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Evolution, by George John Romanes

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Title: The Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution

Author: George John Romanes

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Language: English

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NATURE SERIES.
THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCES OF
ORGANIC
EVOLUTION

BY
GEORGE J. ROMANES, M.A., LL.D.,
F.R.S.,
ZOOLOGICAL SECRETARY OF THE LINNEAN
SOCIETY.
 London:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1882.
The Right of Translation and Reproduction is Reserved.

LONDON:
R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS,
BREAD STREET HILL.
 PREFACE.
SEVERAL months ago I published in the Fortnightly Review a lecture,
which I had previously delivered at the Philosophical Institutions of
Edinburgh and Birmingham, and which bore the above title. The
late Mr. Darwin thought well of the epitome of his doctrine which
the lecture presented, and urged me so strongly to republish it in a
form which might admit of its being “spread broadcast over the
land”, that I promised him to do so. In fulfilment of this promise,
therefore—which I now regard as more binding than ever—I
reproduce the essay in the “Nature Series” with such additions and
alterations as appear to me, on second thoughts, to be desirable. The
only object of the essay is that which is expressed in the opening
paragraph.

LONDON,
June 1, 1882.

SINCE this little Essay was published, it has been suggested to me

that, in its mode of presenting the arguments in favour of Evolution,
there is a similarity to that which has been adopted by Mr. Herbert
Spencer in the third part of his Principles of Biology. I should
therefore like to state, that while such similarity is no doubt in part
due to the similarity of subject-matter, I think, upon reading again,
after an interval of ten years, his admirable presentation of the
evidence it may also in part be due to unconscious memory. This
applies particularly to the headings of the chapters, which I find to
be almost identical with those previously used by Mr. Spencer.

G. J. R.
 CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCES OF
ORGANIC EVOLUTION 1

I.
THE ARGUMENT FROM
CLASSIFICATION 17

II.
THE ARGUMENT FROM MORPHOLOGY
OR STRUCTURE 26

III.
THE ARGUMENT FROM GEOLOGY 46

IV.
THE ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL
DISTRIBUTION 48

V.
THE ARGUMENT FROM
EMBRYOLOGY 63

VI.
ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM CERTAIN
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 70
 THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCES OF
ORGANIC EVOLUTION.
ALTHOUGH it is generally recognised that the Origin of Species has
produced an effect both on the science and the philosophy of our
age which is without a parallel in the history of thought, admirers of
Mr. Darwin's genius are frequently surprised at the ignorance of his
work which is displayed by many persons who can scarcely be said
to belong to the uncultured classes. The reason of this ignorance is
no doubt partly due to the busy life which many of our bread-
winners are constrained to live; but it is also, I think, partly due to
mere indolence. There are thousands of educated persons who, on
coming home from their daily work, prefer reading literature of a
less scientific character than that which is supplied by Mr. Darwin's
works; and therefore it is that such persons feel these works to
belong to a category of books which is to them a very large one—
the books, namely, which never are, but always to be, read. Under
these circumstances I have thought it desirable to supply a short
digest of the Origin of Species, which any man, of however busy a
life, or of however indolent a disposition, may find both time and
energy to follow.

With the general aim of the present abstract being thus understood, I
shall start at the beginning of my subject by very briefly describing
the theory of natural selection. It is a matter of observable fact that
all plants and animals are perpetually engaged in what Mr. Darwin
calls a “struggle for existence.” That is to say, in every generation of
every species a great many more individuals are born than can
possibly survive; so that there is in consequence a perpetual battle
for life going on among all the constituent individuals of any given
generation. Now, in this struggle for existence, which individuals
will be victorious and live? Assuredly those which are best fitted to
live: the weakest and the least fitted to live will succumb and die,
while the strongest and the best fitted to live will be triumphant and
survive. Now it is this “survival of the fittest” that Mr. Darwin calls
“natural selection.” Nature, so to speak, selects the best individuals
out of each generation to live. And not only so, but as these
favoured individuals transmit their favourable qualities to their
offspring, according to the fixed laws of heredity, it follows that the
individuals composing each successive generation have a general
tendency to be better suited to their surroundings than were their
forefathers. And this follows, not merely because in every
generation it is only the flower of the race that is allowed to breed,
but also because if in any generation some new and beneficial
qualities happen to appear as slight variations from the ancestral
type, these will be seized upon by natural selection and added, by
transmission in subsequent generations, to the previously existing
type. Thus the best idea of the whole process will be gained by
comparing it with the closely analogous process whereby gardeners
and cattlebreeders create their wonderful productions; for just as
these men, by always selecting their best individuals to breed from,
slowly but continuously improve their stock, so Nature, by a similar
process of selection, slowly but continuously makes the various
species of plants and animals better and better suited to the external
conditions of their life.

Now, if this process of continuously adapting organisms to their

environment takes place in nature at all, there is no reason why we
should set any limits on the extent to which it is able to go up to the
point at which a complete and perfect adaptation is achieved.
Therefore we might suppose that all species would attain to this
condition of perfect adjustment to their environment, and there
remain fixed. And so undoubtedly they would, if the environment
were itself unchanging. But forasmuch as the environment—or the
sum total of the external conditions of life—of almost every organic
type alters more or less from century to century (whether from
astronomical, geological, and geographical changes, or from the
immigrations and emigrations of other species living on contiguous
geographical areas), it follows that the process of natural selection
need never reach a terminal phase. And forasmuch as natural
selection may thus continue, ad infinitum, slowly to alter a specific
type in adaptation to a gradually changing environment, if in any
case the alteration thus effected is sufficient in amount to lead
naturalists to denote the specific type by some different name, it
follows that natural selection has transmuted one specific type into
another. And so the process is supposed to go on over all the
countless species of plants and animals simultaneously—the world
of organic types being thus regarded as in a state of perpetual,
though gradual, flux.

Such, then, is the theory of natural selection, or survival of the

fittest; and the first thing we have to notice with regard to it is, that
it offers to our acceptance a scientific explanation of the numberless
cases of apparent design which we everywhere meet with in organic
nature. For all such cases of apparent design consist only in the
adaptation which is shown by organisms to their environment, and
it is obvious that the facts are covered by the theory of natural
selection no less completely than they are covered by the theory of
intelligent design. Perhaps it may be answered,—“The fact that
these innumerable cases of adaptation may be accounted for by
natural selection is no proof that they are not really due to intelligent
design.” And, in truth, this is an objection which is often urged by
minds—even highly cultured minds—which have not been
accustomed to scientific modes of thought. I have heard an eminent
professor tell his class that the many instances of adaptation which
Mr. Darwin discovered and described as occurring in orchids,
seemed to him to tell more in favour of contrivance than in favour
of natural causes; and another eminent professor once wrote to me
that although he had read the Origin of Species with care, he could
see in it no evidence of natural selection which might not equally
well be adduced in favour of intelligent design. But here we meet
with a radical misconception of the whole logical attitude of
science. For, be it observed, the exception in limine to the evidence
which we are about to consider, does not question that natural
selection may not be able to do all that Mr. Darwin ascribes to it: it
merely objects to his interpretation of the facts, because it maintains
that these facts might equally well be ascribed to intelligent design.
And so undoubtedly they might, if we were all childish enough to
rush into a supernatural explanation whenever a natural explanation
is found sufficient to account for the facts. Once admit the glaringly
illogical principle that we may assume the operation of higher
causes where the operation of lower ones is sufficient to explain the
observed phenomena, and all our science and all our philosophy are
scattered to the winds. For the law of logic which Sir William
Hamilton called the law of parsimony—or the law which forbids us
to assume the operation of higher causes when lower ones are found
sufficient to explain the observed effects—this law constitutes the
only logical barrier between science and superstition. For it is
manifest that it is always possible to give a hypothetical explanation
of any phenomenon whatever, by referring it immediately to the
intelligence of some supernatural agent; so that the only difference
between the logic of science and the logic of superstition consists in
science recognising a validity in the law of parsimony which
superstition disregards. Therefore I have no hesitation in saying that
this way of looking at the evidence in favour of natural selection is
not a scientific or a reasonable way of looking at it, but a purely
superstitious way. Let us take, for instance, as an illustration, a
perfectly parallel case. When Kepler was unable to explain by any
known causes the paths described by the planets, he resorted to a
supernatural explanation, and supposed that every planet was guided
in its movements by some presiding angel. But when Newton
supplied a beautifully simple physical explanation, all persons with
a scientific habit of mind at once abandoned the metaphysical
explanation. Now, to be consistent, the above-mentioned professors,
and all who think with them, ought still to adhere to Kepler's
hypothesis in preference to Newton's explanation; for, excepting the
law of parsimony, there is certainly no other logical objection to the
statement that the movements of the planets afford as good evidence
of the influence of guiding angels as they do of the influence of
gravitation.

