World Energy Outlook 2005

Summary in English

Two visions of the energy future:

• under-invested, vulnerable and dirty, or
• clean, clever and competitive.
Both are explored in this new edition of the authoritative World Energy Outlook.
In it, the International Energy Agency responds to the remit of the G8 world leaders
by mapping a new energy future, contrasting it with where we are now headed. WEO
2006 shows how to change course. It counts the costs and benefits - and the benefits win.
World Energy Outlook 2006 also answers these questions:
• is the economic reaction to high energy prices merely delayed?
• is oil and gas investment on track?
• are the conditions shaping up for a nuclear energy revival?
• can biofuels erode the oil monopoly in road transport?
• can 2.5 billion people in developing countries switch to modern energy for cooking?
• is Brazil learning new lessons or teaching the world?
With extensive statistics, detailed projections, analysis and advice, WEO 2006 equips
policy-makers and the public to re-make the energy future.

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 Summary and Conclusions
The world is facing twin energy-related threats: that of not having adequate and
secure supplies of energy at affordable prices and that of environmental harm
caused by consuming too much of it. Soaring energy prices and recent geopolitical
events have reminded us of the essential role affordable energy plays in economic growth
and human development and of the vulnerability of the global energy system to supply
disruptions. Safeguarding energy supplies is once again back at the top of the
international policy agenda. Yet the current pattern of energy supply carries the threat of
massive and irreversible environmental damage – including changes in global climate
caused by burning fossil energy. Reconciling the goals of energy security and
environmental protection requires strong and coordinated government action.
The need to curb the growth in fossil-energy demand, to increase geographic and
fuel-supply diversity and to mitigate climate-destabilising emissions is more urgent
than ever. G8 leaders, meeting with the leaders of several major developing countries
and heads of international organisations – including the International Energy Agency – at
Gleneagles in July 2005 and in St Petersburg in July 2006 called on the IEA to “advise on
alternative energy scenarios and strategies aimed at a clean, clever and competitive
energy future”. This year’s Outlook responds to that request. It confirms that fossil-fuel
demand and trade flows, and greenhouse-gas emissions would follow their current
unsustainable paths through to 2030 in the absence of new government action – the
underlying premise of our Reference Scenario. It also demonstrates in an Alternative
Policy Scenario that a package of policies and measures that countries around the world
are considering would reduce significantly the rate of increase in demand and emissions.
Importantly, the economic cost of these policies would be more than outweighed by the
economic benefits that would come from using and producing energy more efficiently.
Fossil energy will remain dominant to 2030
Global primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario is projected to
increase by just over one-half between now and 2030 – an average annual rate of
1.6%. Demand grows by more than one-quarter in the period to 2015 alone. Over 70% of
the increase in demand over the projection period comes from developing countries, with
China alone accounting for 30%. Their economies and population grow much faster than
in the OECD, shifting the centre of gravity of global energy demand. Almost half of the
increase in global primary energy use goes to generating electricity and one-fifth to
meeting transport needs – almost entirely in the form of oil-based fuels.
Globally, fossil fuels will remain the dominant source of energy to 2030 in both
scenarios. In the Reference Scenario, they account for 83% of the overall increase in
energy demand between 2004 and 2030. As a result, their share of world demand edges
up, from 80% to 81%. The share of oil drops, though oil remains the largest single fuel in
the global energy mix in 2030. Global oil demand reaches 99 million barrels per day in
2015 and 116 mb/d in 2030 – up from 84 mb/d in 2005. In contrast to WEO-2005, coal
sees the biggest increase in demand in absolute terms, driven mainly by power
generation. China and India account for almost four-fifths of the incremental demand for

