IB224 Vibhanshu Indonesia

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Issue Brief # 224

June 2013

Innovative Research | Independent Analysis | Informed Opinion

Cracks in Muslim Democracy Model


Radicalization in Contemporary Indonesia

Dr. Vibhanshu Shekhar


Visiting Fellow, IPCS

Indonesia as a multi-ethnic and pluralistic blueprint for other Muslim societies to


democracy lives along multiple faultlines – follow. The moderate Muslims of Indonesia
social, regional, geographic, cultural, have emerged as the vanguard of
ethnic, religious, linguistic, native versus Indonesia’s democratic resurgence.
migrant, highlanders versus lowlanders, Scholars like Joshua Kurlantzik and
and so on. These faultlines have come to magazines with global outreach like the
shape both Indonesia’s internal as well as Economist were prescribing Indonesian
external expressions. Today a rising model of Muslim democracy for the Arab
Indonesia exudes a different sense of countries amidst the revolution initiated at
confidence in its global projection as a the Tahrir Square in Egypt in 2011.
moderate and the largest Muslim
democracy, living somewhat in harmony Second, the Indonesian leadership has
with its multi-layered and multi-pronged projected itself as an important bridge-
diversities. builder between the West and Muslim
world and a facilitator of dialogue
Three characters of the rising Indonesia between the two world-views. The then
have received global attention. First, Indonesian Ambassador to the United
Indonesia has been viewed as a model States, Dino Patti Djalal characterised
Muslim democracy and an alternative Indonesia-US partnership as a
‘constructive 21st-century partnership
between the West and the Islamic world.’
Southeast Asia Programme
(SEARP) at the Institute is
supported by the SAEA Re-
Moreover, the West also seems to have
search Group Singapore. acknowledged Indonesia’s bridge-
building capacity. While delivering his

Southeast Asia Research Programme (SEARP)


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RADICALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA 2

address at Istiqlal mosque in Jakarta in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indonesian


November 2000, the American President, leadership has shown activism in the
Barrack Obama called upon Indonesia to deliberations of the Organisation of
play a greater role in facilitating dialogue Islamic Countries (OIC). Moreover, Susilo
between the West and Muslim world and Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the
build trust. The international Conference Indonesian President had called upon the
on Cultural Diplomacy in the European need for greater global sensitization
Union, Brussels in December 2011 about the Islamic values and an
identified Indonesia as a bridge between international anti-blasphemy Code to
Islam and the West and a model of prevent insult to the global religions during
compatibility between Islam and his speech at the UN General Assembly.
democracy.

Finally, what has drawn the attention of


the international community is Indonesia’s I
image as a moderate Muslim society Cracks in Indonesia’s Muslim
where the state has proven extremely Democracy Model: Towards
effective against terrorism. The Post- Radicalisation
Suharto Indonesia has projected its
successful counterterrorist campaigns As Indonesia is articulating its roles and
against the home-grown terror network priorities in the regional and global order,
with regional and global linkages. So far, it faces growing radicalisation of identities
the democratic Indonesia is known to in the country that challenges Indonesia’s
have launched the most effective credentials as a model Muslim
measures against the terrorist networks. democracy and cuts into Jakarta’s
growing global popularity and its rising
Notwithstanding being the largest Muslim power status. The process of radicalisation
country of the world, ‘Indonesia is neither has troubled the Indonesian leadership
an Islamic state nor is Islam the official since the beginning of the country’s
religion of the state. At the same time, in democratic transition in the aftermath of
pursuance of this objective, Jakarta has the departure of Suharto, who ruled
also emphasised on its credential as a Indonesia with an iron fist and maintained
Muslim society and expressed strong the state’s moderate identity.
opinion on issues confronting the global
Muslim community. The Megawati The process of radicalisation during the
government of Indonesia had openly last fifteen years can be seen in two
criticized the US interventions in different stages marked by different
goals, modus operandi and focus areas.
Moreover, the state and the law-
enforcement agencies also seem to have
As Indonesia is articulating its roles and exhibited different characters. While the
priorities in the regional and global order, it faces first phase saw Christian minorities being
growing radicalisation of identities in the the main target, the second phase has
country that challenges Indonesia’s credentials as seen non-Sunni Muslims being the main
target. Moreover, in contrast to the outer
a model Muslim democracy and cuts into
islands being the main stage of
Jakarta’s growing global popularity and its rising operations during the first stage, the island
power status. of Java seems to have emerged as 2the

