MORBI BRIDGE CASE REPORT

A SEMINAR REPORT
Submitted by
ANSH DWIVEDI (U22CE039)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY
In
CIVIL ENGINEERING

Under the supervision of

Dr. Dilip Patel

(Professor)

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

SARDAR VALLABHBAI NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF T ECHNOLOGY, S U R A T

NOVEMBER 2024

1
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project report MORBI BRIDGE CASE REPORT
submitted by Ansh Dwivedi (U22CE039) to the Sardar Vallabhbhai National
Institute of Technology, Surat, in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the degree of Bachelor of Technology in Civil Engineering is a
bonafide record of work carried out by the student under my supervision. The
contents of this report, in full or in parts have not been submitted to any other
Institute or University for the award of any degree or diploma.

Head of Department Dr. Dilip Patel

Civil Engineering, SVNIT, Surat Professor
Department of Civil Engineering
SVNIT, Surat

Place: Surat
Date:

2
 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This is to certify that the Seminar report entitled submitted by ANSH DWIVEDI
(U22CE039) to the Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology Surat,
in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Bachelor of Technology in Civil Engineering has been accepted by the
examination committee and that the student has successfully completed the
examination held today.

(Internal Examiner) (External Examiner)

Place: Surat
Date:

3
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Dilip Patel, Professor at

SVNIT, for his invaluable guidance and support throughout my academic
journey. His expertise and dedication have significantly enriched my
understanding of the subject matter and inspired me to strive for excellence.

His insightful feedback and constructive criticism have helped me grow both
personally and academically. The passion he brings to teaching has ignited my
own enthusiasm for learning, making even the most complex topics accessible
and engaging.

I am deeply appreciative of the time and effort he invested in mentoring me,

often going beyond the call of duty to ensure I understood the material fully. His
belief in my potential has motivated me to push my boundaries and reach new
heights. The skills and knowledge I gained under his guidance will undoubtedly
serve me well in my future endeavours.

Lastly, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my family, especially my

mom and dad, for their unwavering support and encouragement.

Thank you all for your support.

4
 ABSTRACT

The Morbi Bridge collapse of 2022 was a tragic incident that highlighted the interplay
of media coverage, judicial scrutiny, technical aspects of bridge engineering, and
corporate negligence. The collapse occurred due to the failure of critical maintenance
activities by the contracted repairing company. Media played a pivotal role in raising
public awareness and intensifying the demand for accountability. Court judgments
scrutinized the negligence and lack of adherence to safety protocols, exposing systemic
flaws in infrastructure management and the regulatory oversight of such structures.

From a technical perspective, the disaster emphasized the importance of rigorous

structural assessments, especially in aging infrastructure. Experts pointed to lapses in
the timely assessment of load-bearing capacities and material fatigue. The repairing
company’s negligence, including poor-quality workmanship and missed inspections,
was a key factor in the catastrophe, raising questions about corporate responsibility and
the enforcement of engineering standards.

Incorporating Heinrich’s Domino Theory could prevent such accidents by addressing

failures at multiple stages. Identifying unsafe conditions, enforcing proactive
inspections, and ensuring accountability in each phase of maintenance can prevent
disasters by breaking the chain of failure. Improved oversight, regular audits, and
stricter safety regulations could effectively interrupt the negligent actions leading to
such incidents.

5
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................8
ROLE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM (SIT):.......................................................................................11
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORBI BRIDGE COLLAPSE.......................................................................14
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE..........................................................................17
GUJARAT HIGH COURT AND MEDIA ON COLLAPSE:...............................................................................18
OREVA STATEMENTS:.............................................................................................................................21
HIENRICH DOMINO SEQUENTIAL MODEL...............................................................................................24
REFERENCES...........................................................................................................................................26

6
Table of Figures

Figure 1 Image of accident........................................................................................................................2