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coal. It remains the second-largest primary fuel, its share in global demand increasing
slightly. The share of natural gas also rises, even though gas use grows less quickly than
projected in the last Outlook due to higher prices. Hydropower’s share of primary energy
use rises slightly, while that of nuclear power falls. The share of biomass falls marginally,
as developing countries increasingly switch to using modern commercial energy,
offsetting the growing use of biomass as feedstock for biofuels production. Non-hydro
renewables – including wind, solar and geothermal – grow quickest, but from a small
base.
We have revised upwards our assumptions for oil prices in this Outlook, on the
expectation that crude oil and refined-product markets remain tight. Market
fundamentals point to a modest easing of prices beyond 2007 as new capacity comes on
stream and demand growth slows. But new geopolitical tensions or, worse, a major
supply disruption could drive prices even higher. We assume the average IEA crude oil
import price falls back to $47 per barrel in real terms in the early part of the next decade,
and then rises steadily through to 2030. Natural gas prices are assumed broadly to follow
the trend in oil prices, because of the continuing widespread use of oil-price indexation in
long-term gas supply contracts and because of inter-fuel competition. Coal prices are
assumed to change proportionately less over time, but follow the direction of oil and gas
prices.
The threat to the world’s energy security is real and growing
Rising oil and gas demand, if unchecked, would accentuate the consuming
countries’ vulnerability to a severe supply disruption and resulting price shock.
OECD and developing Asian countries become increasingly dependent on imports as
their indigenous production fails to keep pace with demand. Non-OPEC production of
conventional crude oil and natural gas liquids is set to peak within a decade. By 2030, the
OECD as a whole imports two-thirds of its oil needs in the Reference Scenario, compared
with 55% today. Much of the additional imports come from the Middle East, along
vulnerable maritime routes. The concentration of oil production in a small group of
countries with large reserves – notably Middle East OPEC members and Russia – will
increase their market dominance and their ability to impose higher prices. In increasing
share of gas demand is also expected to be met by imports, via pipeline or in the form of
liquefied natural gas from increasingly distant suppliers.
The growing insensitivity of oil demand to price accentuates the potential impact
on international oil prices of a supply disruption. The share of transport – demand for
which is price-inelastic relative to other energy services – in global oil consumption is
projected to rise in the Reference Scenario. As a result, oil demand becomes less and less
responsive to movements in international crude oil prices. The corollary of this is that
prices would need to fluctuate more than in the past in response to future short-term shifts
in demand and supply. The cushioning effect of subsidies to oil consumers on demand
contributes to the insensitivity of global oil demand to international prices. Current
subsidies on oil products in non-OECD countries are estimated at over $90 billion
annually. Subsidies on all forms of final energy outside the OECD amount to over
$250 billion per year – equal to all the investment needed in the power sector each year
on average in those countries.

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 Oil prices still matter to the economic health of the global economy. Although
most oil-importing economies around the world have continued to grow strongly since
2002, they would have grown even more rapidly had the price of oil and other forms of
energy not increased. In many importing countries, increases in the value of non-energy
commodities exports, the prices of which have also risen, have offset at least part of the
impact of higher energy. The eventual impact of higher energy prices on macroeconomic
prospects remains uncertain, partly because the effects of recent price increases have not
fully worked their way through the economic system. There are growing signs of
inflationary pressures, leading to higher interest rates. Most OECD countries have
experienced a worsening of their current account balances, most obviously the United
States. The recycling of petro-dollars may have helped to mitigate the increase in long-
term interest rates, delaying the adverse impact on real incomes and output of higher
energy prices. The longer prices remain at current levels or the more they rise, the greater
the threat to economic growth in importing countries. An oil-price shock caused by a
sudden and severe supply disruption would be particularly damaging – for heavily
indebted poor countries most of all.
Will the investment come?
Meeting the world’s growing hunger for energy requires massive investment in
energy-supply infrastructure. The Reference Scenario projections in this Outlook call
for cumulative investment of just over $20 trillion (in year-2005 dollars) over 2005-2030.
This is around $3 trillion higher than in WEO-2005, mainly because of recent sharp
increases in unit capital costs, especially in the oil and gas industry. The power sector
accounts for 56% of total investment – 68% if investment in the supply chain to meet the
fuel needs of power stations is included. Oil investment – three-quarters of which goes to
the upstream – amounts to over $4 trillion in total over 2005-2030. Upstream investment
needs are more sensitive to changes in decline rates at producing fields than to the rate of
growth of demand for oil. Roughly half of all the energy investment needed worldwide is
in developing countries, where demand and production increase most quickly. China
alone needs to invest about $3.7 trillion – 19% of the world total.
There is no guarantee that all of the investment needed will be forthcoming.
Government policies, geopolitical factors, unexpected changes in unit costs and prices,
and new technology could all affect the opportunities and incentives for private and
publicly-owned companies to invest in different parts of the various energy-supply
chains. The investment decisions of the major oil and gas producing countries are of
crucial importance, as they will increasingly affect the volume and cost of imports in the
consuming countries. There are doubts, for example, about whether investment in
Russia’s gas industry will be sufficient even to maintain current export levels to Europe
and to start exporting to Asia.
The ability and willingness of major oil and gas producers to step up investment
in order to meet rising global demand are particularly uncertain. Capital spending by
the world’s leading oil and gas companies increased sharply in nominal terms over the
course of the first half of the current decade and, according to company plans, will rise
further to 2010. But the impact on new capacity of higher spending is being blunted by
rising costs. Expressed in cost-inflation adjusted terms, investment in 2005 was actually
lower than in 2000. Planned upstream investment to 2010 is expected to boost slightly

