The Royal Society - 2004 - Making The Uk Safer

Making the UK safer:
detecting and decontaminating

chemical and biological agents
Policy document 06/04
April 2004
ISBN 0 85403 598 2
This report can be found

at www.royalsoc.ac.uk
ISBN 0 85403 598 2
© The Royal Society 2004.

Requests to reproduce all or part of this document should be submitted to:
Science Advice Section
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ii | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and
biological agents
Contents
Page
Summary 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Background to project 3
1.2 Conduct of project 4
1.3 Types and properties of possible agents 4
1.4 Types of possible incident 5
2 Priorities, concepts of use and implementation of detection systems 7

2.1 Detection, identification and monitoring 7
2.2 Activities and decision-making at different stages of an incident 7
2.3 User requirements and concepts of use 10
2.4 Current detection and monitoring technologies 10
2.5 Issues needing to be addressed 11
2.6 Key detection system requirements 11
2.7 Validation and implementation 11
2.8 Impacts on detection 11
2.9 Conclusions and recommendations 12
3 Issues relating to sampling 13

3.1 Introduction 13
3.2 Sampling strategies 13
3.3 Sampling issues needing to be addressed 14
3.4 Distribution of agent 14
3.5 Air sampling 15
3.6 Biological agent release 15
3.7 Chemical agent release 16
4 Current capabilities and future needs of detection 17

4.1 Technologies for detecting chemical agents 17
4.2 Technologies for detecting biological agents 17
4.3 Detecting agents by recognising and diagnosing unusual incidents 18
4.4 Requirements for research into detection systems 19
5 How science, engineering and technology can assist in decontamination 23

5.1 Introduction 23
5.2 Personal decontamination 23
5.3 Decontamination of buildings 24
5.4 Secondary contamination of vehicles 25
5.5 Current technologies and strategies 25
6 Decontamination and return: communication issues and scientific decision support 29

6.1 Introduction 29
6.2 Exposure limits and 'safe dose' 29
6.3 How clean is 'safe'? – scientific issues 30
6.4 How clean is 'safe'? – psychological issues 30
6.5 Communicating risk in the decision process 31
6.6 Decision-making on decontamination issues 32
Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | iii

7 Organisational issues – a proposal for a new centre 35
7.1 The challenge 35
7.2 A proposed solution 35
7.3 Recommendation 36
8 Main conclusions and recommendations 39

8.1 Introduction 39
8.2 Organisation and procedure 39
8.3 Detection 40
8.4 Decontamination 40
8.5 Medical issues relating to detection and decontamination 41
8.6 Mathematical modelling 41
9 References 43
Annex 1 Working group 45
Annex 2 Individuals and organisations giving evidence 46
Annex 3 Mathematical modelling of chemical and biological dispersions 48
Annex 4 Scientific uncertainty, scientific advice and decision support for risk management 50
iv | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

Summary
Recent global events have given greater prominence to · Assess and disseminate protocols and procedures for
the threat of chemical and biological agents being used detection, sampling and decontamination.
malevolently against civil targets such as key landmarks,
transport hubs and postal sorting offices. Science, · Evaluate detection and decontamination equipment
engineering and technology are central to reducing this and establish agreed industrial standards.
threat and so making the United Kingdom safer.
· Ensure information is shared effectively between
The Royal Society established an independent, expert different Government Departments and agencies, the
working group to examine the science, engineering and academic community, industry and other interested
technology relevant to detecting when chemical or parties, including the public.
biological agents have been used and to decontaminating
people and buildings subjected to attack using such · Establish the maximum levels of agents below which it is
agents. We took evidence extensively from key appropriate to permit a return to normal use following
Government Departments, emergency service staff an incident.
(or ‘first responders’), emergency planners, the academic
community and industry. The evidence received forms the · Work with the academic community, industry and the
basis of this report. research councils where appropriate and seek to make
full use of developments and potential funding in the
Rapid and effective detection and decontamination of US, Europe and elsewhere.
an incident are necessary to minimise negative health
impacts and reduce disruption to civil society. The UK has · Provide a clearly identified source of expert advice
considerable scientific expertise in this area. This should regarding chemical or biological incidents for
be harnessed to strengthen the UK’s existing resilience. Government Department and agencies, first responders,
Appropriate organisation of relevant science, engineering NHS Trusts and national and local emergency planners.
and technology is crucial and forms the focus of our main
recommendation. The centre would work with existing expertise in the
Defence Science & Technology Laboratory, Health
There are many similarities in dealing with the Protection Agency, Home Office, Department for the
consequences of a malevolent and an accidental release Environment Food and Rural Affairs, Environment
of a chemical or biological agent. Therefore, many Agency, Cabinet Office, Department of Health, Office of
countermeasures will be equally applicable to either type the Deputy Prime Minister, Department for Transport,
of incident. So there is much to be gained from close Research Councils, Office of Science and Technology,
communication between staff now focused on Department of Trade and Industry, National Health
preparedness against malevolent attack and those Service, first responders, the academic community and
dealing with accidental releases. industry. It would be under independent management
and require a physical location to undertake the required
During our deliberations we became very aware that evaluation work. To increase information sharing and
there is much knowledge and expertise available in the minimise costs, expertise and specialised equipment
UK, some of which has been acquired in a military context. could be shared with existing facilities in Government,
However, no single Government Department appears to academia and industry where appropriate. The budget
have full responsibility for determining how this expertise required by the centre will depend on the timescale
can best be utilised. While the establishment of the CBRN envisaged for the work to be done and on the
(Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear) Team in the sophistication of the appropriate equipment and
Home Office has improved coordination and awareness, materials. Based on information received from a number
considerably more organisation of the resources is required. of sources, we estimate that a reasonable figure would be
of the order of £20 million per year for an initial five year
Consequently, our major recommendation is that the UK period. After this initial period the funding should
Government should establish a new centre to improve the continue but the level would need to be reassessed.
UK’s resilience and to minimise the impact of any civilian
chemical or biological incident. The centre's main All detection systems need to be designed to take into
functions would be to: account how the information they generate will be used,
the level of training of those who will use them, and the
· Determine, commission and direct the work required on environment in which they will be used. A range of
planning, preparedness, research and development detection system requirements covering monitoring,
related to detection and decontamination. identification and quantification of potential agents will
be needed. Some potential technologies for novel
detection systems will come from academic research.
Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 1

We recommend that future work on detection systems · Detailed review of the various options for the
should be concentrated on four objectives: decontamination of people, buildings, vehicles and the
wider environment.
· Exploitation of new and existing science, engineering
and technology for robust detection of chemical and · Assessment of contact hazards from contaminated
biological agents. surfaces.
· Development of point detectors for use by first · Development and implementation of techniques for
responders at the scene of a suspected incident. avoiding secondary contamination in hospitals and
ambulances.
· Establishment of what information on background
interferences and natural variability of agent levels might We recommend that realistic exercises be undertaken
increase the reliability and sensitivity of different regularly involving first responders, emergency planners
detection systems and decision making. Where and some civilians in order to test and develop further the
appropriate the relevant data should be collected. procedures for dealing with an incident. In addition to
providing a considerable measure of reassurance to the
· Analysis of medical intelligence to enhance resilience public, such exercises would be an integral part of staff
and the effectiveness of responses. training and preparedness.
In the event of the release of a chemical or biological We also recommend greater dialogue between scientists,
agent, a rapid and effective medical response will be psychologists, politicians and the public to improve the
crucial. To help achieve this we recommend increasing communication and public understanding of hazard and
the general awareness of all healthcare staff by training, risk issues in relation to terrorist incidents, and to inform
particularly in the detection and management of chemical planning for response to chemical and biological
or biological incidents. We also recommend improved incidents.
coordination of local and national electronic health
surveillance systems to detect clusters of illness or Reducing the threat from chemical and biological
symptoms. agents requires political, economic, organisational and
technological actions. Without political will and cost-
With respect to decontamination studies, we recommend effective implementation, organisational and
the following four priorities: technological innovation cannot deliver their full potential
to make the UK safer.
· Assessment of the efficacy of decontamination
procedures and technologies.
2 | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

1 Introduction
1.1 Background to project Our report Measures for controlling the threat from
biological weapons (Royal Society 2000) concluded that
The Royal Society has a long standing commitment the scale of effectiveness of biological weapons against
to reducing the threat of biological weapons, and has human populations in war and by terrorist attack had
produced two previous reports on this subject mercifully not been proven in practice and that, while it
(Royal Society 1994 & 2000). This report concerns the would be irresponsible to be complacent about the possible
malicious use of chemical and biological agents against effects, it would also seem prudent not to overestimate
civilian targets such as key landmarks, transport hubs, them. That report also concluded that the main negative
postal sorting offices, Government offices, water and effect of a biological weapons incident might be panic
power plants, or large gatherings of people. It examines and disruption of civilian services. While the political and
how such attacks can be detected and the agent(s) security scenario has changed since the 2000 report was
identified and quantified, and how targeted people and produced, its conclusions remain valid.
infrastructure can be decontaminated after attack. It
concentrates on the implications for humans and their Detection is an increasingly demanding and rapidly
environment. developing field, with considerable effort being devoted
to new technical developments by both industry and the
We do not address all potential terrorist threats here. academic community. Detectors of various types are used
In particular, we do not deal with radiological threats throughout science and many could be adapted or
(or ‘dirty bombs’), nor infectious animal or plant diseases developed for the specific or generic detection of chemical
(Royal Society 2002). These are important issues and or biological agents. Chapter two addresses the priorities,
merit separate study. concepts of use and implementation of detection
systems. Issues relating to sampling are discussed in
For the purposes of this report, ‘detection’ will be used to chapter three and the current capabilities and future needs
cover systems and methods for early warning alarms, for of detection systems are investigated in chapter four.
monitoring and for identification and quantification.
Decontamination can be divided into the decontamination
There are many similarities in dealing with the of people and the decontamination of structures
consequences of a malevolent and an accidental release including buildings, furniture, vehicles and equipment.
of a chemical or biological agent. Consequently, many The processes required for effective decontamination
countermeasures will be equally applicable in preparing following an incident are not fully understood. This was
the country against either type of incident. clearly illustrated by the clean-up of the Senate buildings
following the US anthrax letters in Autumn 2001 and the
The report is aimed principally at three groups: national difficulties experienced in restoring them to use. How
and local Government policy-makers involved in long-term science, engineering and technology can assist in
planning to increase preparedness against a possible decontamination is discussed in chapter five.
incident; emergency service staff (or ‘first responders’)
who would be directly involved in dealing with the The consequences of either a chemical or biological
consequences of an incident; and scientists and engineers incident can be greatly reduced if the agent can be rapidly
working in areas that could be applied to extending detected, allowing appropriate countermeasures to be
existing detection and decontamination capabilities, put in place as soon as possible. Chapter six assesses how
particularly those who are currently unaware of the science, engineering and technology can determine
potential of their work. when the environment is safe enough to justify a return to
normal use following an incident.
Reducing the threat from chemical and biological agents
requires political, economic, organisational and How best to coordinate and organise research,
technological actions. A number of these issues were development and planning relating to countermeasures
addressed by the House of Commons Science & Technology against chemical and biological agents is discussed in
Select Committee in their recent report on the scientific chapter seven. Conclusions and recommendations for
response to terrorism (House of Commons 2003). A recent emergency planners, policy-makers and researchers are
review article looked at the current US situation regarding presented in chapter eight, bringing together the
technology challenges (Fitch, Raber & Imbro 2003). Our separate recommendations from the preceding chapters.
report concentrates on where science, engineering and
technology can help in diminishing the consequences of The use of mathematical modelling of chemical and
incidents by reducing vulnerabilities, improving the response biological dispersions is discussed in annex 3. Scientific
of society by consequence management, modelling and uncertainty, scientific advice and decision support for risk
the early warning of potential threats. Detection and management are covered in annex 4.
decontamination are central to all of these issues.

Many scientific disciplines must be brought to bear upon technology could improve their existing systems. Based
detection and decontamination if effective detectors and on the detailed information received, we issued a public
procedures for the decontamination are to be achieved. Key call for evidence in May 2003. This was principally
disciplines include microbiology, surface science, physics, directed at scientists and engineers in the academic
chemistry, medicine and engineering. Novel science, community, industry and Government, and was aimed at
engineering and technology have a vital role to play in determining where the cutting edge science, engineering
meeting detection and decontamination challenges. Such and technology in the most appropriate areas exists and
developments could well occur in research disciplines that how it might be practically applied in the future. We also
have not traditionally been focused on military or security met a number of experts to discuss issues in greater
related concerns, so it is vital to alert academics that their depth. This extensive information forms the basis of the
research might be relevant, even if there is no obvious link. report. We are very grateful to everyone who supplied
Consequently, the coordination, commissioning and information. Details of the organisations and individuals
direction of relevant research are extremely important and who gave evidence are given in annex 2.
are discussed throughout the report.
1.3 Types and properties of possible agents

1.2 Conduct of project
The approaches required to detect and decontaminate
A working group chaired by Professor Herbert Huppert FRS different agents will vary according to the properties of
prepared this report; the full membership is given in the agent in question. Potential chemical and biological
annex 1. The Council of the Royal Society has endorsed agents have a range of physical properties and levels of
the report. toxicity. The physical form and properties of the individual
agent will determine the most likely route of exposure to
We asked key Government Departments and end-users a material. Examples illustrating the range of chemical
of existing detection and decontamination technologies and biological agents are given in table 1 and their
for their views on where science, engineering and different physical forms are outlined in table 2.
Table 1 Range and examples of chemical and biological agents
Biological agents Naturally occurring toxins Synthetic chemicals
· Bacteria eg Bacillus anthracis · Bacterial toxins including botulinum · Chemical warfare agents, including
(anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague) toxin nerve gases (mustard, sarin and VX),
· Viruses eg smallpox · Naturally occurring bio-regulators blister, blood and choking agents
· Rickettsiae – Coxiella burnetii · Ricin and related protein toxins · Toxic industrial chemicals such as
(Q fever) · Mycotoxins (T2), aflatoxin chlorine and phosgene
· Fungi – Histoplasma capsulatum · Palytoxin, batrachotoxin, · Highly potent pharmaceuticals and
· Modified bacteria and tetraodotoxin, saxitoxin agrochemicals
viruses · Animal, plant, marine, snake, frog,
toad, spider and scorpion toxins
· Immuno-modulators, mood
modifiers, analgesics,
psychopeptides
Table 2 Physical form of examples of chemical and biological agents
Physical form at room Example agent Comments

temperature
Gas Ammonia
Chlorine
Volatile liquid Sarin
Tabun Liquids can be thickened with
Persistent liquid Mustard gas polymers to increase their
VX persistence
Soman (when thickened)
Liquid droplets Viruses eg Variola (smallpox)
Solid Ricin Possibly in the form of spores, a dust
Anthrax (spores) or an aerosol

The level of toxicity will influence the requirements for them will determine their impact on humans. What
detection and decontamination. For example, the level of happens to an agent when it lands on a surface, whether
decontamination required for a highly toxic agent is much it becomes adsorbed or degrades over time, will also alter
greater than that for a less toxic agent. Also, it becomes its potential effect on people. Physical form also affects
more important to be able to detect small quantities of detection, sampling and decontamination procedures.
highly toxic materials because a minute quantity could For example, detecting a highly toxic particulate will
have a serious impact on human health. For the most require sampling large volumes of air or large areas of a
toxic materials, uptake of sub-milligram quantities per surface.
person could be lethal, but for the majority of chemicals
higher doses are required. A particular toxic material will Detection, identification, monitoring and sampling
affect different species to varying degrees. It might thus procedures will depend on the physical form of the agent.
be misleading to extrapolate lethal doses established in For gases, liquids with a high vapour pressure or those in
the laboratory to determine the number of people a small aerosols will involve air sampling. In contrast, solid agents
quantity of a toxin will kill. Also, there are fortunately on surfaces will need to be removed from surfaces by
considerable difficulties that would need to be overcome swabs or wipes. The impact of these differences on
to successfully disseminate chemical and biological detection systems is discussed further in chapters 2 and 4,
agents. and on sampling strategies in chapter 3.
Materials can be inhaled, absorbed through the skin or

ingested along with contaminated food or drink. Their 1.4 Types of possible incident
toxicity will be altered according to the different routes of
exposure. Although materials can be almost as toxic There are many possible incidents that could occur,
when inhaled as when injected, absorption through the ranging in size from small to large. These could target air,
skin usually leads to a reduction in potency. For example, food, water, people, livestock, horticulture, aquaculture,
anthrax is considerable more toxic when inhaled than crop plants, strategic facilities or symbolic targets. The
when it is in contact with the skin. agents involved could be used in combination with
radiological, nuclear or conventional explosives. The
The fate of agents following an incident will also alter the combination of these different factors will influence how
potential danger they pose. How long airborne agents the incident will best be dealt with.
stay suspended in the air and how air currents distribute

2 Priorities, concepts of use and implementation of detection systems
Summary 2.2 Activities and decision-making at different

stages of an incident
A fully integrated and coherent approach to detection,
identification, monitoring and decontamination is The UK Government (Cabinet Office 2003) has a three-
needed. This must seamlessly span pre-event planning, tiered approach to dealing with all types of major
organisation, continuous monitoring, the actual event emergencies, regardless of whether they are accidental or
and post-event stages of a chemical or biological incident. deliberate: operational, tactical and strategic. The
This is currently not always the case. Science, engineering Government’s approach is based on the concept of
and technology can be used to improve the detection of resilience. This is defined as the ability at every relevant
chemical and biological agents for static, continuous and level to detect, prevent and, if necessary, to handle and
automated monitoring of specific installations, and the recover from disruptive challenges. The Cabinet Office
resulting equipment must be usable by operators after document also describes which organisations would take
minimal training. The most urgent need is for mobile or responsibility for different aspects of handling incidents,
hand-held instruments capable of point detection at the including interpreting the information generated by the
scene of an incident for use by first responders. Portable detection systems. The following sections (chapter 2.2.1
test systems based on laboratory-based techniques need to 2.2.3) highlight the importance of the output data
to be developed, because such systems would reduce the from detection systems being interpreted objectively and
analysis time for unusual chemical and biological agents used to organise the most appropriate response. The
in the field. The proposed UK Government centre, as Cabinet Office is currently updating its Dealing with
discussed in chapters 7 and 8, should develop standardised disaster document (Cabinet Office 2003), which is planned
evaluation procedures to allow objective comparison of to give more attention to chemical and biological incidents.
alternative techniques and to increase confidence in the
reliability of newly introduced detection systems. In the event of an incident, decision-makers will need to
make timely and informed choices about how, or
whether, to respond. These decisions will need to be
2.1 Detection, identification and monitoring based on a number of scientific, social and economic
aspects of the particular event. The scientific information
Establishing whether a chemical or biological agent is that will inform these decisions can be divided into
present is termed detection. The determination of the detection, decontamination, sampling, psychological and
precise chemical or biological nature of the agent by use medical issues. It is crucial that all of these are used to
of appropriate analytical tools is termed identification. inform decision-making at the various stages of an
The analysis of the supposed agent to reveal the nature, incident, and to improve strategies and planning for
magnitude and extent of the contamination is termed dealing with future incidents. Key decisions will depend
monitoring. This is often done in the context of on the outcomes of the deployed detection/identification
background levels of the same agent, or potential equipment and the interpretation of the measurements.
interferences, and interpreted through a model of the Table 3 outlines the main requirements from these areas
environment. Whilst monitoring is straightforward in an before, during and after an event and how this
aerial environment, it is harder where contamination is on information will inform the decision-making process. It
surfaces, in soil or in food or water chains. Monitoring also also indicates which chapters of the report discuss these
gives an indication of the fate of the agent and provides issues further.
essential information for any proposed decontamination
procedures. A fully integrated approach to detection, identification,
monitoring and decontamination, which covers the
Detection, identification and monitoring systems need different stages of an incident, is essential.
either to sample in (or near) real-time or to take discrete
samples as a function of time. The current capabilities and
future needs of detection are discussed in chapter 4.