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IPCS ISSUE BRIEF # 223, JUNE 2013

focus area of radical forces during the


second phase. In other words, the As a part of this radicalisation process, several
radicals perceived threats coming Islamic paramilitaries came into being in
primarily from the non-Muslims and the
Indonesia...These militias were mobilizing
state during the first phase.
nominal and devout Muslims by capitalizing on
On the other hand, they have begun to the discourse of ‘victim,’ and projecting non-
view, during the second phase, non-Sunni Muslims as enemies and the state as anti-
Muslims and nominal believers or the Islamic.
Abangans of Java as the main threat.
While the first stage was marked by ethno
-communal violence and terrorist
operations, the second stage has seen standstill. Although the geography of
frequent sectarian attacks against non- these conflicts indicates their widespread
Sunni Muslims. While the first stage saw the distribution, the most extensive
state and government adopting zero- devastation occurred in three islands –
tolerance against the terrorist operations, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku.
the second stage has seen gradual
caving in of the state to the radical As a part of this radicalisation process,
pressure. several Islamic paramilitaries came into
being in Indonesia. Some of these
First Phase (1998-2007): Radicalisation organisations are the Front Pembela Islam
against the State and Ethnic minorities (FPI) or Islamic Defenders Front, the
Yogyakarta-based Laskar Jihad, and the
The first phase of radicalisation can be much smaller but still national, Laskar
discerned during the formative years of Mujahidin of the Council of Islamic
Post-Suharto Indonesia’s experiments with Fighters or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.
democracy. Three major elements of These militias were mobilizing nominal and
radicalisation were seen during this phase devout Muslims by capitalizing on the
in the form of large-scale outbreak of discourse of ‘victim,’ and projecting non-
ethno-communal violence in the outer Muslims as enemies and the state as anti-
islands, the rise of Islamic paramilitaries Islamic. While the Laskar Jihad claimed to
and the emergence of local and regional protect Muslims from being victimized by
Al-Qaeda-linked terror networks. As post- the Christians in Maluku and Central
Suharto Indonesia was celebrating the Sulawesi, the FPI aimed at eliminating the
resurgence of democracy in the country, impurities creeping into Indonesian social
it was witnessing simultaneously the horror and individual space – banning bars,
stories of ethno-communal violence on its discotheques, nightclubs, enforcing dress
different islands. codes and so on. Noorhaidi Hasan
identifies three reasons for the rise of
Indonesia witnessed a series of ethno- radical Islamic paramilitaries in Indonesia
communal violence during the late 1990s, – (a) dispersal of state capacity across
in which more than 10,000 people died various regional and national centres (b)
and around one hundred thousand tendency among the political elite to
families were displaced. Many houses, reach out to ‘uncivil forces’ in society,
religious structures and places of public and (c) the rise of factional politics within
utility were burnt down and economic the Indonesian army.
activities in the conflict areas came to a 3

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RADICALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA 4

