandang's homicide. Therefore, the civil action could proceed regardless
complaint, they moved to suspend the civil trial, arguing that it of the outcome of the criminal case.
should await the outcome of the criminal case still pending on
appeal. The presiding judge, Vicente Santiago, granted this
motion, resulting in the suspension of the civil trial. Carandang
filed a motion for reconsideration of this order, which was
denied. Consequently, he sought a writ of certiorari to annul
the judge's order.
In his petition, Carandang invoked Article 33 of the new Civil
Code, which permits a civil action for damages to be filed
independently of a criminal prosecution in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. He contended that the
civil action should proceed irrespective of the status of the
criminal case.

Issue: Whether or not the term physical injuries in Art. 33 of

the Civil Code refers to the crime of physical injuries in the
RPC or any bodily injury.

Ruling: This distinction was critical in determining whether the

civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case.
The court ruled in favor of Carandang, determining that the
trial judge had erred in suspending the civil case. The court
Faraon v Priela, GR L-23129, Aug 02, 1968 fireman supported the claim that the train was not visible until
it was very close to the crossing, and expert testimony
Facts: The case involves an appeal by Isidra Faraon and Lucia confirmed the train's stopping distance.
de Mesa, who owned a Cadillac car that was struck by a train
operated by Tomas Priela. The incident occurred on
September 10, 1960, as the car was traveling towards Manila
from a barrio in Muntinlupa, Rizal. Upon approaching a Issue: Whether or not the trial court err in absolving Priela of
railroad crossing, the car's right front wheel became stuck in a negligence in the operation of train?
rut on the tracks, rendering it immobile. Despite the driver’s
efforts to free the vehicle by shifting gears, it remained stuck.
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,
As Diesel train No. 512 approached from the north, Lucia de holding that the acquittal of Priela in the criminal case
Mesa exited the car and signaled for the train to stop. extinguished any civil liability arising from the same incident.
However, the train, traveling at a speed of 30 to 40 miles per The court referenced Rule III, section 3(c) of the Rules of
hour, was unable to halt in time and collided with the car, Court, which states that the extinction of the penal action does
resulting in its complete destruction. The trial court not carry with it the extinction of the civil action unless the
subsequently found that the collision was due to a "freak acquittal is based on a finding that the facts giving rise to the
accident" and acquitted Priela of the charge of damage to civil action did not exist. In this case, since the trial court found
property through reckless imprudence, concluding that he had that Priela was not negligent, the basis for the civil action was
not acted negligently. negated.
The appellants contested the trial court's decision, arguing that The court also upheld the trial court's factual findings regarding
the court erred in its finding that the damage was due to an the circumstances of the accident, including the expert
unusual accident and that they should not bear the loss. testimony regarding the train's stopping distance and the
The appellants contended that the trial court's conclusion of a visibility issues due to the terrain. The court concluded that the
freak accident was erroneous. They argued that Priela should evidence supported the finding that the collision was indeed a
be held liable for the damages to their car due to his freak accident and that Priela had exercised due caution.
negligence in operating the train. They maintained that the
train was within a reasonable distance when Lucia signaled for
it to stop, and thus Priela should have been able to avoid the
collision.
However, Priela argued that he was not negligent and that the
collision was unavoidable due to the circumstances. He
presented evidence indicating that the train could not have
stopped in time given its speed and the distance from which it
was approaching the crossing. Testimonies from Priela and his
Maccay v Nobela, GR 145823, March 31, 2005 Regional Trial Court acquitted the Nobelas and found that they
were victims of Maccay and Potenciano’s scheme.
Facts: In May 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano sought to sell or
mortgage a parcel of land owned by Oscar Maccay and was Petitioners contended that the trial court was incorrect in
referred to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela at the allowing the respondents to consider a counterclaim within a
Pasig public market. Under the alias Angelita N. Barba, criminal proceeding since the criminal court should only
Potenciano represented herself as Maccay's wife and claimed determine the criminal liability of the accused. They argued
urgency in selling the property, saying she needed to liquidate that the title to the property is valid since it was transferred to
assets due to supposed troubles with the Presidential the Nobelas, thus, they should not be required to reimburse
Commission on Good Government. This claim created a them.
facade of credibility that influenced the Nobela spouses.
However the respondent Nobela spouses argued that they
Potenciano, with Maccay, convinced the Nobelas to purchase were duped into the transaction and pointed out that their
the property for P300,000, leading to a series of amicable claims regarding fraud were justified since Maccay and
meetings and interactions, including visits at their residence. Potenciano exploited their trust. They sought redress for
The Nobelas, trustful of Potenciano due to their growing damages incurred and emphasized their position as the real
relationship, pooled their savings to make the purchase. victims in the purported crime.
However, there were delays and irregularities in transferring
the title of the property after the sale. Maccay accompanied
Potenciano in various transactions but did not finalize the title Issue: Whether or not the trial court can rule on the civil liability
transfer. of the complainant in a criminal case where the civil action was
As time passed, discrepancies began to surface. Notably, not separately filed or reserved.
Potenciano assured Serlina Nobela assistance with the
hospital bills for Prudencio after he suffered a stroke but
prompted further mistrust when her financial claims and Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition by Maccay
dealings appeared dubious. By the end of July 1990, the and Potenciano, asserting that the trial court had erred by
goodwill deteriorated due to Potenciano's evident attempts to ruling on the civil liability of the petitioners within a criminal
profit from Nobela's trust in selling appliances under case. The Court reiterated that a court adjudicating a criminal
questionable circumstances. Eventually, Potenciano filed a case should only determine the guilt of the accused and
complaint against the Nobelas for Estafa, claiming they had corresponding civil liabilities originating from the crime,
stolen the title to the property and appliances. disallowing any counterclaims or cross-claims by the accused
parties.
The Nobelas, on the other hand, filed a separate complaint
against a real estate agent involved in the registration of their
deed of sale after discovering irregularities in the title, which
The Court asserted that the presence of a counterclaim in a
was linked to fraudulent activities. The Criminal Case No.
criminal proceeding was contrary to the established rules,
85961 was initiated against the Nobelas, but after trial, the
which stipulate that such claims should be dealt with in
separate civil actions. It also highlighted the separation of roles
in a trial where a witness, who is not a party to the case,
cannot be held responsible for damages resulting from the
trial.

