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Proclus on Nature
Philosophia Antiqua
A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy

Previous Editors
J.H. Waszink†
W.J. Verdenius†
J.C.M. Van Winden

Edited by
K.A. Algra
F.A.J. De Haas
J. Mansfeld
C.J. Rowe
D.T. Runia
Ch. Wildberg

VOLUME 121
 Proclus on Nature
Philosophy of Nature
and Its Methods in Proclus’ Commentary
on Plato’s Timaeus

by
Marije Martijn

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2010
This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Martijn, Marije.
Proclus on nature : philosophy of nature and its methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's
Timaeus / by Marije Martijn.
p. cm. – (Philosophia antiqua ; v. 121)
Based on the author's thesis (PhD)–Leiden University.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-18191-5 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Proclus, ca. 410-485. On the Timaeus. 2. Philosophy of nature. 3. Plato. Timaeus. I. Title.
II. Series.

B387.P763M37 2010
113–dc22
2009044695

ISSN: 0079-1687
ISBN: 978-90-04-18191-5

Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

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provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center,
222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.

printed in the netherlands

To my grandmothers
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter One. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. Preliminaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
. Philosophy of nature as theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
. Πρψηλα ματα—the prooemium of the Timaeus . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chapter Two. Platonic Φ σις according to Proclus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
. The essence of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
. Nature, soul, and the natural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
. The ontological level of Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
. Nature’s working . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Chapter Three. The prooemium: the geometrical method of

physiologia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
. Introduction— υσιλγα, ελγα, and the geometrical
method of the Timaeus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
. The constituents of the geometrical method in the
prooemium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
. After the starting points—Proclus takes stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
. In conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Chapter Four. After the prooemium: mathematics, the senses, and

life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
. Book III: Intermediate Philosophy of Nature and mathematics 166
. Books IV and V: Lower Philosophy of Nature, the Senses,
and Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
. General conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
. Appendix: The Elements of Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Chapter Five. Discourse and Reality: The εκς λγς . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
. The εκς λγς today—a selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
viii contents

. Proclus on the εκς λγς: preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

. The nature of the εκς λγς: resemblance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
. Unlikeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
. A true and likely story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
. The practice of discourse: assimilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
. In conclusion: υσιλγα as scientific mimesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Chapter Six. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
. Chapter II: Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
. Chapter III: Theological philosophy of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
. Chapter IV: Mathematical, empirical, biological philosophy
of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
. Chapter V: The likely story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Index rerum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Index locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Of Proclus’ immensely dense and variegated philosophical system, the

part concerning the sensible world is by far the most fascinating, as it
combines a very demanding idealist metaphysics with the givenness of
everyday life in the material world. This is where the true challenge lies
for a Neoplatonist: how to maintain the standards of idealism without
denying the given?
This study aims to contribute to meeting the growing interest in those
lower echelons of Neoplatonic reality by giving insight into how Proclus
performs his Herculean task of ‘saving the phenomenal’. He does so by
weaving an intricate web that relates philosophy of nature to theology,
without reducing the former to the latter. I owe Proclus an apology, as
I have not always been nice to him in the past: I now admit that he has
absolutely convinced me, if not of the truth of his system, then at least of
its beauty and sophistication.
This book is based on a doctoral dissertation that was financially
supported, as PhD project, by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO) and executed at what was at that time the Faculty of
Philosophy at Leiden University. It owes a lot to those who assisted me
in my academic coming of age: my supervisors David Runia and Frans
de Haas, and many other dear colleagues in Leiden and Amsterdam,
the members of OIKOS, the CAW, the Academia Platonica, and the
inhabitants of the De Wulf Mansion Centre for Ancient Philosophy. I
thank Alain Lernould, Alessandro Linguiti, Jan Opsomer and Carlos
Steel for carefully commenting on earlier versions of this book, and Stefan
Pedersen for correcting my English. I claim sole responsibility for any
remaining flaws. I also want to acknowledge the kind permission of
Rodopi to print the table from Lowry () in the appendix of chapter ii.
Last, but most certainly not least, I want to thank those who made the
given meet the ideal, by giving me life, food, shelter, an extended family,
and all the love a person could want.

Translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated. Small capitals are used
for cross-references to sections and texts quoted.
 chapter one

INTRODUCTION

i.. Preliminaries

i... The aim of this book

t i. True philosophy of nature must depend on theology, just as nature
depends on the gods and is divided up according to all their orders, in
order that accounts too may be imitators of the things they signify.1
In this brief statement from Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus we find
the essential elements of Proclus’ philosophy of nature: (i) the depen-
dence of nature on the gods and the division of nature into different
strata; (ii) the dependence of philosophy of nature on theology and
(implicitly) the division of philosophy of nature into different types; and
finally, (iii) the mimetic relation of the account of philosophy of nature
to its subject matter.
The main aim of the book lying before you is to present an analysis
of Proclus’ υσιλγα,2 philosophy of nature, from the point of view of
the above elements. In a nutshell: the conception of nature as depend-
ing on the intelligible and as having a particular presence on different
ontological levels determines the structure of the study of nature as con-
sisting of a chain of different kinds of philosophy of nature. The imitation
of this chain in the didactic account, which is what Plato’s Timaeus is

