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The Cambridge Handbook of
Situated Cognition
Since its inception some fifty years ago, cognitive science has undergone a number of sea
changes. Perhaps the best known is the development of connectionist models of cognition
as alternatives to classical, symbol-based approaches. A more recent – and increasingly influ-
ential – trend is that of dynamical-systems-based, ecologically oriented models of the mind.
Researchers suggest that a full understanding of the mind will require systematic study of the
dynamics of interaction among mind, body, and world. Some argue that this new orientation
calls for a revolutionary new metaphysics of mind, according to which mental states and
processes, and even persons, literally extend into the environment.
The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition is a state-of-the-art guide to this new move-
ment in cognitive science. Each chapter tackles either a specific area of empirical research or
a specific sector of the conceptual foundations underlying this research. The chapter authors
are leading figures in the emerging interdisciplinary field of situated cognition, including
representatives from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.
Philip Robbins received his A.B. from Harvard University and his Ph.D. from the University
of Chicago. Before coming to the University of Missouri, he taught at the University of
Vermont and Washington University in St. Louis.
Murat Aydede received his B.A. from Boğaziçi University in Istanbul and his Ph.D. from the
University of Maryland at College Park. Before coming to the University of British Columbia,
he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Florida.
The Cambridge Handbook of
Situated Cognition

Edited by
PHILIP ROBBINS
University of Missouri–Columbia
MURAT AYDEDE
University of British Columbia
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi
Cambridge University Press

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521612869

C Cambridge University Press 2009
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2009
Printed in the United States of America
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition / edited by Philip Robbins,
Murat Aydede.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-521-84832-9 (hardback) – ISBN 978-0-521-61286-9 (pbk.) 1. Cognition.
I. Robbins, Philip, 1963– II. Aydede, Murat. III. Title.
BF311.C19 2009
153–dc22 2008017805
ISBN 978-0-521-84832-9 hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-61286-9 paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in
this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is,
or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel
timetables, and other factual information given in this work are correct at
the time of first printing, but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee
the accuracy of such information thereafter.
Contents
Acknowledgments page vii

Contributors ix
PART I: BACKDROP 1
1 A Short Primer on Situated Cognition 3

Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede
2 Scientific Antecedents of Situated Cognition 11
William J. Clancey
3 Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition 35
Shaun Gallagher
PART II: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 53
4 How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take Its Course 55

Robert A. Wilson and Andy Clark
5 Why the Mind Is Still in the Head 78
Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa
6 Innateness and the Situated Mind 96
Robert Rupert
7 Situated Representation 117
Mark Rowlands
8 Dynamics, Control, and Cognition 134
Chris Eliasmith
v
vi CONTENTS
9 Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition 155

William Bechtel
10 Embedded Rationality 171
Ruth Millikan
PART III: EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS 183
11 Situated Perception and Sensation in Vision and Other Modalities:

A Sensorimotor Approach 185
Erik Myin and J. Kevin O’Regan
12 Spatial Cognition: Embodied and Situated 201
Barbara Tversky
13 Remembering 217
John Sutton
14 Situating Concepts 236
Lawrence W. Barsalou
15 Problem Solving and Situated Cognition 264
David Kirsh
16 The Dynamic Interactions between Situations and Decisions 307
Jerome R. Busemeyer, Ryan K. Jessup, and Eric Dimperio
17 Situating Rationality: Ecologically Rational Decision Making with
Simple Heuristics 322
Henry Brighton and Peter M. Todd
18 Situativity and Learning 347
R. Keith Sawyer and James G. Greeno
19 Language in the Brain, Body, and World 368
Rolf A. Zwaan and Michael P. Kaschak
20 Language Processing Embodied and Embedded 382
Michael Spivey and Daniel Richardson
21 Situated Semantics 401
Varol Akman
22 Is Consciousness Embodied? 419
Jesse Prinz
23 Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion 437
Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino
24 The Social Context of Cognition 454
Eliot R. Smith and Frederica R. Conrey
25 Cognition for Culture 467
Felix Warneken and Michael Tomasello
26 Neuroethology: From Morphological Computation to Planning 480
Malcolm A. MacIver
Index 505
Acknowledgments
This volume has been a long time in the On the business end, Phil Laughlin,
making, and we have gotten a lot of help formerly of Cambridge University Press,
from a lot of people. Accordingly, we have encouraged us to take on the project and
a long list of people to thank. supervised its initial development. His assis-
At the top of the list are our contrib- tant, Armi Macaballug, provided solid sup-
utors, every one of whom did top-notch port throughout. After Phil left the Press,
work for us. Among them, the four mem- Eric Schwartz and his assistant, April Poten-
bers of our advisory board – Larry Barsalou, ciano, took over supervision of the project
Bill Bechtel, David Kirsh, and Rob Wilson – and saw it through the home stretch. During
also assisted us with recruitment and other the production phase, Shana Meyer oversaw
editorial matters. A number of other peo- the project from start to finish, guiding us
ple, including several contributors, extended skillfully through the maze. Katherine Fay-
our editorial reach still further by reviewing dash copyedited the manuscript, and Kate
individual chapters: Pascal Boyer, Philippe Mertes made the index for the book. Both
Chuard, Bill Clancey, Carl Craver, Chris of them did fine work.
Eliasmith, Shaun Gallagher, Kent Johnson, Finally, our nearest and dearest – Sara
Hilary Kornblith, Alan Lambert, Edouard and Judah, and Sema and Derya – helped
Machery, Eric Margolis, Pascale Michelon, immeasurably by just being there.
Michael Wheeler, Wayne Wright, and Jeff Hearty thanks to all.
Zacks. In the final phase, Chris Kahn came
to our rescue by agreeing to format the Philip Robbins
entire manuscript for production, a task that Murat Aydede
he performed with admirable skill and care.
vii
Contributors
FRED ADAMS WILLIAM BECHTEL∗

Department of Linguistics and Cognitive Department of Philosophy
Science University of California, San Diego
University of Delaware USA
USA
HENRY BRIGHTON
KENNETH AIZAWA Center for Adaptive Behavior and
Department of Philosophy Cognition
Centenary College of Louisiana Max Planck Institute for Human
USA Development
Germany
VAROL AKMAN
Departments of Computer Engineering and JEROME R. BUSEMEYER
Philosophy Department of Psychological and Brain
Bilkent University Sciences
Turkey Indiana University
USA
MURAT AYDEDE
Department of Philosophy WILLIAM J. CLANCEY
University of British Columbia NASA/Ames Research Center
Canada USA
LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU∗ ANDY CLARK

Department of Psychology Department of Philosophy
Emory University University of Edinburgh
USA Scotland
∗ Member of the editorial advisory board.
ix
x CONTRIBUTORS
FREDERICA R. CONREY MALCOLM A. MACIVER

Department of Psychological and Brain Department of Biomedical Engineering
Sciences Northwestern University
Indiana University USA
USA
RUTH MILLIKAN
ERIC DIMPERIO Department of Philosophy
Department of Psychological and Brain University of Connecticut
Sciences USA
Indiana University
USA ERIK MYIN
Department of Philosophy
CHRIS ELIASMITH University of Antwerp
Departments of Philosophy and Systems Belgium
Design Engineering
University of Waterloo J. KEVIN O’REGAN
Canada Laboratory of Experimental Psychology
Centre National de la Recherche
SHAUN GALLAGHER Scientifique (CNRS)
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive France
Sciences Program
University of Central Florida JESSE PRINZ
USA Department of Philosophy
University of North Carolina at
JAMES G. GREENO Chapel Hill
School of Education USA
University of Pittsburgh
USA DANIEL RICHARDSON
Department of Psychology
PAUL GRIFFITHS University of Reading
Department of Philosophy England
University of Sydney
Australia PHILIP ROBBINS
Department of Philosophy
RYAN K. JESSUP University of Missouri–Columbia
Department of Psychological and USA
Brain Sciences
Indiana University MARK ROWLANDS
University of Miami
MICHAEL P. KASCHAK USA
Department of Psychology
Florida State University ROBERT RUPERT
University of Colorado at Boulder
DAVID KIRSH∗ USA
Department of Cognitive Science
University of California, San Diego R. KEITH SAWYER
USA Department of Education
CONTRIBUTORS xi
Washington University in St. Louis MICHAEL TOMASELLO

USA Department of Developmental and
Comparative Psychology
ANDREA SCARANTINO Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Department of Philosophy Anthropology
Georgia State University Germany
USA
BARBARA TVERSKY
ELIOT R. SMITH Department of Psychology
Department of Psychological and Brain Stanford University
Sciences USA
Indiana University
USA FELIX WARNEKEN
Department of Developmental and
MICHAEL SPIVEY Comparative Psychology
Department of Psychology Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Cornell University Anthropology
USA Germany
JOHN SUTTON ROBERT A. WILSON∗

Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science Department of Philosophy
Macquarie University University of Alberta
Australia Canada
PETER M. TODD ROLF A. ZWAAN

Department of Psychological and Brain Department of Biological and Cognitive
Sciences Psychology
Indiana University Erasmus University
USA The Netherlands
Part I
BACKDROP

CHAPTER 1
A Short Primer on Situated Cognition
Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede
In recent years there has been a lot of buzz it seems to us as good as any (for compet-
about a new trend in cognitive science. The ing proposals, see Anderson, 2003; Clancey,
trend is associated with terms like embodi- 1997; Wilson, 2002).
ment, enactivism, distributed cognition, and In this brief introductory chapter, we
the extended mind. The ideas expressed using present a bird’s-eye view of the concep-
these terms are a diverse and sundry lot, tual landscape of situated cognition as seen
but three of them stand out as especially from each of the three angles noted previ-
central. First, cognition depends not just on ously: embodiment, embedding, and exten-
the brain but also on the body (the embodi- sion. Our aim is to orient the reader, if
ment thesis). Second, cognitive activity rou- only in a rough and preliminary way, to the
tinely exploits structure in the natural and sprawling territory of this handbook.
social environment (the embedding thesis).
Third, the boundaries of cognition extend
beyond the boundaries of individual organ- 1. The Embodied Mind
isms (the extension thesis). Each of these
theses contributes to a picture of mental Interest in embodiment – in “how the body
activity as dependent on the situation or shapes the mind,” as the title of Gallagher
context in which it occurs, whether that sit- (2005) neatly puts it – has multiple sources.
uation or context is relatively local (as in the Chief among them is a concern about the
case of embodiment) or relatively global (as basis of mental representation. From a foun-
in the case of embedding and extension). It is dational perspective, the concept of em-
this picture of the mind that lies at the heart bodiment matters because it offers help
of research on situated cognition. According with the notorious “symbol-grounding prob-
to our usage, then, situated cognition is the lem,” that is, the problem of explaining how
genus, and embodied, enactive, embedded, representations acquire meaning (Anderson,
and distributed cognition and their ilk are 2003; Harnad, 1990; Niedenthal, Barsalou,
species. This usage is not standard, though Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).
3
4 PHILIP ROBBINS AND MURAT AYDEDE
This is a pressing problem for cognitive sci- the high-level central systems responsible
ence. Theories of cognition are awash in for thinking, and central processing oper-
representations, and the explanatory value ates over amodal representations. On the
of those representations depends on their embodied view, the classical picture of the
meaningfulness, in real-world terms, for mind is fundamentally flawed. In particu-
the agents that deploy them. A natural lar, that view is belied by two important
way to underwrite that meaningfulness is facts about the architecture of cognition:
by grounding representations in an agent’s first, that modality-specific representations,
capacities for sensing the world and acting not amodal representations, are the stuff
in it: out of which thoughts are made; second,
that perception, thought, and action are co-
Grounding the symbol for ‘chair’, for constituted, that is, not just causally but also
instance, involves both the reliable detec- constitutively interdependent (more on this
tion of chairs, and also the appropriate
distinction follows).
reactions to them. . . . The agent must know
what sitting is and be able to systemati- Supposing, however, that the sandwich
cally relate that knowledge to the perceived model is retired and replaced by a model in
scene, and thereby see what things (even if which cognition is sensorimotor to the core,
non-standardly) afford sitting. In the nor- it does not follow that cognition is embod-
mal course of things, such knowledge is ied in the sense of requiring a body for its
gained by mastering the skill of sitting (not realization. For it could be that the sensori-
to mention the related skills of walking, motor basis of cognition resides solely at the
standing up, and moving between sitting central neural level, in sensory and motor
and standing), including refining one’s per- areas of the brain. To see why, consider that
ceptual judgments as to what objects invite sensorimotor skills can be exercised either
or allow these behaviors; grounding ‘chair’,
on-line or off-line (Wilson, 2002). On-line
that is to say, involves a very specific set of
physical skills and experiences. (Anderson, sensorimotor processing occurs when we
2003, pp. 102–103) actively engage with the current task envi-
ronment, taking in sensory input and pro-
This approach to the symbol-grounding ducing motor output. Off-line processing
problem makes it natural for us to attend to occurs when we disengage from the envi-
the role of the body in cognition. After all, ronment to plan, reminisce, speculate, day-
our sensory and motor capacities depend on dream, or otherwise think beyond the con-
more than just the workings of the brain and fines of the here and now. The distinction is
spinal cord; they also depend on the work- important, because only in the on-line case
ings of other parts of the body, such as the is it plausible that sensorimotor capacities
sensory organs, the musculoskeletal system, are body dependent. For off-line function-
and relevant parts of the peripheral nervous ing, presumably all one needs is a working
system (e.g., sensory and motor nerves). brain.
Without the cooperation of the body, there Accordingly, we should distinguish two
can be no sensory inputs from the environ- ways in which cognition can be embodied:
ment and no motor outputs from the agent – on-line and off-line (Niedenthal et al., 2005;
hence, no sensing or acting. And without Wilson, 2002). The idea of on-line embodi-
sensing and acting to ground it, thought is ment refers to the dependence of cogni-
empty. tion – that is, not just perceiving and acting
This focus on the sensorimotor basis of but also thinking – on dynamic interactions
cognition puts pressure on a traditional con- between the sensorimotor brain and rele-
ception of cognitive architecture. According vant parts of the body: sense organs, limbs,
to what Hurley (1998) calls the “sandwich sensory and motor nerves, and the like.
model,” processing in the low-level periph- This is embodiment in a strict and literal
eral systems responsible for sensing and act- sense, as it implicates the body directly. Off-
ing is strictly segregated from processing in line embodiment refers to the dependence
A SHORT PRIMER ON SITUATED COGNITION 5
of cognitive function on sensorimotor areas (approach), and thinking about something

