Propositional logic

Michael Franke

Syntax & semantics of propositional logic; truth-tables; tautologies

vs. contradictions vs. contingencies; logical equivalence; translations
from natural language into propositional logic; semantic meaning
vs. pragmatic enrichment; argument schemas & logical validity.

1 The language of propositional logic

Propositional logic (PropLog) studies how propositions are combined by

logical operators, which closely correspond to certain sentential connectives
in natural language (such as and, or, if, or not). A proposition in the sense of
PropLog is a minimal unit of thought which can be evaluated as true or false
independently of other propositions.1 For example, the logical structure of 1 The notion of a proposition in this

the sentence: sense is not unproblematic. For example, a

case like “This pixel is red.” seems like a
minimal unit of truth-evaluable information
The
| earth
{zis round} |{z}
and |the moon is made
{z of cheese.
} about the color of a particular pixel, but it
p ∧ q is not independent of another statement like
“This pixel is blue.” (Historically, this color-
could be analyzed as composed of two propositions, viz., the proposition (de- related problem was brought up famously
by Frank Ramsey in response to the early
noted here with proposition letter p) that the earth is round and the proposi- logical work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.)
tion (denoted by q) that the moon is made of cheese. These two propositions
are connected by a logical operator “and,” for which we write ∧ in PropLog.
The logical structure of the complex sentence above can therefore be written
as p ∧ q in PropLog.

1.1 Proposition letters & sentential connectives

The language of PropLog is formed by:

(i) a set of proposition letters P = {p, q, r, s, p1 , q27 , . . . }, and

(ii) a set of sentential connectives {¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔}.2 2 You will also find terminology like
logical connectives or logical operators.
The sentential connectives have names and are intended to correspond (ap- There may be additional connectives used
by some logicians or textbooks, and you
proximately) to natural language paraphrases: might find slightly different symbols for the
same notions in some places
name paraphrase symbol
negation “not” ¬
conjunction “and” ∧
disjunction “or” ∨
implication “if . . . , then . . . ” →
equivalence “if and only of” ↔
 propositional logic 2

1.2 Formulas

The language L of PropLog is the set of all formulas which are recursively
defined as follows:3 3 We will make consistent use of Greek
letters ϕ, ψ, χ, . . . as variables for formulas.
(i) Every proposition letter is a formula.

(ii) If ϕ is a formula, so is ¬ϕ.

(iii) If ϕ and ψ are formulas, so are:

a. (ϕ ∧ ψ) b. (ϕ ∨ ψ) c. (ϕ → ψ) d. (ϕ ↔ ψ)

(iv) Anything that cannot be constructed by (i)–(iii) is not a formula.

Examples for formulas of PropLog are:4 4 We conventionally omit the outermost

parentheses of a formula.
p p∧ p
p → ¬q (p ∨ q) ↔ r

Examples of strings made of proposition letters and logical connectives

which are not formulas of PropLog are:

(p) ¬pq
p¬ → ¬q p∨q↔r

1.3 Syntactic trees

The recursive definition for formulas of PropLog gives an internal structure

to each formula. Take the example p ∧ ¬q. There is only one way in which
this formula could have been generated by a constructive process that follows
the recursive definition above. In the last step of that process, the two subfor-
mulas ϕ = p and ψ = ¬q have been combined to form an expression of the
form ϕ ∧ ψ using rule (iii) part a. The first subformula ϕ = p is constructed
by rule (i). The second formula ψ = ¬q can only be constructed by first using
rule (i) to introduce q and then using rule (ii) to introduce the negation sign.
A syntactic tree is a useful visual illustration of the internal structure of a
formula. The syntactic tree of formula p ∧ ¬q is this:

(p ∧ ¬q)

p ∧ ¬q

¬ q

The construction of a complex formula, and therefore its syntactic tree, is

always recoverable by following the introduction of the parentheses in step
(iii). This is illustrated by the minimal pair in Figure 1.5 5 This is why at most the outer parenthe-
ses may be omitted, but never any other pair
of parentheses.
 propositional logic 3