1 In Tim. I .–. Note that in this context, ‘theology’ also means ‘metaphysics’.

Proclus usually applies the term in this sense, although on occasion he uses it to distin-
guish the philosophy of the Oracles from dialectical metaphysics, as at In Tim. I .–.
Proclus does not use the expression τ μετ τ υσικ.
2 I use υσιλγα here, as elsewhere, as a blanket term. Besides υσιλγα, Proclus

also uses the terms  τς σεως εωρα (I .; .–, both concerning the role
of the Atlantis myth for the theory of nature), περ σεως πραγματεα (I .–),
περ σεως λγς (I .–), περ σεως λγι (I .–), and υσικ λγι
(I .; .–; cf. .; II .; III .–) to denominate the account of
philosophy of nature. Note that the latter expression is also used for the creative principles
of nature. See chapter ii.
 chapter one

according to Proclus, assists the Neoplatonic student in his ascent to the

intelligible—but no further than to the Demiurge.
For Neoplatonic students the Timaeus was the penultimate text of the
curriculum, preparing them for the final stage of their education, the
study of the intelligible per se as set out in the Parmenides.3 As such, the
Timaeus was the intermediary dialogue par excellence, starting from the
physical world, and revealing its connection with the intelligible. Proclus’
Commentary on the Timaeus, of which only the first five books, up to Tim.
d, are extant, is the only Neoplatonic text we possess in which we find
an elaborate and sophisticated explanation of why this connecting of the
physical with the intelligible is possible and how it is accomplished.
In the past, Proclus’ philosophy of nature as we find it in his Commen-
tary on the Timaeus has been described as “the final stage of frustration
reached by the scientific thought of ancient Greece at the end of a long
creative era of nearly a thousand years”.4 More recently, a radically dif-
ferent position has been defended, according to which Proclus’ philoso-
phy of nature is actually theology and a study of the divine transcendent
causes of the universe.5 Despite the fact that the latter position is in a
sense the opposite of the former, both have a foundation in one and the
same presupposition of otherworldliness, and a rejection of an intrin-
sic value of the world of sense perception, either forthwith or through a
reduction of physics to metaphysics.
That presupposition, I maintain, is largely incorrect. Any value the
natural world has for a Neoplatonist is ultimately due to its transcen-
dent causes, but that implies neither that the natural world should be
distrusted as an object of study, nor that physics is valuable only if it is
reduced to metaphysics.
Instead, one of my main conclusions regarding the metaphysics and
epistemology underlying Proclus’ philosophy of nature is that the sub-
ject, the nature and the methods of philosophy of nature presuppose a
fundamental and crucial continuity between the world of generation and
the intelligible realm.

3 In Tim. I .–; Theol.Plat. I , .–; cf. In Tim. I .– for Iamblichus’

opinion, see also Anon. Prol. .–. See also Wallis (: ); Siorvanes (: –
).
4 Sambursky (: , cf. –).
5 Lernould (), cf. Steel ().
 introduction 

After a methodological remark, I will explain in what manner this book

responds and contributes to the current debate on Proclus’ philosophy,
discuss a number of preliminary issues to set the stage for the following
chapters, and present an overview of the structure of this book.
In the following, I will speak of υσιλγα and of ‘philosophy of
nature’, rather than of science of nature, or physics, for two reasons. First
of all, I wish to avoid the suggestion that there is one modern science,
or a common cluster of sciences, with which Proclus’ υσιλγα com-
pares, as it contains elements both of what we call the natural sciences
(physics, astronomy, biology) and of psychology, metaphysics, theology,
philosophy of science and epistemology. Secondly, I am more interested
in Proclus’ commentary for its philosophical considerations pertaining
to the study of the natural world—especially in the fields of metaphysics,
epistemology and philosophy of language—than for the details either of
its contribution, if any, to the science of his age or of its comparison to
that of our age.6 I shall attempt to reconstruct the philosophical founda-
tions of Proclus’ philosophy of nature, and any comparison of Proclus’
theory to that of his sources will be subordinate to that aim. The main
approach in this book will be that of conceptual analysis and what Kenny
calls “internal exegesis”.7

i... Status Quaestionis

As the above comparison of a past and a recent view of Proclus’ philoso-
phy of nature illustrate, in recent years, the scholarly attitude amongst
historians of philosophy towards the philosophical traditions of late
antiquity has changed. From a depreciatory attitude, according to which
post-Hellenistic philosophy constitutes the final phase of decay after
the summit of rationality of the great philosophical systems of classical
Greece, developed an attitude that is more appreciative of the riches and
philosophical sophistication of the theories of late antiquity, as well as of
the extent to which they determined the reception of classical philoso-
phy. The most obvious result of this changing attitude has been an explo-
sive expansion of the number of translations, handbooks, sourcebooks,
monographs and papers on the topic. As concerns Proclus, for exam-
ple, one need only compare the two existing bibliographies of primary

6 See Siorvanes () for an evaluation of Proclus’ contributions to the science of

his time and his influence on its later developments.