of the brain even in the absence of sen- negative, like hate, involves negative motor
sory input and motor output. This type of imagery (avoidance). This result exempli-
embodiment implicates the body only indi- fies off-line embodiment, insofar as it sug-
rectly, by way of brain areas that process gests that ostensibly extramotor capacities
body-specific information (e.g., sensory and like lexical comprehension depend to some
motor representations). extent on motor brain function – a mainstay
To illustrate this distinction, let us con- of embodied approaches to concepts and
sider a couple of examples of embodiment categorization (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002;
effects in social psychology (Niedenthal Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
et al., 2005). First, it appears that bodily The distinction between on-line and off-
postures and motor behavior influence eval- line embodiment effects makes clear that
uative attitudes toward novel objects. In not all forms of embodiment involve bodily
one study, monolingual English speakers dependence in a strict and literal sense.
were asked to rate the attractiveness of Indeed, most current research on embodi-
Chinese ideographs after viewing the latter ment focuses on the idea that cognition
while performing different attitude-relevant depends on the sensorimotor brain, with
motor behaviors (Cacioppo, Priester, & or without direct bodily involvement. (In
Bernston, 1993). Subjects rated those ideo- that sense, embodied cognition is something
graphs they saw while performing a posi- of a misnomer, at least as far as the bulk
tively valenced action (pushing upward on of research that falls under this heading is
a table from below) more positively than concerned.) Relatively few researchers in
ideographs they saw either while performing the area highlight the bodily component of
a negatively valenced action (pushing down- embodied cognition. A notable exception is
ward on the tabletop) or while performing Gallagher’s (2005) account of the distinc-
no action at all. This looks to be an effect tion between body image and body schema.
of on-line embodiment, as it suggests that In Gallagher’s account, a body image is a
actual motor behaviors, not just activity in “system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs
motor areas of the brain, can influence atti- pertaining to one’s own body” (p. 24), a
tude formation. complex representational capacity that is
Contrast this case with another study of realized by structures in the brain. A body
attitude processing. Subjects were presented schema, on the other hand, involves “motor
with positively and negatively valenced capacities, abilities, and habits that both
words, such as love and hate, and asked enable and constrain movement and the
to indicate when a word appeared either maintenance of posture” (p. 24), much of
by pulling a lever toward themselves or by which is neither representational in charac-
pushing it away (Chen & Bargh, 1999). In ter nor reducible to brain function. A body
each trial, the subject’s reaction time was schema, unlike a body image, is “a dynamic,
recorded. As predicted, subjects responded operative performance of the body, rather
more quickly when the valence of word than a consciousness, image, or conceptual
and response behavior matched, pulling the model of it” (p. 32). As such, only the
lever more quickly in response to posi- body schema resides in the body proper;
tive words and pushing the lever away the body image is wholly a product of the
more quickly in response to negative words. brain. But if Gallagher is right, both body
Embodiment theorists cite this finding as image and body schema have a shaping influ-
evidence that just thinking about some- ence on cognitive performance in a variety
thing – that is, thinking about something of domains, from object perception to lan-
in the absence of the thing itself – involves guage to social cognition.
activity in motor areas of the brain. In par- So far, in speaking of the dependence
ticular, thinking about something positive, of cognition on the sensorimotor brain and
like love, involves positive motor imagery body, we have been speaking of the idea that
certain cognitive capacities depend on the boost efficiency and extend one’s epistemic
structure of either the sensorimotor brain or reach.
the body, or both, for their physical real- One of the best articulations of the idea
ization. But dependence of this strong con- of cognitive off-loading involves the concept
stitutive sort is a metaphysically demand- of epistemic action (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994).
ing relation. It should not be confused with An epistemic action is an action designed
causal dependence, a weaker relation that to advance the problem solver’s cause by
is easier to satisfy (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; revealing information about the task that
Block, 2005). Correlatively, we can distin- is difficult to compute mentally. The best-
guish between two grades of bodily involve- known example of epistemic action involves
ment in mental affairs: one that requires the computer game Tetris, the goal of which
the constitutive dependence of cognition on is to orient falling blocks (called “zoids”) so
the sensorimotor brain and body, and one they form a maximally compact layer at the
that requires only causal dependence. This bottom of the screen. As the rate of fall
distinction crosscuts the one mooted ear- accelerates, the player has less and less time
lier, between on-line and off-line embodi- to decide how to orient each block before it
ment. Although the causal/constitutive dis- reaches the bottom. To cope better with this
tinction is less entrenched than the on-line/ constraint, skilled players use actual physical
off-line distinction, especially outside of phi- movements on the keyboard to manipulate
losophy circles, it seems no less funda- the blocks on the screen – a more efficient
mental to an adequate understanding of strategy than the “in-the-head” alternative
the concept of embodiment. To see why, of mentally rotating the blocks prior to ori-
note that the studies described previously enting them on the screen with keystrokes.
do not show that cognition constitutively A roughly analogous strategy of cognitive
depends on either the motor brain or the off-loading facilitates more mundane tasks
body. The most these studies show is some like grocery packing (Kirsh, 1995). The prob-
sort of causal dependence, in one or both lem here is to arrange things so that heavy
directions. But causal dependencies are rel- items go on the bottom, fragile items on top,
atively cheap, metaphysically speaking. For and intermediate items in between. As the
this reason, among others, it may turn out groceries continue to move along the con-
that the import of embodiment for foun- veyor belt, decisions about which items go
dational debates in cognitive science is less where need to be made swiftly, to avoid pile-
revolutionary than is sometimes advertised ups and clutter. As items come off the con-
(Adams & Aizawa, 2008). veyor belt and enter the work space, skilled
grocery packers often rapidly sort them by
category (heavy, fragile, intermediate) into
2. The Embedded Mind distinct spatial zones prior to placing each
item in a bag. This procedure significantly
It seems natural to think of cognition as an decreases load on working memory relative
interaction effect: the result, at least in part, to the alternative of mentally calculating the
of causal processes that span the boundary optimal placement of each item as it enters
separating the individual organism from the the work space, without the benefit of exter-
natural, social, and cultural environment. To nal spatial cues.
understand how cognitive work gets done, Both of these examples of epistemic
then, it is not enough to look at what goes action point to the importance of minimiz-
on within individual organisms; we need ing load on internal memory, on working
to consider also the complex transactions memory in particular. This echoes the twin
between embodied minds and the embed- themes of Brooks’s (1991) “world as its own
ding world. One type of such a transaction is model” (p. 140) and O’Regan’s (1992) “world
the use of strategies for off-loading cognitive as an outside memory” (p. 461). The com-
work onto the environment, a useful way to mon idea here is that, instead of building
up detailed internal models of the world and world (Hutchins, 1995). The scope of
that require continuous and costly updat- this ecological perspective on the mind is
ing, it pays to look up relevant informa- very broad indeed. Having expanded far
tion from the world on an as-needed basis. beyond Gibson’s (1979) work on vision, it
In other words, “rather than attempt to informs research programs in virtually every
mentally store and manipulate all the rele- area of psychology, from spatial naviga-
vant details about a situation, we physically tion to language acquisition to social cog-
store and manipulate those details out in the nition. It is nicely illustrated by theories
world, in the very situation itself” (Wilson, of social rationality, which try to explain
2002, p. 629). The suggestion that intelligent human judgment and decision making in
agents do best when they travel informa- terms of the structure of the social envi-
tionally light, keeping internal representa- ronment (Gigerenzer, 2000). Somewhat fur-
tion and processing to a minimum, informs ther afield, the ecological view has begun to
a wide spectrum of research on cognition in show up with increasing frequency in the
the situated tradition (Clark, 1997). Vision literature on phenomenal consciousness,
science affords a nice example of this trend that is, consciousness in the “what-it’s-like”
in the form of research on change blind- sense popularized by Nagel (1974). It is
ness. This is a phenomenon in which viewers implicit, for example, in the enactivist idea
fail to register dramatic changes in a visual that the felt quality of visual awareness is
scene – a phenomenon that some interpret a by-product of ongoing agent-environment
as evidence that the visual system creates interaction (Noë, 2004). It also informs con-
only sparse models of the world, giving rise structivist conceptions of consciousness,
to representational blind spots (O’Regan, such as the idea that an individual’s con-
1992). scious mental life tends to mirror that of
The embedding thesis, then, goes hand in socially salient others (Robbins, 2008). Both
hand with what Clark (1989) calls the “007 of these suggestions about the nature of phe-
principle.” nomenal consciousness – arguably the last
bastion of Cartesian internalism – reflect a
In general, evolved creatures will neither newly invigorated ecological perspective on
store nor process information in costly ways the mind.
when they can use the structure of the envi-
ronment and their operations upon it as
a convenient stand-in for the information-
processing operations concerned. That is, 3. The Extended Mind
know only as much as you need to know to
get the job done. (p. 64) Assigning an important explanatory role to
brain-body and agent-environment interac-
Embedding, in turn, goes hand in hand with tions does not constitute a sharp break from
embodiment, as off-loading cognitive work classical cognitive science. Both the embodi-
depends heavily on sensorimotor capacities ment thesis and the embedding thesis can be
such as visual lookup, pattern recognition, seen as relatively modest proposals, given
and object manipulation. Epistemic actions, that they can be accommodated by rela-
for instance, typically require embodiment tively minor adjustments to the classical pic-
in a strict and literal sense, as they involve ture, such as the acknowledgment that “not
real-time dynamic interaction with the local all representations are enduring, not all are
physical environment. symbolic, not all are amodal, and not all are
The theoretical and methodological independent of the sensory and effector sys-
import of embedding, however, is much tems of the agent” (Markman & Dietrich,
wider. It points to the importance, in gen- 2000, p. 474; see also Vera & Simon, 1993).
eral, of studying cognition “in the wild,” The same cannot be so easily said, however,
with careful attention to the complex inter- of the claim that cognition is extended –
play of processes spanning mind, body, the claim that the boundaries of cognitive
systems lie outside the envelope of individ- to the conclusion that cognition is extended
ual organisms, encompassing features of the as well. Or so the reasoning goes.
physical and social environment (Clark & Another part of the motivation behind
Chalmers, 1998; Wilson, 2004). In this view, the extension thesis traces back to a fic-
the mind leaks out into the world, and cog- tional (but realistic) scenario that Clark and
nitive activity is distributed across individ- Chalmers (1998) describe. They introduce
uals and situations. This is not your grand- a pair of characters named Otto and Inga.
mother’s metaphysics of mind; this is a brave Otto is an Alzheimer’s patient who supple-
new world. Why should anyone believe ments his deteriorating memory by carry-
in it? ing around a notebook stocked with use-
One part of the answer lies in the promise ful information. Unable to recall the address
of dynamical systems theory – the intel- of a museum he wishes to visit, Otto pulls
lectual offspring of classical control theory, out his trusty notebook, flips to the rele-
or cybernetics (Ashby, 1956; Wiener, 1948; vant page, looks up the address, and pro-
Young, 1964) – as an approach to model- ceeds on his way. Neurotypical Inga, in con-
ing cognition (Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, trast, has an intact memory and no need for
1994; van Gelder, 1995). Using the tools of such contrivances. When she decides to visit
dynamical systems theory, one can describe the museum, she simply recalls the address
in a mathematically precise way how various and sets off. Now, there are clear differences
states of a cognitive system change in rela- between the case of Otto and the case of
tion to one another over time. Because those Inga; Otto stores the information externally
state changes depend as much on changes in (on paper), whereas Inga stores it internally
the external environment as on changes in (in neurons); Otto retrieves the information
the internal one, it becomes as important by visual lookup, whereas Inga uses some-
for cognitive modeling to track causal pro- thing like introspective recall; and so on.
cesses that cross the boundary of the indi- But according to Clark and Chalmers, these
vidual organism as it is to track those that differences are relatively superficial. What
lie within that boundary. In short, insofar as is most salient about the cases of Otto and
the mind is a dynamical system, it is natu- of Inga, viewed through a functionalist lens,
ral to think of it as extending not just into are the similarities. Once these similarities
the body but also into the world. The result are given their due, the moral of the story
is a radical challenge to traditional ways of becomes clear: “When it comes to belief,
thinking about the mind, Cartesian internal- there is nothing sacred about skull and skin.
ism in particular: What makes some information count as a
belief is the role it plays, and there is no rea-
The Cartesian tradition is mistaken in sup- son why the relevant role can be played only
posing that the mind is an inner entity from inside the body” (Clark & Chalmers,
of any kind, whether mind-stuff, brain 1998, p. 14). As for the fact that this con-
states, or whatever. Ontologically, mind ception of mind runs afoul of folk intu-
is much more a matter of what we do
itions, well, so much the worse for those
within environmental and social possibil-
ities and bounds. Twentieth-century anti- intuitions.
Cartesianism thus draws much of mind This conclusion is not forced on us, how-
out, and in particular outside the skull. ever, and a number of theorists have urged
(van Gelder, 1995, p. 380) that we resist it. For example, Rupert (2004)
argues that generalizing memory to include
Implicit in this passage is a kind of slippery cases like Otto’s would have the untoward
slope argument premised on a broad theo- effect of voiding the most basic lawlike gen-
retical assumption. Grant that cognition is eralizations uncovered by traditional mem-
embodied and embedded – something that ory research, such as primacy, recency, and
the dynamical systems approach takes more interference effects – and without furnishing
or less as a given – and it is a short distance anything comparably robust to substitute in
their place. In short, insofar as the goal of Block, N. (2005). Review of Alva Noë’s Action
scientific inquiry is to carve nature at its in Perception. Journal of Philosophy, 102, 259–
joints, and lawlike regularities are the best 272.
guide to the location of those joints, it is Brooks, R. (1991). Intelligence without represen-
not clear that a fruitful science of extended tation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139–159.
memory is possible, even in principle. More Cacioppo, J. T., Priester, J. R., & Bernston, G. G.
(1993). Rudimentary determination of atti-
generally, Adams and Aizawa (2008) con-
tudes: II. Arm flexion and extension have dif-
tend that the standard argument for pushing ferential effects on attitudes. Journal of Person-
the boundary of cognition beyond the indi- ality and Social Psychology, 65, 5–17.
vidual organism rests on conflating the meta- Chen, S., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences
physically important distinction between of automatic evaluation: Immediate behavior
causation and constitution. As they point dispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus.
out, it is one thing to say that cognitive Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25,
activity involves systematic causal interac- 215–224.
tion with things outside the head, and it is Clancey, W. J. (1997). Situated cognition. Cam-
quite another to say that those things instan- bridge: Cambridge University Press.
tiate cognitive properties or undergo cogni- Clark, A. (1989). Microcognition. Cambridge, MA:
tive processes. Bridging this conceptual gap MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being there. Cambridge, MA:
remains a major challenge for defenders of
MIT Press.
the extended mind.
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended
mind. Analysis, 58, 10–23.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the
4. Coda mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to
Situated cognition is a many-splendored visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
enterprise, spanning a wide range of projects Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Adaptive thinking. Oxford:
in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, Oxford University Press.
anthropology, robotics, and other fields. In Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002).
this chapter we have touched on a few of the Grounding language in action. Psychonomic
themes running through this research, in an Bulletin and Review, 9, 558–565.
effort to convey some sense of what situ- Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding prob-
ated cognition is and what the excitement is lem. Physica D, 42, 335–346.
about. The twenty-five chapters that follow Hurley, S. L. (1998). Consciousness in action.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
it develop these themes, and other themes
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cam-
in the vicinity, in depth. Both individually
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
and collectively, these chapters reveal what Kirsh, D. (1995). The intelligent use of space. Arti-
“getting situated” means to cognitive sci- ficial Intelligence, 7, 31–68.
ence, and why it matters. Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguish-
ing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive
Science, 18, 513–549.
References Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in
the flesh. New York: Basic Books.
Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of Markman, A. B., & Dietrich, E. (2000). Extending
cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. the classical view of representation. Trends in
Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: Cognitive Sciences, 4, 470–475.
A field guide. Artificial Intelligence, 149, 91– Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Phil-
130. osophical Review, 82, 435–450.
Ashby, W. R. (1956). Introduction to cybernetics. Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkiel-
New York: Wiley. man, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. (2005).
Beer, R. D. (1995). A dynamical systems perspec- Embodiment in attitudes, social perception,
tive on agent-environment interaction. Artifi- and emotion. Personality and Social Psychology
cial Intelligence, 72, 173–215. Review, 9, 184–211.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be,
MA: MIT Press. if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 91,
O’Regan, J. K. (1992). Solving the “real” mysteries 345–381.
of visual perception: The world as an outside Vera, A. H., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Situated
memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 46, action: A symbolic interpretation. Cognitive
461–488. Science, 17, 7–48.
Robbins, P. (2008). Consciousness and the social Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics; or, Control and
mind. Cognitive Systems Research, 9, 15– communication in the animal and the machine.
23. New York: Wiley.
Rupert, R. (2004). Challenging the hypothesis of Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cogni-
extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy, 101, tion. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9, 625–
389–428. 636.
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic Wilson, R. A. (2004). Boundaries of the mind.
systems approach to the development of cog- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
nition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Young, J. Z. (1964). A model of the brain. Oxford:
Press. Oxford University Press.
CHAPTER 2
Scientific Antecedents of Situated

Cognition
William J. Clancey
Introduction provides a broad historical review of the

scientific antecedents of situated cognition;
In the late 1980s, an artificial intelligence Gallagher (this volume) details philosophi-
(AI) researcher trying to untangle controver- cal aspects.1
sies about the nature of knowledge, mem- What idea could be so general that it
ory, and behavior would have been sur- applies to every scientific discipline? And
rounded by perplexed computer science and why was this idea so controversial in the
psychology colleagues who viewed situated AI community? What aspect of cognition
cognition ideas as fool’s gold – or even sug- relates the social sciences, linguistics, ped-
gested that those ideas threatened the foun- agogy, animal cognition, and evolutionary
dations of science itself. But scholars knew biology to neural theories of perception,
the concepts and methods of situated cogni- learning, and memory? What problematic
tion from a much broader and deeper back- aspects of cognition in AI research foreshad-
ground, one that embraced Dewey’s (1896) owed the development of a situated episte-
early objections to stimulus-response the- mology? These are the topics I discuss in
ory, Wittgenstein’s (1953/1958) notions of this chapter. In large part, the story cen-
family resemblances and language games, ters on particular scientists, but I present the
Gibson’s (1966) affordances, Bateson’s (1972) central ideas as crosscutting themes. These
ecology of mind, Polanyi’s (1966) tacit themes reveal that human cognitive pro-
knowledge, von Bertalanffy’s (1968) general cesses are inherently social, interactive, per-
systems theory, and so on, in the work of sonal, biological, and neurological, which is
dozens of well-known figures in philosophy, to say that a variety of systems develop and
psychology, linguistics, ethology, biology, depend on one another in complex ways.
and anthropology. Indeed, throughout sci- Many stories can be told about these interre-
ence, including AI itself during the 1960s lations. The concepts, perspectives, and the-
and 1970s, one finds at least the seeds for oretical frameworks that influenced the sit-
a situated theory of cognition. This chapter uated cognition of the 1980s are still alive in
11
12 WILLIAM J. CLANCEY
potential for thoughtful reconsideration in and so on.2 A system is viewed as a dynamic

tomorrow’s cognitive research. and complex whole, an organization (e.g., a
The key concept across the sciences that cell, a community) located within an envi-
in the realm of AI and cognitive science ronment. We look at the inputs, processes,
manifested as situated cognition is today outputs, feedback, and controls to identify
often called “systems thinking” (von Berta- bidirectional relationships that affect and
lanffy, 1968). This idea is manifested in constitute a system.
different forms as general systems theory, In identifying parts and wholes, systems
complex systems theory (or simply “com- thinking does not reject the value of reduc-
plexity”; Gell-Mann, 1995; Waldrop, 1992), tionist compartmentalization and compo-
system dynamics, chaos theory (Gleick, nential analysis; rather, systems thinking
1987; Prigogine, 1984), complex adaptive sys- strives for a “both-and” perspective (Wilden,
tems (Holland, 1995), and so on. These are 1987) that shows how the whole makes the
modeling approaches with a broadly shared parts what they are and vice versa. For exam-
perspective on how causality operates in ple, in conceptual systems, metonymic rela-
many natural systems and in some designed tions (tropes or figures of speech) may have
systems (Altman & Rogoff, 1987). For exam- a both-and meaning. Consider how the Syd-
ple, systems thinking views human exper- ney Opera House, derided at first as “a pack
tise as occurring within and developing as of French nuns playing football” (Godwin,
a system involving an economic market, a 1988, p. 75), became a symbol for Australia –
community of practice, facilities, represen- and thus changed the national identity, what
tational tools, reasoning, and perceptual- Australia meant to the Australians and the
motor coordination (Lave, 1988). world. The radical and captivating archi-
The following section provides an intro- tecture, built for a high-culture purpose,
duction to systems thinking and its applica- marked Australia as a modern, preeminent
tion in systems theory. The section is fol- society, occupying a unique position in the
lowed by a review of the historical context world (as does the building on the harbor’s
in which a non-systems-thinking perspec- edge) and representing a force for change.
tive developed in the study of intelligence, Thus, the meaning of the nation (the whole)
particularly in AI research. I then briefly and the meaning of the building (a part)
review how systems thinking relates to and reaffirmed each other. The building is both
is manifested in the study of cognition. The contained in the country and a symbol for
core of this chapter then summarizes cross- the country as a whole.
cutting themes that constitute the scientific In situated cognition, one of the funda-
antecedents of situated cognition. Finally, mental concepts is that cognitive processes
I consider recent and continuing dilemmas are causally both social and neural. A per-
that foreshadowed the acceptance of situ- son is obviously part of society, but causal
ated cognition in the fields of AI and psy- effects in learning processes may be under-
chology and suggest prospects for the next stood as bidirectional (Roschelle & Clancey,
scientific advances. 1992).
Systems thinking also views the parts
from different disciplinary viewpoints. For
Overview of Systems Thinking example, when building a highway, one can
consider it within a broader transportation
Systems thinking involves studying things system, an economic system, a city and
in a holistic way – understanding the caus- regional plan, the environmental ecology,
al dependencies and emergent processes and so on (Schön, 1987). Thus, different
among the elements that comprise the categories and relationships from different
whole system, whether it be artificial (e.g., viewpoints frame the design of the high-
a computer program), naturally occurring way system, producing different ontologies
(e.g., living systems), cultural, conceptual, of parts and causal processes; the constraints
SCIENTIFIC ANTECEDENTS OF SITUATED COGNITION 13
between these perspectives are the basis for appropriate formulation of systemic struc-
defining trade-offs of costs and benefits. tures and processes. However, computer sci-
Such a multidisciplinary view of prob- entists and psychologists who found situated
lem solving both extends and challenges cognition perplexing around 1990 did not
the disciplinary notion of expertise that recognize its roots in the work of von Neu-
assumed an objective ontology (i.e., truth mann and Burks (1966), cybernetics (von
about the world), which was inherent in Foerster, 1970), or parallel developments
most knowledge-acquisition theories and in general semantics (Korzybski, 1934/1994).
methods (Hayes-Roth, Lenat, & Waterman, Each of these theoretical developments con-
1983). For example, in the 1970s, it was com- tradicted the tenets of knowledge-base the-
mon to build a medical expert system for a ories of intelligence (Clancey, 1997). These
clinic by working only with physicians in a tenets include a temporally linear process
particular subject area, omitting the nurses, model relating perception, conception, and
hospital managers, computer system admin- action; stored propositional memory; identi-
istrators, insurance companies, family doc- fication of scientific models and knowledge;
tors, and others. and a single-disciplinary view of problem
By adopting a systems perspective, new formulation.
insights may be gained into what prob- In contrast, the development of con-
lems actually occur in a given setting and nectionism in AI (McClelland, Rumelhart,
why; what opportunities technology may & PDP Research Group, 1986) promoted
offer; and how changes in tools, processes, theories and models characterized as com-
roles, and facilities may interact in unex- plex adaptive systems (Gell-Mann, 1995;
pected ways (Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991). Morowitz, 2002; Holland, 1995; van Gelder,
These ideas were becoming current in busi- 1991). This distributed-processing, emergent
ness management (e.g., Jaworski & Flowers, organization approach is also manifest in
1996; Senge, 1990) just as situated cognition multi-agent systems modeling, which brings
came onto the scene in AI and cognitive sci- the ideas of cellular automata and systems
ence. theory back to the computational model-
ing of human behavior (Clancey, Sachs,
Sierhuis, & van Hoof, 1998; Hewitt, 1977).
Systems Theory
Systems theory is an application of sys- Features of Complex Systems