The Court found the previous awarding of damages to the

Nobelas unwarranted, as they had not filed counterclaims nor
provided documentation to support such claims in the criminal
case.
International Flavors v Argos, GR 130362, Sept 10, 2001 Petitioner's Arguments (IFFI):
Facts: International Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.) Inc. (IFFI) is IFFI contended that the civil action was aimed at enforcing its
a corporation engaged in business under Philippine law. subsidiary liability, which requires the prior conviction of the
Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda were the employee in the criminal case for libel.
general manager and commercial director, respectively, of
IFFI's Fragrances Division. In 1992, a managing director It argued that the civil suit was premature, as it was initiated
position was established within IFFI, and Hernan H. Costa, a without the previous conviction of Costa, thereby violating the
Spaniard, was appointed to that role. This resulted in changes provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Civil Code
to the reporting structure of the company, wherein the general concerning subsidiary liability.
managers, including respondents, would report directly to IFFI highlighted that the appellate court improperly
Costa. recharacterized the nature of the complaint, which explicitly
Due to serious differences between Costa and the stated that the action was against IFFI in its subsidiary
respondents, the position of the general managers became capacity.
redundant, leading to the termination of the respondents' Respondents' Arguments:
services. On December 10, 1993, they signed a "Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim." On the same day, Costa issued a Respondents asserted that the appellate court correctly
"Personnel Announcement" labeling the respondents as treated the case as a separate civil action independent of the
"persona non grata," instructing employees to avoid further criminal complaint, in line with Article 33 of the Civil Code.
dealings with them.
They maintained the right to assert a claim against IFFI,
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel especially because Costa had absconded, limiting their ability
against Costa, resulting in two Informations against him to seek remedies from him.
(Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918) filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig. Subsequently, on March
31, 1995, they filed a civil case for damages (Civil Case No. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court err by treating the
65026) against both Costa and IFFI as his employer. IFFI filed action as seeking to enforce IFFI’s primary liability rather than
a motion to dismiss the civil complaint, claiming it was its subsidiary liability?
precluded because respondents had not reserved their right to
file a separate civil action.
The Regional Trial Court initially dismissed the case due to this Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling in favor
lack of reservation. However, upon respondents' motion for of IFFI, and reversing the decisions of the lower courts. It
reconsideration, the court reversed its decision, allowing the determined that that the respondents' lawsuit against IFFI to
case to proceed. IFFI challenged this reversal in the Court of enforce subsidiary civil liability was premature while criminal
Appeals, which, however, affirmed the Regional Trial Court's proceedings against Costa were ongoing. The court
ruling. emphasized that subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code arises only if the employee is convicted
of the criminal act. The justices also noted that the
characterization of the complaint was critical. The court
highlighted the importance of the pleadings, stating that the
relief sought and the allegations in a complaint define its
nature. Notably, the respondents clearly labeled their action as
one seeking damages on the grounds of subsidiary liability.
The court found that the appellate court mistakenly treated
respondents' action as one against IFFI for primary liability
when it should have recognized that the claim was strictly for
subsidiary liability linked to an employee who was not yet
convicted. Therefore, the ruling underscored the established
doctrine that until the criminal case reaches a conclusion,
actions claiming subsidiary liability against an employer cannot
proceed.
Ppl v Cabinan, GR 176158, Mar 27, 2007 death. It ruled that the inconsistencies in witness testimonies
did not undermine their credibility nor the prosecution's case.
Facts: The appellant, Rolando Cabinan, was charged with the
crime of Murder under an Information alleging that on
December 13, 2000, he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attacked Eleuterio Lucas with evident premeditation and The court underscored that the act of throwing the bottle,
treachery, by throwing a pill bottle at him, which struck Lucas particularly aimed at the head and resulting in an explosion,
on the head, resulting in his serious physical injuries and demonstrated intent to kill. The defense's assertion of merely
subsequent death. trying to quell the fight was rejected as implausible given the
circumstances, including the nature of the projectile used.
On the night of the incident, Eleuterio Lucas was drinking with
friends at his residence in Norzagaray, Bulacan. An argument
ensued involving Lucas's friends and Orlando Cabinan, the Treachery was established due to the surprise attack, which
brother of the appellant. After attempting to diffuse the denied the victim the chance to defend himself. The court
situation, Eleuterio was later approached by the Cabinan affirmed that the manner of the attack—deliberately targeting
brothers who, after hearing of the conflict, engaged in another the victim from behind—satisfied the legal definition of
altercation. During this second altercation, Rolando Cabinan treachery under the Revised Penal Code.
threw a gin bottle at Eleuterio, which exploded upon impact,
resulting in fatal injuries. Medical examination revealed that
Lucas died from intracranial hemorrhage caused by the blast
In terms of civil liabilities, the court awarded damages to the
injury to his head.
heirs, including civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate
Rolando Cabinan was arrested and ultimately stood trial. He damages, the latter justified given the evidence of
pleaded not guilty. In his defense, he claimed that he did not hospitalization costs incurred by the victim's family.
intend to kill Eleuterio and only threw the bottle in an attempt Furthermore, the court noted that exemplary damages were
to stop the fight, not aware that it contained explosives. warranted because the crime was committed with a qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

Issue: Whether or not it is appropriate to award the heirs of

Eluterio Lucas for civil liabilities and damages.