So much, then, for the absurdly illogical position that, granting the
evidence in favour of natural selection and supernatural design to be
equal and parallel, we should hesitate for one moment in our choice.
But, of course, if the evidence is supposed not to be equal and
parallel—i.e., if it is supposed that the theory of natural relation is
not so competent a theory to explain the facts of adaptation as is that
of intelligent design—then the objection is no longer the one that we
are considering. It is quite another objection, and one which is not
primâ facie absurd; it requires to be met by examining how far the
theory of natural selection is able to explain the facts. Let us state
the problem clearly.

Innumerable cases of adaptation of organisms to their environment

are the observed facts for which an explanation is required. To
supply this explanation two, and only two, hypotheses are in the
field. Of these two hypotheses one is, intelligent design manifested
in creation; and the other is, natural selection manifested during the
countless ages of the past. Now it would be proof positive of
intelligent design if it could be shown that all species of plants and
animals were created—that is suddenly introduced into the complex
conditions of their life; for it is quite inconceivable that any cause
other than intelligence could be competent to adapt an organism to
its environment suddenly. On the other hand, it would be proof
presumptive of natural selection if it could be shown that one
species becomes slowly transmuted into another—i.e., that one set
of adaptations may be gradually transformed into another set of
adaptations according as changing circumstances require. This
would be proof presumptive of natural selection, because it would
then become amply probable that natural selection might have
brought about many, or most, of the cases of adaptations which we
see; and if so, the law of parsimony excludes the rival hypothesis of
intelligent design. Thus the whole question as between natural
selection and supernatural design resolves itself into this—Were all
the species of plants and animals separately created, or were they
slowly evolved? For if they were specially created, the evidence of
supernatural design remains unrefuted and irrefutable; whereas if
they were slowly evolved, that evidence has been utterly and for
ever destroyed. The doctrine of natural selection therefore depends
for its validity on the doctrine of organic evolution; for if once the
fact of organic evolution were established, no one would dispute
that much of the adaptation was probably effected by natural
selection. How much we cannot say—probably never shall be able
to say; for even Mr. Darwin himself does not doubt that other causes
besides that of natural selection have assisted in the modifying of
specific types. For the sake of simplicity, however, I shall not go
into this subject; but shall always speak of natural selection as the
only cause of organic evolution. Let us, then, weigh the evidence in
favour of organic evolution. If we find it wanting, we need have no
complaints to make of natural theologians of to-day; but if we find it
to be full measure, shaken together and running over, we ought to
maintain that natural theologians can no longer adhere to the
arguments of such writers as Paley, Bell, and Chalmers, without
deliberately violating the only logical principle which separates
science from fetishism.

To avoid misapprehension, however, I may here add that while Mr.

Darwin's theory is thus in plain and direct contradiction to the
theory of design, or system of teleology, as presented by the school
of writers which I have named, I hold that Mr. Darwin's theory has
no point of logical contact with the theory of design in the larger
sense, that behind all secondary causes of a physical kind, there is a
primary cause of a mental kind. Therefore throughout this essay I
refer to design in the sense understood by the narrower forms of
teleology, or as an immediate cause of the observed phenomena.
Whether or not there is an ultimate cause of a psychical kind
pervading all nature, a causa causarum which is the final raison
d'être of the cosmos, this is another question which, as I have said, I
take to present no point of logical contact with Mr. Darwin's theory,
or, I may add, with any of the methods and results of natural
science. The only position, therefore, which I here desire to render
plain is that, if the doctrine of evolution is seen to be established by
sufficient evidence, and therefore the causes which it sets forth are
recognised as adequate to furnish a scientific explanation of the
results observed, then the facts of organic nature necessarily fall into
the same logical category, with reference to any question of design,
as that of all or any other series of facts in the physical universe.
This being understood, I shall now proceed to render an epitome of
the evidence in favour of organic evolution, and I shall do so by
classifying the arguments in a way tending to show their distinct or
independent character, and therefore calculated to display the
additional force which they acquire from their cumulative nature.
 I.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CLASSIFICATION.

I SHALL first take the argument from classification. Naturalists find

that all species of plants and animals present among themselves
structural affinities. According as these structural affinities are more
or less pronounced, the various species are classified under genera,
orders, families, classes, sub-kingdoms, and kingdoms. Now in such
a classification it is found impossible to place all the species in a
linear series, according to the grade of their organization. For
instance, we cannot say that a wolf is more highly organized than a
fox or a jackal; we can only say that the specific points wherein it
differs from these animals are without significance as proving the
one type to be more highly organized than the others. But of course
in many cases, and especially in the cases of the larger divisions, it
is often possible to say—The members in this division are more
highly organized than are the members in that division. Our system
of classification therefore may be likened to a tree, in which a short
trunk may be taken to represent the lowest organisms which cannot
properly be termed either plants or animals. This short trunk soon
separates into two large trunks, one of which represents the
vegetable and the other the animal kingdom. Each of these trunks
then gives off large branches signifying classes, and these give off
smaller, but more numerous branches, signifying families, which
ramify again into orders, genera, and finally into the leaves, which
may be taken to represent species. Now, in such a representative tree
of life, the height of any branch from the ground may be taken to
indicate the grade of organization which the leaves, or species,
present; so that, if we picture to ourselves such a tree, we will
understand that while there is a general advance of organization
from below upwards, there are numberless slight variations in this
respect between leaves growing even on the same branch; but in a
still greater number of cases, leaves growing on the same branch are
growing on the same level—that is, although they represent
different species, it cannot be said that one is more highly organized
than the other. Now, this tree-like arrangement of specific organisms
in nature is an arrangement for which Mr. Darwin is not responsible.
I mean that the framing of this natural classification has been the
work of naturalists for centuries past; and although they did not
know what they were doing, it is now evident to evolutionists that
they were tracing the lines of genetic relationship. For, be it
observed, a scientific or natural classification differs very much
from a popular or hap-hazard classification, and the difference
consists in this, that while a popular classification is framed with
exclusive reference to the external appearance of organisms, a
scientific classification is made with reference to the whole
structure. A whale, for instance, is often thought to be a fish,
because it resembles a fish in form and habits; whereas dissection
shows that it is beyond all comparison more unlike a fish than it is
like a horse or a man. This is, of course, an extreme case; but it was
cases such as this that first led naturalists to see that there are
resemblances between organisms much more deep and important
than appear upon the surface; and consequently, that if a natural
classification was possible at all, it must be made with reference to
these deeper resemblances. Of course, it took time to perceive this
distinction between fundamental and superficial resemblances. I
remember once reading a very comical disquisition in one of
Buffon's works on the question as to whether or not a crocodile was
to be classified as an insect; and the instructive feature in the
disquisition was this, that although a crocodile differs from an insect
as regards every conceivable particular of its internal anatomy, no
allusion at all is made to this fact, while the whole discussion is
made to turn on the hardness of the external casing of a crocodile
resembling the hardness of the external casing of a beetle; and when
at last Buffon decides that, on the whole, a crocodile had better not
be classified as an insect, the only reason given is, that as a
crocodile is so very large an animal, it would make “altogether too
terrible an insect.”
But now, when at last it came to be recognised that internal anatomy
rather than external appearance was to be taken as a guide to
classification, the question was, What features in the internal
anatomy are to take precedence over the other features? And this
question it was not hard to answer. A porpoise, for instance, has a
large number of teeth, and in this feature resembles most fish, while
it differs from all mammals. But it also gives suck to its young, and
in this feature it differs from all fish, while it resembles all
mammals. Now, looking at those two features alone, should we say
that a porpoise ought to be classed as a fish or as a mammal?
Assuredly as a mammal, and for this reason: The number of teeth is
a very variable feature both in fish and in mammals, whereas the
giving of suck is an invariable feature among mammals, and occurs
nowhere else in the animal kingdom. This, of course, is purposely
chosen as a very simple illustration; but it exemplifies the general
fact that the guiding principle of scientific classification is the
comparing of organism with organism, with the view of seeing
which of the constituent organs are of the most invariable
occurrence, and therefore of the most typical signification.