tems thinking, closely related to cybernet-
ics (Wiener, 1948) and what is now called In systems theory, the term complex system
“complex systems.”3 Systems theory was (Center for the Study of Complex Systems,
founded by von Bertalanffy (1968), Ashby n.d.; Gallagher & Appenzeller, 1999; New
(1956), and others between the 1940s and the England Complex Systems Institute, n.d.;
1970s on principles from physics, biology, Waldrop, 1992) refers to a system whose
and engineering. Systems theory was espe- properties are not fully explained by linear
cially influential in social and behavioral sci- interactions of component parts.4 Although
ences, including organizational theory, fam- this idea was well known by the mid-
ily psychotherapy, and economics. Systems 1980s to many AI scientists in the technical
theory emphasizes dynamics involving cir- areas of artificial life and genetic algo-
cular, interdependent, and sometimes time- rithms, its applicability to the study of cog-
delayed relationships. nition proper (e.g., the nature of concep-
Early systems theorists aimed for a gen- tual systems, how memory directly relates
eral systems theory that could explain all sys- perception and action) was not gener-
tems in all fields of science. Wolfram (2002) ally recognized. In particular, applications
argued that a computational approach based to education (situated learning; Lave &
on cellular automata begins to provide an Wenger, 1991) and expert system design
(communities of practice; Wenger, 1998) example, an economy is made up of

were difficult for proponents to articulate – organizations, which are made up of
and for others to understand – because the people.
epistemological foundation of knowledge-
based systems was at question.
The following features of complex sys- Historical Context of the
tems are useful to consider when analyzing Stored-Program Theory of Mind
human behavior, a social system, an organi-
zational design, and so on: Having now presented the seeds of the ref-
ormation (systems thinking and complex
Emergence: In a complex system (ver- systems), I now return to the context of
sus a complicated one), some behav- the reactionary – the cognitive theories that
iors and patterns result from interac- conflict with situated cognition. This brief
tions among elements, and the effects synopsis provides a background for recog-
are nonlinear. nizing the novelty and usefulness of the
Feedback loops: Both negative (damp- crosscutting themes of sociology, language,
ing) and positive (amplifying) feed- biology, and others, which are presented
back relations are found in complex subsequently.
systems. For example, in cognition, First, one must recognize that the
causal couplings occur subconsciously founders of AI in the 1950s were themselves
within processes of conceptualization reforming psychology and even the nature
and perception, consciously as the per- of science. Newell and Simon (1972, p. 9)
son reflects on alternative interpre- explicitly contrast their reductionist process
tations and actions, and serially as theory with behaviorism, which sought to
the physical world and other people explain behavior without reference to unob-
are changed by and respond to the servable internal states. Minsky (1985) refers
person’s action. Situated cognition re- to gestalt theories as halting the analysis
veals nonconceptual and nonlinguis- of cognition into interacting components.
tic aspects of these feedback relations Thus, the founders of AI were biased to
while highlighting conceptual aspects view cognition as fully explained by inputs
that pertain to identity and hence and internal processes that could be bro-
social relations. ken down into structure states and func-
Open, observer-defined boundaries: tional transformations. Consequently, situ-
What constitutes the system being ated cognition claims that aspects of the
studied depends on the questions at mechanism of cognition were outside the
issue and the purposes of knowing. head can be interpreted as a fruitless return
For example, is the boundary of a to “the great debates about the empty organ-
person his or her body? Are clothes ism, behaviorism, intervening variables, and
part of the person? If you stand hypothetical constructs” (Newell & Simon,
uncomfortably close to someone, have 1972, pp. 9–10; cf. Vera & Simon, 1993).
you crossed an emotional boundary? Artificial intelligence research was strong-
Complex systems have a history: How ly shaped by the stored-program von Neu-
the parts have interacted in the past mann computer architecture, consisting of
has changed the parts and what con- a processor that executes instructions sepa-
stitutes their system environment (i.e., rated from a memory containing data and
“the response function depends on a programs (Agrawala & Noh, 1992). The
history of transactions” [Clancey, 1997, derivative information-processing metaphor
p. 280]; Shaw & Todd, 1980). of the mind tended to equate data (i.e.,
Compositional networks: The compo- inputs) with information, models (repre-
nents of the system are often them- sented in the stored programs) with knowl-
selves complex adaptive systems. For edge, logical deduction with reasoning, word
networks with conceptual systems, and knowledge consists of enumerable discrete

problem solving with all human activity elements (e.g., propositions, terms, rela-
(Clancey, 1997, 2002). tions, procedures). The folk distinction be-
The success of the computational meta- tween skills and factual knowledge was well
phor led to the view that a cognitive the- known, but the computational metaphor
ory is not well formed or useful unless suggested that skills were simply com-
it is implemented as a computer program piled from previously known facts and rules
(Vera & Simon, 1993): “the model captures (e.g., Anderson, 1983), which reinforced the
the theory-relevant properties of a domain stored-program memory metaphor. Systems
of study” (Kosslyn, 1980, p. 119). Thus, in thinking may have seemed incompatible
the study of intelligence, most researchers or irrelevant to AI researchers because it
assumed that having a useful, functional threatened the grammar-based theories (see,
understanding (i.e., knowledge) required e.g., Winston & Shellard, 1990) that had
a model (derived from theoretical under- been so successful in facilitating the under-
standing). Questioning this relation threat- standing of aspects of speech recognition,
ened the notion that progress in psychol- text comprehension, scene and object recog-
ogy (and hence AI) depended on explicating nition, and problem solving.
knowledge as propositions, rules, and func- As in other fields, the seeds of situated
tional procedures (e.g., the idea that cognition were probably always present in
commonsense knowledge should be exhaus- the AI community. Connectionism might
tively captured in a knowledge base; Lenat be viewed as the clearest outgrowth of
& Guha, 1990). systems thinking in AI, suggesting a the-
During the three decades starting in the ory of memory compatible with situated
mid-1950s, AI was largely separated from cognition (e.g., Clancey, 1997, pp. 69–75,
sociology and anthropology, and the seeds of chaps. 4 and 7; Clancey, 1999). Connec-
situated cognition in ethology were largely tionism has direct origins in early neural
ignored.5 During this time, the knowledge- network modeling (e.g., the work of War-
based paradigm took hold, and AI research ren McCulloch) that inspired the founders
shifted dramatically from “blocks world” of AI. Indeed, by 1950, Minsky had begun
games (specifically, stacking children’s play- developing “a multiagent learning machine.”
ing blocks, but also chess, cryptarithmetic However, “low-level distributed-connection
puzzles, and so on) to the specialized exper- learning machines” were too limited (Min-
tise of professionals in medicine, science, sky, 1985, p. 323; Minsky & Papert, 1969),
and engineering. With the focus on individ- so Minsky focused instead on common-
ual experts (reinforced by the professional sense reasoning. Minsky (1998) expressed
view of textbook knowledge; Schön, 1987), this continuing theoretical concern with
the idea of distributed cognition was not in examples such as knowing that “you can
vogue until the late 1980s, and, if considered push things with a straight stick but not pull
at all, culture was viewed as a collection of them.”
common knowledge (rather than as a com- Minsky’s (1985) encompassing Society of
plex system of diverse artifacts, skills, and Mind combined the original notion of a net-
practices; Lave, 1988). work of agents with nearly three decades
In trying to identify persistent internal of work on vision and simple problem solv-
structures that cause intelligent behavior, ing, arguing (to paraphrase Winston & Shel-
AI was philosophically grounded in objec- lard, 1990, p. 244) that intelligence emerges
tivism (e.g., scientifically defined universal from contributions of a heterogeneous orga-
ontologies). Failing to recognize different nization of agents. Society of Mind does
disciplinary frameworks for modeling real- not mention systems theory, but it does
ity for different purposes (e.g., the road credit cybernetics with enabling psychology
design example cited previously), AI explic- to use the concept of goal (p. 318). Minsky
itly embraced a reductionist theory that includes internal regulation and feedback in
his framework, which is clearly based on bio- with some individuals questioning what the
logical theory. majority of their colleagues take for granted.
But like Newell and Simon (1972), hav- Even for well-established areas of study, the
ing conceived cognitivism as antibehavior- book is never entirely closed. For example,
ist, Minsky (1985) had difficulty relating Kamin’s (1969) research on simple animal
his theories of agent interaction to systems cognition questioned whether even classi-
thinking. He stated that emergence was a cal conditioning could be explained with-
“pseudo-explanation” (p. 328), merely label- out delving into cognitive theory. Society of
ing phenomena that could be explained by Mind is indeed a broad exploration that goes
taking into account the interactions of parts. well beyond what could be implemented in
In defining gestalt, for example, he says, a computer model when it was formalized
“‘holistic’ views tend to become scientific from about 1975 to 1985. The formation of
handicaps,” and that “there do not appear the Cognitive Science Society in 1980 can
to be any important principles common to itself be viewed as a recognition of the need
the phenomena that have been considered, to regroup and identify the perspectives
from time to time, to be ‘emergent’” (p. 328). to be reconciled. Nevertheless, the strong
Although Minsky was right to press for the reaction to situated cognition research from
study of parts and interactions, he appeared about 1985 to the mid-1990s demonstrates
to deny the distinction between complex that something new and conceptually diffi-
and complicated systems. cult to assimilate was being introduced. The
In contrast, at this time, Papert, Minsky’s next section outlines the leap to systems
Perceptrons collaborator, pursued systems- thinking that an understanding of situated
thinking ideas in the realm of education, cognition requires.
building on the work of Piaget to explicitly
teach “administrative ways to use what one
already knows” (“Papert’s Principle,” Min- Manifestation of Systems Thinking
sky, 1985, p. 102), which Papert realized as in Situated Cognition
a form of constructivism (see section “Con-
structivism1 : Philosophy + Cognition”). For psychologists in particular, systems
Also at the same time, Hewitt (1977), thinking reveals contextual effects that can-
a student of Papert and Minsky, had pro- not be viewed simply as environmental or as
moted a decentralized procedural model of input. Thus, one studies authentic, naturally
knowledge. His ideas were picked up in occurring behaviors, with the awareness that
the blackboard architecture of AI programs, inputs and outputs defined by an experi-
which harkened back to 1940s neurobio- menter (e.g., lists of words to be sorted)
logical models. The blackboard approach may set up situations unrelated to the per-
was successful in the 1970s because it pro- son’s problematic situations and problem-
vided an efficient functional decomposition solving methods in practice (Lave, 1988).
of a complex process: heterogeneous knowl- In particular, determining what constitutes
edge sources (also called “actors,” “beings,” information (“the difference that makes a
or “demons”) operate in parallel to access difference”; Bateson, 1972, p. 453) is part
and modify a symbolic construction (e.g., an of the cognitive process itself (versus being
interpretation of a speech utterance) repre- predefined by the experimenter) and often
sented at different levels of abstraction (e.g., involves causal feedback with physical trans-
phonemes, words). The relation of this com- formations of materials, such that look-
putational architecture to complex, open ing, perceiving, conceiving, reasoning, and
systems in nature and society was not gen- changing the world are in dynamic relation
erally acknowledged until the 1990s (but see (Dewey, 1938).
Hewitt, 1985). One way to understand a dynamic pro-
We must recognize that every field cess is that the system that is operating –
has its own controversies and antinomies, the processes being studied, modeled,
controlled, and/or designed – cannot be individuals and groups in processes of assim-

understood in its development or function ilation that are inevitably adapted and inter-
as strictly localized within one level of preted from unique perspectives (impro-
analysis (e.g., Gould, 1987). That is, cog- vised in action, not simply transferred and
nitive processes are not strictly attributable applied).
(reducible) to neurological mechanisms, nor Articulating the situated view of knowl-
are they purely conceptual (e.g., driven by edge has been and remains difficult because,
knowledge), characteristics of a person, or to some people, it has suggested the cul-
properties of the physical world. But rather, tural relativism of science (Bruner, 1990;
what a person experiences and what an Slezak, 1989). Indeed, the debate appears
observer views – for example, of organ- on the public scene in the issue of how
isms, mental performance, individuals, orga- U.S. Supreme Court judges are to interpret
nizations, populations, ecologies – is the the U.S. Constitution.6 But ironically, fears
ongoing product of a coupled causal rela- of arbitrariness (stemming from the view
tion, such that the entity being studied and that if an understanding is not objective it
its context (whether neurological, concep- must be arbitrary) assume that either sci-
tual, physical-artifactual, interpersonal, or entific or legal activities might occur in a
ecological) shape each other in a complex vacuum, apart from a complex system of
system. Thus, scientific insights of systems social-historical-physical constraints – as if,
thinking (read “situated thinking”) in areas for example, a science that ignored phys-
of study ranging from neurology to environ- ical realities of how sensors operate could
mentalism are often framed as blended disci- accomplish anything at all, or that checks
plines: genetic epistemology, the biology of and balances in the legal system would allow
cognition, the sociology of knowledge, neu- a judge’s ruling that ignored precedent to
ropsychology, evolutionary biology, social stand. Wilden (1987) refers to these confused
cognition, and so on. debates (e.g., objective versus arbitrary)
as “a switch between imaginary opposites”
(p. 125). Thus, some objections to situated
Claims, Challenges, and Contributions
cognition arose because of a reactionary con-
In summary, situated can be understood as cern that open systems could be arbitrary,
emphasizing the contextual, dynamic, sys- and that control must be imposed from out-
temic, nonlocalized aspects of the mind, side to keep complex systems organized (see
mental operations, identity, organizational Clancey, 2005; Lakoff, 2002 [analysis of polit-
behavior, and so on. Across the sciences of ical metaphors]).
psychology, anthropology, sociology, ethol- In summary, situated cognition devel-
ogy, biology, and neurology, and their spe- oped not as a discipline (or a movement)
cialized investigations of knowledge, lan- within AI or psychology or educational tech-
guage, and learning, the systemic, holistic nology but as a way of thinking proclaimed
view strives to explain behavior within by some of the best-known scientists of the
a developmental and evolutionary frame- twentieth century in psychology, biology,
work. Specifically, situated cognition views ethology, sociology, psychiatry, and phi-
human knowledge not as final objective facts losophy. Granting that the threads of the
but as (1) arising conceptually (e.g., dynam- argument were known since Dewey (1896)
ically constructed, remembered, reinter- at least, what did the proponents of situ-
preted) and articulated within a social con- ated cognition of the 1980s and 1990s add
text (i.e., a context conceived with respect to our understanding of systems, causality,
to social roles and norms); (2) varying within and mental operations? The contributions
a population in specialized niches (areas include:
of expertise); (3) socially reproduced (e.g.,
learning in communities of practice; Lave r Better scientific models and modeling
& Wenger, 1991); and (4) transformed by techniques (e.g., models of memory and
learning, such as Edelman’s 1987 neuronal its manifestations in different settings. From
group selection) a psychological perspective, the fundamen-
r Relating explanatory models on different tal issues often boil down to how we
levels (e.g., symbolic and neural models; should properly relate memory, percep-
Clancey, 1999) tion, problem solving, and learning. For
r Improved theories and practices in learn- many AI researchers and cognitive psy-
ing and instruction (e.g., Koschmann, in chologists, such a theory must be inher-
press), as well as in software engineering ently expressed as a mechanism, in partic-
(e.g., Clancey, 2006; Greenbaum & Kyng, ular a computer program that implements
1991), arising through extensive multi- the theory of memory and mental process-
disciplinary collaborations between social ing. But systems thinkers argued that cog-
and computer scientists nitive processes are not like conventional
r The extension of cognitive theory beyond computer programs. Wilden (1987), a com-
games and expert problem solving to munication theorist, contrasted a mech-
include the nature of consciousness and anism (meaning something like a clock
emotion (e.g., autism, dreaming, dys- made of gears, a “machineism”) with an
functions). organicism (essentially an open system).
Further, Bateson (1972), an anthropologist-
But perhaps most visibly and germane to philosopher, explored whether “mental”
the original objectives of AI, situated was a phenomenon that could be localized
robotics flourished as dynamic cognition as a process inside the brain (as opposed
theories – based on feedback, interaction, to being a person-environment interactive
and emergence – inspired new approaches process).
to navigation, perceptual categorization, and Telling this multidimensional, histori-
language learning (Clancey, 1997, chap. 5). cal development is challenging, for it was
never known to anyone at any time in all
of its threads and perspectives. Moreover,
Disciplinary Perspectives because of its complex form, we cannot find
a viewpoint for grasping it, as if it were a
In relating cognitive studies to other sci- landscape, from a single, all-encompassing
ences, it is apparent that no single disci- perspective. Post hoc we can trace themes,
pline has all the answers. All have had par- such as epistemology and the theory of
allel developments that were contrary to memory, and make causal links among indi-
situated cognition and even within their viduals, publications, institutions, and even
own discipline were viewed as lacking an pivotal academic meetings. Even a litany
appropriate contextual aspect. For example, of concepts or issues is perspectival, articu-
some anthropologists might be critical of lated, and exploited within a particular com-
ethnoscience (a development within cogni- munity’s interests and problems. It helps to
tive anthropology) because the study of how recognize the many dimensions of analysis
people perceive their environment through at play and to attempt to identify issues that
their use of language may use phonemic pertain to different concerns, such as the
analysis too narrowly, thereby reifying lin- examples that follow:
guistic categories as if they had a reality apart
from their existence within conceptual and Academic disciplines: Philosophy, psy-
cultural systems. chology, sociology, education, man-
Arguably, epistemology underlies all of agement, anthropology, biology, com-
situated cognition, and thus one might say puter science, neural science
that all cognitive research in sociology, Cross-disciplines: Philosophy of mind/
anthropology, education, psychology, and science, cybernetics, social psychol-
even neurology is aimed at developing an ogy, cognitive anthropology, cogni-
appropriate epistemology and articulating tive science, AI, neuropsychology,
evolutionary/genetic epistemology, evo- same time the neural sciences adapted an