Figure 2 Bridge structure..........................................................................................................................3
Figure 3 Pre-renovation. Distorted aluminum deck plates on the Morbi Bridge. Picture from Eng-
Tips.com...................................................................................................................................................4
Figure 4 Times of India on Administrative Lapses and Negligence...........................................................6
Figure 5 Load distribution on bridge.........................................................................................................6
Figure 6 Aftermath of bridge accident......................................................................................................6
Figure 7 Graph of structural performance vs time....................................................................................7
Figure 8 Application of SHM.....................................................................................................................9
Figure 9 Newspaper clippings regarding Morbi Bridge Collapse...............................................................9
Figure 10 Newspaper Ahmedabad Mirror clipping.................................................................................10
Figure 11 Hindustan Times published in its Annual Magazine................................................................11
Figure 12 Hindustan Times clipping on Morbi Bridge Hearing................................................................11
Figure 13 ANI Official Article..................................................................................................................12
Figure 14 Domino effect in case of accident...........................................................................................14
Figure 15 Figure illustration regarding removal of accident causing factor............................................14

7
 INTRODUCTION

On 30 October 2022, a 141-year-old British-era suspension bridge constructed over the

Machchhu River in Morbi, Gujarat, collapsed. In this incident, 135 people lost their lives
and 56 were injured. This bridge was popularly known as "Jhulto Pul" and was operated
and maintained on contract with the municipality by the Oreva Group.

About 400 people were on the bridge when it collapsed. The figure is more than the
estimates of the number of people the bridge could take in safety. Suspension cables
snapped and with many who fell into the river, some were feared likely to be trapped
there. The case received immense media coverage and attracted judicial intervention as
people started asking questions about the responsibility of the authority and the
contracting repairing firm.
The report will be discussed in depth regarding the different factors of this tragedy,
such as the role of the media, judgments passed by the court, technical deficiencies
concerning the engineering of the bridge, and negligence of the company assigned for its
maintenance. This will help to understand the key failures and find strategies that can
help the system keep such incidents from occurring again.

Basically, Oreva is a clock-making and electrical appliance manufacturing company,

though it has been entrusted to restore and preserve the heritage suspension bridge.
Though Oreva does not have a past experience in mega-infrastructure or civil
engineering projects, it has nonetheless been chosen to repair and maintain the 143-
year-old structure. Latest reports of finalizing Oreva for the crucial project have raised a
controversy surrounding the tendering process and whether such an important project
could be handed over to the company. Much of the work on the renovation would
actually be outsourced to another, smaller companies with less experience, and reports
would indicate key elements of the renovation, including the suspension cables and
other structural components, were indeed being either ignored or inadequately treated.

Cosmetic renovation was cosmetic in nature with painting of the bridge and resurfacing
its deck, while no close checks were made on the integrity of the critical load-bearing
elements of the bridge. In fact, Oreva resumed the bridge to the public without
appropriate safety certification and subjected it only to non-rigorous load tests, which
added.

The disaster prompted widespread media attention and judicial intervention, calling
into question the responsibilities of the authorities and the contracted repairing
company. The report examines the various aspects of the tragedy, including the role of
media, court judgments, technical issues related to bridge engineering, and the
negligence of the company tasked with its maintenance. Through a comprehensive
analysis, it aims to understand the key failures that led to the disaster and explore
potential strategies for preventing similar incidents in the future.

8
 Figure 1 Image of accident

Oreva subcontracted significant amounts of the rehabilitation work to firms that had
minimal experience. It was accused of failing to, or inadequately dealing with, key
refurbishment aspects such as suspension cable replacement and many structural
elements. The renovation focused most on aesthetic touch-ups, such as repainting and
resurfacing the deck, but the integrity of the significant load-carrying structural
elements of the bridge was never put to the test. Furthermore, Oreva reopened public
access to the bridge without attainment of suitable safety certifications or conducting
proper load assessment, which contributed to the subsequent disaster.
DETAILS:
1) Bridge made by British in 20th Feb 1879 by Mumbai governor. Cost that time was 3.5
lackh rupee as per britishers that was quite high in those years.

2) Municipality of Morbi formed in 1961 from those earlier days bridge overall
functioning and maintenance was under municipality they used to state that only 15
persons can stand on the bridge at a time with 1 rupee ticket fee.

3) From 2008 to 2018 Oreva group got involved and at the time of 2018 their contract
got expired and did not renew their license; they were having disputes with a
municipality to increase fee charges of tickets rate from 10 to 15 rupee.

