. 5-_.

··
.-.r

Categorical Propositions
Likt Molierr'5M J L• IWIKt I
{Ol4
4 tit · owrdaiN who fouHd that ht had loHg bttH SP"'"'"' r···1

" . .at 1 ht,d loHg bttH {onttiHg p,opositioHs. I satd to flfystlf, ''Yes, I for,,,
p,oposittoHs whe" "'Y toHgut does Hrort thaH wag. I fonH thtlH out 01ttnHS, I
~ -so_,,.ttltiHg about SOHrtthiHg. Thtrtfort I ought to bt ablt, tH strlous talk, to
:,t;""t those of "'Y p,opositioH. I ought to kHow exactly what I alH
two l'Qrts
Hg "bout, """ exaaly·wlNt I 4Hf .sayiHg about it."
-AAL1JCE

♦ 5.1 Categorical PropositioHs aHd.Classes

The preceding chapters have dealt, for the most part, with the topic _of
language and its influence_on argumentation. We turn now to that special
kind of argument called "deduction." A deductive argument is one whose
premisses are claimed to provide conclusive grounds for the truth of its
conclus1on. Every deductive argument is either valid or invalid: valid if it is
impossible for its premisses to be true without its conclusion being true
also, and invalid otherwise. The theory of deduction is intended to explain
the relationship between premisses and conclusion of a v·alid argument and
to provide techniques for the appraisal of deductive arguments, that is, for
discriminating between valid and invalid deductions.
Informal fallacies were discussed at length in Chapter 3. But even where
no informal fallacy is involved, a deductive argument may be invalid rather
than valid, so further techniques for appraising such arguments must be
devised. The classical or Aristotelian 1 study of deduction focused on

15o called after Aristotle (384-322 s.c.), one of the greatest philosophers of ancient Greece Aft l
studying for twenty years in Plato's Academy, he became tutor to Alexander the Great. later he founded i:
own school, the Lyc.eum, w~ere he contributed to nearly every field of human knowledge. After Aristotle's
death, his trea~ on rusonmg we~e grou~ together and came to be called the O,~anon. The word "logic"
.I
did not acquire Ltl modern meanmg until the second century A.o., but the sub1ect matter of logic was
determined by the content of tht Organon.

206
5.1
Gatqorb l Pn,posfrio,u a,cJ C1"SstS 207
argume nts contain ing only •. f . , .
Proposi tions,, ·h propos
· 1n t e argument
inons o a speaal kmd, called "categorical

No athletes arc vegetarians.

All football players arc athletes.
Therefo re no football players are vegetarians.
~ : _pre.misses and the conclusion are categorical propositions. Propositions
0
_ts ~~ can be analyzed as being about classes affirming or denying that
a class S. 1s
melu d ed m
· a class P, · - .- · -
either m whole or ~m-- part. The
premisses and
conclus10n of the preceding argument are about the class of all athletes the
class of all vegetarians, and the class of all football players. '
Classe~ were mentioned briefly in the preceding chapter, where a class
was expl~1~ed_to be the collection of all objects that have some seecified
charac tensttc m common. There are various ways in which classes may be
related to each other. If every member of one class is also a member of a
second class, then the first class is said to be included or contained in the
second. If some but perhaps not all members of one class are also members of
anothe r, then the first class may be said to be partially contained in the second
class. Of course, there are pairs of classes having no members in common,
such as the class of all triangles and the class of all circles. These various
relationships between classes are affirmed or denied by categorical proposi-
tions.
There are just four different standard forms of categorical propositions.
They are illustrated by the four following propositions:

1. All politicians are liars.

2. No politicians are liars.
3. Some politicians are liars.
4. Some politicians are not liars.
The first is a universal affirmative proposition. It is about two classes, the class
of all politicians and the class of _all liars, sayin~ that the fi~~t class is included
or contain ed in the second. A universal affirmative propos1t1on says that every
member of the first class is als~ ~ ~m:,ber ~f the second class. In the -~r~t
example, the subject term "polit1c1_ans designates the cla~s of all poh~aa ns,
and the predicate term "liars" dest~a tes the cl~ss. of all hars. Any uruversal
affirmative proposition may be wntten schematically as
All Sis P.
where the letters S and . P represent the subject and predicate terms,
respectively. The name "universal affirmative" is appropriate because the
proposition affirms that the relationship of class inclusion holds between the
two classes and says that the inclusion is complete or universal: All members
of S are said to be members of P also.
208
~du ctio H
Clt.apra 5 C.irtgorlcal ProposirioHs
The sec ond exa mp le

No politicians arc liars.

is a uni ver sal neg ativ e pro pos itio n.
th ey are liar s. Con It denies of poli ticia ns univ ersa lly _t~at
cer ned wit h two classes a universal neg
say s tha t the first class is who lly exc lud ative pro po5 it,o n
th at the re is no ei from the second, whi ch is to say
mem ber of the first class that is also a
An y uni ver sal neg ativ e pro pos itio n mem ber of the seco nd ·
may be wri tten schematically ~s
No Sis P
wh ere , aga in, the lett ers S and P repr
esen t the subject and pred icat e term s.
Th e nam e "un ive rsal neg ativ e" is app
rop riat e because the pro pos itio n denies
tha t the rela tion of clas s incl usio n hold
s betw een the two cla sse s-a nd den ies
it uni ver sall y.: No mem ber s at all of
Sar e mem bers of P.
The thir d exa mpl e

Som e politicians are liars.