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global spare crude oil production capacity. But capacity additions could be smaller on
account of shortages of skilled personnel and equipment, regulatory delays, cost inflation,
higher decline rates at existing fields and geopolitics. Increased capital spending on
refining is expected to raise throughput capacity by almost 8 mb/d by 2010. Beyond the
current decade, higher investment in real terms will be needed to maintain growth in
upstream and downstream capacity. In a Deferred Investment Case, lower OPEC crude
oil production, partially offset by increased non-OPEC production, pushes oil prices up
by one-third, trimming global oil demand by 7 mb/d, or 6%, in 2030 relative to the
Reference Scenario.
On current energy trends, carbon emissions will accelerate
Global energy-related carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions increase by 55% between
2004 and 2030, or 1.7% per year, in the Reference Scenario. They reach 40
gigatonnes in 2030, an increase of 14 Gt over the 2004 level. Power generation
contributes half of the increase in global emissions over the projection period. Coal
overtook oil in 2003 as the leading contributor to global energy-related CO2 emissions
and consolidates this position through to 2030. Emissions are projected to grow slightly
faster than primary energy demand – reversing the trend of the last two-and-a-half
decades – because the average carbon content of primary energy consumption increases.
Developing countries account for over three-quarters of the increase in global
CO2 emissions between 2004 and 2030 in this scenario. They overtake the OECD as
the biggest emitter by soon after 2010. The share of developing countries in world
emissions rises from 39% at present to just over one-half by 2030. This increase is faster
than that of their share in energy demand, because their incremental energy use is more
carbon-intensive than that of the OECD and transition economies. In general, the
developing countries use proportionately more coal and less gas. China alone is
responsible for about 39% of the rise in global emissions. China’s emissions more than
double between 2004 and 2030, driven by strong economic growth and heavy reliance on
coal in power generation and industry. China overtakes the United States as the world’s
biggest emitter before 2010. Other Asian countries, notably India, also contribute heavily
to the increase in global emissions. The per-capita emissions of non-OECD countries
nonetheless remain well below those of the OECD.
Prompt government action can alter energy and emission trends
The Reference Scenario trends described above are not set in stone. Indeed,
governments may well to take stronger action to steer the energy system onto a more
sustainable path. In the Alternative Policy Scenario, the policies and measures that
governments are currently considering aimed at enhancing energy security and mitigating
CO2 emissions, which are assumed to implemented, would result in significantly slower
growth in fossil-fuel demand, in oil and gas imports and in emissions. These interventions
include efforts to improve efficiency in energy production and use, to increase indigenous
output of fossil fuels in importing countries, nuclear power and renewable energy
sources, and to encourage the development and deployment of other clean and more
efficient energy-related technologies.
World primary energy demand in 2030 is about 10% lower in the Alternative
Policy Scenario than in the Reference Scenario – roughly equivalent to China’s

