This Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper on “Forming a Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ” is

written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 and released by the J7
Deputy Director for Joint Training.
First Edition: September 2015
Scope of paper: -- Focused on forming the HQ
 Shares CCMD-level considerations.
 Shares interagency and coalition considerations.
 Shares JTF mission partner (e.g., CCMD TSOC/Components) considerations.
 Shares JTF HQ forming considerations for crisis response. Addresses JTF-capable HQs and
enduring (i.e., standing and rotational) HQs.
Table of Contents:
1.0 Executive summary ...................................................................................................1
2.0 Contemporary challenges.........................................................................................2
3.0 Establishment of a JTF.............................................................................................4
4.0 Interagency and Coalition considerations ..............................................................6
5.0 CCMD and mission partner considerations ...........................................................7
6.0 HQ Forming considerations ...................................................................................10
7.0 HQ Readiness implications ....................................................................................14
Enclosure: Common UJTL for JTF-capable HQ ...............................................15
Acronyms and Selected Definitions .......................................................................16

Related Insights and Best Practices papers: Recommend the following focus papers for
related coverage: “Mission Command,” “GCC C2 Organizational Options,” “COS Roles and
Functions,” and “Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm.” These and other
DTD focus papers are accessible at the websites below. Also recommend JP 3-33 (JTF HQ) and
the Joint Force HQ training site on the Joint Electronic Library Plus (select the training tab).
Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used
in this paper. They are defined in the glossary.
POC: Mr. Mike Findlay - Email: [email protected]
Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Joint Training
116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
Accessibility: This and other insight and best practice focus papers can be accessed through use
of a search engine on the open internet and also available on the following websites:
Joint Electronic Library (Public website):
http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/focus_papers.aspx
Joint Electronic Library Plus (CAC enabled):
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
Joint Staff J7 Joint Training Intelink (CAC enabled):
https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/jcw/jt/default.aspx
Releasability: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Disclaimer: The insights in this paper are based on DTD observations and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Joint Staff, DOD, or the United States Government.
This page intentionally left blank
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CCDRs may respond to crises by directing and employing forces from their CCMD or
subordinate HQs, by activating a JTF HQ, or a combination of these options. A JTF HQ provides
a CCDR the benefit of a HQ focused on a single but potentially complex problem set, and the
ability to closely integrate assigned and allocated forces and coordinate with other joint,
coalition, and interagency partners. JTFs help free up decision space for the CCDR to engage up
and out with national decision makers and partners, and to focus on the broader theater activities.
CCMDs can stand up a JTF and the HQ from assigned forces or request support via the Global
Force Management (GFM) process. In-theater HQs can often respond quickly; GFM solutions
may be slower. There can be significant sourcing, manning, training, and equipping challenges in
standing up a JTF HQ, especially in today’s complex, resource-constrained environment.
Establishment of a JTF changes the Theater C2 construct, affects how the CCDR exercises
command and control, and impacts how the CCMD Components operate. This change in C2 is
significant, and if not understood can cause confusion and lack of synergy across the AOR.
Simplicity and unity of command, or at a minimum unity of effort, are essential for success.
CCMD-level Insights  Set the JTF up for success:
 Spend time up-front anticipating and determining feasible and sustainable theater C2
constructs. Minimize AOR-wide perturbations associated with continuing changes to C2.
 Establish and codify clear command relationships to gain unity of effort.
 Identify likely missions, sourcing options, expertise requirements, and readiness standards.
 Set the JTF up to operate as part of a broader coalition and USG interagency approach.
 Plan for transition from initial response HQs and subsequent transition to follow-on entities.
 Share understanding of the problem, policy implications, intent, risks, and priorities.
 Assist (to include augment) the JTF HQ across the man, train, and equip spectrum.
CCMD Component and Theater SOC Insights Support the JTF:
 Anticipate some form of Supporting Command relationship with the JTF.
 Dispatch quality liaison teams to the JTF HQ to assist the HQ in understanding force
capabilities, other ongoing AOR activities, employment considerations, risks, and challenges.
 Support JTF HQ manning requirements as a bridging mechanism prior to JMD sourcing.
JTF-capable HQ Insights Nest with CCDR intent and processes. Be a trusted team member:
 Prepare now; focus training on the most likely scenarios to increase readiness.
 Plan to operate as a coalition joint HQ together with USG interagency partners.
 Take the time to develop trust-based relationships with mission partners and stakeholders.
 Gain understanding of joint, coalition, and interagency perspectives, goals, authorities, and
capabilities to increase synergy and effectiveness of the broader team effort.
 Spend time understanding the political and policy aspects of the mission, and the CCDR’s
mission, intent, endstate, and processes to better define the JTF role and mission.
 Maintain a bias for action by developing a lean HQ organization, requesting necessary staff
expertise, leveraging an effective liaison network, and developing efficient staff processes.
 Understand the range of joint “enablers” available to bring expertise to the HQ.
 Develop and gain approval of manning, training, and equipping plans.