is a par ticu lar affi rma tive pro pos itio
n. Clearly, wha t the pres ent exa mpl e
affir_ms is tha t som e mem bers of the clas
s of all politicians are (also) mem ber s
of the clas s of all liar s. But it does not
affirm this of politicians univ ersa lly:
No t all pol itic ians univ ersa lly, but,
rath er, some part icul ar poli tici an or
pol itic ian s, are said to be liars. Thi s
pro pos itio n neither affirms nor den ies
tha t all pol itic ians are liar s; it mak es no
pro nou nce men t on the mat ter. It doe s
not lite rall y say tha t som e poli ticia ns
are not liars, alth oug h in som e con text s
it mig ht be tak en to sug gest it. The
literal, minimal inte rpre tati on of the
pre sen t pro pos itio n is tha t th~ class of
politicians and the class of liar s hav e
som e mem ber or ~em ber s m com
mon . For definiteness, we ado pt tha t
min ima l inte rpre tan on here .
The wo rd "so me " is indefinite. Does
,, "> h it mean .. at least one " or " t l
.
tw o , ,, or "at leas t a h un d re d . 0 r ow many? For the sake , a eas t
· ·
ltho ugh this pos itio d f d. of defi ·t
a - n may epa n rom or mary usage in som e c m ene ss,
cus tom ary to rega~ d t h e wo~d. " som ,, . . .
ases, it 1s
par ticu lar affi rma tive pro pos mon , wnt : as mea nmg "at leas t one ." Thu s a
ten schematically as
Some Sis P.
s tha t at least one mem ber o( the class designated by the s~b ·e
say mem ber of the class designated by .
also a · the predicate t pl ct term S ts
" · ·
••p· arti cul ar a ffirm ativ e . is lap~rophnate b enn • The n
t' ecause the prop osit ion au:. . ahme
ons hip of clas s me us1on olds
t h <: re 1a \1y b ut o nly partially, of som , but does not affi . f ,,,n ns t at
u n 1ve rsa , e part icul ar mcmb rm it o .the first clas s
clas s. er or mem bers of the
6 rs t 11, e fou rth exa mple
Som e politicia ns are not liars .
5. I
J
Cattgorical Propositloics aHd ClasSlS

is a particular negat~~e .propo~ition. This example, like the one preceding it,
does not refer .t~ pohti~ians universally but only to some member or members
of that class;.1t ts particular. But unlike the third example, it does not affirm
that the particular members of the first class referted to are included in the
second class; this is precisely what is denied. A particular negative
proposition, schematically written as
Some S is not P.
says that at least one member of the class designated by the subject term S is
excluded from the whole of the class designated by the predicate term P.
Not all standard-form categorical propositions are as simple and
straightforward as the four examples just considered. The subject and
predicate terms of a standard-form categorical proposition always designate
classes, but those terms may be complicated expressions instead of single
words. For example, the proposition "All candidates for the position are
persons of honor and integrity" has the phrase "candidates for the position"
as its subject term and the phrase " persons of honor and integrity" as its
predicate term.
It was traditionally held that all deductive arguments were analyzable in
terms of classes, categories, and their relations. Thus the four standard-form
categorical propositions just explained:

universal affirmative propositions (called A propositions)

universal negative propositions (called E propositions)
particular affirmative propositions (called I propositions)
particular negative propositions (called O propositions)

were thought to be·the building blocks of all deducti~e arguments._A great

deal of logical theory-as we shall see-has been built up concerning these
four kinds of propositions.

EXERCISES
Identify the subject and predicate terms and name the form of each of the
tollowing propositions.
* t. Some historians are extremely gifted writers whose works read li ke
first-rate novels.
2. No athletes who have ev~r accepted pay for participating in sports
are amateurs.
3. No dogs that are without pedigrees are candidates fo r blue ri~bons
in official dog shows sponsored by the American Kennel Society .
 DtductfoH s
2 10 Chapter 5 Categorical ProposltioH
. .
4· Al l sateUites th t · . ten thousan d mi les
a are cu rre ntl y m or bit s Jess than
h1•gh · ny thousands of dollars to
de lic ate de vic es tha t co st ma
afre very
manu acture.
* 5. Sof me members Offam1Ties that are rich and famous are no t persons
. h
0
eit er wealth or distinction.
nized
6 pa int ing s pr od uc ed by art ists who are universally recog
· Some ve
ste rs are no t wo rks of ge nu ine merit that either are or deser
as ma
es erv ed in mu seu ms an d ma de available to the public.
to be pr
eradoes who
7. AJI drivers of automobiles that are not safe are desp
lows.
threaten the Jives of their fel
cians wh o co uld no t be elected to the most minor
S. Some politi
als in our government today.
positions are appointed offici are
dr ug s th at are ve ry effec tiv e when properly administered
9. Some cabinets should contain.
e rem ed ies th at all me dic ine
not saf
ve no t the ms elv es do ne cre ative work in the arts
•10. No people who ha
res po ns ible cri tics on wh ose judgment we can rely.
are

1d DistributioH
♦ 5.2 Quality, QuaHtity, a1 ----------
is said to have a quality,
A. QUAL ITY
ca teg ori ca l pr op os iti on
Every standard-form os ition aff irm s some dass inclusion,
If the pr op
affirmative or negative. ty is affirm ative. Thus both universal
al, its qu ali
whether complete or parti lar aff irm ati ve propositions are affirma-
an d pa rti cu
affirmative propositions s, A an d I, respectively, are thought to
Jet ter na me
tive in quality, and their " meaning "I affirm." .If the pr
oposition
the La tin wo rd, "A ffl rm o,
come from gative.
inclusion , wh eth er co mp let e or partial, its quality is ne
denies dass oposi-
iversa l ne ga tiv e pr op os iti on s and particular negative pr
Thus both un ter na mes, E and 0, respectively, ar
e
in qu ality, an d the ir Jet
tions are negative "n Eg O, " meaning "I deny."
m the La tin wo rd
thought to come fro

B. QUANTITY
o
is said to have a quantity als
Every standard-fo rm ~t
lar.
eg
If
or
the
ica
pr
l pr
op
op
os
os
iti
iti
on
on
refers to aJJ members of the clas;
universal or particu ty is un iversal. Thus the A ·and E
e
r. rm , its _q ua nti
design~t~d by its s~ ec t If the pr op osition refers to only some
m qu an tity.
propos1t1ons are umversal
 -
.S.2
Qulity, Qu,crity, ,Mi DimihNtio,, 211
I

~anbe n of the class dcsi~ tcd by its subject term, its quantity is particular.
us the I and O proposmons ~cc particular in quantity.
Every standard -form categorical proposition bPains with one of the words
"all n
"All" " " ,l .. -t,"
no," 0 ~, _so~c.,, These words show the quantity of the proposition.
and no. indicate that the proposition is universal; "some" indicates
!1' ! 3
the quannt y is particular. The quantifier "no" serves additionally to
indicat e the negative quality of the E proposition.
" We . observ
I e that the names "universal affirmative" "unive nal negativ e"
, ,
parncu ar affirmative," and "particular negative" uniquel y describe each of
the four standa rd forms by mentioning first its quantity and then its quality.
c. GENERAL SCHEMA OF STANDARD-mRM CATEGORICAL PRorosmoNS
Between the subject and predicate terms of every standard-form categorical
propos ition occurs some form of the verb "to be" (accompanied by the word
"not" in the case of the O proposition). This verb serves to connect the subject
and predica te terms and is called the "copula." In the schematic formulations
given i.n the preceding section, only "is" and "is not" appear, but depending
on how the proposition is worded otherwise, some other form of the verb "to
be" may be more appropriate. · For example, in the following three
propos itions
Some Roman emperors were monsters.
All squares are rectangles.
Some soldiers will not be heroes.
"were, " "arc," and "will not be" serve as copulas. The general skeleton or
schema of a stand;ird-form categorical proposition consists of four parts: first
the quantifier, then the subject term, next the copula, and finally the predicate
term. This schema may be written as ·
Quantif ier (subject term) copula (predicate term).