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entire energy consumption today. Global demand still grows, by 37% between 2004
and 2030, but more slowly: 1.2% annually against 1.6% in the Reference Scenario. The
biggest energy savings in both absolute and percentage terms come from coal. The impact
on energy demand of new policies is less marked in the first decade of the Outlook
period, but far from negligible. The difference in global energy demand between the two
scenarios in 2015 is about 4%.
In stark contrast with the Reference Scenario, OECD oil imports level off by
around 2015 and then begin to fall steadily. All three OECD regions and developing
Asia are more dependent on oil imports by the end of the projection period, though
markedly less so than in the Reference Scenario. Global oil demand reaches 103 mb/d in
2030 in the Alternative Policy Scenario – an increase of 20 mb/d on the 2005 level but 13
mb/d less than in the Reference Scenario. Measures in the transport sector produce close
to 60% of all the oil savings in the Alternative Policy Scenario. More than two-thirds
come from more efficient new vehicles. Increased biofuels use and production, especially
in Brazil, Europe and the United States, also helps reduce oil needs. Globally, gas
demand and reliance on gas imports are also sharply reduced vis-à-vis the Reference
Scenario.
Energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions are cut by 1.7 Gt, or 5%, in 2015 and
by 6.3 Gt, or 16%, in 2030 relative to the Reference Scenario. The actions taken in the
Alternative Policy Scenario cause emissions in the OECD and in the transition economies
to stabilise and then decline before 2030. Their emissions in 2030 are still slightly higher
than in 2004, but well below the Reference Scenario level. Emissions in the European
Union and Japan fall to below current levels. Emissions in developing regions carry on
growing, but the rate of increase slows appreciably over the Outlook period compared
with the Reference Scenario.
Policies that encourage the more efficient production and use of energy
contribute almost 80% of the avoided CO2 emissions. The remainder comes from
switching to low or zero-carbon fuels. More efficient use of fuels, mainly through more
efficient cars and trucks, accounts for almost 36% of the emissions saved. More efficient
use of electricity in a wide range of applications, including lighting, air conditioning,
appliances and industrial motors accounts for another 30%. More efficient energy
production contributes 13%. Renewables and biofuels together yield another 12% and
nuclear the remaining 10%. The implementation of only a dozen policies would result in
nearly 40% of avoided CO2 emissions by 2030. The policies that are most effective in
reducing emissions also yield the biggest reductions in oil and gas imports.
New policies and measures would pay for themselves
In aggregate, the new policies and measures analysed yield financial savings that
far exceed the initial extra investment cost for consumers – a key result of the
Alternative Policy Scenario. Cumulative investment in 2005-2030 along the energy
chain – from the producer to the consumer – is $580 billion lower than in the Reference
Scenario. Investment in end-use equipment and buildings is $2.4 trillion higher, but this is
more than outweighed by the $3 trillion of investment that is avoided on the supply side.
Over the same period, the cost of the fuel saved to consumers amounts to $8.1 trillion,
more than offsetting the extra demand-side investments required to generate these
savings.