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2.0 CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
Complexity and Adaptability: The complexity, uncertainty, speed, and interdependence of
events in today’s environment require highly adaptable organizations capable of integrating
operations across the whole of government spectrum. The ubiquitous 24 hours a day information
environment has vastly increased the rate of change of perspectives, decisions, and actions in this
environment.
 CCMD and JTF commander perspectives, force capabilities, and ongoing operations both
inform and are informed by policy discussions and decisions. Domestic, regional, and
international political considerations affect
Vignette: Interagency in USARAF
military operations. Commanders must
maintain political and policy awareness as “USARAF had many challenges initially being formed as
they provide options and design, plan, the JFC. One area we lacked in significantly was
expertise on the whole of government. Our response to
conduct, and report on operations. the Ebola crisis was a particularly challenging endeavor
 Many of today’s threats transcend from the stand-point of nesting our support (DOD) within
geographic AORs. A fully integrated the lead federal agency (USAID) set in a complex
whole of government and international environment. We really could have benefitted from
having interagency and intergovernmental additions to
approach is required to confront these
our staff from the very beginning. These additions would
threats across AOR boundaries. NOT be designed for us to lead the effort, but rather
Part of a broader team: JTFs will most properly understand interagency cultural, terms, and
likely be Combined JTFs (CJTFs), comprised operational approach differences in order to deliver the
proper support.” USARAF Senior Staff Officer
of military forces from a variety of
organizations, both joint and multinational. They will also operate with other USG agencies
(often US embassies) and international organizations. Teambuilding in this broader environment
is critical both in terms of trust and relationships, but also in terms of understanding the differing
cultures, goals, authorities, capabilities, and caveats of the participants. We’ve seen a trend
toward the increased utility of coalition joint interagency task forces (CJIATFs) as we closely
integrate with our interagency partners. Quality
Vignette: Role of Allies and Partners
liaison is particularly important during the early
stages of a crisis, a period replete with “CENTCOM integrated military members from the
allied countries, along with representatives from a
uncertainty and transition. number of others early in their planning for the
We see commanders requesting interagency, situation in Syria and Iraq. Other GCCs have applied
allies, and coalition partners to fill key JTF and similar approaches to regional challenges.
JIATF leadership and staff positions to leverage Understand the key role played by allies and partners,
and incorporate them early.” Senior Flag Officer
their strengths, experiences, perspectives, and
leadership. This infusion of multinational and interagency leadership results in better synergy,
decisions, execution, and outcomes.
GCC strategic calculus and regional engagement requirements: The establishment of a JTF
HQ indicates commitment to a specific mission within an area of responsibility (AOR). Events
do not occur in isolation and the creation of a JTF, with the resultant commitment of forces and
marshalling of resources across all elements of national power, will change the strategic
landscape within the GCC’s AOR. The decision to stand-up a JTF is significant with potential
long term ramifications; the JTF must be sustainable for the duration of the mission. This has
force structure implications for the JTF HQ and the sourcing organizations.
Need for experience within the JTF HQ: Several senior leaders note the challenge of having a
limited-experience, service-centric staff who may not be familiar with the background,

2
challenges, and potential approaches to a problem set. They also express the concern of
potentially moving too quickly to a default “JTF” solution, noting that smaller, experienced
TSOC, Component or Service HQs may be better suited Experience: “Sometimes, we don’t consider
to accomplishing the mission. all possible options based on the limited
experience of the staff. For example, planners
HQ Sustainability: JTF HQs have traditionally come
unfamiliar with certain types of military
at a significant cost in terms of manpower, time to form operations may default to what they know.
and prepare, long term sustainability, and rotational They may make recommendations based on
implications. Many of our more demanding mission their limited service-centric experience and
sets anticipate JTF HQs to be operational for years, not avoid risk by overly conservative
recommendations to their commander which
months, thus JTFs must be sustainable in terms of
may reduce options.” CCMD Component J3
backfills. Any rotational sourcing construct that
commits our operational-level HQ capacity (such as Army Corps HQs) may impact on our
readiness and flexibility to respond to other operational requirements. Future JTF HQs will likely
be smaller, more networked, more reliant on reachback and federation, multinational from the
start, and closely integrated with our USG agency and nontraditional partners.
Transitions: Transitions are not discrete events. Vignette: USAFRICOM
They consist of overlapping groups of actions “MARFORAF, NAVAF, and AFAFRICA all serve two
that over time interact to create a potent mix of CCMDs and don't have the bandwidth / capacity to
challenges. The transition of operational maintain a JTF high level of proficiency or serve as a
responsibilities from a CCMD (or designated JTF except in very short duration missions. USARAF
only serves AFRICOM, but is really a very small staff
TSOC or Component HQ) to a JTF, which and needs significant augmentation to even fill the role
usually occurs in the early stages of a crisis, of an initial HQ with a view towards quickly handing an
should apply the seven lessons learned for operation off to a Service HQ. SOCAF serves like a JTF
managing transitions: 1) Plan early and often; 2) every day.”
Build flexibility into plans; 3) Be as transparent CCMD Senior Flag Officer
as possible; 4) Integrate transitions across lines of operation; 5) Ensure key leaders play an active
role managing transitions; 6) Adjust staff processes to account for increased requirements; and 7)
Design organizations and processes with consideration for their short- and long-term
consequences. These also apply to follow-on transitions.
JTF Forming challenges: JTF CDRs often
face five concurrent forming challenges:
 Planning to accomplish the mission.
 Forming the HQ.
 Understanding, leveraging or supporting
other joint, coalition, and interagency
goals, authorities, and activities.
 Organizing, receiving and commanding
assigned or attached joint forces.
 Deploying the force and HQ.
We see commanders prioritizing and
allocating efforts addressing these
challenges as they support crisis action
planning. They support both CCMD-level JOPES crisis action COA development and
determination of required forces, and internal HQ forming and deployment actions.