lutionary biology AI computational modeling method to for-
Applications: Robotics, instruction and mulate the theory of connectionism? Strik-
training, process control automation ingly, each 1980s thread relating to learning,
Methodologies: Sociotechnical systems, animal cognition, and neurology was firmly
ethnomethodology, knowledge acqui- grounded in well-known (including Nobel
sition, cognitive task analysis Prize–winning) research forty to one hun-
Modeling/representational frameworks: dred years earlier. Indeed, one would have
Theory of computation, cybernetics, to view the development of scientific ideas
semantic networks, heuristic classifica- relating to situated cognition as a complex
tion, qualitative causal modeling, neu- system itself – nonlinear, historical, emer-
ral networks (connectionist models), gent, nested, networked, with open bound-
genetic programming aries and feedback loops, and so on.
Cognitive functions: Representation, In particular, and crucially, no discipline
memory, knowledge, learning or focus of study is more fundamental or
Cognitive elements: Percepts, concepts, “inside” another: a computational theory
relations, procedures, beliefs, goals, will not “explain” psychology any more than
desires, theories, activities, motives, situated learning can explain culture. Also,
skills insights do not accumulate monotonically;
Cognitive behavior: Language, classifica- insights from Dewey or 1950s cybernetics
tion, problem solving, navigation might be stomped on by today’s commu-
Systemic concepts: Dynamics, feedback, nication theory (Radford, 1994).
self-regulation, emergence, chaos, Not only the history of situated cognition
interactionism, constructivism, con- but also the systems comprising cognition
textualism, ecology, ethnomethodol- are in principle complexly related. Physio-
ogy, self/identity logical, conceptual, and organizational sys-
tems are mutually constraining – not caus-
In teaching a course about situated cog- ally nested – in what Wilden (1987, p. 74)
nition from a historical perspective, the piv- calls a “dependent hierarchy” of environ-
otal scientific areas of study are the nature mental contexts. Culture is the most diverse
of learning (e.g., as social, psychological, and complex system, but it lies at the bot-
neurological), animal cognition, and neurol- tom of the dependent hierarchy. Like any
ogy (i.e., how the brain accomplishes cogni- open system, culture depends for its exis-
tive functions). Indeed, although symbolic tence on the systems that contain it environ-
AI and problem-solving research in cogni- mentally – society, organic (biological), and
tive science fell behind the systems think- inorganic nature (at the top). Diversity and
ing developed in other sciences in the 1970s, complexity increase descending the depen-
it is apparent that systems thinking itself dent hierarchy; constraints become more
was changing dramatically, as it was reartic- general ascending. An individual organism is
ulated in a communication theory that com- a complex of the two higher orders of com-
bined physics and philosophy by cyberneti- plexity (organic plus inorganic), and “a per-
cists (von Foerster, 1970, 2003), and then son . . . is a complex of ‘both-and’ relation-
developed into chaos and complexity theory ships between all four orders of complexity”
in the 1980s (Prigogine, 1984; Waldrop, 1992) (culture, society, organic, and inorganic),
and into what Wolfram (2002) calls “a new and so cannot be logically fitted within this
kind of science” based on cellular automata hierarchy (Wilden 1987, p. 74).
(pp. 12–14). At best, in writing a scientific history
Is it a coincidence that the term situ- one can hope to mention most of the
ated learning was introduced in the 1980s names and ideas that other stakeholders
not long after animal cognition became a (e.g., researchers in education, psychology,
mainstream topic for ethology, or at the anthropology) would cite, providing not as
much a chronological tale but a coherent James, and John Dewey (see Gallagher, this
relation of people and concepts that fit to tell volume). This perspective emphasized that
a coherent, useful story. Especially, the best knowledge was not merely transferred but
motivation might be the question, What that a transformation developed within and
should any student know about the work through the person’s action. Most simply,
that came before, particularly, what might this means that people can be instructed
be fruitfully read again, in the original, for and are not simply learning habits (rote
inspiration? This is my criterion for select- learning). Importantly, “being instructed”
ing the scientific ideas that follow; I empha- means that what is learned is subjectively
size primary sources that future researchers interpreted and assimilated. The subjective
should read and interpret for themselves. aspect emphasizes both that knowledge can-
not be identified with the curriculum –
which Dewey (1902/1981) called a “map for
Crosscutting Themes of Cognition learning” – and that the learner is consciously
reflecting on and making sense of instruc-
I organize scientific work related to situated tive situations and materials in actively look-
cognition according to what discipline or ing and touching while doing things. Two
field of study the advocates were grounded constructivist principles suggested by von
in – philosophy, education, sociology, lin- Glasersfeld (1984, 1989) build on Piaget’s
guistics, biology, neurology, anthropology – work and philosophical realism (Berkeley,
and then group related work by themes that 1710/1963; Vico, 1710/1858): (1) knowledge is
were developed by studying cognition from not passively received but actively built up
the given perspective. This is different from by the cognizing subject, and (2) the func-
a cognitive-element perspective, insofar as tion of cognition is adaptive and serves the
research on memory, for example, appears organization of the experiential world, not
both in the “language + cognition” category the discovery of ontological reality.
as well as in the “neurology + cognition”
category. My aim is to show fundamental
relations between ideas, not what aspects of Constructivism2 : Education +
mind were derived from the studies. The Cognition
themes are research topics embodying a sit-
uated perspective. Space allows for only a Constructivist epistemology combined with
brief mention of each person’s work – for developmental psychology to greatly influ-
elaboration, please see the references cited. ence pedagogical designs in the twenti-
eth century (Dewey, 1902/1981, 1934, 1938;
Piaget, 1932, 1970, 1970/1971). Research
Constructivism1 : Philosophy + emphasizes the development of individ-
Cognition uals to understand the learner’s active
cognitive operations (e.g., Dewey’s [1938]
Constructivism is a theory of learning notion of inquiry) strategies, stages of
according to which people create knowledge conceptual development, and the nature
from the interaction between their exist- of experiential processes of assimilation
ing knowledge or beliefs and the new ideas and accommodation. Learning interactions
or situations they encounter.7 Constructivist can be analyzed in many dimensions,
pedagogy tends to stress the importance of including perception, conception, repre-
both teacher/environmental guidance and sentation, skills, actions, material interac-
learner activity. One thread of construction, and transformation (e.g., interpret-
tivist thinking developed in the philoso- ing instructions, arranging objects into a
phy of psychology, in the late-nineteenth- design). Perception-conception and action
century American pragmatism (Konvitz & are understood to mutually interact (which
Kennedy, 1960) of Charles Peirce, William Dewey [1896] called “coordination”).
Constructivism3 : Sociology + the emergence of mind and self out of

Cognition the social process of significant communi-
cation, which become the foundation of the
More broadly, a social perspective empha- symbolic-interactionist school of sociology
sizes that the environment includes (often and social psychology (Cronk, 2005). Sym-
physically but always conceptually) other bolic interaction focuses on the construction
people with whom the learner participates of personal identity through interactions
in activity systems (Leont’ev, 1979; Vygot- of individuals, especially through linguistic
sky, 1978; Wertsch, 1979, 1985, 1991). The communication (i.e., symbolic interaction).
individual and society are mutually inter- Meanings are thus socially constructed and
acting: “culture . . . is the capacity for con- interrelate with actions. Other noted sym-
stantly expanding the range and accuracy of bolic interactionists are Blumer (1969) and
one’s perception of meanings” (Dewey, 1916, Goffman (1959). Polanyi (1966) developed
p. 123). A social-cognitive analysis empha- these antipositivist theories further in his
sizes interpersonal communication; mutual, elucidation of the nature of tacit knowledge.
dependent action in a group (e.g., as in play- By the 1970s, sociology ideas stemming
ing hide-and-seek); action by a group (e.g., from turn of the century were reformu-
involving specialized and coordinate roles, as lated in the sociology of knowledge (Berger
in a team playing soccer); and identity (the & Luckmann, 1966), a constructivist theory
conscious concept of self as a person engag- that emphasized the learning of individuals
ing in normative, participatory activity). in their social lives, as actively making sense
Dewey and Bentley (1949) describe this of and thus forming a social reality (e.g.,
system in which learning occurs as “trans- Shibutani, 1966). The anthropologist Hall’s
actional,” emphasizing mutual, historical The Silent Language (1959/1973) provides a
development across levels; between individ- virtuoso exposition of the nature of culture,
uals; and through comprehending and doing in a theory of communication that relates
(Clancey, in press). Cole (1996) and Cole formal, informal (e.g., spatial-temporal lay-
and Wertsch (1996, p. 251) emphasize this out, gestures), and technical conceptual sys-
co-construction aspect: both the child and tems. Latour (1999) has applied the social
the environment are active, and culture is construction perspective to science itself,
“the medium within which the two active leading to the side debate that situated
parties to development interact.” cognition was undermining the integrity
Both the social and perceptual-motor of science (Slezak, 1989). Stemming from
coordination perspectives suggest that the the early work by Durkheim (1912/1947),
phenomenon of knowing (or mind) can- the philosophy of science here intersects
not be localized as a system existing wholly with the epistemological study of common
within a person’s brain. As explained, this sense, namely that scientists and ordinary
was seriously at odds with arguments against folk use different tools to develop theories
behaviorism and gestalt theory, and thus of their world but are still constrained by
appeared to turn away again from decom- (and actively changing) a social-historical
posing the brain’s structures and processes. environment of language, instruments, and
Constructivism was not denying the role of values.
the brain but emphasizing that it was not the
locus of control in determining behavior –
nor was the individual the locus of control – Remembering, Storytelling,
and in no case was human behavior simply a Theorizing: Language + Cognition
linear process of logical transformation from
stimulus to decision to action. Philosophy, pedagogy, and sociology defined
Although not often cited in situated broad constraints for a complex system the-
cognition research by psychologists, Mead ory of mind, but it remained for more
(1934), a sociologist, developed a theory of specific studies of cognitive processes to
elucidate what the processes were and how (see Shapiro, 1992, pp. 1427–1443). Ironically,
they were distributed and temporally devel- Bartlett’s theory of memory is based not on
oped. In particular, a focus on language in storage of schemata but rather on active
its manifestations of remembering, story- processes that are always adaptively con-
telling (narrative), and theorizing revealed structed within action, biased through pre-
a dynamic, constructive aspect that fit the vious ways of working together, and when
pragmatists’ and interactionists’ views that engaged “actively doing something all the
behavior itself was transformative and not time” (Bartlett, 1932/1977, p. 201). Thus, he
merely an applicative result (an output) argued for a process memory, not a descrip-
from the “real” cognitive workings of infor- tive memory of processes or a preconfigured
mation input, matching, retrieval, deduc- memory of stored procedures (see Clancey,
tion, and action-plan configuration. Instead, 1997, chap. 3).
we have the notions of dynamic mem- Bartlett developed his theory by ana-
ory, reconstructive memory, representing lyzing story recollection, showing how
as an observable behavior (e.g., speaking details, fragmentary ideas, and narrative
as representing), and thinking as including were remembered and reconstructed. Lof-
nonverbal conceptualizing (versus purely tus (1979/1996) applied these ideas to reveal
linguistic deduction). In this shift – from the improvisational aspects of memory in
information as stimuli extracted from the legal testimony. Bransford et al. (1977) and
environment and responses as stored pro- Jenkins (1974) demonstrated in experimen-
grams to a theory of remembering-in-action tal settings how linguistic-narrative memory
(a process memory) – situated cognition blended phrases, roles, and themes in ways
more radically turns from behaviorism than people did not realize. All of this suggested
information processing was able. that remembering was not merely retriev-
The language-related foundations of situ- ing but actively reconstructing and reactivat-
ated cognition were well established before ing ways of thinking – and seeing, hearing,
AI research on comprehension and dis- doing.
course by the pragmatists (see especially Schank’s (1982) Dynamic Memory high-
Dewey’s [1939/1989, p. 534] response to Rus- lighted how past experience, such as previ-
sell, Wittgenstein’s [1953/1958] break with ous encounters in a restaurant, shapes how
positivism in his analysis of the language we interpret and act in situations we con-
game, Ryle’s [1949] distinction between ceive to be similar. He suggested that fail-
“knowing how” and “knowing that,” Langer’s ure of expectation was particularly impor-
[1942/1958] distinction between discursive tant in constructing new concepts. Although
and presentational representation, Austin’s formalized by Schank’s research group in
[1962] view of language as speech acts, a network of stored descriptions, this work
and the general semantics of Korzybski emphasized the historical nature of knowl-
[1934/1994]). edge. Learning and behaving are insepa-
rable, with learning occurring in behavior
itself, in contrast with the view that learning
Remembering
occurs only in reflective reconstruction after
A situated theory of human memory is a problem-solving episode is complete. Fur-
like an arch keystone that relates neural, thermore, normative (social) behavior can
symbolic information processing and social be described by scripts (Schank & Abelson,
views of cognition. Bartlett’s (1932/1977) 1977), which are learned patterns of behav-
notion of schemata was of course influential ior based on the sequence of experience,
in qualitative modeling applications, rang- not compiled from theoretical models about
ing from visual processing (e.g., Minsky’s restaurants, and so on (for further relation
[1985] frames) to expert (knowledge-based) of scripts to situated cognition, see Clancey,
problem solving and case-based reasoning 2002).
these relationships were viewed as enumer-

