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These flashes summarise key safety matters and incidents, allowing wider dissemination of lessons learned from them. The information below has been
provided in good faith by members and should be reviewed individually by recipients, who will determine its relevance to their own operations.
The effectiveness of the IMCA safety flash system depends on receiving reports from members in order to pass on information and avoid repeat incidents.
Please consider adding the IMCA secretariat ([email protected]) to your internal distribution list for safety alerts and/or manually submitting information
on specific incidents you consider may be relevant. All information will be anonymised or sanitised, as appropriate.
A number of other organisations issue safety flashes and similar documents which may be of interest to IMCA members. Where these are particularly
relevant, these may be summarised or highlighted here. Links to known relevant websites are provided at www.imca-int.com/links Additional links should
be submitted to [email protected]
During transit the cylinders which were loaded vertically, toppled onto the floor causing the cylinder cap protection to come
off one of the acetylene cylinders, allowing its valve to open resulting in gas venting off inside the container. Fortunately no
one was injured when the container door was opened.
The company has noted that the incident was a serious breach of international transportation of dangerous goods laws by
transporting mixed gases in this manner, not labelling the container for dangerous goods and not passing the information to
the transport company.
1. Gas cylinders should be transported in accordance with SOLAS consolidated edition 1997, Chapter VII, Part A –
Carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form or in solid form in bulk.
2. All cylinders should be transported in racks or cages. Where containers are to be used, these should be identified as
holding dangerous goods and should be transported along with the proper paperwork
3. Additional checks should be introduced at all sites to ensure that mixed gases are never transported in the same rack
or container.
The cause of the crane wire separation appears to have been due to slack being paid out during hook up whereby the wire
over ran the sheave’s flange. When the load was raised, the wire slipped over the sheave and ended up bearing on the sheave
pin rather than the sheave itself. As a result the wire’s lifting capability was severely degraded since it was subject to the
sharp bend radius and as a consequence parted.
1. Checks to be made on all cranes to ensure that the lift wire cannot come out of the sheave(s) either on the jib or
lifting block during lift operations.
2. A viewing arrangement has been installed to ensure that the crane operator can see that the wire fits centrally in the
sheave(s) during lifting operations.
3. As an additional precaution, just prior to raising the load, when the full load comes onto the crane wire, the person
directing crane operations on deck should view the sheaves, if practical, to ensure that the lift wire is correctly located.
A fast rescue craft was being used to carry out the personnel transfer. During the retrieval stage onto the FPSO, the lifting
lug on the craft failed resulting in the craft and its occupants falling 11.5 metres. The lug and the transverse support frame
were both made of aluminium. The reason for failure is currently under investigation.
The company involved as advised anyone operating a rescue craft or life boat to check the security of the lifting point(s) by
appropriate means including, but not limited to visual inspection, non destructive testing and weight testing.
5 Winching Equipment
A client has recently alerted us to a couple of incidents involving winching equipment on board vessels. In the first incident a
member of the vessel crew stood on a tugger winch support bracket with his foot protruding slightly from the support
flange. As the drum rotated during operation, the securing bolts caught the man’s boot, crushing his steel toe cap, resulting
in injury to this big toe.
In the second incident, two members of the marine crew were carrying out routine maintenance on a cherry picker. This
involved spooling off, greasing and respooling on, a section of crane wire rope. One person was positioned on top of the
crane jib, crouched in front of the winch wire. His hand became trapped between the crane winch wire drum counter bar
and rope guard during the respooling operation with the resultant loss of his left-hand index finger.
7 Rigging Incident
One of our members has alerted us to an incident that occurred due to incorrect attachment of a personnel basket to a
crane hook. Four people were being transferred from an FPSO to the deck of a barge some 30 metres below by a Billy Pugh
personnel transfer basket suspended from the barge crane. The basket was rigged by the FPSO deck crew. As the basket has
been lifted about 3 metres vertically and slewed towards the FPSO stern, it suddenly dropped and hit the FPSO handrail.
One passenger jumped free onto the FPSO. One passenger was thrown clear, falling into the sea, the other two passengers
fell into the sea with the basket. The three people in the sea received extensive injuries in the fall, but fortunately were
quickly recovered and evacuated for urgent treatment. The other person was uninjured.
Baskets of this type are fitted with two slings, one is provided as a safety sling and ‘shock absorber’ in case the main wire sling
parts. The safety sling, which is usually longer than the steel wire sling, was attached to the master lifting ring by an
adjustable swivel allowing more or less tension to be applied to the sling.
The evidence suggests that on this occasion, the basket was attached to the crane hook by placing the hook between the two
slings rather than attaching the master ring to the hook. As a consequence, when the tension was applied to the rigging the
safety sling, being longer, slid across the saddle of the hook until the swivel arrangement was horizontal across the saddle.
Safety Flash
At this point the basket had been raised three metres. The adjustment/swivel mechanism bore the full load horizontally
(designed for vertical loading) and broke at the base of the thread.
To prevent recurrence the company involved has initiated the following actions:
1. Ensure, by physical verification, that those responsible for rigging personnel baskets know how to attach the slings to
the crane properly, and this is reflected in procedures;
2. The master ring is painted in a conspicuous colour to help crane operators see if the ring is engaged in the hook, prior
to lifting;
3. Ensure that personnel using a personnel basket have the knowledge and opportunity to check the rigging prior to being
lifted, and this is reflected in procedures;
4. The use of personnel baskets be minimised and eliminated where safer alternatives are available.
1. Divex Ltd. has identified a potential problem with certain batches of L.P. hoses which
have been manufactured by a subcontractor. A recent incident has introduced some
concern regarding these batches, the serial numbers of the hoses concerned are prefixed
as detailed above.
As a precautionary measure Divex Ltd are re-calling all hoses with the above
prefix. Please review hoses in your possession, and if you have any with the above
prefix markings on the serial number label DO NOT USE THEM, return them as soon as
possible to Divex Ltd for re-test and re-certification. (See 2 below for details)
2. Prior to returning hoses please contact Kathleen Scanlan QA Manager at Divex Ltd. who
will co-ordinate their re-test and re-certification. Please state serial numbers of hoses to
be returned.
3. Hoses that have been re-tested will be identified with the same serial prefix and an
additional R after the prefix i.e. 207881/xxxxxx will become 207881 R/xxxxxxx.
4. Divex Ltd apologise for any possible inconvenience caused to all our valued customers
by this problem but we have obviously taken this action in line with the company's
commitment to safety.
For further information contact Kathleen Scanlan on the above telephone or fax
number. Alternatively e mail to [email protected]
G T Gilbert
For and on behalf of Divex Ltd.
Recommendation
Until further information is available it is recommended that William & James gas transfer systems
should not be used in Western Australia, unless the Operator can demonstrate that the risks have been
assessed and are acceptable. Owners and operators of William & James compressors are advised to
contact the manufacturer (Hamworthy Belliss & Morcom Ltd), for information with regard to installation,
maintenance and operation of the system and ancillary equipment (eg. filters). Further details will be
made available when known.
All pressurised systems present some hazards. It is recommended that high-pressure gas transfer systems
should be located and contained so that the hazards to personnel and or equipment are minimised.
Contacts
Hamworthy Belliss & Morcom Ltd Tel: +44-1452-528431 Fax: +44-1452-381232
R J Craddock
ACTING DIRECTOR, PETROLEUM DIVISION
20 July 2000
Petroleum Division
TEL: (08) 9222 3622
FAX: (08) 9222 3799