A Beginner’s Guide

to Internet of Things
Security
 A Beginner’s Guide
to Internet of Things
Security
Attacks, Applications,
Authentication, and Fundamentals

B. B. Gupta
Aakanksha Tewari
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

© 2020 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

No claim to original U.S. Government works

Printed on acid-free paper

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-367-43069-6 (Hardback)

This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources.
Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the
author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the
consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright
holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if
permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not
been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint.

Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted,
reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other
means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission
from the publishers.

For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access
www.copyright.com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance
Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-
for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For
organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of
payment has been arranged.

Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered

trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

http://www.taylorandfrancis.com

and the CRC Press Web site at

http://www.crcpress.com
Dedicated to my parents and family for their constant support during
the course of this book.

-B. B. Gupta

Dedicated to my mentor, my parents, and my friends for their constant

encouragement and belief during the course of this book.

-Aakanksha Tewari
Contents

Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Authors xv

1 Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT): History, Forecasts,

and Security 1
1.1 Evolution of IoT 2
1.2 Statistics and Forecasts 4
1.3 Fundamentals of IoT Security 8
1.3.1 Security at Different Layers 8
1.3.2 System Requirements of the IoT System 8
1.4 Conclusion 9

2 IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols 11

2.1 Layered IoT Architecture 12
2.2 Security and Privacy Issues with IoT Architecture 13
2.2.1 Perception-Layer Security Problems 13
2.2.2 Network-Layer Security Problems 14
2.2.3 Application-Layer Security Problems 14
2.3 IoT Protocol Design 15
2.3.1 Protocol Stack for IoT 15
2.3.2 Security
 Requirements 16
2.4 IETF and IEEE Design Standards 17
2.5 Taxonomy of Threats to IoT Networks 17
2.6 Conclusion 19

3 IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies 21

3.1 IoT Experimentation Setups 21
3.2 Platforms and Software Tools for IoT Simulation 22
3.3 Integration of IoT with Various Domains 23
3.3.1 Data Storage 23
3.3.2 Cloud Computing 25
3.3.3 Big
 Data 26
3.3.4 Fog
 Computing 27
3.4 IoT and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 28

vii
viii Contents

4 Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 31

4.1 M2M to IoT 32
4.2 IoT and Secure Automation 34
4.3 IIoT Applications 35
4.4 IIoT and Cybersecurity 38
4.5 Conclusion 39

41
5.1 Privacy in IoT 41
5.2 Threat to Data Privacy in IoT 43
5.3 Enforcing Trust in IoT 44
5.4 Trust Management 46
5.5 Conclusion 47

6 Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 49

6.1 Data Security in IoT 50
6.2 IoT Limitations 51
6.3 Need for Authentication and Access Control in IoT 51
6.4 System Requirements for Authentication Mechanisms 52
6.5 Taxonomy of IoT Authentication Protocols 53
6.5.1 Hash-Based
 Protocols 53
6.5.2 ECC-Based
 Protocols 56
6.5.3 PUF-Based
 Protocols 56
6.5.4 HB
 Protocols 57
6.5.5 Ultra-Lightweight
 Protocols 58
6.6 Conclusion 59

7 Provable Security Models and Existing Protocols 61

7.1 Provable Security Models 62
7.1.1 Vaudeney’s Model 62
7.1.2 Canard et al.’s Model 64
7.1.3 Universal Composability Framework 66
7.1.4 Juels–Weis Challenge–Response Model 67
7.2 Issues with Security Models 70

8 An Internet of Things (IoT)-Based Security Approach

Ensuring Robust Location Privacy for the Healthcare
Environment 73
8.1 Problem Definition 74
8.2 Abstract Overview 74
8.3 Detailed Protocol Description 75
 Contents ix

8.3.1 Location Privacy-Based Mutual Authentication

Protocol75
8.3.2 Authentication of IoT Devices 76
8.4 IoT Authentication Scheme Ensuring Location Privacy 76
8.4.1 Concept of a Basic Location Privacy-Based
Authentication Scheme78
8.5 Security Analysis 78
8.5.1 Game-Based Security Model 78
8.5.2 Strong Location Privacy 80
8.6 Performance Analysis 81
8.7 Conclusion 81

References 83
Index 91
Preface

The potential capabilities of Internet of Things (IoT) can reduce a lot of time
and expenditure of various organizations. These devices are excellent data
collectors and sensors; therefore, they can help in efficient decision-making
in a wide range of applications. However, security remains the biggest issue in
the IoT domain. A lot of research is being carried out in this area to provide
strong security and privacy mechanisms in IoT networks. The development
of standards and protocol sets is necessary to build the IoT network properly.
Only time will ultimately tell how far IoT will reach and how it will reshape
the world. However, by the planned integration of existing technologies, we
can make IoT networks secure and more efficient. We address various issues in
securing IoT networks, which enabled us to develop various mutual authentica-
tion protocols that strengthen the security and privacy of IoT devices and pre-
vent confidential data from theft. The present scenario of IoT research is mainly
focused on the development of technologies for its implementation. By exam-
ining the recent statistics and literature, it also uncovers various challenges
that have the potential to prevent IoT from growing to its full potential.
Specifically, the chapters contained in this book are summarized as
follows:

Chapter 1: Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT): History, Forecasts,

and Security. This chapter introduces the origin and concept of IoT along with
its system requirements. It also explores the significance of security in the IoT
domain by providing an in-depth statistical analysis of past events and future
predictions.
Chapter 2: IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols. This chapter provides
an overview of design and system requirements of IoT networks and security
and privacy issues linked to the architecture. It also elaborates the configura-
tion and underlying standards and protocols necessary for the development
of IoT. This chapter also highlights the security requirements for platform
development.
Chapter 3: IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies. This chapter
discusses various domains and the support they need from IoT for their
growth. It also illuminates the security aspects of the integration of IoT with
other domains such as cloud computing and big data.

xi
xii Preface

Chapter 4: Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). This chapter discusses

the applications of IoT in industries. It explores various technologies such as
edge computing, mobile technologies, and 3D printing, which have helped in
realizing IIoT. We also discuss cybersecurity and the modular architecture of
IIoT and how security comes into play with each module.
Chapter 5: Trust and Privacy in IoT. This chapter facilitates the
significance of trust and privacy in IoT and how the lack of any one of these
can diminish users’ faith, which may result in the failure of any technology.
It elaborates on the types of attacks and the degree of damage they can do to
the networks. This chapter also gives an overview of methodologies through
which trust can be ensured within a network.
Chapter 6: Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks. This
chapter discusses how authentication mechanisms can secure IoT networks.
It illuminates the workflow of authentication schemes customized for IoT and
their feasibility and cost analysis.
Chapter 7: Provable Security Models and Existing Protocols. Further
exploring the authentication-based security schemes, this chapter discusses
some provable security models and existing protocols that have used these
schemes, as they are crucial in ensuring that a protocol is secure.
Chapter 8: An Internet of Things (IoT)-Based Security Approach
Ensuring Robust Location Privacy for the Healthcare Environment. This
chapter discusses a simple low-cost authentication protocol, which ensures
strong location privacy by giving proof of indistinguishability and forward
secrecy. Further, it elaborates on the security strength of the protocol by a
game-based model.
Acknowledgments

Writing a book is a huge task and more rewarding than one could fathom. This
book entitled A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security is the result of
great contributions and encouragement from many people. None of this would
have been possible without their ideas and support, which has helped greatly
in enhancing the quality of this book. The authors would like to acknowledge
the incredible CRC Press/Taylor & Francis Group staff, particularly Randi
Cohen and her team, for their continuous assistance and motivation. This book
would not have been possible without their technical support. The authors are
eternally grateful to their families for their love and unconditional support at
all times. In the end, the authors are most thankful towards the Almighty who
is always helping us to overcome every obstacle not only for this work but also
throughout our lives.
September 2019
B. B. Gupta
Aakanksha Tewari

xiii
Authors

B. B. Gupta received a Ph.D. degree from the Indian Institute of Technology

Roorkee, India, in the area of information and cybersecurity. He has published
more than 200 research papers in international journals and conferences
of high repute, including IEEE, Elsevier, ACM, Springer, Wiley, Taylor &
Francis, Inderscience, etc. He has visited several countries, that is, Canada,
Japan, Malaysia, Australia, China, Hong-Kong, Italy, and Spain, to present his
research work. His biography was selected and published in the 30th edition
of Marquis Who’s Who in the World, 2012. Dr. Gupta also received the Young
Faculty Research Fellowship Award from the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology, Government of India, in 2018. He is also working as
a principal investigator of various R&D projects. He is serving as an associate
editor of IEEE Access and IEEE TII, and an executive editor of IJITCA and
Inderscience, respectively. At present, Dr. Gupta is working as an assistant
professor in the Department of Computer Engineering, National Institute of
Technology, Kurukshetra, India. His research interests include information
security, cybersecurity, mobile security, cloud computing, web security, intru-
sion detection, and phishing.

Aakanksha Tewari is a Ph.D. scholar in the Department of Computer

Engineering at the National Institute of Technology (NIT), Kurukshetra, India.
Her research interests include computer networks, information security, cloud
computing, phishing detection, Internet of Things, radio frequency identifi-
cation (RFID) authentication, and number theory and cryptography. She has
done her M. Tech. (Computer Engineering) from the Department of Computer
Engineering at the National Institute of Technology (NIT), Kurukshetra,
India. She has participated and won in various national workshops and poster
presentations. Currently, her research work is based on security and privacy in
IoT networks and mutual authentication of RFID tags.

xv
Evolution of
Internet of
Things (IoT)
1
History, Forecasts,
and Security
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a new paradigm which is transforming
everything from the consumer market, that is, household devices to industrial
applications at large scales. The Internet was always intended to bring pieces
of software, services, and people together on one platform at a global level [1].
Nowadays with the evolution of IoT, day-to-day objects have also become
a part of the Internet sending and receiving updates continuously from one
place to another. Therefore, we can define IoT as a network of interconnected
devices, which provide services and share data-connecting and performing
tasks in various applications [2].
The highly distributed and dynamic nature of IoT enables it to receive and
store data continuously in huge amounts. For example, in the field of health-
care, it has led to remote health monitoring, emergency notifications, etc. The
consumer electronics markets are also exploding with wearable gadgets [3].
Various domains such as wireless sensor networks (WSN), embedded systems,
and radio frequency identification (RFID) are found to be huge contributors
towards the growth of IoT.
As IoT is an evolving domain, it requires a lot of attention from the
researchers and the industry as well. Various standardization organizations
such as IEEE and IETF are also working towards developing standards and
protocols for IoT architecture. The sensors and actuators that are consumed in

1
2 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

the consumer electronics market are very low cost and small sized and have
high computational capabilities, which are the reasons for the growth of IoT as
automation is made so easy. Industries are also deploying IoT at large scales
such as in retail management and transportation [3,4].
The understructure for IoT is the Internet providing connectivity, which
also adds to the vulnerabilities in these networks. IoT networks face the same
security threats as the Internet; in addition, due to their limited capabilities and
simpler architecture, they are easier to compromise. At the physical layer, most
of the IoT devices use RFID, therefore ensuring that RFID tags can secure our
data from any threat to security and privacy [5].
Our aim is to perform an in-depth analysis of the recent advancements in
the field of security and privacy in IoT networks. Research needs to be done
in order to facilitate the integration of IoT with other technologies in a secure
environment. This can be accomplished by designing standard communi-
cation methodologies and standard protocols. It is a primary requirement
to make IoT power efficient and reliable. The use of proper authentication
mechanisms is one way to ensure security against various attacks and main-
tain the availability and integrity of data and services at all times for autho-
rized users.

1.1 EVOLUTION OF IoT

In order to grasp the concept of IoT, it is important that we dig a little deeper
towards the history of IoT and how it became what it is today. During 1982, a
group of programmers at Carnegie Mellon University were successful in con-
necting a soda-dispensing machine to the Internet, which was able to check
whether the machine has any cold soda cans left before going to purchase.
In 1990, John Romkey connected a toaster to the Internet through which he
was able to turn it on and off. These are the few earliest examples of automa-
tion before IoT. The year 1999 brought a big reform to consumer electronics
when the term “IoT” was coined by Kevin Ashton, director of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology s auto-ID center [6,7].
The first Internet-connected refrigerator was introduced in 2000. In
2004, the term “IoT” was used by magazines such as The Guardian. During
the same period, the RFID technology was also being deployed on a large
scale in various industries such as Walmart. During 2005, UN’s (United
Nations) international telecom union (ITU) stated that IoT is a new dimen-
sion of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), which will
 1 • Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) 3

multiply the connections leading to a new dynamic network [8]. In 2007,

the first iPhone was out in the market, which changed the whole scenario of
communication between users. In 2010, the Chinese government declared
IoT to be a key technology and a major part of China’s long-term develop-
ment [9].
In 2011, Nest developed a Wi-Fi-enabled thermostat, which was capa-
ble of modifying the atmosphere by monitoring users’ habits. Platforms like
Arduino were made more advanced so that they simplify IoT-based simulation
for experimentation purposes [10]. In 2014, Amazon released Echo into the
smart home domain. The research firm Gartner added IoT to their hype cycle,
which is their graph that compares popular technologies. In 2016, Apple show-
cased HomeKit, which is a proprietary platform for supporting smart home
appliance software. During the same year, the first IoT-related malware called
Mirai was discovered, which collected default credentials through which it
attacked devices using them. In 2017, governments started taking IoT security
seriously as a result of several violations [11]. Various countries proposed a ban
for hard-coded passwords.
In the past few years, IoT devices and related technologies have gotten
a little cheaper and broadly accepted globally. In the long term, IoT is going
to be the new normal. However, Gartner reports claim that IoT is going to
hit a plateau in the coming years. Figure 1.1 shows a brief timeline for IoT
development.

FIGURE 1.1 Brief history of IoT and RFID technology.

4 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

1.2 STATISTICS AND FORECASTS

To secure IoT devices, we need to incorporate security between the network
connections and the software applications that run on those devices. It is
anticipated that in the next ten years, a shift will happen from consumer-based
IoT to industrial IoT. However, it is not sure whether the users and industry
are fully aware of the impact that IoT is going to have in the next few years.
According to Gartner’s report, by 2020, 95% of consumer electronics will
be enabled by IoT. As IoT networks are evolving into huge ecosystems, the
government needs to devise some cybersecurity plans that can recognize
threats and prevent them. Some of the recent trends that show the significance
of IoT are as follows [10]:

• The number of Internet-connected devices surpassed the number

of people on the planet in 2008, and it is estimated that by 2020,
a number of Internet-connected devices will be around 50 billion.
• IoT is having a huge economic impact on the consumer electronics
market; it is estimated that IoT technology will make about 19
trillion dollars of profit in the coming decade.
• It is estimated that by the end of 2019, about 2 billion home appli-
ances will be shipped and will make homes a part of the Internet
as well.
• Healthcare domain has adopted IoT at a large scale, and it is
estimated that by 2025, the total worth of IoT in the markets will be
around $6.2 trillion.
• In the past few years, it was estimated that about 10% of the total
number of cars are connected to the Internet, and by 2020, it will
reach 90%.
• A report by McKinsey & Company estimated that the total revenue
generated by IoT will range from $4 to $11 trillion by 2025.

The aforementioned trends show that the rapid growth IoT has been in the past
few years as well as its potential growth in the coming years. It is estimated that
the economy of IoT security will be around $28.90 billion in 2020. However,
in 2015, it was $6.89 billion. The growth in IoT requires a significant amount
of investment in its security as well. We need security mechanisms that can
protect the IoT network architecture as a whole [12,13].
The current rate of development in IoT technology will help us predict
its future. Currently, the number of connected IoT devices is around
5 billion, most of which are personal devices. Most of the devices are
 1 • Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) 5

consumer based, and the largest increase in number is shown by automotive.

IoT has provided various business opportunities, such as smart homes and
automobiles with better decision-making skills. However, we also need to
address and resolve any security issues, which might prove to be a big threat
to IoT networks in the future. Hewlett-Packard (HP) reported that about
70% of connected IoT devices these days are vulnerable to various threats
due to their default settings. In a report by Harvard Business Review, it was
estimated that nearly 45% of IoT networks have to deal with data privacy-
related issues [14]. Figure 1.2 shows the rate of growth of IoT applications
in the next ten years.
Every IoT device needs a unique identification technique so that there is
no ambiguity in communication. The most popular identification technique
these days is RFID, which has several advantages over the barcode. The
RFID system consists of RFID tags, a reader, and a database or distributed
databases, which keep records of the objects or devices within the network.
RFID technology uses radio frequency mechanism for unique identification
of objects. Every RFID tag contains a chip that has some storage, space, and
sensing capability. In the last couple of years, significant growth in the use of
RFID technology with various applications has given rise to various security
threats such as a denial of service, man-in-the-middle, and desynchronization
attacks.
To promote IoT and make larger networks, we must consider their security
issues that affect the development of IoT networks and devices. Nowadays,
attackers are always one step ahead of existing security mechanisms; they can

FIGURE 1.2 Percentage growth of IoT applications in the next ten years.
(Source: DBS Bank.)
6 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

carry out attacks, which can disrupt services or transfer control to attackers at
remote locations. IoT devices are vulnerable to various attacks such as replay,
forgery, phishing, and denial of service.
In January 2015, Proofpoint revealed a spamming incident where the traf-
fic was routed through several devices across various countries. This global
attack had more than 750,000 malicious emails transferred from various
locations, which were sent from consumer devices such as home routers,
televisions, media and centers. Later on, it was discovered that at least one
refrigerator was also involved in this attack. It was observed that the incident
started from December 23, 2014, and continued till January 6, 2014, where
the malicious email traffic was sent thrice a day with a burst size of 100,000
emails each. The targets were both enterprises and individuals. The primary
cause of these attacks was a lack of caution and awareness. The attackers
exploited misconfigurations and the continued use of default passwords, which
made the devices vulnerable and easy to control [13–15].
Another wave of IoT attacks occurred in 2016, which mainly involved
devices such as IP cameras and routers. The compromised devices were turned
into botnets. These botnets were used collectively to launch attacks on a large
scale. The cybercriminals are becoming more and more advanced. In an attack
in 2018, a device that controlled around 15 CCTV cameras was attacked.
However, in due time, the security operator detected the malicious activity and
issued a warning that this might infect many more CCTV models. Another
cause of these flaws is a lack of complete patching of IoT devices [16].
The IoT-based companies sometimes ignore security, or they are not expe-
rienced enough to realize the gravity of the situation (Figures 1.3 and 1.4).
Lack of consumer awareness is also a very big cause behind these successful
attacks. Consumers are often excited about the features and functions these
devices provide so that they do not pay attention to security updates and setting
strong passwords.

FIGURE 1.3 Growth in IoT consumer devices. (Source: Gartner, Inc.)

 1 • Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) 7

FIGURE 1.4 Top five IoT-based industries from 2017 to 2022.

The attacks are proof of the lack of security schemes in IoT networks,
which need to be taken very seriously. In the current scenario, IoT gadgets are
vulnerable to various attacks that may disrupt their services and transfer the
control to some remote attacker. The attacker can impersonate a server and
make the devices decrease their message-sending rates or increase the rate of
their resource consumption and bandwidth. The attacker might also imper-
sonate any tag and send multiple fake requests to engage servers’ resources
eventually leading to DoS.
IoT devices are also needed to be protected from a wide range of threats,
which include malware infections, disruption of services, and information
theft. The attacker could easily gain in controlling the devices that are a
part of smart home, automobiles, or personal fitness and disease-monitoring
gadgets. An attacker can simply hack the software in a person’s smart watch
or an insulin pump to track their location, or they might gain access to
the information systems present in the automobiles and use them to carry
malicious activities.
The most serious threat IoT devices face is malware such as Trojans,
viruses, and worms that can disable IoT systems. Besides, this work also needs
to be done to ensure that updates received by IoT devices are secure along with
secure default settings. There is still a huge room for improvement when it
comes to securing the IoT architecture.
8 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

1.3 FUNDAMENTALS OF IoT SECURITY

To implement IoT in real time, we need to integrate it with other existing
technologies. However, due to the lack of standards, IoT does not have a
fixed architecture yet. Various groups are working on developing protocols
and standard modular or layered IoT architecture. The existing idea of IoT
architecture has three layers (which in some cases are further subdivided):
perception layer, network layer, and application layer. Each layer has its own
security issues that need to be resolved to facilitate its growth. We need
security mechanisms at every layer of IoT to prevent any security and privacy
threats. In this section, we briefly discuss the security and system requirements
of IoT networks.