Conceptual Structure
able, definable, and in some respects admit-
Focusing on aspects of storytelling, ting to further decomposition. Such descrip-
metaphor, and comprehension, researchers tions ignore the dynamic relations across
explored how concepts are related in perception and motor systems, the concep-
human understanding, how these relations tual organization of physical skills (espe-
develop, and how they are manifest in cially in the dynamics of and among ges-
linguistic behavior. This work tended to ture, sound, and vision), and how social
underscore that knowledge is more than norms (e.g., conceptualization of activity)
conceptual networks with nodes and links develop through interactions. In particular,
representing words and their attributes. cues and timing (as in a dance or complex
Instead, conceptual understanding is not group conversation) cannot be easily pre-
separate from sensory and gestural (embod- described or linearly sequenced as frames
ied) experience (Lakoff, 1987); relations can or schemata in a knowledge base. Rather,
be mutually defining (e.g., Wilden’s [1987] the mental constructs are behavior patterns
exposition of dialectics); and a linguist’s that are activated and adaptively impro-
reduction of speaking to grammatical form vised through ongoing tacit reflection (e.g.,
and definitions “alienates language from the Schön’s [1987] knowing-in-action). This is
self” (Tyler, 1978, p. 17). Similarly, Bruner not to say that the grammatical descrip-
(1990) highlighted the role of narrative in tions of observable patterns are not accu-
the construction of the self. Narrative is rate or useful theoretical tools but to ques-
a representational form that transcends tion whether such models can be identified
individual concepts through “tropes” of with the neural structures that participate in
agents, scenes, goals, and so on, that have the described behavior (see Clancey, 1997,
interpretive value, but not logical “truth chap. 1).
conditions” (pp. 59–60). Thus understand-
ing the genre, development, and function
Learning by Doing and Inquiry
of narrative requires systems thinking.
These theoretical perspectives each As previously noted, the philosophical, psy-
sought in their own way to avoid the pit- chological, and social development of the
falls of a narrow structuralism, which tended systems view of cognition was often based
to localize behavior, knowledge, or meaning on or directly influenced educational theory
in one box of a mental process (e.g., con- and designs. This is most obvious in the work
ceptual memory, grammar) while ignoring of Dewey (who started his own school),
the dynamic relations between systems (e.g., Piaget, Bruner, and Papert, and then mani-
perception-conception-action, experience- fest in the analyses by Bamberger and Schön
self-participation). (1983) of learning in the arts, such as music
Structuralism, attributed to Titchener (Bamberger, 1991) and architectural design
(Plucker, 2003), sought to explain behavior (Schön, 1987). Each explored an aspect
through the interaction of component men- of constructionism (Papert & Harel, 1991),
tal structures, in the manner of a chemist which claimed that making and experiment-
explaining reactions in terms of atomic and ing with physical objects (including draw-
molecular interactions. In his core-context ings and notations) facilitates the learning of
theory of meaning, Titchener suggested a abstract concepts, as well as the generation
complex system, by which “a new mental of new insights that promote abstract think-
process (the core) acquired its meaning from ing. The theoretical claims were based on
the context of other mental processes within constructivism, but can be read as respond-
which it occurs” (Plucker, 2003). However, ing to AI’s models of knowledge acquisi-
in most models of language until the mid- tion: (1) learning is an active, willful process,
1980s (predating neural network models), not a passive comprehension and storage of
facts and procedures to be later applied, (2) already well established in biology, as scien-
understanding requires experience, whether tists came to realize that neither the cell nor
physical or in the imagination, such that the organism could be isolated for under-
multiple modalities of thought are coor- standing the sustenance, development, or
dinated, and (3) conceptual understanding evolution of life. Systems thinking, involv-
relies on perceptual-motor experience and ing notions of dynamic and emergent inter-
simpler ideas, such that learning can be actions, was necessary to relate the interac-
viewed and usefully guided in stages, which tions of inherited phenotype, environmental
themselves require time and exploration to factors, and the effect of learning. Indeed,
develop. Most important, this dynamic sys- in reviewing the literature, one is struck by
tems perspective does not deny the central how ethologists (studying natural behavior
role of formal representations (e.g., musi- of animals), neurologists (focusing on neu-
cal notation) but rather seeks to explain ral and cell assemblies), and cyberneticists
how representations are created and acquire (forming cross-disciplinary theories of sys-
meaning in practice. tems and information) were meeting and
Schön (1979, 1987) combined these ideas writing about similar aspects of life and cog-
quite practically in his reinterpretation of nition. Yet, with a more narrow focus on
Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry (Clancey, intelligence, and then expertise, the rele-
1997, pp. 207–213). For example, his anal- vance of these broad theories to AI and cog-
ysis of architectural design revealed how nitive science was not recognized for several
conceiving, articulating, drawing, perceiv- decades. Thus, even though one can easily
ing, and interpreting/reflecting were dynam- see cybernetics as kin to situated cognition,
ically influencing one another in nested and cybernetics was not presented in AI text-
parallel processes. Within the AI commu- books as a necessary background for study-
nity, these ideas were first developed most ing the nature of intelligence.
visibly in the idea of cognitive appren-
ticeship (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989;
Cybernetics
Collins, Brown, & Newman, 1989), which
produced a lively debate (Bredo, 1994; The intersection of neurology, electronic
Greeno, 1997; see also Clancey’s [1992] network theory, and logic modeling around
response to Sandberg & Wielinga, 1991). World War II was popularized by Nor-
In related naturalistic studies, Gardner bert Wiener (1948), who defined cybernet-
(1985) examined the varieties of intelligence, ics as the study of teleological mechanisms,
emphasizing skills in different modalities exemplified by the feedback mechanisms in
that people exhibited or combined in dif- biological and social systems. As we have
ferent ways. This work had the dual effect seen throughout, the notions of memory
of highlighting what schoolwork and tests and localization were central. Von Foerster
ignored and how the verbal emphasis of (1973) wrote: “The response of a nerve cell
problem-solving research over the previous does not encode the physical nature of the
two decades had ignored physical, visual, agents that caused its response. Encoded is
and even interpersonal forms of knowledge. only ‘how much’ at this point on my body,
but not ‘what’” (pp. 214–215). That is, the
observer’s described world of objects, prop-
Animal Cognition, Evolution, and erties, and events is not represented at this
Ecology Feedback: Biology + level in the nervous system; rather, what
Cognition is registered or encoded is a difference or
change as the body interacts with its envi-
In many respects, the application of sys- ronment.
tems thinking that was so confusing and Similarly, Maturana and Varela’s notion
indeed threatening to psychologists and AI of organizational closure views information
researchers in the 1970s and 1980s was (“in-formation”) as a dynamic relation and
not something that flows into the organ- cognitivist perspective (see especially Shaw
ism as instructions or objectively meaningful & Todd, 1980; elucidated by Clancey, 1997,
packets. Maturana and Varela’s (Maturana, pp. 280–283). In psychology this alternative
1975, 1978, 1983; Maturana & Varela, 1980, view was also called “contextualism” (Hoff-
1987) theoretical framework of the biology man & Nead, 1983).
of cognition also formalizes the complex-
systems concepts of structural coupling
Ethology
(mutual causal relations between organism
and environment) and autopoiesis (self- From a historical perspective, perhaps the
creating) (see Capra, 1996; Clancey, 1997, oddest disconnection in the science of cog-
pp. 85–92). Von Glasersfeld (1974) called this nition is the study of intelligence by early
“radical constructivism” (see also Riegler, AI and cognitive scientists without refer-
2001). ence to animal research. In part, this could
Bateson (1972, 1988, 1991) was a cen- reflect perhaps a resistance to attribute cog-
tral figure in the inquiry relating cybernet- nition per se to animals, as animal cognition
ics, biology, and cognition. His reach was only flourished on the scientific scene in the
especially broad, including cultural anthro- 1980s (e.g., Gould, 1986; Griffin, 1992; Roit-
pology, ethology, and family therapy. For blat, Bever, & Terrace, 1984). And certainly
example, his theory of the double bind the Skinnerian behaviorist psychology of the
in schizophrenia claimed that contradic- 1950s and 1960s appeared to be more about
tory messages (e.g., a verbal command and rote animal training than about problem
an incommensurate gesture) could disrupt solving. Nevertheless, the work of Konrad
conceptual coordination. Thus, in under- Lorenz, Karl von Frisch, and Nikolaas Tin-
standing schizophrenia as not only an inter- bergen, winners of the Nobel Prize in 1973,
nal mental-biological dysfunction but also a was well known through the 1950s. In the
confused interpersonal dynamic – a disor- autobiography accompanying his Nobel lec-
ganized relation between person and envi- ture, Lorenz (1973) says he early on believed
ronment – Bateson brought a dialectic, that his responsibility (“chief life task”) was
ecological notion of information and com- to develop an evolutionary theory of ani-
munication to understanding development mal psychology, based on the comparative
in biology and social science. study of behavior. He was influenced by Karl
Bühler and Egon Brunswick to consider a
psychology of perception tied to epistemol-
Ecological Psychology
ogy; similarly, he found in Erich von Holst “a
Gibson (1979), a psychologist, developed a biologically oriented psychologist who was,
systems theory of cognition that explained at the same time, interested in theory of
behavior as a relation that develops in knowledge.”
located action. For example, rather than say- Frisch’s analysis of the “waggle dance” of
ing that a person can jump over a stream, honeybees, The Bee’s Language (published
one might say that a given stream affords in German in 1923), is an exemplary study
jumping when a person is running as he or of situated animal behavior in groups (com-
she approaches (Turvey & Shaw, 1995). Such pare this study over time and across loca-
an affordance is a dynamic relation between tions with feeding pellets to pigeons in a cage
a moving person and the environment, not apparatus). Tinbergen’s (1953) The Herring
located in the person or in the stream. Tur- Gull’s World teased apart the stimuli orga-
vey and Shaw further developed this the- nizing social behavior patterns.
ory relating perception and motion, char- The study of animal navigation and
acterizing the organism-in-environment as a social behavior is especially profound for
reciprocal relation, seeking a biologically rel- AI and cognitive science because it reveals
evant information theory (see Clancey, 1997, what simpler mechanisms – fixed pro-
chap. 11). They explicitly argued against the grams with perhaps limited learning during
maturation – can accomplish. Studying ani- Lashley, 1951) and predated computational
mals forces the scientist to acknowledge that modeling of problem solving. Rosenfield
an observer’s descriptive world maps and (1988, 2000), Edelman (1987), and Freeman
principled rule descriptions of behavior (as (1991) directly addressed and often critiqued
might be found in an expert system), though cognitive theories, showing that they were
useful to model animal behavior, could not incoherent from the perspective of com-
be the generative mechanism in creatures plex systems theory and were biologically
lacking a language for modeling the world implausible.
and behavior. This realization, pioneered by Similarly, Sacks (1987), a neurologist,
Brooks (1991), produced in the late 1980s a used case studies of how patients survive
wide variety of animal-inspired mechanisms and adapt to reveal how neural processes,
in the field of situated robotics (Clancey, the environment, and issues such as self-
1997, Part 2). The formulation of a theory of hood interact to inhibit or enable men-
dynamic (complex) systems (termed chaos tal experience. Sacks was especially adept
systems) by Prigogine (1984) helped explain, at showing how conventional neurology’s
for example, ant organization around a tests and dysfunctional categories veritably
food source. In particular, the complex sys- “decomposed” the patient by an inventory
tems concept of dissipative structures (in of deficits, while instead the patient’s expe-
which decreased energy becomes a source rience developed as a compensatory reor-
of increased order) inspired Steels’s (1990) ganizing process of preserving and reestab-
designs of self-organizing robotic systems. lishing identity (persona). Notice how the
Related work in artificial life (Resnick, idea of a person – involving personal projects
1997) in the 1980s sought to explain the (Sacks, 1995), temperament, friendships,
development of systemic organization and cherished experiences, and so on – is very
emergent properties through the same cellu- different from the typical antiseptic refer-
lar automata mechanisms that inspired Min- ence to humans as subjects of study, in
sky in 1950. Kaufmann (1993) moved this which it becomes all too easy to then ignore
investigation to molecular biology, interest- issues of identity and consciousness.
ingly combining the strings-of-symbols idea
from information processing with the notion
of self-organizing feedback systems. He sug- Contemporary Theories of Knowledge
gested the applicability of this approach to and Learning: Anthropology +
understanding economics, conceptual sys- Cognition
tems, and cultural organization – hence “the
new kind of science” (Wolfram, 2002). At this point in the story, the history of
science by the late 1980s becomes the con-
temporary development of situated cogni-
Neurology and Neuropsychology: tion in AI and cognitive science (Clancey,
Neurology + Cognition 1997). Some social scientists were shift-
ing from third-world sites to business and
Neuroscience, inspired by mechanisms of school settings in the United States, Europe,
computational connectionism and grounded and South America, focusing especially on
in magnetic resonance imaging and related learning (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991). These
methods for inspecting brain processes, researchers were especially influenced by
raced ahead in the 1990s with new models Dewey, Vygotsky, Piaget (e.g., Cole &
of categorization learning, visual processing, Wertsch, 1996), Bateson, Gibson, Hall, and
sensory memory, and theories relating emo- Mead (e.g., Suchman, 1987). Often anthro-
tion to cognition (Damasio, 1994). pology provided an organizing theoreti-
As previously related, connectionism cal and methodological perspective (Green-
derived from early work in neural network baum & Kyng, 1991). Studies of learning
modeling (e.g., Head, 1920; Hebb, 1949; and instructional design were transformed
to relate information and participatory pro- tic network of concepts and relations – sup-
cesses in activity systems (Greeno, 2006). posedly modified in long-term memory and
Drawn in perhaps by the formation processed by a central processing unit that
of the Cognitive Science Society in 1980, was by assumption identical in every human
some social scientists and psychologists brain.
reacted especially to the theory that all Nevertheless, some cognitive phenomena
problem-solving behavior was generated stood out as requiring consideration: com-
from a preformulated plan derived from monsense knowledge (nobody needs physics
verbally defined goals and deductive infer- calculations to know whether a spilled liq-
ence about problem-solving methods (Agre, uid is likely to reach the end of a table), the
1997; Schön, 1987). For example, Lave (1988) relation of imagery and discursive thought
questioned whether human expertise could (Langer, 1942/1958), the subjective nature
be inventoried and indeed stored in a of meaning versus the idea that knowl-
knowledge base. Situated action and situ- edge consisted of stored proposition mod-
ated learning sought to expose how peo- els of facts and rules (highlighted by the
ple actually behaved, what they knew, and philosophical analysis of Winograd & Flo-
how they learned during work. Some of res, 1986), language learning (how does a
the earliest proponents were Scribner and child learn so much grammar from so few
Cole (1973), Rogoff and Lave (1984), and examples?), ill-structured problems (Simon,
Suchman (1987). The previously mentioned 1973), musical creation and performance
ideas of cognitive apprenticeship devel- (e.g., Smoliar, 1973), how symbols in a cog-
oped in this academic community of prac- nitive system are grounded (Harnad, 1990),
tice, which resided predominantly at the and so on.
University of California’s Irvine and San Reflecting on the problems scientists had
Diego campuses, Xerox-PARC, Pittsburgh’s in bringing a complex-systems perspective
Learning Research and Development Cen- to AI and cognitive science, Clancey (1997,
ter (LRDC), the Massachusetts Institute of pp. 345–364) formulated a set of heuristics
Technology’s Media Lab, and the Institute for scientists: Beware an either-or mental-
for Research on Learning. ity (e.g., knowledge is either objective or
arbitrary). Try both narrow and broad inter-
pretations of terms. Given a dichotomy,
Foreshadowed Dilemmas in Cognitive ask what both positions assume. Beware
Psychology and AI imposing spatial metaphors. Beware locat-
ing relations. Try viewing independent lev-
Artificial intelligence and cognitive scientists els as codetermined. Don’t equate a descrip-
were aware of gaps and oddities in main- tive model with the causal process being
stream theories of intelligence through the described. Recognize that first approxima-
1960s and 1970s. However, any science must tions may be overstatements. Be aware
exclude certain phenomena (one is tempted that words sometimes mean their opposites.
to say, “certain complexities”). Thus, it is no Enduring dilemmas are possibly important
surprise that although engaging invited talks clues. Periodically revisit what you have
and textbook final chapters (e.g., Neisser, chosen to ignore. Beware of building your
1976) might mention autism, dreaming, and theory into the data. Locate your work
emotion, there was no coherent theory of within historical debates and trends. “It’s not
consciousness. (Indeed, the new reputabil- new” does not refute a hypothesis. Beware
ity of the topic of consciousness in cognitive of errors of logical typing. Recognize con-
science during the 1990s was somewhat like ceptual barriers to change. To understand
the admission of cognition into talk about an incomprehensible position, start with
animals in the 1980s.) Psychiatric disorders, what the person is against. Recognize that
for example, were difficult to make sensi- the born-again mentality conceives sharp
ble from the perspective of a single seman- contrasts. Recognize how other disciplines
study and use as tools different aspects of inhibited; prone to ennui and powerless anx-
intelligence. Recognize the different mental iety, yet in joy of nature and companionship
styles of your colleagues. always situated.
Can we summarize the meaning of situ-
ated cognition itself, as seen through all the
scientific disciplines over the past century? Acknowledgments
As stated, an all-encompassing generaliza-
tion is the perspective of complex systems. My understanding of situated cognition has been
strongly influenced by courses at Rice University
From an investigative standpoint, the one
in 1971–1973 taught by Fred Gamst (Sociocultural
essential theoretical move is contextualiza-
Anthropology); Konstantin Kolenda (Philosophy
tion (perhaps stated as “antilocalization,” in of Knowledge; Philosophy of Literature); Ken
terms of what must be rooted out): we can- Leiter, then visiting from University of Cali-
not locate meaning in the text, life in the fornia, Irvine (Ethnomethodology: The Radical
cell, the person in the body, knowledge in Sociology of Knowledge); and Stephen Tyler
the brain, a memory in a neuron. Rather, (Language, Thought, and Culture). Conversa-
these are all active, dynamic processes, exist- tions with my colleagues at IRL (1987–1997),
ing only in interactive behaviors of cultural, particularly John Seely Brown, Jim Greeno,
social, biological, and physical environment Gitti Jordan, Jean Lave, Charlotte Linde, Jeremy
systems. Meaning, life, people, knowledge, Roschelle, Susan Stucky, and Etienne Wenger,
provided insights and motivation for putting
and so on, are not arbitrary, wholly sub-
these ideas together. I am grateful to Alex
jective, culturally relative, or totally impro-
Riegler, Mike Shafto, Jim Greeno, and an anony-
vised. Rather, behaviors, conceptions, and mous reviewer for their comments on this chap-
emotional experiences are constrained by ter. My writing has been supported in part
historically developed structural relations by NASA’s Computing, Communications, and
among parts and subprocesses in different Information Technology Program.
kinds of memories – neural, artifactual, rep-
resentational, and organizational – and are
dynamically constrained in action across sys- Notes
tem levels.
Many difficult problems remain in under- 1 This is a story about the conceptual founda-
standing learning, language, creativity, and tions of situated cognition; for how the par-
consciousness. From a computer scientist’s ticular theories of situativity and learning in
the 1980s and 1990s developed, see Sawyer
standpoint, looking out over the vast land-
and Greeno (this volume).
scape of more than a century of exploration, 2 Definitions in this section are adapted from
the nature of memory and development the Wikipedia discussion (retrieved June
still appears pivotal. Almost certainly, elu- 7, 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
cidating the emergent structures and regu- Systems_Thinking). For an introduction, see
latory processes of genetic biology (Carroll, also New England Complex Systems Institute
2005) will inspire more complex computa- (n.d.).
tional theories and machines with perhaps 3 Definitions in this section are adapted from
reconstructive procedures and hierarchies. the Wikipedia discussion (retrieved June 7,
The nature of conceptualization and hence 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
consciousness will gradually be articulated, Systems_theory).
4 Definitions in this section are adapted
comprising a complex order of molecular,
from the Wikipedia discussion (retrieved
physiological, neural, coordination memory, June 7, 2005, from http://en.wikipedia.org/
and activity systems. The nature of the wiki/Complex_system).
self – unfolding, self-organized, and willfully 5 As a graduate student in the 1970s, I read
determined – will be revealed as the essential a Natural History article about the dance of
cognitive dialectic: controlling, yet biased by the bees and wondered, How did insect nav-
ideas; open to change, yet inconsistent and igation relate to expert reasoning? Could we
model the bee’s knowledge as rules? Brooks Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind.
(1991) provided an alternative theory. New York: Ballantine Books.
6 For a discussion of the dichotomy between Bateson, G. (1988). Mind and nature: A necessary
the living constitution (arbitrariness) and unity. New York: Bantam Books.
strict interpretation (objectivity) – indeed Bateson, G. (1991). Sacred unity. New York: Cor-
an argument against either-or thinking – see nelia & Michael Bessie.
Antonin Scalia’s remarks at the Woodrow Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social
Wilson International Center for Scholars in construction of reality: A treatise in the
Washington, DC, on March 14, 2005 (re- sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor
trieved July 20, 2005, from http://www. Books.
cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/guest_ Berkeley, G. (1963). A treatise concerning the prin-
commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech. ciples of human knowledge. La Salle, IL: Open
htm). Court. (Originally published 1710)
7 “Constructivism.” In Webster’s Third New Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Per-
International Dictionary, Unabridged (re- spective and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
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merriam-webster.com). Bransford, J. D., McCarrell, N. S., Franks, J. J.,
& Nitsch, K. E. (1977). Toward unexplaining
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CHAPTER 3
Philosophical Antecedents
of Situated Cognition
Shaun Gallagher
In this chapter I plan to situate the concept sky to Gibson) and biologists (from von
of situated cognition within the framework Uexküll to Varela), many of whom have had
of antecedent philosophical work. My inten- a significant impact on how we think of cog-
tion, however, is not to provide a simple nition as complexly embodied and situated.2
historical guide but to suggest that there are I think that it is right to say that most con-
still some untapped resources in these past temporary philosophers who champion the
philosophers that may serve to enrich cur- idea of situated cognition have been posi-
rent accounts of situated cognition. tively influenced by this work in psychol-
I will include embodied cognition as part ogy and neurobiology. For the philosophers
of the concept of situated cognition. One with whom we will be concerned, how-
often encounters these terms used together – ever, the psychology and biology of their
embodied cognition and situated cognition – time had less of a positive effect, and in
and it is clear that situated cognition can- some cases defined precisely what these
not be disembodied, although some authors philosophers were reacting against. What is
emphasize one over the other or provide even clearer is that these philosophers were
principled distinctions between them.1 Phi- reacting against a long philosophical tradi-
losophical thought experiments notwith- tion that simply ignored the importance of
standing, however, the often-encountered body and situation in favor of the isolated
brain in a vat is, to say the least, in a very mind. This tradition included, of course,
odd and artificial situation. Given what Descartes, but also Locke, Hume, and Kant,
seems to be an essential connection between and almost every other modern philosopher
embodiment and situation, I will take the one can name. To ignore embodiment and
more inclusive and holistic route and view situation was the overwhelming tendency of
them accordingly. the philosophical tradition up to and includ-
The large landscape of sources for the ing many twentieth-century philosophers.
concept of situated cognition is populated Before the twentieth century it is dif-
with important psychologists (from Vygot- ficult, though not impossible, to find
35
36 SHAUN GALLAGHER
philosophers who could count as propo- many others, such as William James, George
nents of situated cognition. There is, how- Herbert Mead, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aron
ever, a long tradition that emphasized prac- Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas, Hubert Dreyfus,
tical reason, especially in discussions of or more recently, Andy Clark, Mark John-
ethics and politics, and in these discourses son (writing with George Lakoff), and Evan
the idea of situated reasoning is not absent. Thompson (writing with Francisco Varela).
One could mention here Aristotle’s notion
of phronesis (practical wisdom), which is
a form of knowing or epistemic capacity Organism-Environment
that is highly dependent on the particular
and practical (moral) situation in which it Situated cognition has become an impor-
must be practiced. In the case of phrone- tant concept in educational theory, and one
sis, one does not know in general, or by of the most frequently cited philosophers
appeal to a set of rules, so much as one in this context is John Dewey (see, e.g.,
decides case by case – with special atten- Bredo, 1994; Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989;
tion to the details of each case – what one Clancey, 1997; Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger,
must do. The Stoics also regarded the situ- 1991). Curiously, just as much as Dewey is
ation, defined in its most determined and cited in discussions of situated learning, he
concrete terms, as an important factor in is almost entirely ignored in the philosophy-
knowing what one can and cannot do. These of-mind discussion of situated cognition.4
traditions, however, were not carried over But Dewey was clearly the Dennett of his
into the realm of theoretical knowledge, time, at least in terms of his enthusiasm
or what philosophy has considered cogni- for the science of mind and his rejection
tion per se (something closer to mathe- of Cartesianism. As early as 1884 Dewey
matics than to phronesis), which was most reviewed the significance of the new phys-
frequently thought to be independent of iological psychology, and he points to the
situation. Even moral deliberation was importance of certain biological concepts of
frequently modeled on context-free or organism and environment:
mathematical thinking (think of Kant’s cat-
egorical imperative or Bentham’s utilitarian The influence of biological science in general
calculus). There may be a number of excep- upon psychology has been very great. . . . To
tions to this general view (I think Nietzsche biology is due the conception of organ-
ism. . . . In psychology this conception has
would count as an exception, for example),3
led to the recognition of mental life as an
but nothing like a fully developed concept organic unitary process developing accord-
of situated cognition is to be found prior to ing to the laws of all life, and not a
the twentieth century. theatre for the exhibition of independent
In general, then, if the roots of the idea of autonomous faculties, or a rendezvous
situated cognition extend back into the his- in which isolated, atomic sensations and
tory of philosophy, they remained undevel- ideas may gather, hold external converse,
oped and well covered by the ground from and then forever part. Along with this
which the Enlightenment grew, not even to recognition of the solidarity of mental life
be unearthed in all the digging for episte- has come that of the relation in which it
mological foundations. But in the twenti- stands to other lives organized in society.
The idea of environment is a necessity to
eth century this idea did break the surface,
the idea of organism, and with the con-
and it started to grow in certain philoso- ception of environment comes the impos-
phers who were reacting critically against sibility of considering psychical life as an
the modern philosophies of Descartes, Kant, individual, isolated thing developing in a
and numerous others. I focus on four such vacuum. (Dewey, 1884, p. 280)
philosophers: Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, and Wittgenstein. These are four Dewey thus criticized conceptions of cogni-
philosophers among a list that could include tive experience that construe it as narrowly
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SITUATED COGNITION 37
individual, ideational, and passive. Experi- the situation.5 For Dewey, ideas, as well
ence is not something that happens in an as gestures and speech acts, are themselves
isolated mind; rather, experience is biologi- tools for this kind of interaction. Further-
cal, insofar as it involves an organism in an more, whether we are moving things about
environment, and social, insofar as that envi- or reconstructing meaning, cognition is pri-
ronment is intersubjective. Cognition, then, marily a social event and is often accom-
emerges in the transactional relations that plished in a joint effort. Cognition and such
characterize organisms and the physical and communicative processes are measurable in
social environment with which they engage. terms of their pragmatic success. A good
Experience is thus situated. “In actual expe- idea consists of a set of practices that resolves
rience, there is never any such isolated sin- the problem.
gular object or event; an object or event is Dewey was thus criticizing a strict Carte-
always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an sian division of labor between mind and
environing experienced world – a situation” body – a division of labor that was not simply
(Dewey, 1938a, p. 67). theoretical and a problem for philosophers
Dewey uses the notion of a problematic but that was finding its way into the prag-
situation to describe how cognition involves matics of everyday life. Consider the fol-
coping with unfamiliar circumstances. Situ- lowing description of management practices
ations are problematic if there is some ele- from Taylor’s 1911 textbook Scientific Man-
ment of confusion, disturbance, uncertainty, agement:
or incompleteness that needs to be resolved
Thus all of the planning which under the
and there is no clear direction that would
old system was done by the workman, as
lead to resolution. In such cases, cognition is a result of his personal experience, must
a form of inquiry, and this is understood as of necessity under the new system be done
a hands-on practical activity through which by the management in accordance with the
we transform the situation into one that is laws of the science. . . . It is also clear that
less confused and more comprehensible, and in most cases one type of man is needed to
in which ideas for successful action start to plan ahead and an entirely different type
emerge. An idea is not primarily an intel- to execute the work. The man in the plan-
lectual entity in the head but “an organic ning room, whose specialty under scientific
anticipation of what will happen when cer- management is planning ahead, invariably
finds that the work can be done better
tain operations are executed under and with
and more economically by a subdivision
respect to observed conditions” (Dewey,
of the labour; each act of each mechanic,
1938a, p. 109). Cognitive inquiry is not a for example, should be preceded by vari-
purely mental phenomenon but involves an ous preparatory acts done by other men.
interaction between organism and environ- (Taylor, 1911/1967, p. 37)
ment to produce real changes in the causal
couplings that characterize the situation. The separation of mental experience
We should add the important point that the from hands-on physical manipulation of the
situation should be defined as inclusive of environment was, for Dewey, both a philo-
the inquirer. It is not I as cognitive inquirer sophical and a social problem.6 For him, cog-
confronting a situation; the situation sur- nition is a form of action and not a relation
rounds and includes me. between a thinking that goes on in the mind
Dewey was influenced by Peirce in his and a behavior that goes on in the world.
thinking that, in the process of coping with The basic unit of experience is the organism-
a problematic situation, we use not only environment rather than a Cartesian cogito
ideas but also tools – physical ones like ham- or Kantian pure ego:
mers with which we can physically reshape We see that man is somewhat more than
the environment, but also linguistic ones, a neatly dovetailed psychical machine who
which in communicative contexts may do may be taken as an isolated individual. . . .
just as well in reshaping the dynamics of We know that his life is bound up with
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Title: Tervanpolttajat
Ynnä muita kertomuksia pohjan periltä
Author: Salomo Pulkkinen
Release date: April 15, 2024 [eBook #73400]
Language: Finnish
Original publication: Porvoo: WSOY, 1904
Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen
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TERVANPOLTTAJAT ***
TERVANPOLTTAJAT
Ynnä muita kertomuksia Pohjan periltä
Kirj.
SALOMO PULKKINEN
Porvoossa, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1904.
Sensuurin hyväksymä. Porvoo, 22 p. Marrask. 1904.
SISÄLLYS:
Tervanpolttajat.
Pakeneva onni.
Kannan pahennus.
Suolle taloksi.
Tervajoella.
Ruotipoika.
Markkinaturkki.
Tervanpolttajat.
Lehtilahden Antti oli juuri saanut tervahautansa viimeiset puut