Another important trend of radicalization democratisation introduced


process in Indonesia has been the rise of majoritarianisation of electoral and
terror networks, led by Jemaah Islamiyah political processes prompting the political
that represented a multi-faceted parties and groups to mobilise majority of
narrative, weaving together local, Muslim population, the decentralisation
regional and global stories of Islamic and regional redistricting not only brought
radicalism. While the 9/11 awakened out vested interests but also set in motion
Indonesia as a Muslim country to a new scramble for power and positions in the
set of discourse regarding the growing provinces. The mutually reinforcing
radicalization of Islam, the Bali bombing relationship between the state capacity
made Indonesia an active participant of for governance and politico-economic
the global discourse on radical Islam. crisis gave a fillip to the criminal elements
and the manipulation of mass sentiments.
Democratic Indonesia had to choose Apart from structural limitations, the
between the growing domestic support inefficiency of the security agencies in
for the radical Islam against the West and managing the conflict and maintaining
its role as a good international Samaritan law and order also emanated from their
to counter radical Islamic tendencies vested interests, a hallmark of the New
both within as well as outside the country. Order regime.
Various terrorist operations in Jakarta
(April 2003, September 2004, July 2009)
and Bali (October 2002, September 2005)
point towards growing inter-linkages Second Phase (2008 onwards): Towards
between global vectors of Islamic Sunni Majoritarianism
terrorism and local agents (Jemaah
Islamiyah), operating in domestic Of late, Indonesia’s social spectrum has
constituencies (Poso, Ambon, Java). witnessed a new trend in the process of
radicalisation with more frequent attacks
Major drivers for the radicalisation during on non-Sunni Muslims, more intense
this phase came from a weak and debates on purifying Indonesian Islam
vulnerable state, a discredited military with an emphasis on outward observation
with vested interests, an untrained and of Islamic outlook, and growing
partisan police, under-developed advocacy of the Arab-variant of Islam.
institutional checks and balances and Moreover, the state - with its indifference,
negative fallouts of twin virtues of inaction, juridico-legal support for stricter
governance – democratisation and observance of Sunni Islam, partisan role of
decentralisation. While the process of the law-enforcement agenci es,
majoritarian politics of many of the
political parties of the country - has been
seen as facilitator of the process. The new
Another important trend of radicalization
sectarian trend can best be understood
process in Indonesia has been the rise of terror as growing Sunni majoritarianism within
networks, led by Jemaah Islamiyah that the country’s national political and social
represented a multi-faceted narrative, weaving life. Following elements testify to the
together local, regional and global stories of growing trend towards Sunni
Islamic radicalism...the Bali bombing made majoritarianism.
Indonesia an active participant of the global
First, non-Sunni Muslims and nominal
discourse on radical Islam. 4

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IPCS ISSUE BRIEF # 223, JUNE 2013

Muslims of Java have been major targets


of the radicals. As per the reports of the
The process of radicalisation seems to have also
Human Rights Watch, more than 200 acquired legal character. The HRW report
attacks are taking place against the identified 156 statutes, regulations, decrees and
minorities every year since 2010. The by-laws by 2010 restricting religious freedom,
Muslim community of Ahmadiyas has many of them justified under article 28J (2).
been banned from publicly professing Moreover, Indonesia has witnessed greater
their religion and their houses by the
application of Sharia in social, legal and cultural
decree of 2008 and their religious places
have been attacked on a few occasions
affairs.
during the last five years. A few
Ahmadiyas were attacked and killed by
the radical militias on two occasions in rendered difficult the construction of the
the western Java in February and August religious places of worship for the
2011. The Shia community has also come minorities.
under attack during the last few years
including an attack on the community in Two explanations for the moderate
the Sampang district of Madura in August Indonesia’s drift towards the majoritarian
2012. Similarly, atheists have not been outlook stand prominent. The most
spared either and many of them seem to important factor is the majoritarian
have gone underground. outlook of the national politico-electoral
processes emanating from the lack of
political will and the compulsion of
coalition politics. Bahtiar Effendy, a
II prominent scholar on Indonesian Islam,
Legal, Judicial and writes, “Had the state been strong
Policing Issues enough and functioned the way it's
supposed to function, I don't think that this
The process of radicalisation seems to so-called radicalism will escalate.” The
have also acquired legal character. The HRW report of 2013 mentions, “Despite
HRW report identified 156 statutes, occasional positive rhetoric, however,
regulations, decrees and by-laws by 2010 President Yudhoyono has responded
restricting religious freedom, many of weakly to growing intolerance and acts
them justified under article 28J (2). of violence against religious minorities, has
Moreover, Indonesia has witnessed not insisted firmly that national laws be
greater application of Sharia in social, enforced, and has often been unwilling to
legal and cultural affairs. There have use his powers as president to see that the
been more than 60 cases of laws be enforced.” The defamatory
implementation of Sharia laws throughout Statements from the Minister for Religious
the country, with roughly half of 32 Affairs, Suryadharma Ali of the United
provinces reporting to have implemented Development Party (PPP), against Shias
different sets of sharia laws. Of late, the and Ahmediyas since 2011 seems a
governments both at the national as well repetition of what Hamza Haz, his
as provincial levels have resorted to more predecessor and the then Vice-President
frequent application of the Anti- of Indonesia was praciting during the
Blasphemy Law of 1965 since 2005. presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri.
Moreover, the decrees on houses of
worship of 1969 and of 2006 have Second, a somewhat long-term trend
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RADICALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA 6