Table 3 Outlining key requirements at the different stages of an incident
Pre-event Event Post-event

Decision Determine detection and Control movement of people Decide when safe to return
(Chapters 2, 6) decontamination strategies. at incident site. to use.
Determine impact of
potential litigation.
Detection Define concept of use of Determine affected area. Confirm identity of agent.
(Chapters 2, 4) detection system.
Preliminary identification of Collect evidence.
Set up real-time monitoring / agent.
sampling systems. Confirm effective
decontamination.
Establish background
interference and agent levels.
Intelligence gathering.
Train operators to use detection

systems.
Sampling Decide on type and method of Adapt sampling strategy to Assess whether ‘safe’ level
(Chapter 3) sampling for different agents. locate source and distribution has been reached after
of agent. decontamination.
Identify and train personnel.
Validate sampling procedures.
Decontamination Train first responders. Decontaminate people. Decontaminate buildings

(Chapter 5) and environment.
Evaluate decontamination Clean mobile infrastructure.
technologies and procedures.
Psychological issues Inform public what to expect. Reduce impact of event using Justify return to incident
(Chapter 6) media, economic & civil tools. site.
Prepare information to be
circulated in the event of an
incident.
Medical issues Establish a medical intelligence Decontaminate people on Implement medical

(Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5) resource. site. countermeasures
(eg vaccination).
Increase training of clinicians in Transfer to designated
CBRN-related subjects. receiving hospitals with Long-term clinical follow-up
separated treatment area. of exposed populations.
Avoid secondary
contamination.
Key decisions need to be taken depending on the nature on decontamination of buildings and the environment,
of the event and the extent of the affected zone. These the determination of when something is sufficiently clean
include what steps need to be taken to control people and the impact of potential litigation will have to be resolved.
entering or leaving the affected zone, what needs to be
done to decontaminate personnel and mobile infrastructure 2.2.1 Pre-event activities
(such as ambulances), and by whom. Also, the central
authorities need to use all available psychological, media, Strategies and procedures for dealing with an event need
economic and civil tools at their disposal to minimise the to be established in advance of any potential incident.
negative impact of the incident. Post-event key decisions Sensitive installations should introduce continuous

monitoring systems. It is essential to establish precisely followed by quantitative monitoring of the reduction of
what scientific information is required for the current the contamination level through naturally occurring
operational strategies. Collating all existing information processes, such as wind dispersal and rain wash-out.
on thresholds and baseline levels for different agents can
be used to assess their relative hazards. The first detection of a deliberate release may be by a
General Practitioner (GP) or Accident and Emergency
A management communication and coordination doctor seeing a cluster of an illness or an unusual clinical
structure needs to be in place before the event occurs. presentation. There is a short window of opportunity after
This requires the existence of a competent organisation detection of a biological event in which the administration
with well trained staff to handle the entire process. of antibiotics can minimise the impact. This window
Realistic exercises should be undertaken as an integral corresponds to the incubation period, which ranges from 48
part of staff training. These should involving first hours for respiratory anthrax to 21 days for Q-fever. In those
responders, emergency planners and some civilians to test who have received a lower exposure dose, the incubation
and develop the procedures for dealing with an incident. period will be greater. Evidence based diagnostic techniques
and appropriate training for healthcare professionals are
Where practicable, the presence (or absence) of important for detecting chemical or biological exposure, as
background interferences and the natural variation in the well as validated treatments for the effective consequence
agent should be determined. This will involve establishing management of adverse effects on health.
pre-event reference levels of agents and organisms and
determining the geographical and statistical variability of
doses or concentrations in order to give target levels for 2.2.3 Post-event activities
remediation. For example, in the case of chemical agents
such as mustard gases there will be no background level Post-event activities include confirming the nature of the
of the agent itself. However, there might be background agents employed with more elaborate laboratory tests
interferences for the detection system due to other and collecting material from the site for evidence.
chemicals present in the environment and consequently it
would be important to understand the background levels There will need to be an assessment of the effectiveness
of these ‘interfering’ chemicals rather than the agent itself. of decontamination to establish whether conditions exist
for a justified return to use or occupancy. Before a building
Pre-event surveillance covers intelligence, real-time is re-occupied, or infrastructure is put back into use, the
monitoring and sampling systems located at sensitive effectiveness of decontamination needs to be verified by
installations. This information should be reported to a central reference to objectives agreed, preferably set at the
command post, which is run by a clearly identified leader. outset, or just as the work of decontamination begins.
There is a need for static and continuous monitoring of Confirmation that decontamination has been effective
specific installations, such as postal sorting offices, city will require advice from specialist agencies, such as the
water supply systems, Parliament, or networked systems proposed new centre, Health Protection Agency (HPA) or
of monitors on the London Underground and other cities Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (dstl) Porton
with similar underground transport systems, and systems Down, as well as the body responsible for health and
for post-incident detection or monitoring to confirm safety enforcement on the premises concerned. Similar
effectiveness of decontamination procedures. Currently considerations are likely to apply to determining the
deployed military systems for continuous air sampling and effectiveness of items decontaminated off-site. In all
monitoring of biological agents could be adapted for cases, if the initial decontamination is not completely
monitoring sensitive civilian installations. More effective the process will need to be repeated, or another
widespread general pre-event continuous monitoring is more effective decontamination method applied, until it
not presently considered to be feasible or effective. Some is successful. How science, engineering and technology
key locations currently have detection systems in place, can assist in decontamination and in determining when
which have been successfully deployed and have yet to to justify a return to normal use following an incident is
detect any significant incidents. discussed further in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
Once the identity of the agent is known and its release

2.2.2 Event activities location defined the following steps will need to be
implemented:
When an event takes place, first responders will ideally
deploy hand-held or vehicle located detectors for · Issue correct personal protection equipment
sampling, determining the affected area and preliminary · Activate first-aid and therapy regimes
identification of the nature of the event. · Implement decontamination procedures
· Monitor the extent and fate of the contamination
All available data about the agent must be collected with · Establish a safe-to-return decision protocol.
proper scientific rigour, taking into account the uncertainty · Update procedures for future similar incidents as
on all parameters and measurements. This should be appropriate.

There are few data on the long-term risks to health in · Simplicity of use, especially for emergency situations
populations exposed to chemical agents. Agents such as · Portability, robustness and a lack of moving parts, which
mustard gas are suspected carcinogens, but the long-term might be enhanced by miniaturisation and mass
effects of organophosphates are still unclear. production
Consequently, it will be important that exposed · Long shelf-life of detectors and any reagents
populations are identified and subjected to close long-term · Low power consumption
clinical follow-up. With both chemical and biological · Known reliability
agents, an understanding of the toxic and pathogenic · Sensitivity appropriate for the agent
mechanisms involved will contribute to the diagnosis and · Near-zero false alarm rate
management of suspected long-term adverse health effects.
A response time of the detector of the order of one
minute or less is desirable. Good specificity is required
2.3 User requirements and concepts of use where the agent must be immediately identified. Rapid
generic detectors for toxicity or the presence of biological
It is vital that those using detection and monitoring systems materials, backed up by subsequent identification and
develop the concept of use of the particular systems. quantification, would provide a useful aid to immediate
This defines the properties of the equipment and how decision-making. The ability to analyse all of the data
the data it generates will be interpreted and used to generated and distribute the most relevant information
inform decision-making. The following issues should be across command and control systems is desirable but not
considered when specifying the concept of use: currently feasible. The creation of a coordinated network
of first responders who share best practice will be crucial
· Selectivity to the efficient application and use of detection
· Sensitivity technologies in a civil context.
· Response times
· False-alarm rates
· Target analytes and agents 2.4 Current detection and monitoring
· Down-time and redundancies technologies
· Area or volume monitored
· Infrastructure requirements Currently, there are few detection and monitoring
· Maintenance regimes and logistical support technologies that fulfil the requirements in chapter 2.3.
· Operator and support staffing requirement Hand-held immuno-chromatography strips and ‘pocket’
· Training needs polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests are unreliable in the
· Output data interpretation models field and a report to the White House has dismissed their
· Calibration and checking protocols utility (CDC 2001). There is a particularly urgent need for
· Numbers, locations and cost rapidly deployable hand-held or vehicle-carried detectors
· Equipment lifetime and replacement for detection of chemical and biological agents at
· Background levels of agent incidents that will respond in a few minutes and permit
· Specific environment systems will be used in. first responders to gauge the nature and severity of the
event as quickly as possible in order to minimise disruption.
The concept of use needs to take into account a realistic Such field-based systems will be operated by trained first
assessment of the detector’s performance. The level of responders acutely aware of the response times, inherent
training of the user is vitally important. For example, limitations and false positive/negative rates of the devices.
equipment to be used by first responders at the scene of The current capabilities and future needs of detection are
an incident needs to give as unambiguous a result as discussed in further detail in chapter 4.
possible. In contrast, equipment utilised by highly trained
operators can be used to determine the complex The speed of action of many chemical agents means that
influences of background interferences and natural no current detector will alarm in time to prevent exposure
variation of agents. Other factors include the of some individuals. So it may not be possible to use
communication network, the interpretation model and available technology for detection, but rather apply it for
overall response capability. Ensuring that concepts of use incident monitoring and agent identification. In most
for detection systems are clear, so that equipment and situations it is more likely that initially the identity of the
procedures can be designed accordingly, would best be agent will not be known and that the sudden occurrence
coordinated and directed by the proposed new centre. of casualties will be the first indication of a deliberate
release. Clinical features should be a good indicator of the
In addition to the requirements outlined for generic probable chemical or biological agent involved and
detection systems, the additional key requirements for appropriate clinical skills should be available at the site of
the rapid detection of a range of chemical and biological an incident to aid the identification and management of
species are: casualties.
· Inexpensive instruments and disposables

Highlighting the similarities between preparing for (or ‘stand-off’) instruments to avoid contamination of
accidental and deliberate releases, the methods of virus emergency staff. Rapid, inexpensive and broad-based
detection used in human and veterinary medicine have tests with a zero or near-zero false-alarm rate must be
been reviewed in relation to infectious diseases in developed for detection and identification of toxic
livestock (Royal Society 2002). The key aims of detection materials and organisms. These analytical tests should
of the foot and mouth disease virus were identified as preferably provide high quality data at the point of use of
sensitivity, specificity and speed. the same standard as tests conducted in a laboratory. At
their current state of development, present day detectors
are of limited use in the civilian context, particularly those
2.5 Issues needing to be addressed that are agent-specific. Detectors under development for
military use are not fully suitable for civilian application, as
The data from the devices needs to create sufficient they often require specialist operators and might not be
confidence in the operators to allow positive decisions to available in sufficient numbers to cover all scenarios and
be made that promote a state of ‘peace-of-mind’ in response teams. Similar systems would be used for
distressed public observers. Additionally, all chemical or verification of use and collection of forensic evidence for
biological detectors and monitors that are used pre-event, any subsequent litigation.
event or post-event, and whether real-time, discrete,
generic, array or specific, must be part of an overall Detectors suitable for use by first responders would also
integrated response system that collects and collates data prove useful for monitoring the spread of contamination
from all available sources. and the efficacy of decontamination. These operators will
need to be highly trained and practised, and work to the
False alarms occur whenever sensors or monitors show a same standard operating protocols. They must have
response to an agent that is not present or is present personal protective equipment so that they can be
below some threshold level (false positive) or fail to deployed immediately after an incident. Training should
respond when an agent is present (false negative). Ideally, involve real chemical and biological agents.
these false-alarm rates should be zero but in practice, this
is rarely so. It is important to determine the likely incidence
of false responses caused by operator error, instrument 2.7 Validation and implementation
and software quirks and chemical interferences.
Standards must be developed for validation and comparison
Significant numbers of false negatives cannot be tolerated of newly developed technologies. All hand-held, vehicle-
in civil environments, as these could result in unprotected borne and laboratory equipment used as the basis for
individuals being exposed to the contamination. The decisions need to be procured, stored, maintained, tested
occurrence of false positives also has serious implications, and systematically replaced. Chosen equipment would be
as they could lead to extreme disruption, and possibly tested in realistic scenarios based on the concept-of-use
panic, which might have more harmful consequences by competent organisations, such as the new centre or
than a chemical or biological release itself. Repeated false dstl Porton Down and, when proven, accepted into
positives might lead to future real alarms being ignored. service. Arrangements would be made with local
Using two or more independent measurement techniques laboratories to have access to their laboratory facilities
will reduce the occurrence of false positives to near zero. post-event and to provide second-line analysis capability.
Additionally, all systems should be fully validated prior to Local laboratories should also routinely run standard
use in service by the new Government centre. samples to ensure that their equipment and skills are still
at an appropriate level. Scientific advisors would have
Monitoring methods are required that can be placed in established methodologies and maintained essential
the environment to monitor the quality of food, water, stocks of kit and consumables to permit rapid
soil and air. Improved sampling, pre-processing and modification of laboratory assets to the analysis of samples.
interference elimination techniques are required. The
development of system automation for use by operators
with minimal training and concepts-of-use should be 2.8 Impacts on detection
addressed. The transfer of laboratory-based techniques to
portable test systems will also be important in reducing Many other factors might impact on the detection and/or
development times for the analysis of novel chemical and monitoring of chemical or biological agents, particularly
biological agents in the field. where deliberate attempts are made to conceal the target
agent. For example, the use of interfering or inhibitory
materials and genetic engineering could all thwart current
2.6 Key detection system requirements detection technologies. Also, modern genetic engineering,
genomics and proteomics could be exploited to create
The most urgent need is for mobile or hand-held new agents, aid their production, impede their detection
instruments for point detection at the scene of an incident and subsequent decontamination, and reduce the
for use by first responders. Ideally, these should be remote effectiveness of medical countermeasures. Unlike other

potential agents, the ability to create biological agents is to pay more attention to dealing with chemical and
not limited to the sophisticated nations. A state-of-the-art biological incidents, clearly spells out the concepts of use
biological laboratory could be built at low cost, housed in for detection systems, so equipment and procedures can
a small room and staffed with any one of many people be designed and implemented accordingly. In particular,
who have the appropriate basic biological know-how. this updated document should cover the scope for better
The technology is well within the grasp of determined coordination of pre-event action plans, scientific
small terrorist groups. Developers of novel detection responses at the time of an incident, and timely
systems will need to be aware of these capabilities and implementation of scientific advances.
the capacity of potential aggressors to evade existing
detection and decontamination approaches. Realistic exercises should be undertaken involving first
responders, emergency planners and some civilians in
order to test and develop the procedures for dealing with
2.9 Conclusions and recommendations an incident. In addition to providing a considerable
measure of reassurance to the public, such exercises
The continuous protection of the entire civilian population would be an integral part of staff training and
against unannounced chemical or biological attack is preparedness.
impractical. Realistically, only a limited number of target
locations can be monitored. National and regional Evidence based diagnostic techniques and appropriate
planners, ideally advised by the proposed centre, will training of medical personnel are important for detecting
need to establish detection systems to protect key target. chemical or biological exposure. It is also vital to validate
To meet these needs the concepts of use and user treatments for the effective consequence management of
requirements should be followed throughout the adverse effects on health. The identification and
development of detectors and monitors. Candidate treatment of unusual casualties will require special
detection systems must be tested before being put in place, training for initial medical responders in the community,
including how the information they generate will be used. hospitals and health protection teams. Increased training
should be extended to undergraduate and postgraduate
The most urgent need is for mobile or hand-held medical training so that all doctors are aware of relevant
instruments capable of point detection at the scene of an toxicological and infectious diseases. The General Medical
incident for use by first-responders. Ideally these should Council and the Royal Colleges should take the lead on
be remote (or ‘stand-off’) instruments to avoid this issue.
contamination of emergency staff. Rapid, inexpensive
and broad-based tests with zero or near-zero false-alarm There are few data on the long-term risks to health in
rate must be developed for detection and identification of populations exposed to chemical agents. Consequently,
toxic materials and organisms. it will be important that exposed populations are
identified and subjected to close long term clinical follow
We recommend that the next edition of the Cabinet up. The HPA should take the lead in undertaking this.
Office document Dealing with disaster, which is expected