ladotuiksi; hän istui nyt pirttinsä sivupenkillä vuoleskellen
lapionvartta sillä aikaa kun emäntänsä Liisa kirnusi eteisen penkillä
puolisvoita. Liisa oli koko viikon huoletellut että mistä se saadaan
hautahamari sitten kun hauta sytytetään, vaan Antin mielestä oli tuo
asia niin vähäpätöinen että ei monesti vastannut Liisalle mitään
tämän aina uudistaessa kysymyksensä hautahamarista; arveli vain
toisinaan että: Viisi minä veisaan hämäristä, kunhan saisi
sytytysyöksi vain vähän työ-apua. Antti aikoi puolisten syötyä
lähettää Liisan kysymään Lovaniemen Juusoa, jos se olisi kotosalla,
että eikö sopisi tuota niinkun käydä vähän apuna hautaa
sytytettäessä. Vaan se homma jäi kuitenkin nyt aivan kokonaan, kun
pirttiin astui Kanalan Jussi, Antin lankomies, kantaen suurta
eväsnyyttyä.
Kun Antti oli pistänyt kättä lankomiehelleen ja kysynyt kuulumiset,

meni hän suoraa päätä sanomaan Liisalle, että lankomies, Kanalan
Jussi, on tullut vieraaksi, joten nyt ei tarvitakaan enää käydä
Lovaniemessä rukoilemassa avuksi Juusoa, joka ei kuitenkaan ole
mikään mestari niihin asioihin.
— Niinpä kylläkin, sanoi Liisa, parasta on ettei tarvitse Juusoon

turvautua. Eikös se Juuso ole semmoinen laiska vötkylä, ja kuitenkin
pitäisi kaikki hoito olla nenällä haistain. Kyllä minä muistan viime
syksynä kun se täällä oli navetan nosto-aikana, kun minä pirautin
vähän jyviä kahven sekaan, niin vaikka muut eivät siitä tienneet
mitään, elähän ollakaan, Lova-Juuson nenä on siitä kippurassa.
Köyhä mies ja niin ranttu. No jo sit — — —
— Elähän, kuulehan vielä, sanoi Antti, Kanalan Jussilla oli iso

nyytty mukana; siinä nyytyssä voipi olla eväitä ja hyväpä ollakin;
Jussi ei ole milloinkaan käynyt niin jotta sillä ei olisi mukana metson
takat, kapahauit, juustoleivät ja ryynikukot. Ajattelepas nyt, Liisa,
kun saadaan mies omin ruokinsa työhön. Se tosiaan sattuikin oikein
paraassa jamassa. Elähän nyt muuta, vaan laitahan puolista meille
yhteen Jussin kanssa, niin minä jo ennakolta lähden puhumaan
Jussille siitä tervaruukista.
— No jokos siellä Kanalan puolessa ovat ihmiset tervojaan

polttaneet? kysyi Antti lankomieheltään ensi sanoikseen, jotta siitä
olisi mukavampi sitten livahtaa puhumaan omasta tervaruukista.
— Kyllä ne muutamat ovat tainneet jo polttaa; taitaa teilläkin olla

tervaruukki; minä siitä tässä tuonoin jo kuulin.
— Niin on, aivan poltto-valmis. Minä tässä ajattelin lähettää

kylästä hakemaan apulaista, vaan koska sinä nyt tähän satuit
tulemaan, niin emme tarvitse lähteä kylään.
— Vaan entä hautahamari, mistä se saadaan? Arvatenkin itse ette

osaa, sillä te olette syntynyt ja kasvanut siellä etelän puolessa, missä
ei tervaa ruukata ollenkaan, ja minä taas'en ymmärrä tervaruukin
päälle mitään, sillä minä olen koko ikäni elänyt vieraana koko
tervahommalle, huomautti Kanalan Jussi.
Mutta Antti sanoi olevan naurettavan lapsellista puhua
hautahamarista; sanoi useita kertoja sattumalta nähneensä miten
Lontta-Lassi aina Sutilan haudalla lapion kanssa kiertää kännisti
hautaa, miten aina kurikan kanssa nousi haudan päälle ja hieman
kierona suin hyppäsi vuoroin toisen ja toisen jalkansa varaan, sitten
aina poleskeli ympäri päällystä, löi vuoroin kurikalla ja taas
tasakäpälässä hyppäsi, ja sitä tekostaan teki kunnes laskeusi sieltä
alas, otti lapion ja sillä remautteli hieman multaa haudan rintaan.
»Siinä se sitten on se koko hamarin mahti. Minusta näytti että siinä
oli tuli, joka viisaimman työn teki, paraan konstin arvasi. Sitä
samallaista mahtia sitä kyllä on meilläkin. Annahan kunhan tuossa
auringon laskeutuessa tyyntyy, niin syöstetään vain tuli haudan
rintaan. Saat nähdä lankomies sitten, miten hauta palaa, tuli
mestarin työt tekee. Me vain päältä katsomme, juomme kahvia ja
laskemme tervaa.»
Iltatyyni tuli ja Lehtilahden Antti oli pian lankomiehensä kanssa

tulta virittämässä turpeilla katetun haudan ympärille, josta alkoi heti
nousta valkeanharmaa savu ensin sameana pilvenä korkeuteen ja
sieltä laskeusi sitten alas leviten pitkin Lehtijärven vesisinistä pintaa.
Tuli vain hiljaisen huminan kanssa kohosi vähitellen ylös haudan

ulkopintaa lankomiesten alituisesti hautaa kierellessä ja nakatessa
aina lapiollaan multaa siihen kohti, mistä sininen savu nousi. Tulen
humina ja riske alkoi kuulua jo kulmilta ja se tiesi sitä että tuli oli jo
noussut niin ylös. Kaikki näytti jo voitetulta, siispä Antti sanoi
lankomiehelleen. Kanalan Jussille: »Nyt tässä ei ole mitään hätää;
istutaanhan tuohon mättäälle, katsotaan miten hauta palaa ja
jutellaan maailman asioista.»
Antti rupesi nyt Jussille esittelemään: »Mitähän ajattelisit, jos tuo
Lehtiniemen kallio olisi kokonaan kultaa, tahi kokonaan muuttuisi
kullaksi? Kelpaisikos tässä paikassa sitten elellä?» Mutta mitäs
tapahtuikaan. Molempain miesten järvelle katsoessa oli hiilivalkea
loimahtanut yltäyleensä koko haudan ympärille.
— Voi mikä tuli! sanoi Antti, nyt se palaa kyllä meiltä väkisellä.
Hän otti lapion ja alkoi kaikin voimin multaa syytää päristämään
haudan päälle. Vaan Jussi ei hievahtanut paikaltaan, katsoi vaan
miten Antin lapiosta lenti multa ja katosi aina liekkien sekaan. Antti
ei ensin sitä huomannut, vaan luuli Jussinkin samalla tavalla tulta
sammuttavan. Sitten kuitenkin sattuivat Antin silmät jouten istuvaan
Jussiin ja hän sanoi heti:
— Etkö sinä, Jussi kulta, näe että hauta palaa väkivalkeassa. Miksi
istut jouten, etkä sammuta?
— Minä luulen että se ei ole hätävalkea, ei, se ei ole muu kuin

hikivalkea, huomautti Jussi ollen vieläkin istuallaan.
Antti ei usko Jussin puhetta, sanoo Jussille vaan että: »minähän

näen silmilläni että tämä palaa ja sinä vain istua tollotat, sinä; istut
kuin kanto etkä ajattele sitä, etkä huoli, jos minun vuosikautinen
työni palaa tuhkaksi, ilman että saisin siitä yhtään sankollista
tervaa.»
Jussi vain ei nouse ylös. Sitävastoin että olisi noussut edes

seisoalleen, heittäypi hän pitkälleen kaltevan mättään rintamaan,
haukotellen ja samalla kämmenillään peittäen laihan ja
litteäposkisen, pitkän naamansa.
Antti luuli nyt Jussin tekevän hänelle suoranaista pilaa. Sen vuoksi
harmista ja vihasta vapisevilla käsillään alkoi tapailla jotain sujuvata,
josta antaisi lankomiehelle oivan langonryypyn, mutta ennenkuin oli
ennättänyt tuumansa toteuttaa, oli liekki vähitellen kadonnut pois ja
sen sijaan taas nousi vaan valkoisen-harmaa, paksu savupatsas.
— Enkös minä sulle sanonut jo, että se on vain hikivalkea, eikä

pala kauvan, loimuaa tuossa vaan vähän aikaa ja sitten sammuu?
Antti ei tähän Jussin puheeseen vastannut mitään; pyyhiskeli vaan

takkinsa liepeellä leveää otsaansa ja täysiruskeapartaista leukaansa
ja sitten taas, katsoen ylös nousevaan savupatsaaseen, virkkoi:
— Tuossa savun illistellessä juohtui taas mieleeni eräs keksintö,

joka ajoi pois äskeisen suuttumuksen.
Keksintöä ei hän saattanut salata Jussilla ja sen vuoksi alkoi:
— No, voi sen peijakas, tuota savun paksuutta, mikä tuosta

nousee. Jos tuo savu olisi kaikki rahakalua, jos se kaupaksi kävisi ja
sen kiini saisi, niin eipä sitten rahasta puutetta. Siinä mahtaisi olla
jotakin ainetta, tärpättihappoa tahi kukapa tuon tiesi, jos siinä piilee
hyvinkin kalliita aineita. Sitä tutkimaan tarvittaisiin joku kemisti,
mutta huolivatkos ne sitä semmoista asiaa tutkia, josta meikäläinen
talonpoika hyötyisi, vaurastuisi ja eläisi. Sen sijaan että tutkisivat
tervasavuja, pakkasenpesiä ja hallan hautoja, tutkivat vaan hiiriä,
sisiliskoja ja sammakoita, jotta mitä ainetta ne sisältävät, mistä ovat
kokoonpannut ja rakennetut. Mene, ota selvä Luojan töistä
ihmisviisaudella. Vaan kun tuo tervassavu meikäläisenkin tallukan
nenään jo peninkulmien päähän tuoksahtaa niin rohdosmaiselle, niin
ei meissä tarvitseisi olla kuin edes jokunen hyppy kemist'ismiä niin
silloin me tietäisimme mihin tervasavu kelpaa.
Jussi oli koko ajan ihmeissään ja ääneti kuunnellut tuota Antin
keksintöä tervasavun rahakaluksi muuttamisesta sekä samalla
katsonut soikeilla tummilla silmillään, miten Antin leukaparta hiljaa
sekä muutoin epäsäännöllisesti lepatti, kun puhui uusista
keksinnöistä. Viimein kysyi hän Antilta:
— Mikä se on se komisti? Onko se sellainen kone, taikka elä ‒ ‒ ‒?
— Ihminen, ihminen. Se on semmoinen herrasmies, paljon

herrempi kuin kauppias Pelkonen taikka vallesmanni.
— No aina se tuo etelän mies on viisaampi meitä Pohjanmaan

tolloja.
Antti alkoi nyt Jussille tuumata, että eiköhän lähdetä ja kierretä

tuo hauta. »Ja jos minä nousen tuonne haudan päälle, niin minä
näytän sulle, Jussi, miten se Lontta-Lassi kierolla suin hautaa polki.
Vaan katsoppas kuin tässä juurella on tuommoinen huokonen; tuosta
se ensiksi tuli menee silmään ja silloin emme saa tervaa, emme
kuivan kepin nenään, ja entäs tuossa, siinäpä on vielä isompi.
Lyöhän, Jussi, turvetta huokoseen, niin minä äsäyttelen multaa.
Aivan sillä lailla, niin! Polkasehan jalallasi niin sitten se pysyy —!»
— Enpä polkase. Johan minä nyt kenkäni poltan, paraat kenkäni,

joita ei ole sen enempää pidelty kuin viitenä sunnuntaina käyty
kirkossa.
— No siristä sitten ne rajasi jaloistasi pois, moinen kirkkomies.
— Vai niin että minä tässä nyt jalkani polttaisin; millä pakon!
— No ota sitten tämä lapio, niin minä näytän sinulle, Jussi; näytän
mallia haudan polttoon, mallia työn tekoon ja mallia ihmisyyteen.
Vaan jos sinussa on vähääkään miestä, niin nouse tuonne päälle!
Ehkäpä siellä saat jotakin kemiallista tuntea aivoissasi. Itsensä edelle
sitä ei ole käynyttä, sanoi Antti ja samassa peräytyi muutamia
askelin takaperin sekä, ottaen muutamia hyppyjä kepin kanssa,
hyppäsi suoraan haudan päälle, väänti leukansa kieroksi ja sanoi,
hyppien vuoroin toisella ja toisella jalalla raskaammasti:
— Näin se näkyi Lontta-Lassi tekevän, aivan näin. Mutta tämä

toinen puoli painuu vain alemmaksi; on pehmyt kuin höyhenpolsteri.
Vaan tämä toinen puoli on kova kuin kivi. Siinä on kyllä vielä aivan
kirkkaat puut ja muualta tämä hauta on jo aivan hiilellä. Tuopa nyt
oli ihme että yksi kohta jäi palamatta. Juuri puoli päälakea jäi
palamatta. Toinen puoli on kyllä aivan hiilellä ja pehmyt, vaan tämä
toinen puoli, tämä ei anna vähääkään perään. Tähän saisi nyt tulla
hyppimään kaksitoista miestä hevosen kanssa.
— Se näkyy olevan kani, sanoi Jussi; vaan en niinäkään nyt

muista, miten se siitä pois kulutetaan. Siihen on kyllä semmoinen
erityinen konsti, mutta kukas sen nyt tuli ja muisti. Eikös siinä
kulmalla ole aivan kirkkaat säröksen nenät, katsoppas Antti?
— Niin on, aivan kovat ja kirkkaat.
— Minä muistelen, että kanin kohta se pitää hyvin visusti kattaa

turpeella ja mullalla, vaan matalampi kohta aukaista, niin minä olen
kuullut. Mutta omapa on hautasi; tee niinkuin tahdot.
Mutta sitä ei Antti uskonut ollenkaan, ei uskonut syttyvän

ennestään jo sammuneen paikan tukkimalla ja sammuvan, liiaksi
palavan paikan auki repimällä, jonka tähden sanoi Jussille:
— Ei kelpaa se sinun neuvosi. Se oli viisautta, jota tänä päivänä ei
vielä panna käytäntöön. Ei ainakaan tällä ruukilla ja tässä paikassa.
On parasta nyt, Jussi, kun katsot päältä valmista, kun minä rupean
hautaani kohentamaan. Tuosta kanin päältä ensin turpeet kaikki
tuohon matalammalle puolen ja syttöjä särösten nenään, revippäs
tuolta kannosta tuohta. Sytytetään niitä hyvä kerppu palamaan
tämän kanin päälle, niin saadaanpa heti nähdä, miten se alkaa
lutistua toisen puolen tasalle.
Jussi repi tuohin melkoisen vihkon, joka sitten asetettiin kanin

päälle painojen avulla. Sitten pantiin tuli tuohien nurkkiin, jotka heti
rupesivat siinä palaa leimuamaan, tupruttaen mustaa savua entisen
valkoisen savun rinnalla ylös korkeuteen, jossa savut sitten liittyivät
yhdeksi.
— Luulisitkos, Antti, sanoi Jussi tuosta tuohensavusta sen kemistin

löytävän mitään rahaista ainetta? Eikös se näytä paljon
jykevämmältä tuon entisen valkoisen savun rinnalla?
Antti ei vastannut nyt Jussille mitään, sillä tuommoinen tuntui

hänen mielestään vähän pilkkapuheelta näin tärkeässä asiassa. Pelko
kokeen onnistumisesta teki Antin milteipä levottomaksi katsoessaan
loimuavaan tuohiläjään.
Tuohet ne kyllä paloivat kaikki ja iloisesti paloivatkin, vaan tuli ei

tarttunutkaan särösten neniin. Palaneet tuohen hiilet vierivät alas
kaltevaa haudan rintaa ja kanista äskeisen loimun sijaan nousi nyt
hiljalleen mustan-sinertävä savu.
— Eipä se syttynyt; ei koe onnistunut, sanoi Antti. Mutta meillä on

enempi konstia kuin tätä hautaa polttaessa tarvitaan. Ei tosin sinulla,
Jussi, näy olevan mitään tolkkua, mutta viisautta ei ole jakaja
jakanutkaan yhdellä mitalla, toiselle se on antanut enemmän ja
toiselle taas vähemmän. Sinä sitä näyt saaneen kyllä vähemmän,
mutta se ei ole sinun oma syysi. Ajatteleppas nyt, Jussi, jos minäkin
olisin tässä niin toimeton kuin sinä, mikä meidät sitten hyvä
hyvittäisi? Sano kuitenkin paksusta päästäsi konsti, miten saada tuo
kani palamaan!
— Sen sanon mitä äsken jo sanoin, että kanin päälle pitää panna
visu kallo turpeesta ja mullasta ja vastakkaiseen kulmaan reikä, se
on minun konstini, sanoi Jussi.
— Ei kelpaa mulle sun mahtisi; niitä saat muille loruta, loruin niille,
jotka niitä uskovat. Minulla on vielä konsti semmoinen, joka sinun
päähäsi ei olisi juolahtanut, vaikka kuinkakin vanhaksi olisit elänyt.
Koetetaanpas laskea tervaa, eikö lähtisi edes sen vertaa että
saataisiin sytöksi tuohon kaniin. Hei, tappi auki ja tynnyri alle! sanoi
Antti ja kiskasi tapin auki.
Mutta sen sijaan että olisi tullut tippaakaan tervaa, kitkusi sieltä
vähän kylmää savua.
— Unta luulisi olevan koko homman, sanoi Antti ja painoi tapin

kiini.
— Ei näytä tästä ruukista saatavan tervaa, ei edes omaan

sytökseen. Vaan ei tässä sen vuoksi hätää tule. Minulla on vielä
sankollinen vanhaa tervaa. Sen käyn tänne ja poltan tuossa kanin
päällä perinnöksi, annan perinnöksi sen tälle helotukselle. Sitä se nyt
vaatii ja ilman sitä emme tule saamaan lippaakaan. Lisän kanssa se
voi porosta nousee, sanotaan, ja niin se käypi nytkin.
Näin puhuessaan lähti Antti astua lippomaan aikoen mennä tervan
nountiin.
Kun Antti oli kadonnut näkymättömiin, tuli Liisa toista tietä

kantaen kuparinkirkasta kahvipannua, keitettynä valmiiksi, jota toi
nyt yön valvoneille työmiehille, kysyen ensi sanoikseen: »Joko on
monta tynnyriä täyteen laskettu?»
— Ei yhtään ole laskettu, eikä taida kovin monta laskeakkaan,

vastasi
Jussi alakuloisen näköisesti.
— No, minkätähden? oli Liisan tiukka kysymys. Palaahan tuo!