1.3.1 Security at Different Layers

Each layer of IoT architecture has some security- and privacy-related issues,
which we are required to be addressed in order to secure IoT applications. In
fact, all such issues should be taken into account and remedied at the very
initial stage of system design. The existing IoT architecture raises the require-
ment of proper security checks during the beginning and at regular intervals
for an IoT network as a whole. At the network layer, threats to confidentiality,
integrity, and availability should be dealt with. Attacks such as eavesdropping,
man-in-the-middle, DoS/DDoS, and network intrusion are common threats at
this layer. The application layer needs different security standards as per the
application requirements, which makes the task of securing the application
hard and complicated.

1.3.2 System Requirements of the IoT System

In order to ensure the security of an IoT system, we can ensure the basic
security requirements at the RFID level. These are considered to be basic
criteria that must be fulfilled by the protocol to protect security attacks on a
system [17].

• Mutual authentication: It is an essential requirement that the

server should authenticate the tag to be legitimate and tag should
also authenticate the server before they exchange any important
information.
 1 • Evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) 9

• Anonymity: It refers to concealing the identity from any adversary

by an encryption technique. It is said to be strong if the attacker is
not able to trace back the tag with the help of its communication
with the tag.
• Forward secrecy: It ensures that some compromised present com-
munication information could not be used to obtain past communi-
cation information.
• Confidentiality: It ensures that all the information is transferred
secretly without getting revealed to anyone except the receiver.
• Availability: It ensures that the authentication protocol works all
the time, thus not causing desynchronization between the tag and
the server.

1.4 CONCLUSION
Our research work has addressed various issues in securing IoT networks,
which enabled us to develop various mutual authentication protocols that
strengthen the security and privacy of IoT devices and prevent confidential
data from theft. We have discussed that the present scenario of IoT research
is mainly focused on the development of technologies for its implementation.
By examining the recent statistics and literature, we have also uncovered vari-
ous challenges that have the potential to prevent IoT from growing to its full
potential.
The potential capabilities of IoT can reduce a lot of time and expenditure
of various organizations. These devices are excellent data collectors and sen-
sors; therefore, they can help in efficient decision-making in a wide range of
applications. However, security remains the biggest issue in the IoT domain.
A lot of research is being carried out in this area to provide strong security
and privacy mechanisms in IoT networks. The development of standards and
protocol set is necessary to build the IoT network properly. Only time will ulti-
mately tell how far IoT will reach and how it will reshape the world. However,
by the planned integration of existing technologies, we can make IoT networks
secure and more efficient.
IoT Design,
Standards,
and Protocols
2
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a highly distributed and dynamic cyber-physical
system. It integrates devices having sensors, identification systems, storage,
communication, processing, and networking capabilities. With the advance-
ment of technology, sensors and actuators have more complex specifications,
which are available in lesser cost and smaller sizes nowadays. These devices
are making the growth of ubiquitous computing easier. Various industries are
deploying IoT for the development of industrial applications to increase auto-
mation and monitoring. The rapid advancement of technology and industrial-
ization will enable the applications of IoT in various fields and industries. For
example, consider the food industry that has integrated radio frequency iden-
tification (RFID) technology with wireless sensor networks (WSN) in order
to automate the process of monitoring, tracking, and measuring the quality of
food of any food supply chain [1,2].
In this chapter, we will survey the current scenario of security and trust
management in IoT by analyzing existing works and taxonomies of security
schemes and checking their compatibility with the existing IoT applications.
We also open issues and challenges and the expected future trends related to
IoT growth and need of security. The ongoing research in the field of IoT is
majorly focused on technology [3]. The full realization of IoT is not done yet;
therefore, there are huge opportunities of technical growth and development in
the field of IoT. However, the rapid growth rate of technology and the research
in IoT will have applications in the fields such as law, economics, management,
and social studies [4]. RFID technology, which is a primary enabler for IoT,
has also seen a rapid growth in the last couple of years. It has applications in
the field of retail management, transportation and logistics, and healthcare [8].
With the increasing use of RFID, the maintenance of security and data privacy
has also become a chief concern.
RFID systems are always deployed in bulk; these systems comprise a set
of tags that have some storage and computational capabilities. These tags are

11
12 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

monitored and identified using readers equipped with transponders to com-

municate with these tags. RFID systems are being used in retail at large scales
replacing barcodes due to their resistance to tampering and ease of reading.
RFID tags do not have to be in the line of sight of the reader for identification
and communication. However, RFID tags have a limited storage and compu-
tational capability [9,10].

2.1 LAYERED IoT ARCHITECTURE

The standardization organizations are working on designing layered architec-
ture for IoT. However, as of now, IoT devices have no standard architecture;
there are few tentative models that are being used by the researchers. The
existing IoT architectures have three, four, or five layers; the most widely used
is the three-layered architecture: application layer, middleware layer, and sen-
sor layer, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Perception/sensor layer: This layer identifies objects uniquely within the
IoT networks. It also uses sensors to collect data from its surroundings and
other objects. This layer deploys WSN or RFID tags depending upon the appli-
cations’ requirements. The data collected by the sensors is transferred to the
middleware layer for further processing.

FIGURE 2.1 IoT architecture.

 2 • IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols 13

Middleware layer: This layer provides a set of communication protocols

and network support methodologies to IoT devices. In the existing literature,
this layer has also been divided into two or more layers each providing differ-
ent services depending upon the requirements of IoT network. In some four-
layered architectures, we have a processing layer that collects and processes
data from the sensor layer; the processed data is then sent to a transport layer,
which provides access to communication technologies such as Bluetooth and
Wi-Fi to send and receive data, as shown in Figure 2.1. This layer also assigns
unique addresses to objects within a network using IPv6 addressing [12–15].
Application layer: This layer receives processed data from its subsequent
layers and uses it according to the applications’ requirements. Some architec-
tures divide this layer into two parts: the business layer deals with the security
and privacy requirements of an application and manages the data, and the
upper application layer deals with interoperability and distinguishes among
various applications.

2.2 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES

WITH IoT ARCHITECTURE
In order to ensure security in IoT applications, our primary aim is to address
the security- and privacy-related issues at each layer of IoT architecture. The
existing architectures require strong security checks and traffic monitoring at
regular intervals. In this section, we discuss the security issues that exist at
each layer of the IoT architecture.

2.2.1 Perception-Layer Security Problems

The primary technologies used in the perception layers are WSN, RFID, and
other types of sensing and identification techniques. The most common types
of threats faced by this layer are as follows:

a. Node capture: The nodes present at the network gateway are more
likely to be compromised, which may result in the leakage of impor-
tant information that poses a serious threat to the security of the
entire network.
b. Fake node and malicious data: The adversary can add a mali-
cious node to the existing system through which they can circulate
14 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

malicious codes and information over the network, and can infect
the whole system.
c. Replay attack: The adversary replays a previous message to the
destination node so as to compromise the network trust and authen-
tication schemes.

2.2.2 Network-Layer Security Problems

At the network layer, we have to deal with threats to confidentiality, integ-
rity, and availability. Attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-the middle, DoS/
DDoS, and network intrusion are common threats at this layer.

a. Heterogeneity: Due to the use of different technologies and proto-

cols, security and network coordination are hard to maintain, thus
making the system vulnerable.
b. Scalability issues: IoT comprises a large number of devices within
a network, and more devices may enter or leave the network at dif-
ferent times, which raises issues such as a lack of authentication and
network congestion. It also depletes a lot of resources.
c. Data disclosure: Using social engineering techniques, the adversary
might be able to obtain sensitive information from the network. The
IoT devices collectively have huge amounts of data; therefore, using
certain data retrieval techniques makes it easy to extract informa-
tion from the nodes.

2.2.3 Application-Layer Security Problems

This layer needs different security standards as per the application’s
requirements, which makes the task of securing the application hard and
complicated. Some of the security and privacy issues at this layer are as
follows:

a. Mutual authentication and node identification: Each application

has a different set of users, which requires various degrees of access
privileges. Thus, to prevent any illegal access, effective authentica-
tion schemes should be applied.
b. Information privacy: User privacy should be ensured for each com-
munication session. However, in some cases, the techniques that are
being used to process data might be vulnerable, which leads to data
loss. Over a long term, it can create huge damages to the system.
 2 • IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols 15

c. Data management: Due to huge data collections, the system com-

plexity increases, which requires a lot of resources and complex
algorithms for data management. It may also result in data loss.
d. Application-specific vulnerabilities: While developing modules
for an application, some vulnerabilities might be left behind,
which are unknown to the user. These can be exploited by the
adversary later on.

2.3 IoT PROTOCOL DESIGN

IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) has formed various groups with the
task of developing protocols for IoT networks considering the storage and
computation constraints of the devices. Another important thing to keep
in mind is the ability to communicate with other devices having different
architectures and applications [18].

2.3.1 Protocol Stack for IoT

IoT devices have a standard protocol stack, which can be divided into the
following:

a. IEEE 802.15.4 underlines certain protocols that require low energy

for communication at the physical layer, thus laying down a set of
rules for communication at the physical layer and a base for higher
layers [19].
b. The 6LoWPAN layer enables IPv6 packet transmission, thus
using 102 bytes for low-energy protocols at higher layers. This
layer also incorporates mechanisms for packet fragmentation and
reassembly [20].
c. Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) support
routing in 6LoWPAN. It also enables an adaptable architecture
to support the routing and optimization requirements for IoT
applications [20,21].
d. IETF work groups are currently developing Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) for application-layer communication. It will also
ensure interoperability in case of communication between hetero-
geneous networks or devices [22].
16 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

2.3.2 Security Requirements
The security of IoT networks should be addressed by the communication
protocols used at each layer rather than the application of external security
models. The primary security designs aim to ensure confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and anonymity. The security is ensured with the help of modes,
access control functions, and time synchronization present in IEEE 802.15.4.
For the 6LoWPAN layer, there are no security mechanisms defined so far.
However, the related RFCs mention security challenges and usage of security
in the network layer. For example, RFC 6606 discusses the significances of
security designs with time synchronization and localization. The RPL protocol
incorporates security modes. The control message contains 4-byte security
field. The field code has higher-order bit value to specify whether or not secu-
rity is implemented for the given message [20–23].
CoAP supports security at the application layer in integration with DTLS
(Datagram Transport Layer Security). DTLS ensures confidentiality, integ-
rity, and authentication at the application level. Figure 2.2 shows the security
designs at protocol level for each layer.

FIGURE 2.2 Security data formats at different layers.

 2 • IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols 17

2.4 IETF AND IEEE DESIGN STANDARDS

In this section, we describe the standards that aid the realization of IoT and main-
tenance of security and privacy of these networks. Nowadays, protocols and
architectures are being developed in order to extend Internet technologies for
low-cost devices. These protocols are developed by modifying the existing com-
munication protocols. Several protocols have been developed at the network layer
to ensure proper communication and data flow. Protocols such as IPv6 over low-
power WPANs have been developed for the transmission of packets and so on.
These new standards provide a support for the growth of IoT networks, making
end-to-end connectivity of constrained devices and day-to-day objects possible.
It may seem like it but global connectivity is not the primary reason
behind the success of the Internet, the web services, and the World Wide Web.
For the IoT networks, we need web services to be implemented on embedded
systems to exploit all the applications that IoT has to offer in order to build
a Web of Things. Recently, the working group IETF Constrained RESTful
Environments (CoRE) has begun working on developing standards to enable
the integration of IoT devices with Internet and provide a related set of services.
For application development, high-level programming standards are required
for the implementation of Semantic Web of Things or building a sensor net-
work. With the new technologies and standards, deploying a sensor network
that can organize itself has become possible. These networks can be connected
with each other using IPv6 Internet. In order to develop applications, we need
standard interfaces to enable data processing and communication and access
sensor-collected data. The IETF working group have developed various novel
standards and protocols.
The key realizations of the related IETF working groups will be discussed,
complemented with an extensive overview of related research results that
illustrate how these novel technologies can be extended or used to tackle other
problems, and complemented with a discussion on open issues and challenges.

2.5 TAXONOMY OF THREATS

TO IoT NETWORKS
Considering the attack patterns, we present an attack mechanism (shown in
Figure 2.3) followed by the adversary while planning an IoT attack (or any
other attack campaign). There are four steps taken by the attacker while
18 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

FIGURE 2.3 (a) Stages in an attack. (b) IoT attack mechanism.

carrying out IoT attack campaign (which can be generalized for any security
attack) that is mentioned below:

• Plan: The first step taken by the adversary is planning of the attack,
which is not specific to IoT only. Before carrying out an attack, the
first step is to gain as much information as possible about the net-
work that is to be exploited. The users can gain information by hear-
ing the messages between the IoT devices and the server or between
the devices.
• Deploy: After collecting sufficient information, the attacker plans
the attack campaign, that is, deciding the medium of attack, getting
access to the IoT devices to install malicious software, and extract-
ing information using a remote system.
• Monitor/detect: After the malware is successfully installed in
the devices of an IoT network, the next step is to monitor the
communication and other functionalities of the IoT objects and
gather the required confidential information or bring the network
down, etc.
 2 • IoT Design, Standards, and Protocols 19

TABLE 2.1 Attacks on IoT Networks

ATTACK DESCRIPTION
Physical attack The attacker may compromise several IoT devices, which
have a fixed topology; this attack is at the physical layer,
and the breaches cause data to be stolen.
Unauthorized IoT devices may have some vulnerability or improper
access configuration, and the attacker exploits them to gain
illegal access to the devices or the network.
Cloning attack As the IoT nodes have a fairly simple architecture, it is
possible to make their duplicates, and it harms the
network integrity.
Brute force Due to limited resources and computational power, it is
easy to perform a brute-force attack on IoT devices to
compromise them and retrieve information.
Denial of Service Due to restricted resources, DoS attacks can be easily
(DoS) attack performed on IoT networks to refrain the nodes from
the services and resources.
Desynchronization These attacks disturb the synchronization between the
attack RFID tag and the server; these are performed by
continuously intercepting the communication and
message exchanges between two parties.
Full disclosure This attack enables the attacker to retrieve the identity
attack and other confidential information of an RFID tag.

• Exfiltrate: After fulfilling their objectives, the adversary’s next aim

is to exfiltrate out of the network without being detected to end their
campaign successfully.

The IoT devices are basically wireless devices with a limited number of
resources and require the identification of other objects and humans as well.
They are widely accepted in every field these days. But, having a limited
functionality, we require some lightweight mechanisms to secure them from
various attacks, as given in Table 2.1.

2.6 CONCLUSION
The popularity of sensor networks (and in a broader sense IoT) has increased
significantly over the past ten years. Integration of these embedded devices into
the Internet is challenging, since they have characteristics that differ strongly
20 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

from traditional Internet devices, such as very limited energy, memory, and
processing capabilities. Initially, research focused on developing proprietary
solutions that were typically vendor-specific and did not allow end-to-end
connectivity between client devices and sensor devices. However, the use of
standardized protocols enables the integration of constrained devices in the
IPv6 Internet, both at the network level and at the service level. We present a
high-level overview of the ongoing IETF standardization work that focuses on
enabling direct connectivity between clients and sensor devices. To this end,
different IETF groups are currently active. The IETF 6LoWPAN and ROLL
groups focus on the addressability and routing of IPv6, whereas the IETF
CoRE group focuses on realizing an embedded counterpart for RESTful web
services. By combining these protocols, an embedded protocol stack can be
created that has similar characteristics to traditional Internet protocol stacks.
In fact, the IETF protocols are designed to enable easy translation from Internet
protocols to sensor protocols, and vice versa. We also discuss the combina-
tion of IETF protocols enabling a flexible, direct interaction between internet
clients and embedded IoT devices. However, we show that the advent of stan-
dardized protocols is not an end point, but only a starting point for exploring
additional open issues that should be solved to realize an all-encompassing
IoT. Several open challenges remain, such as resource representation, security,
dealing with sleeping nodes, energy efficiency, integration with existing web
service technologies and tools, linking with cloud services, use of semantics,
easy creation of applications, scalability, interoperability with other wireless
standards, and maintainability. Anyone involved in IoT research (whether
dealing with network-layer aspects or service-layer aspects) will, sooner or
later, be confronted with the IETF protocols.
IoT’s
Integration
with Other
3
Technologies
In the early years of development, Internet of Things (IoT) had fewer resources
and machines, which had high-design installation cost. However, in the past
few years, there had been a significant growth in this domain that is making
the resources cheaper, which has led to the advanced research and developments
in this field. In order to perform a real-time evaluation and analysis of an exist-
ing IoT network, we need large-scale and multidisciplinary testbeds, which can
help us overcome the issues faced by these networks. These testbeds enable us to
evaluate whether the new IoT solutions are reasonable. These testbeds also mea-
sure the degree to which these applications will be of use to the consumers [24].

3.1 IoT EXPERIMENTATION SETUPS

Most of the testbeds being used for IoT these days are adapted from wireless
sensor networks (WSN), which were centered on performing experiments on
networks that are isolated, and all the developments are to be done within them.
However, IoT networks intend to combine these isolated networks and form
a globally connected domain where devices with different configurations can
communicate with each other. There are some requirements that need to be ful-
filled by these testbeds in order to carry out IoT experimentations (Figure 3.1):

Increase in the number of nodes: While WSN-based testbeds contain

lesser nodes, the IoT networks comprise thousands of nodes that
mostly operate without any human intervention; thus, for IoT, we

21
22 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

FIGURE 3.1 Design challenges for IoT testbeds (a) 2-level. (b) 3-level.

require testbeds that can perform a real-time analysis of a larger

number of nodes and perform error detection and management of
their own.
Heterogeneity in the devices: The testbeds should be able to support
devices with different configurations. In WSNs, the nodes present at
the gateway only performed the task of a sink node, whereas for IoT
networks, these nodes should have other functionalities also.
Multitasking: Multitasking is a necessary feature of IoT networks. Since
these systems have constraints on performance and resources, differ-
ent nodes may have different tasks to carry out. The testbed supporting
IoT should incorporate functionalities in order to minimize the effect
of multiple experiments going on at the same time.

3.2 PLATFORMS AND SOFTWARE

TOOLS FOR IoT SIMULATION
The operating systems (OS) used for IoT devices have made the integration
of various software products possible, thus increasing the functionality of
the network and assisting the users more in their day-to-day tasks. Although
security problems in IoT-based OS are not very similar to those of the
conventional ones, still the standards defined by IETF (Internet Engineering
Task Force) provide protocols to secure such systems. Some of the IoT-based
OS are mentioned below:
 3 • IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies 23

a. mbed: This OS was developed by Acorn RISC Machine (ARM), to

be used with 32-bit Cortex-M microcontrollers. It was written in C
and C++ and is an open source OS with Apache License 2.0. The
mbed OS incorporates software configuration to develop firmware
for IoT devices [25].
b. RIOT: This OS was developed by INRIA, HAW Hamburg, and FU
Berlin. It is written using C and C++ and is an open source OS with
LGPL v2.1. It is compatible with ARM Cortex-M3, M4, ARM7,
and AVRAtmega devices. The Software Development Kit (SDK)
configuration supports C and C++ applications [26].
c. Contiki: This OS was initially created by Adam Dunkels, but
afterward, various organizations such as Cisco, SAP, and Oxford
University further developed it. This OS performs efficiently for
resource-constrained devices. Contiki uses Cooja (a network simu-
lator) for Contiki nodes. There are three types of Contiki nodes:
emulated nodes, Cooja nodes, and Java nodes [27].
d. Nano-RK: This OS is also written in C and is an open source. It was
developed at Carnegie Mellon University. It is designed to work
with WSN. The Eclipse IDE supports the application development
for this OS [28].