D. DISTIUBUTION
On the class interpretation, the subject and predicate tenns of a standard-
form categorical proposition designate classes of objects, and the proposition
is regarded as being about these classes. Propositions may refer to classes in
different ways, of course. A proposition may refer to all members of a clan,
or it may refer to only some members of that class. Thus the proposition
All senators arc citizens.
refers to or is about all senators but does not refer to all citizens. It asserts that
each and every member of the class of senators is a citizen, but it makes no
assertion about all citizens. It does not affirm that each and every citizen is a
senato r, but it does not deny it either. Any A proposition, of this form,
All Sis P.
 ..mitiOHS
Categorical Pro,,-- '
212 " -.J Chapter 5
~~ ro
. d by its subject t~r '
is thus seen to refer to all members of the class deSign~te ted by its predicate
S, hut does not refer to all members of the class deSigna
term, P. h a·cterize the w~ys
The technical term "distribution" is introduc~d toAc aroposition distnb-
.m w h"1ch terms can occur in categonca · l propoSl·t10ns.· prd by the tertl1• Let
utes a term if it refers to all members of the class designa~c. to see which
us examine each of the standard-form categorical propoSittons,
terms are distributed or undistributed in them. . the example
First, consider the A. Proposition. As we noted above, ~~mg . distributed
15
"All senators are citizens," the subject term of an A propoSlt~n sition is
in (or by) that proposition. But the predicate term of an propo
undistributed in (or by) it.
Next consider the E proposition. An E proposition such as
No athletes are vegetarians.
asserts of each and every athlete that he or she is not a vegetarian. ~e wh~le
of the class of athletes is said to be excluded from the class of vegetanans. All
members of the class designated by its subject term are referred to by an E
proposition, which is therefore said to distribute its subject term. At the same
time, in asserting that the whole class of athletes is excluded from the class of
vegetarians, it is also asserted that the whole class of vegetarians is excluded
from the class of athletes. The given proposition clearly asserts of each and
every vegetarian that he or she is not an athlete. An E proposition therefore
refer~ t~ all m~mbers ~f the class d~signated by it_s _predicate term 'and is .said
to distribute 1ts predicate term a,so. E propostttons distribute b o th th ezr •
. pred.tcate terms.
subject an d t hetr
The situation is different with respect to I propositions. Thus
Some soldiers are cowards.
makes no assertion about all soldiers and makes nO . .
cowards e1t· h er. It says not h.mg a bout each and every ldiassertton a bout all
and every coward. Neither class is said to be either whs~l ~r, nor about each
excluded fr~m the other. ~oth subject and predicate t: Y included or wholly
in any partic_ular affirm~t,ve proposition. nns are undistributed
The particular negative or O proposition is · . .
1
distribute its subject term. Thus the propositiostnu ar tn that it,' too d
n , oes not
Some horses are not thoro ghb
u reds
s nothing about all horses but refers t ·
s ay h b. o some
d signated by t e su 1ect term. It says of this rnernbcrs f
. e_s excluded from the class of all thoroughbpardt of the class of lol h the class
it J l G. h . l re s th . . a or
h latter c ass. 1ven t e part1cu ar horse f , at 1s, frorn h ses that
t e member of the class of thoroughb sdre ~rred to, it sa t e ivho/e f
every h. . .d re s 15 n Ys tha o
When so met mg 1s sa1 to be ex cIu d ed frorn ot one of h t each d
ho rses. l t ose . an
a c ass, th~ vv Particula r
hole o f the
 5.2 2 13
Quality, QuiHtity, aHd DlsrributioH

class is referred to, as when a person is excluded from a country, all parts of
that country are forbidden to that person. The particular negative proposition
does distribute its predicate term, but not its subject term.
We may summarize these remarks on distribution as follows. Universal
propositions, both affirmative and negative, distribute their subject terms,
whereas particular propositions, whether affirmative or negative, do not
distribute their subject terms. Thus the quantity of any standard-f orm
categorical proposition deterrqines whether its subject term is distributed or
undistributed. Affirmative propositions, whether universal or particular, do
not distribute their predicate terms, whereas negative propositions, both
universal and particular, do distribute their predicate terms. Thus the quality
of any standard-form categorical proposition determines whether its predi-
cate term is distributed or undistributed.
The following diagram summarizes this information and may be useful in
helping the student to remember which propositions distribute which of their
~ terms.

subject term distributed

~

predicate A : All S is P. £ : No S is P. predicate

term term
}
undistribute d distributed
/ : Some S is P. 0 : Some Sis not P.
. "
subject term undistributed

EXERCISES
Name the quality and quantity of each of the following propositions, and
state whether their subject and predicate terms are distributed or undistrib-
uted.
* 1. Some presidential candidates will 'be sadly disappointed people.
2. All those who died in Nazi concentration camps were victims of a
cruel and irrational tyranny.
3. Some recently identified unstable elements were not entirely
accidental discoveries.
l• 4. Some members of the military-industrial complex are mild-man-
nered people to whom violence is abhorrent .
\ * 5. No leader of the feminist movement is a major business executive.
l
 • c,iCAI J>rcpOSitiOJfS
Chapter 5 C11ttf
114 Dtductio1t people who
I d order at any cost are derstand
6. All hard-line advocates of aw an f having failed to un

✓]
will be remembered, if at all, onlr orrwentieth century. .
the major social pressures of the ate litically mott-
Court were po • I al
7. Some recent rulings of the Suhpremet. e history of American eg
vated decisions that flouted t e en tr
practice. enuine contri-
.. h . . I defoliants were g
8. No harmful pesticides or c emica
butions to the long-range agricultura 1goa s
1 O f the nation.
. f
.. . I and economic re orms
9. Some advocates of major pohttcal, socia' k 1•n maintaining the
are not responsible people who have a st a e
status quo. .
. . . h ts to the trade unaon
•10. All new labor-savmg devices are ma1or t rea
movement.