4) June 3rd 2020 proposed contract to the municipality, which includes a statement that
all the renovation and maintenance are under their work while the overall pandemic,
2022 signed the contract. The Ajanta manufacturing private limited company is solely
responsible for all the work related to the bridge.
5) The conversation was not about the ability of people to stand the bridge as
constructed. A design based on compression and tension must also be engineered to
take into account lateral forces such as wind and seismic activities, along with the load
placed by the deck.

9
A 143-year-old pedestrian suspension bridge over the Machu River in Morbi in the state
of Gujarat, India, collapsed at 6:32 p.m. on October 30—just 4 days after it had been re-
opened with great fanfare culminating 6 months of renovation. An estimated 250 people
were on the bridge at that time. One report indicates that it had an accident but was still
capable of carrying 125 people.
It is suspected that some of the victims might have hit the riverbed, which is reportedly
10 feet below the water level, alongside the riverbanks. The commander of the National
Disaster Response Force that has been deployed at the site said the river bed is 30 feet
deep in the middle.
Not all suspension bridges are swinging, Machu Bridge was swinging whereas Bandra
Worli sea link is suspension but not swinging.

Figure 2 Bridge structure

Views of people:
1) According to the people, the Bhuj earthquake has damaged the Morbi bridged up to
some extent. But as Bhuj is 150km away from Morbi.
2) The fact that, at any instant, people are many more than the bridge can bear may be a
cause of its collapse.
3) Some parts of the structure were not repaired after carrying out minor repairs
activities lately and more reinforcing steel was added although this is not recommended
as it increased its self-weight.

10
 Figure 3 Pre-renovation. Distorted aluminum deck plates on the Morbi Bridge. Picture from Eng-Tips.com.

ROLE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM (SIT):

Noting that no ATR has been filed, Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav
Trivedi of the chief justice bench commented that the government has let it go
unperturbed. This comes after the SIT, in its report that was tabled before the court, had
specifically pointed out various lapses and shortcomings attributed to the office-bearers
of Morbi Nagarpalika, while the individual held the position of chief officer at that time.

The Gujarat high court on Wednesday directed the state government to file a report on
the steps taken against the office-bearers of Morbi municipality as the SIT highlighted
lapses in the aftermath of the collapse of a bridge in October 2022, killing 135 people.
Meanwhile, a man whose two relatives were reported dead in the bridge collapse
moved HC seeking its direction for repairing and restoring the heritage British-era
structure and also individualized compensation directives while Chief Justice Agarwal
was hearing suo motu PIL noted that the state government has yet to submit an ATR
following SIT findings on lapses by Morbi.
Without a doubt, an important clause in the maintenance contract received huge
attention according to which it appears that the municipality has nothing to do with the
operations regarding the bridge. Indeed, this news has been going viral amidst the
community and officials too. Moreover, there have been formal appeals filed before the
court as well, and whether an investigation headed either by a sitting judge or a retired
judge would be ordered or not is not clear at present. In the meanwhile, it is worthy to
mention here that the state government has not undertaken any crucial stride or move
in that regard so far.

11
The present situation of the Morbi bridge, which was originally designed in the British
colonial time, suggests that it was highly designed to carry just a few people, about
couple dozens as its carrying capacity. Indeed, this was turned upside down because
some 200 people were standing on it when it finally collapsed. While Oreva will indeed
be forced to answer and explain many aspects of both the construction and
maintenance work that was conducted on the bridge as well as how crowds which went
to view the bridge were handled and managed, it is quite very much the local
administration now under scrutiny and roundly criticized for having effectively
abdicated responsibility and oversight of a facility so popular and densely crowded to
be placed in the care and management of a private operator.
The bridge was closed for more than seven months for maintenance and remodelling.
The bridge collapsed on the 4th day after reopening. The death toll has risen to 60,
eyewitness said, "Many people came here in view of the Diwali holidays & weekend; it's
a tourist-friendly place. The incident occurred probably because of the huge crowd at
the bridge. When it collapsed, people fell over each other."
After the contract between the Oreva Group and Morbi municipality was renewed
regarding maintenance and operation of the bridge, the company failed to take technical
opinion of an expert agency or consult the civic body before giving the contract to one
Dev Prakash Solutions to carry out major repair works, it said.
No restrictions were placed on the number of persons accessing the bridge at a given
point of time or on sale of tickets, it further said.
Corroded wires, welded suspenders behind Morbi bridge tragedy: SIT in
preliminary probe report: According to the SIT, there were nearly 300 persons on the
bridge at the time of collapse, which was “far more” than the load-bearing capacity of
the bridge.
The December 2022 report said that one of the two main cables of the Morbi bridge was
found to be corroded and had nearly half of its wires "may be already broken" before it
snapped.