3.3 INTEGRATION OF IoT WITH

VARIOUS DOMAINS

3.3.1 Data Storage
The rapid growth of IoT has led to the development of new kinds of gadgets in
various domains. The primary aim of any such network is the collection and
processing of data in order to make decisions so as to gain knowledge about
the environment. With the increase in devices, the volume of data over the
Internet has also increased overwhelmingly [29].
As data is processed at various layers of IoT, it becomes more structured
and readable (machine readable). Big data and cloud applications provide
various tools for processing and managing the data collected by IoT
sensors [30]. However, due to heterogeneity in the architecture of devices and
data as well as limited processing capabilities, IoT networks have different
design requirements in terms of interoperability, scalability, and security as
compared to the devices currently used on the web [31].
24 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Therefore, in order to address these requirements, Atzori et al. [2]

presented a new semantic-oriented perspective for data analytics in IoT.
Semantics promotes interoperability among different devices and data models
and facilitates effective data management and processing and knowledge
extraction. In this section, we will discuss the developments in the semantic-
oriented data analytics in IoT.

a. Semantics are not enough: Ontologies do not make data interoper-

able at a global scale. Semantic annotations need to be processed
and analyzed as semantic technologies are not just hype.
b. Semantic modeling and ontology development: Deploying seman-
tics can simplify the process of data management as it encourages
different sources with heterogeneous data to be interoperable.
c. Linked sensor data: Linked data enables different resources to
correlate with each other. By adopting semantic annotations, IoT
resources and processing can be associated with each other, which
makes the scattered data more relevant. Data linking makes IoT
more usable across different domains and also contributes to system
interoperability. The IoT objects have semantic data, which is linked
to the domain-related information of that object, for example,
location. Different resources are able to link with each other due to
the use of various data models and ontologies. The linked data can
also be used as the source of knowledge that annotates the IoT data.
d. Database issues in IoT: The size and scale of data gathered by IoT
devices are huge. The data collected by local IoT networks needs to
be collected by a local authority. However, globally, we require a
central authority to manage the domain resource knowledge using
proper indexing so that looking for a certain resource or piece of
data can be properly done. Some resources and information can be
made publicly available, while others require access control. Most
of the developments done in the IoT is service based. The SOA
(service-oriented architecture) will assist the systems to integrate
heterogeneous applications and ensure interoperability (Figure 3.2).
e. Tools for data reuse: Tools play a major role in promoting the reuse
of data and ontologies. Although not many tools are currently avail-
able, still a few of them have either been newly developed or been
adapted from previously existing tools to be used for IoT platforms.
These tools focus on supporting widely popular ontologies and data
models in order to promote common annotations and interoperabil-
ity. Various tools that are used for semantic web engines can be used
with IoT devices for searching and resource browsing among the
linked data.
 3 • IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies 25

FIGURE 3.2 IoT data integration requirements.

f. Sense2Web-linked sensor data platform: This tool has a GUI for

data annotation, which makes it convenient for the user to link data
and publish Resource Description Framework (RDF) [32]. This
platform performs data linking in two ways:
• Use of globally linked resources as domain information for data
annotation.
• Annotated data is published as linked data resources.

3.3.2 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing enables pervasive networks with on-demand service and
a pool of shared resources. It also provides unlimited space and loses cost
computation capabilities. The integration of cloud computing with IoT fulfills
the requirements of IoT architecture satisfying all the necessary constraints,
including application, service, and resource management [33–36]. In this
section, we discuss some of the issues with the integration of IoT and cloud.

a. Standardization: Most of the “things” are connected to the cloud

in the current scenario resolving the storage problem and providing
various services. Thus, there is an urgent need for standard protocols,
interfaces, and APIs to ensure interoperability between heteroge-
neous platforms and facilitate interconnection among smart objects
to provide enhanced services.
b. Integration: The interconnection of cloud and smart objects gen-
erating and processing data in real time needs enhanced cognitive
abilities and intelligent decision-making. Thus, it is necessary that
there should be a common integration method with standard work-
flows. The combination of cloud and IoT requires a generic platform
for the distribution of integrated services among different entities
for managing and processing data in the integrated scenario.
26 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

c. Scalability: Smart devices collect huge amounts of data and thus

require efficient techniques to link the gathered information with the
relevant application or event. Cloud computing provides extensible
support and data management, which helps in maintaining the scal-
ability with respect to smart devices and end users.
d. Power and energy constraints: The IoT applications in the current
scenario incorporate data transmission and communications almost
at all times, thus enhancing the power consumption and energy
requirements. Cloud computing provides various services such as
data compression and efficient communications and caching mech-
anisms to decrease the power consumption and enable the reuse of
cached data. Cloud also deploys middleware technologies in order
to handle the long-duration data monitoring.
e. Security and privacy: Security and privacy in transit is always a
primary concern in any application. The integration of IoT and
cloud combines the real-world data and events, which makes the
security threats altogether more serious. Cloud ensures properly
designed policies and authorized roles so that only legitimate users
have access to sensitive data (Figure 3.3).

3.3.3 Big Data
The big data produced by IoT is of different nature than the regular big data
due to heterogeneity and noise in the collected data. It is estimated by HP that
by 2030, the total number of sensors deployed will be in trillions, which will

FIGURE 3.3 Integration of IoT with cloud.

 3 • IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies 27

make IoT a major contributor to big data [37–39]. The primary features that
map IoT data to big data are as follows:

• A huge number of sensors collecting enormous amounts of data.

• Most of the gathered data is unstructured and redundant.
• Data can be transformed into useful information only after analysis.

The main features exhibited by big data produced by IoT are as follows:

a. Large-scale data: The data produced in IoT networks is considered

to be a large scale as it requires a lot of data acquisition tools, which
collect huge amounts of heterogeneous data. In order to process this
data, sometimes previously processed data is required to be stored.
b. Heterogeneity: Data acquired by the IoT devices can be in any for-
mat and size, for example, text, audio, and video, which require a
number of data acquisition devices that can gather and analyze data
having different characteristics.
c. Time and space correlation: Time and space hold a significant
priority for statistical analysis. All the data acquisition devices have
location monitors and all the data packets have timestamps as the
correlation between time and space is important for data analysis.
d. Lesser amounts of effective data: Huge amounts of data are acquired
by the devices, of which only a certain amount is actually useful.
For example, while acquiring traffic surveillance video, only frames
that show rule violations or accidents are more significant as com-
pared to the rest.

3.3.4 Fog Computing
The fog extends the cloud to be closer to the things that produce and act on IoT
data. These devices, called fog nodes, can be deployed anywhere with a net-
work connection: on a factory floor, on top of a power pole, alongside a railway
track, in a vehicle, or on an oil rig. Any device with computing, storage, and
network connectivity can be a fog node. Examples include industrial control-
lers, switches, routers, embedded servers, and video surveillance cameras [40].
International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that the amount of data
analyzed on devices that are physically close to the IoT is approaching 40%.
There is a good reason: analyzing IoT data close to where it is collected
minimizes latency. It offloads the gigabytes of network traffic from the core
network, and it keeps sensitive data inside the network [41]. Analyzing IoT data
close to where it is collected minimizes latency.
28 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Fog applications are as diverse as the IoT itself. What they have in com-
mon is monitoring or analyzing real-time data from network-connected things
and then initiating an action. The action can involve machine-to-machine
(M2M) communications or human–machine interaction (HMI). Examples
include locking a door, changing equipment settings, applying the brakes on
a train, zooming a video camera, opening a valve in response to a pressure
reading, creating a bar chart, or sending an alert to a technician to make a
preventive repair. The possibilities are unlimited. Developers either port or
write IoT applications for fog at the network edge. The fog nodes closest to
the network edge ingest the data from IoT devices [42,43]. Then, this is crucial
that the fog IoT application directs different types of data to the optimal place
for analysis:

a. The most time-sensitive data is analyzed on the fog node closest

to the things generating the data. In a Cisco Smart Grid distribu-
tion network, for example, the most time-sensitive requirement is
to verify that protection and control loops are operating properly.
Therefore, the fog nodes closest to the grid sensors can look for
signs of problems and then prevent them by sending control com-
mands to actuators.
b. Data that can wait seconds or minutes for action is passed along
to an aggregation node for analysis and action. In the Smart Grid
example, each substation might have its own aggregation node
that reports the operational status of each downstream feeder and
lateral.
c. Data that is less time sensitive is sent to the cloud for historical
analysis, big data analytics, and long-term storage (see sidebar). For
example, each of thousands or hundreds of thousands of fog nodes
might send periodic summaries of grid data to the cloud for histori-
cal analysis and storage.

3.4 IoT AND RADIO FREQUENCY

IDENTIFICATION (RFID)
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are available in many sizes, capa-
bilities, and shapes. Which tag would be deployed into the system depends
upon the business and technological requirements of the organization. The
antenna, integrated circuit, printed circuit board, or substrates are the main
components of RFID tags. The antenna initiates a transmission and receiving
 3 • IoT’s Integration with Other Technologies 29

of radio wave signals for communication. It is also a coupling mechanism

where energy can be transmitted in the form of electromagnetic radiation.
This is the most typical style of communication between reader and tag.
Depending upon the distance between antenna and reader, the antenna can
also power up other components of a tag. The brain of the tag is called an inte-
grated circuit, which is a collection of various components. Its functions are
equivalent to those of a multiprocessor found in any computer or smartphone.
The sole function of an integrated circuit is the transmission of a unique iden-
tifier of the tag. Moreover, it can also collect information if a tag has any
peripherals and their pieces of information are also sent along with a unique
identifier.
The printed circuit board is used to accommodate the tag. It may be flexible
or rigid and is made up of various materials depending upon the functionality,
deployment environment, purpose, and size of the tags. Tags are made
with appropriate standards called a class. Six classes have been defined by
EPCglobal so far as under [44]:

Class 0/class 1: Provides very fundamental radio frequency passive

capabilities. The difference between these two classes is program-
ming: class 0 is default factory-programmed and class 1 is not
factory-programmed as users can program according to their own
specifications.
Class 2: Possesses capabilities of encryption and RF memory
read–write.
Class 3: Contains on-board batteries for longer power and also provides
long-range broadband communications.
Class 4: Consists of active tags, peer-to-peer communication, and
various sensors.
Class 5: Contains readers only and also activates other tags in the
environment.

No built-in power sources are added into passive tags. Readers use radio
frequency to power up readers and normally fall into class 0 to 3 range. Class 4
states active tags only that contain their own internal power source to provide
energy for a specific time period for various operations. Class 5 deals with
active tags and readers only that can read data from various tags.
RFID is one of the primary enabling technologies for IoT. RFID is
replacing barcode in most of the applications. Using RFID in integration
with IoT, we can add authentication mechanisms to enhance the security
of devices. In the past few years, various mutual authentication schemes
have been proposed for RFID, which can secure IoT devices from security
threats.
30 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

IoT mainly reckons on the capability of RFID to identify and be identified

by other objects and communicate with them as well. Most of the IoT applica-
tions nowadays rely on sending, receiving, and storing information. The major
development issues faced by IoT are as follows:

• Scalability: More and more devices join the IoT network every
day, which raises challenges such as addressing, services, and data
management.
• Heterogeneity: IoT networks consist of different types of devices
gathering and storing different types of data, which needs to be
processed into meaningful information.
• Power and resource constraints: IoT devices have small memory
and low power supply; thus, we need to minimize the use of power
during communications.
• Integration with WSN node: The integration of RFID and WSN can
be possible for high-end applications, but it brings a lot of challenges
alongside; such types of nodes could have more than one sensor and
extra communication capabilities as compared to RFID.
• Vulnerabilities in RFID system: The RFID reader acts as a medium
between the tags and the server, and if in such cases, the number of
tags increases, then the system must always be scalable. For every
tag request, the server has to perform a linear search to identify the
tag and the time of this search process increases with the number
of tags, and it affects the performance of an authentication protocol
and increases the computational overload.
Industrial
Internet of
Things (IIoT)
4
Current industrial trends and initiatives aim to “connect the unconnected.”
Today, millions of embedded devices are used in safety and security critical
applications such as industrial control systems, modern vehicles, and
critical infrastructure. In the past decades, classical production engineering,
automation, and intelligent computation systems merged into the Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT). The number of computation components integrated
into industrial control systems, production systems, and factories is steadily
increasing.
With the integration of classical computing into production systems,
emerging megatrends, such as mobile computing, cloud computing, and big
data, are becoming important drivers of innovation in the industry. Cloud-
based services are used to monitor and optimize complex supply chains.
Big data algorithms predict machine failures, which reduces downtimes and
maintenance costs; the interconnected production systems enable a tight
integration and optimization of production and business processes as well as
outsourcing production steps to other locations, companies, and freelancers.
In the near future, cloud-based services will allow considering more customer
requirements in the production process and planning, and enabling a new level
of product individualization at a minimal cost. This development driven by
computation systems is also called the “fourth industrial revolution.”
Industrial IoT brings many new challenges with regard to different
aspects, including security, privacy, standardization, legal, and social aspects.
In particular, increased diversity and large numbers of devices in IoT systems
require highly scalable solutions for, for example, naming and addressing, data
communication, knowledge management, and service provisioning. Further,
most IoT devices have only limited resources, which demands architectures
supporting low-power, low-cost, fully networked integrated devices that are
compatible with standard communication techniques.

31
32 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) generate, process, and exchange

vast amounts of security and safety-critical data, as well as privacy-sensitive
information, and hence are appealing targets of various attacks. To ensure the
correct and safe operation of IoT systems, it is crucial to assure the integrity
of the underlying devices, in particular their code and data, against malicious
modifications. Recent studies have revealed many security vulnerabilities in
embedded devices, which pose new challenges on the design and implementa-
tion of secure embedded systems that typically must provide multiple functions,
security features, and real-time guarantees at a minimal cost. In this chapter,
we will give an overview of the developments and trends of IIoT systems, point
out related security and privacy risks and challenges, and discuss potential
solutions towards a holistic security framework for IIoT systems.

4.1 M2M TO IoT

M2M, or machine-to-machine, is a direct communication between devices
using wired or wireless communication channels. M2M refers to the inter-
action of two or more devices/machines that are connected with each other.
These devices capture data and share with other connected devices, creating
an intelligent network of things or systems. Devices could be sensors, actua-
tors, embedded systems, or other connected elements [45] (Figure 4.1).
M2M technology could be present in our homes, offices, shopping malls,
and other places. Controlling electrical appliances like bulbs and fans using

FIGURE 4.1 M2M vs IoT market revenue.

 4 • Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 33

RF or Bluetooth from your smartphone is a simple example of M2M appli-

cations at home. Here, the electrical appliance and your smartphone are the
two machines interacting with each other. The IoT is the network of physi-
cal devices embedded with sensors, software, and electronics, enabling these
devices to communicate with each other and exchange data over a computer
network. The things in the IoT refer to hardware devices uniquely identifiable
through a network platform within the Internet infrastructure.
Machine-to-machine communication, or M2M, is exactly as it sounds:
two machines “communicating,” or exchanging, data, without human inter-
facing or interaction. This includes serial connection, powerline connection
(PLC), or wireless communications in the IIoT. Switching over to wireless has
made M2M communication much easier and enabled more applications to be
connected. In general, when someone says M2M communication, they often
are referring to cellular communication for embedded devices. Examples of
M2M communication in this case would be vending machines sending out
inventory information or ATMs getting authorization to dispense cash [46].
As businesses have realized the value of M2M, it has taken on a new
name: the IoT. IoT and M2M have similar promises: to fundamentally change
the way the world operates. Just like IoT, M2M allows virtually any sen-
sor to communicate, which opens up the possibility of systems monitoring
themselves and automatically responding to changes in the environment,
with a much-reduced need for human involvement. M2M and IoT are almost
synonymous. The exception is that IoT (the newer term) typically refers to
wireless communications, whereas M2M can refer to any two machines: wired
or wireless communications.
Growth in the M2M and IoT markets has been growing rapidly, and
according to many reports, growth will continue. Strategy analytics believes
that low-power, wide-area network (LPWAN) connections will grow from
11 million in 2014 to 5 billion in 2022. And IDC says that the market for world-
wide IoT solutions will go from $1.9 trillion in 2013 to $7.1 trillion in 2020.
Many big cell operators, like AT&T and Verizon, see this potential and are
rolling out their own M2M platforms. Intel, PTC, and Wipro are all marketing
heavily in M2M and working to take advantage of their major industry growth
spurt. But there is still a great opportunity for new technology companies to
engage in highly automated solutions to help streamline processes in nearly
any type of industry [47,48].
However, as the cost of M2M communication continues to decrease,
companies must determine how they will create a value for businesses and
customers. In our mind, the opportunity and the value for M2M don’t lie in
the more traditional layers of the communication world. Cell carriers and
hardware manufacturers, for example, are beginning to look into full-stack
offerings that enable M2M and IoT product development. We strongly believe
34 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

value lies in the application side of things, and the growth in this industry will
be driven by smart applications from this point forward.

4.2 IoT AND SECURE AUTOMATION

The very nature of IoT devices is to collect, process, and relay data through
a communication channel and sometimes control a much larger unit. The
data in question can range from a heartbeat, to the temperature of a room,
to living habits, and even to the location of the user. The ensuing privacy
and security concerns that arise are known to manufacturers; however, secu-
rity in IoT devices is either neglected or treated as an afterthought. Often,
this is due to short time to market (TTM) and reduction of costs driving
the device’s design and development. As such, IoT devices remain open for
attack and become attractive targets for those wishing to obtain the informa-
tion they hold [49].
Further, given the always-on network connectivity some of these devices
hold and their usage patterns, these devices could be targeted by malware,
increasing the potential for harmful usage. The few devices that do choose to
add any protection usually employ software-level solutions, such as firmware
signing and the execution of signed binaries, methods that resemble those used
in regular computing. These solutions, however, do not consider the different
usage patterns that IoT devices have when compared to traditional embedded
systems or personal computers. This proves to be insufficient, as not only have
these mechanisms been proven to be by-passable, but software-level protection
schemes often leave the hardware unintentionally vulnerable, allowing for new
attack vectors [50].
In order to better understand the security and privacy issues associated
with the current IoT device design flow and their implications, we used two
IoT devices as case studies. Given that IoT devices are widely used in both
commercial and industrial applications, the selected sample IoT devices
include a smart controller for a home automation system and a smart meter for
modern power grids. Commercial IoT devices that directly target end users are
often designed with an emphasis on device functionality. Security features are
often added in an ad hoc manner where remote attacks are treated as the main
threats. Therefore, commercial IoT devices often suffer from hardware-level
vulnerabilities [14], which may be remotely exploited. Similar to commercial
IoT devices, smart devices are also widely used in industrial applications.
These devices, if compromised, may have a more serious impact than compro-
mised commercial IoT devices.
 4 • Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 35

Improperly secured IoT devices may easily be compromised dur-

ing transport and deployment by remote attackers. The effects of these
attacks could range from simple backdoors to a total compromise of the
device. Industrial devices pose an even bigger threat if compromised, as
critical infrastructure may be damaged. In our proof of concept, we were
able to change the identification of a smart meter, thus broadcasting energy
consumption while masquerading as a different device. In doing this
operation, an attacker is capable of altering how billing is performed for
their power consumption.
Furthermore, as the meter exposes programming and debugs interfaces,
it can be modified to report reduced reads, further exacerbating the prob-
lem. This has a detrimental effect on the economy, as the energy supplier
is no longer able to bill customers as it should; the power grid, as expected
capacity computations based on the recorded values are now incorrect; and the
environment, as energy can now be used without proper recording. On-field
deployment of compromised IoT devices will lead to safety complications.
Due to the services these units provide, an attacker can utilize these devices
to cause physical harm to users. Excess unmonitored power consumption
can result in the overload of the grid, causing outages and in extreme cases,
equipment failure.
By 2020, it is expected that the global smart home market will reach
around 40 billion dollars. Now, these smart home devices range from anything
like smart kettles, refrigerators, and dryers to air conditioners and a range
of safety and security devices, like alarm systems and circuit security cam-
eras. Ease and convenience are what make smart home systems so appeal-
ing, and as they are connected with each other, it becomes easy to manage
more operations. With the help of IoT smart home devices, it becomes easy to
reduce energy and costs, all the while saving time. One of the main issues that
common people, as well as businessmen, are facing when it comes to apply-
ing IoT smart homes is the high costs. They are quite high compared to the
nonconnected devices, and so, when it comes down to choosing IoT-enabled
devices, they are always a bit hesitant.