Ruling: The court affirmed the conviction of Rolando Cabinan

for murder. The trial court's findings were found to be
supported by substantial evidence, including eyewitness
identification and medical testimonies confirming the cause of
 insolvency, Carpio moved for a subsidiary writ of execution
against Toribio, which the MTC denied.
Issue: Whether or not subsidiary liability of the vehicle owner,
Carpio v Doroja, GR 84516, Dec 5, 1989 Eduardo Toribio, may be enforced within the same criminal
Facts: This case involves a petition for certiorari challenging proceedings against Edwin Ramirez, where the judgment was
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Zamboanga initially rendered, or if a separate civil action is required for this
City, which denied the motion for a subsidiary writ of execution purpose.
against Eduardo Toribio, the owner-operator of a passenger
vehicle involved in an accident. The incident occurred on
October 23, 1985, when Edwin Ramirez, driving a passenger Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Carpio, holding
Fuso Jitney owned by Toribio, struck Dionisio Carpio, a that Toribio's subsidiary liability could indeed be enforced in
pedestrian. As a result of this accident, Carpio suffered serious the same proceedings following the criminal conviction of
injuries, including a fractured clavicle, necessitating medical Ramirez. The Court clarified that under Article 103 of the
treatment over three months. Revised Penal Code, the conditions for establishing subsidiary
liability had been met—specifically, the conviction of the driver
After the incident, an information for Reckless Imprudence (Ramirez), his insolvency, and the owner-operator’s
Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed against involvement in the business operation of the vehicle at the
Ramirez. On January 14, 1987, he pleaded guilty to a lesser time of the incident.
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Less Serious
Physical Injuries. The MTC convicted him and sentenced him The Court referenced that the convictions and the obligations
to imprisonment, ordering him to indemnify Carpio for various arising from them are inherently tied to the actions taken in the
expenses, including P45 for lost goods, P200 for hospital fees, criminal case, supporting the notion that such liabilities are
and P1,500 for attorney's fees. part of the execution process of the judgment. It reiterated that
businesses engaged in operations where employees can
After Ramirez sought probation, the private prosecutor cause harm to others are legally bound to shoulder the risks
expressed a desire to establish the civil liability of either him or presented, thereby supporting the rationale for subsidiary
the vehicle’s owner. The MTC, however, denied the motion for liability.
subsidiary execution against Toribio on the grounds that the
appellate court’s decision did not mention Toribio’s civil liability The Supreme Court further emphasized that the Court of origin
and that the nature of the accident was classified under "culpa- retains jurisdiction over its execution processes and that
aquiliana" rather than "culpa-contractual." actions to fulfill subsidiary liabilities do not require altering
previous judgments. The subsisting requirement is that the
Subsequently, the private prosecutor appealed the civil aspect employer, in this case, had to be provided an opportunity to be
of the MTC decision, which led to the Regional Trial Court heard regarding his obligations under the subsidiary liability.
modifying the decision by granting partial moral damages to
Carpio while affirming the previous indemnities. When
attempts to collect the judgment from Ramirez failed due to his
Solidum v Ppl, GR 192123, March 10, 2014 prosecution's claims did not support a presumption of
negligence or an inference of wrongdoing.
Facts: The case involves Dr. Fernando P. Solidum, a
physician-anesthesiologist who was found guilty of reckless However, Private respondent argued that the circumstances
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the surrounding the operation were such that they could only be
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). The attributed to a failure in the administration of anesthesia by Dr.
case arose from the surgery of a three-year-old patient, Gerald Solidum, making res ipsa loquitur applicable.
Albert Gercayo, who was born with an imperforate anus and
had undergone colostomy shortly after birth. On May 17, 1995, Private Respondent maintained that the injuries sustained by