minkätähden siitä sitten ei lasketa? Aika komiastihan tuo palaa.
— Palaa se kyllä mistä palaa ja miten palaa, vaan katsoppas tuota

kania tuosta kulmalta, palaako sekin. Siinä on vielä aivan kirkkaat
puut, vaikka muualta on palanut, painunut ja latistunut noin, noin
matalaksi, jaaritteli Jussi ja vielä lisäsi, että Antti aikoo tuohon kaniin
kaataa vanhaa tervan, jotta sitten syttyisi ja rupeaisi palamaan. Sitä
juuri lähti sieltä kotoa hakemaan. Se koetti sitä jo tuohien avulla
polttaa, vaan ei syttynyt.
— Ymmärrätkö sitä sinä sitten paremmin sen asian päälle;

ymmärrätkö ja luuletko että Antti ei osaa eikä tajua koko polton
päälle? kysyi Liisa Jussilta.
— Ymmärtäköön jos tahtoo, vaan eritapaan minä olisin polttanut,

jos minun valtani olisi ollut, eritapaan jo aivan alusta alkaen. Vaan se
tuntuu minua pitävän tuhmana tollona, joka en ymmärtäisi mitään,
ja että viisaus ja tajunta ovat yksin hänen päässään. Mutta kunhan
se sieltä kotoa tuopi nyt sen tervasankon ja kaataa sitten tuohon
tuon nystyrän päälle, niin tässä nähdään vielä oikea rekkola,
nähdään semmoinen loimu että näkevät Varisrannallekin että Antin
hauta siellä nyt palaa.
— Semmoinen äikkäpäinen möykärihän se on. Jos luulet sinä

olevasi viisaampi, niin kun se nyt tänne tulee, laitetaan se sitten
täältä jonnekin muka tärkeään asiaan, ja ota sinä sitten oikeen
miehen tarmolla hoitaaksesi ja polttaaksesi tuo hauta. Siitä muutoin
ei saada mitään, ei juuri mitään, puhui Liisa äänellä, joka muistutti
hänen saaneen jo kauvan tuntea ikävää eläessään Antin kanssa.
— Lähetä vain, vaan en usko että se lähtee. Sitten olet mestari,

jos saat menemään. Samassa työntyi puiden takaa näkyviin Antti
leveäliepeisine hattuineen, kantaen selässään keppiin kiinnitettyä
tervasankkoa, jonka laskettuaan maahan arveli:
— No ei sitä leikillä leipää syödä tervanpoltostakaan.
Liisa käski hänen paikalla tulla kahville ja alkoi sitten puhua Antille
totena uutisena, Möttös-Reetan kertomana, kuinka Reeta oli nähnyt
erään tuntemattoman miehen kokevan Antin rysiä Virtasalmen
matalassa ja päästävän rysästä monta monituista suurta haukia,
liekö ollut lohiakin. Kalat olivat tietysti olleet suuria, kun olivat
veneessä pitäneet sellaista loisketta, että oli kuulunut
Juurikkasalmelle asti.
Antti kuunteli tarkasti Liisan puhetta ja hillitsemätön viha muutti

koko hänen kasvonsa mustanpunaisiksi.
— Se roisto ei ole ollut kukaan muu kuin Viteikön Jakke. No

puhuikos se
Reeta, mihin se sitten olisi ne rysät pannut?
— Muistelen vähän että oli repinyt, sanoi Liisa, ja huomautti Antille
että on parasta mennä ottamaan selvä asiasta että miten se
oikeastaan onkaan.
— Niinpä tietenkin teen, otan selvän asiasta, otan oikein tarkan

selvän. Minun rysäni eivät saa enää rauhaa minun omilla
kalavesilläni, tuopa olisi vietävän kummaa, vaan jos ikään Viteikön
Jakke on tiennyt käpälänsä minun rysiini puuttua, niin sen
kopluamisen pitää Jakelle tulla maksamaan, jotta ei haluta toista
kertaa hiipiä minun kalavesilleni ja rysilleni. Hänen pitää oppia
tietämään, ett'ei minun rysästäni kaloja viedä niinkään. Ne kalat,
sanon minä, janottavat vielä kauvan Jakkea. Sit'ei ole minun nimeni
Antti, jos ei janota.
Antilta unohtui nyt koko tervanpoltto sikseen; ei maininnut

Jussillekaan mitään siitä, miten tulisi tästä lähtien hautaa hoitaa. Sitä
ei hän muistanut sentähden, että oli mielensä ja ajatuksensa niin
tarkoin kiinnittänyt siihen kalastusjuttuun. Se vei häneltä maltin eli
oikean tajunnan pois.
Puhuen vieläkin uhkaavin sanoja Jakkea kohtaan, lähti Antti

puolijuoksua mennä hilpomaan ensin kotiin ja sieltä kotirannasta
sitten veneellä Virtasalmelle.
Vaan maikalla muisti hän että mitenhän siellä sen tervaruukin

käypi, kun se jäi sen paksujärkisen Jussitollukan varaan. Olisi ollut
välttämättömästi tarvis sanoa se, jotta ei san yhdellä kertaa sitä
tervaa kaataa sen kanin päälle, vaan sitä on pantava vähitellen, sen
mukaan kuin tarve vaatii, tahi sikäli kuin se kani siitä rupeaa
palamaan. Mitäpäs muuta kuin palaa takaisin sanomaan. Antti ei
tosin malttanut käydä aivan Jussin luona, vaan huusi kuitenkin
sanottavansa haudan hoitamisesta etempää, johon Liisa vastasi
huutamalla:
— Joo joo, kyllä, kyllä! Menehän nyt joutuin!
Jussi otti nyt raskaan, tuoreesta koivusta tehdyn kurikan, nousi

haudan päälle ja alkoi sillä mököttää siihen kanin kohtaan, ja sen
sijaan, että Antti käski tervan kanssa se sytyttää palamaan, kattoi
Jussi sen visusti multaturpeella, kuokki samalta kohdalta juuren auki
ja teki vastakkaiseen kulmaan reiän.
Tätä Jussin työtä katsoi Liisa tarkasti ja kysyi viimein Jussilta:
— Luuletko sinä saatavan tästä ruukista enää yhtään tynnyriä

tervaa?
— Luulen saatavan muutamin, mutta tämä hauta sai jo mennä niin

huonolle kurssille että tästä täytyy nyt hukata monta monituista
tynnyriä. Ja kukas sen tietää varmaan, miten sattuu ja käypi tässä
vielä. Kukapas tiesi minkälaisen pohjan se on Antti laittanut, ja
monta muuta? — Jussi lähti kiertelemään hautaa ja siellä
kierrellessään sattui silmäämään halssin puoleen. Vaan mikäs näky
täällä!
— Voi Rötkösen iltanen ja Liisan-Antun namunen, kun terva tulee

omia teitään, piipun alatse multaa myöten valuen halssiin! Tule sinä,
Liisa, katso mistä terva juoksee! Nyt saisi olla se yöllinen Antin
kemisti, oikea Lapin tietäjä, joka ajaisi tuon tervan takaisin oikeaan
reikäänsä. On niin paljon että tartun tuohon kynään ja revin
kokonaan pois semmoisen rakenteen, jolla ei ole kuitenkaan mitään
merkitystä.
— Niinpähän näkyy, sanoi Liisa. — Huonot laitokset, huonot
seuraukset. Mitenpä etelänmies osasi tervaa ruukata, jota ei ole ikinä
nähnyt ei tehnyt, ja liekö tuo ehkä hänelle muutoinkaan luontaista.
Tämä maa tässä on vähän saviperäistä ja sentähden tuskinpa tässä
imee maa kovin paljon tervaa itseensä. Poltahan sinä, Jussi, hautaa
paraan malttisi mukaan, niin minä ammennan kiululla tuota tervaa
tuosta halsista tynnyreihin. Eipä tässä nyt muu auta kuin ottaa pois
mitä annetaan. Se Antti-rukka olisi paljon luontaisempi maanviljelijä
kuin tervanruukkari. Nyt tämä näin sattui että ruvettiin muka
reistaamaan, jos tuo onnistuisi; vaan ei, ei luottanut kun ei ole
osattu, ei todella osattu.
Antti meni oikopäätä suoraan Virtasalmelle ja löysi sieltä rysänsä

aivan eheinä sekä niin täynnä kaloja ettei parempaan saaliiseen ollut
yhtynyt viime kolmen vuoden aikana. Mutta nyt heräsi Antissa
ajatus, mitenkä tuo rysien repimis- ja kalojen vientiuutinen oli
syntynyt, mistä Möttös-Reeta tuon jutun löysi? Jokohan tuo Reeta
tuon aivan omasta päästään laklatteli! Eikö tuo olisi tiennyt, missä se
Virtasalmi on, missä minun rysäni ja kalavetenä Viteikön Jaken se
kyllä tuntee kaukaakin, tuntee edestä ja takaa, siitä ei ole
epäilemistäkään. Miksipäs se ei Jakkea tuntisi kun jo kerran pojankin
sille teki. Liekö vielä nytkin Jakelle vihoissaan, kun ei Tuokkoa pojalle
käräjissä voittanut. Ja jokohan tuo kepponen oli Reetan
huikentelevasta kaulasta lähtenyt, aikeessa siten Jakelle kostaa, kun
tiesi minun tulivihaseksi mieheksi ja luuli että minä kuullessani Jaken
kalanpyydyksille pahaa tehneen, menisin suoraan Jakkea
rusikoimaan. Ohoh, en minä vielä niin pöljä ole ja tuskinpa tulen
olemaankaan! Olisit itse, Reeta, nyt tuossa, niin valehtelemastasi
muikkisin tuolla huoparimen pyyryllä pitkin pintojasi; semmoinen
juorulakkari ja intohimojen tyyssija.
Oli niin tyyni ja herttainen kesäaamu ja Antille oli sattunut mukaan
se paras ahvenonki, jolla Antti aina ne suurimmat ahvenet veteli.
Hän tuli siinä ajatelleeksi että jokohan nyt nokkaan tuossa
muutaman kerran veteen tuota ahvenonkea, niin pian näen mitä
tuohon tarttui. Vaan siellähän rupesi heti tarttumaan puolenkyynärän
pituista ahventa toinen toisensa jälestä, että Antilta unhottui
tykkänään pois tervanpoltto ja kotiin lähtö. Kun Antti oli
satayksikolmatta ahventa vetänyt ongella veneeseensä, sitten vasta
lähti huovata nyökyttelemään Lehtilahtea kohden, veisaten itsekseen
vanhaa lempivirttään: »Miksi kiukuitsevat pakanat».
Liisa oli tervaa ammentaessaan tervannut sekä kätensä että

vaatteensa ja oli nyt juuri kun Antti kotiin tuli, parasta aikaa käsiään
pesemässä ja muuttamassa puhtaampia vaatteita päälleen.
— Etpä usko, Liisa, sanoi Antti, kuinka paljon minä sain kaloja:
viisitoista haukia ja satayksikolmatta suurta ahventa. Sinun täytyy
nyt sanoa että minä olen se oikea kalamies, jonkunlaista saapi hakea
kaukaa ja kauvan, eikä sittenkään löydy.
— Kyllähän sinä kaloja saat, vaan sanopas minkälainen

tervanruukkari sinä olet? Sika olet tervanpolttajaksi, sanon minä. Kun
laittaa sillälailla pohjan hautaan, niin pahasti kynät ja muut, jotta
terva juosta ölvöttää kynän alatse eikä itsestään kynästä tule
tippaakaan.
— Se Kanalan Jussi on niin huono-onninen että, kaikki käypi reten,

kaikki sattuu nurinkurin, mikä joutuu vain hänen silmiensä eteen,
sanoi Antti. Mutta joko sinä Liisa olet katsonut, mitä se kanalaisen
nyytti sisältää? Minulla on nyt oikein hirmuinen nälkä. Otetaanpas se
Jussin nyytti esille ja lihmotaan siitä kaikki paraat eväät.
— Ei siinä nyytissä ole mitään syötävää; tosin syötävää, vaan
muutoin paremmin lehmäin eväitä. Se Jussi sanoi niitä turnipsiksi, ne
ovat paljon nauriille sukua, vaan muutoin paksuja kuin pölkynpäitä.
Se Jussi toi meille niitä näkeeksi, jotta eikö meilläkin ruveta niitä
kasvattamaan, selitti miehelleen Liisa.
Mutta Antti sanoi: »Onpa mies vähän lapsellinen kun lähtee

nauriita kantamaan pitäjästä toiseen. Kyllä minun käsivarteni eivät
olisi niin halvat, jotta lähtisin tuon taipaleen naurisnyyttiä kantamaan
ja niillä vielä häpäisemään toista ihmistä. Meillehän tuo kyllä välttää,
vaan olisi sen tehnyt joillenkin muille arvokkaammille ihmisille, niin
siitä ei hyvä tulisi.
Jussi astuu pirttiin, kädet mustina kuin ainakin tervankeittäjällä, ja

ilmoittaa Antille että nyt on jo hauta palanut kaikki ja saatu tervaa se
mikä on saatu, ei vähääkään oikealla tavalla, vaan hätyyttämällä.
— Montako tynnyriä sinä laskit sitten? kysyi Antti.
— Laskit. Hm. Siinä oli laskemista; sehän valui omia teitään

suoraan halssiin, ja siitähän sitä piti sitten ammentaa tynnyriin. Kyllä
Liisa jo tietää tervaa tarponeensa. Kymmenen tynnyriä siellä on
aivan täyttä ja yksi vajaa. Siinä ne sitten ovat.
— Kymmenen tynnyriä tervaa ja kymmenen syltä runsaasti puita,

olivatkin oikein lihavia puita, kuusi vuotta olleet kolottuina ja kaksi
jatkoksella. Kylläpä se nyt meni polusta, meni aivan polusta, meni
monivuotinen työni, puuni ja kuka sen tietää mitä sitä vielä menee.
Olen ottanut velkaa porvarilta niitä vastaan 200 markkaa ja terva
kuuluu nykyisin maksavan vain 12 markkaa tynnyri. Paljon parempi
olisi että tämä minun nykyinen elämäni olisi unta, olisi oikean sian
unta. Varsinkin tämä minun tervahommani olisi saanut olla unta,
siitähän minun olisi sitten hyvä herätä todellisuuteen. Mutta entäs
nyt; minä kun nyt vien ne kymmenen tynnyriä tervaa porvarille
velastani, velka jääpi auki sittenkin. Minä vähän luulen että
viimeisestä velasta astuu syksyllä porvari kantapäille, viepi verkot ja
veneet, hevoset ja heinäsuovat Sen teki se kirottu tervaruukki. Sano,
lanko Jussi, jo suoraan, että minusta tuli Kota-Mikko.
*****
Ajan vuosiratas oli neljätoista kertaa pyörähtänyt ympäri, kun

taaskin Kanalan Jussi on Lehtilahteen Antin luo tullut kylään.
Lehtijärvi kuten ennenkin laineillaan huuhtoo Lehtiniemen
ruskeanharmaata kalliota. Antin vuosikymmeniä vanha täysi-parta on
harmentunut ja hänen leveät hartiansa painuneet entistä
kumarammiksi. Mutta suurempi muutos on tapahtunut Antin työ-
aloissa ja viljelyksissä. Entinen pieni, pimeä ja ränsistynyt
puunavetta on kadonnut kokonaan pois ja sijaan on tehty uusi,
kivinen, akkunoilla valaistu navetta. Päärakennusta ei tosin näy
korjatun sitten, viime näkemän, vaan onpa sen sijaan tehty paljon
viljamaata. Se tervahaudan pohja, jossa Antti Kanalan Jussin kanssa
tervaa poltti neljätoista vuotta sitten, on joutunut viljamaiden
keskelle. Viljamaiden takaa näkyy vankka, hyöteäkasvuinen metsä,
joka ulottuu samallaisena takalaitaan, Rastisuohon asti. Antti ei ole
sitten neljäntoista vuoden ruukannut tervaa ollenkaan, sen hän on
katsonut sulaksi tappioksi, eikä polttopuiksi koskaan kaatanut muita
kuin kitukasvuisia ja toisia puita rasittavia puita, mutta ennen kaikkia
koivuja. Antti on opettanut poikansakin yhtä täsmällisiksi metsän
hoidossa, että eivät pojatkaan tapauksessakaan käy yli Antti isän
määräysten. Saha-yhtiöitten asiamiesten silmiin on jo aikoja sitten
pystynyt tuo Lehtilahden Antin metsä. Se on jo kierretty ja silmäilty
ristiin rastiin, mutta kauppoihin ei ole sovittu. Palstottain,
summakaupalla myöntiä pitää Antti hulluutena ja sanoo sen, joka
niin tekee, rikkovan luonnonlakia ja yhteiskuntajärjestystä vastaan.
Antti sanoo usein: jos minä myön metsää, niin minä myön
kantaluvulla ja itse merkitsemiäni puita. Minun paras ihanteeni on
hyvin hoidettu ja kasvatettu metsä. Raastaa sitä putipuhtaaksi, sitä
minä en salli, ainakaan elinaikanani.
Asiamies kaiketi luuli kerran saavansa Antin tekemään