3
3.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF A JTF
A JTF is one of six options available to a CCDR to employ force (see GCC C2 Organizational
Options focus paper).
GCCs normally respond to crises
with in-place HQs and forces
because of their understanding of
the ongoing strategic
environment, resident expertise,
and availability. (see figure and
considerations box). Some HQs
are better suited than others for
certain missions based on
expertise, focus, and posture.
We normally see a JTF as a
follow-on option. The JTF HQ
may be formed around a Service
Component, TSOC, Service HQ,
Global Response Force HQ, or a designated commander with joint individual augmentees. The
mission, timing, and sourcing expertise and
availability impact the JTF HQ’s selection,
formation, and capabilities.
CCDRs are increasingly establishing
Combined HQs and CJTFs inclusive of USG
agency partners from the very beginning.
Designation of US JTF-capable HQs: We
observe three categories of JTF-capable HQs based on how they are designated, identified, and
sourced. The figures on the next page depict defining characteristics and examples for each.
 The most common option for sourcing a JTF HQ is from a CCMD’s Service or Functional
Component HQ, TSOC, or existing subordinate HQ (such as a numbered Fleet, Numbered Air
Force, Marine Expeditionary Force, or Army Corps). This core HQ with its established
command structure will likely be supported by individual augmentation from within the theater
using CCMD and Component HQ personnel, and through joint and interagency enabler plugs
(see page 12) that can quickly deploy to provide expertise and capabilities.
 Another sourcing option is the Global Response Force (GRF) HQ. The GRF HQ, designated
by the SecDef, is tasked to prepare for designated mission sets, focuses on organization,
process, manning, equipping, and training, and reports joint readiness to the SecDef.
Vignette: USPACOM and JTF 505 (Nepal) Vignette: USAFRICOM and JFC Liberia
COMUSPACOM activated JTF 505 to support the COMUSAFRICOM initially deployed its Army
government of Nepal by conducting humanitarian disaster Service Component (USARAF) to lead military
relief operations. The U.S. Embassy in Nepal headed the efforts in support of USAID to assist the
U.S. effort, with USAID as the lead federal agency. The government of Liberia in containing the Ebola
CCDR designated the III MEF CG as the JTF Commander. virus. C2 transitioned to JFC Liberia whose HQ
JTF activation followed initial responses by a special forces was formed around an Army division HQ,
team that was already in country, a deployed Joint sourced through the GFM allocation process.
Humanitarian Assistance survey team, and the USAID JECC enablers supported both Crisis Action
OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team. Planning and the formation of JFC Liberia.

4
 USSOCOM and the Services also identify and prepare
HQs to be JTF-capable HQs. These HQs may be at
varying levels of readiness for employment as the core of
a JTF HQ.
Rotational Requirements: Enduring missions often
require a standing HQ (e.g., USNORTHCOM’s JTF-
North) or rotational HQ (e.g., MNC-I in Iraq or IJC in
Afghanistan). These HQs provide operational C2
continuity through either assigned personnel (in the case of
standing HQ), or through rotational core HQs and
individual augmentees. The forming challenges for a
rotational HQ are often less than for a newly forming HQ.
However, rotational HQ challenges include: understanding
the environment, receiving required manning,
understanding and covering down on established
organizations and processes, and maintaining campaign
continuity. Continuous dialog with the in-place HQ,
maximum use of predeployment site surveys, and extended
left seat / right seat rides enhance continuity.
Individual Augmentees (IA): A JTF HQ can also be
formed almost solely through the use of well prepared
assigned personnel or joint and coalition augmentees.
Examples are JTF-North, JTF-Civil Support, CJTF-HOA,
SOJTF HQs, and the former MNF-I and ISAF HQs.

Insights:
 Designate and exercise identified JTF-capable HQs to
reduce ad-hoc formations. See section 6 (page 13).
 Plan for transitions; both to and from a JTF.
 Incorporate coalition and interagency from the start.
 Consider the principal of simplicity. Limit perturbations
to the Theater C2 architecture. Consider other available
C2 options such as the TSOC or Service HQ due to their regional and functional expertise, and
their knowledge of “burned-in” Theater C2 processes.
Vignette: Special Operations JTF (SOJTF) – Building a HQ around a Designated Commander
USSOCOM has had success forming SOJTF HQs tailored to the mission around a designated commander
at a CONUS location. These HQs are sourced through by-name-requests and joint individual augmentees.
They are supported by a permanent CONUS-based mission support site with highly experienced cadre
and prepared during the predeployment period through near-continuous contact with forward HQ and
training supported by USSOCOM and JS J7 teams. These mission support cadre also prepare the
continuous stream of individual augmentee rotating into theater, assists with reachback, and recovers and
debriefs redeploying personnel upon tour completion.
5
4.0 INTERAGENCY AND COALITION CONSIDERATIONS – The broader Team.
Senior leaders note that the success of a JTF Commander and subordinates is increasingly
dependent on their existing skill, ability, and experience operating across four areas:
 The US Interagency. “When direct participation by
 The coalition. departments other than DOD is
 Civilian populations and their political leaders. significant, the TF establishing
authority may designate it as a Joint
 The 24/7 information environment. Interagency Task Force.” JP 3-0
Failure in any of these four areas may jeopardize mission
accomplishment. Thought-out sourcing and “cultural” development of the staff from an
interagency and coalition perspective can help.
Several Coalition JIATFs have been established in the past 15 years. JIATF-South, in existence
for over 20 years, is well known for its counterdrug Vignette: JIATF-South and CJIATF-Syria
mission and leveraging of partnerships with Both of these organizations have “Directors”
interagency and regional nations. JTF-Civil Support, – not “Commanders.” Both have senior
interagency partners designated as “Deputy
subordinate to USNORTHCOM, effectively operates
Directors.” This promotes increased access /
in CONUS. Recently, CJIATF-Syria was formed to transparency across agencies, but does not
oversee the Congressionally-approved Syrian Train intrude nor violate the command / agency
and Equip program. oversight of their respective activities.
Trust-based relationships are critical to success: The Director for CJIATF-Syria spent three
months visiting USG institutions in Washington, DC and the nations that were willing to join the
train and equip mission. He cultivated relationships and gained understanding, advocacy, and
support for the mission. The CJIATF-Syria leadership also spent significant time building
relationships with the respective US Ambassadors and their Country Teams. Good relationships
with these respective country teams enabled effective interaction with the MoDs, MoIs, and the
Foreign Ministries of key partner nations.
 JTFs forming on short notice may not have the opportunity to develop these relationships
initially; CCMDs can help jumpstart these relationships. Conversely, headquarters preparing to
replace in-place HQ often have time to develop these relationships before deployment.
 A CJIATF may also be able to develop relationships with other USG agencies (obviously with
the approval of their CCDR, JS, and OSD). They often meet with JS and OSD personnel, the
State Department, CIA, USAID, and the FBI among others that have direct applicability to
their operations. Each of these agencies has unique authorities and capabilities that contribute
to USG objectives.
Insights:
 Identify and develop trust-based relationships with mission partners by understanding and
respecting their interests, equities, authorities, capabilities, and risks.
 Understand and respect the sovereignty of the host nation and its leadership prerogatives.
 Recognize and respect the role and authorities of the U.S. Ambassador and Country Team.
 Leverage the authorities and capabilities of mission partners to increase effectiveness (such as
the Title 22 and 50 authorities within the USG and those of the individual coalition countries).
 Request inclusion of senior USG agency and coalition personnel in the HQ. Likewise, support
their efforts.