7 Kenny ().
 chapter one

and secondary scholarly literature on Proclus, the first of which, offering

around  pages of references, covers  years of scholarship (–
),8 whereas the more recent one edited by Carlos Steel and others
provides over  pages covering as little as  years (–).9
As to Proclus’ philosophy of nature and his Commentary on the Timae-
us, more and more publications appear on different topics from the
commentary,10 a tendency which will only increase with the publication
of the new English translation of the commentary by Tarrant, Runia,
Baltzly and Share.11
More specifically, a wide range of themes in Proclus’ Commentary on
the Timaeus and his philosophy of nature have been addressed, such as
the generation12 and the structure13 of the cosmos, the different demi-
urges,14 astronomy,15 psychology,16 and, most relevant for this book, the
role of mathematics in philosophy of nature,17 the relation between phi-
losophy of nature and theology/dialectic,18 methodological issues,19 and
the status of the physical account.20 Most recently the increasing inter-
est in the more ‘down to earth’ aspects of Proclus’ philosophy shows
from a volume edited by Chiaradonna and Trabattoni, which is dedi-
cated entirely to Proclus’ views on the lowest aspects of reality, such as
matter.21
Surprisingly, Proclus’ notion of nature ( σις) itself has so far hardly
received any attention of modern authors, despite the fact that, as I
will show, grasping that notion is crucial for a proper understanding
of Proclus’ philosophy of nature.22 Those authors who do discuss it,
present a notion of σις that obeys to Proclus’ metaphysical principles

8 Scotti Muth ().

9 Steel, et al. ().
10 See Steel, et al. (: esp. , –, –, –) for references.
11 Baltzly (), Runia and Share (), Tarrant (), other volumes forthcoming.
12 Baltes ().
13 Siorvanes () offers a discussion of numerous physical issues. Cf. Baltzly ()

on elements and causality.

14 Opsomer (a, b, b, ), Steel ().
15 Lloyd, G.E.R. ().
16 MacIsaac ().
17 Lernould (), O’Meara ().
18 Lernould (), Martijn (b), Steel ().
19 Gersh (), Martijn (b), Siorvanes ().
20 Lernould (), Martijn (a).
21 Chiaradonna and Trabattoni (). See also Opsomer (a).
22 See e.g. and Cleary (), and cf. Gersh (: –, highlighting the divinity

of nature), Lernould (: ).

 introduction 

but does not cohere with the material Proclus himself offers on the
subject of nature.23
Since the present book to quite some extent covers the same field as
the main recent work on Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus, Physique
et Théologie () by Alain Lernould, a sketch of the difference between
his views and mine is in order.

i... Proclus’ philosophy of nature according to Alain Lernould

The main difference between Lernould’s reading of Proclus’ philoso-
phy of nature and my own lies in our presuppositions regarding Pro-
clus’ philosophical system. Whereas Lernould emphasizes the existence
of a chasm between the perceptible and the intelligible, my main conclu-
sion from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus regarding the underlying
metaphysics and epistemology, as said above, is that they are character-
ized by the assumption of a fundamental and crucial continuity between
the world of generation and the intelligible realm.
Physique et Théologie, the reworked dissertation of Alain Lernould,
has as its main aim to show how Proclus ‘dialectizes’ the Timaeus in the
second book of his commentary (I -end). The work has two parts.
In the first part (–) the author shows how Proclus imposes several
structures on the Timaeus that are all different from Plato’s own divi-
sion into the “works of intellect” and the “works of necessity”. What these
imposed structures have in common is that they reduce the Timaeus to
its first part (up to d), i.e. the part that is covered by the commentary
insofar as it is extant.24 In the second part of Lernould’s book, entitled
“La Dialectisation du Timée” (–) Lernould argues that Proclus in
the second book of the commentary interprets the Timaeus as a triple
dialectic ascent to the transcendent causes of the universe (the Demi-
urge, the Paradigm, the Good).25 He finds the three ascents in the so-
called hypotheses (d–b; In Tim. .–.), the demonstra-
tions (Tim. b–d; In Tim. I .–.), and the demiurgy (Tim.
d–b; In Tim. I .–.) respectively. Lernould’s book ends
with three appendices, containing the text of Tim. c–b, a discus-

23 Rosán () and, more extensively, Siorvanes ().

24 This does not mean that Lernould thinks the commentary ended there, although he
does suggest a relation between the restructuring and the fact that we no longer possess
the remainder of the commentary (: ).
25 Lernould (: ).
 chapter one

