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Defense in Depth
Because a security solution is only as strong as its
weakest link, network administrators are challenged to implement a security solution that protects a complex network. As a result, rather than deploying a single security solution, Cisco recommends multiple, overlapping solutions. These overlapping solutions target different aspects of security, such as securing against insider attacks and securing against technical attacks. These solutions should also be subjected to routine testing and evaluation. Security solutions should also overlap in a way that eliminates any single point of failure.
Defense in Depth is a design philosophy that achieves this
layered security approach. The layers of security present in a Defense in Depth deployment should provide redundancy for one another while offering a variety of defense strategies for protecting multiple aspects of a network. Any single points of failure in a security solution should be eliminated, and weak links in the security solution should be strengthened.
The Defense in Depth design philosophy includes
recommendations such as the following:
■ Defend multiple attack targets in the network.
" Key \ Topic
— Protect the network infrastructure.
— Protect strategic computing resources, such as via a
Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS).
■ Create overlapping defenses. For example, include both
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and IPS protections.
■ Let the value of a protected resource dictate the
strength of the security mechanism. For example, deploy more resources to protect a network boundary as opposed to the resources deployed to protect an end- user workstation.
■ Use strong encryption technologies, such as AES (as
opposed to DES) or Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solutions.
Consider the sample Defense in Depth topology shown in
Figure 1-2. Notice the two e-mail servers—external and internal. The external e-mail server acts as an e-mail relay to the internal e-mail server. Therefore, an attacker attempting to exploit an e-mail vulnerability would have to compromise both e-mail servers to affect the internal corporate e-mail.
Also notice the use of a Network-based Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS), a Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS), and a Host-based Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS). All three of these mitigation strategies look for malicious traffic and can alert or drop such traffic. However, these strategies are deployed at different locations in the network to protect different areas of the network. This overlapping yet diversified protection is an example of the Defense in Depth design philosophy.
However, if all security solutions in a network were
configured and managed by a single management station, this management station could be a single point of failure. Therefore, if an attacker compromised the management station, he could defeat other security measures.
Figure 1-2 Defense in Depth
Internal e-Mail
Figure 1-2 Defense in Depth
Internal e-Mail In the "Potential Attackers" section you read about five classes of attacks; Table 1-6 provides examples of overlapping defenses for each of these classes.
Table 1-6 Defending Against Different Classes of Attacks
Table 1-6 Defending Against Different Classes of Attacks
Attack Secondary Layer of
Primary Layer of Defense Class Defense Applications with Passive Encryption integrated security Firewall at the network Active HIPS edge Protecting against Insider unauthorized physical Authentication access Protecting against Video monitoring Close-in unauthorized physical systems access Secured software Real-time software Distribution distribution system integrity checking