((p ∨ q) → r) (p ∨ (q → r))
Figure 1: Examples of syntactic
trees
(p ∨ q) → r p ∨ (q → r)

p ∨ q q → r
(a) Tree for ((p ∨ q) → r) (b) Tree for (p ∨ (q → r))

1.4 Terminology

A formula of PropLog which consists of a single proposition letter is called

atomic formula. Any formula of PropLog which is not atomic is called a
complex formula.
Each complex formula has a main connective. The main connective is the
last sentential connector introduced during the construction of the formula.
A complex formula is also often called by the name of its main connective.
For example, the formula p ∧ ¬q has a conjunction as its main operator and
would therefore be called a conjunction. The formula (p ∨ q) → r from
Figure 1(a) is an implication, while the formula p ∨ (q → r) from Figure 1(b)
is a disjunction.
For some connectives, the subformulas that they contain may have special
names as well. In the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, the subformulas ϕ and ψ are called
conjuncts. In the disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ, the subformulas ϕ and ψ are called
disjuncts. In the implication ϕ → ψ, the subformula ϕ is called antecedent
and the subformula ψ is called consequent.

Exercise 1. Determine which of the following strings are formulas of propo-

sitional logic. For any formula, determine its main operator.

a. q12 d. p → (p ∧ p)

b. p, q ∧ r e. (p →)(p ∧ p)

c. (p) ∧ q f. (p ∨ ¬q) ↔ (r → (¬(p ∨ ¬p)))

Exercise 2. Draw the syntactic tree for each of the following formulas.

a. p ↔ q c. p → ¬(q ∧ r)

b. ¬p ∧ p d. (¬p ∨ ¬q) ∧ (r → p)
 propositional logic 4

2 The semantics of propositional logic

The language of PropLog defines rules of systematically combining propo-

sition letters with sentential connectives. The semantics of PropLog gives a
meaning to each formula. Yet, PropLog is not concerned with the meaning
of the proposition letters. Whether the proposition p corresponding to “The
earth is round.” is true or false in this world we live in, is of no concern to
the logician. The (propositional) logician cares only about the meaning of
the sentential connectives. More specifically, PropLog pays attention to a
specific kind of meaning, namely truth-conditional meaning. Concretely,
PropLog analyzes the meaning of a sentential connective ∈ {∧, ∨, →, ↔}
in terms of how the truth or falsity of the complex sentence ϕ ψ depends
on the truth or falsity of its components ϕ and ψ; and how the meaning of ¬ϕ
depends on the truth or falsity of ϕ.

2.1 Truth tables

One way of defining the semantics of the sentential connectives is by truth ta-
bles. Truth tables are also handy for systematically calculating the conditions
under which complex formulas are true.
Take the complex formula ¬ϕ.6 For all we know, ϕ could be either true 6 We use ϕ here as a variable which could

or false. There are just these two possibilities.7 To give a truth-conditional represent any formula, no matter if it is a
proposition letter or extremely long and
meaning to the operator ¬ we need to define whether ¬ϕ is true or false for complex.
each case: when ϕ is true, and when ϕ is false. The truth table that defines the 7 That PropLog only considers two truth
values is also referred to as the principle of
meaning of negation is given in Table 1(a).8 PropLog treats negation like a
bivalence. There are other logics, so-called
switch: take a formula ϕ as input, look at its truth value, and swap it for the many-valued logics, which allow for more
other (since there are only two truth values). than two truth values, e.g., to represent
degrees of truth or uncertainty.
Other sentential connectives than negation take two formulas as input, 8 We here write 1 for the truth value
so to speak, and may therefore be conceived of as functions that take a pair “true” and 0 for “false.” It is also common to
of truth values as input to return a single truth value. The semantics of the use letters T and F, or yet other symbols in
truth tables.
binary connectives is given in Table 1(b):

φ ψ φ∧ψ φ∨ψ φ→ψ φ↔ψ

Table 1: Semantics of sentential
ϕ ¬ϕ 1 1 1 1 1 1 connectives in propositional logic
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 expressed in terms of truth tables
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
(a) Semantics of negation (b) Semantics of binary connectives