sion of the relation between the body of the world and the elements, and
a brief discussion of Alcinous’ summary of the Timaeus in the Didaska-
likos.
According to Lernould Proclus ‘dialectizes’ Plato’s philosophy of na-
ture and turns it into theology, thereby sacrificing the professed Pythag-
orean character of the dialogue to its Platonic character.26 Lernould is the
first to present an elaborate study of the relation between υσιλγα
and ελγα in Proclus’ philosophical system, in a thorough analysis
of the second book of the commentary, which contains many valuable
discussions, e.g. regarding the notion of ‘becoming’.27
The main objection to Lernould’s monograph is that he gets carried
away by the thesis that philosophy of nature should be theology, to
the extent that he looses sight of the υσιλγα itself and reduces it
to theology altogether. This interpretation is incompatible with a num-
ber of aspects of Proclus’ discussion of υσιλγα, and has problem-
atic consequences, most notably that it constitutes an equation of the
Timaeus and the Parmenides as both dealing with the divine per se,
although these two dialogues are considered to belong to two different
stages in the philosophical development of the Neoplatonic student.28
The Timaeus is a work of theological philosophy of nature, but not pure
theology.29
Similar problems are present in Lernould’s other work. In a paper on
Proclus’ views on the relation between mathematics and philosophy of
nature (regarding Tim. c), Lernould concludes that the mathematiza-
tion of physics, combined with a theologization of mathematics, in turn
leads to a theologization of physics, at the cost of the role of mathemat-
ics.30 The clearest signal that Lernould’s interpretation runs into problems
is found in his most recent paper, on the status of the physical account

26For this purpose in the first pages of his book (–) Lernould takes Proclus’ char-
acterization of Timaeus’ method in the prooemium as “geometrical” (which Lernould
associates with the Pythagorean character) and explains it as meaning no more than
“demonstrative” (associated with the Platonic character). See on this topic chapter iii.
27 Lernould (: ch. ,  ff.).
28 Lernould himself later adjusted his position in his paper on the likely story (:

) and in private conversation.

29 Cf. Siorvanes (: ).
30 Lernould (: esp. –). Here the author seems to conflate mathematics as

the discursive science of discrete and continuous quantity with the originally mathemat-
ical principles that constitute the heart of Neoplatonic metaphysics. On this topic see
chapter iv.
 introduction 

(the “likely story”), where he is forced to conclude that Proclus’ reading

of the likely story is incompatible with his overall views of philosophy of
nature.31

The objections to Lernould’s interpretation of Proclus’ philosophy of

nature can all be explained as caused by the same assumptions regarding
some basic features of Proclus’ philosophical system. Lernould empha-
sizes the opposition between the physical and the transcendent, the sen-
sible and the intelligible, physics and theology. I will show, however, that
Proclus in his overall reading of the Timaeus is concerned especially with
the continuity both of reality and of cognition. All his writings are deeply
imbued with the principle “all in all, but appropriately to each thing”.32
According to Proclus, all sciences are theology in some manner, since
they all discuss the divine in its presence in some realm or other, just as
all Aristotelian sciences study some aspect of being. Only pure theology,
however, studies the divine per se, just as for Aristotle only metaphysics
studies being per se. The other sciences study some aspect of the divine,
with the appropriate methods and subject to the appropriate limitations.
In what sense, then, can we say that philosophy of nature is theology?

i.. Philosophy of nature as theology

t i. It seems to me to be glaringly clear to all who are not utterly

blind to words (λγι) that the aim (πρεσις) of the Platonic Timaeus is
firmly fixed upon the whole of physical inquiry ( υσιλγα), and involves
the study of the All, treating it systematically (πραγματευμ!νυ) from
beginning to end.33

31 Lernould (). On the likely story see chapter v.

32 El.Th. prop. . On the source of this principle, which Wallis (: ) somewhat
unfortunately calls the ‘principle of correspondence’, and its role in Proclus’ metaphysics,
psychology and exegetical method see Siorvanes (: –). For the related principle
of the Golden Chain see Beierwaltes (: –, and n. ).
33 In Tim. I .– trans. Tarrant, slightly modified. The same force speaks from Theol.

Plat. I  .–: “That the Timaeus contains all of the science of nature is agreed upon
by all who are capable of even the smallest amount of insight.” Cf. In Tim. I .–:
“This whole dialogue, throughout its entire length, has philosophy of nature as its aim,
examining the same matters both in images and in paradigms, in wholes and in parts.
It has been filled throughout with all the finest rules of philosophy of nature, tackling
simples for the sake of complexes, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of
their originals, leaving none of the originative causes of nature outside the scope of the
inquiry” (trans. Tarrant, slightly modified).
 chapter one

This very first sentence of Proclus’ fourteen page introduction to his

commentary is a straightforward and emphatic statement of the aim (the
σκπς or πρεσις) of the Timaeus as “the whole of physical inquiry
( υσιλγα)”.34 According to late Neoplatonic exegetical principles, a
text has one and only one σκπς, and every last detail of the text should
be interpreted as pertaining to that σκπς.35 In order to enhance the
precision of exegesis of all these details, the σκπς has to be defined
as narrowly as possible.36 This entails that it does not suffice to men-
tion a general subject, in this case υσιλγα. Instead, one should nar-
row down the σκπς as far as possible, i.e. to Platonic υσιλγα.37
That is precisely what Proclus does in the first pages of the commen-
tary, while at the same time giving a justification for studying the natural
world through reading the Timaeus rather than Aristotle’s Physics.38 Pro-
clus describes three approaches to υσιλγα, one which concentrates
on matter and material causes, one which adds to that the study of the
(immanent) form, and rather considers this to be the cause, and a third,
which regards matter and form as mere subsidiary causes (συνατιαι),
and focuses on other, real causes of everything natural, i.e. the transcen-
dent efficient, paradigmatic and final causes.39 Only Platonic υσιλγα
as presented in the Timaeus, following Pythagorean practice,40 studies
both the secondary and the real causes—and rightly so, Proclus states,
since ultimately everything, including the secondary causes themselves,