The SIT, comprising five members, has found that corrosion on nearly half of the wires
on one of the main cables and the welding of old suspenders with new ones were some
of the key issues that led to the bridge collapse. The report states that the upstream
main cable of the bridge snapped, leading to the tragedy. The Gujarat government-
appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT) has found in its preliminary probe that
corrosion on nearly half of the wires on a cable and welding of old suspenders with new
ones were some of the major faults that led to the collapse of the suspension bridge in
Morbi last year in which 135 people were killed.
One of the major reasons behind the collapse is the overcapacity. The bridge has a
holding capacity of around 50-100 people. But there were hundreds of people on that
bridge that day. The bridge was not checked before it was made operational,"
The tragedy was "a result of lapses at administrative level to follow due procedure as
per government norms, and also due to technical incompetency to repair the bridge and
test it before opening it to the public," the SIT said in its report submitted before a
division bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Aniruddha P Mayee, which is
hearing a suo motu PIL on the tragedy.
12
Even after the completion of the repairing work and before opening the bridge to the
public at large, the Oreva Company ought to have obtained its fitness report and
consulted the municipality on that behalf, the SIT said in the report presented by
Advocate General Kamal Trivedi before the court.
They also found several lapses in repairs, maintenance and operation of the bridge.

The bridge, built in 1887 during the British era, collapsed on the evening of October 30,
2022, leading to a tragedy that shook the state.
The findings are part of the ’Preliminary Report on Morbi Bridge Incident’ submitted by
the five-member SIT in December 2022. The report was recently shared by the state
Urban Development Department with the Morbi Municipality.

Figure 4 Times of India on Administrative Lapses and Negligence

The Morbi Municipality had awarded the contract to maintain and operate the bridge to
Ajanta Manufacturing Limited (Oreva Group), which was responsible for its operation
and maintenance at the time of the tragedy.

Notably, the bridge had reopened just days before its collapse after being closed for
about seven months for extensive repairs and renovation.

13
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORBI BRIDGE COLLAPSE

Structural Overview

The Morbi Bridge was a suspension bridge constructed in the late 19th century, characterized
by its cable-stayed design. Such bridges rely on cables to support the deck, distributing weight
effectively. However, their age and the materials used (such as steel and concrete) necessitate
regular maintenance and assessment to ensure structural integrity.

Figure 5 Load distribution on bridge

Figure 6 Aftermath of bridge accident

Factors Leading to Collapse

1. Overloading:
o At the time of the collapse, the bridge was reported to be overcrowded, with
estimates suggesting that it was carrying significantly more weight than it was
designed to support.
o Suspension bridges have a maximum load capacity; exceeding this can lead to
increased stress on cables and joints.

14
 2. Deterioration of Materials:
o Given the age of the bridge, it likely suffered from material degradation,
including:
 Corrosion of steel cables: Over time, exposure to environmental factors
can weaken steel, reducing its load-bearing capacity.
 Fatigue in structural components: Continuous use without proper
inspection can lead to micro fractures and weakening in key areas.

3. Inadequate Maintenance:
o The bridge underwent recent renovations but may not have included thorough
inspections of critical components.
o Reports indicated that safety protocols were insufficient, and necessary
assessments may have been bypassed or inadequately performed.

4. Design Limitations:
o As a historic structure, the original design may not have accounted for modern
load requirements or safety standards.
o The bridge's design could lack redundancy—an essential characteristic in modern
bridge engineering that provides alternative load paths in case of failure.

5. Environmental Factors:
o Weather conditions, such as wind or vibrations caused by the crowd, may have
contributed to the stress on the bridge.
o Sudden movements from the crowd could create dynamic loads, which are often
more significant than static loads.

Analysis of Failure Mechanism

1. Initial Stress Response:

o As the load on the bridge exceeded its design capacity, stress concentrated in
critical areas, particularly at the joints and anchorage points.