3 Issues relating to sampling
Summary When an incident occurs the primary objective of the

sampling strategy is to determine the distribution and
At present, there is little readily available guidance on nature of the agent concerned. Minimising the time taken
either sampling protocols or sample preparation to do this is important and consideration should be given
specifically for chemical and biological agents. This should to how samples should be taken, stored and transported
be a priority. Procedures are needed to ensure rapid and to aid subsequent analysis. Immediately following an
reliable collection of samples to support subsequent event, and for some time afterwards, both the air and
analysis. In the event of a chemical or biological incident, surfaces might need to be tested.
the standard of subsequent analysis will depend on the
quality of the sampling carried out. Different sampling The objective of post-event sampling will be to provide
schemes will be required to reflect the detection information on the persistence of an agent, and any
technology being used. dispersal from the point of the initial incident, and also to
inform decisions on decontamination procedures and when
it is safe to return to the area. Once decontamination has
3.1 Introduction started, sampling could be complicated by the presence
of decontamination agents, such as foams that might
In this chapter most of the discussion concentrates on disperse the agent.
taking samples likely to contain solid or liquid agents for
analysis. Air sampling is briefly discussed in chapter 3.5. 3.2 Sampling strategies
The primary objectives for sampling are that the strategy When determining the most appropriate sampling
provides representative samples, that an appropriate strategy, it is crucial to take into account different issues
number of samples are taken and that the sampling regime that apply to chemical and biological agents. However, a
is tailored to the physical properties of the likely agent as number of generic issues that should be considered in all
well as the environment being sampled, eg water, air, soil strategy planning to achieve a representative sample that
and/or clothing. The resulting samples should support are discussed below.
accurate identification and quantification of the analyte
at appropriate concentrations (related to known harmful · Sampling techniques must be compatible with the
doses) that would reflect both acute and chronic exposure detection and identification technologies used. For
dosages. example, if microbes are to be detected by culturing the
extraction technique must not contain harsh chemicals
Any sampling methodology should be robust and that will reduce viability. Polymerase chain reaction
repeatable. In addition to analytical considerations, details (PCR) amplification of nucleic acid requires careful
of the nature and location of individual samples should be sampling, storage and transportation to avoid
logged, and samples should be stored and transported to contamination and degradation of the sample.
the point of analysis in a secure manner so that their
whereabouts can be accounted for at all times (chain-of- · The frequency of sampling should be determined,
custody). Consideration should also be given to the need taking the resources available into account. Maximum
for police evidence gathering. When detection is not coverage needs to be achieved from the minimum
carried out on site, national or regional analytical number of samples.
laboratories need to be identified in advance and reporting
procedures agreed. · Sampling strategies need to be designed to locate the
sources of the agent and the scope of its effect
A chemical or biological agent might be deliberately (vulnerable sites, likely chain of infection). Visual
released through the air, with water systems being the evidence should be taken into account (eg white
next most likely target. Food and bottled beverages could powder, agent plumes) in addition to prevailing
also be contaminated deliberately and there have been conditions, such as the weather, that may affect the
criminal incidents of this kind. An example of this was the scope of the agent’s effect. Strategies must also ensure
contamination with salmonella of salad bars in ten that a range of concentrations can be detected (eg high
restaurants in 1984 in Oregon by the Rajneeshee cult, which concentration at the focus of the event and lower
resulted in 751 cases of food poisoning (Tucker 1999). concentration as the agent disperses.) If infective dose is
The quality control systems currently in place for food and very low then rapid concentration of samples will be
drink mean far fewer people might be affected than an required.
incident involving deliberate releases in air or water systems.
The existing quality control systems for food and drink · Sampling strategies need to be validated to identify any
might help identify which sampling techniques should be likely sources of contamination.
used and where work is needed to improve detection.

· The type of sample (eg air/water/surface/soil) and the · Guidance on both the collection and preparation of a
method of sampling (eg swab, scrape, suck) need to be range of environmental samples is available from other
decided for different agents. Swab or wipe samples are sources. Defence and Science Technology Laboratory
probably the most suitable for collecting material from (dstl) Porton Down and the Health Protection Agency
solid surfaces, but clear guidance is needed on the area (HPA) both have extensive experience in sampling for
to be sampled and on any solvents that are used to biological agents and this information needs to be
impregnate the wipe. Several wipes might need to be shared so that it can be applied in a civilian context.
used in one location with one dry, another water
impregnated and a third with solvent. Chemicals vary in
their solubility in water and organic solvents and this will 3.3 Sampling issues needing to be addressed
need to be taken account of in the interpretation of
results. Wipe samples might only indicate where more The personnel who can and will carry out sampling need
detailed sampling is required. to be identified and trained. Suitable respiratory and
personal protective equipment needs to be made available
· The method of sampling will be affected by the porosity for their use and decontamination facilities should be
of surfaces. Tape lift samples and swab samples can be ordered and tested. Strategies for undertaking sampling
considered and the nature of the moistening agent for need to be devised and can be based on available
swab samples can be chosen to enhance collection of guidance for sampling the environment and the more
samples from non-porous surfaces (eg containing mild specific suggestions for sampling for known chemical
detergent solution, solvents.) Porous samples will tend warfare agents and biological agents (Carlson, MacQueen
to absorb the agent and will be harder to sample & Krauter 2001).
accurately, and any samples obtained are likely to
underestimate the amount of agent present. On the Because of the large variability in the amount of agent
other hand, the material that is available to sample from recovered from different surfaces it is important to know
these surfaces may fairly reflect the immediate the effectiveness of sampling procedures for a variety of
concentration of agent that would present a hazard. agents when used on a range of surfaces. Knowing
whether agent recovery is high or low is essential to be
· Samples may need to be treated to liberate the agent for able to provide good advice. All procedures for soil
analysis. Some chemicals, for example, may bind to sampling should be validated. This should include
organic matter in the soil and require treatment with recording soil pH, the physical make-up of the soil
acid or solvent to release them for analysis. Also, described (matrix) and moisture content, as this will affect
surfactants may be considered to promote detachment retrieval of agent from the sample.
of biological materials from surfaces.
The feasibility of remote sampling, particularly for volatile
· To extract agents from soil pores, a variety of techniques materials, should be assessed to limit exposure of
including suction to draw materials out of soil pores, personnel. The outside of collection vials should be
centrifugation to collect soil pore water and ion- suitably packaged or treated prior to sending for analysis
exchange techniques to enhance recovery of chemical to protect laboratory personnel from secondary
and biological agents from soil matrices can be used. contamination.
Recovery of biological agents from soil depends on the
physical and chemical characteristics of the soil. Sampling strategies might require taking very large
Between 10% and 25% of a bacterial sample from soil numbers of samples to be effective. The work involved in
would be extracted at best. preparing and undertaking the analysis of these samples
using current technology is likely to be considerable and
· It might be necessary or appropriate to collect samples very time consuming. Consideration needs to be given to
from individuals, and the forthcoming Health and Safety reducing this amount of work through pre-event training,
Executive (HSE) sampling guidelines should be followed. simplifying procedures and developing new technologies.
There are ethical issues associated with sampling
individuals, with a need to obtain informed consent if at
all possible. Any data resulting from the sampling 3.4 Distribution of agent
should be kept confidential in terms of patient identity
but be available for informing clinicians involved in the An important issue for both chemical and biological
medical management of the patient. agent sampling is the likely lack of uniformity in the
distribution of the agent released. In some instances
· Lessons can be learned from existing protocols for sampling could miss an agent entirely. Dispersion models
environmental sampling and biological monitoring, have been developed for chemical and biological agents
procedures necessary for regulatory compliance and to track the plume of the released agent and its
forensic applications. Recommendations for biological movement downwind. The models can be used to map
sampling are to be published in the near future by the the likely dispersion of a released chemical using the
UK HSE. appropriate meteorological data. These maps can then be

used to help devise where sampling might take place 3.5 Air sampling
initially and to estimate the variations in the agent
concentration from the point of release. Air sampling has a number of associated issues. Microbial
aerosol samplers must take into account mode of capture,
A chemical released in the open as a gas, vapour or flow rate, flow characteristics and collection efficiency.
aerosol will disperse, with most blowing downwind. These parameters will be a function of particle size and
Concentrations of the agent will decrease with increasing shape. Microbes are very difficult to sample in air as they
distance from the point of release. Movement of chemicals will not be uniformly distributed, and sampling devices
in restricted environments (buildings, underground can have significant shear forces that might generate
tunnels etc) will be governed by air circulation and samples unsuitable for certain detection techniques. The
ventilation procedures. For most gases or vapours the flow rate of sampler should be the same as ambient flow
likelihood of any surface contamination will be minimal. rate or only small particles might be captured.
If there were concerns about a continuing plume of agent
in circumstances where the agent was being continuously A variety of traditional air sampling devices can be used to
produced then air sampling for a gas or vapour would be sample continuously over an extended period of hours or
appropriate. even days. For example, Hirst traps are often employed to
allow sampling of pollen grains, fungal spores and other
Increasingly sophisticated and reliable computational fluid biological particles. Traditional air sampling devices such
dynamics (CFD) models have been developed to track the as the Anderson sampler depend upon trapping spores
dispersal of agents in air and water. Movement of and other viable airborne particles that are subsequently
substances in the air has been modelled for both rural and detected using culture-based methods. Where the local
built-up environments and this approach provides guidance conditions are thought to be hazardous, remote sampling
on the likely concentrations of either gases or aerosols. vehicles (eg radio-controlled aircraft) can be used in
Mathematical modelling of chemical and biological conjunction with agar plate sampling devices to trap and
dispersions is discussed further in annex 3. In addition to establish the amount of viable biological material. In
identifying surfaces to sample, consideration should be addition, new technology is being developed and may be
given to whether control samples collected nearby will particularly attractive for single-use applications
help to validate predictions about dispersal of the agent. (Environmental Microbiology Laboratories 2004). A wide
variety of portable air sampling devices are designed to
Timing of the event will have a major influence on the detect volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that can be
approach adopted. If there is a likelihood of an airborne sealed and sent to a laboratory for analysis. There are
hazard then estimates of average air concentrations many examples where air quality is measured routinely
might be sufficient over a period of time. Potential hot using on-line monitoring systems to detect total
spots will require a different approach and the shape of suspended particulate material, VOCs and a variety of
the contaminated area will dictate where to sample. metals. There are no absolute data on sensitivity and to an
Probability models using a grid in the form of a square, extent it depends upon the sensitivity of subsequent
rectangle or triangle are available and will provide detection technologies. There are logistical problems with
guidance on the likelihood of the hot spot being located carrying out experiments to determine the efficiency of air
(Carlsen et al 2001). samplers in ‘real life’ situations.
The most likely routes for contamination for each

potential agent should be evaluated and used to inform 3.6 Biological agent release
the sampling strategy. For example, samples taken from
water supplies might contain very low, but harmful, Because biological agents are active in small quantities, in
concentrations of biological agent and so would need to contrast to chemical agents that invariably require larger
be concentrated as part of the sampling procedure. The concentrations to have a comparable impact (in terms of
nature of pathogens (relatively large particle size and numbers affected), the sampling strategy should be related
density) means that they would be unlikely to be readily to the so-called ‘infective dose’ of the agent concerned.
sampled in air samplers or to be found on vertical
surfaces, as after any release the highest concentrations Sampling air or water to obtain an early indicator of an
would be found on surfaces as they settle quickly. They incident might allow the use of countermeasures, such as
will be more prevalent on horizontal surfaces near the administering antibiotics. However, there will be a limited
floor of buildings and where ambient conditions favour opportunity to do this because of the likely delay between
their growth. By contrast, chemicals, if released as an the event and the first indication of the incident. This is
aerosol of liquid or solid, will deposit on a wide range of most likely to be the reporting of symptoms to NHS
both horizontal and vertical surfaces. Direct, GPs or hospital accident and emergency
departments. If the cost of sampling is very high, particularly
for pre-event sampling, then there is likely to be very little
support for it.

The release of a biological agent does not produce a that outlined for a biological agent in chapter 3.6, that
sudden or immediately visible health outcome. The can sample, analyse and identify the agent at the scene
generic issues are the slow evolution of the incident and would aid the diagnosis and treatment of casualties and
how soon it will be detected. The speed an incident is suggest methods of decontamination.
detected depends on improvements in the systems used
for health surveillance, such as NHS net. One issue is Post-event, the major concern for chemical agents will be
whether there is a case to be made for the provision of to limit skin contact with the agent. However, it might
rapid response vehicles that can sample, analyse and also be necessary to consider whether there is a remaining
identify the agent at the scene. A specialist group using a airborne hazard. Identification of the agent will enable
dedicated response vehicle capable of sampling and decisions to be taken about where to collect samples.
identifying microbes would aid diagnosis and treatment
and define the contamination. These rapid response
teams would be highly trained scientists skilled in 3.8 Conclusions and recommendations
sampling and analysis, able to utilise mobile analytical and
detection equipment. In downtime this group could be Sampling for chemical and biological agents must provide
used to build up knowledge of the relevant background a representative picture of the total area contaminated,
levels for biological agents. This would enable greater and strategies are needed to ensure this is achieved.
awareness and detection of deviations from the norm in These strategies should be informed by the nature of the
unusual incidents when there was no indication of the agent to be detected and the infective or harmful dose.
cause. They would work for organisations such as HPA,
dstl, the Home Office and the Environment Agency. Sampling methodologies must be consistent with
detection methods and take into account the need for
For some bacterial pathogens the mode of collection and evidence gathering. The logging and storage of samples
subsequent transport are crucial because they will be must be appropriate for the nature of agent to be
subject to stress in environmental conditions (since many detected. This will require liaison with the testing
are used to warm, humid conditions). Once released into laboratories.
the environment, some biological agents (eg Vibrio
cholerae) might enter a viable but non-culturable (VBNC) We recommend the following priorities for future work
phase where they will be hard to resuscitate for detection on sampling issues:
using traditional microbiological culturing methods.
Therefore it would be advisable to employ both PCR-based · Standard sampling protocols and guidelines should be
detection technologies and traditional culture-based developed and provided to all those who will require
methodologies to ensure that organisms in the VNBC them.
state are not missed.
· Relevant personnel should be identified and trained in
sampling.
3.7 Chemical agent release
· Expert advice should be provided for personnel
In the absence of a warning, the first indications of a responsible for sampling to help identify the most
deliberate release of chemicals are likely to be increasing appropriate laboratory to undertake analysis.
numbers of people in obvious distress either with
difficulty breathing or complaining of irritation to the · Existing dispersal models should be evaluated to ensure
eyes, nose, throat or skin. Animals, and particularly birds, they provide the information required to establish good
are likely to be affected too. The clinical effects from sampling strategies.
exposure will be informative and appropriate monitoring
and sampling, using broad-spectrum detectors, should · Efficiency of different sampling methods should be
provide guidance as to the nature of the agent(s). quantified.
Monitoring will also help define the topography of the
hot and warm zones of contamination. The proposed new centre should take the lead on this
work. If such a centre is not established, then we
There is a critical need for a rapid assessment at the scene recommend that a relevant Government Department
including some indication of the nature, if not the such as the Home Office CBRN Team take the lead.
identity, of the agent. A rapid response team, similar to

4 Current capabilities and future needs of detection
Summary spectrometry systems, including matrix-assisted laser

desorption ionisation time-of-flight mass spectrometry
The existing techniques and devices for chemical and (MALDI-TOF-MS). Current limitations of miniaturised or
biological agent detection fall short of requirements for microfabricated MS instruments relate to poor mass-
the civil environment in terms of specification, ease-of-use, resolution. The parent systems are the existing standard
reliability and/or user confidence. Much scientific and for identification and may become more widely
technological research that may contribute to meeting applicable for detection with further advances in
the demand is being carried out in diverse fields, in miniaturisation and integration.
particular in cell- and tissue-based recognition elements
and lab-on-a-chip technologies, and this effort should Laser standoff systems. These are not yet available for
receive continued support. The key detection practical use but are being developed for both liquid and
requirement is for a safe, efficient and rapid means for solid chemical contamination. Those reported in the
first responders to confirm the presence of chemical or literature are either visible or UV Raman systems with
biological agents at an incident and to identify and upwards of ten meters range. High-intensity, low-cost
quantify them. The establishment of a civilian medical and miniaturised laser sources are being developed
intelligence unit that could collect surveillance data from rapidly and should benefit the creation of portable laser
multiple sources would assist with the early detection of standoff systems. If these approaches can reach
an evolving incident. Both basic and applied research into appropriate specifications for sensitivity, selectivity and
more reliable and sensitive low-cost, in-the-field and response time, they will be ideal for detection and
point-of-use detectors, non-contact (standoff) monitoring applications. These are discussed further in
techniques, and continuous monitors for specific sites relation to the detection of biological agents in chapter 4.2.
should be focused on chemical and biological agent
applications, and military systems should be adapted for
civil use. 4.2 Technologies for detecting biological
agents
This chapter provides an overview of research that could
be applied to extending existing detection and Protein detection kits. These kits, presently used by first
decontamination capabilities or developing new ones and responders, detect whether there is biological material in
the challenges associated with this research. a sample but do not identify the material. While it is useful
to know that biological material is present in, for instance,
4.1 Technologies for detecting chemical agents a ‘white powder’ incident, these kits do not positively
identify that the material is a biological agent rather than
Point detectors. Potential chemical agents are presently an innocuous substance, and are likely to result in false
detected by first responders at the scene using either spot alarms. Currently, samples identified as biological are sent
papers for detection and a limited degree of identification for identification to a central laboratory, and the result
or, in a few cases, more sensitive systems for chemical may not be known for several hours, or even days, by
vapours using ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) or which time severe disruption may have been caused.
combining IMS and surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices
for detection, limited identification and monitoring. Immunoassays. Field immunoassay kits, enzyme-linked
These provide a useful first warning that is subsequently immunosorbent assays (ELISA), and
confirmed, typically after 6 to 48 hours depending on the immunochromatography strips are becoming available to
agent, by more sensitive laboratory techniques such as first responders, and provide simple, rapid tests for
gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS). specific agents such as Bacillus anthracis. While detection
Reduction of false positives is being achieved both by limits might not be below the lethal dose, in situ ‘white
combining the two techniques and by ‘profiling’ for powder’ identification would be extremely useful for
background signals at specific installations in repeated in- deployment by appropriately protected first responders.
situ tests. However, there is little consensus on the There is some danger of false positives due to cross-
reliability of such systems and broadening the range of reactivities of antibodies used in immunoassays. These
analytes, reduction in false positives, and lowering of technologies are appropriate for detection and, in
detection limits would be welcome. principle, identification. However, there is presently no
defined decision-making process following use of existing
Chromatography. GC-MS and high performance liquid field assays, and the sample is sent for laboratory analysis,
chromatography (HPLC) are widely accepted as the whether the result is positive or negative, due to lack of
standard method for identification and quantification of user confidence.
chemical agents. Mobile (but far from hand-held) systems
have been successfully deployed and there is a substantial
body of work on further miniaturisation of mass