34 See also Lernould’s discussion of the σκπς (:  ff.). Note, however, that his

overall thesis makes him reduce the σκπς to the primary causes.
35 Even the introductory passages, i.e. the recapitulation of the Republic and the

Atlantis story (Tim. b–d), are explained as providing meaningful information,

presented in images, regarding υσιλγα. See In Tim. I .–. For the exegetical
principle of ε#ς σκπς, the formulation of which is ascribed to Iamblichus, cf. In Remp.
I .–. See also Coulter (:  ff.), Martijn (a), Praechter ().
36 As Siorvanes (: –) points out, the theme of the Timaeus, the “nature of

the universe”, seems to be straightforward, but the vagueness of the terms “nature” and
“universe” leaves a lot of room for interpretation.
37 Cf. Anon. Prol. .–: “We will not accept it when people say that the aim of

the Timaeus is teaching about philosophy of nature, since that is general and vague:
after all, Aristotle and many others also teach philosophy of nature . . . So we should
say, proceeding on firmer footing, that the aim is [teaching] about philosophy of nature
according to Plato, and what philosophy of nature is according to Plato, but not about
philosophy of nature simpliciter.”
38 On Plato vs. Aristotle see In Tim. I . ff. and Steel ().
39 In Tim. I .–.
40 Proclus followed the tradition that in writing the Timaeus Plato imitated a Pythag-

orean named Timaeus who also wrote a cosmology, In Tim. I .–. On this Timaeus
Locri see Baltes ().
 introduction 

depends on the real causes.41 Plato treats all the causes of the universe in
that he “gives the universe matter and a form that derives from the hyper-
cosmic gods, makes it depend from the universal demiurgy (i.e. the effi-
cient cause), likens it to the intelligible living being (i.e. the paradigmatic
cause), and shows it to be a god by the presence of the good (i.e. the final
cause), and in this manner he renders the whole universe an intelligent
ensouled god.”42 This approach has far-reaching consequences, primarily
that philosophy of nature becomes “a kind of theology”.
t i. The dialogue is divine (σεμνς), and makes its conceptions from
above, from the first principles, and combines the categorical with the
demonstrative, and equips us to reflect on physical things (τ υσικ) not
only physically ( υσικ$ς), but also theologically (ελγικ$ς).43

This Pythagorean character of the dialogue does not result, however, in

the reduction of philosophy of nature to theology pure and simple.
Proclus divides all of philosophy into two fields, the study of the encos-
mic and that of the intelligible, analogous to the “two κσμι”, the percep-
tible and the intelligible.44 As said above, for Proclus, as for the majority
of Neoplatonists, this division is typically represented in two dialogues,
which form the last phase in the school curriculum as established by
Iamblichus: the representative dialogue for the study of the encosmic is
the Timaeus, whereas the Parmenides is considered the summit of the
study of the intelligible. This should not be understood to mean that the
science of the encosmic and that of the divine are considered entirely
separate sciences. Instead, they are different approaches to the same sub-
ject, namely reality including all of its levels, which theology (in the Par-
menides) studies from the intelligible archetype, and philosophy of nature
(in the Timaeus) from the ontological image (εκ%ν) that is the natural
world.45

41 In Tim. I .–..
42 In Tim. I .–. Cf. In Parm. . ff.
43 In Tim. I .–. Cf. the end of book I (In Tim. I .–), quoted above as t i., and

.–. As Dillon () has shown, Proclus uses the word ελγικ$ς in different
senses, referring to metaphysics on the one hand and to the “wise men of old” (Homer,
Hesiod, Orpheus, Pythagoras) on the other. In this study, the two will be kept apart by
reserving “theology” for metaphysics, which is our main concern, and “theologians” for
the “wise men of old”.
44 In Tim. I .–., referring to Tim. c.
45 In Tim. I ., . ff.; cf. . ff., III . ff., and El.Th.  with Dodds (: ).

Dodds notes the ‘Aristotelian’ use of ελγικ in the title of the Elements of Theology. The
same goes for υσικ in the other manual, the Elements of Physics (cf. Arist. Met. VI ).
As Dodds notes, in Neoplatonism the distinction that is thereby made between theology
 chapter one

Philosophy of nature in Proclus’ view consists of a chain of different

disciplines with different subject matters and respective methods, and
crowned by theological philosophy of nature. It is theology—i.e. the
science of the first, divine principles, their properties and their emanation
into Being46—in the sense that it provides insight in the divine as cause
of the physical world, especially (διαερντως) its transcendent efficient
cause, the Demiurge, but also its paradigmatic and final causes;47 and on a
lower level philosophy of nature provides insight also in the material and
formal causes of the universe.48 Where the Parmenides reveals how all
beings are the offspring of the One, the Timaeus shows how the physical
universe is ordered by the Demiurge; the former teaches about God
( πλς ες), the latter about a god (τς ες).49