Now, since the days of Linnæus this principle has been carefully
followed, and it is by its aid that the tree-like system of
classification has been established. No one, even long before
Darwin's days, ever dreamed of doubting that this system is in
reality, what it always has been in name, a natural system. What,
then, is the inference we are to draw from it? An evolutionist
answers, that it is just such a system as his theory of descent would
lead him to expect as a natural system. For this tree-like system is as
clear an expression as anything could be of the fact that all species
are bound together by the ties of genetic relationship. If all species
were separately created, it is almost incredible that we should
everywhere observe this progressive shading off of characters
common to larger groups, into more and more specialized characters
distinctive only of smaller and smaller groups. At any rate, to say
the least, the law of parsimony forbids us to ascribe such effects to a
supernatural cause, acting in so whimsical a manner, when the
effects are precisely what we should expect to follow from the
action of a highly probable natural cause. The classification of
animal forms, indeed, as Darwin, Lyell, and Hæckel have pointed
out, strongly resembles the classification of languages. In the case
of languages, as in the case of species, we have genetic affinities
strongly marked; so that it is possible to some extent to construct a
language-tree, the branches of which shall indicate, in a
diagrammatic form, the progressive divergence of a large group of
languages from a common stock. For instance, Latin may be
regarded as a fossil language, which has given rise, by way of
genetic descent, to a group of living languages—Italian, Spanish,
French, and, to a large extent, English. Now what should we think
of a philologist who should maintain that English, French, Spanish,
and Italian were all specially created languages—or languages
separately constructed by the Deity, and by as many separate acts of
inspiration communicated to these several nations—and that their
resemblance to the fossil form, Latin, is to be attributed to special
design? Yet the evidence of the natural transmutation of species, is,
in one respect, much stronger than that of the natural transmutation
of languages—in respect, namely, of there being a vastly greater
number of cases all bearing testimony to the fact of genetic
relationship.
 II.
THE ARGUMENT FROM MORPHOLOGY OR
STRUCTURE.

I NOW pass to another line of argument. The theory of evolution by

natural selection supposes that hereditary characters admit of being
slowly modified wherever their modification will render an
organism better suited to a change in its conditions of life. Let us,
then, observe the evidence we have of such adaptive modifications
of structure, in cases where the need of such modification is
apparent. For the sake of clearness, I shall begin by again taking the
case of the whales and porpoises. The theory of evolution infers,
from the whole structure of these animals, that their progenitors
must have been terrestrial quadrupeds of some kind, which became
aquatic in their habits. Now the change in the conditions of their life
thus brought about would render desirable great modifications of
structure. These changes would, in the first instance, begin to affect
the least typical—that is, the least strongly inherited structures—
such as the skin, claws, and teeth, &c. But as time went on, the
adaptation would begin to extend to the more typical structures,
until the shape of the body began to be affected by the bones and
muscles required for terrestrial locomotion becoming better adapted
for aquatic locomotion, and the whole outline of the animal more
fish-like in shape. This is the stage which we actually observe in the
seals, where the hind legs, although retaining all their typical bones,
have become shortened up almost to rudiments, and directed
backwards, so as to be of no use for walking, but serving to
complete the fish-like taper of the body. But in the whales the
modification has gone even further than this, so that the hind legs
have ceased to be apparent externally, and are only represented
internally by remnants so rudimentary that it is impossible to make
out with certainty the homologies of the bones; moreover, the head
and the whole body have become completely fish-like in shape. But
profound as these changes are, they only affect those parts of the
organism which it was for the benefit of the organism to have
altered, so that it might be adapted to an aquatic mode of existence.
Thus the arm, which is used as a fin, still retains the bones of the
shoulder, fore-arm, wrist, and fingers, although they are all inclosed
in a fin-shaped sack, so as to render them quite useless for any other
purpose than swimming. Similarly, the head, although it so closely
resembles the head of a fish in shape, still retains the bones of the
mammalian skull in their proper anatomical relation to one another,
but modified in form so as to offer the least possible amount of
resistance to the water. In short it may be said that all the
modifications have been effected with the least possible divergence
from the typical mammalian type, which is compatible with
securing so perfect an adaptation to a purely aquatic mode of life.

Now I have chosen the case of the whale and porpoise group
because they offer so extreme an example of profound modification
of structure in adaptation to changed conditions of life. But the same
thing may be seen in hundreds and hundreds of other cases. For
instance, to confine our attention to the arm, not only is the limb
modified in the whale for swimming, but in another mammal—the
bat—it is modified for flying, by having the fingers enormously
elongated and overspread with a membranous web. In birds, again,
the arm is modified for flight in a wholly different way—the fingers
here being very short and all run together, and the chief expanse of
the wing being composed of the shoulder and fore-arm. In frogs and
lizards, again, we find hands more like our own; but in an extinct
species of flying reptile the modification was extreme, the wing
having been formed by a prodigious elongation of the fifth finger,
and a membrane spread over it and the rest of the hand. Lastly, in
serpents the hand and arm have disappeared altogether.

Thus, even if we confine our attention to a single structure, how

wonderful are the modifications which it is seen to undergo,
although never losing its typical character! How are we to explain
this? By design manifested in special creation, or by descent with
adaptive modification? If it is said by design manifested in special
creation, we must suppose that the Deity formed an archetypal plan
of certain structures, and that He determined to adhere to this plan
through all the modifications which those structures exhibit. Now
the difficulties in the way of this supposition are prodigious, if not
quite insurmountable. In the first place, why is it that some
structures are selected as typical and not others? Why should the
vertebral skeleton, for instance, be tortured into every conceivable
variety of modification in order to make it serviceable for as great a
variety of functions; while another structure, such as the eye, is
made in different sub-kingdoms on fundamentally different plans,
notwithstanding that it has throughout to perform the same
function? Will any one have the hardihood to assert that in the case
of the skeleton the Deity has endeavoured to show His ingenuity by
the manifold functions to which He has made the same structure
subservient; while in the case of the eye He has endeavoured to
show his resources by the manifold structures which He has to
subserve the same function? If so, it appears to me a most
unfortunate circumstance, that throughout both the vegetable and
animal kingdoms, all cases which can be pointed to as showing
ingenious adaptation of the same typical structure to the
performance of widely different functions, are cases which come
within the limits of the same natural group of plants and animals,
and therefore admit of being equally well explained by descent from
a common ancestry; while all cases of widely different structures
performing the same function are to be found in different groups of
plants or animals, and are therefore suggestive of independent
variations arising in the different lines of hereditary descent.