2.2 Working with truth tables

Truth tables are useful for systematically working out the conditions under
which complex formulas are true. Consider the complex formula (ϕ ∧ ψ) →
 propositional logic 5

¬χ. We do not know whether the subformula ϕ, ψ and χ are atomic or com-
plex. But we want to know under which truth-value assignments to ϕ, ψ and
χ the formula (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ is true or false. In order to find out, we can
construct a truth table that starts by enumerating all logical possibilities of
truth-value assignments for the formulas ϕ, ψ and χ (the first three columns
in the table below). We then work towards the “goal formula” (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ
by following the recursive definition of formulas of PropLog. At each step
we apply the definition of the semantics of the relevant sentential connective
until we arrive at the “goal formula”. Following this method, we construct the
truth table in Table 2, which shows that the formula (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ is always
true, except when all three subformulas, ϕ, ψ and χ are all true at the same
time.

ϕ ψ χ ϕ∧ψ ¬χ (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ
Table 2: Truth table for formula
1 1 1 1 0 0 (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ
1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1

2.3 Contingencies, tautologies & contradictions

A common application of truth tables is to find out whether a given formula is

always true, always false or whether it can sometimes be true and sometimes
be false. The truth table in Table 2 shows that the formula (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬χ
belongs to the last category: there are cases, i.e., assignments of truth values
to its components (= rows in the table), where it is true, and there are cases
where it is false. A formula which can become true and false for different
assignments of truth values to its components is called a contingency. A
formula which is always true under any constellation of truth values for its
components is called a tautology. A formula which is false for all ways of
assigning truth values to its subformulas is a contradiction. We say that a
tautology is a formula that is necessarily true, or true by logical necessity.
Similarly, a contradiction can be said to be necessarily false, or false by
logical necessity.9 9 Another way of thinking about this is to

To show that any formula of the form ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is a tautology, we can con- imagine that you know nothing at all about
some foreign universe. You don’t know at
struct the relevant truth table, shown in Table 3(a), and check whether the all which proposition letters are true or not.
column for the “goal formula” contains only ones, no zeros. Similarly, the Given a tautology you can nevertheless be
sure that it is true, no matter what the world
truth table in Table 3(b) reveals that any formula of the logical form ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is is like. Of a contradiction you are sure that
a contradiction. it is false. And for a contingency you know
that you don’t know whether it is true or
false, before you learn facts about the world.
 propositional logic 6

ϕ ¬ϕ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ϕ ¬ϕ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ
Table 3: Truth tables for a tautol-
1 0 1 1 0 0 ogy and a contradiction
0 1 1 0 1 0
(a) Truth table for ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (b) Truth table for ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ

2.4 Logical equivalence

Two formulas ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent if they have exactly the same
truth value no matter how we assign meanings to all subformulas of ϕ and
ψ, as long as we assign any subformula that occurs in both ϕ and ψ the same
truth value. We can use truth table to test when or demonstrate that two for-
mulas are logically equivalent. To do this, we just have to make a combined
truth table in which we have one column for ϕ and another for ψ. ϕ and ψ are
logically equivalent exactly when the truth values in the columns that corre-
spond to them are identical in each row. The truth table in Table 4 shows that
ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and ¬(ϕ → ψ) are in fact logically equivalent.

ϕ ψ ¬ψ ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ϕ→ψ ¬(ϕ → ψ)
Table 4: Truth table showing
1 1 0 0 1 0 the equivalence of ϕ ∧ ¬ψ and
1 0 1 1 0 1 ¬(ϕ → ψ)
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0

If two formulas ϕ and ψ are not logically equivalent, we can also show
this with a truth table. In that case, there must be at least one row in which
their truth values differ. In practice it may help to mark one such row as the
refuting counterexample against the assumption of logical equivalence. This
is shown in Table 5.