6
5.0 CCMD AND MISSION PARTNER CONSIDERATIONS -- Recognize the JTF role
CCMDs must be able to address crises while rapidly supporting the establishment of a JTF and
continuing to focus on the theater campaign plan. This has implications for HQ transitions into
and out of a “crisis mode,” command relationships with other components, battle rhythms, initial
and sustained planning efforts, assessments, individual augmentation and joint enabler plans, and
HHQ and CDR’s information and decision requirements.
Focus: CCMDs are faced with a challenge in balancing the CDR’s and staff’s focus, efforts and
time to respond to crises while maintaining a
Vignette: GCC OPLAN Rehearsal
focus on the theater-wide campaign plan.
During a mission rehearsal, one CCMD attempted to
Establishment and delegation of authority to the conduct a focused high intensity fight performing as
JTF will dictate a corresponding change in the “JFC” fighting through its functional
command relationships and resultant direction components and TSOC. They found that this
to CCMD Components relative to the JTF. overwhelmed their HQ staff and leaders, and took
Establishing up front how a CCMD and theater focus away from continued dialog with national
leadership. They are reassessing their HQ training
components will “join” and support a JTF, and program, and reconsidering the JTF option while
what the JTF can expect in terms of CCMD and recognizing its costs in terms of limited time to form
theater component assistance and requirements and prepare, HQ manpower shortfalls, and
will help ensure a CCMD is prepared to handle perturbation in Theater-level C2 relative to the
a crisis and the establishment of a JTF. standing components. This reinforces the importance
of training and mission rehearsal exercises to assess
Risk: The CCDR owns the risk in how he feasibility of plans and increase readiness.
organizes forces and employs capabilities. The
CCDR assesses the risk and payoff Vignette: Another GCC OPLAN Rehearsal
associated with activating a JTF. He Another CCMD recognized the need to “fight tonight” and has
determines optimal command accordingly tasked both its HQ and functional components
relationships across the AOR, with operational C2 requirements for one of its primary plans.
balancing JTF unity of command One component has been identified as the Supported
requirements with that of retaining Commander and tasked with development of a supporting
plan. The CCMD recognized the time delay and risk
flexibility across the AOR. He associated with a JTF HQ activation even under the best of
determines the degree of JTF command circumstances and decided to initially fight through standing
authority (using OPCON or TACON) components.
together with providing the JTF access
to capabilities through support command relationships. This C2 decision is based on AOR
requirements, the JTF HQ’s expertise in planning and employment of supporting forces, and the
degree of required integration and detailed Vignette: AFRICOM & CJTF-HOA
synchronization of capabilities. The CCDR COMUSAFRICOM established CJTF-HOA and a
mitigates risk by sharing context, providing clear CJOA in the Horn of Africa. COMUSAFRICOM
priorities to both supported and supporting designated CDR, CJTF-HOA as the supported
commanders, codifying mission approval commander for operations in the CJOA and directed
authorities, requiring horizontal crosstalk among USAFRICOM components to support CJTF-HOA in
subordinates, and reaching out to gain their input theater security cooperation activities. While CJTF-
HOA is the supported command for three of the four
on risk to mission and force considerations for Lines of Operation, SOCAFRICA is a supported
CCMD-level decisions. commander for the other line of operations. Multiple
supported commands is often the norm in an AOR.
Support Command relationship: The support
command relationship may be the most powerful command relationship in terms of gaining
assured access to additional capabilities when understood and codified in some form of directive

7
or order. This relationship makes supporting commanders responsible for the success of the
supported commander. It requires them to assist the supported commander during the design and
planning phase, and stay involved to aid and assist the supported commander during execution.
They can’t simply provide forces and walk away from challenges. The establishing authority (in
this case the CCDR) has a key role in defining the support relationship by providing clarity in
scope, anticipated duration, authorities, Vignette: CJTF-OIR
priorities, and risk acceptance and Commander CJTF-OIR opted to establish a support
“refereeing” between commanders in cases command relationship between his two major components
of confusion or disagreement. See the in Iraq. This in effect strengthened the horizontal linkages
“Mission Command” paper. between the two subordinates and resulted in them
collaborating to determine the best way forward versus
TACON Command relationship: TACON, each looking up to the CJTF for detailed tactical direction
like OPCON, provides for “ownership” of and integration. These two HQ have nearly co-located
the force and unity of command. However, their HQ and benefit from a close relationship.
while commonly used, TACON can be a source of friction within a JTF if not adequately
defined. We often see differing perspectives on the TACON relationship. The CCMD and
gaining HQs often view it as a means to achieve unity of command by empowering the gaining
commander (in this case the JTF CDR) to direct the TACON force within the overall parameters
of the TACON authority (in essence “owning” the force for accomplishment of the mission).
However, the providing (losing) command may view the delegation of TACON in a more
minimalist perspective in which it retains primary direction, authority, and responsibility over the
force. They see the TACON command relationship as a limiting relationship that authorizes the
gaining JTF CDR to only exercise limited direction of the force – a more deconfliction-like
viewpoint. The CCDR can resolve this potential disparity by clarifying the delegation of
TACON authority. Some best practices include: the CCMD articulating overall intent for
achieving unity of command through the use of the TACON relationship, specifying those
missions for which the JTF CDR has authority to exercise TACON, CONOP approval
authorities, force protection responsibilities, operational
“Readiness and no-notice capabilities
reporting channels, directed deployment of liaison, limits to do not happen by accident. They come
the parent HQ authority, and command venues by which to with foresight, with investment, and
address misunderstanding or risk concerns. with training – joint training.”
Senior Flag Officer
CCMD-level Insights  Set the JTF up for success:
 Identify likely C2 HQ options and specify joint readiness standards for the respective HQs.
 Set conditions for the JTF to support USG lead federal agencies, coordinate with other
agencies, and operate as part of an alliance or coalition force. This includes actions such as
getting coalition and interagency personnel into the HQ, working through multinational
command relationships, establishing support agreements with coalition partners, authorizing
direct liaison with relevant USG agency representatives, and empowering the JTF liaison
element in a US Embassy to speak to the Country Team on behalf of the JTF.
 Plan for potential transitions - to the JTF, and then to another agency, force, or Host Nation.
Include necessary assessment and measurement criteria for proper transition and / or
disestablishment. Bridge the procedures / knowledge gap often associated with personnel
transition by overlap of personnel, and even a small "transition cell" to ensure continuity of
effort.
 Based on AOR experience and likely missions, develop a plan for those roles, responsibilities,
relationships, and authorities that will be delegated to the JTF and those that will be retained at