To take a specific illustration. The octopus or devil-fish belongs to a

widely different class of animals from a true fish, and yet its eye, in
general appearance, looks wonderfully like the eye of a true fish.
Now, Mr. Mivart pointed to this fact as a great difficulty in the way
of the theory of evolution by natural selection, because it must
clearly be a most improbable thing that so complicated a structure as
the eye of a fish should happen to be arrived at through each of two
totally different lines of descent. And this difficulty would, indeed,
be almost fatal to the theory of evolution by natural selection, if the
apparent similarity were a real one. Unfortunately for the objection,
however, Mr. Darwin clearly showed, in his reply, that in no one
anatomical feature of typical importance do the two structures
resemble one another; so that in point of fact the two organs do not
resemble one another in any particular further than it is necessary
that they should, if both are to serve as organs of sight. But now,
suppose that this had not been the case, and that the two structures,
besides presenting the necessary superficial resemblance, had also
presented an anatomical resemblance; with what tremendous force
might it have then been urged,—“Your hypothesis of hereditary
descent with progressive modification being here excluded, by the
fact that the animals compared belong to two widely different
branches of the tree of life, how are we to explain the identity of
type manifested by these two complicated organs of vision? The
only hypothesis open to us is intelligent adherence to an ideal type.”
But as this cannot now be urged in any one case throughout the
whole organic world, we may, on the other hand, present it as a most
significant fact, that, while within the limits of the same large
branch of the tree of life we constantly find the same typical
structures modified so as to perform very different functions, we
never find any vestige of these particular types of structure in other
large divisions of that tree. In other words, we never find typical
structures appearing except in cases where their presence may be
explained by the hypothesis of hereditary descent; while in
thousands of such cases we find these structures undergoing every
conceivable variety of adaptive modification.

Consequently, special creationists must fall back upon another

position and say,—“Well, but it may have pleased the Deity to form
a certain number of ideal types, and never to allow the structures
occurring in the one type to appear in any of the others.” I answer,
undoubtedly it may have done so; but if it did, it is a most
unfortunate thing for your theory; for the fact implies that the Deity
has planned His types in such a way as to suggest the counter-theory
of descent. For instance, it would seem to me a most capricious
thing in the Deity to make the eyes of an innumerable number of
fish on exactly the same ideal type, and then to make the eye of the
octopus so exactly like these other eyes in superficial appearance as
to deceive so accomplished a naturalist as Mr. Mivart, and yet to
take scrupulous care that in no one ideal particular should this
solitary eye resemble all the host of other eyes. However, adopting
for the sake of argument this gigantic assumption, let us suppose
that God laid down these arbitrary rules for His own guidance in
creation, and let us see to what it leads. If, as is assumed, the Deity
formed a certain number of ideal types, and determined that on no
account should He allow any part of one type to appear in any part
of another, surely we should expect that within the limits of the
same type the same typical structures should always be present.
Thus, remember what desperate efforts, so to speak, there have been
made to maintain the uniformity of type in the case of the arm, and
should we not expect that in other and similar cases similar efforts
should be made? Yet we repeatedly find that this is not the case.
Even in the whale, as we have seen, the hind-limbs are not apparent;
and it is impossible to see in what respect the hind-limbs are of any
less ideal value than the fore-limbs, which, as we have also seen, are
so carefully preserved in nearly all vertebrated animals except the
snakes, where again we meet in this particular with a sudden and
sublime indifference to the maintenance of a typical structure. Now
I say that if the theory of ideal types is true, we have in these facts
evidence of the most unreasonable inconsistency; for no explanation
can be assigned why so much care should have been taken to
maintain the type in some cases, while such reckless indifference
should have been displayed towards maintaining it in others. But the
theory of descent with continued adaptive modification fully
explains all the known cases; for in every case the degree of
divergence from the typical structure which an organism presents
corresponds with the length of time during which the divergence has
been going on. Thus we scarcely ever meet with any great departure
from the typical form—such as the absence of limbs—without some
of the other organs in the body being so far modified as of
themselves to indicate, on the supposition of descent with
modification, that the animal or plant must have been subject to the
modifying influences for a long series of generations. And this
combined testimony of a number of organs in the same organism is
what the theory of descent would lead us to expect, while the rival
theory of design can offer no explanation of the fact, that when one
organ shows a conspicuous departure from the supposed ideal type,
some of the other organs in the same organism should tend to keep
it company by doing likewise.[1]

I will now briefly touch on another branch of the argument from

morphology—the argument, namely, from rudimentary structures.

Throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms we constantly meet

with organs which are the dwarfed and useless representatives of
organs which, in other and allied kinds of animals and plants, are of
large size and functional utility. Thus, for instance, the unborn
whale has rudimentary teeth, which are never destined to cut the
gums; and we all know that our own rudimentary tail is of no
practical service. Now, rudimentary organs of this kind are of such
common occurrence, that almost every species presents one or more
of them. The question, therefore, is—How are they to be accounted
for? Of course the theory of descent with adaptive modification has
a delightfully simple answer to supply, viz., that when, from
changed conditions of life, an organ which was previously useful
becomes useless, natural selection, combined with disuse and so-
called economy of growth, will cause it to dwindle till it becomes a
rudiment. On the other hand, the theory of special creation can only
maintain that these rudiments are formed for the sake of adhering to
an ideal type. Now, here again the former theory is triumphant over
the latter; for, without waiting to dispute the wisdom of making
dwarfed and useless structures merely for the whimsical motive
assigned, surely if so extraordinary a method is adopted in so many
cases, we should expect that in consistency it would be adopted in
all cases. This reasonable expectation, however, is far from being
realised. In numberless cases, such as that of the fore-limbs of
serpents, no vestige of a rudiment is present. But the vacillating
policy in the matter of rudiments does not end here; for it is shown,
if possible, in a more aggravated form where, within the limits of
the same natural group of organisms, a rudiment is sometimes
present and sometimes absent. For instance, to take again the case of
limbs, in nearly all the numerous species of snakes there are no
vestiges of limbs at all; but in the python we find beneath the skin
very tiny rudiments of the hind limbs. Now, is it a worthy
conception of Deity that, while neglecting to maintain His unity of
ideal in the case of nearly all the numerous species of snakes, He
should have added a tiny rudiment in the case of the python, and
even in that case should have maintained His ideal type very
inefficiently, inasmuch as only two limbs instead of four are
represented? Or, again, take the case of the limb in other animals.
Five toes seem to constitute the ideal type, notwithstanding that in
numberless cases this ideal fails in its structural expression. Now, in
the case of the horse, one toe appears to have become developed at
the expense of the others; for the so-called knee of the horse is
really the wrist or ankle, and the so-called shank the middle toe or
finger very much enlarged. But on each side of this enlarged toe
there are, beneath the skin, rudimentary bones of two other toes—
the so-called splint-bones. So far good, but three toes are not five;
so special creationists must suppose that while in this case the Deity
has, so to speak, struggled to maintain the uniformity of His ideal,
His efforts have nevertheless conspicuously failed. How much less
strained is the scientific interpretation; for I may mention that in this
particular case, besides the general inference that rudiments point us
to a remote ancestry, we have direct palæontological evidence that
there have been a whole series of extinct horse-like animals, that
began low down in the geological strata with five toes (on the fore-
feet, one being rudimentary), which afterwards became reduced to
four and then to three; after which the two lateral toes began to
become rudimentary, as we now see them in oxen, and later on still
more so. Lastly, as we come nearer to recent times, we find fossils
of the existing horse, with the lateral toes shortened up to the
condition of splint-bones. Thus we have some half-dozen different
genera of horse, all standing in a linear series in time as in structure,
between the earliest representative with the typical number of five
toes, and the existing very aberrant form with only one toe.