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 The changes in electricity-related investment brought about by the policies
included in the Alternative Policy Scenario yield particularly big savings. On
average, an additional dollar invested in more-efficient electrical equipment, appliances
and buildings avoids more than two dollars in investment in electricity supply. This ratio
is highest in non-OECD countries. Two-thirds of the additional demand-side capital
spending is borne by consumers in OECD countries. The payback periods of the
additional demand-side investments are very short, ranging from one to ten years. They
are shortest in developing countries and for those polices introduced before 2015.
Nuclear power could play a key role – if accepted by the public
Nuclear power – a proven technology for baseload electricity generation – could
make a major contribution to reducing dependence on imported gas and curbing
CO2 emissions. In the Reference Scenario, world nuclear power generating capacity
increases from 368 GW in 2005 to 417 GW in 2030. But its share in the primary energy
mix still falls, on the assumption that few new reactors are built and that several existing
ones are retired. In the Alternative Policy Scenario, more favourable nuclear policies raise
nuclear power generating capacity to 519 GW by 2030, so that its share in the energy mix
rises.
Interest in building nuclear reactors has increased as a result of higher fossil-
energy prices, which have made nuclear power relatively more competitive. New
nuclear power plants could produce electricity at a cost of less than five cents per kWh, if
construction and operating risks are appropriately managed by plant vendors and power
companies. At this cost, nuclear power would be cheaper than gas-based electricity if gas
prices are above $4.70 per MBtu. Nuclear power would still be more expensive than
conventional coal-fired plants at coal prices of less than $70 per tonne. The breakeven
costs of nuclear power would be lower if a financial penalty on CO2 emissions were
introduced.
Nuclear power will only become more important if the governments of countries
where nuclear power is acceptable play a stronger role in facilitating private
investment, especially in liberalised markets. Nuclear power plants are capital-
intensive, requiring initial investment of $2 billion to $3.5 billion per reactor. On the
other hand, nuclear power generating costs are less vulnerable to fuel-price changes than
coal- or gas-fired generation. Moreover, uranium resources are abundant and widely
distributed around the globe. These two advantages make nuclear power a potentially
attractive option for enhancing the security of electricity supply – if concerns about plant
safety, nuclear waste disposal and the risk of proliferation can be solved to the
satisfaction of the public and investors.
The contribution of biofuels hinges on new technology
Biofuels are expected to make a significant contribution to meeting global road-
transport energy needs, especially in the Alternative Policy Scenario. They account
for 7% of the road-fuel consumption in 2030 in that scenario, up from 1% today. In the
Reference Scenario, the share reached 4%. In both scenarios, the United States, the
European Union and Brazil account for the bulk of the increase and remain the leading
producers and consumers of biofuels. Ethanol is expected to account for most of the
increase in biofuels use worldwide, as production costs are expected to fall faster than

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those of biodiesel – the other main biofuel. The share of biofuels in transport-fuel use
remains far and away the highest in Brazil – the world’s lowest cost producer of ethanol.
Rising food demand, which competes with biofuels for existing arable and
pasture land, will constrain the potential for biofuels production using current
technology. About 14 million hectares of land are now used for the production of
biofuels, equal to about 1% of the world’s currently available arable land. This share rises
to 2% in the Reference Scenario and 3.5% in the Alternative Policy Scenario. The amount
of arable land needed in 2030 is equal to that of the entire surface area of France in the
Reference Scenario and that of all the OECD Pacific countries – including Australia – in
the Alternative Policy Scenario.
New biofuels technologies being developed today, notably ligno-cellulosic
ethanol, could allow biofuels to play a much bigger role than that foreseen in either
scenario. But significant technological challenges still need to be overcome for these
second-generation technologies to become commercially viable. Trade and subsidy
policies will be critical factors in determining where and with what resources and
technologies biofuels will be produced in the coming decades, the overall burden of
subsidy on tax-payers and the cost-effectiveness of biofuels as a way of promoting energy
diversity and reducing carbon-dioxide emissions.
Making the Alternative Policy Scenario a reality
There are formidable hurdles to the adoption and implementation of the policies
and measures in the Alternative Policy scenario. In practice, it will take considerable
political will to push these policies through, many of which are bound to encounter
resistance from industry and consumer interests. Politicians need to spell out clearly the
overall benefits to the economy and to society as a whole of proposed measures to
counter political inertia. In most countries, the public is becoming familiar with the
energy-security and environmental advantages of action to encourage more efficient
energy use and to boost the role of renewables, making it easier politically to introduce
new policies.
Private-sector support for more stringent government policy initiatives and
international cooperation would be essential. While most energy-related investment
will have to come from the private sector, governments have a key role in creating
appropriate investment. The industrialised countries have an important role to play in
helping developing countries leapfrog to the most advanced technologies and adopt
efficient equipment and practices. This would require programmes to promote technology
transfer, capacity building and collaborative research and development. A strong degree
of co-operation between countries, and between industry and government will be needed.
Non-OECD countries could seek support from multilateral lending institutions and other
international organisations in devising and implementing new policies. This may be
particularly critical for small developing countries, unlike China and India, which may
struggle to attract investment.
The analysis of the Alternative Policy Scenario demonstrates the urgency with
which policy action is required. Each year of delay in implementing the policies
analysed would have a disproportionately larger effect on emissions. For example, if the
policies were to be delayed by ten years, with implementation starting only in 2015, the