ϕ ψ ϕ→ψ ϕ↔ψ counterexample

Table 5: Truth table showing the
1 1 1 1 non-equivalence of ϕ → ψ and
1 0 0 0 ϕ↔ψ
0 1 1 0 ⇐
0 0 1 1
 propositional logic 7

Exercise 3. For each of the following formulas, try to intuit whether it is

a tautology, a contradiction or a contingency. Write down your best guess.
Then use the truth-table method to find out for certain.

a. ϕ → ¬ϕ c. (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) → ψ

b. ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ) d. (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ↔ (ϕ → ψ)

Exercise 4. For each of the following pairs of formulas, try to intuit whether
they are logically equivalent of not. Write down your guess. Then use truth
tables to determine whether your guess is correct. Highlight the relevant
columns in your truth table. Mark a row as a counterexample if they are not.

a. ϕ, ¬¬ϕ c. ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ → ψ

b. ϕ ↔ φ, ϕ ∧ ψ d. ϕ ∨ (χ → ¬ϕ), ψ ∨ (χ → ¬ψ)
 propositional logic 8

3 Logical structure of meaning

Linguistic theory distinguishes between semantic meaning of a sentence or an

expression and additional pragmatic enrichments to the literal meaning. The
literal meaning is the context-independent logical core meaning. Pragmatic
enrichments arise in context by taking into account general world knowledge
or the reasons why a speaker used language in the way that they did. Prag-
matic enrichments may be part of what we “perceive” to be the most likely
interpretation of a sentence; they may be what the speaker meant to say, but
not what the sentence means literally.10 10 The most obvious example is an utter-

Our current goal is to learn to excavate the logical structure of natural ance of a sentence like The weather is so
nice today! when clearly meant ironically.
language sentences. Therefore, we have to learn to “strip off the pragmatic
layer,” so to speak. Indeed, the logical operators of PropLog bear a close
correspondence to natural language expressions and, or, if and if and only
if. But the correspondence is not a perfect match. This is partly due to the
difference between semantic meaning and pragmatic enrichment.11 Let us 11 There are also arguments suggesting

look at a few interesting cases. that the logical operators of PropLog are
not good enough for analyzing the semantic
meaning of their corresponding natural
3.1 Conjunction & order-sensitivity language expressions. Most importantly,
this concerns the semantic meaning of
Logical conjunction is order-insensitive: ϕ ∧ ψ and ψ ∧ ϕ are logically conditional sentences, i.e., natural language
sentences with if . . . , then . . . .
equivalent. But natural language conjunctions are not necessarily. Saying that

They got married and had children.

might be understood differently from saying that

They had children and got married.

Still, we would analyze both of these sentences as having a logical-conjunctive

meaning, additional inferences about the temporal order of events notwith-
standing.

3.2 Disjunction: inclusive vs. exclusive

Logical disjunction is inclusive: ϕ ∨ ψ is true when ϕ and ψ are both true.

Yet natural language disjunctions can be understood as exclusive disjunction
according to which exactly one, but not both disjuncts are true. For example,
if I say:

She owns a Porsche or a Ferrari.

you might take that to mean that she doesn’t own both. But did I literally say
that? — The logical meaning of that sentence is more plausibly just analyzed
as inclusive disjunction. This is because it is not contradictory to say:

She owns a Porsche or a Ferrari and possibly both.

This contrasts with the weirdness of saying:

 propositional logic 9

She owns either a Porsche or a Ferrari and possibly both.

suggesting that natural language either . . . or . . . does have an exclusive

disjunctive meaning, but simple or does not.

3.3 Conditional perfection

PropLog analyzes implication as so-called material implication, but it is

controversial whether natural language conditional sentences might not
have a much richer meaning, e.g., requiring a discernible causal-inferential
relation between antecedent and consequent. Moreover, similar to the case
of inclusive vs. exclusive disjunctions, many natural language conditionals
receive a so-called conditional perfection reading, i.e., they are read like an
“if and only if” statement which would correspond to logical operator ↔,
even though their logical meaning might just be that of a simple implication
→. For example, the conditional statement:

If Bubu comes, Kiki comes.

does suggest to a certain degree that Kiki only comes when Bubu does. But
that is not the logical core meaning of this sentence. It is rather a pragmatic
enrichment on top of the logical meaning of the sentence. To see this, com-
pare the difference in weirdness between saying

If Bubu comes, Kiki comes, and maybe Kiki comes no matter what.

which seems fine, especially when compared to the much weirder:

Kiki comes only if Bubu comes, and maybe Kiki comes not matter what.