It is sometimes said that a striking corroboration of a scientific

theory is furnished when it enables us correctly to predict
discoveries. Such a corroboration is afforded in this instance; for
Professor Huxley, speaking in 1870, said, “If the expectation raised
by the splints of the horses that, in some ancestor of the horses,
these splints would be found to be complete digits, has been
verified, we are furnished with very strong reasons for looking for a
no less complete verification that the three-toed plagiolophus-like
'avus' of the horse must have had a five-toed 'atavus' at some earlier
period. No such five-toed 'atavus,' however, has yet made its
appearance.” But since then the “atavus” has made its appearance, if
not with five complete toes, at least with four complete and one
rudimentary; and any day we may hear that Professor Marsh has
found in still earlier strata a more primitive form with all five toes
complete.

I have no space to go into the evidence of similar “missing links”

which have been recently supplied by palæontological researches in
the case of several other groups of animals; but their consideration
seems to me quite to justify a more recent utterance of Professor
Huxley, who, in 1878, wrote in the Encyclopædia Britannica: “On
the evidence of palæontology, the evolution of many existing forms
of animal life from their predecessors is no longer an hypothesis,
but an historical fact; it is only the nature of the physiological
factors to which that evolution is due which is still open to
discussion.”
[1] This consideration is, I believe, original. Several exceptions to its
validity might be adduced, but as a general principle it certainly holds
good.
 III.
THE ARGUMENT FROM GEOLOGY.

BUT this allusion to fossils leads me to the next division of my

subject—the argument from geology. It is not, however, necessary
to say much on this head, for the simple reason that the whole body
of geological evidence is for the most part of one kind, which
although of a very massive, is of a very simple character. That is to
say, apart from the increasingly numerous cases, such as the one just
mentioned, which geology supplies of extinct “intermediate links”
between particular species now living, the great weight of the
geological evidence consists in the general fact, that of all the
thousands of specific forms of life which palæontology reveals to us
as having lived on this planet in times past, there is no instance of a
highly organised form occurring low down in the geological series.
[1] On the contrary, there is the best evidence to show that since the

first dawn of life in the occurrence of the simplest organisms, until

the meridian splendour of life as now we see it, gradual advance
from the general to the special—from the low to the high, from the
few and simple to the many and complex—has been the law of
organic nature. And of course it is needless to say that this is
precisely the law to which the process of descent with adaptive
modification would of necessity give rise.
[1] Some of the lower vertebrata (Elasmobranch and Ganoid fishes)
occur, indeed, in early strata (upper Silurian); but still far from the
earliest in which some of the invertebrata are found. The general
statement in the text applies chiefly to the more highly organised forms
of the vertebrate series.
 IV.
THE ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL
DISTRIBUTION.

THE argument from geology is the argument from the distribution of

species in time. I will, therefore, next take the argument from the
distribution of species in space—that is, the present geographical
distribution of plants and animals. It is easy to see that this must be
a most important argument, if we reflect that as the theory of
descent with adaptive modification implies slow and gradual change
of one species into another, and a still more slow and gradual
change of one genus, family, or order into another genus, family, or
order, we should expect on this theory that the organic types living
on any given geographical area should be found to resemble or to
differ from organic types living elsewhere, according as the area is
connected or disconnected with other geographical areas. And this
we find to be the case, as abundant evidence proves. For, to quote
from Mr. Darwin, “barriers of any kind, or obstacles to free
migration, are related in a close and important manner to the
differences between the productions of various regions. We see this
in the great difference in nearly all the terrestrial productions of the
New and Old Worlds, excepting in the northern parts, where the
land almost joins.... We see the same fact in the great difference
between the inhabitants of Australia, Africa, and South America
under the same latitude, for these countries are almost as much
isolated from one another as possible. On each continent, also, we
see the same fact; for on the opposite sides of lofty and continuous
mountain ranges, of great deserts, and even of large rivers, we find
different productions; though as mountain chains, deserts, &c., are
not so impassable, or likely to have endured so long as the ocean-
separated continents, the differences are very inferior in degree to
those characteristic of distinct continents.” That is to say, the
differences are usually confined to species and genera, whereas in
the case of continents the differences extend to orders. Similarly in
marine productions the same laws prevail—the species on the
different sides of the American continent, for instance, being very
distinct. Now, this law cannot be explained by any reasonable
argument from design.

And still stronger does the present argument become when we look
to the fossil species contained on different continents; for these
fossil species invariably present the same characteristic stamp as the
living species now flourishing on the same continents. Thus, in
America we find fossils all presenting the characteristically
American types of animals, in Australia the characteristically
Australian types, and so on. That is to say, on every continent the
dead species resemble the living species, as we may expect that they
should, if they are all bound together by the ties of hereditary
descent; while, if different continents are compared, the fossil
species are as unlike as we have seen the living species to be.

Turning next to the case of oceanic islands, situated at some

distance from a continent. In these cases the plants and animals
found on the island, though very often differing from all other plants
and animals in the world as regards their specific type, nevertheless
in generic type resemble the plants and animals of the neighbouring
continent. The inference clearly is, that the island has been stocked
from the continent with these types—either by winds, currents,
floating trees, or numerous other modes of transport—and that, after
settling in the island, some of these imported types have retained
their specific characters, while others have varied so as to become
specific types peculiar to that island. The Galapagos Archipelago
islands are particularly instructive in this connection; for while the
whole group of islands lies at a distance of over five hundred miles
from the shores of South America, the constituent islands are
separated from one another by straits varying from twenty to thirty
miles. Now, to quote from Darwin, “Each separate island of the
Galapagos Archipelago is tenanted, and the fact is a marvellous one,
by many distinct species; but these species are related to each other
in a very much closer manner than to the inhabitants of the
American continent.” That is to say, the American continent being
some fifteen times the distance from these islands that they are from
one another, emigration to them from the continent is of much more
rare occurrence than emigration from one island to another; and
therefore, as more time for variation is thus allowed, while the
differences between the inhabitants of island and island are only
specific, the differences between the inhabitants of the islands as a
group and the inhabitants of the American continent are very often
generic. I may mention, in passing, that it was upon discovering
these relations in the case of the Galapagos Archipelago, and
pondering upon them as “marvellous facts,” that Mr. Darwin was
first led to entertain the idea that the doctrine of descent might be
the grand truth for which the science of the nineteenth century was
waiting.