DNA-based assays. This approach uses short DNA These techniques require the sample to be brought into
fragments to identify micro-organisms, often in an array contact with the detection system and sample
format with fluorescence read-out. The polymerase chain preparation to be performed prior to analysis, as
reaction (PCR) might be used to amplify the DNA before discussed in chapter 3. This is not ideal, as it implies that
detection, and a hand-held system has been developed, some material has already been identified as potentially
but PCR is considered to be slow and prone to hazardous and will require clearing the area and donning
contamination and thus false positives. These assays are protective clothing before proceeding to conduct the test.
available, but not yet in a format appropriate for practical An extremely rapid non-contact (stand-off) system to
use in the field, and so are presently more appropriate for determine whether there is a hazard present before
identification rather than detection. However, clearing the area and conducting further tests to identify
developments in the field are rendering this technology and quantify substances is required.
much faster, which may make it suitable for some first-
responder situations, and false positive rates are reported Laser-based techniques. UV-laser based aerosol detection
to be lower than for antibody-based technologies. Single systems using wavelengths in the region 250nm to
primer isothermal amplification (SPIA) shows promise for 400nm detect fluorescence from biological materials in
faster throughput. Miniaturisation using disposable aerosols. These are not specific to hazardous biological
microfluidic systems and integration of detection is materials but provide a non-contact method of
rendering these approaches portable, faster and simpler determining whether biological material is present.
to use. Lab-on-a-chip or micro-electro-mechanical Because these systems do not distinguish between toxic
(MEMS) approaches (see chapter 4.4 below) are and non-toxic biological materials, they can only be used
attracting much attention for this and other applications. to provide partial evidence in a decision-making process,
Portable microfluidic devices for the identification of and not directly as an alarm system. In principle, the laser-
biological agents have been reported and based standoff techniques lend themselves well to
commercialised. Devices extract and concentrate DNA monitoring and detection systems.
from biological materials such as cells and spores, amplify
the extracted DNA using PCR and identify the amplified An agent-specific laser standoff technique has been
sequence in a rapid manner. developed for TNT where particles coated with specific
fluorescent-tagged coatings are deposited (from a
Biosensors. Biosensors are being developed to combine distance) on contaminated ground, and the presence of
immunoassays or DNA-based assays with signal TNT strongly influences fluorescence from the spheres,
transduction on a chip to provide more quantitative direct excited by laser irradiation and detected at a distance.
electronic readout of data, but are not presently available This approach could potentially be adapted to biological
for practical application. Biosensors exploit materials.
electrochemical, acoustic or optical transduction, for
example, usually with chemically-selective coatings, and
will lend themselves to mass production and to realisation 4.3 Detecting agents by recognising and
of arrays of sensors to detect several different analytes diagnosing unusual incidents
from one sample simultaneously. Optical transducers are
being most aggressively pursued worldwide at present, As discussed in chapter 2.4, the speed of action of many
with fluorescence or electroluminescence-based chemical agents means that no current detector will
immunoassay systems and surface plasmon resonance or alarm in time to prevent exposure of some individuals.
resonant mirror-based systems being prevalent. Consequently, a major method of detecting chemical and
biological agents is by recognising and diagnosing the
However, optical devices are generally more expensive to effects of an unusual incident. The Health Protection
produce and use than electrochemical and surface Agency (HPA) is responsible for the surveillance of
acoustic wave systems. Gold and semiconductor outbreaks of infectious diseases and incidents involving
nanospheres are being used as alternative tags to exposure to hazardous chemicals, and is delivering a
fluorophores, with simple colorimetric readout and high CBRN training strategy. The NHS monitors hospital
luminescence yields. Sensor arrays for multianalyte admissions and many GPs are able to provide real-time
detection are being developed in most of these morbidity data about their patients. However, there is no
technologies. Whole cell biosensors integrate living cells proactive assessment of intelligence in a medical context
with physical transducers to measure the effect of toxic or collation of multiple-source surveillance data for the
agents on cell activity, through changes in the level of early detection of an evolving incident. This is medical
bioluminescence, for example. While these do not intelligence, and currently the only source of medical
provide identification of specific agents, they provide a intelligence analysis is focused on military operational
direct measure of toxicity. Molecularly imprinted polymers needs, run by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
are being developed that mimic biological molecules
involved in immunobinding and may prove useful as the This comprehensive military medical intelligence service
recognition unit in robust and stable biosensors. provides an all-source threat assessment for military
medical and wider strategic and operational planning

where the basic requirement is to provide timely and Cell-based biosensor systems. Cell- and tissue-based
accurate intelligence based on defined requirements. A sensors offer unique potential for agent detection.
comparable civilian medical intelligence unit would Benefits include the ability to detect and classify
provide timely advice to the UK Government and work in unanticipated threats or novel pathogens, to relate sensor
close collaboration with the MoD, but be specifically data to human physiology, toxicity and pathology, and to
focused on: integrate numerous input stimuli into nonlinear cellular
responses. This approach also offers the potential for
· Issuing indicators and warnings of imminent health creation of self-replicating biodegradable sensors with
threats in the UK. adaptive dynamic range, and can leverage emergent
· Monitoring emerging diseases of chemical or biological techniques in cell biology. However, key challenges
causation, from a global perspective. include:
· Analysing intelligence source material from a medical
perspective. · Integration of viable cells and tissues with synthetic
· Collating and analysing open source material. materials
· Producing regular medical intelligence briefings to · Strategies to improve genotypic and phenotypic stability
Government. of cells and longevity
· Monitoring occurrence of the unusual disease by liaison · Preservation and enhancement of physiological
with the HPA. input/output responses
· Localisation and confinement of cells in micro-patterned
A civilian medical intelligence output would include arrangement
real-time mapping of incidents and outbreaks in the UK, · Monitoring of indirect measures of cell behaviour
development and validation of indicators and warnings · Metabolism or compounds released from actively
for pre-event threat assessments, and interpretation of metabolising cells
intelligence in a health context. We welcome the · Cell sourcing
announcement that the HPA is planning to establish a · Uniform or synchronous cultures
medical intelligence unit (Home Office 2004). · Generation of stem cells from both adult and embryonic
sources
In addition to enhancing the ability to deal with the · Immortalised cell lines
deliberate use of chemical and biological agents, many of · Knock-out cells as control populations
the points discussed here will improve capabilities to · Incorporation of fluorescent or luminescent
handle accidental releases of chemical or biological technologies into genomes
agents, as well as natural outbreaks of infectious diseases. · Improved storage
One example is that improvements to health surveillance · Automation
networks will enhance the ability of GPs and the NHS · Modularity and portability
quickly to identify outbreaks of infectious diseases such as · Data mining
SARS or tuberculosis. · Informatics and knowledge engineering
· Maintenance of aseptic environments and development
of strains that can exist anaerobically
4.4 Requirements for research into detection
systems Lab-on-a-chip technologies. The key to low-cost hand-
held analytical systems combining ease-of-use with
It is crucial to harness existing strands of research from a reliability is in the further development of lab-on-a-chip,
broad range of science, engineering and technology for microfluidic and MEMS systems. Further miniaturisation
application to the detection of chemical and biological that might allow the parallel or simultaneous detection of
agents. This requires, first, that scientists and engineers a number of agents with the same device offers the
become aware that their work might make a useful potential of extremely rapid and reliable systems for first-
contribution to these applications and, second, that novel responders, incorporating a variety of processing and
science, engineering and technology have a route to recognition systems, and needing little user intervention.
develop devices and instruments that may be used with
confidence in the field. The establishment of a centre to Lab-on-a-chip systems bring these generic benefits to
focus research into civilian applications of devices and detection systems for both chemical and biological
systems for agent detection is therefore desirable (see agents, but are in a very early stage of development. Lab-
chapter 7). Two priority research directions are on-a-chip technologies are broadly defined as microscale
highlighted and discussed below: (i) cell-based systems analytical instruments that employ semiconductor and
that show great promise as recognition elements for MEMS technologies to assembly features such as
detectors, and (ii) nanoparticle and lab-on-a-chip channels, electrodes, reactors, filters and electronic
technologies that will allow miniaturised, integrated circuits on the same small surface (usually a silicon chip).
automation of sample preparation, ruggedness and Such devices are able to manipulate fluid samples with
portability, thereby allowing practical use of a wider range high precision and efficiency and have been used in a
of approaches in the field. wide variety of applications including nucleic acid

separations, protein analysis, process control, small- · Highly integrated lab-on-a-chip devices for in-the-field
molecule organic synthesis, DNA amplification, measurements (eg micro PCR and capillary
immunoassays, DNA sequencing, and cell manipulations. electrophoresis) with the capacity to assay multiple
agents simultaneously or sequentially in a rapid manner.
Chip-based analytical systems have been shown to have Key to the realisation of such devices will be the
many fundamental advantages over their conventional development of integrated optical detectors and light
(larger) analogues. These include improved efficiency sources at low unit cost. Developments in MEMS and
with regard to sample size, response times, cost, microfluidics and more sensitive Complimentary Metal
analytical performance, process control, integration, Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) chips, light sources, and
throughput and automation. A key benefit of these chip- photodetector arrays are required.
based systems is the ability to integrate many functions
on a single mass-produced device, thus affording highly · Miniaturised MS and integrated hyphenated MS
miniaturised, portable instruments ideal for performing techniques (EI, MALDI, AP-MALDI, IR-MALDITOF),
in-the-field analysis with high efficiency and low unit cost. miniature pulsed lasers for MALDI. Developments in
these areas will provide for chemical and biological
In addition to microfluidic separation systems, sensors, fingerprinting in the field.
and miniature pumps and reactors, there is a requirement
for low-cost light sources, sensitive detector arrays and · Standoff techniques – laser sources, mid-IR and
integrated electronic systems. Research into lab-on-a- terahertz spectroscopies.
chip devices has been reported for chemical and
biological agent detection and should ultimately provide · Particle systems – upconverting phosphors, quantum
handheld test devices for a wide range of agents for in- dots, gold, magnetic, nanostructured silicon ‘smart
the-field applications. Such chip devices also offer the dust’, core-shell particles to facilitate high-sensitivity
opportunity to integrate specific detection technologies, optical detection. Improved fluorophores with high
for example using DNA sequences or antibody fragments, fluorescence quantum efficiencies and low
with whole cell microbial biosensors that can now be photodegradation characteristics.
sustained on chip surfaces. This will offer the potential of
combining gross measurements on biological toxicity · Nanoparticle arrays. Interaction of nanoparticles with
(potential scale of the event) with signals from other specific chemical species can be engineered to induce
integrated devices indicating the nature of the agent aggregation or disaggregation and thus a change in the
being deployed. optical characteristics of the nanoparticles.
Examples of additional research directions that show · Integrated ‘plug-and-play’ systems that allow
promise in providing solutions to detection of chemical replacement of the sensor head for detection of
and biological agents are given below. different analytes.
· Novel chemical and biological recognition systems – · Networked systems, software, data mining and
antibodies, fragments, single chain antibody variable knowledge engineering, to generate useful knowledge
region fragments, aptamers (single stranded DNA and from the raw data provided by sensors.
RNA molecules), peptides, molecular imprinted
polymers, whole organism systems (IR, magnetic and
optical), cell and tissue based sensors, nanoreactors. 4.5 Conclusions and recommendations
· Microfabricated transducers – electrochemical/ Much scientific and technological research that may
electroluminescence sensors, thin film optical devices, contribute to meeting the demand for novel detection
magnetic systems, optical sensors based on surface systems is being carried out in diverse fields, in particular
plasmon resonance, quantum dots, photonic crystals, in cell- and tissue-based recognition elements and
reflectivity and holography, fibre optic bundles, surface lab-on-a-chip technologies, and this effort should receive
enhanced Raman spectroscopy (SERS) and surface continued support. At present much relevant research
enhanced resonance Raman spectroscopy (SERRS), and development is driven by military, medical or
optical, electrical and acoustic arrays, imaging environmental applications and there is little coordinated
techniques, instrumentation and software, acoustic effort in the UK to harness this research for applications to
sensors (rupture event scanning, Love wave, chemical and biological agent detection in the civil
magnetic-acoustic resonance). Sample presentation, environment.
miniaturisation, ruggedisation, reagent-free techniques.
Integration with force-based techniques (magnetic Considerable research is presently being undertaken on
bead, optical tweezers). fledgling technologies of potential relevance to detection,
identification and monitoring of chemical and biological
agents, by parts of the academic community that have
little or no experience of working on military or

security-related projects. It is essential that this research Appropriate funding from the UK Government must be
be allowed to develop so that the potential technologies earmarked for research and development into systems for
can be assessed. To achieve this we recommend that the detection, identification and monitoring of chemical and
UK Government support a cross-disciplinary programme, biological agents, if the UK is to be well prepared.
ideally coordinated by the proposed new centre, to raise Funding is required both for short-term development to
awareness of the issues among the scientific community advance preparedness immediately and for longer-term
and to encourage the exploitation of new science, scientific and technological research.
engineering and technology for detection of chemical
and biological agents, including networking and data There should be improved coordination of national and
fusion activities and instrument development activities local electronic health surveillance systems to detect
focused on solving problems in a real environment. clusters of illness/symptoms and unusual diseases.
Surveillance data should be real time, and the HPA will
A key requirement to be addressed by this programme is have a key role in this development. The HPA and the NHS
for point detectors to be developed for use by first should utilise medical intelligence as it has the potential to
responders at the scene of a potential incident involving a make significant contributions to resilience and the
chemical or biological agent. For these systems to be useful, effectiveness of responses. We welcome the
it is also essential that research be carried out into announcement that the HPA is planning to establish a
background levels of chemical and biological agents and medical intelligence unit.
substances that interfere with detections systems, where
appropriate in representative environments so that the
significance of a detection event may be determined in
comparison with normal levels.

5 How science, engineering and technology can assist in
decontamination
Summary to destroy chemical and biological agents all work well
provided good contact between the agent and
We have identified four areas of decontamination where decontaminant can be achieved. In practice, most
different approaches would be needed: personal, vehicle, research into new procedures for decontamination is
and the interior and exterior of buildings. These mostly directed at topics such as gels, foams and microemulsions,
fall outside the remit of military research (except for very much with the purpose of enhancing the contact
vehicle contamination). In the UK there is currently a time between the decontaminant and agent. For civil use
considerable body of knowledge on decontamination of the main challenges are to find decontaminants that do
all kinds that would be relevant to the civil environment, not cause significant problems for people or material and
but it is widely dispersed. It could form the basis for the that are compatible with sampling and measurement
implementation of effective practices for all four areas of methods that could give confidence that effective clean
decontamination, but it would need to be coordinated up has been achieved.
and supported. More quantitative data is needed on the
persistence, transfer and contact hazards of toxic The following sections discuss personal decontamination
materials. from the practical viewpoint of providing immediate help
to casualties. Issues connected with decontaminating
A major difficulty following an incident is the production buildings are summarised, emphasising the large
of convincing criteria for the reoccupation of buildings or knowledge gaps and much experimental work required if
sites. Following decontamination of, for example, the optimum decontamination strategies are to be
external surface of a building, a substantial amount of developed. Secondary contamination of vehicles is briefly
toxic agent could remain embedded in the structure but considered. This is important in preventing secondary
be perfectly safe. Quantitative assessments of such contamination in ambulances, which is an area where
contamination are feasible but do not seem to be military research might be relevant. Finally, current
currently available. Information on the effectiveness of technologies and strategies are reviewed.
decontaminants needs to be obtained and collated.
5.2 Personal decontamination

5.1 Introduction
The current practice is that those contaminated should
The measures required for decontaminating buildings, first remove their clothes and then wash or be washed
equipment, furniture, paintings and the environment in with luke warm water plus detergent (‘rinse-wipe’ –
general will very much depend on the type and level of Home Office 2003). The washings might be held locally
contamination. The big difference between personal for subsequent treatment or discharged to a foul sewer.
decontamination and decontamination of buildings is The need for rapid action, potentially before the nature of
that whereas the former must be carried out as soon as the contamination is known, means there does not appear
possible (and probably before the agent has been to be any alternative to a simple procedure such as this.
identified), in the latter cases there should be time to However a number of issues arise.
identify the toxic materials and to select the most
effective decontaminating procedure. · While removal of clothes is a sensible way of removing a
significant amount of any contamination, there may be
There has been little Government sponsored research to situations where it is too slow. It might be more efficient
determine the most effective procedures for to decontaminate people by hosing first, particularly if
decontamination in a civilian environment. Military numbers are large. Some experimental evidence should
research has of necessity been focused on rapid be obtained with a representative sample of different
decontamination methods under conditions where the types of agents.
availability of water might be limited. In a civil context
there are fewer logistical limitations and consequently it is · The detergent must provide efficient washing, especially
worth finding the best means of decontaminating for the oily nature of chemical toxins.
buildings using procedures specific to each agent. The
considerable amount of military research concerned with · No assistance should be given to contaminants
battlefield decontamination against agents such as penetrating the skin.
mustard gas and nerve agents might not be totally
relevant and neither might the procedures currently used · No, or minimal, foaming should occur if detergent is to
to sterilise laboratories that are specifically designed to be added to the water supply.
carry out work on dangerous pathogens. What has been
learnt that is relevant is that the most obvious approaches · The optimum temperature of the water supply and for
of using oxidising, chlorinating or hydrolytic procedures performance of the detergent needs to be considered.