continuing in Indonesia is the growing III


debate within Indonesian Islam about Conclusion
what is sacred and what is profane,
prompting people to shed those aspects A multi-religious, religiously tolerant and
of life-style that may not appear to be syncretic Indonesia faces today the rise of
orthodox Muslim. There has been a Sunni majoritarianism, a trend that may
growing tendency towards going to the disrupt the Indonesian happy trajectory of
roots, to the Arab worldview on Islam with a model Muslim democracy. In other
an emphasis on outward observation. As words, the rising Indonesia’s success story
a result, Arabic has become fashionable may not travel very far if it does not put its
leading to increased circulation of veils house in order. What is more worrisome is
and yellow books. It also appears that their continued existence for a long time
common Muslims, though not in favour of and the lack of political will as well as
violence and radical Islam, are not averse consensus within the country as to how
to purer version of their Islamic these challenges should be dealt with.
credentials. This tendency also seems to
have influenced the outlook of the
national political parties and
organisations. The experiences of ethno- Views expressed are author’s personal.
religious violence have also seemed to
have hardened radicalised identities and
entities.

Finally, the law-enforcement agencies


have exhibited both their inability as well
as unwillingness to act against the radical
elements engaged in the persecution of
religious minorities. In other words, the law
-enforcement agencies, especially the
police, continue to demonstrate their
partisan role that disrupted peace and
harmony all over the country during the
first few years of Indonesia’s transition to
democracy after the departure of
Suharto.

Another important trend of radicalization


process in Indonesia has been the rise of terror
networks, led by Jemaah Islamiyah that
represented a multi-faceted narrative, weaving
together local, regional and global stories of
Islamic radicalism...the Bali bombing made
Indonesia an active participant of the global
discourse on radical Islam. 6

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IPCS ISSUE BRIEF # 223, JUNE 2013

Southeast Asia
Recent IPCS Publications

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Prof. V. Suryanarayan
Special Report 139

China and its Peripheries: Beijing


and the BCIM
Ravi Bhoothalingam
SEARP
Issue Brief 216 The Myanmar Project

China and its Peripheries: Beijing’s


Myanmar Strategy Rudderless & Drowning in Tears: The Rohingyas
Ranjit Gupta of Myanmar
Roomana Hukil & Nayantara Shaunik
Issue Brief 215
Issue Brief 222

Emerging Security Architecture in Challenging the Reconciliation Process:


Southeast & East Asia: Growing Myanmar’s Ethnic Divide and Conflicts
Tensions in South China Sea CS Kuppuswamy
Sonika Gupta Issue Brief 221
Issue Brief 213
Myanmar’s National Reconciliation: An Audit
of Insurgencies and Ceasefires
Emerging Security Architecture in
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Southeast & East Asia: Japan and
ASEAN Special Report

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Issue Brief 211

Emerging Security Architecture in


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RADICALIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

SEARP Southeast Asia


Recent Events/Discussions
Research Programme
(SEARP)
The Kachin &
Rohingya The Southeast Asia Research Programme (SEARP)
Conflicts in at the Institute of Peace and Conflict studies (IPCS)
Myanmar aims to promote research on Southeast Asia in In-
dia, map the existing nature and dynamics of India
14 June 2013 - Southeast Asia relations, and highlight current
political, economic and security developments of
mutual concern.

Malaysia:
Through a combination of discussions, dialogues
Election 2013
and research work, the Programme seeks to achieve
17 May 2013 its goal of creating avenues for collaboration and
fostering understanding between India and
ASEAN. More importantly, the Programme empha-
sises on training the next generation of scholars;
Indonesia 2013: besides building capacity within India to focus on
Society, Southeast Asia as an academic field of study.
Politics,
Governance The SEARP also publishes a quarterly titled South-
and Security east Asia (available online and in print), with com-
mentaries and essays relating to contemporary de-
3 May 2013
velopments in the region.

The Programme also organizes “Inside Southeast


Asia Pacific Asia,” an annual conference on the region, every
2013: Looking year during the first week of December.
Beyond
Southeast Asia
4 March 2013

Southeast Asia Programme


(SEARP) at the Institute is
supported by the SAEA Re-
search Group Singapore.

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B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi, 110029. www.ipcs.org

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