The evidence from oceanic islands, however, is not yet exhausted;

for in no part of the world is there an oceanic island more than a
certain distance from a mainland in which any species of the large
class of frogs, toads, and newts is to be found. Why is this? Simply
because these animals, and their spawn, are quickly killed by
contact with sea-water; and therefore frogs, toads, and newts have
never been able to reach oceanic islands in a living state. Similarly
in all oceanic islands situated more than three hundred miles from
land, no species of the whole class of mammals is to be found,
excepting species of the only order of mammals which can fly, viz.,
bats. And, as if to make the case still stronger, these forlornly
created species of bats sometimes differ from all other bats in the
world. But can we, as reasonable men, suppose that the Deity has
chosen, without any apparent reason, never to create any frog, toad,
newt, or mammal on any oceanic island, save only such species as
are able to fly? Or, if we go so far as to say,—“There may have been
some hidden reason why batrachians and quadrupeds should not
have been created on oceanic islands,” I will adduce another very
remarkable fact, viz., that on some of these islands there occur
species of plants, the seeds of which are provided with numerous
hooks adapted to catch the hair of moving quadrupeds, and so to
become disseminated. But, as we have just seen, there are no
quadrupeds in these islands to meet this case of adaptation; so that
special creationists must resort to the almost impious hypothesis,
that in these cases the Deity only carried out half His plan, in that
while He made an elaborate provision for plants which depended for
its efficiency on the presence of quadrupeds, He nevertheless, after
all, neglected to place the quadrupeds in the same islands as the
plants! Now, I submit that such abortive attempts at adaptation bring
the thesis of the special creationists to a reductio ad absurdum; so
that the only possible explanation before us is, that while the seeds
of these plants were able to float to the islands, the quadrupeds were
not able to swim.

Perhaps in sheer desperation, however, the special creationists will

try to take refuge in the assumption that oceanic islands differ from
continents in not having been the scenes of creative power, and have
therefore depended on immigration for their inhabitants. But here
again there is no standing-room; for we have already seen that
oceanic islands are particularly rich in peculiar species which occur
nowhere else in the world; so that, as a matter of fact, if the special
creation theory is true, we must conclude that oceanic islands have
been the theatres of extraordinary creative activity; although an
exception has always been carefully made to the detriment of frogs,
toads, newts, and mammals, save only such as are able to fly.

If space permitted, I might adduce several other highly instructive

facts in this argument from geographical distribution; but I will
content myself with mentioning only one other. When Mr. Wallace
was at the Malay Archipelago, he observed that the quadrupeds
inhabiting the various islands belonged to the same or to closely
allied species. But he also observed that all the quadrupeds
inhabiting the islands lying on one side of an imaginary sinuous
line, differed widely from the quadrupeds inhabiting the islands
lying on the other side of that line. Now, soundings showed that in
exact correspondence with this imaginary sinuous line the sea was
much deeper than in any other part of the Archipelago.
Consequently, how beautiful is the explanation. We have only to
suppose that at some previous time the sea bottom was raised
sufficiently to unite all the islands on each side of the deep water
into two great tracts of land, separated from one another by the deep
strait of water. Each of these great tracts of land would then have
had their own distinctive kinds of quadrupeds—just as the American
quadrupeds are now distinct from the European; for the
comparatively narrow strait between the then Malay continents
would have offered as effectual a barrier to the migration of
quadrupeds as does the Atlantic Ocean at the present day. Hence,
when all the land slowly subsided so as to leave only its mountain
chains and table lands standing above the surface in the form of
islands, we now have the state of things which Mr. Wallace
describes—viz., two large groups of islands with the quadrupeds on
the one group differing widely from the quadrupeds on the other,
while within the limits of the same group the quadrupeds inhabiting
different islands all belong to the same or to closely allied species.
On this highly interesting subject Darwin writes, “I have not as yet
had time to follow up this subject in all quarters of the globe; but as
far as I have gone the relation holds good. For instance, Britain is
separated by a shallow channel from Europe, and the mammals are
the same on both sides, and so it is with all the islands near the
shores of America. The West Indian islands, on the other hand,
stand on a deeply submerged bank nearly 1,000 fathoms in depth,
and here we find American forms, but the species, and even the
genera, are distinct. As the amount of modification which animals
of all kinds undergo partly depends on lapse of time, and as the
islands which are separated from each other or from the mainland
by shallow channels are more likely to have been continuously
united within a recent period than the islands separated by deeper
channels, we can understand how it is that a relation exists between
the depth of the sea separating two mammalian faunas, and the
degree of their affinity—a relation which is quite inexplicable on the
theory of independent acts of creation.”

So much, then, for the argument from geographical distribution—

the many facts of crucial importance which it affords almost
resembling so many experiments devised by Nature to prove the
falsity of the special creation hypothesis. For now, let it in
conclusion be observed, that there is no physiological reason why
animals and plants of the different characters observed should
inhabit different continents, islands, seas, and so forth. As Darwin
observes, “there is hardly a climate or condition in the Old World
which cannot be paralleled in the New ... and yet how widely
different are their living productions.” And that it is not the
suitability of organisms to the areas which they inhabit which has
determined their creation upon those areas, is conclusively proved
by the effects of the artificial transportation of species by man. For
in such cases it frequently happens that the imported species thrives
quite as well in its new as in its old home, and indeed often
supplants the native species. As the Maoris say,—“As the white
man's rat has driven away the native rat, so the European fly has
driven away our fly, so the clover kills our fern, and so will the
Maori himself disappear before the white man.”

Upon the whole then we are driven to the conclusion, that if the
special creation theory is true, the various plants and animals have
not been placed in the various habitats which they occupy with any
reference to the suitability of these habitats to the organisations of
these particular plants and animals. So that, considering all the
evidence under the head of geographical distribution, I think we are
driven to the yet further conclusion, that if the special creation
theory is true, the only principle which appears to have been
consistently followed in the geographical deposition of species, is
the principle of so depositing them as in all cases to make it appear
that the supposition of their having been thus deposited is not
merely a highly dubious one, but one which, on the face of it, is
conspicuously absurd.
 V.
THE ARGUMENT FROM EMBRYOLOGY.

THERE is still another important line of evidence which we cannot

afford to overlook; I mean the argument from embryology. To
economise space, I shall not explain the considerations which
obviously lead to the anticipation that, if the theory of descent by
inheritance is true, the life history of the individual ought to
constitute a sort of condensed epitome of the whole history of its
descent. But taking this anticipation for granted, as it is fully
realised by the facts of embryology, it follows that the science of
embryology affords perhaps the strongest of all the strong
arguments in favour of evolution. From the nature of the case,
however, the evidence under this head requires special training to
appreciate; so I will merely observe, in general terms, that the
higher animals almost invariably pass through the same
embryological stages as the lower ones, up to the time when the
higher animal begins to assume its higher characters. Thus, for
instance, to take the case of the highest animal, man, his
development begins from a speck of living matter similar to that
from which the development of a plant begins. And, when his
animality becomes established, he exhibits the fundamental
anatomical qualities which characterise such lowly animals as the
jelly-fish. Next he is marked off as a vertebrate, but it cannot be said
whether he is to be a fish, a snake, a bird or a beast. Later on it is
evident that he is to be a mammal; but not till still later can it be said
to which order of mammals he belongs.

Now this progressive inheritance by higher types of embryological

characters common to lower types is a fact which tells greatly in
favour of the theory of descent, whilst it seems almost fatal to the
theory of design. For instance, to take a specific case, Mr. Lewes
remarks of a species of salamander—which differs from most
salamanders in being exclusively terrestrial—that although its
young ones can never require gills, yet on cutting open a pregnant
female we find the young ones to possess gills like aquatic
salamanders; and when placed in the water the young ones swim
about like the tadpoles of the water newt. Now, to suppose that these
utterly useless gills were specially designed is to suppose design
without any assignable purpose; for even the far-fetched assumption
that a unity of ideal is the cause of organic affinities, becomes
positively ridiculous when applied to the case of embryonic
structures, which are destined to disappear before the animal is
born. Who, for instance, would have the courage to affirm that the
Deity had any such motive in providing, not only the unborn young
of specially created salamanders, but also the unborn young of
specially created man, with the essential anatomical features of
gills?