4.3 IIoT APPLICATIONS

With the rapid growth of IoT, various applications such as in the field of
healthcare and monitoring, environment and cattle monitoring, transports,
and home support and security have also been growing. In this section,
we discuss the applications of IoT with respect to industries. The real-time
36 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

industry-based IoT applications have multiple goals. Thus, the developers

need to be able to attain a balance.
However, the use of IoT is rapidly evolving and growing. Quite a few IoT
applications are being developed and/or deployed in various industries, includ-
ing environmental monitoring; healthcare service; inventory and production
management; food supply chain (FSC); transportation; workplace; and home
support, security, and surveillance. Atzori et al. [2] provide a general introduc-
tion to IoT applications in various domains. Different from their discussions,
we specifically focus on industrial IoT applications. The design of industrial
IoT applications needs to consider multiple goals. Depending on the intended
industrial applications, designers may have to make a tradeoff among these
goals to achieve a balance of cost and benefits. Below are some IoT applications
in industries.

a. IoT applications in the healthcare industry: IoT provides new

opportunities to improve healthcare. All objects in the health-
care systems (people, equipment, medicine, etc.) can be tracked
and monitored constantly by being powered by IoT’s ubiquitous
identification, sensing, and communication capacities. All the
healthcare-related information (logistics, diagnosis, therapy, recov-
ery, medication, management, finance, and even daily activity)
can be collected, managed, and shared efficiently. For example, a
patient’s heart rate can be collected by sensors from time to time,
and then, it is sent to the doctor’s office. Using the personal comput-
ing devices (laptop, mobile phone, tablet, etc.) and mobile Internet
access (Wi-Fi, 3G, LTE, etc.), the IoT-based healthcare services
can be mobile and personalized [51]. The widespread use of mobile
Internet service has expedited the development of the IoT-powered
in-home healthcare (IHH) services. Security and privacy concerns
are two major challenges.
b. IoT applications in FSC: Today, FSC is extremely distributed and
complex. It has large geographical and temporal scales, complex
operation processes, and a large number of stakeholders. A typi-
cal IoT solution for FSC (the so-called Food–IoT) comprises three
parts: (i) the field devices such as WSN nodes, radio frequency
identification (RFID) readers/tags, and user interface terminals;
(ii) the backbone system such as databases, servers, and many
kinds of terminals connected by distributed computer networks;
and (iii) the communication infrastructures such as WLAN, cel-
lular, satellite, powerline, and Ethernet. As the IoT system offers
ubiquitous networking capacity, all of these elements can be
 4 • Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 37

distributed throughout the entire FSC. Furthermore, it also offers

effective sensing functionalities to track and monitor the process
of food production. The vast amount of raw data can be further
mined and analyzed to improve the business process and support
decision-making. Big data analytics can be used to respond to the
challenge of analyzing the tremendous amount of data collected
from FSC.
c. IoT applications in mining industries: Mine safety is a big concern
for many countries due to the working condition in the underground
mines. To prevent and reduce any accidents in the mining, there is a
need to use IoT technologies to sense mine disaster signals in order
to make early warning, disaster forecasting, and safety improvement
of underground production possible [19]. Using RFID, Wi-Fi, and
other wireless communications technology and devices to enable
effective communication between surface and underground, min-
ing companies can track the location of underground miners and
analyze critical safety data collected from sensors to enhance safety
measures.
d. IoT applications in transportation and logistics: IoT will play
an increasingly important role in the transportation and logis-
tics industries. Furthermore, IoT is expected to offer promising
solutions to transform transportation systems and automobile
services. Recently, an intelligent informatics system (iDrive sys-
tem) developed by BMW used various sensors and tags to monitor
the environment, such as tracking the vehicle location and the road
condition to provide driving directions. Zhang et al. [52] designed
an intelligent monitoring system to monitor temperature/humid-
ity inside refrigerator trucks by RFID tags, sensors, and wireless
communication technology. Security and privacy protections are
important for the widespread use of IoT in the transportation and
logistics, since many vehicle drivers are worried about informa-
tion leak and privacy invasion. Reasonable efforts in technology,
law, and regulation are needed to prevent unauthorized access to,
or disclosure of, the privacy data.

Recently, Ji and Qi [53] illustrate an infrastructure of IoT applications used

for emergency management in China. Their IoT application infrastructure
contains sensing layer, transmission layer, supporting layer, platform layer, and
application layer. Their IoT infrastructure has been designed to integrate both
local-based and sector-specific emergency systems. Establishing standards for
implementing fire IoT is a pressing challenge now.
38 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

4.4 IIoT AND CYBERSECURITY

Security for connected consumer devices gets all the attention. However,
electronics companies should also focus deeply on security for industrial
systems used to manufacture components and increasingly high-tech products.
The production of “intelligent industrial things” must also have effective cyber-
security, or it can place a company’s entire ecosystem at risk. Our research
found that more than 80% of electronics companies are implementing IIoT
technologies in plants and assembly lines without fully evaluating the risks or
preparing effective responses.
Electronics companies need cybersecurity capabilities that are con-
textual, cognitive, and adaptive to continuously identify, mitigate, and pre-
vent risk. Manufacturing operations are among the most expensive parts
of the electronics value chain. While IIoT provides insight, it can also
increase the risk of exposure to potential cyberattacks and damage on
multiple fronts. Each point presents a new opportunity for unauthorized
entry. Whether caused by cyber hackers, competing companies, countries
engaged in corporate espionage, or even disgruntled employees, losses can
mount quickly once under attack. The risks may include equipment failure,
loss of critical data and corporate reputation, or even injury and loss of life
(Figure 4.2).
IIoT technologies can vastly improve operational efficiencies, yet they
also expose potential new attack surfaces and security targets if not prop-
erly protected. Each new machine joins “a system of systems” as it connects
to additional IIoT devices. Technological expansions such as 5G will likely
increase the use of IIoT technologies by providing the infrastructure needed to

FIGURE 4.2 Attacks on industrial control systems.

 4 • Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) 39

carry huge amounts of data. But this also widens the attack surface. Virtually
anything can become vulnerable, from high-value assets or services, critical
workloads in the cloud, process control subsystems in cyber-physical systems
to critical business and operational data.
Organizations need capabilities that will protect not only their assets and
networks, but also their entire IIoT ecosystems. Equally important is the ability
to respond quickly and effectively in the event of a breach. Organizations of
virtually all types must work to keep pace with ever-evolving IIoT threats.
To better understand IIoT security risks and implications, the IBM Institute
for Business Value (IBV) partnered with Oxford Economics to survey 700
executives. They represent 700 companies in 18 countries from the energy and
industrial sectors, of which 269 were electronics. They are all implementing
IIoT in their plants. The two most prevalent applications are for real-time equip-
ment monitoring and predictive maintenance, at 65% and 58%, respectively.
Automation of machines and processes are also common applications, with
45% and 43% using IIoT technologies to automate machines and workflow,
respectively.
Electronics companies are aware of the cybersecurity risks and are
working to manage their security spending accordingly. But they are less
clear on the combination of IIoT cybersecurity capabilities – skills, controls,
practices, and protective technologies – required to secure their current and
future business from IIoT threats.

4.5 CONCLUSION
To be cyber resilient, IoT manufacturers need to spend more time on security
measures in the product development stage. Products that come with reliable
endpoint protection and detailed monitoring infrastructure are well placed
to meet the security challenges of IIoT in 2018. Another primary task for an
IIoT deployment team is meeting encryption standards. Every interaction with
the system (from any device) must go through generally accepted cryptogra-
phy protocols. The volume of personal information being shared every day
across the network will only rise in the years to come – making encryption
one of the most critical measures from the perspective of privacy. As more
devices connect to a shared network, it becomes harder for IT teams to iden-
tify risks. As the WEF suggest, IIoT deployment teams must build modules
that define all the digital and physical assets that need protection. They also
need to better collect data on potential threats. One of the most significant
problems is when integrity legacy software with IIoT platforms is a lack of
40 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

maintenance. While testing legacy software is one challenge, it is imperative

that IIoT devices (and associated software) are tested rigorously through-
out their lifespan. Methodologies should include “unit, system, acceptance,
regression testing, and threat modeling, along with maintaining an inventory
of the source for any third-party/open source code and components utilized.”
Trust and
Privacy in IoT 5
The Internet of Things (IoT) presents numerous benefits to consumers and has
the potential to change the ways that consumers interact with technology in
fundamental ways. In the future, the IoT is likely to meld the virtual and physi-
cal worlds together in ways that are currently difficult to comprehend. From
the perspective of security and privacy, the predicted pervasive introduction of
sensors and devices into currently intimate spaces – such as the home, the car,
and with wearables and ingestible, even the body – poses particular challenges.
As physical objects in our everyday lives increasingly detect and share obser-
vations about us, consumers will likely continue to want privacy.
The IoT is emerging as the third wave in the development of the Internet.
The 1990s’ Internet wave connected 1 billion users, while the 2000s’ mobile
wave connected another 2 billion. The IoT has the potential to connect 10× as
many (28 billion) “things” to the Internet by 2020, ranging from bracelets to
cars. Breakthroughs in the cost of sensors, processing power, and bandwidth
to connect devices are enabling ubiquitous connections right now. Smart prod-
ucts like smart watches and thermostats (Nest) are already gaining traction as
stated in Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research’s report. The rise of the
IoT has already sparked concerns about privacy: now security pros are worried
that badly configured gadgets might provide a backdoor for hackers looking to
break into corporate networks.

5.1 PRIVACY IN IoT

Protecting consumer privacy becomes increasingly difficult as the IoT
becomes more prevalent. More devices are connected to different types
of devices, and this increase in connectivity and data collection results in
less control. Both control of data and control of the very devices that are
connected are at stake.

41
42 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Control can be lost if someone hacks into the smartphone or computer act-
ing as a remote for the other devices. In the case of computers and smartphones,
this hacking can be done remotely and often undetected. Smartphones, just
like computers, carry an enormous amount of personal information about their
owners. They often link to bank accounts, email accounts, and in some cases
household appliances. Stolen data can result in serious problems. Vehicles
contain many computers that control their function. Initially, these computers
could not be hacked into. With the increased connectivity of the IoT, however,
vehicles are now at risk due to being connected to the Internet.
In another sense, control can be lost as more and more companies col-
lect data about users. This data often paints a detailed picture of individual
users through the collection of activities online. Everything we search, all of
the activities online, is being tracked by companies that use that data. These
companies often use the data to improve the user’s experience, but they also
use this data to sell user’s products or sell to other companies who sell user’s
products. Innovation in this realm means that the organization must alter
the privacy policies that are in place as well as how they interact with these
devices. Companies will need to take another look at the policies that they
have in place to ensure that consumers are offered opportunities to access and
control their own data. Consumers will become increasingly aware of the pri-
vacy implications of this level of connectivity through an interaction with the
IoT and exposure to the policies that companies provide to them.
Frank Pasquale, law professor and EPIC advisory board member,
discusses privacy concerns related to the IoT in a May 2014 Pew Research
Report. He states that the expansion of the IoT will result in a world that is
more “prison-like” with a “small class of ‘watchers’ and a much larger class of
the experimented upon, the watched.” In another article, he reinforces the idea
that the IoT “will be a tool for other people to keep tabs on what the populace
is doing” [54].
EPIC President, Marc Rotenberg, explains in the Pew Research Report
that the problem with the IoT is that “users are just another category of things,”
and states that this “is worth thinking about more deeply about in the future.”
This is where the concept of “privacy by design” comes into play. In this
approach, manufacturers assess a product’s potential privacy risks and con-
siderations during the design phase, and then adjust or address those issues in
the product’s development and manufacturing process [55]. This concept is a
key feature in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in which the
most privacy-friendly settings such as those that collect, retain, and share per-
sonal information will be required to be designed and built into new products,
devices, and business processes when the rule takes an effect in 2018.
In general, a manufacturer’s IoT device privacy considerations should
reflect every step of the planned operating life and retirement of a device,
 5 • Trust and Privacy in IoT 43

including how to address any associated cloud services, how much data
really needs to be gathered, and what should be done with any retained data.
For instance, these considerations could address the secondary market for
long-lived items such as refrigerators or cars.

5.2 THREAT TO DATA PRIVACY IN IoT

Above all regulatory threats, privacy will loom the largest for many IoT sys-
tems and services because it is a form of regulation that cuts across many
industries and IoT-use cases. Additionally, privacy advocates have been known
to operate above technology and yet seek to propose (or impose) regulation
with an incomplete or flawed understanding of systems and services. Privacy
is also a high priority among legislators, but it is an inconsistently defined reg-
ulatory requirement with many different privacy laws overlapping at different
levels of government. Privacy regulation can be found as omnibus legislation
that applies across a national economy, but also as industry-specific guidance.
For instance, health systems will often have their own privacy statutes and
regulations over and above the omnibus legislation.
Many of the emerging use cases in the IoT are potentially inconsistent
with personal privacy: they are founded on the assumption that personal infor-
mation about users is accessible and linkable. In some cases, this is a valid
assumption, especially if the service in question is free and the business model
calls for selling directed advertising or user profile information to a third party.
But a real threat to business and user alike will arise as expectations of privacy
do not match the business designs of an IoT service provider. In sum, privacy
threats in the IoT come in two broad forms [56]:

• Type 1 privacy threat: Threats to businesses that need to collect,

use, and disclose personal data, and their ability to do so without
legal or market-based sanctions for breaches.
• Type 2 privacy threat: Threats to individuals and users of IoT
service, who will be offered services that are either free or subsi-
dized, through consenting to the collection, use, and disclosure of
personally identifiable information.

IoT finds its applications in many different fields, for example, patients’ remote
monitoring, energy consumption control, traffic control, smart parking system,
inventory management, production chain, customization of the shopping at the
supermarket, and civil protection. For all of them, users require the protection
44 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

of their personal information related to their movements, habits, and interac-

tions with other people. In a single term, their privacy should be guaranteed.
In literature, there are some attempts to address such an issue.
In [57], a data tagging for managing privacy in IoT is proposed. Using
techniques taken from the Information Flow Control, data representing net-
work events can be tagged with several privacy properties; such tags allow the
system to reason about the flows of data and preserve the privacy of individu-
als. Exploiting tagging within resource-constrained sensor nodes may not be
a viable solution because tags may be too large with respect to the data size
and sensitivity; therefore, they generate an excessive overhead. Clearly, in this
case, it is not suitable for IoT.
In [58], a user-controlled, privacy-preserved access control protocol is
proposed, based on context-aware k-anonymity privacy policies. Note that pri-
vacy protection mechanisms are investigated: users can control which of their
personal data is being collected and accessed, who is collecting and accessing
such data, and when this happens.
In [59], it is presented Continuously Anonymizing Streaming data via
adaptive clustering (CASTLE). It is a cluster-based scheme that ensures ano-
nymity, freshness, and delay constraints on data streams, thus enhancing those
privacy-preserving techniques (e.g., k-anonymity) that are designed for static
data sets and not for continuous, unbounded, and transient streams. More in
detail, [58] models k-anonymity on data streams and defines k-anonymized
clusters exploiting the quasi-identifier attributes of tuples in order to preserve
the sensitive data privacy.
In [60], the traditional privacy mechanisms are divided into two catego-
ries: discretionary access and limited access. The former addresses the mini-
mum privacy risks, in order to prevent the disclosure or the cloning of sensitive
data, whereas the latter aims at limiting the security access to avoid malicious
unauthorized attacks.

5.3 ENFORCING TRUST IN IoT

The trust concept is used in various contexts and with different meanings. Trust
is a complex notion about which no definitive consensus exists in the scientific
literature, although its importance is widely recognized. The main problem
with many approaches towards trust definition is that they do not lend them-
selves to the establishment of metrics and evaluation methodologies. Moreover,
the satisfaction of trust requirements is strictly related to the identity manage-
ment and access control issues. Both [59,60] focus on the trust-level assessment
 5 • Trust and Privacy in IoT 45

of IoT entities. The authors assume that most smart objects are human-carried
or human-related devices, so they are often exposed to public areas and
communicate through wireless, and hence vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Smart objects have heterogeneous features and need to cooperatively work
together. The social relationships considered are friendship, ownership, and
community, since users are friends among themselves (i.e., friendship), users
own the devices (i.e., ownership), and the devices belong to some communities
(i.e., community). Malicious nodes aim at breaking the basic functionality
of IoT by means of trust-related attacks: self-promoting, bad-mouthing, and
good-mouthing. The trust management protocol for IoT proposed in [61] is dis-
tributed, encounter based, and activity based: two nodes that come in touch to
each other or involved in a mutual interaction can directly rate each other and
exchange trust evaluation about the other nodes, so they perform an indirect
rate which seems like a recommendation. The reference parameters to trust
evaluation are honesty, cooperativeness, and community interest.
Therefore, such a dynamic trust management protocol is capable of
adaptively adjusting the best trust parameter setting in response to dynami-
cally changing environments in order to maximize application performance.
A similar approach to provide a trustworthiness evaluation is carried out in
[62] in the so-called Social Internet of Things (SIoT). This paradigm derives
from the integration of social networking concepts into IoT, due to the fact
that the objects belonging to the IoT infrastructure are capable of establishing
social relationships in an autonomous way with respect to their owners. The
challenge addressed in [63] is to build a reputation-based trust mechanism for
the SIoT, which can effectively deal with certain types of malicious behaviors
aimed at misleading other nodes, in order to drive the use of services and
information delivery only towards trusted nodes. A subjective model for the
management of trustworthiness is defined, which builds upon the solutions
proposed for P2P networks. Each node computes the trustworthiness of its
friends based on their own experience and the opinion of the common friends.
As a consequence, a node chooses the provider of the service it needs based on
this highest computed trustworthiness level.
Yet in relation to the social network context, in [64], the authors propose
a secure distributed ad hoc network; it is based on a direct peer-to-peer inter-
actions and the creation of communities in order to grant a quick, easy, and
secure access to users to surf the web; thus, it is close to the social network
concept. Each node (i.e., device) and each community have an identity in the
network and modify the trust of other nodes based on their behavior, thus
establishing a trust chain among users. The parameters analyzed are physical
proximity, fulfillment, consistency of answer, hierarchy on the trusted chain,
similar properties (e.g., age, gender, types of sensors), common goals and war-
rants, history of interaction, availability, and interactions. Chains of confidence
46 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

will allow the establishment of groups or communities and unique identities

(for the communities) for the access to services as well as for the spreading of
group information. Therefore, security is established when the users access the
network through the use of the trust chain generated by nodes, which he/she
crosses. It is considered that the traditional access control models are not suit-
able for the decentralized and dynamic IoT scenarios, where identities are not
known in advance. Trust relationship between two devices helps in influencing
the future behaviors of their interactions.
When devices trust each other, they prefer to share services and resources.
Such a paper presents a Fuzzy approach to the Trust-Based Access Control
(FTBAC). The trust scores are calculated by the FTBAC framework from fac-
tors such as experience, knowledge, and recommendation. Such trust scores
are then mapped to permissions, and access requests are accompanied by a set
of credentials, which together constitute a proof for allowing the access or not.

5.4 TRUST MANAGEMENT

In order to provide an IoT network that is trustworthy, the following goals
should be achieved [65,66]:

a. Correlation and agreement: Trust management enables the

assessment of the degree of correlation and agreement between
IoT network nodes. It also helps them to reach consensus and
cooperate with each other. Trust correlation assessment takes into
account all the entities present within the IoT network at all the
layers and plays a fundamental role in intelligent and autonomic
trust management.
b. Knowledge apprehension: Trust management system should ensure
a reliable data transfer between nodes in the network. In order to
achieve that, the system must ensure precision and perseverance as
well as an efficient collection of data. This goal is generally achieved
at the perception layer.
c. Maintaining confidentiality: Trust management system must act
in accordance with policies in order to safeguard the privacy and
confidentiality of sensitive data, which are in transit within the
IoT network.
d. Trustworthy communication: Trust management system must ensure
that the data flow and messages passing within the network are
secure from any threats. For this purpose, authorization certificates
 5 • Trust and Privacy in IoT 47

and key management are deployed to control any malicious access

in the network. This goal of trust management is one of the funda-
mental security requirements for IoT’s development.
e. Quality of service: This objective of the trust management system is
mainly application specific (application layer). However, it requires
support from other layers also. Quality of service ensures that the
services should be provided to the right end user at the right time.

5.5 CONCLUSION
The real spreading of IoT services requires customized security and privacy
levels to be guaranteed. The broad overview provided with this survey arises
many open issues and shed some light on research directions in the IoT security
field. More in detail, a unified vision regarding the insurance of security and
privacy requirements in such a heterogeneous environment, involving different
technologies and communication standards, is still missing. Suitable solutions
need to be designed and deployed, which are independent from the exploited
platform and able to guarantee: confidentiality, access control, and privacy for
users and things, trustworthiness among devices and users, compliance with
defined security and privacy policies. Research efforts are also required to face
the integration of IoT and communication technologies in a secure middle-
ware, able to cope with the defined protection constraints. Another research
field is that of IoT security in mobile devices, increasingly widespread today.
Much efforts have been (and are being) spent by the worldwide scientific com-
munity to address the aforementioned topics, but there are still many open
issues to be faced.
Authentication
Mechanisms
for IoT
6
Networks
Developing comprehensive security and privacy solutions for IoT requires
revisiting almost all security techniques we may think of. Encryption proto-
cols need to be engineered so as to be efficient and scalable for deployment
on large-scale IoT systems and devices with limited computational resources.
Benchmarks are needed to perform detailed assessments of such protocols.
In addition, as devices may be physically unprotected, attackers may have
access to the state of the memory, while encryption operations are being
performed. Addressing such problems may require new techniques based,
for example, on white-box cryptography.
White-box encryption techniques hide encryption keys by transform-
ing them into large look-up tables in order to make harder for attackers to
extract the keys. Such techniques are, however, very expensive, and many
of the proposed white-box encryption protocols have been cryptanalyzed.
Introducing dynamics in the look-up tables by a shuffling approach may help
in addressing such a problem. In addition, scalability of such protocols is criti-
cal, in that in many safety-sensitive applications, encryption operations must
be very efficient. For example, in a vehicle network, a message from a vehicle
informing other vehicles of a sudden break should be processed very quickly
in order to give the other vehicles enough time to break.