· As decontaminants are likely to be only used once, they · In general, there is unlikely to be a need for a building to
might be able to contain more powerful agents than be decontaminated immediately and time should be
repeated use formulations. Components such as allowed to bring the most effective decontaminant from
oxidising or chlorinating agents could be added that a central source, so that emergency services need not
might facilitate the destruction of some toxic agents. store supplies at each and every depot.
The requirements are so completely different from the · Gaseous oxidising and chlorinating gases can be effective
military scenario, where the focus is on personal decontaminants for many chemical and biological agents,
protection equipment to prevent individuals becoming but there is a need to evaluate such procedures, especially
contaminated, that little useful extrapolation can be with regard to damage to the contents of building, such
made from the military experience. They are also such as computing equipment, and to establish the correct
that it should be possible to produce standard detergent criteria for their use.
solutions and protocols for their use and equip first
responders accordingly. It is, however, important to · Whether there is a need to decontaminate and whether
consider variants of whatever procedure might be the decontamination has been successful will depend
standardised for different types of contamination, ie on whether any toxic substance is present in sufficient
chemical warfare agents, industrial spills (where there is quantity and form to be transferred to people by
some experience already available), and biological agents. inhalation, by mouth or by contact with the skin.
Systematic experimental investigation of the options is There is a need on an agent-by-agent basis to provide
required, especially of the interaction of contaminants estimates of safe levels of contamination. It must be
and decontaminants with skin, but the difficulties of recognised that it will be difficult to design experimental
designing experimental protocols that can be protocols to provide meaningful data about realistic
extrapolated with confidence to real situations should not scenarios. The surfaces of the interiors of buildings,
be underestimated. which will mainly be paintwork, are sometimes porous
and often highly retentive of organic contaminants. At
Contaminated casualties may arrive at hospitals and safe levels for reoccupation such surfaces might retain
adequate facilities should be available at designated significant amounts of toxic agent, but factors such as
receiving hospitals for decontamination prior to slow release of the agent and its slow degradation by air,
admission. This may require a separate building for and the role of exposure length of the occupants, would
reception to ensure the treatment area is maintained free need to be thoroughly assessed. There is also the
of contamination. considerable problem of public perception and
confidence in the advice offered (see chapter 6).
5.3 Decontamination of buildings · The selection of decontaminants will depend not only
on the toxic material but also on whether it is essential
5.3.1 Interior to avoid damage to the fabric and contents of the
building. Although excessive use of water should be
Decisions about whether decontamination of the interior avoided, this need not rule out water-based cleaning,
of buildings is necessary will depend on the nature of the especially foam- and possibly also gel-based
contamination. Good ventilation over time will be all that formulations, and the use of more specific agents such
is necessary following contamination by gases and very as enzymes.
volatile liquids. Other more persistent agents will require
specific treatments that may depend on the nature of the · It is essential that the sampling and analytical procedures
building contents and the urgency of returning the used to show that a building is safe, together with the
building to its normal use. With the notable exception of appropriate toxicological data, give those who live and
anthrax, live biological agents die off rapidly on exposure work in the building the confidence that it is safe.
to sunlight.
· Cost-effective methods of making decontamination of
There are a number of important issues that need buildings easier might usefully be investigated, along
consideration and/or investigation. the lines of ensuring that new buildings are designed to
help rather than hinder decontamination procedures.
· For decontamination of buildings, time should be allowed
to identify the agent accurately and to select the most Many of these issues had to be dealt with following the
appropriate decontaminant for that agent relevant to deliberate release of anthrax spores in letters in the USA,
the interior fabric of the building. Much experimental where the clean-up requirement was for no spores to
work is needed to provide background information for remain in the environment. In the United States 23
decision-making. Inherent in determining the level of facilities were contaminated, and 20 of these have so far
contamination will be the reliability of the sampling been decontaminated at a cost of $800m, producing
strategy adopted. Experience gained from military 3000 tons of contaminated waste. Anthrax spores exist
decontamination studies might not be entirely relevant. naturally in certain environments and can be an

occupational hazard in the leather and wool industries, areas. It will be important that ambulances and other
particularly with imported raw materials. vehicles be monitored for contamination and, if necessary,
methods be available to decontaminate them adequately
and prevent secondary contamination of subsequent
5.3.2 Exterior passengers.
Other issues relate to the exterior of buildings and to To prevent (or remove) secondary contamination of
urban environments in general. One is the problem of ambulances will require rapid and efficient methods of
immediate containment. For example, a heavily decontamination of the interior of the vehicle. This is an
contaminated surface or pools of volatile liquids on the issue where military expertise from the battlefield should
ground might cause significant down-wind hazard. Good be directly useful, for decontamination and possibly for
computer models can help in the assessment of the better design, eg avoiding crevices where capillary action
hazard and decontamination protocols available for can concentrate contaminants.
dealing with liquid pools.
Surfaces often found on the exterior of buildings, such as 5.5 Current technologies and strategies
concrete, stone or brick, have an enormous effective surface
area due to their porous nature. Rain, air and sunlight will The expertise in decontamination is held by a number of
tend to degrade any organic agent on a surface over time, groups. The most obvious are the official groups, eg the
so simple washing of the exterior along the lines of Health Protection Agency (HPA), Ministry of Defence
present procedures used for cleaning old buildings should (MoD), and overseas groups, particularly in the USA. For
be satisfactory. In serious cases detergent might also be the problems that arise in the civil environment, much
used, which would have the possible benefit of applicable knowledge might be found in those industries
incorporating specific cleaning agents, such as bleach or involved in all types of industrial cleaning,
enzymes. The extent to which a given detergent might decontamination of plant (pharmaceutical and food
assist penetration of the washings through the material industries), personal care products and household
should be assessed. Although surface contamination cleaning goods.
might be removed, some agents might remain at
appreciable levels within the pores of a building material Current technologies and strategies for decontamination
and yet be safe. Rather than attempt to remove them by adopted by the HPA use water-based formulations
drastic means it might be best to leave them or to seal including detergents, bleaches and oxidizing agents. The
them in by some appropriate surface coating. The principle of decontamination they adopt is to reduce the
presence of any such agents would need to be taken into amount of pathogen to a level at which it can no longer
account if the building was to be altered or demolished in cause harm. In many cases, this can be readily achieved by
future, especially with regard to long-lived biological washing with water and surfactant, which has been
agents. demonstrated to remove up to 99.9% of organisms from
surfaces. Additional protection can be achieved by adding
The main issue is the decision about when clean-up has hypochlorite to the wash solution, which also serves to
been achieved. This is not straightforward, and involves inactivate material in the run-off water. If surfaces are
consideration of, for example, how the wide range of heavily soiled, physical cleaning is essential to ensure that
possible agents will disperse over different types of the surface is clean: disinfectants do not reliably penetrate
exterior surfaces and whether this would change encrusted material or heavy deposits of organic material.
following simple washing procedures. Given that most
contaminant would be retained on parts of the surface MoD research is focused on military needs: the emphasis
inaccessible to people, estimates should be made of the on personnel has rightly been on protection rather than
amount of agent that could be removed by a person personal decontamination and the material
coming into direct contact with the building, such as by decontamination procedures that have been developed
placing a hand on the surface. These estimates should be assume that water will be in short supply. The emphasis
used to fix the criterion of safety of access. An alternative has therefore been on formulations with a low water
based on the total amount of toxic agent on the whole content that are especially suitable for decontamination
surface of the building would be inappropriate. Any of equipment and on the development of reactive
subsequent building work on a previously contaminated formulations. Examples are:
building would have different safety criteria for the
exterior structure. · Active surfactant formulations to overcome solubility
problems - a microemulsion based formulation has been
approved for service.
5.4 Secondary contamination of vehicles
· Microemulsion formulations to cope with capillary
In some cases, casualties and equipment may trapping (self-agitating surfactant-less middle phases)
contaminate vehicles used for transport to treatment or thickened chemical agents.

· Reactive coatings, eg self-cleaning paints, novel systems decontaminating reagent and the contaminant and
based on nanoparticulate oxides that catalytically allow decontamination of objects that would be
destroy chemical agents. destroyed by decontaminants with high water content
or corrosive gases. Systems currently being developed
· Reactive gases such as hydrogen peroxide vapour. are based on a commercial oxidizer.
The MoD has also explored active clinging foams as a · Surfactant based decontaminating solutions. The aim is
means of dealing with agents on vertical surfaces and has to incorporate peracid chemistry into surfactant based
identified a system based on a commercial pressure microemulsions to give a system that is not corrosive or
washer dispensing an active chlorine formulation for hazardous to the user or the environment. The low
cleaning of buildings. Although MoD research has been interfacial tension of microemulsions enhances their
focussed on military needs, its experience and expertise in ability to enter contaminated porous materials and
handling and removing chemical and biological agents is hence bring the reactive components into contact with
considerable, such as Gruniard Island (Manchee et al the chemical agents. Peracids break down into weak
1983), and should be fully utilised in any new research acid and water and have many forms used in the laundry
initiative. An extensive account of liquid phase cleaning industry, with a range of solubility and surface active
agents currently in use (ie ‘proven’ decontamination properties
technologies) and in development can be found in the
Counter Proliferation Program Review Committee Report (ii) Gas phase chemistry. The most promising gas phase
to Congress (CPRC 2003). agents for application to decontamination of the external
surfaces of buildings are thought to be ozone and
Current agents are based on oxidative solutions such as chlorine dioxide, both of which are very destructive of
hydrogen peroxide, peroxyacids and potassium chemical and biological agents and of much else.
peroxymonosulphate, which are well established for Aerosols fall between solution and gas methods in that
disinfecting biological warfare agents. They are attractive they are dispersions of liquid (or solid) droplets, eg
for several reasons: (i) they act on chemical and biological hydrogen peroxide fogs. Electrostatic charging might
agents; (ii) they are less toxic to individuals and the enhance decontamination as charged aerosols have the
environment than chlorine-based decontaminants; and ability to penetrate the less accessible regions of an
(iii) they form less toxic, more manageable reaction object. The aim is to produce a battery operated
products. There are, however, concerns about the toxicity backpack, UV photoactivated liquid decontamination
of some tried and tested oxidative decontaminants such system.
as formaldehyde.
Finally, the many technologies available in the range of
Formulations currently being developed are aimed at ease industries identified above, ie those involved in all types of
of distribution and application and at the treatment of industrial cleaning, decontamination of plant
chemical and biological contaminants in a single (pharmaceutical and food industries), personal care
application. The main developments are as follows. products and household cleaning goods, constitute a
considerable body of knowledge directly and immediately
(i) Solution phase chemistry. The aim is to develop organic relevant to civil decontamination and a resource of
or aqueous-based decontamination solutions to replace research techniques that would be valuable in the
aqueous bleach and to reduce logistical burdens development of really effective methods of
associated with operational decontamination of external decontamination. For example, a high proportion of the
building surfaces. One formulation could combine items from the 2002 CPRC Report to Congress, some of
existing enzyme, peroxy- and catalyst technologies. which do involve industrial input, could be rapidly
Technologies under development include the following: developed from existing industrial capability in the UK. In
addition:
· Non-toxic, non-corrosive stable foam (Sandia 2004).
This requires minimal logistics support, and a single · The development of personal care products has required
decontaminating solution can be used for both extensive research on the interaction of materials with
chemical and biological agents. It can be deployed skin using aqueous and non-aqueous methods of
rapidly, causes minimal health and collateral damage, application. Apart from contributing to the relevant
and is relatively inexpensive. Trials have indicated that knowledge base, this type of work has generated high
the foam kills anthrax spores at least to some degree throughput testing methods that could be used in
(and partially neutralises thickened soman, VX and extending this knowledge to optimise personal
distilled mustard gas) although it is not clear whether decontamination.
this is through sporostatic (preventing germination
rather than killing the spores) or sporicidal control. · Industrial cleaning of smooth surfaces (eg ceramic,
metal and others) is highly developed and includes a
· Peroxymonosulphate oxidisers applied in the form of a wide range of methods from the application of liquid
gel. Gels maximise the contact between the bacteriocidal formulations containing many different

active agents, through foams with a chlorine dioxide mechanistic understanding, although the nature of
release formulation, to electrostatically assisted cleaning efficient contact of contaminants with different surfaces
with hydrogen peroxide aerosols. might require a more fundamental approach. It is
recognised that this will need specially equipped
· The food, pharmaceutical and cleaning industries also laboratories. The military experience with highly toxic
have extensive experience in the assessment of cleaning materials will be essential here, as is the experience of
techniques (and cleansing systems); the question of the personal products industry for wide-scale
‘what is safe?’ is one that they constantly address. The assessment techniques.
nuclear industry also has similar experience, although
here detection and assessment of cleanliness present · A research programme is needed to assess contact
quite different issues, where there is considerable hazards from contaminated surfaces, particularly when
experience of decontaminating radiological incidents the levels of contamination are low but not zero, as is
(eg NRPB 2002). likely to be the case in most circumstances. The
standards of cleanliness required by different
procedures varies and devising of criteria of cleanliness
5.6 Conclusions and recommendations forms a vital component of decontamination, which will
be very relevant to the assessment of clean-up following
There needs to be an extensive programme first to bring a chemical or biological incident.
together existing knowledge about options for
decontamination of people, buildings and the wider · As more and more options for decontamination kits
environment, and second to measure the effectiveness of become available in the market place to potential end
decontamination formulations against a range of toxic users (ambulance services, fire brigades, airport
chemical and biological materials. We therefore authorities, postal services, rail authorities), it is
recommend the following: important that end-users are fully aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of each option. In particular,
· A more coordinated research programme targeting end-users must know how to obtain the best results. We
decontamination strategies needs to be initiated, ideally recommend that the proposed new centre ‘kite mark’
coordinated by the proposed new centre. It must the various methodologies both to assist end-users in
emphasise technologies optimised for decontamination the choices they must make and to standardise some of
of the civilian environment. Consultation with industries the decontamination protocols. If the proposed new
with relevant experience of decontamination strategies centre is not established then an appropriate
and quantification of cleanliness is particularly Government department, such as the Home Office
important. CBRN Team, should take the lead.
· There should be extensive experimental investigation of · It is important that NHS Trusts and Ambulance Trusts are
decontamination procedures for a wide range of toxic aware of the risks of secondary contamination and put
chemicals. Since decontamination formulations are measures in place to avoid it in hospitals, ambulances
likely to use similar chemically reactive species, such as and among first responders. Validated decontamination
chlorine, peracids and peroxides, the programme facilities are needed for hospitals and transport vehicles.
should obtain empirical results rather than a detailed