2. Progressive Structural Failure:

o Failure in one component (such as a cable or support) can lead to a domino
effect. For instance, if a cable snaps due to excessive strain, the remaining cables
and the deck may be unable to redistribute the load, leading to a catastrophic
failure.

3. Resonance and Dynamic Effects:

o If the crowd moved in unison (e.g., cheering or swaying), this could have created
resonance, amplifying forces on the structure. Suspension bridges can be
particularly susceptible to resonance, leading to oscillations that exceed safe
limits.

4. Complete Structural Collapse:

o Once critical components failed, the entire structure could no longer sustain its
load, resulting in the deck collapsing into the river below.

15
Figure 7 Graph of structural performance vs time

16
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE

 Regular Structural Assessments: Implement comprehensive inspection

protocols for older bridges.
 Load Monitoring Systems: Consider using modern technology to monitor real-
time stress and load conditions on bridges.
 Upgrading Standards: Ensure that maintenance practices adhere to current
engineering standards and safety regulations.

This analysis highlights the complexities involved in the failure of large structures and
emphasizes the importance of rigorous maintenance and engineering practices to
prevent future incidents.

As of now, the current status of the Morbi bridge incident includes:

1. Investigations: Ongoing inquiries are being conducted by various authorities to

determine the causes of the collapse. This includes assessing the maintenance
practices and accountability of those involved in the recent renovations.
2. Legal Proceedings: Several individuals, including local officials and the
contractor responsible for the bridge's maintenance, have faced legal action.
Arrests have been made, and trials are expected to follow as the investigations
progress.
3. Infrastructure Review: The Gujarat government has initiated a review of
infrastructure safety standards across the state, focusing on aging bridges and
public structures. Plans for regular inspections and maintenance protocols are
being discussed.
4. Community Support: Efforts to support the victims’ families and the local
community are ongoing, with various organizations providing assistance.
5. Safety Measures: There have been calls for improved regulations regarding the
safety and maintenance of public infrastructure to prevent similar incidents in
the future.

This situation remains dynamic, with updates likely as investigations and legal
processes continue.

SHM Methodology:

The main parameters to be determined on a bridge are environmental parameters,

operational and environmental loads, and response parameters.

The responses of live loads like stress, vibrations, displacement, inclinations of different
parts, etc. can be monitored by placing sensors for the same on the corresponding
components of the structure. Corrosion is another important parameter to be
monitored.

The sensors for measuring the level of corrosion can be installed on the structural
components which are likely to be corroded. These sensors can be implemented in all
civil structures including bridges so that such mis-happenings can be avoided. The
measured values of the parameters from each sensor at a specific time will be recorded
and saved offline and/or online. The input from the sensors will be provided to the
computers and mobile phones of concerned personnel, along with alarms when the
17
monitored parameters exceed their threshold values. The structural elements can be
repaired or replaced at that stage to avoid the loss and damage to life and property.

India, as per 2019 data, there are about around 39000 railway bridges which are more
than 100 years old. The Indian Railway confirms that a systematic process of inspection
every year for all these bridges is ongoing. This is a welcome measure.

In the case of SHM, there will be a large, saved data available for each monitoring
parameter of the structure. From the analysis of this data, the health of the structure can be
predicted for any later stage by introducing Artificial intelligence.

Figure 8 Application of SHM

GUJARAT HIGH COURT AND MEDIA ON COLLAPSE:

State government to submit a report on the action taken against the office-bearers of
Morbi municipality as the SIT highlighted lapses in the aftermath of the collapse of a
bridge in October 2022, which killed 135 people.

The division bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi noted the
government has not yet submitted an Action Taken Report (ATR) after a Special
Investigation Team (SIT) highlighted lapses by office-bearers of the Morbi Nagar palika,
including its then-chief officer.

Meanwhile, a man who lost two relatives in the bridge collapse has moved the high
court, seeking its direction for repairing and restoring the heritage British-era structure,
and directives for individualised compensation. While hearing a suo motu PIL, Chief
Justice Agarwal noted that the state government has yet to submit an ATR following the
SIT findings on lapses by Morbi Nagarpalika office-bearers, including its then chief
officer. The SIT's final report was submitted on October 9, 2023.