49
50 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

6.1 DATA SECURITY IN IoT

The estimated growth of this new trend in the market is expected to hit between
26 billion and 30 billion devices by 2020, with an estimated market worth of
between $6 trillion and $9 trillion. To put this in context, the following are
some interesting implications (including ones concerning data protection) that
relate to the explosion of these interconnected devices [67,68]:

• These devices will constantly generate huge amounts of data, so

we will need faster networks, larger storage capabilities (likely
in the cloud), and more bandwidths to support the growth in
Internet traffic.
• There is not yet an open ecosystem to host these devices to make
them interoperable as there is on Microsoft Windows, Apple iOS,
and Google Android ecosystems.
• Vendors are creating private networks for interoperability among
their own products, but these are incompatible with others. This cre-
ates a major challenge for integration across multiple solutions.
• The current Internet protocol (IPv4) cannot handle the growth in
the number of interconnected devices on the Internet. This will
trigger the need to switch to a more scalable protocol, such as
IPv6.

Data security, availability, and quality are critical areas for IoT. Data security
requires, in addition to the use of encryption to secure the data while being
transmitted and at rest, access control policies to govern access to data, by
taking into account information on data provenance and metadata concerning
the data acquisition context, such as location and time. Availability requires
among other things to make sure that relevant data is not lost. Addressing such
requirement entails designing protocols for data acquisition and transmission
that have data loss minimization as a key security goal. Kinesis [69] is an
example of a sensor network system designed to make it possible for sensors
to automatically take response actions in the event of data transmission dis-
ruptions. Ensuring data quality is a major critical requirement in IoT as data
acquired and transmitted by IoT devices may be of poor quality, because of
several reasons such as bad device calibration, device faults, and deliberate
attacks aiming at data deception attacks. Solutions like data fusion need to
be revised and extended to deal with dynamic environments and large-scale
heterogeneous data sources.
 6 • Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 51

6.2 IoT LIMITATIONS

Devices of the IoT are resource constrained, and therefore, traditional security
mechanisms are not precise in smart things. According to [70], some security
limitations related to the IoT communication devices are as follows:

• Memory capacity: Restricted devices use random access memory

(RAM) to store data, and their storage capacity ranges between a
few kilobytes and 12 kilobytes. Data storage in the IoT devices is
limited, and some devices cannot store or send data. As a result,
some data is ignored if it exceeds the limit of storage.
• Energy capacity: It is the amount of energy the devices have to
maintain itself over a specified period. The energy sources in the
devices are limited and need to be replaced after a particular time.
Some IoT devices consume large amounts of power and are not
rechargeable. Therefore, to save the battery in limited devices, low-
bandwidth connections are used.
• Processing capacity: It refers to the amount of power in the devices.
Many IoT devices are small sized and of low cost with low process-
ing capacity. Therefore, these devices require lightweight protocols
to work efficiently.

6.3 NEED FOR AUTHENTICATION

AND ACCESS CONTROL IN IoT
IoT is focusing on machine-to-machine (M2M) mode of communication. For
such communication nodes, authentication is very important for insuring secu-
rity and privacy. When two or more nodes are communicating with each other
for a common objective, they should authenticate each other first in order to
block fake node attack. However, there is no efficient authentication mecha-
nism for a massive number of IoT devices.
The first principle of security is visibility. Issues from patching to moni-
toring to quarantining all require establishing visibility the moment a device
touches the network. Since access control technologies are usually the first net-
work element that a new device touches, they need to be able to automatically
recognize IoT devices, determine if they have been compromised, and then
52 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

provide controlled access based on factors such as type of device, intended

destination, and if it is user based, the role of the user.
As the volume of IoT devices connecting and disconnecting from the net-
work continues to escalate, access control solutions need to be able to do this
at digital speeds. Access control solutions then need to seamlessly synchronize
with network and security controls to ensure that these devices are tracked and
that policy enforcement is consistently enforced as they and their applications
move across the distributed network.
Strong IoT device authentication is required to ensure that connected
devices on the IoT can be trusted to be what they purport to be. Consequently,
each IoT device needs a unique identity that can be authenticated when the
device attempts to connect to a gateway or central server.

6.4 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR

AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
The main IoT security concerns are authentication, authorization, integrity,
confidentiality, non-repudiation, availability, and privacy.

• Authentication: The process of confirming and insuring the iden-

tity of objects. In IoT context, each object should have the ability
to identify and authenticate all other objects in the system (or in a
given part of the system with which it interacts).
• The authorization: The process of giving permission to an entity to
do or have something.
• Integrity: The way towards keeping up the consistency, precision,
and dependability of information over its whole life cycle. In IoT,
the alteration of basic information or even the infusion of invalid
information could prompt major issues; for example, in smart health
system-use cases, it could lead to the death of the patient.
• Confidentiality: The process of ensuring that the information is only
accessed by authorized people. Two main issues should be consid-
ered regarding confidentiality in IoT: first, to ensure that the object
receiving the data is not going to move/transfer these data to other
objects and, second, to consider the data management.
• Non-repudiation: The way towards guaranteeing the ability to
demonstrate that a task or event has occurred (and by whom), with
the goal that this cannot be denied later. In other words, the object
cannot deny the authenticity of a specific data transferred.
 6 • Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 53

• Availability: The process of ensuring that the service needed is

available anywhere and anytime for the intended users. This
includes in IoT the availability of the objects themselves.
• Privacy: The process of ensuring nonaccessibility to private infor-
mation by public or malicious objects.

6.5 TAXONOMY OF IoT

AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
Depending upon the communication and computation capabilities, the mutual
authentication protocols are divided into four classes (as shown in Figure 6.1):
(i) full-fledged protocols, use classical cryptographic encryption and decryp-
tion and have high computational overhead; (ii) simple protocols, use light-
weight techniques such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG), and hash function; (iii) lightweight protocols, use
checksums, hash function, and bitwise operations; and (iv) ultra-lightweight
protocols, only use bitwise operations, for example, rotations and permuta-
tions. There are several mutual authentication protocols for radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags, which can be used to secure IoT devices. Some of
these protocols are given in Table 6.1.

6.5.1 Hash-Based Protocols
Hash-chain based approaches deploy cryptographic mechanisms to secure pass-
words and other credentials. A hash chain of length “N” is obtained by recursive
application of one-way hash function with an initial value “x”: hN(x) = h(h(…
h(x)…)), such that if an adversary knows hN(x) and “x,” it cannot obtain hN−1(x).

FIGURE 6.1 Classification of RFID authentication protocols.

54 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

TABLE 6.1 RFID Security Techniques

DESCRIPTION NOVELTY SHORTCOMINGS
Chen et al. Private mutual Server performs only one Suffers from
[71] authentication decryption to obtain the forgery attack,
scheme based real identify of tags location privacy
on quadratic without requiring linear problem, and
residues search replay attack.
referred to
Rabin
cryptosystem
Yeh et al. [72] Securing RFID Able to detect DoS attacks Cannot withstand
systems and also enhances the against server
conforming to overall performance impersonation
EPC Class 1 efficiently at the same attack and the
Generation 2 time data integrity
standard attack since the
server’s data is
transmitted in the
plaintext format
Cho et al. Hash-based RFID Enable a constant creation Cannot withstand
[73] mutual of distinct response against
authentication messages without resynchronization
protocol using interferences from attack, the tag
a secret value intended or meaningless impersonation
requests generated by an attack, and the
adversary, while the secret reader
value is not directly impersonation
transmitted attack
Burmester- Tag and server Supports session Performance issues
Munilla are mutually unlinkability and forward as the PRNG
et al.’s authenticated and backward security. In needs to be
protocol [74] by exchanging this protocol, each tag refreshed when
either three or shares with the server a there is suspicion
five consecutive synchronized PRNG. that the state of
numbers from the PRNG may be
the PRNG compromised
Liao and ECC-based RFID Supports forward and Vulnerable to the
Hsiao’s authentication backward security and tag masquerade
protocol [75] scheme provides very low time attack, the server
integrated with complexity. spoofing attack,
ID-verifier the location
transfer tracking attack,
protocol and the tag
cloning attack
(Continued)
 6 • Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 55

TABLE 6.1 (CONTINUED) RFID Security Techniques

DESCRIPTION NOVELTY SHORTCOMINGS
Chou’s ECC-based RFID Low computation Suffers from the
protocol [76] authentication complexity and all the tag information
scheme using messages need to be privacy problem,
prime and communicated after using backward
random hash function as the traceability and
numbers channel is assumed to be forward
insecure. traceability
problem
Tu and Authentication Password-based key Vulnerable to
Piramuthu’s protocol for agreement; thus, the user impersonation
protocol [77] session is free to change their attack
initiation password in case of any
protocol using suspicion
smart card.

The first hash-based approach was proposed by Ohkubo et al. [78],

which used an identifier that was new for every session. This protocol did
not use any random number generator. The parameters are renewed for every
new session. They used a fresh tag identifier for every new session without
using any random number generator. However, the protocol is vulnerable to
replay attacks.
Weis et al. [79] proposed one-way hash function-based security scheme.
Each tag has a temporary ID, which is the result of hash of a key “k.” Each
tag functions in either locked or unlocked state. During the lock state, the
tag responds to all the requests with the temporary ID and no other action
is taken.
Henrici and Muller [80] proposed an authentication protocol using
one-way hash functions to ensure secure communication between the reader
and the server. After the successful completion of every session, the tag ID
is updated at both server’s and tag’s sides in order to ensure location privacy
and forward secrecy. The protocol also ensures anonymity; however, it fails to
provide security against backtracking.
Molnar and Wagner [81] proposed another authentication protocol that
used a hash tree approach instead of hash chains to distribute the cost of com-
putations more evenly throughout the RFID system (among all the nodes).
They also developed a new model library to store node details at the backend
server so as to prevent exhaustive search and ensure more security. The library
architecture was very efficient in terms of searching speed; however, the
authentication protocol failed to ensure anonymity.
56 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

6.5.2 ECC-Based Protocols
The current state-of-the-art authentication protocols for RFID systems include
various categories of solutions such as mechanisms built up on public key cryp-
tography or other mechanism to provide security at low cost by using simpler
techniques to ensure tag security. The use of public key cryptography for low-
cost devices is not a very efficient idea as it requires a lot of resources and
space. Similarly, if we attempt to use existing symmetric key solution with
these devices, the protocols fail to work efficiently due to different network
conditions and lesser resources.
ECC has been providing very efficient substitution to public key cryp-
tography for low-cost devices because it requires very small keys to provide
security and privacy comparable to traditional public key cryptography-based
schemes. The first ECC-based authentication protocol for RFID devices was
proposed by Tulys and Batina in 2006 [82]. However, later on, Lee et al. [83]
found out some weaknesses in this protocol and proposed a new solution to
address these issues.
Liao and Hsiao [84] proposed another ECC-based solution that did not
use any hash functions or complex computations, and hence, it was very
simple to implement and was suitable for passive tags also. Later on, Peeters
and Hermans [85] proved that the aforementioned protocol is unable to ensure
security against tracking, spoofing, and cloning. It also fails to ensure privacy.
Liao and Hsiao [75] proposed another authentication protocol, which claimed
to ensure privacy and anonymity; they also presented proofs that the protocol
ensures security against tracking and tag cloning.
Tan [86] proposed a three-factor-based key exchange mechanism for
secure communication between low-cost devices. However, this scheme was
unable to secure the devices against Denial of Service (DoS) and replay
attacks. To overcome the vulnerabilities of Tan’s protocol [86], Arshad
and Nikooghadam [87] presented an ECC-based authentication proto-
col. However, Lu et al. [88] showed that Arshad and Nikooghadam’s [87]
protocol is vulnerable to password attacks, which can make tags vulnerable
to impersonation.

6.5.3 PUF-Based Protocols
A physically unclonable function (PUF) is used to map a set of challenge val-
ues to set of response values based on a complex function. The complex func-
tion is based on a physical system and computes a response value for each
challenge. PUFs provide a cost-effective security protocol. There are various
 6 • Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 57

ways to implement a PUF, for example, using silicon physical systems, which
hides timing and delay of Integrated Circuits (ICs). PUFs are embedded in
devices and track even various changes in the host environment, for example,
temperature and pressure. A different response value will be generated every
time the host environment changes. Thus, PUFs are hard to predict due to dif-
ferent responses even with a slight change in the challenge values. However,
some solutions [89–93] suggested that in order to obtain the secret value from
the token, the PUF has to deploy some error correction techniques, which
increase the cost of computations.
Some other works have also explored various weaknesses that exist in
PUF-based functions. Most of the PUFs fail to ensure a mutual authentication
between the tag and the reader. PUF-based approaches also have scalability
issues and are prone to DoS attacks, which can disrupt the connection and
services between the server and the tag permanently.

6.5.4 HB Protocols
Hopper and Blum [94] proposed an authentication scheme in 2001, known as
HB protocol. These protocols rely on Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) prob-
lem, which is a computationally hard problem.
LPN problem [95]: Assume P to be a matrix with the dimension q, x to be
a k-bit binary vector, and υ to be a vector such that wt(υ) ≤ q·η, where η ∈ [0, ½]
and the size of v is q-bits. If we have z = P·x ⊕ υ, then the LPN problem is to
obtain x0 such that |P·x0 ⊕ υ | ≤ q·η.
LPN has various applications in cryptography as it is able to provide
a stepping stone for provably secure solutions; that is, it can be mathe-
matically shown that the solution is able to resist an active attacker in the
existing environment. These schemes are very simple and take only a few
step; thus, these schemes are very feasible for low-cost devices. The cryp-
tographic schemes are mostly decisional; for the LPN problem, it can be
shown that there is not a very significant difference between the decisional
approach and the search approach. The cryptographic notions that can be
derived from this problem can be collision resistant. The LPN problem is
assumed to be collision resistant and remains a hard problem even for non-
uniform noise values.
Juels and Weis [96,110] presented another HB-based approach for RFID
systems referred to as HB+ [97]. They also demonstrated an active attack and
added some other minor computations to improve the HB protocol. Later on,
Gilbert et al. [98] proved that both HB and HB+ schemes are vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks.
58 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

6.5.5 Ultra-Lightweight Protocols
The fourth class of protocols is the ultra-lightweight protocols, which are
entirely developed using bitwise operations such as OR, AND, XOR, rotation,
or permutation. These protocols have the lowest overhead in terms of storage
and computation.
In SASI [99], each tag has an ID and shares a pseudonym (IDS) and
key value with the backend database server. The length of each of them is
96-bits. SASI ensures strong authentication and integrity, and uses bitwise
XOR (⊕)(⊕), bitwise OR (∨)(∨), bitwise AND (∧)(∧), addition mod 2n(+),
and left rotate (Rot(x, y)) operation, which left rotates the value of x with
y-bits. Complex operations such as hash functions are not used by this proto-
col. However, this protocol is susceptible to disclosure attacks and does not
ensure untraceability.
Peris-Lopez et al. proposed LMAP [100] protocol that used simple bit-
wise operations XOR (⊕)(⊕), bitwise OR (∨)(∨), bitwise AND (∧)(∧), and addi-
tion mod 2m (+). This protocol ensures a mutual authentication and security
from various attacks without the use of complex operations like hashing. This
scheme uses an index pseudonym (IDS), which is 96-bits in length. Here, the
IDS is the index of the row where all the tag-related data are stored. Each tag
has key, which is divided into four parts of 96-bits each.
M2AP [101] protocol, which is very similar to LMAP [100], is also a
lightweight mutual authentication protocol for RFID tags, where the index
pseudonym updation procedure is different from LMAP while key updating
operations remain the same. Both LMAP and M2AP [101] ensure anonym-
ity and mutual authentication and provide security against various attacks,
such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. However, both of
these protocols are susceptible to desynchronization and full- disclosure
attacks.
Another protocol called EMAP [102], which is based on challenge–
response mechanism, is an authentication scheme for passive tags. Most of
the complex computations in this protocol are performed by the reader, and
tags perform lightweight operations such as hash. It only requires one storage
unit for the tag in addition to the ID for storing authentication-related data.
This protocol also ensures confidentiality, integrity, and untraceability.
Peris-Lopez et al. proposed the Gossamer protocol [103], which addresses
the weaknesses of SASI [99] such as desynchronization and disclosure attacks.
It uses dual rotations and MixBits operation, which is a lightweight function
(i.e., combination of bitwise right shift and addition operations). However, this
protocol has low throughput.
 6 • Authentication Mechanisms for IoT Networks 59

6.6 CONCLUSION
IoT is the next step towards using Internet anywhere and anytime. IoT allows
to connect people and devices (things) anytime and anyplace, with anything
and anyone. The main security issues related to IoT are explained in brief.
By observation, it is easy to understand that there is no project still in work,
which satisfies all security issues in IoT. Also, there is no single project that
provides policy enforcement in the IoT. In summary, an accomplished vision
admiring the assurance of security and privacy constraints in a dissimilar
environment, which implies that current security services are insufficient for
such contradictory technologies and communication standard. As IoT deals
with interconnecting various heterogeneous things, currently there are many
challenges occurring while building it. So this area has many open research
issues. The future research directions mainly consist of how to deal with the
challenges, may be related to security issues, faced by IoT.
Provable
Security
Models and
7
Existing
Protocols
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have restricted resources and energy; how-
ever, they require regular updates and identification from other devices and the
backend server. Thus, security is also a major concern, and the most common
way to do it is mutual authentication between the communicating parties. The
authentication schemes used for RFID tags are generally lightweight consider-
ing the constraints over IoT devices.
The RFID tags have a capacity of few kbs and deploy around 5,000–6,000
gates, out of which only a few hundred can be devoted to security functions.
However, the classical cryptography authentication protocols require around
30,000–40,000 logic gates. In addition to that, we also have to consider the
limited battery power.
However, in spite of these issues, the use of RFID tags in various fields
has been increasing rapidly. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the privacy issues
related to these systems. The items deploying these tags may reveal confiden-
tial data such as location due to predictability. A very common solution to this
issue is the use of random values as keys. There are many more issues such
as above, which are faced by RFID systems. For example, various security
models do not take into consideration that an adversary could be able to attack
a tag physically, for example, tampering of the tag.
However, this situation must always be considered as products with low
cost can be physically compromised very easily. Any adversary can carry out
“reset” attacks and side-channel attacks by influencing the physical conditions

61
62 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

of the tags, that is, varying power and voltage. Some models, however, take
this into consideration while examining a protocol’s security.
Many researchers have been working on these past couples of years to
ensure the security and privacy of RFID systems. However, there is still no
generic solution to this problem as most of the existing solutions are specific
to particular scenarios or provide security against certain types of attacks.
In addition to finding security solutions for RFID devices, researchers are
also working on developing formal models, which can be used to prove the
strength of protocols. These models help in analyzing the design and work-
ing of RFID protocols. They also emphasize the strengths and weaknesses of
a protocol. However, these models also suffer from various deficiencies; for
example, most of the frameworks do not fully comprehend the effects of func-
tionalities and the level of access provided to the adversary on the system.

7.1 PROVABLE SECURITY MODELS

Most of the authentication schemes these days turn out to be insecure as they
are developed solely based on previous experiences. But provable security has
emerged as a new state-of-the-art model for the verification and development
of more secure protocols based on experience as well as cognitive reasoning.
Provable security aims to provide concrete mathematical proof for ensuring
the protocol’s security.
Modern cryptographic protocols deploy “game-based” security models,
which have an adversary (active or passive) that can carry out potential attacks
over the concerned system. If there exists an adversary who can win the game,
then the scheme is considered to be insecure.

7.1.1 Vaudeney’s Model
This model [104] has the capability to affect all the ongoing communications
between entities and is able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on any
entity accessible to the adversary. It also has the authority to get the output of
a device authentication (0 or 1). The adversary in this model is able to select or
deselect tags randomly which are moving in and out of the range. The adver-
sary has the ability to corrupt tags by extracting the details of their internal
state. During any ongoing session, the adversary has a temporary identifier for
the tags within its range.
 7 • Provable Security Models 63

Oracles: the following oracles are defined by Vaudeney:

• CreateTag(): It generates a tag with unique identifiers and updates

the database.
• DrawTag(): It selects or draws a set of fresh tags (which are to be
sent to the adversary). It also identifies whether the drawn set of tags
is legitimate.
• Free(): It releases a virtual tag (vtag), which then becomes unreach-
able by the adversary.
• Launch(): It launches a new protocol session.
• SendReader(): It sends a message to the reader during a protocol run.
• Result(): On the completion of a protocol run, it generates the output
0 or 1.
• Corrupt(): It returns tag status based on which tags are kept or
destroyed.