6 Decontamination and justified return: communication issues
and scientific decision support
Summary air concentrations. For most other substances that might
be occasionally found in air, there are no established
At present, there is little fully-fledged science-based concentrations that have been determined acceptable for
guidance for informing decisions on returning localities to the general public, with the notable exception of some
use or buildings to re-occupation following a deliberate chemical warfare agents.
release of a chemical or biological agent. Many
ambiguities seem to exist over how detailed and specific Thus for the majority of toxic industrial chemicals, any of
advice will be obtained in practice if an incident takes which might be released in a terrorist attack, there are no
place. An important related problem for decision support reported concentrations to which officials might refer to
is a lack of reliable information on the background levels determine who is at risk from exposure to the agents and
of many chemical or biological agents or substances that who is safe. However, there are exposure limits that have
cause interference with detection systems. In face of the been determined acceptable for some 600 to 700
inevitable scientific uncertainty that will exist, the chemicals to which people may be exposed at work.
perception of risk, communication of risk and informing These occupational exposure limits are reviewed on a
the public about an unexpected chemical or biological regular basis and could form the basis for determining
incident will be complicated issues to deal with. acceptable exposure concentrations for the general
Collaboration between experts in national and local public. The important point to bear in mind is that
Government, natural sciences, psychology and social occupational limits assume exposure of an individual for
science is required, in addition to public consultation to only 8 hours in every 24. This allows the person an interval
address these issues. before the next exposure and will ensure that much of the
chemical clears the body before the next exposure, thus
Adequate expertise exists in the UK for tackling the preventing significant accumulation. For individuals
difficulties associated with a chemical or biological agent exposed for the whole 24 hours in each day there will be
incident and with the challenges that will arise in urgent no such interval. Thus lower exposure limits will be
decision-making. This expertise should be used to needed than those considered acceptable in the
improve and strengthen advice capabilities and decision occupational setting. An initial approach to establishing
support, and the urgent mobilisation of available acceptable limits for the public may be to divide the
academic and industrial resources should be a priority. occupational limits by a factor of 10. However, this
Advantage can be taken, at least initially, of existing approach may not be safe for all chemicals and a higher
industrial and medical protocols, guidelines and safety factor of 100, or even greater, may be necessary.
regulations. This approach could be used without great cost to
establish safe exposure limits for the public for the 600 to
700 identified chemicals.
6.1 Introduction
There is more of a problem for the other thousands of
In the event of a terrorist chemical or biological incident, chemicals in use. However, not all of them will be
there will be a need to verify the effectiveness of personal available in sufficient quantity to constitute a threat to the
decontamination and environmental clean-ups before a public should terrorists try to get hold of them. For most
decision can be made that people can return to ‘normal’ chemicals on the market there is some established
life, infrastructure can be put back into service or a public information about their toxic properties. It is possible to
area re-opened for ordinary use. Once such an incident get an indication of the toxicity of a chemical from
has taken place, the main issue can be effectively toxicokinetic data, the nature of its toxic effect and
summed up by asking ‘How clean is safe enough?’. matching the hazardous properties of these other
chemicals with those for which there are established
The issue is how science, engineering and technology can occupational exposure limits. By applying appropriate
best contribute to the challenge of determining when safety factors of 100 to 500, safe concentrations for the
something is clean enough to be ‘safe’. We recognise that general public can be determined. This matching of
a decision about ‘safe enough’ will also involve political hazardous properties (together with some details about
considerations and will be influenced by public the physical state of the chemical and the quantity in use)
acceptance. is now an established practice in industry for devising the
correct control procedures for a wide range of chemicals
of a known hazard. The Health and Safety Executive has
6.2 Exposure limits and ‘safe dose’ devised this control approach which is available on the
agency’s website, known as COSHH Essentials.
Acceptable exposure limits are available for some
chemical air pollutants such as ozone, carbon monoxide, Contamination limits for agents on surfaces will depend
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. These limits refer to on a combination of the properties of the particular

surface and of the agent. The situation is more complex to be ‘safe’ involves the psychology of risk acceptability.
than it is for air concentration limits. With surfaces it is the This is inextricably linked to the communication of risks.
quantity of agent that can be dislodged and taken up by Scientific input and advice can play a central part in this
an individual that determines the risk. It can be assumed dialogue, but it will not necessarily be decisive or
that the permissible contamination limits will be much definitive. Two main psychological perspectives can be
greater for agents on surfaces (however they adhere) brought to bear on this aspect of the problem: empirical
than they will be for the air. It is important to remember, research on reactions to risk, and risk communication as
however, that surface limits will be expressed as one part of an entire decision process.
mg/square metre whereas air concentrations will be
mg/cubic metre. Because of the uncertainties caused by Insights into reactions to risk provide guidance, for
the huge variety in properties of agents and surfaces, it example as to what affects and influences public trust in
will be considerably harder to determine acceptable any advice proffered, which types of risk are most likely to
contamination limits for agents on surfaces than for limits be seen as unacceptable or extreme, whether information
in air. For agents adsorbed on surfaces the most likely about probabilities will be understood, and why
routes of exposure would be through direct contact with comparisons between different risks are sometimes
the skin or exposure to vapour. Re-aerosolisation of misleading. This, essentially psychological, perspective
agents is a much lower risk and something that could be can be extended by considering the wider context – for
disregarded. Thus situations can be managed by example, the role of the media will be crucial. Not only do
monitoring air concentrations and limiting skin contact. newspapers, television and radio inform the public but,
perhaps more importantly, they effectively determine why
some risks rather than others become major public
6.3 How clean is safe? - scientific issues ‘issues’.
Independent verification that decontamination has been The second psychological perspective considers risk
successful, and that safe levels have been achieved, will communication as an element of the overall decision
be required. The public is unlikely to accept reassurances process. Pointers to good practice are available, based on
from parties directly involved in the decontamination well-established research that can be adapted to
activities or who might have a vested interest in their individual circumstances: success in communication
being undertaken, eg suppliers of decontaminants. There involves much more than just the choice of words and
is a need for a separate, impartial and authoritative body numbers (UK Resilience 2004). ‘Value judgements’
or source of advice for this specific purpose. The proposed pervade both risk and benefits, especially personal rather
new centre would be an appropriate body to provide this than societal risks. Decision-makers, potential
advice. beneficiaries and victims typically have different
viewpoints, making a variety of social and political value
The difficulties of persuading the public to return judgements unavoidable. For many people, involuntary,
following decontamination were seen following the US unjust or inescapable aspects of their situation are not just
anthrax letter incidents in 2001. The technical challenges fright or dread factors, but characteristics of
associated with decontamination following these unacceptable exposure. Thus their response to risk is
incidents were discussed in chapter 5.3.1. None of the intimately bound up with wider values. Dispassionate or
postal sorting offices involved has yet re-entered service, isolated scientific facts about the objective risk in any
even though they have apparently been decontaminated particular case might have little impact on a person’s
completely: people remain unconvinced this has been views about its generic acceptability.
achieved. There are, therefore, inescapable psychological
facets to the response to any chemical or biological It is known, for instance, that having to deal with releases
contamination incident. of certain chemicals, such as dioxins, can easily cause
additional decision-making difficulties to arise: they
The whole topic of ‘how clean is safe?’ needs to be attract a high ‘dread’ factor, because of their supposed
addressed by an interdisciplinary team, including extreme carcinogenicity and because of precedent
members of the general public, representatives from notoriety. But dioxins are difficult to measure at low
national and local Government, natural scientists, concentrations, and getting people to accept assurances
psychologists and social scientists. Even with access to all about them at what might be termed normal levels of
the available information this is not a trivial problem, and safety proves to be very difficult at the best of times, let
requires adequate funding and suitable investment in alone if such chemicals have been maliciously dispersed
preparatory work. into a populated area.
Public confidence will be increased if people feel they

6.4 How clean is safe? - psychological issues have a definite sense of control, or if they are given the
means and information to check conditions for
Following a deliberate release, understanding what is themselves. For personal decontamination, evidence
perceived by the population at large to be clean enough given by the British Psychological Society indicates that

any clues that a person has been successfully modified food and bovine spongiform encephalopathy
decontaminated might not be tangible. Therefore, if at all (BSE) are useful analogues for understanding the way
possible, equipment should be used that objectively people think about and deal with risks, and the kinds of
measures and indicates the level of decontamination. To factors that influence the perception of chemical and
show that someone or something is ‘clean’, we suggest biological risks.
the use of an open and interactive system of multiple tests
with a variety of markers or measurements. At present In the context of a terrorist incident itself, experiences
such equipment is not readily available, and may not be from other types of disaster could be relevant, depending
for several years. This approach can help generate a on the nature of the incident: the way in which the public
‘catalogue of reassurance’. This is preferable to relying on reacts to, and interacts with, say, a fire in an industrial
bald professional assurances or single diagnostic complex is one obvious source of guidance. In this regard,
indicators. The alternative is to use take-it-or-leave-it the National Steering Committee on Warning and
assurances by an official expert, which are often Informing the Public (NSCWIP) has been encouraging
unhelpful and counter-productive, no matter how often improvements in the arrangements for warning the
they are repeated. public of any imminent or actual threat to life, health or
property and of ways to inform them of the appropriate
These points all lead to the expectation that there could action to take.
be major difficulties in communicating risks and risk
assessments to affected persons and the general public Although initially set up without funding, and motivated
after a terrorist incident. This will be particularly so when mainly by the emergency services and chemical industries
trying to convince the wider population that an area is requirement to prepare incident response plans for the
clean after decontamination, or that affected individuals public, NSCWIP’s remit has broadened to include other
are free from contamination. Communicating risks disaster situations such as flooding, chemical tanker spills
requires more than dealing with scientific concerns: and terrorist incidents. In considering several industrial
engaging with representative members of the public to case histories, NSCWIP was concerned that the
identify other concerns is also necessary (Stern and information that licensees were required to provide to the
Fineberg 1996; Slovic 2000). The experience gained in public was not achieving the desired effect, so the
collaborations between chemical companies and Committee produced a more generic message that could
residents living near chemical production sites can be be applied to a wider range of situations.
looked to for guidance.
They promoted the general message ‘Go in, stay in, tune
An Economic and Social Research Council programme in’. This is often termed ‘shelter advice’, and is based both
The domestic management of terrorist attacks (ESRC on exposure-uptake experiments and on the premise
2004) has been set up to look specifically into people’s that, if the public shelter themselves as an immediate
reaction to terrorism, and a forum is being promoted for response, this should assist in controlling the situation by
the Government and various areas of the media to discuss leaving the way clear for the emergency services to work
the media’s response to a terrorist incident. Technical more rapidly. Also, if people are at home or indoors,
experts and scientists should also be involved in this advice can be transmitted to the greatest number most
dialogue, and all should work together to find ways to efficiently via radio, TV, text messaging or paging
communicate a range of views on hazards and risks in a (NSCWIP 2004).
balanced and creative way.
Whilst the Government has apparently endorsed this
advice in principle (Hansard 2003), it seems reluctant to
6.5 Communicating risk in the decision process promote the concept more widely. Several reasons have
been suggested. It might be the Government fears a
Behavioural science research can be useful for revealing repeat of the outcome of the ‘Protect and survive’
public understanding of the risks of terrorism and the campaign of the 1970s, which aimed to increase public
benefits of alternative programmes to confront the preparedness for a nuclear attack; then, the advice given
threats. Behaviourally realistic assessments of risks, with gained no credibility whatsoever with the public, mainly
and without alternative response strategies, can guide because of media ridicule.
priority setting consistent with an understanding both of
the science and of public values. However, the public will In the light of more recent experience with media
need almost total confidence in any detection and coverage of scientific issues, for example the controversy
decontamination systems in order to be convinced that, over MMR, the measles mumps and rubella vaccine, the
when these indicate something is ‘clean’, it really is ‘safe’. Government might be concerned that the media could
misconstrue messages about how to respond to a
In respect of ‘informing the public’ generally, information terrorist incident, causing excessive public anxiety.
that accurately reflects risk is less likely to cause However, the experience of the BSE crisis demonstrates
apprehension, whilst vague and non-specific information the danger of concealing information, and many in the
is more likely to cause anxiety. Concerns over genetically chemical industry have found that being open and honest

is a better way to deal with situations involving · Scientific questions relating to risks that cannot be
technological threats and risk. shown to be significant, given existing knowledge and
scientific understanding; and when, and how, to apply
This is underpinned by research on the effectiveness of the ‘Precautionary Principle’.
technical and scientific information that was provided by
safety-critical industries in various circumstances. It has If detection and decontamination responses are to be
been found that many people just do not accept optimised, there is a wide range of science-related topics
unquestioningly the information they are given in an for which additional thought and investigation would be
emergency: they either tend to be sceptical of it, or at desirable.
least wish to know more about the reasoning behind the
advice before acting on it. Others can turn plain One fundamental issue underlying any consideration of
inquisitive about an incident, and wish to approach the the management of the whole decontamination process
hazard: this famously, but fatally for some, happened is scientific uncertainty and the reliability of available data.
with the Mount St Helens volcano eruption in 1980 and, For risk-informed decision-making, intensive sampling
more notoriously, during the fire at Chernobyl, when can be used to reduce uncertainty in threat
workers and their families from the plant living in nearby characterisation, and to reduce the likelihood than an
Pripyat stood in the open and watched the fire as inappropriate decision is made, but significant further
radioactive debris fell on them, despite being aware of work needs to be done on all these issues. As noted in
the dangers of exposure. Some might even move closer to chapter 2, there will be vital scientific contributions to be
the threat in order to actively investigate it for themselves. made at every stage: before, during and after the event.
Messages need to be layered so that those who want to
learn more easily can do so. This can be achieved by Confirmation that decontamination has been effective,
having an information website resource that can provide and that a safe return to use is justified, will probably
audiences with different levels of detail. require inputs from several specialist agencies, as well as
the body or bodies responsible for health and safety at the
It seems evident from the NSCWIP work that the public locations or premises concerned, as discussed in chapter
should be made more aware of the chaos and immediate 2.2.3. Thus, to support the goal of a justified return to
confusion that is likely to arise should a terrorist chemical normal use, there will be need to integrate into a
or biological incident occur. People should have complete, science-informed decision process:
information on how and when advice will be provided,
and if suitable guidance is given beforehand the public · A structured framework for the inclusion of all scientific
may well respond more appropriately when they feel and technical information.
obliged to apply natural intuitions to an abnormal
situation. · Numerical models for mapping the spatial extent,
intensity of initial contamination and timescale
forecasting, and for tracking decontamination progress.
6.6 Decision-making on decontamination
issues · Quantitative risk or cost-benefit analyses of decisions
using science-based evidence.
Some of the key issues that warrant further scientific
attention in relation to decision-making on physical, When it comes to using decontamination measurement
chemical or biological decontamination activities are: data for decision-making, the National Radiological
Protection Board (NRPB) has done some valuable work in
· Effectiveness of existing detection and decontamination producing a decision-support software package for
measures, and alternative approaches. estimating the consequences of decontamination options
for radiological incidents in inhabited areas. Though there
· Current status of methodologies for assessing exposure, are considerable differences between radiological and
vulnerability, dose, risk, cost-benefit, value-of-life and chemical or biological incidents, this package could, in
consequence, especially in near real-time. principle, be adapted for application to the latter.
However, before derivative versions of the software could
· Current arrangements for mobilising and optimising achieve a sufficient degree of effectiveness for use, it will
expertise and ways to enhance the role and contribution be necessary to develop explicit databases and other
of scientific advice to decision-making. inputs, specific to the problems associated with the
chemical and biological agent incidents.
· Issues surrounding statistical and probabilistic methods
for representing scientific uncertainty, expert judgement, The approach adopted by the NRPB package is appealing
and the implications of scientific uncertainty, statistical as a template because it provides decision support by
test performance (false positives, negatives, etc) for incorporating all key factors: dose, cost, timescale and
assessment and decision-making (see annex 4). waste generation, as well as estimating the consequences
for a range of different scenarios. This total approach

allows the decision-maker to scope the extent and scale 6.7 Conclusions and recommendations
of the problem, and to identify some options that can or
should be excluded and others that should be developed There is a clear need for all scientific and technical
for chemical or biological terrorism incidents. While all the information to be integrated into a complete, science-
various inputs of scientific fact and technical information informed structured framework for decision processing.
ought to be actively taken into account for risk-benefit The proposed new centre would be well situated to
analysis, there will also be a need to state the scientific coordinate this activity. The NRPB radiological incident
uncertainty that attaches to any assessment of software is an example of good practice and should be
consequence. Ideally, this uncertainty should then be adapted to chemical and biological incidents to the best
communicated to policy makers, incident managers and extent possible.
the general public.
Criteria for safe exposure levels for chemical and
Any successful decontamination will have to address the biological agents should be developed and estimates
concerns of the key stakeholders: the public, Government made on best available evidence. Also background levels
and regulators. This will be in addition to undertaking the of many chemical or biological substances or agents that
specific approach adopted for the particular incident, be it might be used as malicious contaminants or cause
destruction, removal or in situ cleaning. Science has a role interference with detection systems should be
to play in the fostering of public confidence in detection determined where appropriate, as recommended in
systems and decontamination methods, as part of the chapter 4.5.
decision process. Ultimately any decision to return will be
a personal choice, so it must be ensured that the public Dialogue between scientists, psychologists and the
are well informed and their concerns have been general public should be encouraged to improve the
adequately addressed (Stern & Fineberg 1996). communication and public understanding of hazard and
risk issues in relation to terrorist incidents, and any
insights should be proactively incorporated into decision
support. The currently separate efforts of the NSCWIP to
improve ways of warning and informing the public should
be engaged more widely in these challenges.