8
 the CCMD level. Focus on those AOR-wide, and to a lesser extent JOA, responsibilities
required to enable JTF success and transition.
 Assist across the man, train, and equip spectrum.
‐ Provide joint expertise, especially during initial forming, and approve and support the JTF
manning, equipping, and training plans. The CCMD can assist the JTF in developing a
feasible, supportable manning plan and work with the JS to gain access to joint enablers,
approval of the Joint Manning Document (JMD),
and JMD sourcing solutions to include those from Vignette: CJTF-OIR
coalition and interagency partners. CENTCOM HQs provided substantial
early-on expertise to CJTF-OIR. The
‐ Identify and plan for a robust liaison team to be CENTCOM Fires Section provided several
located with the JTF HQ, especially in the forming assistance visits to ensure the HQ was
phase. This LNO team may be reduced as the JTF capable of assuming the required targeting
matures and establishes required relationships and authorities and functions.
develops a greater understanding of the AOR.
‐ Develop a Joint Mission Essential Equipment List (JMEEL) and Joint Equipping Plan that
considers necessary communications systems including Mission Network Environment
requirements (a federation of independent, partner networks such as the well-known
Afghanistan Mission Network), facility requirements, and installation, operations, and
maintenance activities.
 Share understanding and provide clear commander’s intent, acceptable risk, and priorities.
 Involve anticipated JTF-capable HQs in crisis action planning to gain their input.
 Establish and codify clear command relationships leveraging OPCON, TACON and Support
command relationships to ensure unity of effort and synergy of action.
 Develop a clear battle rhythm that provides the opportunity for synergy and shared
understanding, both within the staff and with affected organizations.
 Recalibrate CCMD focus back to the strategic level by reviewing and elevating CCMD-level
decision requirements, associated CCIRs, functions, and processes commensurate with
establishment of the JTF, and delegation of operational-level authorities and responsibilities.
CCMD Component and TSOC Insights Support the JTF:
 Anticipate a supporting command relationship with the JTF. Vignette: CENTCOM
 Support IAW Title 10 and Executive Agent responsibilities. The CENTCOM CFACC is a
 Send quality liaison personnel to the JTF HQ to help them model “Supporting Commander”
continually looking for
better understand supporting force capabilities and challenges. opportunities to assist CJTF-OIR.
 Leverage liaison teams to stay informed of JTF requirements. AFCENT and the CFACC
 Assist JTF HQ manning requirements prior to JMD sourcing. dispatched senior leaders to
 Anticipate transfer of forces TACON to the JTF as part of the ensure they were supporting
CJTF-OIR requirements.
CCDR’s intent to ensure JTF-level unity of command.

9
6.0 HQ FORMING CONSIDERATIONS -- Develop proficiency and gain the CCDR’s trust
Operational mission requirements and commander’s guidance drive a JTF HQ’s organization,
processes, and manning.
The adjacent figure provides a
conceptual framework for
increasing the capability and
readiness of a JTF-capable HQ.
It starts with a decision to
develop a JTF HQ capability
and progresses through
development and
implementation of manning,
training, and equipping plans,
followed by sustainment
events.
The HQ forming framework
(see next figure) depicts the
actions involved in developing plans for manning, training, and equipping. Feasibility estimates
during these planning efforts provide feedback
that iteratively shapes the organization,
functions, and processes. The goal of the
forming effort is an agile, effective, efficient,
and sustainable HQ.
Organization and functions:
 Form follows function. Consider how the
HQ will organize to apply the joint
functions of C2, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, protection, and
sustainment. The staff supports the
commander’s decision making
requirements, higher HQ and mission
partner information requirements, and sets conditions for subordinate success.
 Direct how the HQ will monitor, assess, plan, and direct operations. We often see challenges
in effectively organizing to conduct assessments, integrate lethal and nonlethal actions,
manage knowledge and information, plan and support Vignette: CJTF-OIR
key leader engagement, and leverage collaboration
Commander CJTF-OIR organized the HQ
and liaison elements. (See the “Joint HQ under a J-Code structure and assigned
Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm” responsibility for the key tasks noted in the
paper) adjacent paragraph, notably, knowledge
 Guard against the tendency to build a large HQ. First, management, assessment, and integration
of lethal and nonlethal actions.
its sourcing may not be feasible nor sustainable.
Second, large HQs are often hobbled by their sheer size in sharing understanding and purpose,
lack a bias for action, have challenges in communications and delegation of authority, and
develop extensive and often convoluted staffing in an attempt to ensure all are included in the
staffing processes. Focus on building agile HQs that have a “bias” for action. Lean HQs stay