Adversary: it is an algorithm that interacts with tags, has a public key, and
requires oracles to carry out its operations. Vaudeney classified adversaries
into the following categories:

• Strong adversary: It has access to all the oracles without any

limitations.
• Weak adversary: It cannot corrupt tags, and it can only listen to the
ongoing communications and interact with the oracle.
• Forward adversary: It becomes active once a tag is corrupted after
which protocol interactions are not allowed.
• Destructive adversary: It cannot interact with a corrupted tag; that
is, tags are destroyed after being corrupted.

Vaudeney stated that: StrongAdv ⊇ DestructiveAdv ⊇ Forward Adv ⊇ Weak Adv

Security (Vaudeney’s definition): If an adversary is able to identify a legit-
imate tag, then it wins the game. Thus, for a protocol to be secure, the prob-
ability of an adversary’s winning should be negligible.
Privacy (Vaudeney’s definition): During the game, the adversary has a set
of drawn tags among which it has to identify a legitimate tag by the result 0
or 1. If the output is 1, then adversary wins; therefore, for a scheme to ensure
privacy, all such adversaries should be trivial.
Blinder: A blinder B for any adversary A is a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithm that observes all the messages sent and received by A.
It can also simulate Launch(), SendReader(), SendTag(), and Result() oracles.
However, B is unable to access the reader’s data.
64 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

An adversary is said to be blinded (denoted as A B) if it does not use

Launch(), SendReader(), SendTag(), and Result() oracles. Also, the adversary
AB is said to be trivial if after it is blinded, it produces the same output as
before; that is, |Pr(Awins) – Pr(ABwins)| ≤ ∈, where ∈ is a negligible function.
The game between the adversary A and the challenger C is divided into
two phases (as shown in Figure 7.1):

• Attack phase: During this phase, the adversary interacts with the
system and queries with the oracle to gather information.
• Analysis phase: During this phase, the adversary is given a table of
tags, among which it has to identify the legitimate and fake tags.
A generates results as 0 or 1. If the output is 1, A wins.

Vaudeney’s model [105] discusses various aspects of security and includes

most of the correctness and privacy aspects. However, it has some weaknesses.
Vaudeney stated that wide-strong privacy is not possible to achieve, which was
later corrected by Ouafi and Vaudenay [106]. Vaudeney stated that there exists
an entity called blinder, which answers the Result() oracle. Here, the adversary
knows the selected tag, whereas the blinder doesn’t. The blinder now knows
the random coin flip.

7.1.2 Canard et al.’s Model

Canard et al. [107,108] proposed a security model, which is derived from
Vaudeney’s model. Canard et al.’s model uses strong, destructive, and weak
adversaries. In addition, the use of oracles is also similar to those used by

ExpVaudeney(S,A)

Attack phase
■ Challenger initializes system S and a key is sent to A.
■ Depending upon the class A belongs to, it communicates with tags and oracles
to gather information during a protocol session.

Analysis phase
■ A analyzes S without any oracle.
■ A is sent a table by DrawTag oracle.
■ On basis of previous interactions, A outputs 0 or 1.

FIGURE 7.1 Vaudeney’s privacy experiment.

 7 • Provable Security Models 65

Vaudeney’s model. However, unlike the notion of security and privacy in

Vaudeney’s model, Canard et al. also ensure properties such as soundness,
correctness, and untraceability.
Some of the new properties introduced by Canard et al. are as follows:

• Nonobvious link: a link between two virtual tags (v1, v2) is said to
be nonobvious if
i. Both tags refer to the same tag ID.
ii. A “dummy” adversary that can call DrawTag, CreateTag,
Free, Corrupt, and oracle is unable to generate this link with
probability ≥ 1/2.
• A nonobvious link can be categorized into the following classes:
i. Standard: if both virtual tags are not corrupted by the adversary.
ii. Past: if v1 is uncorrupted.
iii. Future: if v2 is uncorrupted.
iv. We have Future(Strongest Privacy) ⊇ Past ⊇ Standard.

Canard et al. [107] have dummy adversary A D instead of a blinder B. Vaudeney

has a blinder B, which is an entity on its own separate from the adversary A B,
whereas “dummy” adversary is a single entity having knowledge of all random
choices that can be made.

Untraceability experiment: Untraceability can be proved in a system

if all the adversaries are unable to generate a nonobvious link with
probability greater than the dummy adversary (probability ≥ 1/2).
It can be stated as:

( )
ExpUNT ( S , A ) = Pr ( Awins ) – Pr AD wins ≤ ∈

Canard et al.’s model has most certainly overcome some of the demer-
its of Vaudeney’s by using A D and nonobvious links, but it still can-
not be used with every scheme due to the use of nontrivial links and
the limited scope within which untraceability is defined (as shown
in Figure 7.2).
Correctness: A scheme S is correct for any class of adversary A, if
any A ∈ {Strong, Destructive, Weak} is a PPT algorithm where
SuccessCORRECT (S, A) is negligible (as shown in Figure 7.3). It can
be stated as:

SuccessCORRECT ( S , A ) = Pr ExpCORRECT ( S , A ) = 0
66 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Exp UNT (S,A)

■ Challenger initializes system S and a key is sent to A.
■ Depending upon the class A belongs to, it communicates with tags and oracles to
gather information during a protocol session.
■ A returns a link (v1, v2)

FIGURE 7.2 Canard et al.’s untraceability experiment.

ExpCORRECT(S,A)

■ Challenger initializes system S and a key is sent to A.

■ Depending upon the class A belongs to, it communicates with tags and oracles to
gather information during a protocol session.
■ A chooses an uncorrupted tag.
■ A launches the attack phase. The experiment returns a bit ‘b’ as generated by the oracle.

FIGURE 7.3 Canard et al.’s correctness experiment.

7.1.3 Universal Composability Framework

This framework [109,110] provides a very general methodology for executing
and verifying protocol security, since this framework ensures security under
composition operation; here, it is also referred to as universal composition. The
protocols that satisfy the notions of this framework are said to be universally
composable (UC).
Universal composition: The universal composition theorem states that
running protocol πρ, with no access to F (where F is an ideal functionality),
has essentially the same effect as running the original F-hybrid protocol π.
More precisely, it guarantees that for any adversary A, there exists an adversary
AF such that no environment machine can tell with non-negligible probability
whether it is interacting with A and parties running πρ, or with AF and parties
running π. In particular, if π UC-realizes some ideal functionality G, then πρ
can also do the same.
The UC framework is able to model the real world, the ideal world, and an
emulation (that models a real-world protocol into an ideal world). It creates an
interactive environment that captures the parameter values of the algorithm at
the current time. The UC framework has the following components:
 7 • Provable Security Models 67

• In this framework, the adversary A interacts with environment Z,

which comprises legitimate entities, each of which is PPT algo-
rithms. Z generates the initial input parameters and obtains the output
parameters by performing random queries with the adversary.

For an algorithm run for each adversary (PPT), there is a real-world simula-
tion of the algorithm, which can be modeled into an ideal-world scenario in
the presence of a simulated adversary A in such a way that Z cannot be able to
distinguish if it is interacting with the adversary and algorithm instance in the
ideal world or the real world.
The adversary in the UC security model interacts with both real-world and
ideal-world environments. The adversary can eavesdrop into all the commu-
nications and can schedule the activation sequence of the entities. Every ses-
sion has an identifier “sid,” which is shared by all the entities involved in the
communication. During the session initiation, Z becomes active first and then
activates the adversary. If Z stops, the whole simulation is aborted. Z may also
allow more than one protocol session to run simultaneously.
In the ideal scenario, the UC framework implements an anonymous
authentication and anonymous key exchange functionality. To ensure anonym-
ity in all the channels, anonymous wireless communications are involved.
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 give a brief description of authentication and key exchange
functionalities.
There are many ways for combining more than one protocol together, for
example, sequential or concurrent executions. The protocol executions can be
run by one or more than one entity and have one or more inputs and outputs.
All of the scenarios can be considered as special cases of UC framework by
varying uses of synchronization, sub-session, and inputs.

7.1.4 Juels–Weis Challenge–Response Model

The Juels–Weis [111] model is also a game-based framework where the system
comprises one RFID reader R and n RFID tags. Each tag has its own key and
pseudo-key, which is reset after every session. This model uses the following
messages:

• To assign a new secret key to the tag, the SetKey message is used.
When the tag receives SetKey message, it discards the old key value
and a new arbitrary secret is allotted to the tag.
• The TagInit message initializes the session key to a new value,
discards the current session details, and issues a new session key.
• The ReaderInit message is used by R to initialize a new session.
68 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

Anonymous mutual authentication functionality has a session identifier ‘sid’ shared by all the entities

Server initiates the session:

INITIATE from server
Clear all the records of other tags stored locally INIT(s, .)
Generate a unique identifier ‘s’
Store INIT(s, server)
Send INIT(s, server) to the adversary A

Tag initiates the session:

INITIATE from tag T
If T is impersonated by A
Drop Session
Else
Generate a unique identifier ‘s’
Store INIT(s,T)
Send INIT (s,T) to the A

ACCEPT request from A:

ACCEPT(s,s’) from A
If INIT(s,server) and INIT(s’,T) are stored locally
Clear INIT(s’,T)
Store PARTNER(s,server,s’,T)
Output ACCEPT(T)
Else IF partner(s’,server,s,T) already exists
Clear partner(s’,server,s,T)
Send ACCEPT(server) to T

A requests to impersonate T:
IMPERSONATE(s,T)
If INIT(s,server) is stored locally AND T is impersonated by A
Return ACCEPT (T) to server

A requests KILL command:

A sends KILL(s,s’)
IF partner(s,server,s’,T) exists
Clear partner(s’,server,s,T)
Output DIE to T
Delete T from sid

FIGURE 7.4 Anonymous mutual entity authentication with KILL command.

A is assumed to be an adversary which has the capability to generate any of

the above messages. Once the tag is active, it is entitled to respond to any num-
ber of challenge–response messages, that is, (ci, ri) messages, which is based
on the information from parameters such as previous sessions and challenge–
response messages. The tag stores a log with the details of previous sessions
and challenge–response message pairs.
Whenever the reader R receives the message (sid, ri), it first evaluates a cer-
tain function based on its current status and all open as well as closed sessions.
Based on this function, R outputs “accept” or “reject.” A can corrupt any existing
tag and issue any new tag as it is able to send any number of SetKey messages.
Thus, if a tag receives SetKey message from A, it is said to be corrupted.
 7 • Provable Security Models 69

Anonymous mutual authentication functionality has a session identifier ‘sid’ shared by all the entities

Server initiates the session:

INITIATE from server
Clear all the records of other tags stored locally INIT(s, .)
Generate a unique identifier ‘s’
Store INIT(s, server)
Send INIT(s, server) to the adversary A

Tag initiates the session:

INITIATE from tag T
If T is impersonated by A
Drop Session
Else
Generate a unique identifier ‘s’
Store INIT(s,T)
Send INIT(s,T) to the A

ACCEPT request from A:

ACCEPT(s,s’) from A
If INIT(s,server) and INIT(s’,T) are stored locally
Clear INIT(s’,T)
Generate random key k
Store PARTNER(s,server,s’,T,k)
Output ACCEPT(T,k)
Else IF partner(s’,server,s,T) already exists
Clear both PARTNER records
Send ACCEPT(server,k) to T

A requests to impersonate T:
IMPERSONATE(s,T)
If INIT(s,server) is stored locally AND T is impersonated by A
Return ACCEPT(T) to server

FIGURE 7.5 Anonymous key exchange.

In this approach, it is assumed that the adversary A listens and controls all
the ongoing communications between the reader and the tags. Here, one reader
R and a tags (T ∈ Tags), at the end of each session if one protocol party finds
the other to be legitimate it outputs Accept.
A has the ability to issue the following queries:

• Execute(R, T, i): Here, A eavesdrops on an actual execution of the

protocol between the reader (R) and the tag (T) in session i. It is a
passive attack.
• Send(P1, P2, i, m): This query is the generalization of the challenge–
response technique defined in Juels–Weis model along with
the TagInit and ReaderInit messages. Here, the adversary can
70 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

impersonate a party P1, which could be the reader or a tag during

session “i,” and sends m messages to some other party P2.
• Corrupt(T, K): This query is the same as the SetKey query. Here,
the adversary changes the secret key of the tag to K. This is a more
powerful attack as compared to Send query as the adversary has
access to the tag.
• Test(T1, T2, i): When the Test query is issued, in the session “i”
depending upon b ∈ {0, 1}, an id IDb is chosen from {ID1, ID2} and
A has to guess the bit “b” correctly to succeed.

In the game that is to be played between the party and the adversary, the goal
of the adversary is to identify the correct tag, and both of them must be fresh;
that is, it has not been issued any corrupt queries. The following phases are
considered in the game:

• Phase I (learning phase): During this phase, A is able to send any

number of Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries to learn about the
tags and the reader.
• Phase II (challenge phase): Here, A chooses a new session and
sends a Test message to the session. The session must be fresh and
selects a random bit ∈ {0, 1} depending on which it is given a tag to
guess. A then continues making the queries, ensuring that the tags
that are chosen for guessing remain fresh.
• Phase III (guessing phase): The game terminates when A outputs a
bit value b; A wins if it successfully guesses the tag ID and is able
to distinguish between T0 and T1. The success of A is quantitatively
represented as an advantage of A and denoted as:

Adv A UNT ( k ) = [ A wins] Pr – Pr [random coin flip]

= Pr [ b ′ = b ] – 1 2

7.2 ISSUES WITH SECURITY MODELS

The real spreading of IoT services requires customized security and privacy
levels to be guaranteed. The broad overview provided with this literature sur-
vey arises many open issues and sheds some light on research directions in the
IoT security field. However, the domain still lacks a unified vision regarding
 7 • Provable Security Models 71

the insurance of security and privacy requirements in a heterogeneous envi-

ronment, involving different technologies and communication standards.
Suitable solutions need to be designed and deployed, which are indepen-
dent from the exploited platform and able to guarantee confidentiality, access
control, and privacy for users and things; trustworthiness among devices and
users; and compliance with defined security and privacy policies.
In order to conduct holistic IoT trust management, we explored the trust
properties that impact trust relationships, classified them into five categories,
and indicated that holistic trust management should concern part or all of them
in different contexts and for different purposes. Based on a general IoT system
model, we presented some objectives for holistic IoT trust management and
indicated their supporting IoT layers by emphasizing vertical trust manage-
ment, which is crucial for achieving trust and security in IoT.
We have also discussed the security aspects of IoT with RFID as its
enabling technology. Various security protocols have been proposed in this
domain, and there are many methodologies that aid in providing a formal proof
of correctness. Vaudeney’s and Canard et al.’s models try to define privacy as
indistinguishability between real-time and ideal-world scenarios. Vaudeney’s
model has offered more categories of the adversary, while other models con-
sider maintaining privacy during authentication sessions. Vaudeney’s model
takes into account the privacy of all ongoing sessions. Considering real-time
and ideal-world scenarios, the UC model can also analyze more than one proto-
col at a time, where the environment is also interactive. However, it may some-
times be a shortcoming as some insecure protocols may remain undetected.
Thus, Vaudeney’s model must be used if we want to ensure strong privacy.
Considering Juels–Weis model, privacy is ensured by the fact that the
adversary is unable to distinguish between two tags. Canard et al.’s model,
which is built up on Vaudeney’s model, provides the same oracles, and they
can easily implement the privacy notions of Juels–Weis model, which fall
under its future-privacy notion. Thus, if we consider the indistinguishability
of tags, Canard et al.’s model can ensure better privacy as compared to Juels–
Weis model. Another issue with Juels–Weis model is that if we have to test a
system having only one tag, the model fails as it requires at least two tags to be
in a system for the challenge phase.
Some models are designed to be applied to certain categories of proto-
cols, and they might not be able to model some other categories. For example,
Vaudeney’s and Canard et al.’s models can analyze authentication protocols
well, and they can also be adapted to other models. However, the Juels–Weis
model and the UC model allow all kinds of protocols to be modeled easily and
are not restrictive in nature.
Both Vaudeney’s and Canard et al.’s models provide most categories
of adversaries as compared to others. Therefore, in order to model a weak
72 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

adversary that cannot corrupt a tag under any circumstances (the possibility
of this happening is very low), this model is feasible. Other models such as
UC and Juels–Weis assume that a tag can always be corrupted. However, in
Juels–Weis challenge phase, the adversary is unable to corrupt any of the tags.
Vaudeney’s model also provides an adversary with the authority to corrupt
tags at the end of the protocol run under the forward secrecy notion. However,
the Juels–Weis model has some constraints. It can also allow the adversary to
corrupt a tag only to back-trace previous sessions that come under their notion
of forward privacy.
Both Vaudeney’s and Canard et al.’s models define a strong adversary,
which has no restrictions on any kind of tag corruption. Initially, Vaudeney’s
model has failed to achieve the highest level of privacy, which can be reached
in all other models. However, Ouafi et al. have extended Vaudeney’s model to
incorporate the notion of strong privacy.
UC allows more parallel and sequential runs of protocols and is able to
incorporate all the tags present in the system at a time. However, Juels–Weis
model specifies no tag at the initial stage, and the adversary is allowed to study
(n − 1) tags at most.
An Internet of
Things (IoT)-
Based Security
8
Approach
Ensuring Robust
Location
Privacy for the
Healthcare
Environment
Recently, various applications of IoT are being developed for the healthcare
domain. In this chapter, our contribution is to design a lightweight security
approach for the Internet of Things (IoT) devices in healthcare. The main goal
is to make patients’ lives easier and comfortable and to provide them more
effective treatment. In addition, we also intend to address the issues related
to location privacy and security due to the deployment of IoT devices. We
have proposed a very simple mutual authentication protocol, which provides
strong location privacy using hash function, pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG), and bitwise operation. The security strength of our protocol is veri-
fied through a formal proof model for location privacy.

73
74 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

8.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION

In order to ensure privacy in the healthcare domain, the identity of tags must
remain a secret to all unauthorized parties. Tag’s identity is disclosed to autho-
rized readers only. Every reader should authenticate itself to the tag before
any communication. The location privacy can be protected if the tag identifier
(ID) is protected. The ID is a fixed integer value set during manufacturing
that uniquely identifies a tag. This ID is permanent until the tag dies or is
destroyed. Sometimes tag ID leaves certain traces analyzing which the adver-
sary can find out the tag ID. The disclosure of tag ID poses a serious threat
to devices in a network. Therefore, we have designed a very simple mutual
authentication algorithm, which aims to secure the tag ID.
The proposed solution is a challenge response-based scheme. In this case,
to ensure location privacy, we have made sure that our solution provides indis-
tinguishability and forward secrecy. First, we ensure that the adversary is not
able to identify which tag is communicating with the reader, that is, indistin-
guishability. Second, we ensure that in case the current secret parameters are
revealed, it does not compromise the security of earlier parameters.

8.2 ABSTRACT OVERVIEW

IoT devices are needed to be protected from a wide range of threats, which
include malware infections, disruption of services, and information theft. The
attacker could easily gain control of the devices that are a part of smart home,
automobiles, personal fitness, disease-monitoring gadgets, etc. An attacker
can simply hack the software in a person’s smart watch or insulin pump to
track their location, or they might gain access to the information systems pres-
ent in the automobiles and use them to carry malicious activities. Improving
the efficiency of medical infrastructure is a very challenging task at present.
The developments in IoT such as fully automated device identification and
tracking and monitoring of patients in real time are helping to deliver quality
healthcare services. These services also help in reducing the cost and at the
same time reducing the resource requirements, which is a big issue in most
of the hospitals.
One of the major concerns for such networks is the security and privacy of
the devices. In the healthcare environment, data privacy is a major concern as
the data on these devices is mostly patients’ personal information. Thus, it is
 8 • Privacy for the Healthcare Environment 75

crucial to mitigate the security risks and to develop strong and secure networks
keeping in mind the cost barrier.
IoT-based healthcare systems are networks containing devices that are
interconnected and perform sharing and processing of a significant amount of
data. Securing these networks requires cryptographic techniques, which can
be adapted as per the architecture and computing capabilities of IoT devices.
Various such protocols have been proposed in the past few years. One of the
major security concerns is that one single device cannot be considered alone
because even if a single device in the network is vulnerable to outsider threats,
it will provide a gateway for unauthorized access to the whole network. To
remedy this issue, we need to ensure that all the devices in the network are
secure against tracking and disclosure attacks so that the device identification,
location, and communication data remains secure.
In this chapter, we propose a simple lightweight mutual authentication pro-
tocol for healthcare systems with low computation and storage requirements.
Our protocol uses a minimal number of messages between the reader and the
tag for authentication purposes. We deploy one-way hash, random number
generator, and bitwise shift operation for our protocol, which ensures mutual
authentication between the tag and the reader. Location privacy is one of the
primary requirements for any device. Our protocol ensures strong security by
providing both indistinguishability and forward secrecy. We have deployed a
formal model to give a demonstration of security provided by the proposed
protocol to ensure security, privacy, and correctness.