18
 Figure 9 Newspaper clippings regarding Morbi Bridge Collapse

According to the NBT official news updated on 5th November 2022 after court orders.

Figure 10 Newspaper Ahmedabad Mirror clipping

High Court Judge Samir Dave refused to take hearing of Accused Devang Parmar in
morbi bridge case by official update on Paper named Ahemdabad Mirror.
Justice Samir Dave of the Gujarat High Court recused himself from hearing a bail
application of Devang Parmar, one of the accused in the Morbi bridge collapse case, on
Friday. The judge recused from hearing after noting the absence of the lawyer
representing the victims. The matter will now be placed before the Chief Justice and will
be assigned to another bench.

The Morbi tragedy had led to the loss of 135 lives in October, 2022. The High Court has
already granted bail to nine of the ten accused in the case. Devang Parmar, who owns
Dev Prakash Solutions based in Dhrangadhra, was a subcontractor for the repair works

19
of the bridge built by Oreva Group. Recently, the SC also granted bail to Jaysukh Patel,
CMD of Oreva.

Figure 11 Hindustan Times published in its Annual Magazine

20
 Figure 12 Hindustan Times clipping on Morbi Bridge Hearing

OREVA STATEMENTS:

Oreva, a company known primarily for manufacturing clocks and electrical appliances,
was entrusted with the renovation and maintenance of the historic suspension bridge.
Despite having no direct experience in large-scale infrastructure or civil engineering
projects, Oreva was awarded the contract for repairs and upkeep of the 143-year-old
bridge. This decision raised questions about the tendering process and the company's
qualifications for handling such a critical project.
Oreva subcontracted much of the repair work to other, less experienced companies,
with reports suggesting that key aspects of the renovation, such as the replacement of
suspension cables and other structural components, were either ignored or
inadequately addressed. The renovation focused largely on cosmetic improvements,
including painting and resurfacing the deck, while the integrity of the critical load-
bearing elements of the bridge was left unchecked. Furthermore, Oreva reopened the
bridge to the public without obtaining proper safety certifications or conducting
rigorous load tests, contributing to the disaster.
One of the two managers of Oreva Company (that have been arrested) told the court
that it is an 'Act of God': Adv HS Panchal, Additional Public Prosecutor, Morbi.

21
 Figure 13 ANI Official Article

Advocate HS Panchal said one of the two managers of the firm, who have been arrested,
made this statement in a court in Gujarat. According to him, another significant
revelation was that the bridge's cable wires were "rusting away" and were not in the
best shape to be opened to the public.
"In the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report, the Investigating Officer (IO) said that
the cable of the bridge was rusting away. The Investigating Officer says that only
flooring of the bridge was done and the cables were not changed, oiling-greasing also
wasn't done," Advocate Panchal added, as per ANI. Citing an FSL officer, he further said
prima facie it seems that it was an old cable.
Out of the 4 people who were sent to Police custody, two are managers at Oreva Co and
two others did fabrication work for the bridge. The five others who were sent to judicial
custody are security personnel and ticket vendors," Panchal said regarding details of the
accused sent to police custody today.
According to Panchal, the Investigating Officer claimed in its report that the contract to
the firm was awarded directly rather than through a tender process.
On Wednesday, the Morbi Court in Gujarat sentenced four of the nine people, who had
been detained in connection with the collapse of the century-old suspension bridge on
October 30, to police custody and placed the other five into judicial detention until
November 5.
It is pertinent to mention here that at least 135 people, including women and children,
were killed and over 100 are receiving treatment for their injuries sustained after a
cable suspension bridge in Morbi town collapsed.

22
Accusations over repairs

Many people are now asking how a tragedy of this scale could happen and why was it not
prevented?
The bridge was thrown open to the public to coincide with the Gujarati New Year.
A day earlier, Jaysukh Bhai Patel, the owner of Oreva group, the firm contracted to maintain
and operate the bridge since 2008, told a press conference the renovation work had cost 20
million rupees ($242,000; £211,200).
"Nothing will happen to the bridge for the next 8-10 years. And if it's used responsibly, the
bridge will need no repairs for 15 years," Jaysukh bhai was heard as saying.

He is reported to have lauded the quality of the repair work, the machinery and the
contractor the firm had hired.