10
 in their lane at the operational level, leverage reach-back and others’ capabilities, and
continually review requirements to retain focus on the important tasks.
 Reachback has both benefits and limitations. The JTF HQ needs to balance a forward
deployed concept and its challenges in terms of footprint, size, and sustainability with that of
reachback and its potential limitations in terms of situational understanding and
responsiveness. HHQ “assures access” to responsive reachback through definitive orders.
 Several commanders use a “forward” and “rear” HQs Vignette: Reachback
concept. Roles, responsibilities, and authorities Both I MEF and XVIII Abn Corps
between these HQs can be confusing. We normally successfully used reachback to rear
find that commanders and their COS have to clearly elements to reduce forward HQ footprint
delineate and share understanding of the roles, during OEF (RC-SW and IJC).
functions, and responsibilities of these HQ, and codify terms of reference for commanders and
deputies in terms of location and responsibilities.
 JTF HQ personnel will likely work with interagency and multinational mission partners. This
requires delineation of the CCMD and JTF responsibilities, and has implications for JTF
manning, liaison exchange, training, expertise, HQ structure, and processes. Ensure
information-exchange technical platforms are in-place, necessary disclosure / information
sharing training is accomplished, and establish and enforce a strong “write for release” policy
to enable information sharing and collaboration both within and external to the HQ. Leverage
preexisting CCMD-level relationships to speed inclusion with these partners.
 Early collaborative planning with multinational partners is essential to successful operations.
Leverage the unique skill sets and capabilities of each nation’s force within the alliance or
coalition. Maintain a C5 mindset: Command, Control, Cooperation, Collaboration, and
Coordination.
Processes:
 Developing processes that simultaneously support the commander’s decision making cycle,
satisfy higher headquarters’ information requirements, and allow the commander to execute
command of his forces requires significant analysis. These processes must be integrated with
the desired organizational structure and support the identified functions of the HQ.
 Staffs must understand the commander’s preferred decision-making style and venues. Roles,
authorities, and functions of the command group and key staff must be delineated in a terms
of reference document prior to developing specific processes within the HQ. See the “COS
Roles and Functions” paper for an excerpt of a terms of reference document.
 Designing a battle rhythm is a key element of the staff process and needs to be synchronized
up, across, and down the organization. We devote nearly an entire focus paper to this topic.
See the “Joint HQ Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm” paper.
Manning and Equipping:
 Spend time upfront identifying HQ functions and determining the appropriate organization
and processes before focusing on specifics of manning. Emphasize the establishment and use
of a Joint Manning Plan. This plan should identify billets and the means to man the HQ
through by-name-requests (BNR), enabler plugs, unit sourcing using Requests For Forces
(RFF), and joint individual augmentees. Continually assess these plans, and adjust up or down
as necessary to accomplish the mission while maintaining agility and flexibility.

11
 Key billets. Existing personal relationships
and building trust and confidence are
important when forming the HQ. Based on
mission analysis, the CDR may pursue
BNRs to fill some key billets. Common
BNR billets are: Deputy Commander, Chief
of Staff, Political Advisor (POLAD),
Command Senior Enlisted Leader,
principal staff officers, liaison officers,
Public Affairs Officer, cultural advisors
(seen in some JTFs), and allied, coalition,
and interagency staff officers or
representatives.
 Speed is key. Ten to twenty BNRs are more palatable and likely to be filled than large JMDs.
These BNR individuals are often high payoff and can jumpstart a HQ.
 Enablers. Enablers are an important mission enhancer and are often more readily available
than individual augmentees sourced through the JMD process. They normally are not long-
term manning solutions as most enablers will often be limited to 120-day deployments (e.g.,
JECC Enablers). There are numerous enabler Vignette: PACOM & JTF-505
“plugs” available to a JTF HQ. Enablers may Following typhoon Haiyan in 2013, PACOM
not always be pushed to the JTF and may need HQs provided personnel from the PACOM staff
to be requested. to III MEF to help it operate as the JTF-505 HQ
 Individual Augmentees. We’ve seen IAs tasked with conducting humanitarian assistance
sourced via unit-based RFFs, through personal and disaster relief operations in support of the
Philippine government. These personnel
relationships, and via the joint individual understood the organization, personalities, and
augmentation sourcing process. The value of processes of the PACOM HQ and facilitated
IAs is often directly related to the billet interaction between the two HQs.
description of required skill sets provided in the
JMD. The CCMD and Joint Staff can help in the development of these descriptions.
 Different Service cultures and skill sets. Service augmentees come to the JTF HQ with their
service viewpoints and understanding as they relate Vignette: CJTF-OIR
to their staff duties and responsibilities. The
Commander CJTF-OIR leveraged
Services also have unique skill sets aligned to USARCENT manning and requested
different staff positions. Successful HQs codify support for numerous enablers as the CJTF
staff roles to best align Service and individual HQ stood up. Enablers came from the
strengths with JMD positions. JECC, DLA, DIA, Joint IO Command,
CYBERCOM, and CENTCOM HQ. He also
 Identify early the opportunity to fully incorporate sent out several BNRs to CENTCOM.
interagency and multinational partners within the Lastly, he requested assistance from the JS
JTF HQ, both in key leadership and staff positions. J7 to assist his staff with forming,
 Reception planning and execution is often organization, and decision-making
overlooked, but is essential to success. Stand up a processes.
Joint Reception Center to in-process, account for, and prepare / train individual augmentees
prior to assignment to staff sections. This allows staff sections to better function by reducing
the turbulence and workload associated with individual staff entry-level reception and training
of augmentees. Ensure augmentees have the right reception, workspace, computers, and
billeting to make them teammates from day one.