♦ 5.3 The TraditioHal Square of OppositioH

\Standard-form categorical proposition$ having the same subject and predicate
terms may differ from each other in quality or in quantity or in both. This
kind of differing was given the technical name "opposition" k: 7 oha.:
Jogiciaos...,and certain important truth · relations were correlated with the
various kinds of opposition.

A. CONTRADICTORIES

Two propositions are contradi,ctories if one is the denial or negati00 f th

other, that is, if they cannot bdth be_true and they cannot both b £
· I e a1se. It
°·
_e
1s
clear that two stan dard-form categonca propositions havin the s , .
and predicate terms but differing from each other b th . g ai:ne subJect
quality are contradictories. Thus the A and O pro ~ . m quantity and in
pos1t1ons
(All judges are lawyers. ·
and
Some judges are not law ~
yer<
which are opposed both in quantity and · .
. I .
tones. Exact y one 1s true, and exact! in qua 1tty
·. , are o bviously .
propositions
,
y one is false . Similarly hcontradic-
t e E and I

and E politicians are id 1· ~ -

ea 1sts,
5.3 Tltt Tr,ditioHal Squart of OppositioH 21S

Some politicians are idealists.

arc opposed in both quantity and quality and are contradictories. Schemati-
cally we may say that the contradic tory of "All S is P" is "Some S is not
P," and the contradic tory of ~o, S is P" is "Some S is P"; A and O are
contradic tories, as are E and I. j

B. CONTRARIES
frwo propositions are said to be contraries if they cann~_both be true, that is,
'if the truth of either one entails that the other i,s false~Thus "AJi~e is older
than Betty" and "Betty is older than Alice" are contraries: If either one is true
then the other must be false. But they are not contrad~ ories: Both would be
false if Alice and Betty were exactly the same age,\.,!wo propositions are
contraries if they cannot both be true, although they may both be false. The
traditiona l or Aristotelian account of categorical propositions held that
universal propositions having the same subject and predicate terms but

e . .
differing in quality were contraries. 2 Thus, it was urged, A and E propt>sitions

~ t s are idlers.

No poets are idle1

cannot both be true, although both may be false and are therefore to be
regarded as contraries.-
This claim that A and E propositions are contraries is not correct if either
the A or the E proposition is a necessar y-that is, a logical or mathemati-
cal-trut h, such as "AH squares are rectangles" or "No squares ate circles."
For if a proposition is necessarily true-tha t is, cannot possibly be false-it
cannot have a contrary, because propositions that are contraries can both be
false. A proposition that is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false is said
to be contingent. The claim that A and E propositions having the same subject
and predicate terms are contraries may be correct if both are contingent
propositions, and we shall assume that they are in the remainder of this
chapter. 3

C. SUBCONTRARIES

Two propositions arc said to be subcontraries if they cannot both be false,

although they may both be true. The traditional account held that particular

1 This traditional view will be examined critically in Section 5 .5.

3That the complications in this account arc required has been cogently argued by David H. Sanford in
his article «c ontraries and Subcontraries," in NOUS 2 (February 1968): 95 -96.
 - ------~
Chapter 5 Caregorlcal ProposlrioHs
216 Dedu ctioH
.. in the sam e sub jec t and pre dic ate
prop_osmons habv g term s but dif fer ing in
.
quality were su con tran es. It wa s affi rme d tha t I and O pro pos itio ns suc h as
Some diamonds are precious stones. I
I
and /
(
I
Some diamonds are not precious stones.
could bot h be true but could not bot h
be false and mu st the ref ore be reg ard
as subcontraries. ed
Thi s claim tha t I and O pro pos itio ns
are sub con trar ies is not cor rec t if
, either the I or the O pro pos itio n
is necessarily false, for exa mp le, "So
squares are circles" or "So me squares are me
not rec tan gle s." For if a pro pos itio n
is necessarily fal se- tha t is, can not
possibly be tru e-i t can not hav e
subcontrary, because propositions tha a
t are sub con trar ies can bot h be tru e.
However, if bot h the I and Oa re conting
ent pro pos itio ns, the n the y can bot h
be true, and, as noted in the pre ced
ing discussion of con trar ies, we sha
assume tha t they are contingent in the ll
remainder of this cha pte r.

D. SUBALTER N ATIO N

Where two propositions have the sam

e subject and the sam e pre dic ate term
and agree in quality (i.e., are bot h affi s,
rmative, or are bot h negative) but diff
only in quantity (i.e., one is universal er
while
called "corresponding propositions." Thu s the oth er is par ticu lar) they are
I the A pro pos itio n
All spiders are eight-legged animals.
has a corresponding I proposition

Some spiders are eight-legged.

and the E proposition

No whales are fishes.

has a corresponding O proposition

Some whales are not fishes.

Thu s far, the examples of opposition
disagreement . But " oppos1.t1on . ,, . h between propositions have
m t e present context is a technical sug geste d
· h d'
applies even w ere 1sagreement m · t he d" t d
. .. or mar y sen se is not pre se t erm an
· case O f · correspon dmg proposmo h
ns, w ere no d_1. ~agreement betwee n. In t h e
and the I, or between the E and the n the A
O proposmons was implied h
opp osi tion nevertheIess, but o f a spec . 1 k. d
1a m . The opp osit , t ere 1.s
. .
universal propo~ltton an d.ns cdo~resp d' . l ion het w
on t~g-part1~u ar is nam een a
. ,, ln any pai r of cor resp on mg pro pos ed "su halterna-
uon. .. . ll d h " itions, hke the two pairs i· ust b
the uni•ver sal proposmo ,, n 1s ca e t e sup era 1 ,,
tern , and the par t· a ove. ,
call ed the "subaltern . · 1cu1ar 1s
)
5.3 The TraditioHal $quart of OpposittoH
217

rn implies the
In suba ltern ation , it was traditionally held, the supe ralte
ersal affirmative "All
truth of the suba ltern . Thu s, for example, from the univ
mative, "Som e birds
bird s have feath ers," the corresponding parti cula r affir
ersal negative "No
have feath ers," was held to follow; and from the univ
"Som e whales are
wh~les -are fishes," the corresponding parti cula r negative,
does not hold from
not fishes," was held to follow. But the implication
prop ositi on "Som e
suba ltern to superaltern. From the parti cula r affirmative
als are cats ." And
anim als are cats ,'' we certainly may not infer that "All anim
e animals are not
likewise, from the parti cula r negative proposition "Som
cats ," we certainly may not infer that no anima!s are cats.