7 Organisational issues – a proposal for a new centre
Summary · Establishing appropriate criteria to evaluate detection

and decontamination equipment and procedures for
During our deliberations we became very aware that their use, and collecting the detailed data required to
although there is much knowledge and expertise assess the efficiency of sampling and decontamination
available in the UK, some of which has been acquired in a procedures, and residual contact hazards.
military context, no single Government Department
appears to have full responsibility for determining how · Evaluating commercially developed technologies.
this expertise can best be utilised. We propose a centre to
coordinate, commission and direct the work required, · Establishing maximum levels of agents below which it is
with overarching responsibility and a suitable budget. appropriate to permit return to normal use following an
incident.
7.1 The challenge · Providing expert advice regarding chemical or biological

incidents for Government department and agencies,
To establish coherent strategies and procedures to deal first responders, NHS Trusts and national and local
with any chemical or biological incidents, all available emergency planners.
expertise must be well coordinated and directed. We are
convinced that the current organisation could be · Investigating how scientific uncertainties and technical
considerably improved. difficulties impinge on all issues about responding to
chemical and biological incidents and how they are
The evidence from Government Departments and formalised to allow rational decisions to be made.
agencies assumed that other unspecified bodies could
provide relevant technical information and advice.
However, a very considerable amount of work is needed 7.2 A proposed solution
to fill the many gaps in existing data, understanding and
procedures, and there is also a need for a clearly identified The type of organisation best suited to coordinate,
source of advice. commission and direct the work listed in chapter 7.1 is a
centre with overarching responsibility and a suitable
A considerable number of Government budget. The budget required by the centre will depend on
interdepartmental meetings, many coordinated by the the timescale envisaged for the work to be done and on
Home Office CBRN Team, have done much to improve the sophistication of the equipment and materials it aims
overall awareness of the information needed. However, to produce. Based on information received from a
little new data collection work has been commissioned. number of sources, we estimate that a reasonable figure
Such work is essential in helping those responsible for would be of the order of £20 million per year, and that
dealing with the consequences of a chemical or biological five years would be needed to train staff and undertake
incident to give good advice based on technical the initial work programme required. After this initial
knowledge. For example, despite a perceived need for a period the funding should continue but the level would
decontaminant for buildings contaminated with anthrax, need to be reassessed. The centre would not be
little practical work has been done to evaluate the responsible for directly funding fundamental scientific
effectiveness of gaseous decontaminants in this context. research with potential applications in this field, since the
Research Councils currently have responsibility for this.
The preceding chapters have identified many areas However, it is important that the centre work with the
requiring new technical work, including: Research Councils to identify research with potential
applications in detection and decontamination. A small,
· Developing improved methods for detecting, but very important, component of the work could be
monitoring, identifying and providing medical carried out in universities.
treatment against chemical and biological agents.
If such a centre with its access to diverse expertise were
· Ensuring concepts of use for detection systems are clear, not established, then it would be extremely difficult for
so equipment and procedures can be designed the relevant parts of Government to coordinate the
accordingly. research and collection of data we have identified.
Without this the UK will not gain the benefit of the
· Assessing and coordinating protocols for medical existing but widely dispersed expertise.
responses.
Much of the work requires handling highly toxic chemical
· Translating laboratory techniques into robust and biological agents and needs to be done in facilities
equipment capable of being used in the field. designed for that purpose. The technical staff carrying out

the work to collect the data must be well trained and It is important that the technical team should be outward
experienced in handling highly toxic materials. At present looking, prepared to work with the academic community,
most of the expertise for this work resides with the Health industry and the research councils where appropriate and
Protection Agency (HPA) and Defence and Science also seek to make full use of developments and potential
Technology Laboratory (dstl). dstl Porton Down has the funding in the US, Europe and elsewhere. Co-locating the
capability to handle the broadest range of chemical and centre with a large research centre like dstl Porton Down
biological agents, although most of their current work is would allow the technical staff to take advantage of the
for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and has not been innumerable contacts of the current staff with fellow
targeted for use in a civil context. In contrast, HPA focuses scientists in the academic community, industry and in
on improving civilian health. Although HPA has the other countries. These scientific contacts will enable the
necessary laboratories to handle highly toxic biological technical team to act as a truly informed and intelligent
materials, its facilities for handling toxic chemicals are customer capable of placing work where it can be done
under-developed at present. This highlights the need for most effectively. As discussed in chapter 6, dialogue
more collaboration between HPA and dstl in order to between scientists, psychologists and the general public
improve the UK’s resilience against a deliberate or should be encouraged to improve the communication
accidental release of a chemical or biological agent. Such and public understanding of hazard and risk issues in
collaboration should aim to maximise the capabilities to relation to terrorist incidents. The proposed centre should
handle the greatest range of agents and scenarios, rather coordinate this dialogue.
than simply duplicating facilities.
The considerable need for the centre to establish the
The centre would bring together existing expertise by maximum levels of agents below which it would be
working with dstl, Health Protection Agency, Home appropriate to permit a return to normal use following an
Office, Department for the Environment Food and Rural incident was discussed in chapter 6. Also, the centre
Affairs, Environment Agency, Cabinet Office, Department would be a clearly identified source of expert advice on
of Health, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, chemical or biological incidents for Government
Department for Transport, the Research Councils, Office Departments and agencies, first responders, NHS Trusts
of Science and Technology, Department of Trade and and national and local emergency planners. Both of these
Industry, National Health Service, first responders, the functions would give decision-makers vital information
academic community and industry. Some of these during an incident. In addition, the centre would be able
Departments would continue to take the lead on to advise the Cabinet Office on dealing with accidental
particular issues but would coordinate their efforts with releases of chemical and biological agents or natural
the new centre. Pooling the expertise from these diverse outbreaks of infectious diseases, where appropriate.
groups will maximise potential synergies. It is important
that the centre has a dedicated budget to establish an In its response (Home Office 2004) to the House of
extensive network of academic collaborators. An outward Commons Science & Technology Select Committee report
looking approach will be essential for success. This on the scientific response to terrorism (House of
approach will include discussing preparedness, Commons 2003) the UK Government rejected the
coordination and communication strategies with those recommendation to establish a ‘Centre for Home
responsible for other types of emergencies, such as Defence’. The Government proposed undertaking a one-
radiation hazards, flooding, severe weather, transport off exercise to identify the research required in this area.
accidents, industrial accidents, animal disease, food and We do not believe that this would provide the required
water contamination and infectious diseases. A panel of evaluation work, risk communication, information
expert, independent scientists should advise the centre, sharing and co-ordination we have clearly identified in
helping to guide the programmes and provide external our report. Also, it is not clear who would be responsible
scrutiny. The membership of such a group could be drawn for commissioning work under the Government’s
from existing panels, and the Royal Society would be proposed research programme. The Government also
happy to suggest potential additional members. asserts that it would be prohibitively expensive to
construct the specialist facilities required. Our suggestion
The centre should be located to maximise overlaps with of co-locating the new centre with existing laboratories
key partners. This might best be achieved by operating a with these facilities, such as Porton Down, would
number of different sites. One possibility is that the centre minimise the costs of establishing the centre.
could have a small unit based in or near London to deal
with liaison issues between Government Departments
and other organisations concerned with responding to 7.3 Recommendation
chemical and biological incidents. The main part of the
centre for dealing with technical issues, determining the We recommend that a fully funded centre be established
work needed and placing the necessary contracts, could to coordinate, commission and direct the work required
be located at an existing research centre, possibly at to improve the UK’s capabilities to minimise the impact of
Porton Down, but it must be independent of the dstl any civil chemical or biological incident.
management.

Such a centre would undertake the following detailed · Ensure that improvements are made to equipment and
activities: materials and that these are made available to the
response agencies.
· Obtain any missing data to ensure procedures and
protocols for detection, sampling, decontamination and · Liase with the HPA on surveillance of outbreaks of
medical treatments are based on the best possible unusual disease.
technical information.
· Establish maximum levels of agents below which it is
· Regularly update the procedures planned to manage appropriate to permit a return to normal use following
the consequences of chemical and biological incidents an incident.
in line with improvements in equipment and technical
data. · Work with the academic community, industry and the
research councils where appropriate and seek to make
· Evaluate all equipment and materials available to ensure full use of developments and potential funding in the
suitability for the purpose described in their operating US, Europe and elsewhere.
instructions by providing ‘kite marks’ or agreed
industrial standards. · Provide a clearly identified source of expert advice
regarding chemical or biological incidents for
· Share information effectively between Government Government Department and agencies, first
Departments and agencies, the academic community, responders, NHS Trusts and national and local
industry and other interested parties including the emergency planners.
public.

8 Main conclusions and recommendations
8.1 Introduction · Establish the maximum levels of agents below

which it is appropriate to permit a return to
Science, engineering and technology will be able to normal use following an incident.
reduce the threat from chemical and biological agents.
How this is coordinated and organised is crucial to the · Work with the academic community, industry
successful utilisation of developments in detection, and the research councils where appropriate
decontamination, sampling and risk communication, as and seek to make full use of developments
highlighted in chapter 7. Without political will and and potential funding in the US, Europe and
cost-effective implementation, organisational and elsewhere.
technological innovation cannot deliver their full
potential to make the UK safer. · Provide a clearly identified source of expert
advice regarding chemical or biological
It is currently not practical to constantly monitor the entire incidents for Government Department and
civilian population against unannounced chemical or agencies, first responders, NHS Trusts and
biological attack. The difficulties preventing such an national and local emergency planners.
approach include the vast amounts of data it would
generate, which could not be practicably analysed, and It has become clear that the current system does not
the logistical difficulties in setting up a network of utilise the extensive expertise in local and national
appropriate monitors. Realistically, only a limited number Government, first responders, the academic community,
of target locations can be monitored. industry and others to the greatest benefit to the UK. In
order to harness that expertise, we recommend that such
There is considerable expertise in dealing with chemical a centre has a significant, ring-fenced budget to
and biological agents in military scenarios. Whilst there commission work to develop and evaluate detection and
are many differences between potential military and decontamination equipment. The budget required by the
civilian incidents, some of the extensive military centre will depend on the timescale envisaged for the
knowledge could be translated to a civilian context. work to be done and on the sophistication of the
equipment and materials it aims to produce. Based on
information from a number of sources, we estimate that a
8.2 Organisation and procedure reasonable figure would be of the order of £20 million per
year. It is important that the centre works with the
R1 The UK Government should establish a new Research Councils to identify promising research relevant
centre to coordinate and direct the work to detection and decontamination. An outward looking
required to improve the UK’s capability and to approach would be essential for the success of such a
minimise the impact of any civilian chemical or centre, as would collaborations with other countries. If
biological incident. such a centre were not established then it would be
extremely difficult for the appropriate parts of
R2 The centre’s main functions would be as Government to be sufficiently aware of the diverse
follows. expertise to allocate this funding. Without this budget the
UK will not gain the benefit of the existing but widely
· Determine, commission and direct the work dispersed expertise.
required on planning, preparedness, research
and development related to detection and The centre would bring together the existing expertise by
decontamination. working with Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory (dstl), Health Protection Agency, Home Office,
·Assess and disseminate protocols and Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs,
procedures for detection, sampling and Environment Agency, Cabinet Office, Department of
decontamination. Health, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Department
for Transport, the Research Councils, Office of Science
· Evaluate detection and decontamination and Technology, Department of Trade and Industry,
equipment and establish agreed industrial National Health Service, first responders, the academic
standards. community and industry. A panel of expert, independent
scientists should advise the centre, helping to guide the
· Ensure information is shared effectively programmes and provide external scrutiny. The
between different Government Departments membership of such a group could be drawn from
and agencies, the academic community, existing panels, and the Royal Society would be prepared
industry and other interested parties, to suggest potential additional members.
including the public.

The centre should be located to maximise the overlaps · Establish what information on background
with key partners. For example, the centre will need interferences and natural variability of agent
laboratories for handling highly toxic materials and it levels might increase the reliability and
would be preferable for the centre to use existing facilities, sensitivity of different detection systems and
such as Porton Down, rather than construct new ones. decision making. Where appropriate the
The centre should also address the pressing need for relevant data should be collected.
investigation of the ways scientific uncertainties and
technical difficulties impinge on all issues in responding to
a chemical or biological incident, and how they are R6 The work on detection would best be
formalised for rational decision support at all stages. coordinated and directed by the proposed new
Dialogue between scientists, psychologists, politicians centre. If the proposed centre is not established
and the general public should be encouraged to improve then we recommend that an appropriate
the communication and public understanding of hazard Government department such as the Home
and risk issues in relation to terrorist incidents, and any Office CBRN Team take the lead.
insights should be proactively incorporated into decision
support. The efforts of the National Steering Committee Considerable research is being undertaken on fledgling
on Warning and Informing the Public should be utilised in technologies by parts of the academic community that
these challenges. have little or no experience of working on military or
security related projects. It is essential that this research be
R3 We recommend that the next edition of the allowed to develop so that new potential technologies
Cabinet Office document ‘Dealing with can be assessed, particularly in cross-disciplinary areas.
disaster’, which is expected to pay more This should include networking and data fusion activities
attention to dealing with chemical and and instrument development activities focused on solving
biological incidents, clearly spells out the real problems in a real environment.
concepts of use for detection systems, so
equipment and procedures can be designed One of the most urgent needs is for point detectors for
and implemented accordingly. first responders. We recommend that this should be a top
priority of the research and development programme.
In particular, this updated document should cover the Mobile or hand-held instruments for use by first
scope for better coordination of pre-event action plans, responders at the scene of an incident would be
scientific responses at the time of an incident, and timely extremely advantageous. The ideal instrument would be
implementation of scientific advances. remote to avoid contamination of emergency staff.
R4 Realistic exercises should be undertaken Sampling methodologies must be consistent with

involving first responders, emergency planners detection methods and take into account the need for
and some civilians in order to test and develop evidence gathering. The logging and storage of samples
the correct reactions to an incident. must be appropriate for the nature of the agent to be
detected and will require liaison with the testing
In addition to providing a considerable measure of laboratories.
reassurance to the public, such exercises would be an
integral part of staff training and preparedness. The
proposed centre would advise first responders and 8.4 Decontamination
emergency planners in running such exercises.
R7 With respect to decontamination studies, we
recommend the following four priorities:
8.3 Detection
· Undertake a detailed review of the various
R5 We recommend that future work on detection options for the decontamination of people,
systems should be concentrated on three buildings, vehicles and the wider
objectives: environment.
· Exploit new and existing science, engineering · Assess the efficacy of decontamination
and technology for robust detection of procedures and technologies.
chemical and biological agents.
· Assess contact hazards from contaminated
· Develop point detectors for use by first surfaces.
responders at the scene of a suspected
incident. · Develop and implement techniques for
avoiding secondary contamination in
hospitals and ambulances.

R8 We recommend work on decontamination be Evidence based diagnostic techniques and appropriate
coordinated and directed by the new centre, training of medical personnel are important for detecting
working in collaboration with relevant UK chemical or biological exposure. It is also vital to validate
industries where appropriate. If the proposed treatments for the effective consequence management of
centre is not established then we recommend adverse effects on health. The treatment of unusual
that an appropriate Government Department casualties will require special training for initial medical
such as the Home Office CBRN Team take the responders in the community, hospitals and health
lead. protection teams. Increased training should be extended
to undergraduate and postgraduate medical training so
This is an area where collaboration with appropriate UK that all doctors are aware of relevant toxicological and
industries would be extremely beneficial. For example, infectious diseases. This training should be delivered in a
there is considerable expertise amongst detergent systematic approach and available to all institutions
manufacturers. Human surface decontamination is still through electronic as well as traditional teaching methods.
rudimentary: clothes are bagged and plenty of soap and
water applied. More research is needed to determine the There should be improved coordination of national and
best technologies for generic cleansing of skin. local electronic health surveillance systems to detect
clusters of illness/symptoms and unusual diseases.
There needs to be an extensive programme first to bring Surveillance data should be real time and the HPA will
together existing knowledge and second to measure the have a key role in this development. The HPA and the NHS
effectiveness of decontamination formulations against a should utilise medical intelligence as it has the potential to
range of toxic chemical and biological materials. There is a make significant contributions to resilience and the
need for rapid environmental decontamination at the effectiveness of responses. We welcome the
incident site, using generic methods because the identity announcement that the HPA is planning to establish a
of the agent is usually unknown. Robust monitoring medical intelligence unit (Home Office 2004).
methods are also required to determine when the
environment is acceptable for reuse. There are few data on the long-term risks to health in
populations exposed to chemical agents. Agents such as
mustard gas are suspected carcinogens, but the long-
8.5 Medical issues relating to detection and term effects of organophosphates are still unclear.
decontamination Consequently, it will be important that exposed
populations are identified and subjected to close long-
R9 The occurrence of a chemical or biological term clinical follow-up.
incident may first become apparent through
those affected reporting medical symptoms.
Such reporting can therefore play a crucial role 8.6 Mathematical modelling
in the detection and subsequent
decontamination of chemical and biological R11 The proposed new centre should assess the
agents. We therefore recommend: current and future capabilities of mathematical
modelling to provide real-time information to
· Increasing training of clinicians in CBRN- inform first responders and emergency
related subjects by Medical Schools, led by the planners.
General Medical Council, to improve
recognition of the relevant symptoms in The types of models that should be assessed include those
individuals. to determine the extent of the initial contamination and
potential re-dispersion, chemical plume dispersal for a
· Using medical intelligence analysis, in range of built-up and open environments, predict the
conjunction with the Health Protection effectiveness of cleanup strategies and identify the
Agency (HPA) and NHS, to improve recognition potential impact on the civilian population. These models
of a chemical or biological event at the level of need to yield results in as near to real time as possible and
the population and thus strengthen the should be tested against on-the-ground measurement of
resilience and the effectiveness of responses. chemicals and simulates to validate and improve them.
· Establishing systems for the long-term

follow-up of exposed populations, with the
Department of Health.
R10 These recommendations would best be

integrated with the work undertaken by the
proposed new centre.