12
 Equipping. Typically, the most challenging equipping issue is in the area of communications
and networks. The CCMD often takes the lead in identifying required networks and the extent
of use of the mission network environment
“There is a lot of investment in this readiness
addressed on page 9. business, and it has to be practiced,”
Training – a key forming task: “You have to have a force that has all the
enablers that would be needed in an
 Designated JTF-capable HQs focus training on the expeditionary environment, and they have to
most likely missions. We have seen planners from be ready and work together and train
the designated GRF HQ visiting GCCs to ascertain together.” Senior Flag Officer
the most likely scenarios and missions resulting in
more focused training and exercise programs.
 A small training section within the JTF HQ can orchestrate development of pre-deployment
training requirements for incoming rotational HQ and joint IAs (JIA), coordinate their
reception, and orchestrate staff sustainment training.
 Individual Training. JKO is one source for
Vignette: ISAF Joint Command (IJC)
individual training as are the DTD focus
papers and joint training guides described on Commander IJC established a training section in
the HQ to identify individual, unit, and staff pre-
the inside front cover. Specific technical
deployment training requirements. IJC forwarded
training is also available. JTF leaders can these requirements both to NATO and through
identify prerequisite training requirements for USFOR-A to help focus “force providers” in
augmentees and pass them to the CCMD for appropriately preparing forces and individuals.
subsequent implementation by force providers.
 The Joint Staff J7 has developed several small group scenario trainer (SGST) modules that
support operational planning team (OPT) and working group (WG) internal process training.
This construct includes pre-testing to refine training requirements and post-testing to assess
value of the training experience and identify follow-on training requirements. Smaller, more
focused training events can pay off in the broader HQ readiness.
 The ongoing Joint Staff J7 exercise series and the Chairman’s exercise program coupled with
Service training programs can help the Commander get the JTF HQ to a “quick walk / slow
run” training proficiency level. We continually see the benefit of initial training that focuses
on understanding the strategic environment to assist the forming HQ in understanding its role
in the “bigger picture.” Other high payoff events are tailored plenary and functional seminars,
tabletop exercises, and senior leader seminars. These build trust-based relationships, share
understanding, and identify empowerment opportunities (all elements of mission command).
 JTF Forming Exercises (FORMEX) based on potential missions stress the staff and identify
deficiencies and opportunities to gain efficiencies. JTF HQ readiness events can be designed
to exercise the formation of the JTF HQ under CCMD-defined conditions. The FORMEX
builds trust between organizations, increases understanding within the CCMD of its
requirements for a JTF, and exercises the JTF HQ on its most likely mission sets.
 The JS J7 can also send small tailored teams forward to assist JTF commanders and staffs in
increasing HQ effectiveness through over-the-shoulder individual training. J7 training teams
also provide observations and recommendations to the command while gaining operationally
relevant insights and best practices to share with other joint HQs.

13
7.0 READINESS IMPLICATIONS Vignette: PACOM OCA Process
Readiness of JTF-capable HQs is a continuing theme with PACOM has a well-defined Operational
both CCMDs and force providers. Capability Assessment (OCA) process
by which they assess the readiness of
Readiness of designated HQs: As noted earlier, one designated HQs to perform as JTF HQs.
important task of the CCMD is to designate JTF-capable Their process incorporates CCMD-level
HQs, identify likely mission sets, and specify tasks and oversight, periodic assistance visits, and
assessments to ensure / report readiness.
readiness standards for those HQs. These can be codified
in RFFs and other directives, and aligned against UJTL tasks (see enclosure). CCMDs can
establish unique joint UICs for these core HQs and direct that they report their readiness via
DRRS. This UIC and DRRS concept is being used by some CCMDs and with the GRF HQ.
The terms “certification” and
“validation” are no longer mandated by Conceptual JTF HQ Migration
the UCP for addressing readiness and Build Capability & Capacity  Gain Authority
deployability status of JTF-capable HQs. (J1/J4) JMD & JMEEL fill complete

That said, some force provider HQs (J6) Sustainable mission partner comms network

(e.g., SOCOM) still use certification and (J2) Establish Mission Partner Fusion Center (J34) Common
(All) JTF Directorate workspaces
validation terminology to report the include Mission Partners
understanding of JTF HQ
process & procedures
readiness of a joint HQs being provided (J34) Prioritize ISR & CAS (J34) Exercise JIPTL approval authority
/ transferred to a CCMD for (J2) Establish ISR (J32) Establish Personnel Recovery
Coordination Cell
employment in that CCDR’s AOR. Process
(J3) Mission Partner Integration Coordinator identified
Readiness of a forming HQ: CCDRs (J34) Employ Fires & Targeting process
(J3) Publish & exercise JTF Battle Rhythm
must know the level of operational
(J6) Establish initial mission partner communications network
capability of a forming JTF and the HQ (J35) Establish JTF C2 architecture
as they plan the timing of transfer of (J5) Publish Implementation Plan
authority from either the CCMD HQ or
other operational HQ to the forming JTF HQ. The JTF commander normally projects an
estimated timeline for attainment of IOC and FOC to assist CCMD and JTF planning efforts and
to manage expectations of the JTF’s capability. There is a direct correlation between an increase
in capability with the associated delegation of authority. The arrow in the above figure
characterizes one plan of action and milestones. The figure also depicts some likely delegations
of authorities to the JTF HQ as it achieves IOC and FOC.
Assessment: Forming HQs normally require some form of internal assessment to inform the
CDR and HHQ as critical capabilities are achieved. This provides common awareness of HQ
progress toward readiness and assists the CDR and
Vignette: CJTF-OIR
CCMD in the transition planning discussed above (See
vignette). CJTF-OIR implemented an assessment
process to track its progress from initial to
Summary: Focus on “sustaining readiness” instead of full operational capability. Each staff
focusing solely on a culminating exercise or event. section identified required UJTL, projected
Unless a JTF-capable HQ is transitioning immediately anticipated achievement of capability, and
to execute a JTF mission, the terms “certification” and then provided a monthly assessment
(green, amber, red) of progress.
“validation” have transient value.