E. TH£ SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

ed"- as contradicto-
Thes e four ways in which propositions may be "op pos
supe ralte rns- are
ries, as contraries, as subcontraries, and as sub- and
d the "Square of
represented by an impo rtant and widely used diagram, calle
Opp ositi on," which is reproduced as Figure 1.

!;~;.!:::.~
- j

;~~~.: :.~ 1 ~c contrar;es/

·;:; 0~ . e.,'> ·;:;

""F ~~O' o"-"
. c,-.:
"'
E
E ~- ~
......~ "0 -
-
i 0~ "o?.. i

subaltern i/ c •,

(Some Si~ P.)~ 1 - - - - subcontraries - - 0 (Some

~ r,
S is not P.)
su~lt em

Figure 1

were believed
The relationships diagrammed by this Square of Opposition
forms of argument.
to provide a logical basis for validating certain elementary
een mediate and
In this connection it is customary to distinguish betw
imm edia te inference. Any inference is the drawing of a
conclusion from one
involved, as in a
or more premisses. Where there is more than one premiss
is said to be mediate,
syllogism, which has two premisses, the inference
n from the first
presumably because the conclusion is supposed to be' draw
lusion is drawn
premiss through the mediation of the second. Where a conc
the inference is said .
from only one premiss, there is no such mediation, and
to be immedia t_e. The information embodied in the
traditional Squa re of
ediate inferences.
Opposition clearly provides a basis for a number of imm
to the Squa re of
Thus if an A proposition is taken as prem iss, then according
prop ositio n (i.e. ,
Opposition, one can validly infer that the correspondi ng O
terms as the A ) is
the O prop osition having the same subject and pred icate
118 DtductioH Chapter 5 Categorical Propositions

false . And from the . same premiss one can 1mm . di l infer that the
e ate Y h of an I
corr espo ndin g I prop ositi on is true . Of cour se, _£~om th
e trutf II but
prop ositi on, the truth of its corr espo ndin g A propos1tton
the false hood of its cont radi ctor y E prop ositi on does .
00 0
does . ~ i°;''
The trad itio~ a ci;a r
e
of Opp ositi on prov ides the basis for a considerable num
ber of such imm e iate
inferences. Give n the truth or·falsehood of any one of the
four stan dard -for m
cate gori cal prop ositi ons, the truth or falsehood of som
e or all of the othe rs
can be infe rred immediately. The immediate infer
ences base d on the
trad ition al Squa re of Opp ositi on may be listed as follo
ws :

A bein g\giv en as true : E is false I is true O is false .

E bein g given as true ! A is false,' I is false', 0 is true .
I oein g given as true : E is false, while A and O are unde term
ined .
0 bein g give n as t~ue : A is false, while "f. and I are unde
termined.
A_bein g ~iven as false : 0 is.true, while E and I are unde
termined.
E"be ing give n as false : I is true, while A and O are unde
termined .
I_being given as false : A is false, E is true, 0 .is true .
0 being given as false : A is true, E is false, I is true .

EXERCISES

Wha t can be infe rred abou t the truth or falsehood

of the remammg -
prop ositi ons in each of the follo wing sets (1) if we assu
me the first to be true?
(2) If we assu me it to be false ?
* 1. c!· All successful executive s are intelligent people.
b. No successful executives are intelligent people.
c. Som e successful executives are intelligent people.
d. Some successful executives are not intelligent peop
le.
2 . a. No anim als with horn s are carnivores.
b. Some animals with horn s are carnivores.
c. Some animals with horns are not carnivores.
d. All animals with horn s are carnivores.
3. a. Some uran ium isotopes are highly unstable subs
tances.
b. Some uranium isotopes are not high ly unst able subs
tances.
c. Alt uran ium isotopes are highly unstable substances.
d. N o uran ium isotopes are highly unstable substanc
es.
4 . a. Some college professors are not ente rtaining
lecturers.
b. All college profe ssors are entertaining lectu rers.
 5.4 Further J,,.,,,tdiatt lH/trtHCtS 219

c. No college professors are entertaining lecturers.

d. Some college professors are entertaining lecturers.

♦ S.4 Further lffffffediate lHfereHces

There are other kinds of immediate inference in addition to those associated
with the traditional Square of Opposition. In this section we shall present
three of these other types.

A. CONVERSION

The first kind of immediate inference, called "conversion ," proceeds by

simply interchanging the subject and predicate terms ol the proposition.
Conversion is perfectly.valid in the case of E and I propositions. Clearly, "No
men are angels" can be uttered to make the same a~sertion as "No a·ngels are
men," and either can be validly inferred, from the other by the immediate
inference called "conversion." Just as clearly, "Some writers are women" and
"Some women are writers" are logically equivalent, so by conversion either
can be validly inferred from the other. One standard-form categorical
proposition is said to be the converse of another when it is formed by simp~y
interchanging the subject and predicate terms of that other proposition. Thus
"No idealists are politicians" is the converse of "No politicians are idealists,"
· and each can validly be inferred from the other by conversion. The term
'·'convertend" is used to refer to the p remiss of an immediate inference by
conversion, and the conclusion of that inference is called the "converse."
Note that the converse of an A proposition does not in general follow
validly from that A proposition. Thus, if our original proposition is "AU dogs
are animals," its converse, "All animals are dogs," does not follow from the
original proposition at all, the convertend being true while its converse is
false. Traditional logic recognized this fact, of course, but asserted that
some,thing like conversion was valid for A propositions. From an A
pro.position (All Sis P) its subaltern I proposition (Some Sis P) can be validly
inferred on the traditional Square of Opposition, as explained in Section 5.3.
The A proposition says something about all members of S, but the I
proposition makr.s a more limited claim, about only some members of S. We
have just seen that conversion of an I proposition is perfectly valid. So given
F the A proposition (All Sis P), its subaltern (Some Sis P) can validJy be inferred
by subalternation, and from that subaltern the proposition (Some P is S) can
validly be inferred by conversion. So by a combination of subalternation and
conversion Some Pis Scan validly be inferred from A// sis P. This pattern of
inference, called "conversion by limitation," (or "conversion per accidens" )
 ..
l
220 DtdNCtiON Chapter 5 Oittgoric11l ProposltioHs I