But this remark leads us to consider a little more attentively the

anatomical features presented by the human embryo. The gill-slits
just mentioned occur on each side of the neck, and to them the
arteries run in branching arches, as in a fish. This, in fact, is the
stage through which the branchiæ of a fish are developed, and
therefore in fish the slits remain open during life, while the so called
“visceral arches” throw out filaments which receive the arterial
branches coming from the aortic arches, and so become the organs
of respiration, or branchiæ. But in all the other vertebrata (i.e.
except fish and amphibia) the gill-slits do not develop branchiæ,
become closed (with the frequent exception of the first), and so
never subserve the function of respiration. Or, as Mr. Darwin states
it, “At this period the arteries run in arch-like branches, as if to carry
the blood to branchiæ which are not present in the higher vertebrata,
though the slits on the sides of the neck still remain, marking their
former position.”

The heart is at first a simple pulsating vessel, like the heart of the
lowest fishes, and the excreta are voided through a common cloacal
passage—an anatomical feature so characteristic of the lower
vertebrata, that it occurs in no fully formed member of the
mammalian group, with the exception of the bird-like order of
monotremata, which takes its name from presenting so striking a
peculiarity.

At a later period the human embryo is provided with a very

conspicuous tail, which is considerably longer than the rudimentary
legs occurring at that period of development, and which Professor
Turner has found to be provided with muscles—the extensor, which
is so largely developed in many animals, being especially well
marked.

Again, as Mr. Darwin says, “In the embryos of all air-breathing

vertebrates, certain glands, called the corpora Wolffiana, correspond
with and act like the kidneys of mature fishes;” and during the sixth
month the whole body is covered very thickly with wool-like hair—
even the forehead and ears being closely coated; but it is, as Mr.
Darwin observes, “a significant fact that the palms of the hands and
the soles of the feet are quite naked, like the inferior surfaces of all
four extremities in most of the lower animals,” including monkeys.

Lastly, Professor Wyman has found that in a human embryo about

an inch in length, “the great toe was shorter than the others; and,
instead of being parallel to them, projected at an angle from the side
of the foot, thus corresponding with the permanent condition of this
part in the quadrumana.”[1]

Therefore, on the whole, we may conclude these brief remarks on

embryology with the words of Professor Huxley:—“Without
question, the mode of origin, and the early stages of the
development of man, are identical with those of the animals
immediately below him in the scale; without a doubt, in these
respects he is far nearer to apes than the apes are to the dog.”[2]
[1] Proc. Amer. Acad. Scs., vol. iv., 1860, p. 17. It should be added,
however, that although the direction taken by the great toe of man at this
early age is doubtless, as Prof. Wyman states, more like that which
obtains in the quadrumana, there is a slight anatomical difference in the
mode of its articulation with the foot, which seems to assist in securing
the forward direction taken by it in later life.
[2] Man's Place in Nature, p. 65.
 VI.
ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM CERTAIN GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS.

THERE are two or three arguments of a somewhat weighty character,

which do not fall under any of the previous headings, but which we
must not on this account neglect.

1. It is justly deemed a substantiation of a scientific theory if it is

found to furnish an explanation of other classes of phenomena than
those for the explanation of which it was first devised. And this is
the case with the theory of natural selection in the region of
psychology. The theory was first devised to explain the facts of
biology, and proving so successful in that region, Mr. Darwin
proceeded to test it in the region of psychology. The result has been
to show that large classes of phenomena in this region which were
previously unaccountable become fully intelligible. This is
especially the case with the phenomena of instinct, and in a lesser
degree with those of reason and conscience. For the theory shows
that if structures admit of being moulded to their special uses by
natural selection, the same must be true of instincts; and it is found
an easy matter to understand how, by seizing upon and fixing,
through hereditary beneficial variations of habit (whether instinctive
or intelligent), natural selection is as competent to fashion the
mental structure of an animal as it is to shape its bodily structure
into agreement with the external conditions of life. Thus the whole
philosophy of animal intelligence is greatly elucidated, and this fact
may justly be regarded as lending much additional credence to the
theory.

Again, by observing that sympathy and the social instincts generally

are developed to a large extent in many of the lower animals, and
particularly so in the quadrumana, the theory of natural selection is
provided with a reasonable basis for furnishing a scientific
explanation of the moral sense in man; and by observing that many
of the lower animals are capable of drawing simple inferences, the
theory is likewise able to explain the development of reason. So that
in the province of human psychology no less than in that of animal,
the theory of natural selection, in showing itself competent to
explain much which is otherwise inexplicable, is seen to derive a
large additional measure of argumentative support.

2. Although the majority of structures and instincts met with in the

animal kingdom are in a marvellous degree suited to the
performance of their functions and uses, it is nevertheless far from
being an invariable rule that the suitability is perfect. Thus, for
instance, even in the case of the eye—which is perhaps the most
wonderful and most highly elaborated structure in organic nature—
it is demonstrable that the organ, considered as an optical
instrument, is not ideally perfect; so that, if it were an artificial
production, opticians would know how to improve it. And as for
instinct, numberless cases might be adduced of imperfection,
ranging in all degrees from a slight deficiency to fatal blundering.

Now if all organic structures are supposed to be mechanisms

designed by the Deity, and all instincts are supposed to be mental
attributes implanted by Him, it becomes unintelligible that in the
result the human mind should thus be able to perceive, either an
ignorance of natural principles in the Author of nature, or a singular
absence of thought in applying His knowledge. But, on the other
hand, if all the structures and instincts are supposed to be due to
natural selection (whether alone or in conjunction with other natural
causes), we have no need to feel staggered at flagrant cases of
imperfection; we have only to wonder at the number of cases in
which perfection, more or less complete, has been attained.

3. Lastly, there is still another general consideration, and one which

appeals to my mind as of immense weight. The question, it will be
remembered, lies between beneficent design and natural selection,
and I think that the consideration about to be adduced is in itself
alone sufficient to decide the question.

This consideration is that amid all the millions of mechanisms and

instincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a
mechanism or instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive
benefit of another species, although there are a few cases in which a
mechanism or instinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come
also to be utilised by other species. Now, on the beneficent design
theory it is impossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in
the same species are invariably correlated for the benefit of that
species, there should never be any such correlation between
mechanisms in different species, or why the same remark should
apply to instincts. For how magnificent a display of divine
beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if all, or even
some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to each other's
necessities. Organic species might then have been likened to a
countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm
of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination;
every species is for itself, and for itself alone—an outcome of the
always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life.

Such, then, is a sketch of the evidence in favour of organic

evolution. Of course in such a meagre outline it has not been
possible to do justice to that evidence, which should be studied in
detail rather than looked at in such a bird's-eye view as I have
presented. Nevertheless, enough, I hope, has been said to convince
all reasonable persons, that any longer to withhold assent from so
vast a body of evidence is a token, not of intellectual prudence, but
of intellectual incapacity. With Professor Huxley, therefore, I
exclaim,—“Choose your hypothesis; I have chosen mine,” and “I
refuse to run the risk of insulting any sane man by supposing that he
seriously holds such a notion” as that of special creation. These
words, I submit, are not in the least too strong; for if any man can
study the many and important lines of evidence all converging on
the central truth that evolution has been the law of organic nature,
and still fail to perceive the certainty of that truth, then I say that
that man—either on account of his prejudices, or from his inability
to estimate the value of evidence—must properly be regarded as a
weak-minded man. Or, to state the case in another way, if such a
man were to say to me,—Notwithstanding all your lines of
evidence, I still believe in special design manifested in creation; I
should reply,—And in this I fully agree with you; for if,
notwithstanding these numerous and important lines of evidence,
the theory which they substantiate is false, then to my mind we have
the best conceivable evidence of very special design having been
manifested in creation—the special design, namely, to deceive
mankind by an elaborate, detailed, and systematic fraud. For, if the
theory of special creation is true, I hold that as no one fact can be
adduced in its favour, whilst so vast a body of facts can be adduced
against it, the only possible explanation of so extraordinary a
circumstance is that of a mendacious intelligence of superhuman
power carefully disposing all the observable facts of his creation in
such a way as to compel his rational creatures, by the best and most
impartial use of their rational faculties, to conclude that the theory
of evolution is as certainly true as the theory of special creation is
conspicuously false.