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cumulative avoided emissions by 2030 vis-à-vis the Reference Scenario would be only
2%, compared with 8% in the Alternative Policy Scenario. In addition, delays in stepping
up energy-related research and development efforts, particularly in the field of carbon
capture and storage, would hinder prospects for bringing down emissions after 2030.
Larger energy savings would require an even bigger policy push
Even if governments actually implement, as we assume, all the policies they are
considering to curb energy imports and emissions, both would still rise through to
2030. Keeping global CO2 emissions at current levels would require much stronger
policies. In practice, technological breakthroughs that change profoundly the way we
produce and consume energy will almost certainly be needed as well. The difficulties in
making this happen in the timeframe of our analysis do not provide an excuse for inaction
or delay, which would raise the long-term economic, security and environmental cost.
The sooner a start is made, the quicker a new generation of more-efficient and low- or
zero-carbon energy systems can be put into place.
A much more sustainable energy future is within our reach, using technologies
that are already available or close to commercialisation. A recently-published IEA
report, Energy Technology Perspectives, demonstrates that, for this to happen, a portfolio
approach to technology development and deployment is needed. In this Outlook, a
Beyond the Alternative Policy Scenario (BAPS) Case illustrates how the extremely
challenging goal of capping CO2 emissions in 2030 at today’s levels could be achieved.
This would require emissions to be cut by 8 Gt more than in the Alternative Policy
Scenario. Four-fifths of the energy and emissions savings in the BAPS Case come from
stronger policy efforts to further improve energy efficiency, to boost nuclear power and
renewables-based electricity generation and to support the introduction of carbon capture
and storage technology – one the most promising options for mitigating emissions in the
longer term. Yet the technology shifts outlined in the BAPS Case, while technically
feasible, would be unprecedented in scale and speed of deployment.
Bringing modern energy to the world’s poor is an urgent necessity
Although steady progress is made in both scenarios in expanding the use of
modern household energy services in developing countries, many people still depend
on traditional biomass in 2030. Today, 2.5 billion people use fuelwood, charcoal,
agricultural waste and animal dung to meet most of their daily energy needs for cooking
and heating. In many countries, these resources account for over 90% of total household
energy consumption. The inefficient and unsustainable use of biomass has severe
consequences for health, the environment and economic development. Shockingly, about
1.3 million people – mostly women and children – die prematurely every year because of
exposure to indoor air pollution from biomass. There is evidence that, in Brazil and other
countries where local prices have adjusted to recent high international energy prices, the
shift to cleaner, more efficient cooking has actually slowed and even reversed. In the
Reference Scenario, the number of people using biomass increases to 2.6 billion by 2015
and to 2.7 billion by 2030 as population rises. That is, one-third of the world’s population
will still be relying on these fuels, a share barely smaller than today.
Action to encourage more efficient and sustainable use of traditional biomass
and help people switch to modern cooking fuels and technologies is needed urgently.

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The appropriate policy approach depends on local circumstances such as per-capita
incomes and the availability of a sustainable biomass supply. Alternative fuels and
technologies are already available at reasonable cost. Halving the number of households
using biomass for cooking by 2015 – a recommendation of the UN Millennium Project –
would involve 1.3 billion people switching to liquefied petroleum gas and other
commercial fuels. This would not have a significant impact on world oil demand and
would cost, at most, $1.5 billion per year. But vigorous and concerted government action
– with support from the industrialised countries – is needed to achieve this target, together
with increased funding from both public and private sources. Policies would need to
address barriers to access, affordability and supply, and to form a central component of
broader development strategies.

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