i.. Πρψηλα ματα—the prooemium of the Timaeus

For the definition of υσιλγα and Proclus’ concept of nature the

introduction to the Commentary on the Timaeus is the most informative
source. For the elaboration of his notion of the philosophy of nature and
its methods, on the other hand, the main source of information is his
expansive exegesis of the prooemium (Tim. c–d, In Tim. I –
), Timaeus’ methodological preamble to his cosmological exposition.
Although we find clues throughout Proclus’ commentary, both in numer-
ous methodological remarks and in the practice of the commentary, the
density of methodological information is at its highest in Proclus’ com-
ments on the prooemium, and hence this section can be considered the
heart of Proclus’ theory of υσιλγα, its methods and limitations.
A brief introduction of the prooemium will allow me to bring forward
two clues which set the frame within which Proclus’ entire exegesis of
Timaeus’ cosmological account is to be understood: (i) Proclus reads the

and physics, is not as rigid as these titles suggest, because “all things are full of gods”. On
ontological images see chapter v.
46 Theol.Plat. I  and .
47 At Theol.Plat. III  .–., where Proclus collects the teachings on the divine

from the Timaeus, this dialogue turns out to contribute especially to the knowledge of
the intelligible living being and in book V (esp.  .–.) to the knowledge of the
Demiurge.
48 In Tim. I .–, .–.. Cf. Simpl. In Cat. .–: “the divine Plato . . . also

investigates the natural insofar as it participates in what transcends nature.”

49 In Parm. .–. (- Cousin).
 introduction 

Timaeus as a hymn to the Demiurge, and (ii) the main function he gives
to the prooemium is that of ensuring a scientific status for philosophy of
nature.

i... The prooemium and the Timaeus as a hymn

One of the characteristics of Plato’s Timaeus that sets it apart from most
other Platonic dialogues is that it is not in fact a dialogue, except initially.
After the opening, the ‘recapitulation’ of (part of) the discussion of the
Republic, and the Atlantis-story, Timaeus takes the stage (at c), not to
leave it even at the end of the dialogue. The only interruption in Timaeus’
long account is a short remark of Socrates’, just after Timaeus’ famous
request to his audience to be content with a likely story:
t i. Bravo, Timaeus! By all means! We must accept it as you say we
should. This overture (τ( μ)ν *ν πρμιν) of yours was marvellous.
Go on now and let us have the work itself (τ(ν δ) δ+ νμν).
(Tim. d–, trans. Zeyl)
This remark is important for two reasons. First of all, through this one
remark, the foregoing section of Timaeus’ account (Tim. c–d)
is set apart from the sequel as its prooemium. It is thereby identified
as a unity, and given extra weight and a special function with respect
to what follows. Secondly, by his choice of words Socrates summons
an image of the account Timaeus is in the course of giving as a poem
or a musical piece (a νμς). A prooemium is, generally speaking, any
preamble, be it to a piece of music, a poem, or a speech.50 But by the
addition of νμς, which among many other things means ‘melody’, or
‘strain’, Timaeus’ account is compared with a musical performance. As
the Athenian stranger in the Laws points out:
t i. . . . the spoken word, and in general all compositions that involve
using the voice, employ ‘preludes’ (a sort of limbering up (,νακιν σεις), so
to speak), and [ . . . ] these introductions are artistically designed to aid the
coming performance. For instance, the νμι of songs to the harp, and all
other kinds of musical composition, are preceded by preludes of wonderful
elaboration.51

50 Cf. Phdr. d–. The term prooemium is not uncommon in Plato (e.g. at Rep. VII

d– and d the term is applied to all of education before dialectic, which is called
the νμς), and occurs especially frequently in the Laws. See for the parallel between the
prooemium of a speech and of a poem or musical performance also Arist Rhet. III ,
b–.
51 Laws IV d–e (trans. Saunders modified), cf. V e–. The metaphor
 chapter one

This same image of a musical performance is present in the very first

lines of the Critias, the sequel of the Timaeus. It is here that we find the
end of Timaeus’ account, in the form of a prayer for forgiveness for any
false notes.52 With this added element of the prayer, Timaeus ends his
νμς the way he commenced his prooemium at Tim. d–.53 Whereas
at the outset of his account he prayed to the gods in general, he here
addresses “the god who in fact existed long before but has just now been
created in my words”,54 that is, the Demiurge.
In his explanation of Socrates’ remark that delimits the prooemium,
Proclus picks up the image of the musical performance, but interestingly
chooses a particular instrument: the lyre. This choice is not a casual one:
Proclus deliberately compares Timaeus to a lyreplayer, who composes
hymns to the gods.
t i. The word νμς [at Tim. d] is taken from the νμι of the lyre-
players: they are a particular kind of songs, made in honour, some of
Athena, some of Ares, some are inspired, and others aim at regulating
behaviour. They usually had a prelude precede these νμι, which they
called for this reason “pre-stroking of the strings” (πρψηλα ματα).55
(I .–)
As has been shown by Van den Berg, Proclus considers Critias’ Atlantis
story to be a hymn to Athena.56 More important for our purposes is that
Timaeus’ own account is here ranked among the hymns. And elsewhere,
in the Platonic Theology, Proclus tells us that the divinity celebrated by

becomes an actual pun in the context of the Laws, of course, since the preambles are in fact
followed by νμι, in the sense of laws. The main purpose of the prooemia expounded in
the Laws is to convince the possible wrongdoer otherwise; just as in a speech, the pream-
ble is persuasive in nature. Cf. IV e ff.; VI d ff.; etc. At XI e ff., however, the
stranger speaks of a more general prooemium, which would have an apologetic character,
like the prooemium in the Timaeus, cf. Runia (: –).
52 Crit. a–b, esp. b “discordant note”, b– “bring the musician who strikes the

wrong note back into harmony”, cf. b–.