But having now concluded this brief review of the leading

arguments in favour of organic evolution, and having expressed as
forcibly as I am able my own opinion upon them, I do not wish it to
be supposed, either that I am intolerant of opinions which are held
by others, or that I have been trying to, “make out a case” by
suppressing adverse facts. I am not intolerant, because I believe that
dissent from the general doctrine of evolution can only arise either
from ignorance of some special departments of science, or from a
bias of feeling against the doctrine—to both of which weaknesses
evolutionists can afford to be indulgent. And in order to show that I
have not been trying unfairly to make out a case, I shall conclude by
briefly reviewing the arguments which have been adduced against
the doctrine in question.

The only argument of this kind that I know from the side of reason
(if we neglect those special objections which have been fully shown
by Mr. Darwin himself to be based on inadequate information or
erroneous conception, and therefore futile), is that which says:—
Evolution, if true, can only be proved so by an actual observation of
the process, and as no one pretends to have witnessed the
transmutation of species, it follows that evolution has not been
proved.

Now, it is perfectly right to draw a clear distinction between a

theory and a demonstration; but it is a great mistake to suppose that
a theory may then only be admitted by science when it has been
demonstrated. Bishop Butler tells us that “Probability is the guide of
life,” and not less true is it that probability is likewise the guide of
science. The business of science, as of common life, is to estimate
correctly the relative degrees of probability presented by this and
that theory or hypothesis; when once a theory or hypothesis is
demonstrated it ceases to be a matter of scientific inquiry, and
becomes a matter of scientific fact. Thus received, we have to
consider the doctrine of evolution as certainly standing in the first
rank of scientific theories in respect of probability sustained by
evidence, although no less certainly not demonstrated as a matter of
scientific fact. But when a theory has been raised to such a level of
probability as this, it is, for all practical purposes, as good as a
demonstration. Thus, in the particular instance before us, even if the
sceptical demand for evidence, which from the nature of the case is
clearly impossible, were granted, and if we could actually observe
the transmutation of species, the fact would not exert any further
influence on the progress of science than is now exerted by the large
and converging bodies of evidence which leave no other rational
theory open to us than that such transmutation has taken place.
Therefore, it seems to me, the hypercritical objection which we are
considering is really founded on a misconception of scientific
method, and of what it is that justifies a scientific doctrine.
Assuredly, in the case of every theory, as distinguished from a
demonstration, there must always be a proportion between the
evidence of and the warrant for the proposition which the theory
states; and if gauged by this simple rule the warrant for accepting
the theory of evolution is now estimated by the judgment of all
scientifically trained minds as so high, that by no additional
evidence could it be placed higher without becoming a full
demonstration. Or, otherwise stated, as a theory the doctrine of
descent is now in the topmost position of probability, so that by no
amount of additional evidence could it be raised higher without
ceasing to be a probability and becoming a certainty. That is to say,
we do not need any more evidence in any of the lines of evidence to
add to the strength of our belief in, as distinguished from our
knowledge of, the truth of evolution. For the strength of our
conviction could not be increased by the discovery of any additional
number of connecting links among fossil species, further facts
relating to geographical distribution, to morphology, classification,
embryology, or any of the other lines of evidence which have been
mentioned; no further evidence the same in kind is now competent
to raise in degree the probability which has already been raised, as
far as from its very nature as a probability it can be raised.

I have no doubt, however, that the principal obstacle which the

doctrine of evolution encounters in the popular mind is not one of
reason, but of sentiment. It is thought that the conception of man
being a lineal descendant of the monkey is a conception which is
degrading to the dignity of the former animal. Now this obstacle
being, as I have said, a matter of feeling or sentiment, as such I am
not able to meet it. If you think that man is shown to be any less
human because his origin is now shown to have been derivative, I
cannot change that decision on your part; I can only express dissent
from it on my own. But although I cannot affect your sentiments in
this matter, I may be permitted to point out that, as they are only
sentiments, they are quite worthless as arguments or guides to truth.
I have yet to learn that the “dignity of man” is a matter of any
concern to our Mother Nature, who in all her dealings appears, to
say the least, to treat us in rather a matter-of-fact sort of way.
Indeed, so far is she from respecting our ideas of “dignity,” that
whenever these ideas have been applied to any of her processes, the
progress of science has been destined rudely to dispel them. Thus,
for instance, when the sun-spots were first observed they were
indignantly denied by the Aristotelians, on the ground of its being
“impossible that the eye of the universe could suffer from
ophthalmia;” and when Kepler made his great discovery of the
accelerated and retarded motion of the planets in different parts of
their orbits, many persons refused to entertain the conception, on the
ground that it was “undignified” for heavenly bodies to hurry and
slacken their pace in accordance with Kepler's law. This now seems
most absurd to us; but to posterity it will not seem nearly so much
so as that, notwithstanding such precedents, persons should still be
found to object to Darwin's discovery, not because they were
anxious to maintain the dignity of the heavenly bodies, but because
they were so ludicrously anxious to maintain the dignity of their
own! Good it is for man, puffed up with such silly pride, that Nature
teaches him humility.

But, before leaving this subject, I should like further to point out
that those who advance this preposterous objection from dignity
appear to forget one all-important point, viz., that whether or not the
monkey is the parent of the man, the man is certainly made in every
way to _look like_ a child of the monkey. For it is a matter of
anatomical demonstration, that in all the features of our bodily
structure—even up to our brains—we more closely resemble the
man-like apes than the man-like apes resemble the lower
quadrumana. And I beg it to be remembered that the tremendous
significance of this fact can only be duly appreciated by those who
know the astounding complexity of our bodily structure. Those who
are ignorant of human anatomy cannot form any adequate—
probably not even an approximate—conception of its intricacy. Yet
we find that this terrifically intricate organisation is repeated down
to all the minute bones and muscles, blood-vessels, nerves and
viscera, in the bodies of the higher apes. Here, then, I say, we have a
fact—or rather let me say a hundred thousand facts—which cannot
possibly be attributed to chance. As reasonable beings we must
conclude that there has been some definite cause for this
extraordinary imitation by the most highly organised being in
creation of the next most highly organised. And if we reject the
natural explanation of hereditary descent from a common ancestry,
we can only suppose that the Deity, in creating man, took the most
scrupulous pains to make him in the image of the ape. This, I say, is
a matter of undeniable fact—supposing the creation theory true—
and as a matter of fact, therefore, it calls for explanation. Why
should God have thus conditioned man as an elaborate copy of the
ape, when we know from the rest of creation how endless are His
resources in the invention of types?

I present the matter thus to show that even the weight of sentiment
is not all on the side of special creation. Look on this picture and on
this:—

The Creator has exhibited the extraordinary and unaccountable

design of casting the complex structure of man in the same mould
that He had just previously used to cast the complex structure of the
ape.

“When I view all beings, not as special creations, but as the lineal
descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first
bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to me to
become ennobled.... There is grandeur in this view of life, with its
several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into
a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling
on according to the first law of gravity, from so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are
being evolved.”

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