Since Sunday's accident, police have arrested nine people associated with Oreva - including
two managers and two ticket clerks on its payroll, as well as two contractors and three
security guards it had hired.

They are being investigated for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

HIENRICH DOMINO SEQUENTIAL MODEL

23
Heinrich’s domino model of accident causation:
Herbert W. Heinrich was a pioneering occupational safety researcher, whose 1931
publication Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach was based on the
analysis of large amounts of accident data collected by his employer, a large insurance
company. This work, which continued for more than thirty years, identified causal
factors of industrial accidents including “unsafe acts of people” and “unsafe mechanical
or physicalconditions”.

Heinrich is most famous for originating the concept of the “Safety Pyramid”. He also
developed the “five domino model” of accident causation, a sequential accident
model which has been influential in the development of occupational safety thinking.
His “domino theory” represents an accident sequence as a causal chain of events,
represented as dominos that topple in a chain reaction. The fall of the first domino leads
to the fall of the second, followed by the third, etc. A similar analogy was in use in
geopolitical theory during the Cold War, speculating that if one country “fell” to
communism, then surrounding countries might quickly follow. This domino theory was
used by the US administration to justify the need for American intervention in various
parts of the world.

Figure 14 Domino effect in case of accident

Heinrich saw the occurrence of a “preventable injury” as the culmination of a series of

events that form a sequence, similar to a row of dominos placed so that the toppling of a
first domino knocks down the next, which makes the third fall down, and so on until the
entire row is toppled. If this series is interrupted by the elimination of even one of the
several factors that comprise it, the injury will not occur, as illustrated in the figure
below:

Figure 15 Figure illustration regarding removal of accident causing factor

24
Accident prevention by interrupting the accident sequence, from the 1950 edition of the
book Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach
In the first version of this model, published in 1931, the five factors identified were:
 Domino 1: ancestry and the worker’s social environment, which impact the
worker’s skills, beliefs and “traits of character”, Heinrich wrote that
“Recklessness, stubbornness, avariciousness, and other undesirable traits of
character may be passed along through inheritance”. This kind of belief is not
very different from that held by supporters of eugenics and thus the way in
which they perform tasks
 Domino 2: the worker’s carelessness or personal faults, which lead them to pay
insufficient attention to the task (see box about “accident-proneness” theory)
 Domino 3: an unsafe act or a mechanical/physical hazard, such as a worker error
(standing under suspended loads, starting machinery without warning…) or a
technical equipment failure or insufficiently protected machinery
 Domino 4: the accident
 Domino 5: injuries or loss, the consequences of the accident.

CONCLUSION:

The Morbi bridge collapse was likely the result of a combination of excessive loading,
material deterioration, inadequate maintenance, and possible design limitations. A
thorough investigation is essential to pinpoint specific failures and ensure
accountability. Moving forward, lessons learned should guide improvements in the
inspection, maintenance, and design standards for aging infrastructure. However apart
from this Morbi Suspension bridge was the combination of all not required factors or
cases which should not have happened. Intially, there should not be excessive loading
on the bridge which more than 200 people with effect of swinging that suspension
bridge.

Secondly, 42 corroded wires and placed heavy Aluminium deck slab panels, which
increased self-weight of the bridge deck, increased load. Apart from this inspection held
before starting the bridge was not done thoroughly as mentioned by court and higher
authorities of investigation, corrosion was still there, Ultimate capacity on the deck was
not checked or executed at the place which led to overcrowding as there was fee to visit
the bridge, leads towards the business mindset of Oreva company a watch based
company in morbi with no prior experience in construction industry.

Indeed, there was no proof checking of the bridge after inspection before making it for
use.

25
REFERENCES

1. Saafan, A. S., Theoretical analysis of suspension bridges, Proc. ASCE, 92, ST4,1966.
2. April 2017 IJSDR | Volume 2, Issue 4 ISSN: 2455-2631 Analysis and Construction
criteria.
3. Patel, Ramesh. 2022. "Morbi Bridge Collapse: What Went Wrong?" Ahmedabad Mirror,
October 31.
4. Sharma, Priya. 2022. "Morbi Bridge Disaster: The Engineering Breakdown."
Hindustan Times, October 31

26