53 There is another image, namely that of the account as a journey. This image is

also evoked by the word πρμιν (-μς in the word πρ-μιν), and recurs at the
beginning of the Critias as well. In the first line of the Critias, which is in content also
the last one of the Timaeus, Timaeus expresses his relief at taking a rest, as it were, after a
long journey (.κ μακρ/ς 0δ1, διαπρεας) (Crit. a–). This image is less relevant
to our purposes as it is not picked up by Proclus.
54 Crit. a–.
55 Note that the term Proclus uses to refer to the custom of playing a prelude, πρψη-

λ ημα, as if it were common (.κλυν) is in fact a hapax, which emphasizes the novelty
of his interpretation.
56 Van den Berg (: –).
 introduction 

Plato in the Timaeus is the Demiurge. Through Timaeus’ entire exposi-

tion he presents “a kind of hymn” to Zeus the Demiurge:
t i. The providence of the Demiurge manifests itself from above down to
the creation of this [visible world], and this text has been presented by Plato
as a kind of hymn (#ν 3μνς τις) to the Demiurge and the Father of this
universe, proclaiming his powers and creations and gifts to the cosmos.57
(Theol.Plat. V , .–)
A similar position was taken two centuries earlier by Menander Rhetor,
who classifies the Timaeus as a 3μνς υσικς/ υσιλγικς,58 i.e. a
hymn in which we identify an aspect of the natural world with a divin-
ity and study its nature.59 Menander, however, refers to the Timaeus as
a hymn to the universe (τ1 Παντς, .), rather than to the Demi-
urge.60 The importance of Proclus’ choice is that as a hymn to the Demi-
urge, the dialogue is also considered an .πιστρ to him,61 and this,
we will see in later chapters, has its reflection in Proclus’ analysis of the
structure and function of the Timaeus.

57 The Timaeus is not the only dialogue which Proclus calls a hymn. See Saffrey

and Westerink (–: vol. V , n. ) for references to other examples. Strictly
speaking, the phrase ‘this text’ (4τς) refers only to the description of the demiurgic
creations, not those of the lesser gods, and therefore not to Timaeus’ entire exposition.
Still, Proclus here also refers to the entire range of creation, 5νωεν . . . 56ρι τς τ των
πι σεως, and thus we can conclude that he does include all of Timaeus’ account into
the hymn to the Demiurge.
58 Menander Rhet. .–., esp. . and  ff. (Spengel).
59 On the so-called υσικ 3μνι see Russell and Wilson (: – with –)

and Van den Berg (: –). I propose to translate υσικ as “of nature” rather than
“scientific” (as Russell/Wilson), to emphasize that we are dealing with hymns that reveal
the nature (essence, cf. .) of a divinity through a (scientific, true) discussion of their
presence in nature (the natural world, cf. .). On the commentary as prayer see Brisson
(b). Cf. the rd/th c. Pythagorean hymn to Nature, see Powell (: –), and
Simplicius, who dedicates his own commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo as a hymn to the
Demiurge (In Cael. .–).
60 In fact, Menander states that Plato himself in the Critias calls the Timaeus a 3μνς

τ1 Παντς. As has been remarked by modern commentators Russell and Wilson (:
), Van den Berg (: ), nowhere in the Critias can such a remark be found.
Russell/Wilson propose that Menander was thinking of Tim. c and b, or Critias a,
all invocations. I propose that in addition Menander may have had in mind Tim. a,
where Critias (rather than the Critias) calls his own account a kind of hymn (-νπερ
7μν1ντας).
61 And not, e.g. to the One. On hymns as .πιστρ see Van den Berg (: –
and chapter ).
 chapter one

i... The prooemium and philosophy of nature as a science62

The prooemium has a second important function, namely that of secur-
ing a scientific status of philosophy of nature.
As has been shown by Runia, the Timaeus places itself in the tradi-
tion of the Presocratic περ σεως literature by incorporating in the
prooemium the following elements: () invocation of the gods, () intro-
duction of the author, () indication of the audience, () statement of
the subject, () truth claim, and () outline of the method to be fol-
lowed.63 The only element of the Timaeus prooemium that does not fit
the tradition is what Proclus will call “the hypotheses and what needs to
be demonstrated from them beforehand”,64 i.e. Timaeus’ developing of
the starting points of his account (Tim. d–d). Interestingly, Pro-
clus considers this same eccentric element to be the very core of the
prooemium.
Proclus presents two summaries of the prooemium on one page. The
first contains five items, in the order of the Platonic text: () “the kind
(ε-δς) of research subject”, () “the hypotheses” and () “what needs
to be demonstrated from them beforehand”, () “the kind (ε-δς) of
text”, and () “the disposition of the audience”.65 In the second summary,
however, all that is mentioned as the content of the prooemium are the
hypotheses and the demonstrations.66 The ε-δς of the subject matter
is no longer separated from the hypotheses, and as a consequence the
nature of the text (which is determined by the subject matter) is no longer
separated from the demonstrations. The disposition of the audience is left
out altogether.