8.3 DETAILED PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION

In order to ensure the security of an IoT system, we need to ensure the basic
security requirements at the radio frequency identification (RFID) level.
These are considered to be basic criteria that must be fulfilled by the protocol
to protect security attacks on a system.

8.3.1 Location Privacy-Based Mutual

Authentication Protocol
Location privacy is one of the most prominent threats to IoT devices. In case
of RFID tags, the message exchange between the server and the tag is done via
radio frequency, thus making it easier for attackers to extract the information
76 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

during communication. If the messages are not properly secured or encrypted,

it might lead to the infringement in the devices’ location privacy. Each RFID
tag has information for computation purposes; thus, security issues are there
automatically. In healthcare sector, the problem of location tracking is of
utmost concern as it may disclose a person’s private and sensitive informa-
tion. By being able to trace a tag’s location, the adversary might also detect a
patient’s movements and activities, which poses a very serious threat.
For any protocol to ensure strong location privacy, two conditions need to
be satisfied [111]:

• Indistinguishability: The parameters sent by various tags cannot be

distinguished by any adversary.
• Forward secrecy: It ensures that even if the adversary obtains secret
parameters of a tag, they are not able to track its location with the
help of messages from previous sessions.

8.3.2 Authentication of IoT Devices

Before initiating a communication with a new device, users must ensure that
it is legitimate (either from the hospital or from the patient). Therefore, the
requesting party should initialize an authentication session before any informa-
tion transfer. The hosting party, if legitimate, will then correctly authenticate
itself using random challenge parameters. To ensure security, the ID of the
devices must always be protected. Whenever a party is required to send its ID
value, proper encryption must be done. For such requirements, various light-
weight cryptographic mechanisms are used.

8.4 IoT AUTHENTICATION SCHEME

ENSURING LOCATION PRIVACY
In the previous sections, we have briefly discussed the current scenario of
IoT-based healthcare and security requirements it entails. Now, we will discuss
the idea of a simple authentication protocol to ensure location privacy for
devices in healthcare (Figure 8.1).
Setup: Here, tuple (ID, k) of the devices are stored by the reader. The
devices and the reader also have PRNGs for generating fresh nonce values for
authentication in every session. The messages in transit are encrypted using
one-way hash (h()). The attacker analyzes the traffic for secret information,
 8 • Privacy for the Healthcare Environment 77

FIGURE 8.1 Secure communication among IoT sensors and server.

which is sent via radio frequency, and records the communication between
the server and the tag. However, it is not possible for the attacker to decrypt
the hash values; therefore, each message has a new random variable value. For
each tag, these values will be different; thus, the intercepted information is of
no use to the attacker (Figure 8.2).

FIGURE 8.2 Flowchart of our proposed solution.

78 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

8.4.1 Concept of a Basic Location Privacy-

Based Authentication Scheme
i. The reader sends a session initialization message to the tag.
ii. The tag generates a random nonce value Nt, calculates X =
h((ID  k)  Nt), and then sends (X, Nt) to the reader.
iii. On receiving tag’s response, the reader now calculates
X′ = h((ID  k)  Nt) and compares it with X. If X′ = X, then
the reader generates another random nonce value Nr, calculates
Y = h((ID  Nr)  Nt), and sends (Y, Nr) to the tag.
iv. On receiving the response from the reader, if the tag is able to
calculate the value of Y and it matches the value received, then the
session will be successful. If the computed value Y does not match
the received value, then the session is immediately dropped.

8.5 SECURITY ANALYSIS

There may be the case where the adversary tries to impersonate the server and
sends a captured value of Nr to initiate the session. Since the nonce values are
fresh for every session, the tag computes a new Nt and calculates X, even if
the attacker knows both Nr and Nt. However, ID is still unknown, and for the
next session, both nonce values will be different. Therefore, the information
gathered by the adversary from the previous session will be useless for the
fresh session.

8.5.1 Game-Based Security Model

We will prove that our proposed approach exhibits strong location privacy
through the security model proposed by Chawla and Ha [112]. For this model,
it is assumed that there is a finite set of tags T = {t1, t2,…, tn}. The system com-
prises a reader R and a set of tags. Prior to the protocol execution, both tags T
and the reader R are initialized.
We are assuming an active adversary A, which is modeled by an oracle O
which has control over all the communications going on within the network.
The oracle receives the query message and generates appropriate outputs.
Table 8.1 shows the set of query messages involved during this model.
 8 • Privacy for the Healthcare Environment 79

TABLE 8.1 List of Query Messages

QUERY DESCRIPTION
Query(R, m1) Invokes R and outputs a message m1
Reply(R/Ti, Invokes tag or reader on receiving m1 and responds with
m1, m2) message m2
Auth(p1, p2) For this query, the oracle models perform the calculation of
parameter p2 after successfully identifying p1
Execute(R, Ti) The oracle models A to eavesdrop during an ongoing session
to extract all the messages.
Execute(R, Ti) = {Query(R, m1). Reply(R/Ti, m1, m2). Auth(p1, p2)}
Reveal(Ti) Invokes all the secret parameters of a tag
Test(Ti) To check whether the adversary is successful or not.

We assume the adversary to be active, and therefore, it is able to exe-

cute any of the above-mentioned queries on all the tags any number of times.
However, test() can be executed only once on a single tag. We will execute an
attack game on our protocol to prove its security:

Phase I: Initialization
1. Set each tag ti ∈ T with secret key ki.
2. Save ki ∀ ti ∈ T in the reader’s database.

Phase II: Learning

1. A executes oracle O ∀ ti ∈ T present in the system except for any one
tag tc, which is saved for the challenge phase.
2. A calls Query(R, m1), Reply(R/Ti, m1, m2), Auth(p1, p2), and
Reveal(Ti) on all the tags any number of times.

Phase III: Challenge

1. A selects tc from T for the challenge phase.
2. A executes oracle O for tag tc.
3. A calls Query(R, m1), Reply(R/Ti,m1,m2), and Auth(p1,p2), but not
Reveal(Ti), on any number of times.
4. A executes oracle O for Test(tc).
• Oracle O tosses a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}; let b ← {0, 1}.
• If b = 1, A correctly identifies tc.
• If b = 0, A calculates a random value.
5. A executes oracles for n − 1 tags ti ∈ T except tc.
6. A outputs a guess bit b′.
7. A wins the attack game if b = b′.
80 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

8.5.2 Strong Location Privacy

Definition 1: An authentication algorithm is said to exhibit strong location
privacy if it ensures both indistinguishability and forward secrecy ∀ adversar-
ies (passive or active) with queries e, r, a, x (where e = Execute(); r = Reply();
a = Auth(); and x is the secret parameter).

a. Proof of indistinguishability: For A to successfully determine the

location of tc, A must determine (IDc, kc) from all the guessed
values generated on the basis of the knowledge A obtained dur-
ing the learning phase. In order to distinguish between the tag
values, A must be able to successfully determine that some values
( IDc′ , kc′ , N t′, N r′ ) are not corresponding to tc. Moreover, A should be
able to know that ( IDc ≠ ID′, c kc ≠ kc′ , N t ≠ N t′, N t ≠ N r′ ). Suppose
A executes at most α Execute() queries, β Reply() queries, and γ
Auth() queries for tc during the challenge phase. For each session,
there is a generation of fresh random nonce values and key val-
ues having 2q space (assuming each parameter is q-bits in size).
Thus, the condition for A to distinguish the values correctly has the
probability p =
(α + β + γ ) , which is negligible; thus, our protocol
2q
exhibits indistinguishability.
b. Proof of forward secrecy: During the challenge phase, suppose A
makes α Execute() queries ∀ (n − 1) tags ti ∈ T. Here, the advantage
of A guessing the ID values for all the tags based on the knowl-
edge from the learning phase is denoted as Adv gA ( ti ), which is as
follows:

e
1
Adv gA ( ti ) =  k 
2 

A has a random value or tc’s real parameters on the basis of (IDc,

kc, Nt, Nr). Therefore, the aim of A is to extract the IDc value from
tc using the execute queries for eavesdropping and knowledge from
the other tags and previous sessions. The advantage of A correctly
guessing the fair coin value b denoted as Adv Afs ( tc ) is calculated as
follows:

Adv Afs ( tc ) ≤ Adv gA ( t1 ) + Adv gA ( t2 ) +  + Adv gA ( tn −1 )

 8 • Privacy for the Healthcare Environment 81

≤ ( n − 1) Adv gA ( t1 )
e
1  1 
≤ ( n − 1)  k  ≤ ( n − 1)  ke 
2  2 

which is negligible; thus, our protocol ensures forward secrecy.

Since it has been proved that the above protocol ensures both
indistinguishability and forward secrecy, it exhibits strong location
privacy.

8.6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

It is known that IoT-based devices have limited resources, which enables us to
take into account performance issues in real-world applications. Authentication
protocols must consider the cost of all the computations and message com-
munications. The use of random numbers adds to our protocol’s security and
reduces the storage cost.
Our protocol requires a tag to store three parameters: the device ID, the
session key k, and the random number Nr. Each is 96-bits in size. The total
storage cost of our protocol is 286 (3 × 96) bits.
The tag uses a one-way hash function with time complexity O(1) and ran-
dom number generator also having complexity O(1). The complexity of the
circular left shift is w × O(n), where w is the hamming weight of the parameter
with respect to which the value is to be rotated. Circular shift operation also
requires 1-bit auxiliary space.

8.7 CONCLUSION
The increasing cost of healthcare is a big issue these days as everyone can-
not afford the resources. The main aim behind the integration of IoT with
healthcare is to provide healthcare facilities to anyone at any place. Although
the devices may be large or may be as small as rice grain installed inside a
human being or an animal, it is important to secure these devices as they
deal with human-related data and vitals. In this chapter, we have presented
82 A Beginner’s Guide to Internet of Things Security

a very simple yet strong location privacy authentication solution for such
devices, which can be implemented at very low cost without affecting the
device mobility as it does not require any higher-layer resources. Our pro-
tocol is suitable for both passive and active tags. Further, our work can be
extended to make the proposed solution suitable for other business models,
taking into account their functional and nonfunctional requirements. At the
physical level, we can work on variants of our protocol to be based on some
hard-mathematical problems.
References
1. J. Buckley (ed.) The Internet of Things: From RFID to the Next-Generation
Pervasive Networked Systems. Auerbach Publications, New York, 2006.
2. L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, “The Internet of Things: a survey,” Comput.
Netw. vol. 54, pp. 2787–2805, 2010.
3. M. Zorzi, A. Gluhak, S. Lange, A. Bassi, “From today’s Intranet of Things to a
future Internet of Things: a wireless- and mobility-related view,” IEEE Wirel.
Commun. vol. 17, pp. 43–51, 2010.
4. H.S. Ning, Z.O. Wang, “Future Internet of Things architecture: Like mankind
neural system or social organization framework?” IEEE Commun. Lett. vol. 15,
pp. 461–463, 2011.
5. K.E. Psannis, S. Xinogalos, A. Sifaleras, “Convergence of Internet of Things
and mobile cloud computing,” Syst. Sci. Control Eng. Open Access J. vol. 2,
no. 1, pp. 476–483, 2014.
6. R. Roman, P. Najera, J. Lopez “Securing the Internet of Things,” Computer
vol. 44, no. 9, 51–58, 2011.
7. J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, M. Palaniswami, “Internet of Things (IoT): a
vision, architectural elements, and future directions,” Futur. Gener. Comput.
Syst. vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 1645–1660, 2013.
8. K. Ashton, “That ‘Internet of Things’ thing,” RFiD J. 2009. www.itrco.jp/
libraries/RFIDjournalThat%20Internet%20of%20Things%20Thing.pdf, Last
accessed January 2019.
9. Near Field Communications History “Timeline of RFID technology,” 2016.
Available at: www.nfcnearfieldcommunication.org/timeline.html, Last accessed
January 2019.
10. Postscapes, “History of Internet of Things,” 2016. Available at: http://postscapes.
com/internet-of-things-history, Last accessed January 2019.
11. E. Welbourne, L. Battle, G. Cole et al. “Building the Internet of Things Using
RFID: the RFID ecosystem experience,” IEEE Computing Society, 2009.
Available at: http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~magda/papers/welbourne-
ieeeic09.pdf, Last accessed January 2019.
12. G. Abramovich, “15 facts about Internet Of Things,” April 2015, Available at:
www.cmo.com/articles/2015/4/13/mind-blowing-stats-Internet-of-things-iot.
html, Last accessed January 2019.
13. J. Hanson, “The 10 challenges of securing IoT communications,” May 2015,
Available at: www.pubnub.com/blog/2015-05-04-10-challenges-securing-iot-
communications-iot-security/, Last accessed January 2019.
14. Cyber Security Ventures, “IoT Security Report, Q3 2015.” Available at: http://
cybersecurityventures.com/internet-of-things-security-report-q3-2015/, Last
accessed April 2016.

83
84 References

15. Sophos Labs, “Mobile and IoT attacks: SophosLabs 2019 Threat Report.”
Available at: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2018/11/23/mobile-and-iot-
attacks-sophoslabs-2019-threat-report/, Last accessed January 2019.
16. Forbes, “2017 Roundup of Internet Of Things forecasts.” Available at: www.
forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2017/12/10/2017-roundup-of-internet-of-
things-forecasts/#2bbbc6541480, Last accessed January 2019.
17. IT Pro, “IoT malware tripled in the first half of 2018.” Available at: www.
itpro.co.uk/malware/31945/iot-malware-tripled-in-the-first-half-of-2018, Last
accessed January 2019.
18. J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sá Silva, “Security for the Internet of Things: A
survey of existing protocols and open research issues,” IEEE Commun. Surveys
Tuts., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312, 3rd Quart., 2015.
19. IEEE Standard for Information Technology, Telecommunications and infor-
mation exchange between systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-
Specific requirements Part 15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low-Rate Wireless Personal
Area Networks (WPANs) Amendment 3: Alternative Physical Layer
Extension to support the Japanese 950 MHz bands, IEEE Std 802.15.4d-
2009 (Amendment to IEEE Std 802.15.4-2006), (2009) 1–27 doi:10.1109/
IEEESTD.2009.4840354.
20. S. Raza, S. Duquennoy, T. Voigt, “Securing communication in 6LoWPAN
with compressed IPsec,” in International Conference on Distributed
Computing in Sensor Systems (DCOSS), Barcelona, 1–8 2011. doi:10.1109/
DCOSS.2011.5982177.
21. T. Clausen, U. Herberg, and M. Philipp, “A critical evaluation of the IPv6 routing
protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL),” in Proceedings of the IEEE
7th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Istanbul,
2011, pp. 365–372.
22. Z. Shelby, K. Hartke, C. Bormann, and B. Frank, Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP).draft-ietf-core-coap-18. Internet Eng. Task Force (IETF),
Fremont, CA, 2013.
23. W. Colitti, K. Steenhaut, N. De Caro, B. Buta, and V. Dobrota, “Evaluation of
constrained application protocol for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
the 18th IEEE Workshop on Local and Metropolitan Area Networks (LANMAN),
Chapel Hill, NC, 2011, pp. 1–6.
24. T. Borgohain, U. Kumar, S. Sanyal, “Survey of operating systems for the IoT
environment,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1504.02517, 2015/4/13.
25. Arm Limited MBed OS, Available at: https://mbed.org/technology/os/ Last
accessed February 2018.
26. E. Baccelli, O. Hahm, M. Günes, M. Wählisch, and T.C. Schmidt, “RIOT
OS: Towards an OS for the Internet of Things,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSPS),
Turin, Italy, 2013, pp. 79–80.
27. A. Dunkels, B. Gronvall, and T. Voigt, “Contiki—A lightweight and flexible
operating system for tiny networked sensors,” in Proceedings of the 29th Annual
IEEE International Conference on Local Computer Networks, Tampa, FL,
2004, pp. 455–462.
 References 85

28. A. Eswaran, A. Rowe, and R. Rajkumar. “Nano-rk: An energy-aware resource-

centric RTOS for sensor 5 networks,” in 26th IEEE International Real-Time
Systems Symposium (RTSS’05), Miami, FL, IEEE, 2005, p. 10.
29. P. Barnaghi, W. Wang, C. Henson, and K. Taylor, “Semantics for the Internet
of Things: Early progress and back to the future,” Proc. IJSWIS, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 1–21, January 2012.
30. T. Kamiya and J. Schneider, “Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) Format 1.0,”
World Wide Web Consortium, Cambridge, MA, 2011.
31. S. De, B. Christophe, and K. Moessner, “Semantic enablers for dynamic digital-
physical object associations in a federated node architecture for the Internet of
Things,” Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 18, pp. 102–120, 2014.
32. L. Yu and Y. Liu, “Using the linked data approach in a heterogeneous sensor
web: Challenges, experiments and lessons learned,” in Proceedings of Sensor
Web Enablement (SWE) Workshop, Banff, Alberta, Canada, 2011.
33. F. Li, M. Voegler, M. Claessens, and S. Dustdar, “Efficient and scalable IoT
service delivery on cloud,” in Proceedings of the IEEE 6th International
Conference on CLOUD, Dresden, 2013, pp. 740–747.
34. C. Wang, Z. Bi, and L.D. Xu, “IoT and cloud computing in automation of assem-
bly modeling systems,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1426–1434,
May 2014.
35. B. Rochwerger et al., “The reservoir model and architecture for open federated
cloud computing,” IBM J. Res. Develop., vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 535–545, July
2009.
36. G.C. Fox, S. Kamburugamuve, and R.D. Hartman, “Architecture and measured
characteristics of a cloud based Internet of Things,” in Proceedings of the
International Conference on CTS, Denver, CO, 2012, pp. 6–12.
37. Gartner, “The Importance of ‘Big Data’: A Definition,” June 21 2012, www.
gartner.com/doc/2057415/ importance-big-data-definition, Last accessed June
2014.
38. C. Hsinchun, R.H.L. Chiang, and V.C. Storey, “Business intelligence and
analytics: From big data to big impact,” MIS Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 4,
pp. 1165–1188, 2012.
39. H. Jiang, F. Shen, S. Chen, K.-C. Li, Y.-S. Jeong, “A secure and scalable storage
system for aggregate data in IoT,” Future Generation Comp. Syst. vol. 49,
133–141, 2015.

41. M. Yannuzzi, R. Milito, R. Serral-Gracia, and D. Montero, “Key ingredients

in an IoT recipe: Fog computing, cloud computing, and more fog comput-
ing”, in International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling and Design
of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD), Athens, Greece, 2014,
pp. 325–329.
42. W. Shi, J. Cao, Q. Zhang, Y. Li, and L. Xu, “Edge computing: Vision and
challenges,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 637–646, October 2016.
43. R. Mahmud and R. Buyya. (2016). “Fog computing: A taxonomy, survey and
future directions.” (Online). Available at: http://arxiv. org/abs/1611.05539.
86 References

44. N. Wu, M. Nystrom, T. Lin, and H. Yu, “Challenges to global RFID adoption,”
Technovation, vol. 26, pp. 1317–1323, 2006.
45. R. Ratasuk, A. Prasad, Z. Li, A. Ghosh, and M.A. Uusitalo. “Recent advance-
ments in M2M communications in 4G networks and evolution towards 5G,” in
Innovation in Clouds, Internet and Networks, Paris, 2015, pp. 52–57.
46. B. Ray, “What is M2M? 2018 Update,” Available at: www.link-labs.com/blog/
what-is-m2m, Last accessed September 2019.
47. Business Wire, “Internet of Things (IoT) & Machine-to-Machine (M2M)
industry almanac, 2019.” Available at: www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20190501005539/en/Internet-Things-IoT-Machine-to-Machine-M2M-
Industry-Almanac, Last accessed September 2019.
48. A. Holst, “M2M (machine-to-machine) - statistics & facts.” Available at: www.
statista.com/topics/1843/m2m-machine-to-machine/, Last accessed September
2019.
49. K. Fischer and J. Gesner, “Security architecture elements for IoT enabled
automation networks,” in 2012 IEEE 17th Conference on Emerging
Technologies Factory Automation (ETFA), Krakow, Poland, September 2012,
pp. 1–8.
50. S. Pirbhulal, H. Zhang, M.E. E Alahi, H. Ghayvat, S.C. Mukhopadhyay, Y.T.
Zhang, W. Wu, “A novel secure IoT-based smart home automation system
using a wireless sensor network,” Sensors, vol. 17, p. 69, 2016. doi:10.3390/
s17010069.