proceeds by interchanging subject and predicate terms and changi~g the

I
quantity of the proposition from universal to particular. Thus It was
traditionally claimed that from the premiss "All dogs are animals" the
conclusion "Some animals are dogs" could validly be inferred, the inference
being called "conversion by limitation." This type of conversion will be J
considered further in the next section.
Observe that the converse obtained as the outcon1e of conversion by
limitation is n.ot equivalent to the A proposition from which it is derived. The
reason is that conversion by limitation requires a change in quantity, from
universal to particular. The pr'oposition that results from this.conversion by
limitation is therefore 1not an A but an I proposition; it cannot have the same
meaning as its convertend and hence cannot be logically equivalent to it. But
the converse of an E proposition is an E proposition, and the converse of an
I proposition is an I proposition; in these cases, the convertend and the
converse do have the same quantity and are logically equivalent.
Finally, note that the conversion of an O proposition is not, in general,
valid. The O proposition "Some animals are not dogs" is plainly true; its
converse is the proposition "Some dogs are not animals," which is plainly
false. An O proposition and its converse are not, in general, equivalent.
The converse of a given proposition always contains exactly the same - I
terms as the given proposition (their order being reversed) and always has the f
same quality. The following table was traditionally held to give a complete 1
picture of this immediate inference:

Table of Valid Conversions

CoHverttHd CoH~
A: All Sis P. I: Some P is S (by limitation)
E: No Sis P. E: No Pis S.
I: Some S is P. I: Some P is S.
0: Some Sis not P. (conversion not valid)

B. OBVERSION
The next type of immediate infere~ce to be discussed is_ called "obversion."
Before explaining it, we shall find it hel~ful to return_briefly to the notion of
" l ,, and to introduce some new ideas that will enable us to discuss
a c ~s more easily. A class is the collection of all objects having a cenain
obversion ttribute that we refer to as the "class-defining characteristic." Thus
0
colllfl1° a f all humans is the collection of all things which have the
0
the class . . f being human, and its class-defining characteristic is the
characteris~cb ~10g human. The class-defining characteristic need not be a
attribute O .: in any sense, for any attribute determines a class. Thus the
''sirnple" attr•.;:;e of being left-handed and red-headed and a student
\e,c attr• the class of all left-handed, red-headed students.
cornP . a class-
determines
5.4 fNrdrtr lHoHttllatt lH/mHcts 221
Every class bas associated with it a complementary class, or complement,
which is the collection of all things that do not belong to the original class.
Thus the complement of the class of all people is the class of all things that are
not people. The class-defining characteristic of the complementary class is the
(negative) attribute of not being ·a person. The complement of the class of all
people contains no people, but contains everything else: shoes and ships and
sealing wax, and cabbages-but no kings, since kings are people. It is
sometimes convenient to speak of the complement of the class of all persons
as "the class of all nonpersons." The complement of the class designated by
the term S is then designated by the term non-S, and we may speak of the term
non-S as being the complement of the term S. 4
We are using the word "complement" in two senses: one the sense of class
complement, the other the sense of the complement of a term. The two senses,
although different, are very closely connected. One term is the (term)
complement of another just in case the first term designates the (class)
complement of the class designated by the second term. It should be noted
that just as a class is the (class) complement of its own complement, a term is
the (term) complement of its own complement. A sort of "double negative"
rule is involved here, so that we need not have strings of "non's" prefixed to
a term. Thus we should write the complement of the term "voter" as
"nonvoter,'' but we should write the complement of "nonvoter" simply as
"voter" rather than "nonnonvoter." One must be careful not to mistake
contrary terms for complementary terms, as in identifying "cowards" and
"nonheroes." The terms "coward" and "hero" are contraries in that no
person can be both a coward and a hero, but not everyone-and certainly not
everything- need be either one or the other. Thus the complement, of the
term "winner" is not "loser," but "nonwinner," for although not every-
thing-or even everyone-is either a winner or a loser, absolutely everything
is either a winner or a nonwinner.
Now that we understand what is meant by the complement of a term, the
process of obversion is easy to describe. In obversion, the subject term
remains unchanged, and so does the quantity of the proposition being
obverted. To obvert a proposition, we change its quality and replace the
predicate term by its complement. Thus the A proposition
, f·

All residents arc voters.

has as its obverse the E proposition

No residents are nonvoters.

4
Sometimes we reason usin~ w_hat is called the "relativ¢ complement., of a class, its complement within
some other class. For example: wtthan the class of "children of mine., there is a subclass, "daugnters of mine,"
whole relative complement is another subclass, "children of mine who arc not daughters" or "sons of mine."
But obvcrsion and other immediate inferences normally rely upon the absolute complement of classes, as
defined above.
 t
..................
DtdwctioNi
................
-These two propositions, it is dear, are logicall~ equiv~le?t, so ~tber one
validly be inferred from the other. Obversion ~s a vahd •~~ediate IICR!lltllw·

when applied- to any standard-form ca'tegorical proposition. Thus the

proposition
No ~mpires are partisa_ns.

has as its ~bverse the logically equivalent A proposition

All umpires are nonpartisans.
Similarly, the obverse of the I proposition
Some metals are conductors.

is the O proposition
Some metals are not nonconductors. •

And finally the O proposition

Some nations were not belligerents.
has as its obverse the I proposition
Some nations were nonbelligerents.
The term "obvertend" is used to refer to the premiss of an immediate
inference by obversion, and the conclusion is called the "obverse." Every
standard-form categorical proposition is logically equivalent to its obverse, so
obversion is a valid form of immediate inference for any standard-form
categorical proposition. To obtain the obverse of a proposition, we leave the
quantity and the subject term unchanged, change the quality of the
proposition, and replace the predicate term by its complement. The following
table gives a complete picture of all valid obversions:

Table of Obvenions

ObverttHd Obvmt
A: All Sis P. E: No S is non-P.
E: No Sis P. A: All
. S is non-P.
. )

I: Some S is P. ~ - 0: Some S is not non-P.

0: Some Sis not P. I: Some S is non-P.