Gerald was admitted to the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull- Gerald were the direct result of Dr. Solidum’s actions (or
through operation. During the operation, while under the care negligence) during the surgery.
of the anesthesiology team, Gerald experienced bradycardia,
subsequently going into a coma for an extended period. Upon
regaining consciousness, he was found to be incapable of Issue: Whether Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence
seeing, hearing, or moving. considering the standards of medical care and the specifics of
the case.

Gerald's mother, Ma. Luz Gercayo, filed a complaint against

the attending physicians, claiming that Dr. Solidum failed to Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA
use the requisite care in administering anesthesia, alleging and acquitted Dr. Solidum. The Court concluded that the
that he neglected to monitor the levels properly and used application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
100% halothane, leading to Gerald’s cardiac arrest and inappropriate in this case. Although Dr. Solidum had exclusive
hypoxic encephalopathy. The case was transferred to the control over the anesthetic administration, the Court found that
RTC, where Dr. Solidum was convicted. He was sentenced to hypoxia and bradycardia did not ordinarily result from actions
an indeterminate penalty and ordered to pay damages. taken during a routine procedure without evidence of
negligence.
The Court examined the evidence and found that the
Petitioner Solidum Contended that the prosecution had not prosecution failed to provide expert testimony establishing the
proven beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of standard of care that should have been followed. They noted
negligence as required for criminal conviction because there that the standard of care must be informed by witness
was actually no overdose of anesthetic, asserting that he only testimonies and that a physician's duty is evaluated based on
used 1% halothane, which was properly regulated with an the customary practices at the time of treatment. The Court
anesthesia machine. emphasized that establishing a causal link between an alleged
Petitioner argued that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was negligent act and the injury suffered was essential, and the
improperly applied because the factual basis of the mere existence of a bad outcome—like the patient's
bradycardia—did not automatically imply negligence.
Moreover, Dr. Solidum's assertions, which were supported by
the clinical records, indicated that proper protocols were
followed, and the evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to establish that any negligence occurred during
the operation. The Court concluded that the prosecution did
not demonstrate that Dr. Solidum's actions were inexcusable
or that he failed to meet the standard of care expected of
anesthesiologists in similar contexts.
Furthermore, the Court noted the lack of basis for the joint civil
liability of Ospital ng Maynila, given that it was never charged
as a party in the action and the conditions for subsidiary
liability were not met.
Ppl v Evangelio, GR 181902, Aug 31, 2011 the sanctity of the offended party's house. It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of
Facts: On 3rd of October 2001, in the City of Tacloban, all
privacy that the law accords to the human abode. He who
accused, armed with a handgun and deadly/bladed weapons
goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more
forcibly enter the inhabited house/residence of BBB and while
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
inside, take, and carry away from said residence some
personal properties amounting to PhP336,000.00. On the
occasion of the said robbery, accused feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA, a 17-year-old minor, against her will and
consent and at the time when the latter lost consciousness
after her head was banged on the bathroom floor. Trial court
convicted accused for the crime charged and appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, committed by a band,
dwelling and unlawful entry. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision with modification. CA did not consider the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and unlawful entry. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not trial court erred in appreciating the