52. Y. Zhang, B. Chen, and X. Lu, “Intelligent monitoring system on refrigera-

tor trucks based on the Internet of Things,” Wireless Commun. Appl., vol. 72,
pp. 201–206, 2012.
53. Z. Ji and A. Qi, “The application of Internet of Things (IoT) in emergency
management system in China,” in Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International
Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), Waltham, MA,
2010, pp. 139–142.
54. EPIC, “Internet of Things (IoT).” Available at: https://epic.org/privacy/internet/
iot/, Last accessed September 2019.
55. GAO, “INTERNET OF THINGS: Status and implications of an increasingly
connected world.” Available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-75, Last
accessed September 2019.
56. T. Macaulay, RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet
of Things. Elsevier (USA), 2016.
57. S. Gürses, B. Berendt, T. Santen, “Multilateral security requirements analysis for
preserving privacy in ubiquitous environments,” in Proceedings of the UKDU
Workshop, Berlin, 2006, pp. 51–64.
58. X. Huang, R. Fu, B. Chen et al. “User interactive Internet of Things privacy
preserved access control,” in 2012 International Conference for Internet
Technology and Secured Transactions, IEEE, 2012, pp. 597–602.
59. J. Cao, B. Carminati, E. Ferrari et al. “Castle: Continuously anonymizing data
streams,” IEEE Trans. Depend. Secure Comput., vol. 8, pp. 337–352, 2011.
 References 87

60. A. Alcaide, E. Palomar, J. Montero-Castillo et al. “Anonymous authentication

for privacy-preserving IoT target-driven applications,” Comput. Secur., vol. 37,
pp. 111–123, 2013.
61. E.-O. Blass, K. Elkhiyaoui, R. Molva, “Tracker: Security and privacy for RFID-
based supply chains,” in NDSS’11, 18th Annual Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, San Diego, CA, 6–9 February 2011.
62. K. Elkhiyaoui, E.-O. Blass, R. Molva (2012). “CHECKER: On-site checking
in RFID-based supply chains,” in Proceedings of the Fifth ACM Conference
on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, ACM, Florida,
pp. 173–184.
63. H. Sundmaeker, P. Guillemin, P. Friess et al. “Vision and challenges for realising
the Internet of Things,” Cluster of European Research Projects on the Internet
of Things, European Commision, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 34–36, 2010.
64. S. Hachem, T. Teixeira, V. Issarny, “Ontologies for the Internet of Things,”
in Proceedings of the 8th Middleware Doctoral Symposium, ACM, Lisbon,
Portugal, 2011, p. 3.
65. J. Wan, H. Yan, H. Suo et al. (2011). “Advances in cyber-physical systems
research,” TIIS vol. 5, pp. 1891–1908.
66. Y. Wang, Q. Wen, “A privacy enhanced DNS scheme for the Internet of
Things,” in IET International Conference on Communication Technology and
Application (ICCTA 2011), IET, Beijing, 2011, pp. 699–702.
67. Tech Target, “IoT security trends to watch in 2019,” Available at: https://
internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/blog/IoT-Agenda/IoT-security-trends-to-
watch-in-2019, Last accessed September, 2019.
68. E. Bertino, “Data Security and Privacy in the IoT,” in Proceedings of the
Extending Database Technology (EDBT), Bordeaux, France, March 2016.
69. S. Sultana, D. Midi, and E. Bertino. “Kinesis: A security incident response and
prevention system for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 12th
ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems, SenSys ’14, Memphis,
TN, November 3–6 2014, pp. 148–162.
70. K. Zhao and L. Ge, “A survey on the Internet of Things security,” in 2013 9th
International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS),
Lehsan, China, December 2013, pp. 663–667.
71. Y. Chen, J. Chou, and C. Lin, “A novel RFID authentication protocol based
on elliptic curve cryptosystem,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/381,
2011.
72. T. Yeh, Y. Wanga, T. Kuo, S. Wang, “Securing RFID systems conforming to
EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard,” Exp. Syst. Appl. vol. 37, pp. 7678–7683,
2010.
73. J. Cho, S. Yeo, and S. Kim, “Securing against brute-force attack: A hash-based
RFID mutual authentication protocol using a secret value,” Comput. Commun.,
vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 391–397, 2011.
74. M. Burmester, T. van Le, and B. de Medeiros. “Provably secure ubiquitous
systems: Universally composable RFID authentication protocols,” 2006.
Referenced 2006 at http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/131.pdf.
75. Y. Liao and C. Hsiao, “A secure ECC-based RFID authentication scheme using
hybrid protocols,” in Y. Liao and C. Hsiao (eds.) Advances in Intelligent Systems
and Applications, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, pp. 1–13, 2013.
88 References

76. J. Chou, “An efficient mutual authentication RFID scheme based on elliptic
curve cryptography,” J. Supercomput., vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 75–94, 2014.
77. Y.-J. Tu and S. Piramuthu. “RFID distance bounding protocols,” in 1st
International EURASIP Workshop in RFID Technology, Vienna, Austria, 2007.

79. S.A. Weis, S.E. Sarma, R.L. Rivest, D.W. Engels, “Security & privacy aspects
of low-cost radio frequency identification systems,” Security in Pervasive
Computing, LNCS no. 2802, 2004, pp. 201–212.
80. A. Henrici, P. Muller, “Hash-based enhancement of location privacy for radio-
frequency identification devices using varying identifiers,” in International
Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communication Security PerSec,
Orlando, FL, 2004, pp. 149–153.
81. D. Molnar, D. Wagner, “Privacy and security in library RFID: Issues, practices,
and architectures,” in Conference on Computer and Communications Security—
ACM CCS, Washington, DC, 2004, pp. 210–219. (ISBN: 1-58113-961-6).
82. P. Tuyls, L. Batina, “RFID-tags for anti-counterfeiting,” In Topics in Cryptology
(CT-RSA’06), LNCS 3860, 2006, pp. 115–131.
83. Y.K. Lee, L. Batina, and I. Verbauwhede, “EC-RAC (ECDLP based random-
ized access control): Provably secure RFID authentication protocol,” in IEEE
International Conference on RFID, Las Vegas, NV, 2008, pp. 97–104.
84. Y. Liao and C. Hsiao, “A secure ECC-based RFID authentication scheme
integrated with ID-verifier transfer protocol,” Ad Hoc Networks, 2013,
doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2013.02.004.

86. Z. Tan, “A user anonymity preserving three-factor authentication scheme for

telecare medicine information systems,” J. Med. Syst. vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 1–9,
2014.
87. H. Arshad and M. Nikooghadam, “Three-factor anonymous authentication and
key agreement scheme for telecare medicine information systems,” J. Med. Syst.
vol. 38, no. 12, pp. 1–12, 2014.
88. Y. Lu, L. Li, H. Peng, Y. Yang, “An enhanced biometric-based authentication
scheme for telecare medicine information systems using elliptic curve
cryptosystem,” J. Med. Syst. vol. 39, no. 3, p. 32, 2015. doi:10.1007/s10916-
015-0221–7.

90. M. Akgun and M. U. Caglayan, “Providing destructive privacy and scalability

in RFID systems using PUFs,” Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 32, pp. 32–42, September
2015.
91. D. Sadhya and S.K. Singh, “Biometric Template Security and Biometric
Encryption Using Fuzzy Frameworks,” in Encyclopedia of Information Science
and Technology, Third Edition. IGI Global (USA), pp. 512–524, 2015.
 References 89

92. D. Sadhya and S.K. Singh, “Providing robust security measures to Bloom
filter based biometric template protection schemes,” Comput. Secur., vol. 67,
pp. 59–72, 2017.
93. E. Aysu, D. Gulcan, P. Moriyama, Schaumont, and M. Yung, “End-to-
end design of a PUF-based privacy preserving authentication protocol,”
in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES), vol. 9293, Saint-Malo, France,
September 2015, pp. 556–576.
94. N.J. Hopper and M. Blum, “Secure human identification protocols, Advances
in Cryptology – ASYACRYPT’2001,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 2248, Springer, 2001, pp. 52–66.
95. M.L. Blum, M.J. Furst, R.J. Kearns, “Lipton, crypto-graphic primitives based on
hard learning problems, Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO’93,” Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Springer, 1993, pp. 278–291.
96. A. Aysu, Y. Wang, P. Schaumont, and M. Orshansky, “New maskless debias-
ing method for lightweight physical unclonable function,” in Proceedings of
the IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust
(HOST), McLean, VA, May 2017, pp. 134–139.
97. J. Katz, J.S. Shin, “Parallel and concurrent security of the HB and HB+
protocols,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/461, 2005, http://eprint.
iacr.org.
98. H. Gilbert, M. Robshaw, H. Silbert, “An active attack against HB+ – A provable
secure lightweight authentication protocol,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2005/237, 2005, http://eprint.iacr.org.
99. H.-Y. Chien, “SASI: A New Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol
Providing Strong Authentication and Strong Integrity”, IEEE Trans. Depend.
Secure Comput., vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 337–340, 2007.

103. P. Peris-Lopez, J.C. Hernandez-Castro, J.M.E. Tapiador, A. Ribagorda “Advances

in ultralightweight cryptography for low-cost RFID tags: Gossamer protocol,” in
Proceedings of International Workshop on Information Security Applications,
Jeju Island, Korea 2008, pp. 56–68.
90 References
Index
A hash-based protocols, 53–55
HB protocols, 57
Access control solutions, 52 PUF-based protocols, 56–57
Acorn RISC Machine (ARM), 23 ultra-lightweight protocols, 58
Adversary, Vaudeney’s classification, 63 system requirements, 52–53
Amazon, 3 Authorization, 33, 52
Analysis phase, 64 Availability, security, 9, 50, 53
Anonymity, 9, 44, 55, 56
Apache License 2.0., 23
Apple, 3, 50 B
Application layer Big data, 23, 26–27, 31, 37
CoAP supports security, 16 Blinder, Vaudeney’s definition, 63–65
IoT architecture, 8, 12, 13 Brute force attack on IoT, 19
security problems, 14–15
trust management system, 47
C
Application-specific vulnerabilities, 15
Architecture, layered IoT Canard’s security model, 64–66
application layer, 13 CASTLE, see Continuously Anonymizing
middleware layer, 13 Streaming data via adaptive
perception/sensor layer, 12 clustering (CASTLE)
security- and privacy issues Cisco Smart Grid distribution network, 28
application-layer security problems, Cloning attack, 19
14–15 Cloud computing, 25–26
network-layer security problems, 14 Cluster-based scheme, 44
perception-layer security problems, CoAP, see Constrained Application Protocol
13–14 (CoAP)
Arduino platform, 3 Communication protocols, 16
ARM, see Acorn RISC Machine (ARM) Confidentiality, 9, 52
Attack mechanism Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP),
deploy, 18 15, 16
exfiltrate, 19 Constrained RESTful Environments
on IoT networks, 19 (CoRE), 17
monitor/detect, 18 Consumer-based IoT, 4
plan, 18 Consumer electronics markets, 1, 2
Attack phase, 64 Consumer privacy, 41–43
Authentication mechanisms Contiki OS, 23
access control, 51–52 Continuously Anonymizing Streaming
algorithm, definition, 80 data via adaptive clustering
data security in IoT, 50 (CASTLE), 44
of IoT devices, 76 CoRE, see Constrained RESTful
IoT limitations, 51 Environments (CoRE)
KILL command, 68 Correctness experiment, 65, 66
protocols Correlation and agreement, degree of, 46
ECC-based protocols, 56 Cost-effective security protocol, 56

91
92 Index

Cryptographic techniques, 75 Global smart home market, 35

Cybersecurity, 4, 38–39 Gossamer protocol, 58

D H
Database issues in IoT, 24 Harvard Business Review, 5
Data integration requirements, 25 Hash-based protocols, 53–55
Data management, 15 HB protocols, 57
Data privacy, 43–44 Healthcare domain, location privacy
Data reuse tools, 24 abstract overview, 74–75
Data security, 50 authentication scheme, concept of, 78
Data storage, 23–25 performance analysis, 81
Data, types of, 28 problem definition, 74
Denial of service (DoS) attack, 19 protocol description
Destructive adversary, 63 IoT devices authentication, 76
Desynchronization attack, 19 mutual authentication protocol, 75–76
DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security), 16 security analysis
“Dummy” adversary, 65 game-based security model, 78–79
strong location privacy, 80–81
E Healthcare industry, IoT applications, 36
Heterogeneity, 14, 30
ECC, see Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) Hewlett-Packard (HP), 5
Echo, Amazon, 3 HMI, see Human-machine interaction (HMI)
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), 53, 56 HomeKit, Apple, 3
EMAP protocol, 58 HP, see Hewlett-Packard (HP)
Embedded systems, 17, 32, 34 Human–machine interaction (HMI), 28
Energy capacity, 51
EPCglobal, 29 I
Evolution of IoT
security, fundamentals of IBV, see Institute for Business Value (IBV)
different layers, 8 ICs, see Integrated Circuits (ICs)
IoT system, 8–9 ICT, see Information and communication
statistics and forecasts, 4–7 technology (ICT)
IDC, see International Data Corporation (IDC)
F Identifier (ID), 74
IDS, see Index pseudonym (IDS)
Fake node and malicious data attack, 13 IEEE 802.15.4, 15, 16
Fog computing, 27–28 IEEE design standards, 17
Food supply chain (FSC), 36–37 IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), 15,
Forward adversary, 63 17, 22
Forward secrecy, 9, 76, 80 Index pseudonym (IDS), 58
“Fourth industrial revolution,” 31 Indistinguishability, 76, 80
FSC, see Food supply chain (FSC) Industrial control systems, 38
FTBAC, see Trust-Based Access Control Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
(FTBAC) applications, 35–37
Full disclosure attack, 19 and cybersecurity, 38–39
Fuzzy approach, 45 M2M TO IoT, 32–34
secure automation, 34–35
G wireless communications, 33
Information and communication technology
Game-based security model, 62, 78–79 (ICT), 2
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 42 Information Flow Control, 44
 Index 93

Information privacy, 14 game-based security model, 78–79

In-home healthcare (IHH) services, 36 strong location privacy, 80–81
Institute for Business Value (IBV), 39 6LoWPAN layer, 15, 16, 17
Integrated Circuits (ICs), 57 Low-power, wide-area network (LPWAN), 33
Integration, cloud computing, 25 LPN, see Learning Parity with Noise (LPN)
Integration of IoT LPWAN, see Low-power, wide-area network
big data, 26–27 (LPWAN)
cloud computing, 25–26
data storage, 23–25 M
fog computing, 27–28
Integration, WSN node, 30 Machine-to-machine (M2M)
Integrity, 52 communications, 28, 32–34, 51
“Intelligent industrial things,” 38 Maintaining confidentiality, 46
Intelligent informatics system (iDrive M2AP protocol, 58
system), 37 mbed OS, 23
International Data Corporation (IDC), 27 Memory capacity, 51
International telecom union (ITU), 2 Middleware layer, 13
Internet, 1 Mining industries, IoT applications, 37
data storage, 23–25 Mirai, IoT-related malware, 3
development of, 41 MixBits operation, 58
IETF protocols, 20 Modern cryptographic protocols, 62
IoT networks, 2 Multitasking, 22
soda-dispensing machine, 2 Mutual authentication application, 8, 14
Internet-connected refrigerator, 2 Mutual authentication protocol, 75–76
Internet protocol (IPv4), 50
IoT attacks mechanism, 6, 17, 18 N
IoT-based healthcare systems, 75
IPv6 packet transmission, 15, 17 Nano-RK OS, 23
ITU, see International telecom union (ITU) Network layer, 8, 16, 17, 20
security problems, 14
J Node capture attack, 13
Node identification application, 14
Juels–Weis model, 67–70 Nonobvious link, 65
Non-repudiation, 52
K
O
KILL command, 68
Knowledge apprehension, 46 Operating systems (OS), 22
Oracles, Vaudeney’s definition, 63
L OS, see Operating systems (OS)

Learning Parity with Noise (LPN), 57 P

Linked sensor data, 24
Location privacy Peer-to-peer (P2P) interactions, 45
abstract overview, 74–75 Perception-layer security problems, 13–14
authentication scheme, concept of, 78 Perception/sensor layer, 8, 12
performance analysis, 81 Pew Research Report, 42
problem definition, 74 Physical attack, 19
protocol description Physically unclonable function (PUF), 56
IoT devices authentication, 76 PLC, see Powerline connection (PLC)
mutual authentication protocol, 75–76 Power and energy constraints, 26, 30
security analysis Powerline connection (PLC), 33
94 Index

Privacy, 53, 63 RDF, see Resource Description Framework

“Privacy by design” concept, 42 (RDF)
Privacy-preserved access control protocol, 44 ReaderInit message, 67
Privacy threat, 43 Replay attack, 14
PRNG, see Pseudo-random number generator “Reset” attacks, 61
(PRNG) Resource Description Framework (RDF), 25
Probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) RFID, see Radio frequency identification
algorithm, 63, 65, 67 (RFID)
Processing capacity, 51 RIOT OS, 23
Protocol, IoT Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy
ECC-based protocols, 56 Networks (RPL), 15, 16
hash-based protocols, 53–55
HB protocols, 57 S
IoT devices authentication, 76
mutual authentication protocol, 75–76 SASI protocol, 58
PUF-based protocols, 56–57 Scalability, cloud computing, 26
security requirements, 16 Scalability issues attack, 14, 30
stack design, 15 SDK, see Software Development Kit (SDK)
ultra-lightweight protocols, 58 Secure automation, 34–35
Provable security models Security, 45
Canard security model, 64–66 data formats, 16
with issues, 70–72 and privacy, cloud computing, 26
Juels–Weis model, 67–70 Vaudeney’s definition, 63
universal composability framework, 66–67 Security threats, 2
Vaudeney’s model, 62–64 Semantic-oriented perspective, 24
Pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), Semantic Web of Things, 17
53, 73 Sense2Web-linked sensor data platform, 25
PUF, see Physically unclonable function (PUF) Sensor network system, 50
PUF-based protocols, 56–57 SetKey message, 67, 68
Side-channel attacks, 61
Q Silicon physical systems, 57
Social Internet of Things (SIoT), 45
Quality of service, 47 Soda-dispensing machine, 2
Software Development Kit (SDK), 23
R Standardization, cloud computing, 25
State-of-the-art authentication protocols, 56
Radio frequency identification (RFID) State-of-the-art model, 62
applications in, 11–12 Strong adversary, 63
authentication protocols, 53, 55 Strong location privacy, 80–81
ECC-based authentication protocol, 56
HB-based approach, 57 T
and Internet of Things, 3, 28–30
Juels–Weis model, 67–70 TagInit message, 67
location privacy, 75–76 Threat taxonomy
M2AP protocol, 58 application layer, 14–15
perception-layer security problems, 13–14 IoT attack mechanism, 18–19
radio frequency mechanism, 5 IoT devices, 7
security and privacy of, 62 network layer, 14
security techniques, 54–55 perception layers, 13–14
system requirements, 8–9 Time to market (TTM), 34
wireless sensor networks, 11 Transportation and logistics, IoT
Radio frequency mechanism, 5 applications, 37
 Index 95

Trust and privacy in IoT V

consumer privacy, 41–43
data privacy, 43–44 Vaudeney’s model, 62–64
enforcing trust, 44–46 Vulnerabilities in RFID system, 30
trust management, 46–47
Trust-Based Access Control (FTBAC), 45 W
Trust management protocol, 46–47
Trustworthy communication, 46–47 Weak adversary, 63
TTM, see Time to market (TTM) Web of Things, 17
White-box encryption techniques, 49
Wi-Fi-enabled thermostat, 3
U
Wireless sensor networks (WSN), 11, 12, 13,
Ultra-lightweight protocols, 58 21–23, 36
Unauthorized access, 19 World Wide Web, 17
Untraceability experiment, 65, 66 WSN, see wireless sensor networks (WSN)
 Taylor & Francis eBooks
www.taylorfrancis.com

A single destination for eBooks from Taylor & Francis

with increased functionality and an improved user
experience to meet the needs of our customers.

90,000+ eBooks of award-winning academic content in

Humanities, Social Science, Science, Technology, Engineering,
and Medical written by a global network of editors and authors.

TA Y LOR & FRANCIS EBOOKS OFFERS:

Improved
A streamlined A single point search and
experience for of discovery discovery of
our library for all of our content at both
customers eBook content book and
chapter level

REQUEST A FREE TRIAL

[email protected]