palstakauppoja erityisemmällä konstilla. Tultuaan kerran
Lehtilahteen, sanoi hän Antille: Nyt tällä kuukaudella on puutavarain
hinta paljon huojistunut ja näyttää tämä aikakausi siltä että se tulee
yhäkin huojistumaan, vaan siitä huolimatta maksan minä sulle Antti
vielä sen entisen, korkean taksan mukaan, jos tahdot nyt myödä
metsäsi. Mutta Antti ei myö palstottain ei vaikka kuin paljon
annettaisiin, sanoo vain: Rahaa sitä kyllä aina saapi, mutta
semmoista metsää kuin minulla on, en minä saisi sijaan rahallakaan.
Paljon saapi Antti rahaa vuosittain karjan tuotteilla. Turnipsi, jota

kerran Kanalan Jussi kantoi Lehtilahteen näytteille, on nyt Antin
mielestä paras kasvilaji; jos meillä ei turnipsia olisi, niin ei meillä
maitoakaan olisi, on aina tapana Antin sanoa.
Kun Antti lähti lankomiehelleen, Kanalan Jussille, näyttelemään

ojamaita, joutuivat he siellä siihen kohtaan, jossa kerran yhdessä
tervaa polttivat. Se kohta ei ollut ruvennut heiniä kasvamaan yhtä
paljon kuin muualta, vaikka oli koetettu sitä paikkaa lannoittaakkin.
Jussin kysymykseen: Minkätähden tuossa kasvaa noin vähän? vastasi
Antti: »Sen teki se kirottu tervaruukki».
Pakeneva onni.
Kesä kaunistuksineen oli jo vierähtänyt tuhansien joukkoon. Syksy

riehuvina myrskyineen oli juuri käsillä.
Kesärannan Leuno vaimonsa kanssa oli jo parisen viikkoa ollut

kalanpyydystyksellä, huolimatta siitä että toiset talot olivat pottunsa
aivan vähäksi jo kuokkineet. Kesärannan Leunolla tavallisesti oli
kaikki Lyöt oikeassa järjestyksessä, vähän niinkuin muista edellä,
vaan se hyvä kalansaalis oli nyt viivyttänyt niin että peltotyöt olivat
sen takia vähän unohtuneet. Mutta eräänä päivänä oli tuuli
kääntynytkin pohjoiseen, ilma äkkiä muuttunut kylmäksi ja samana
iltana kuuropilveltä satoi jo lunta, ei vähempää kuin sen aikuista
mittaa viisi tuumaa vahvalta, vaikka suurin osa lehteä oli vielä
puissa.
Oliko päivän tapaukset aiheena Leunon tyytymättömyyteen

kotielämässään, vai jotakin sivullista laatua, siitä kyllä ei kukaan
liennyt niin erityisesti kertoa; tiettiin vaan että Leuno oli uhannut
lähteä lämpimämpiin maihin, maihin, joissa syksyn vilulta saapi
rauhassa viljansa maasta korjata, pottunsa kuokkia ja nauriinsa
listiä. »Amerikkaan, Amerikkaan, joka on se oikea ihmisten
asuinpaikka, niinkuin päivä yön rinnalla Suomeen verrattuna», oli
Leuno sanonut Ja vielä: »Tämä kuuluukin alkujaan olleen
lappalaisten maa, vaan suomalaiset sitten pöyhkeyksissään
tunkeutuneet tänne, tänne kurjille kujille, poloiselle Pohjanmaalle».
Tämä tuuma ei jäänytkään lastenlauluksi, vaan se muuttui

tositoimeksi. Ja ensi sunnuntaina oli seurakunnan kirkossa
luettavana seuraava kuulutus:
»Amerikkaan muuton takia myödään t.k. 17 pnä vapaaehtoisella
huutokaupalla Kesärannassa Leuno Mattisen omistama puoli maata
ja kaikellaista irtainta omaisuutta. Huudot ovat samana päivänä
maksettavat.»
Kesärannan Leunon koko omaisuus muuttui näin yhtenä päivänä

puhtaaksi rahaksi, paitsi jotakin irtainta, kaksi lehmää ja talven ruoka
niille jäivät myömättä. Leunon aikomus näet oli lähteä yksin matkalle
ja jättää lapseton vaimo tänne niin kauvaksi kun on ehtinyt
Amerikassa saada talousolot järjestetyiksi sikäli että ne varmasti
takaavat pettämättömän toimeentulon aina vanhuuden päiviin asti:
sitten vaimokin kutsua heti pois.
Kolmen päivän perästä sen jälkeen soi eronhetki ja se oli

molemmin puolin katkera; monta kyyneltä vierähti vaimon poskille jo
ennen eroa, eikä se ollut kivestä Leunonkaan sydän. »Ethän tehne
niinkuin muutamat siellä, Amerikassa kuuluvat tekevän, niinkuin ne
jotka — toisen akan, siellä ottavat», muistutti vaimo vielä
erotessakin.
Näin hajosi Leunon ja hänen vaimonsa mallikelpoiseksi kehittynyt,

onnesta ja ilosta loistava, herttainen koti, koti, jonka myötäonnen
seuraamina yksimielisesti säästäväisyydellä ja ahkeruudella vanhain
päiväin varalta itsellensä olivat perustaneet.
Nuo jätetyt kaksi lehmää ja pieni rahasumma antoivat kyllä

vaimolle ensi kahtena vuotena yltäkylläisen toimeentulon, vaan se ei
kuitenkaan läheskään tuntunut entisen kotionnen arvoiselta.
Amerikasta joka viikon postissa Leunolla saapuneet kirjeet kuvasivat
tosin tyytyväisyyttä uusiin oloihin; tervennä oli perille päässyt, heti
siellä työtä saanut ja tavannut muutamia tuttaviakin. Sieltä ajatusten
lomasta pisti esiin kuitenkin aina viittaava katumuksen tunne, joka
oli omiansa katkeroittamaan vaimon heikkoa mieltä. Mutta uskollinen
ja eheä rakkaus, joka puhtaana syntyen, ajan kaiken säilyen, loi aina
uutta toivoa synkistyneeseen sydämeen, ehkäpä vielä yhtymisestä
kerran, jos ei täällä Suomessa, niin siellä merien takana sitten, se piti
yllä.
Näin siirryttiin ajassa eteenpäin, saaden Amerikasta aina uusia

tietoja. Leuno nyt tosin kirjoitti vaimolleen harvemmin kuin ensin,
mutta sen sijaan tuli sivullisiltakin tietoja. Nämä tiesivät kertoa
Leunon vajonneen juoppouden tielle ja sen mukana muihin pahoihin
taipumuksiin, johon viittasivat myöskin ne harvat kirjeet, joita
Lennolta aina vainionsa sai. Kirjeessä valitti nyt Leuno vaimolleen
huonoa terveyttään, rahainsa kadottamista y.m. Tämä tietenkään ei
vaimoa enää ihastuttanut, vaan tuli se entisen ikävän ja huolen
lisäksi, jota hän sydämessään kantoi.
Vaimon asiat kotimaassa olisivat nyt jo vaatineet Leunon

rahanlähetystä, mutta kun vaimo kirjeessä tuli siitä maininneeksi, ei
Leuno siihen vastannut mitään ja silloin katkesi kokonaan
kirjeenvaihto Leunon puolelta. Epätoivo valtasi nyt kokonaan vaimon.
Kuinka hänen rakas miehensä olisi voinut noin tylyksi tulla? Ainoa
lohdutus oli vain ajatus että jos kirjeet matkalla todellakin olisivat
hukkaan joutuneet, kuten monesti luullaan tapahtuvan.
Mutta johtaessa mieleen noitten sivullisten kertomuksia katosi

viimeinenkin toivon kipinä vaimon sydämestä ja täytyi tunnustaa nuo
kertomukset miehensä synteihin vajoamisesta tosiksi, synteihin,
joista täällä ollessa ei aavistustakaan ollut. Onko mahdollista että
sallimus asettaa hänet vielä viimeiselle pykälälle muitten
kuolevaisten joukossa? Onko mahdollista että joutuu vaivaistalon
loukkoon muitten onnettomain kanssa jakamaan sitä peittämätöntä
häpeää ja kurjuutta, jonka siellä osakseen saapi enimmiten se, jolla
tunnetaan olleen paremman toimeentulon edellytykset, vaan tavalla
tahi toisella kuitenkin sinne on joutunut.
New-Yorkin satamaan laskee suuri siirtolaislaiva eräänä syyskuun

päivänä, tuoden mukanaan matkustajia kaikista Euroopan maista.
Laivan tuloa odottaa maalla suuri kansanpaljous, monta tirkistävää
silmää, jotka ovat tulleet vastaanottamaan kutsutulta sukulaisiaan
tahi tuttaviaan, myöskin niitä jotka samassa laivassa aikovat lähteä
Eurooppaan. Kukin kansallisuus tervehtii siinä omalla tavallaan,
mutta sydän, useassa eritapauksessa, tuntee kaiketi sitä samaa,
vaikkakin tosin eri mitalla. Suomalainen tervehtiessä puristaa lujasti
kättä, mutta jos kohtaus on erityisempää laatua, pistetään suuta
kiertäen molemmin käsin toistensa ympärille. Tuolla sattuu vasta
laivassa tullutta keski-ikäistä naista vastaan eräs elähtänyt mies.
Sopiipas nyt tuossa nähdä ovatko hyvinkin tuttuja toisilleen.
Epäilyksestä vapisevat kädet koskettavat vaan vähän toisiaan, mutta
eroavat sitten heti. Silmä katsoo silmää niinkuin niissä säkenöisi vielä
pieni kipinä siitä tulesta, joka kerran syttyi ja paloi, paloi monta
monituista onnen vuotta, muinoin siellä rakkaassa kotimaassa.
»Tunnetko sinä minua?» kysyi viimein nainen. »Miksi en nyt sinua
tuntisi, vaan minkästähden sinä tulit tänne nyt, kun juuri tässä
laivassa oli aikomukseni matkustaa Suomeen», sanoi mies. —
»Minun oma Leunonihan sinä oletkin, rakas mieheni, jota ikävällä
olen ajatellut nämä viisi vuotta, jotka mielestäni ovat olleet paljoa
pitemmät kuin koko siihen asti eletty ikäni. Miksikäs et ole kirjottanut
etkä lähettänyt rahaa jota olisin jo kovasti tarvinnut Tulin juuri sinua
katsomaan ja vieläpä löysinkin näin pian. Multa voi sentään kun olet
paljon vanhentunut täällä ollessasi; et suinkaan näytä ensinkään
terveeltä.» Leuno oli todellakin vanhentunut; hänen pulska
muotonsa, kimaltelevat poskipäänsä olivat rumiksi kuihtuneet;
eloisat sinisilmät syvälle painuneet ja harmistuneet; luontonsa
nähtävästi tylsistynyt, sielunsa ja ruumiinsa turmiolle tullut. Hän ei
ollenkaan ihastunut vaimonsa tulosta, vaan päinvastoin tuli hyvin
levottomaksi, änkyttäen aina: »Minähän olisin tullut nyt heti
Suomeen. Kyllä olit houkka kun tänne tulit — minun ristikseni.»
Leuno päätti nyt kuitenkin vaimonsa kanssa matkustaa siihen

kaupunkiin, johon vaimonsa pilotti osoitti ja osti itselleen asemalta
rautatiepiletin. Asemakello löi ensimäisen kerran kun he yhdessä
astuivat vaunuun ja istuivat vaunuun penkille. Äänettömänä tuijotti
Leuno eteensä niinkauvan kunnes asemakello löi kolmannen kerran
ja heti silloin junan lähtiessä eteenpäin mitään virkkamatta syöstyi
Leuno ulos vaunun ovesta ja hyppäsi asemalle takaisin ja vaimo jäi
vaunuihin, junan kiihtyvällä vauhdilla eteenpäin lähtiessä kiitämään.
Sanomaton kauhun tunne valtasi nyt vaimon. Hän näki jo ettei
hänen ennen rakastettu miehensä ollut sama, vaan petomainen
petturi ja uskoton ilkimys, joksi hän tässä vieraassa maassa noiden
viiden vuoden kuluessa oli muuttunut. Vaimo tunsi nyt itsensä
kaikkein onnettomimmaksi tässä elämässä, tunsi kadottaneensa nyt
jo viimeisenkin toivonsa ja katui lähteneensä koko tälle matkalle,
jossa vielä outojen ihmisten parissa on odotettavana vain
onnettoman elämä mahdollisine kärsimyksilleen.
Määräpaikkaansa saavuttuaan löysi vaimo suomalaisten asumuksia

ja sattumalta myöskin samalta paikkakunnalta olevan henkilön, jolle
hän kertoi matkastaan tänne ja että hän tullessaan New-Yorkin
satamassa oli jo löytänyt miehensä, joka oli aivan toisellaiseksi
muuttunut kuin koton lähtiessään oli ja että se junan liikkeelle
lähtiessä mitään virkkamatta karkasi vaunusta pois. Tätä
kertoessaan peitti vaimo molemmilla käsillään kasvonsa ja itki
katkerasti.
Tämä henkilö, jonka vaimo ensin löysi, vei hänen sitten toisten
tuttavainsa luokse, jotka tiesivät kertoa Leunosta ja hänen
elämästään täällä. Se oli Amerikkaan tultuaan ollut ensin hyvin
alakuloisen näköinen, ei paljon puhunut mitään. Syvämietteisen
näköisenä istuen kuului aina puhkeuneen syviin huokauksiin, mutta
sitten joutuneen huonoon seuraan, joka vietteli hänet juoppouteen
ja sen sivulla muuhun irstaiseen elämään, tarvitsematta kuitenkaan
käydä vankilassa kun yhden ainoan kerran, joka tuli toisen
pahoinpitelystä.
Nämä tuttavat hankkivat nyt vaimolle työnansiota ja hän tuli

heidän luokseen asumaan. Mutta hänen mielensä oli niin murtunut
ettei hän mitenkään täällä vieraassa maassa tahtonut viihtyä. Hänen
silmänsä harhailivat aina ympärilleen pälyen, milloinka tuo
raatelevaksi pedoksi muuttunut miehensä tulisi vastaan ja kukapa
tiesi missä mielessä.
Eräänä päivänä luettiin kuitenkin paikkakunnan sanomalehdessä

uutisena että siirtolainen, työmies Leuno Mattinen t.k. 27 pnä oli
kaupungin takalistolla ryöstetty ja murhattu.
Tämä uutinen moninkertaisesti runteli vaimon jo ennestään

särjettyä sydäntä. Hän käsitti nyt täydellisesti mitä on elämä, elämä
ilman onnea, mikä ja mistä onnettomuus, se on tyytymättömyyden
palkka, itsensä hillitsemättömäin, himojensa orjain palkka.
Niin pian kun vaimo oli saanut kootuksi kyytirahat paluumatkaa

varten, jätti hän hyvästit kultaiselle Amerikalle ja tunsi itsensä vasta
oikein turvalliseksi kun oli astunut jalkansa vanhan kotoisen
kynnyksen yli. Mutta hänellä oli nyt myöskin sitä, jota ilman
Amerikassa käymättä ei olisi ollut. Hänellä oli nyt rikas
elämänkokemus.
Kunnan pahennus.
Se oli sellainen harmaahapsinen, tai paremmin

liinanvalkeatukkainen, vanha, pienen mökin ukko, joka hiljaisena,
tyytyväisenä istuskeli pienen pirttinsä loukossa, tuudittaen pienintä
pienokaistaan, samalla kun toinen, vähän vanhempi istui polvella,
yhä vanhemman lattialla leikkiessä toisten, vanhempain lasten
kanssa. Tämä kohtaloonsa tyytyväinen vanhus oli yksi niistä monista
kovaosaisista, joiden sallimus ei ole suonut sen ensimäisen kanssa
loppuun asti elää, vaan odottamatta temmannut sen pois. Sen oli
kuolon peruuttamaton sääntö niin määrännyt ja siksi sen tuli niin
tapahtua. Mutta tämä kovaosaisen kohtalo saattoi hänelle kuitenkin
monta ilon hetkeä. Hänellä oli nyt näin monta sirkeäsilmäistä
pienokaista, jotka nuorehko, asemaansa tyytyväinen vaimonsa oli
hänelle synnyttänyt. Hän hyvin viihtyi perheensä parissa, eikä
koskaan ollut tyytymätön, ei silloinkaan kun usein ainoa leipäpala
täytyi jakaa pienokaisille ja itse jäädä ilman. Häntä senvuoksi aina
nimitettiin kunnan pahennukseksi, vaikka monessa suhteessa hän
olisi sopinut hyväksi esimerkiksi niille, jotka häntä siksi nimittivät.
Ehkä annammekin kylän miesten itsensä lausua tästä pienen

mökin vanhuksesta, joka ilmitulee seuraavista keskusteluista:
— Terveisiä kirkolta. — No, mitäs sinne kirkolle nyt kuuluu? Oliko

sairaita tai kuolleita?
— Ei ollut sairaita, vaan kiitos tehtiin kahdellenkin kuolleelle. — Ne

ovat olleet varmaankin Koskelan emäntä ja Kemppaisen lapsi. —
Nepä kuuluivat olevan. — Olikos muita kuulutuksia? — Oli niitä kyllä
paljonkin, vaan eihän niitä tässä nyt kaikkia muista. —
Kuuluutettiinko kunnankokousta? — Ei kuulutettu, vaan se oli juuri

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Acknowledgments page vii

1 A Short Primer on Situated Cognition 3

PART II: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 53

4 How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take Its Course 55

9 Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition 155

PART III: EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS 183

11 Situated Perception and Sensation in Vision and Other Modalities:

FRED ADAMS WILLIAM BECHTEL∗

LAWRENCE W. BARSALOU∗ ANDY CLARK

∗ Member of the editorial advisory board.

FREDERICA R. CONREY MALCOLM A. MACIVER

Washington University in St. Louis MICHAEL TOMASELLO

JOHN SUTTON ROBERT A. WILSON∗

PETER M. TODD ROLF A. ZWAAN

A Short Primer on Situated Cognition

Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede

of cognitive function on sensorimotor areas (approach), and thinking about something

Scientific Antecedents of Situated

Introduction provides a broad historical review of the

potential for thoughtful reconsideration in and so on.2 A system is viewed as a dynamic

Systems theory is an application of sys- Features of Complex Systems

(communities of practice; Wenger, 1998) example, an economy is made up of

networks with conceptual systems, and knowledge consists of enumerable discrete

controlled, and/or designed – cannot be individuals and groups in processes of assim-

evolutionary/genetic epistemology, evo- same time the neural sciences adapted an

Constructivism3 : Sociology + the emergence of mind and self out of

these relationships were viewed as enumer-

Author: Salomo Pulkkinen

Release date: April 15, 2024 [eBook #73400]

Original publication: Porvoo: WSOY, 1904

Credits: Juhani Kärkkäinen and Tapio Riikonen

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK

Ynnä muita kertomuksia Pohjan periltä

Porvoossa, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1904.

Sensuurin hyväksymä. Porvoo, 22 p. Marrask. 1904.

Lehtilahden Antti oli juuri saanut tervahautansa viimeiset puut

Kun Antti oli pistänyt kättä lankomiehelleen ja kysynyt kuulumiset,

— Niinpä kylläkin, sanoi Liisa, parasta on ettei tarvitse Juusoon

— Elähän, kuulehan vielä, sanoi Antti, Kanalan Jussilla oli iso

— No jokos siellä Kanalan puolessa ovat ihmiset tervojaan

— Kyllä ne muutamat ovat tainneet jo polttaa; taitaa teilläkin olla

— Niin on, aivan poltto-valmis. Minä tässä ajattelin lähettää