14
Enclosure: Sample UJTL Operational Level 5.5 Enabling Tasks for a JTF-Capable HQ

a. Identify and request forces and capabilities required for the JTF to perform assigned
missions.
b. Develop and provide recommended Joint Operations Area for the JTF.
c. Establish the JTF C2 structure and associated command authorities to enable the JTF
Commander to command the JTF.
d. Determine the JTF HQ staff organization necessary to support the JTF Commander’s
command of the JTF.
e. Identify and request manning required for the JTF HQ to perform assigned missions.
f. Integrate augmentees into the JTF HQ staff.
g. Establish a JTF liaison structure to reinforce trust-based relationships, ensure mutual
understanding and unity of purpose and action, and enhance coordination.
h. Determine terms of reference for the JTF’s senior leaders.
i. Identify requirements for advance parties and forward elements in the operational area and
prepare them for deployment.
j. Define criteria and timeline for the JTF HQ achieving initial and final operational capability
to perform its critical functions as determined by the establishing authority.
k. Develop a JTF HQ staff battle rhythm that enables the JTF Commander to command the JTF.
l. Develop a JTF HQ information plan that enables the JTF Commander to command the JTF.
m. Determine the locations, layout, functions, systems, manning, and security plan for the JTF
HQ command posts.
n. Develop staff operating procedures for the JTF HQ.
o. Report readiness of the JTF-capable HQ.

15
GLOSSARY (1 of 2): ACRONYMS AND SELECTED DEFINITIONS

AFAFRICA: Air Force AFRICA IOC: Initial Operational Capability

B2C2WG & OPT: Boards, Bureaus, Centers, J-Dir: Joint Staff Director (e.g., J-3)
Cells, Working Groups and Operational JFC: Joint Force Commander
Planning Teams. All are means to integrate the
staff efforts to support decision making. JIA: Joint Individual Augmentee
C2: Command and Control JMD: Joint Manning Document
CCDR: Combatant Commander JTF: Joint Task Force
CCMD: Combatant Command KM: Knowledge Management. An
organization’s deliberate approach to
CJIATF: Combined Joint Interagency TF establishing effective staff processes necessary
CJOA: Combined Joint Operations Area to achieve and maintain the shared
CJTF: Combined or Coalition JTF (as used in understanding that enables decision support for
this paper) the commander. No DOD definition. This is a
commonly used definition.
CONOP: Concept of Operation
LNO: Liaison Officer
COS: Chief of Staff
MNC-I: Multinational Corps – Iraq
DRRS: Defense Readiness Reporting System:
A capability based, Department wide readiness MNE: Mission Network Environment
system that provides mission assessments NEO: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
through its METL construct. It provides timely NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
and accurate information for planning, OIR: Operation Inherent Resolve
readiness, and risk assessments for joint and
Service unit commands. OGA: Other Governmental Agency
FHA: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance PDSS: Predeployment Site Survey
FOC: Full Operational Capability SOCAF: SOC AFRICA (a TSOC)
GCC: Geographic Combatant Commander SOP: Standard Operating Procedures
GRF: Global Response Force SVTC: Secure Video Teleconference
HQ: Headquarters TACON: Tactical Control
HHQ: Higher Headquarters TSOC: Theater Special Operations Command
IJC: ISAF Joint Command TOR: Terms of Reference
IM: Information Management. The function of TTP: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
managing an organization’s information UIC: Unit Identification Code
resources for the handling of data and UJTL: Universal Joint Task List. A menu of
information acquired by one or many different tasks, which serves as the foundation for joint
systems, individuals, and organizations in a operations planning across the range of military
way that optimizes access by all who have a and interagency operations.
share in that data or a right to that information
USARAF: US Army AFRICA

16
GLOSSARY (2 of 2): SELECTED JTF and TRAINING DEFINITIONS
Joint Task Forces. A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by SecDef, a
CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing commander, joint task force
to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require centralized
control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a commander may require directive
authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs may be established on a
geographical area or functional basis. JTFs normally are established to achieve operational
objectives. When direct participation by departments other than DOD is significant, the TF
establishing authority may designate it as a joint interagency task force. This might typically
occur when the other interagency partners have primacy and legal authority and the JFC provides
supporting capabilities, such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The proper authority
dissolves a JTF when the JTF achieves the purpose for which it was created or is no longer
required. (JP 3-0)
Establishing Authority: A combatant commander (CCDR) will be the joint task force
establishing authority in most situations but the Secretary of Defense, a sub-unified command
commander, and a commander of a joint task force, may also establish subordinate JTFs. The
JTF establishing authority designates command authorities and relationships, and provides other
command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the commander to form the joint force and
begin operations (JP 3-33)
Service Headquarters: A combat force HQs that is organized, manned, equipped and trained to
perform Service and functional roles (Joint Staff Common JTF HQs SOP, Version 2.0, 26 June
2013)
Designated Service Headquarters: A Service headquarters selected by the establishing authority
to be a joint task force-capable headquarters. (JP 3-33)
Service Retained. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise administrative control
(ADCON) over Service retained forces through their respective Service Chief . . . The
Secretaries also perform a role as a force provider of Service retained forces until they are
deployed to CCMDs (JP-1)
Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters: A designated Service headquarters that can achieve and
sustain a level of readiness to establish, organize and operate as a joint task force headquarters,
acceptable to the supported/assigned combatant commander. (JP 3-33)
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ): Any headquarters for a joint task force that is
constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-
unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander to conduct military operations or
provide support to a specific situation. (JP 1-02)
Service Component Command: Command consisting of the Service Component Commander and
all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations
under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant
command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1)
Functional Component Command: A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of
forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of
military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or
may extend over a period of time. (JP 1)
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