C. CONTllAPOSmON
The third variety of immediate inference to be discussed introduces no:-
principles, for it can be reduced, in a sense, to the fint two. To ••ll!I·
contrapositive of a given proposition we replace its ,abject &alli;.
complcm~t of its predicate term and replace its prediclee
complement of its tubiect term. Thus the contrapositiY.e
All inemlMn - .l:C"WJI:
 -
5.4 Furrhtr lHfHttdiatt l1t/trtHctS 223
•
is the A proposition
All nonvoters are nonmembers.
That these two _are logically equivalent will be evident upon a moment's
reflection, and from this it is dear that contraposition is a valid form of
irpmediate inference when applied to A propositions. Contraposition intro-
duces nothing new, for we can ··get from any A proposition to its
contrapositive by first obverting it, next applying conversion, and then
applying obversion again. Thus, beginning with "All Sis P; "we obvert it to
·obtain "No Si's non-P, "which converts validly to .,,No non-Pis S, "whose
obverse is "All non-Pis non-S. "Thus the contrapositive of any A proposition
is the obverse of the converse of the obverse ·of that proposition.
Contraposition is most useful in working with A propositions, but it is a
valid form of immediate inference when applied to O propositions also. Thus
the contrapositive of the O proposition
· Some students are not idealists.
is the some~hat cumbersome O proposition
Some nonidealists are not nonstudents.
which is logically equivalent to the fi~st. Their logical equivalence can be
shown by deriving the contrapositive l , step at a- time through obverting,
converting, and then obverting again/ as in the follow~ng schematic
derivation: "Some Sis nof P" obverts to ""Some Sis non-P, " which converts
to usome non-J> is S', ,f which obverts to "Some non-P is not non-S " (the
contrapositive).
Contraposition is not, in general, valid for I propositions. This can be seen
by noting that the true I proposition
· Some citizens are nonlegislators.
has as its contrapositive the false pr_oposition
Some legislators are noncitizens.

( The reason that contraposition is not generally valid when applied to I

propositions can .be seen w~en we attempt to derive the contrapositive of an
I proposition by successively obverting, converting, and obverting. The
obverse of rhe I proposition "Some S is P" is the O proposition "Some S is not
no~P," who~ converse does not in general follow validly from it. .
,~ J
The contrapositive of the E proposition "No !S ~s P" is "~o non-P is
oon-S," which does not in general followvalidly from the otigina}, as can be
&een by ob.erving that the E1'f8pe'lition ,
No wrestler• are weakl(ngs.
which i1 true, has as its contrapositive the false proposition.
No nonweaklings ·are nonwrestlers.
114 l"'LJ
~WctiOH

Chapttr 5 Categorical Propositio11s

If we attempt to d . h
. enve t e contra ·· f . · ..
obvers1on, conversion a d b ~ostt1ve o an B propos1non by successive
0
The obverse of the E 'r: . ~ers:~n, w~ fin~ ~e reason for this invalidity.
non-P,, and i p. pos1t1on No Sis p is the A proposition "All Sis
we d ' ~ gene~al_ It ~annot validly be converted except by limitation. If
O
b convert it by hm1tat1on to obtain '~ome.non-~ ~ £" then thelatter dan
e obvert~~ to obtain "Some, non-P is not non-S," wh'ich we may call the
contrap?s1t1ve by limitati.on. This type of c~ntraposition will be considered
further m the next sectio~
Note that contraposition by limitation, in which we infei: an O prop-
osition from an E proposition-th at is, in which we ·1nfer "Some non-P- is
non-S" from "No S is P" -has the same peculiarity as conversion by
limitation, on which it depends. Because a particular proposition was inferred
from a universal proposition, the resulting contrapositive cannot have the
same meaning and cannot be logically equivalent to the E proposition that
was the original premiss. But the contrapositive of an A proposition is an A
proposition, and the contrapositive of an O proposition is an O proposition,
and in each of these cases, the contrapositive and the premiss from which it
is derived are equivalent.
Thqs we see that contraposition i~ a valid form of inference only when ap-
plied to A and O propositions. Contraposition is not valid at all for I propo-
sitions and is valid for E propositions only by limitation. The complete picture
of this immediate inference may also be presented in the form of a table.

Table of Contraposition

PreH«iss CoHtrapositivt
A: All Sis P. A: All non-Pis non-S. J
E: No Sis P. 0: Some non-Pis not rion-S. (by limitation) ·
I: Some Sis P. (contraposition not valid)
0: Some Sis not P. 0: Some non-Pis not non-S.

There are many other types of immediate inference that have been
classified and given special names, but since they involve no new principles we
shall not discuss them here.
Some questions about the relations between propositions are best
answered by explaining the various immediate inferences that can dr~wn ?~
from one or the other of them. For example, given that the propos1non All
s~rgeons are physicians" is true, what can be said about the truth or falsehood
of the proposition "No nonsurgeons are nonphysicians"? Here on~ ~seful
procedure is to draw as many valid. inference~ _from the ?iven prop~s1t1on as
you can, to see if che problematic propos1t10n-or its ~ontrad1cto~ or
contrary- follows validly from the one given as true. In this example, given
5.4
Furthtr lHu,cedi,ut l,cftm1ctS 22S
tha~ "All Sis P" we validly infer its contrapositive, "All non-P is non-S
," from
which conversion by limitation gives us "Some non-S is non-P," which
is,
according to the traditional logic, a valid consequence of the
given
propo sition and is therefore true. But by the Square of Opposition, it
is the
contr adicto ry of the problematic proposition "No non-Sis non-P," which
is
thus no longer problematic but known to be false.
As ~as pointed out in Section 1. 7, although a valid argument whose
premisses are true must have a true conclusion, a valid argument
whose
premisses are false can have a true conclusion. Examp.l_es of the latter
come
easily to mind for conversion by limitation, contraposition by limitation,
and
subal temat ion in the Square of Opposition. Thus, from the false premi
ss "All
animals are cats," the true proposition "Some animals are cats" folJow
s by
subalternation. And from the false proposition "All parents are stude
nts,"
conversion by limitation yields the true proposition "Some studen
ts are
paren ts." So if a proposition is given to be false and the question is
raised
about the truth or falsehood of another (somehow related) proposition
, the
recommended procedure is to begin drawing immediate inference either
from
the contradictory of the proposition given to be false or from the proble
matic
propo sition itself. For the contradictory of a false proposition must be
true,
and all valid inferences from it will also be true propositions. And
if the
probl emati c proposition can be shown to imply the proposition that is
given
to be false, it must itself be false._

• . SUMM AllY OF SECTION 5.4

The three immediate inferences explained in this Sectio n-con versio
n,
obversion, and contr aposi tion- may be summarized in table form as follow
s:

Convenion

CoHvtrttHd CoHffl'St
A: All Sis P. I: Some P is $. (by limitation)
E: No Sis P. • E: No Pis S.
I: Some Sis P. I: Some Pis S.
0: Some Sis not P. (conversion not valid)

Obvenion

ObvtrttHd Obvmt
A: All Sis P. E: No S is non-P.
E: No Sis P. A: All S is non-P.
I: So~e S fs P. 0: Some Sis not non-P.
0: Some Sis not P. I: Some S is non-P.
226 DtrJuctloN

Contraposidon

PreHt iss _,_ CoHtra,ositivt

A: All Sis P ;./ A: All non-P is non-S. . . . .
E: No Sis 1: J 0: Some non-Pis not non-S. (by hm1tat1on)
(cont(aposition not valid) ,.
I: Some S i.s P/
0: Some S is not P. 0: Some non-P is not non-S.