3.4 Excavating the logical structure of natural language sentences

Despite superficial discrepancies, it is possible and highly informative to try

to lay bare the logical structure of natural language sentences. The logical
relation between propositions contained in a natural language sentence may
sometimes be opaque. Take the following example sentence:

If drawing a red card means that I lost, I lost.

This sentence does have a propositional-logical structure, even though it is

not at all apparent from the way it is realized in natural language. There are
two atomic (truth-evaluable) propositions involved here:

p: I drew a red card. q: I lost.

With this translation key, we can then determine the logical structure of the
sentence above as:

(p → q) → q

Here are a few other examples.

 propositional logic 10

(i) John is hungry.

Key: p: John is hungry. Logical form: p

(ii) Mary likes John.

Key: p: Mary likes John. Logical form: p

(iii) John is hungry and Mary likes John.

Key: p: John is hungry. q: Mary likes John.
Logical form: p ∧ q

(iv) Berlin is east of Hamburg and Bremen.

Key: p: Berlin is east of Hamburg. q: Berlin is east of Bremen.
Logical form: p ∧ q

(v) Call me ‘sweetie’ once more and, no kidding, I’ll step on your toe.
Key: p: I’m not kidding. q: I’ll step on your toe.
Key: r: You call me ‘sweetie’ once more.
Logical form: p ∧ (r → q)

(vi) I will only play salsa, if you give me earplugs.12 12 There is a likely inclination to analyze

Key: p: I will play salsa. q: You give me earplugs. this as p ↔ q, but it is not clear whether
this is part of the semantic/logical content
Logical form: p → q here. Suppose you know that the sentence is
true. Now you learn that earplugs have been
handed over. Does that logically entail that
Exercise 5. For each of the following sentences give the translation key and salsa was played? No, because the sentence
only says that earplugs are a necessary but
the (propositional) logical form.
not necessarily sufficient condition for salsa.

(i) If John is hungry, then Mary likes John.

(ii) If John is hungry and Bill runs, then Mary doesn’t likes John.

(iii) John is hungry or it’s false that Bill runs.

(iv) Mary likes John or Mary doesn’t like John.

(v) Mary likes John but John is hungry.

(vi) Mary likes John provided Bill runs.

 propositional logic 11

4 Valuation functions, possible worlds & logical entailment

4.1 Valuation functions

The truth-tables method introduced above is very practical, but a proper

definition of the semantics of PropLog should better not rely on vocabulary
like “rows” and “columns,” but use mathematical notions like “function”
or “set.” The proper definition of the semantics of PropLog is therefore
formulated in terms of so-called valuation functions.
A valuation function V is a function that assigns to every formula of
propositional logic a unique truth value (0 or 1). More specifically, think of a
valuation function as a way of assigning truth-values to all proposition letters.
Once we know the truth or falsity of all proposition letters, the truth or falsity
of all complex formulas is non-arbitrary, because it is fixed by the meaning of
the sentential connectives.

V(p), V(q), . . . arbitrary

V(¬φ) = 1 iff V(φ) = 0 Table 6: Semantics of proposi-
V(φ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff V(φ) = 1 and V(ψ) = 1 tional logic in terms of valuation
functions
V(φ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff V(φ) = 1 or V(ψ) = 1
V(φ → ψ) = 0 iff V(φ) = 1 and V(ψ) = 0
V(φ ↔ ψ) = 1 iff V(φ) = V(ψ)
A valuation function is analogous to a row in a truth table.