9 References
Cabinet Office (2003) Dealing with disaster. Revised third House of Commons (2003) The scientific response to
edition. Cabinet Office: London terrorism. Science & Technology select committee Eighth
report of session 2002-03 HC 415. The Stationary Office:
Carlson T M, MacQueen D H & Krauter P W (2001) London
Sampling requirements for chemical and biological agent
decontamination efficacy verification. UCRL-AR-143245. Manchee R J, Broster M G, Anderson I S, Henstridge R M
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: US Department & Melling J (1983) Decontamination of Bacillus anthracis
of Energy on Gruinard Island. Nature 303, 239-240
CDC (2001) Hand-held immunoassays for detection of NRPB (2002) Technical handbook on the national
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Available online at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/
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Committee on Warning and Informing the Public: London
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Review Committee: Washington Royal Society: London
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Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical,
Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or
Material. The Stationary Office: London.
Available online at http://www.ukresilience.info/cbrn/
cbrn_guidance.htm

Annex 1 Working group
The members of the working group involved in producing this report were as follows.
Professor John F Alder Department of Instrumentation & Analytical Science, UMIST
Dr Willy Aspinall Aspinall & Associates
Professor Peter Blain CBE Department of Environmental and Occupational Medicine,

University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Dr Andrew de Mello Zeneca/SmithKline Beecham Centre for Analytical Science,

Department of Chemistry, Imperial College
Professor Herbert Huppert FRS (Chair) Department of Applied Mathematics & Theoretical Physics,
University of Cambridge
Professor Lynn Gladden OBE FREng Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Cambridge
Professor Anne Glover School of Medical Sciences, University of Aberdeen
Professor Alastair Hay OBE Molecular Epidemiology Unit, School of Medicine, University of Leeds
Dr Thomas Inch OBE Chairman, National Advisory Committee to the National Authority for
Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Act
Dr Nigel Lightfoot* Health Protection Agency (from 1 April 2003)
Professor Chris Lowe Institute of Biotechnology, University of Cambridge
Professor Trevor Page School of Chemical Engineering and Advanced Materials,

University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Dr Robert K Thomas FRS Physical and Theoretical Chemistry Laboratory

University of Oxford
Professor James Wilkinson Optoelectronics Research Centre

University of Southampton
* Dr Lightfoot was not involved in finalising the recommendations of this report owing to his appointment during the
study as Director, Emergency Response Division, Health Protection Agency.
Secretariat: Sara Al-Bader, Dr Nick Green1, Kate O’Shea, Dr Rachel Quinn, Matthew Rigby
1
Please address any correspondence to Dr Green

Annex 2 Individuals and organisations giving evidence
We sought evidence from a variety of organisations and individuals, and also received a number of useful unsolicited
contributions. We are very grateful to all who participated.
Evidence submitted at meetings of the working group

Dr Rebecca Bowden, Office of Science and Technology
Adrian Dwyer, British Transport Police
Ian Howell, Unilever Port Sunlight
Martin Jones, Unilever Port Sunlight
Professor Dick Lacey, Police Scientific Development Branch
Dr David Langley, Cabinet Office
Dr Ian Lawston, Home Office
Dr Robert Maynard, Senior Medical Officer, Department of Health
Dr Paul Norman, Chief Scientist, Chemical and Biological Defence, dstl
Dr Dominic Tildesley, Chief Scientist, Unilever Port Sunlight
Graham Turner, Unilever Port Sunlight
Professor Gordon Walker, University of Staffordshire
Meetings with the Chair of the working group

Mark Barker, Assistant Director Civil Protection, Cambridgeshire County Council
Sir David King FRS, Chief Scientific Advisor, Office of Science & Technology
Sir Keith O’Nions FRS, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence
Professor Ron Atlas, University of Louisville
Professor David Fisk FREng, Chief Scientific Advisor, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Meetings with sub-groups of the working group

Professor Rex Britter, University of Cambridge
Sir David Omand, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office
Professor Anatoly Vorobjev, Moscow Sechenov Medical Academy
dstl Porton Down (Dr Andy Bell, Dr Stuart Brewer, Dr Matt Chinn, Dr Norman Govan, Dr Rick Hall, Dr Martin Pearce,
Dr Richard Scott, Dr Brian Warburton)
Dr Gordon Woo, Risk Management Solutions Ltd
Evidence acquired by correspondence
(i) Organisations
Antec International Ltd
Acqua Lider
British Medical Association
British Psychological Society
British Transport Police
Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants Ltd
Casella Stanger on behalf of the London Fire Brigade
Cranfield University
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
Department of Trade & Industry, Foresight Directorate
dstl Fort Halstead
dstl Porton Down
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Health Protection Agency
Home Office
London Ambulance Service NHS Trust
McBride plc
Metropolitan Police, CBRN Co-ordination Unit
Ministry of Defence
National Radiological Protection Board
Office of Science & Technology

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PROTECT Institute, UMIST and University of Manchester
Research Councils UK
Royal Mail
Science Applications International Corporations (SAIC), San Diego
Smiths Detection
Society for General Microbiology on behalf of the Bioscience Federation
Steris Limited
US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command’s Homeland Defence Business Unit
US Department of Homeland Security, Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office
(ii) Individuals
Dr Cam Boulet, Defence R&D Canada
Dr Tina Carlsen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Dr Eric Eisenstadt, US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Defense Science Office
Dr Homme Hellinga, Department of Biochemistry, Duke University Medical Centre
Professor Paul Kaye, Science & Technology Centre, University of Hertfordshire
Dorothea Paterno, US Army
Dr Ellen Raber, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Dr Mark White, Health and Safety Executive
Professor Brendan Wren, Pathogen Molecular Biology Unit, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

Annex 3 Mathematical modelling of chemical and biological
dispersions
A3.1 Introduction developed based on the results of these large
calculations. These simpler models provide data in real
Following a release of a chemical or biological agent time, which has already been usefully incorporated into
those dealing with the incident will want to know how far prediction scenarios and emergency response systems.
and how quickly a contaminant will spread, what its
maximum concentration is and where this will be. The This approach is consistent with requirements identified
agent will be carried by natural winds and other air flows by the Government for computer modelling support in a
such as those generated by traffic, further explosions or civil emergency: planning model should deliver
currents associated with collapsing buildings, as occurred predictions fit for purpose, whilst operational models
on 11 September 2001 in New York. Increasing need to be fast. Operational models need to be able to
urbanisation, concern about sustainability and quality of accommodate observations and additional
life, and desire to increase preparedness for a terrorist measurements in as close to real time as possible. dstl
incident have all contributed to considerable progress in Porton Down has produced a number of models,
mathematical modelling of this area. including the urban dispersion model that has been
developed over a ten year period through funding from
Mathematical models have a number of applications at all MoD. This model has been validated and results from it
stages of an incident. Pre-event modelling can inform have been used operationally on a number of different
strategic planning. During an incident, models are vital for occasions in the last few years.
defining the ‘hot zone’. Post-incident models describing
the distribution of an agent will inform the sampling Very recently, there have been a number of (relatively)
strategy, as raised in chapter 3.4, and determine when it is large field studies undertaken in urban areas, specifically
appropriate to undertake a justified return. with a terrorist incident in mind, in order to compare the
results of the various computational fluid dynamics
calculations and physical models against real
A3.2 Recent modelling work observations. These have taken place in a number of US
and European cities including London; and a large field
Dispersion depends on the meteorological conditions experiment is currently being planned for New York. One
near to the ground and on the details of the terrain, such of the important results from these studies is that the
as whether it is flat, hilly or close to a coast, and the concentration of a contaminant can peak and then begin
arrangement of the buildings at and near the release site. to fall within half an hour, which is typically the minimum
Dispersion depends on the separations between response time for the emergency services. It is also
buildings, and the size of the buildings relative to the important to note two different timescales can operate
spaces (streets) between them. There are a number of for dispersion of an agent: a shorter timescale associated
reviews summarising recent modelling work (Hunt, with its transport outside buildings, and a longer
Carruthers & Daish 2004, Hanna & Britter 2002, Britter & timescale when the agent becomes trapped within a
Hanna 2003). In addition, considerable work has been building and then acts as reservoir for slow release of the
undertaken at dstl Porton Down on the development of contaminant into the open air.
the urban dispersion models.
From the civil decision maker’s perspective, any model
Many research projects have been undertaken to uncover should provide the right level of resolution, and must
the fundamental fluid mechanical and meteorological assist their understanding of the ‘dynamics’ of the total
principles involved. Most of the models have been system, allowing prompt comparison of alternative
compared reasonably successfully to wind tunnel responses, their effectiveness and optimisation. The
experiments and large scale empirical observations. From fundamental need is to use computer modelling to
these models three distinct spatial ranges that must be increase resilience.
carefully considered have been identified: city-wide, local
neighbourhood and smaller street/building scale. Sophisticated numerical modelling often involves
complex computer programs and cannot be properly
This work has led to the development of very large scale used and interpreted without considerable training.
computational fluid dynamics codes that make detailed Without adequate training these models could easily be
predictions over the whole range of scales. Such misinterpreted with dangerous consequences.
calculations provide essential insights for informing the Consequently, they must be managed and run by
judgements needed on how to respond to an incident. In specialists, especially in any critical emergency situation.
practice, such computational fluid dynamics calculations Even simpler dispersion models need to used and
take many hours to complete, and are strongly interpreted with care.
dependent on the details of terrain, building layout and
local meteorology. Simpler and faster models are being

A3.3 Conclusions A3.4 References
Models are required that are as near to real time as Britter R E & Hanna S R (2003) Flow and dispersion in urban
possible, which should be tested against on-the-ground areas. Annual Review of Fluid Mechanics 35, 469-496
measurement of chemicals and simulates to validate and
improve them. Models are needed in following four Hanna S & Britter R E (2002) Wind Flow and Vapor Cloud
areas: Dispersion at Industrial and Urban Sites. American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York USA
· Determining the extent of the initial contamination and
potential re-dispersion. Hunt J C R, Carruthers D J & Daish N C (2004) Dispersion
from Accidental Releases in Urban Areas. Report to the
· Predicting the dispersal of chemical plumes in built-up UK Atmospheric Dispersion Modelling Liaison
and open environments. Committee. Report No. ADMLC/2002/3. Cambridge
Environmental Research Consultants Ltd: Cambridge
· Identifying the effectiveness of alternative cleanup
strategies.
· Assessing the potential impact on the civilian

population.

Annex 4 Scientific uncertainty, scientific advice and decision
support for risk management
Summary A4.2 Scientific uncertainty
In the UK, official documents do not detail the issues and The whole subject of scientific opinion and uncertainty
challenges involved in decision-making in the face of and the relationship to decision-making is very topical,
scientific uncertainty, especially in emergency situations receiving increasing attention in many areas. A recent UK
such the deliberate release of a chemical or biological technical report on climate change (UKCIP 2003) provides
agent. Scientific uncertainty is ubiquitous and unavoidable a wide-ranging and useful review of many of the
in such circumstances, and must be fully and properly approaches, techniques and problems. This review
incorporated into decision support procedures. Enhanced includes the various forms that scientific uncertainty takes
techniques already exist for doing this but these are not and different ways to determine, quantify and express
widely used in governmental settings. scientific uncertainty.
Expert judgement will have to be used in some form as Scientific uncertainty is a complex subject and the
part of the critical decision process in an emergency. For understanding of it is still evolving. Research in the
maximum benefit to the decision-maker, the pooling of cognitive and psychological sciences has shown that
expert scientific opinion should be formalised and individuals are not good estimators of probabilities or
structured, and make use of optimal scoring rule what confidence limits should be attached to uncertain
techniques. data.
Increasing exposure to public accountability and legal The use of science in emergency situations differs from its
ramifications can significantly prevent such advice being more usual role in one crucial respect: in an emergency
given. These factors need to be considered when scientists might have to make immediate
obtaining unbiased and high quality advice when setting recommendations that affect public safety. The traditional
up a decision support framework for responding to scientific approach involves making observations,
chemical or biological incidents. conducting experiments, and developing explanatory
models. Consequently, the usual response to significant
scientific uncertainty is to undertake further research to
A4.1 Background reduce it. Progress is dependent on many factors and
often takes a considerable amount of time. This means
The Royal Society initiated public discussion of many scientists might be viewed as being ill-equipped to deal
issues connected with risk in the 1980s and continued in with urgent crisis situations, especially when these have a
the 1990s (Royal Society 1981 & 1992). A number of very strong political component.
important discussion documents and position papers on
the technical and scientific aspects of risk assessment and The available scientific data for responding to a crisis will
management have emerged from the Government and inevitably be incomplete, insufficient and uncertain. For
its agencies in the last ten years. decision support it is vital that the available information
can be used most logically and effectively for assessing
These documents do not detail the issues and challenges and stating hazard or risk levels. The application of certain
involved in decision-making in the face of scientific elementary principles for the rational treatment of
uncertainty, especially in an urgent emergency situation. uncertainty helps, especially where responsibility for
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is virtually nothing about advice might rest mainly on the subjective judgment of a
these concerns when dealing with a terrorist chemical or few scientists, or even with a single scientist. The basic
biological attack. Indeed, this particular aspect of the principles are common to decision-making in many key
decision-making problem is apparently absent from walks of life, including the law and medicine. Evidence
international academic and technical literature, even based medicine (eg Sackett et al 2000) is a recent concept
though structures, pathways and flowcharts identifying for the formalised integration of best research evidence
the key decisions involved at different stages have been with clinical expertise and patient values in medical
proposed. practice. Similar principles apply to the use of forensic
science in the courtroom (eg Robertson & Vignaux 1995),
The Government has dealt with public safety, risk and risk although there have been difficulties in using this
management, both generally (HM Treasury 1996 & 2002; approach in the UK (Balding 1996). The principles are
HSE 1999) and in relation to the specific issues of nuclear logical rather than mathematical and should be accessible
power stations (HSE 1988), bovine spongiform to the whole spectrum of scientific expertise. The basic
encephalopathy (Phillips 2000), and foot and mouth principles involved are in an emerging speciality with the
(Anderson 2002). These led to the guidelines provided by over-arching title of evidence science (Aitken 1995;
the Office of Science and Technology (OST 2001) for Jeffreys 1961).
scientific advisory committees.

There are many sources of information available on the conducted under committee rules.
subject of scientific uncertainty, the ways it can be
handled in different circumstances, and the myriad issues An alternative formulation to decision-conferencing for a
to confront. Best practice is a product of supporting any group of experts is to use a procedure based on
critical assessment process that is used in response to that mathematical scoring rules, to arrive at what can be
threat. Exploring and adopting the best available described as a ‘rational consensus’, where account is
techniques for appraising uncertain scientific evidence taken of the fact that not all experts are equally well-
should be a priority for decision support in this context. informed or informative in their judgements. A
methodology has been developed for doing this
numerically (Cooke 1991), which represents a significant
A4.3 Scientific advice as a component of improvement on previous opinion pooling schemes.
decision-making
Cooke (1991) has laid down five central principles as
The assessment of risks in ‘low-probability/high- essential for sanctioning the use of this expert judgement
consequence’ events is a decision-making process that scheme in quantitative risk analysis and related decision-
will inevitably involve expert judgement. The relative making. These principles echo the basic tenets of the
importance of expert judgement, compared with expert scientific method, and can be summarised as follows:
knowledge based on hard data, would vary from case to
case, according to the quality and quantity of the (1) Reproducibility. The scientific basis for the analysis
available information. In situations where there will must be fully specified and the input data and other
always be numerous uncertainties, it is particularly information used must be made explicit for scientific
important to formalise the use of expert judgement to the peers to review and reproduce.
maximum possible extent.
(2) Accountability. The source of an expert opinion must
As in early studies of the formalised use of expert be ultimately identifiable, if required. Accountability
judgement (eg in earthquake studies in the eastern US), implies that every subjective probability or statement of
judgements might be combined analytically through the belief can be traced through documentation back to the
practice of weighting the probability distributions individual supplying it.
assigned by individual experts. A number of algorithms
exist for combining such judgements (varying from simple (3) Neutrality. The method for evaluating expert opinions
averaging, through self-weighting, to scoring experts should encourage experts to state their true opinions.
according to performance on test calibration questions).
Alternatively, collective judgements might be formed into (4) Fairness. All experts are treated equally at the outset,
a consensus through discussion. It is this latter, decision- with analysis of specific technical expertise providing the
conferencing, approach (informed, where appropriate, by rational basis for preferring one opinion above another.
other studies) that has generally been adopted in
traditional government for resolving questions on (5) Empirical control. Wherever possible, a methodology
scientific issues where decisions have to be made in the for using expert opinion must incorporate some form of
face of uncertainty. empirical control, to permit evaluation of performance on
the basis of known or possible observations. Without
Where a broad spread of expertise in synergistic such empirical control, it might be argued that one
disciplines is involved, the decision-conferencing subjective probability is as good as another.
approach to the use of expert judgement provides one
framework to tackle complex issues in a comprehensive Neutrality might appear trite, but is of paramount
and coherent manner. Individual specialists interrogated importance for deriving the best possible scientific advice
singly might find difficulty, if not reluctance, in expressing in the face of uncertainty, and is one that is commonly
informed judgement on technical issues in different fields violated in practical risk assessment applications. It is well
of scientific endeavour, even if all are relevant to the known that group biases, peer pressure or media
subject at issue. Effectively, the adoption of the decision- exposure can exert significant influences on the way
conferencing approach is an expression of support for the many people express their views in public, on committees
principle of collective expert judgement; the benefits of or in other open fora, and that their true opinions might
this approach might be manifest in narrower confidence be moderated or compromised in consequence. These
limits on scientific estimates than would be obtained by influences can be minimised by sharing all sources of
approaches which assign equal (‘democratic’) weight to information and data amongst the group, and then
the opinions of individuals, irrespective of the scientific obtaining the views of each individual expert privately by
worth and validity of their opinions. The main drawback an independent facilitator.
to the decision-conferencing approach is one that is
recognisable with committees of all kinds: the potential The outcome of this fully-structured approach is a rational
for one or more individual members to manipulate the combination of the collective views of the group by
agenda, discussion or outcome of deliberations weighted pooling, the results provided being sometimes

referred to as those of a ‘synthetic decision-maker’. Anderson I (2002) FMD 2001: Lessons to be Learned. The
(As such, these rarely reproduce the exact view of any Stationary Office: London
individual contributor.)
Balding D (1996) DNA profiles and the courts. Royal
Extensive quantitative empirical trials with many differing Statistical Society News 24, 1-2
sets of experts in many fields have found that a group
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Making the UK safer:

detecting and decontaminating

Policy document 06/04

ISBN 0 85403 598 2

This report can be found

© The Royal Society 2004.

ii | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

2 Priorities, concepts of use and implementation of detection systems 7

3 Issues relating to sampling 13

4 Current capabilities and future needs of detection 17

5 How science, engineering and technology can assist in decontamination 23

6 Decontamination and return: communication issues and scientific decision support 29

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | iii

8 Main conclusions and recommendations 39

Annex 1 Working group 45

Annex 2 Individuals and organisations giving evidence 46

Annex 3 Mathematical modelling of chemical and biological dispersions 48

iv | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 1

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1.3 Types and properties of possible agents

Table 1 Range and examples of chemical and biological agents

Biological agents Naturally occurring toxins Synthetic chemicals

Table 2 Physical form of examples of chemical and biological agents

Physical form at room Example agent Comments

4 | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

Materials can be inhaled, absorbed through the skin or

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 5

Summary 2.2 Activities and decision-making at different

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 7

Pre-event Event Post-event

Train operators to use detection

Validate sampling procedures.

Decontamination Train first responders. Decontaminate people. Decontaminate buildings

Medical issues Establish a medical intelligence Decontaminate people on Implement medical

8 | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer

Once the identity of the agent is known and its release

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· Inexpensive instruments and disposables

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Summary When an incident occurs the primary objective of the

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The most likely routes for contamination for each

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Summary spectrometry systems, including matrix-assisted laser

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 17

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5.2 Personal decontamination

Making the UK safer The Royal Society | April 2004 | 23

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