EXERCISES
I. State the converses of the following propositions and indicate which of
them are equivalent to the given propositions.
* t. No people who are considerate of others are reckless drivers who
pay no attention to traffic regulations.
2. All graduates of West Point are commissioned officers in the U.S.
Army.
3. Some European cars are overpriced and underpowered automo-
biles.
4. No reptiles are warm-blooded animals.
• 5. Some professional wrestlers are elderly persons who are incapable
of doing an honest day's work.
11. State the obverses of the following propositions.
• 1. Some college athletes are professionals.
2. No organic compounds are metals.
3. Some clergy are not abstainers.
4. No geniuses are conformists.
• 5. All objects suitable for boat anchors are objects weighing at least
fifteen pounds.
m. State the contrapositives of the following propositions and indicate
which of them are equivalent to the given propositions.
• 1. All journalists are pessimists.
2. Some soldiers are not officers.
3. All scholars arc nondegenerates.
4. All things weighing less than fifty pounds are objects not more than
four feet high.
• 5. Some noncitizens are not nonresidents.
5.4
Fwrrhtr lHCHCtdi,tt INftrtHcts 227
IV. If "All socialists are pacifists,, is true, what may be inferred about
the
tru~ or falsehood of the following propositions? .,.
* 1. Some nonpacifists are not nonsocialists. ;rJ. SrP-".. . ., ~ Ji y' S,
Ji.. No socialists are nonpacifists. ~\ ~ ~ ~ ()-1'- •
, 3. ~ All nonsocialists are non pacifists. (, , ~ \-~ 7
-r~
/ - ~ ~
4. No nonpacifists are socialists. • (q,_ ) 1i?\
* S.
~
No nonsocialists are nonpacifists.
✓ 6. All non pacifists are nonsocialists. "--

7. No pacifists are
,, nonsocialists.
.
8. Some socialists' are not pacifists .
9. All pacifists are socialists.
•10. Some nonpacifists are socialists.
,.
V. If "No scientists. ate philosophers" is true, what may be inferred about
the truth or fafsehood of the following propositions?
• 1. No nonphilosophers are scientists.
2. Some nonphilosophers are not nonscientists.
3. All nonscientists are nonphilosophers.
4. No scientists are nonphilosophers.
• S. No nonscientists are nonphilosophers.
6. All philoso phen, a~e scientists.
7. Some ,non philosophers ar~. scientists.
8. All nonphilosophers are nonscientists.
9. Some scientists are not philosophers.
•10. No philosop'hers are nonscientists.
~

VI. If "Some saints were martyrs,, is true, what may be inferred about the
truti\. or falsehood of the following propositions? C- ~ fl tv- c~ S. ·
• 1. All saints were martyrs. ~
0
J-J · -
( ,.= ..,,.v, f- 1'- 0 .,.....
tvl
0
~ :;,o~ '-"' .,,~~ ,; I..."
✓ -
.,,.2-. Some nonmartyrs were not nonsaints. G-' r,,
~::..,,-< ''--'- J., ~
(_ 'T'vv-.
3. No nonsaints were martyrs. ~ Q)
4. Some nonmartyrs were saints.
• 5. Some martyrs were not nonsaints.
6. No martyts were nonsaints.
 228 ~dwcrioN Chi1p1tr 5 Categorical Propositio1n

7. Some nonsaints were not nonmartyrs.

8. All martyrs were saints.
9. No saints were martyrs.
•10. All martyrs were nonsaints.
11. Some nonsaints were not martyrs.
12. No nonmartyrs were saints.
13. No saints were nonmartyrs.
14. Some nonmartyrs were nonsaints.
•15. No martyrs were saints.
16. Some nonsaints were nonmartyrs.
17. No nonmartyrs were nonsaints.
18. Some nonsaints were martyrs.
19. All nonmartyrs were saints.
•20. Some saints were not nonmartyrs.

, 21. Some martyrs were not saints.

22. No nonsaints were nonmartyrs.
23. Some martyrs were saints.
24. Some saints were nonmartyrs.
•25. All nonmartyrs were nonsaints.
26. All saints were nonm~rtyrs.
27. Some saints were not martyrs.
28. All nonsaints were nonmartyrs.
29. Some martyrs were nonsaints.
•30. All nonsaints were martyrs.
31. Some nonmarty rs were not saints.
VII. If "Some merchants are not pirates" is true, what may be inferred about
the truth or falsehood of the following propositions?
* 1. Some nonpirates are not nonmerchants.
2. No nonmerchants are pirates.
3. No pirates are nonmerchants.
4. All merchants are nonpirates.
* 5. All nonpirates are nonmerchants.
5.5
Existt1ttial lHCport 229
6. No merchants are pirates.
7. Some pirates are merchants.
8. No nonmerchants are nonpirates.
9. All nonpirates are merchants.
•10. All nonmerchants are pirates.
11. Some pirates are not nonmerchants.
12. No nonpirates are nonmerchants.
13. Some merchants are pirates.
14. Some pirates are not merchants.
•15. No nonpirates are merchants.
16. All pirates are nonmerchants.
17. Some merchants are not non pirates.
18. Some nonpirates are nonmerchants.
19. Some merchants are nonpirates.
•20. Some nonpirates are merchants.
21. Some nonmerchants are not pirates.
22. Some nonmerchants are not nonpirates.
,,
23. All nonmerchants are nonpirates.
24. Some nonmerchants are pirates.
•25. Some pirates are nonmerchants.
26. No merchants are nonpirates.
27. Some nonpirates are not merchants.
28. All merchants are pirates.
29. No pirates are merchants.
*30. Some nonmerchants are nonpirates.
31. All pirates are merchants.

♦ 5.5 ExisteHtial lJHport

A propositi on is said to have "existent ial import" if it is typically uttered to
assert the existence of objects of some kind. For example, the proposition
" There are books on my desk" has existentia l import, whereas the