4.2 Possible worlds & truth-conditional meaning

A valuation function can also be thought of as a possible world.13 A possible 13 This terminology is widely used in

world is a way in which things could be. A possible world conforms to the formal semantics and philosophy.

rules of logic, but otherwise allows all atomic propositions to be different

from the facts in the actual world.
Using valuation functions or, equivalently, possible worlds, we can give
a clear definition of the meaning of a formula (and, therefore by extension,
to the logical meaning of a natural language sentence). The truth-conditional
meaning of formula ϕ is the set of all valuation functions, or possible worlds,
for which ϕ is true. Formal semantics often uses notation ϕ to denote the
 

meaning of a formula in this sense:

ϕ = {V | V is a valuation function such that V(ϕ) = 1}

 

Alternatively, we could say that the meaning of a formula is the set of possi-
ble worlds in which it is true.14 14 Compare the famous passage from
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logica Philosoph-
icus: “Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, wissen
4.3 Tautologies, contradictions, contingencies & equivalence (revisited) was der Fall ist, wenn er wahr ist. (Man
kann ihn also verstehen, ohne zu wissen, ob
Using valuation functions and/or possible worlds, we can also give a proper er wahr ist.)” [TLP 4.024]
definition of notions we used previously in the context of truth tables. We
 propositional logic 12

say that ϕ is a tautology iff V(ϕ) = 1 for all valuation functions V. We say
that ϕ is a contradiction iff V(ϕ) = 0 for all valuation functions V. We say
that ϕ is a contingency iff there is at least one valuation function V1 such that
V1 (ϕ) = 1 and there is at least one valuation function V2 such that V2 (ϕ) = 0.
We say that ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent, iff for all valuation functions
V(ϕ) = V(ψ).

4.4 Logical entailment, informativity, & independence

We can now also give a definition of logical entailment. Formula ϕ logically

entails ψ iff for all valuation functions V, if V(ϕ) = 1, then V(ψ) = 1. An
alternative formulation is this: ϕ logically entails ψ iff ϕ ⊆ ψ .
   

Based on the notion of logical meaning in terms of sets of possible worlds,

we can also tackle another otherwise extremely elusive concept, namely
that of informativity, i.e., the amount of information given. We say that a
contingency ϕ is at least as informative as ψ iff ϕ ⊆ ψ , and that ϕ is
   

strictly more informative than ψ iff ϕ ⊂ ψ .

   

This notion of logical informativity is a relative one. It does not give

an absolute measure of information for each formula, but only compares
two formulas in terms of their relative informativity. It also only compares
some formulas; in fact, the ordering induced by this definition of logical
informativity is a partial order.15 15 Probabilistic notions of information,

Formulas ϕ and ψ are logically independent iff all of the following are e.g., as given by information theory extend
the notion of logical information to an abso-
non-empty: ϕ ∩ ψ , ¬ϕ ∩ ψ , ϕ ∩ ¬ψ , ¬ϕ ∩ ¬ψ . Intuitively,
               
lute measure of information which yields a
logical independence means that for every possible truth-value assignment to total order.
both ϕ and ψ is possible: there exists at least one valuation function (possible
world) for each combination of truth values for ϕ and ψ. In other words, the
truth value of ϕ does not determine the truth value of ψ and vice versa. Just
learning the truth value of one formula does not reveal the truth value of the
other.

4.5 Argument schemas & validity

The important concept of logical validity can be thought of, at least for
PropLog, as an extension of the notion of logical entailment to more than
two formulas. Concretely, we define logical validity of so-called argument
schemas. If ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . , ϕn and ψ are forumlas of propositional logic, then
ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . , ϕn /ψ is an argument schema. Formulas ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . , ϕn are the
premisses, formula ψ is the conclusion.
The argument schema ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . , ϕn /ψ is valid iff for all valuation func-
tions V such that V(ϕ1 ) = V(ϕ2 ) = · · · = V(ϕn ) = 1 it also holds that
V(ψ) = 1. If valid, we write ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . , ϕn |= ψ.
We can use truth tables again to check whether any given argument
schema is valid or not. Consider the argument schema: ϕ ∨ ψ, ¬ψ / ϕ. A
natural language analogue would be the following. We know or assume the
 propositional logic 13

following premisses:

The murderer is the butler or the gardener.

The gardener is not the murderer.

And the putative conclusion is:

The butler is the murderer.

We would like to find out whether the conclusion logically follows from the
premisses. Table 7 tells us that it does: in all rows (=valuation functions or
possible worlds) in which all the premisses are true, which are marked with
an asterisk (*) in Table 7, the conclusion (in the last column) is also true.