aggravating circumstance of dwelling in the commission of the
crime.

Ruling: The SC was not impressed with the defense of

Evangelio. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was
attendant in the present case. Dwelling aggravates a felony
where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.[39]In this case, robbery with violence was committed
in the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In
robbery with violence and intimidation against persons,
dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the
crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing
Ppl v Joson, GR 206393, Jan 21, 2015
Facts: The case involves Michael Joson y Rogando, who was Ruling: The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
accused of raping his 14-year-old sister, referred to as AAA, prosecution successfully established that Joson had carnal
on May 14, 2009. The accusation led to the filing of an knowledge of AAA through intimidation and moral ascendancy.
Information under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in The Court ruled that while physical force was a consideration,
relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The incident occurred it need not be overpowering, particularly given the significant
around 1:00 AM while the accused's common-law partner was age and relational disparity between Joson and AAA. The
away. AAA testified that she was awakened by Joson testimony of AAA was deemed credible and sufficient to prove
undressing her. Despite her attempts to struggle and resist, he that Joson’s actions were coercive, despite what was
held her arms tightly, and after undressing her, he kissed her presented as a lack of resistance.
and mounted her, ultimately forcing his penis into her vagina,
causing her pain.
The Court clarified that resistance is not a prerequisite to
After the assault, Joson left a letter apologizing for his actions,
establish rape if intimidation or moral ascendancy is evident, a
blaming his behavior on drunkenness and imploring AAA not
principle consistent with previous jurisprudence. Furthermore,
to disclose the incident to anyone, especially not to his wife.
the Court upheld that moral ascendancy exists in sibling
The incident was reported to Joson’s wife later that day, and a
relationships where power dynamics are characterized, and
police report followed on June 1, 2009. A medico-legal report
this can fulfill the requirement of force in cases involving
indicated no evident injury on AAA at the time of examination,
familial abuse.
but her birth certificate was presented to establish her status
as a minor.
Joson acknowledged that AAA was his sister but mounted a The court agree that Joson should suffer the penalty of
defense of alibi, claiming he was away in Alfonso, Cavite, at reclusion perpetua for the crime of Art 266-B of the RPC. The
the time of the crime, and denied writing the letter. The penalty imposed for the crime provides death penalty however
Regional Trial Court found Joson guilty of rape, leading to a pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the
sentence of reclusion perpetua and an award of damages to imposition of the death penalty the imposable penalty is
AAA. reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether the modification of the amount of damages In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, the court
awarded in this case is justified. deemed it proper to modify the amount of damages awarded
in this case. Citing People v. Gambao, the court increased the
amounts of indemnity and damage where the penalty for the
crime committed is death but which cannot be imposed
because of Republic Act No. 9346. Wherefore the conviction
of appellant Joson is affirmed with modification as regard to
the civil damages. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to
₱100,000.00 from 50,000.00; moral damages to ₱100,000.00
from 50,000.00; and the exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00
from 25,000.00 and additionally, the award of damages shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of the judgment until fully paid.