ϕ ψ ϕ∨ψ ¬ψ / ϕ
Table 7: Truth table for checking
1 1 1 0 1 the validity of argument schema
1 0 1 1 * 1 ϕ ∨ ψ, ¬ψ / ϕ
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
Table 8 shows a more extensive example of the truth-table method for the
argument schema ¬ϕ → (ψ ∧ ¬χ), ¬ψ → ¬χ / ϕ, which is not valid. The table
also introduces names for each row, in terms of (types of) possible worlds, so
that we can conveniently say that a possible world like w6 in which ϕ and χ
are false and ψ is true is a counterexample to validity: both premises are true,
but the conclusion is false.

ϕ ψ χ ¬ϕ ¬χ ψ ∧ ¬χ ¬ϕ → (ψ ∧ ¬χ) ¬ψ ¬ψ → ¬χ / ϕ
w1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 * 1
w2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 * 1
w3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
w4 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 * 1
w5 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
w6 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 * 0 ←
w7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
w8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Table 8: Example of the truth-table
method applied to an argument
4.6 Theorems of propositional logic schema that is not valid
Based on the definitions we have seen so far, we can prove illuminating facts
about PropLog.16 . Here are some examples. 16 Proving properties of a logical system is
a special subfield called metalogic
Proposition 1. If ϕ is a tautology, then ¬ϕ is a contradiction.

Proof. If ϕ is a tautology, then for all valuation functions V we have V(ϕ) =

1. For any valuation function V if V(ϕ) = 1 then, by definition, V(¬ϕ) = 0.
Therefore, V(¬ϕ) = 0 for all V, which means that ϕ is a contradiction. 
 propositional logic 14

Proposition 2. ϕ → ψ is a tautology iff ϕ logically entails ψ.17 17 Notice that this may seem trivial, but
there are really two notions that are related
Proof. First assume that ϕ → ψ is a tautology. We need to show that it by this proposition. One is the definition
of the sentential connective →, the other
follows that ϕ logically entails ψ. Towards contradiction, let us assume that is a high-level notion of logical entailment
ϕ does not logically entail ψ. This can only be the case if there is at least one defined on top of the semantics for all
formulas.
valuation function V for which V(ϕ) = 1 and V(ψ) = 0. For this valuation
function, by definition of the meaning of →, it holds that V(ϕ → ψ) = 0. So,
we contradict our assumption that ϕ → ψ is a tautology.
Next, we assume that ϕ logically entails ψ. We need to show that ϕ → ψ
is a tautology. If ϕ logically entails ψ, this means that there is no valuation
function V for which V(ϕ) = 1 and V(ψ) = 0. But, from the definition of the
semantics of →, we know that the only possibility for ϕ → ψ to be false is if
V(ϕ) = 1 and V(ψ) = 0. Since this is ruled out by our assumption, ϕ → ψ
must be a tautology. 

We can even generalize this last result to show that propositional logic is
very well-behaved in the sense that entailment, truth of conditional statements
and validity all coalesce. This need not be the case for any logical system,
and so you might want to try to prove the following for yourself:

Proposition 3. (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ) → ψ is a tautology iff ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn entails ψ

iff ϕ1 , . . . , ϕn |= ψ.

Exercise 6. Use the truth-table method to check whether the following argu-
ment schemas are valid:

(i) p → q, p / q [modus ponens]

(ii) p → q, q / p [affirmation of the consequent]

(iii) p → q, ¬q/ ¬p [modus tollens]

(iv) ¬(p ∧ q), ¬q / p

Exercise 7. For each of the following claims, determine whether it is true or

false. If it is true prove it. If it is false, give a refutation by counterexample.

(i) If ϕ is a tautology and ψ is a contradiction, ϕ → ψ is a contradiction.

(ii) If ψ is a tautology, ϕ → ψ is a tautology.

(iii) If ϕ is a tautology, ϕ → ψ is a tautology.

(iv) If ϕ ∨ ψ is a contradiction, ϕ is a contradiction.