62 I am grateful to David Runia for letting me mine his unpublished paper ‘Proclus’

interpretation of the proœmium of Plato’s Timaeus (d–d)’, which was presented at

“Plato’s Ancient Readers”, a conference held in Newcastle (AUS), June .
63 Runia (: –).
64 In Tim. I .–.
65 I .–.. A comparison with Runia’s analysis of Plato’s text shows several

similarities, and one puzzling difference: the prayer, one of the traditional constituents
of the prooemium, occurs in neither summary, despite the fact that Proclus comments
on it extensively. That does not mean he thinks that the prayer is not really needed (as
does Menander, who states that a hymn of nature does not require a prayer, .–),
but rather that it does not belong to the prooemia (cf. In Tim. I .–). Another
difference is that in Proclus’ summaries there is no mention of the author/speaker. As to
the similarities, we recognize the introduction of the subject matter in (), the truth claim
in (), and the mention of the audience in ().
66 I .– (Proclus subsequently adds the characterization of the text).
 introduction 

We can conclude, then, that in his exegesis of the prooemium Pro-

clus concentrates on () and (): “the hypotheses and what needs to be
demonstrated from them beforehand”, that is, on the only non-traditional
element of the prooemium. Proclus’ main reason for this, as will be
shown, is that it is precisely the presence of hypotheses and demonstra-
tions that give Platonic philosophy of nature its status of a science.

i... The structure of this book

t i. (= t i.) True philosophy of nature must depend on theology (iii),
just as nature depends on the gods (ii) and is divided up according to
all their orders (ii/iv), in order that accounts too may be imitators of the
things they signify (v).67
The elements of this statement, which as mentioned at the outset of the
introduction, sum up the basic ingredients of Proclean philosophy of
nature, have their counterparts in the different chapters of this book (ii–
v).
Chapter ii discusses the ontological realm that is the subject matter of
philosophy of nature: σις. The chapter presents an analysis of Proclus’
notion of nature ( σις) as described in the introduction to the commen-
tary on the Timaeus, as well as elsewhere in his work. The main issues
discussed in this chapter are the ontological status of nature, its relation
to soul, and its activities. I will argue that in Proclus’ metaphysical sys-
tem universal Nature is an intermediary hypostasis, which, together with
Soul, connects the physical world with its intelligible causes. It is also the
proximate cause of physical objects. This universal nature, however, only
partly transcends its effects, and is part of a chain of natures, from the
highest intelligible “source of nature” to its lowest manifestation in indi-
vidual natures.
In chapters iii and iv, the elements of this metaphysical chain of nature
will be shown to have their correspondents in an epistemological chain of
different kinds of philosophy of nature. In the five books of Proclus’ com-
mentary we find different phases of philosophy of nature—mostly with
different methods and limitations—depending on the subject matter at
hand.68

67 In Tim. I .–.
68 The part of the first book in which Proclus interprets the summary of the Republic
and the Atlantis story as presentations of the universe in images and symbols respec-
tively (Tim. b–c with In Tim. I .–., and c–d with I .–.
 chapter one

In chapter iii, the highest kind of υσιλγα is discussed. This theo-

logical and dialectical philosophy of nature, the main part of which Pro-
clus finds in the prooemium, consists in an analytic proceeding from
the nature of the sensible world to its primary cause, the Demiurge,
and in him also to the intelligible Living Being and the Good. Proclus
presents an analysis of this highest kind of philosophy of nature in which
he emphasizes certain parallels between Plato’s procedure and that of a
geometer. I argue that the aim of this comparison is not just to give phi-
losophy of nature a scientific status, but also to determine the main char-
acteristics of that science: the starting points of the ascent to the Demi-
urge remain hypothetical and are partly a posteriori. The combination of
partly empirical starting points and a scientific status rests on an inge-
nious notion of δ8α as the cognitive faculty with which we study the
natural world.
Chapter iv contains an analysis of the notion of philosophy of nature
as it occurs in the later books of the commentary. I will show that we
there find lower kinds of philosophy of nature, matching the respective
subjects of the books in question: mathematical υσιλγα for the body
and the soul of the world, empirical philosophy of nature for the heavenly
bodies, and something like biology, a science of the living being. As
part of this chapter I discuss the explanatory role of mathematics in
philosophy of nature. I argue that in Proclus’ view the structure of the
natural world is in a sense mathematical, but that at the same time for
understanding that world mathematical explanations are helpful but not
sufficient. I also argue that the manner in which mathematics helps us
reach a proper explanation of the natural world is determined by the
aspect of the world that is being explained, namely the body or the soul
of the world respectively.
In the last chapter, chapter v, I discuss Proclus’ interpretation of the
textual and didactic aspects of the Timaeus, as he finds them in Plato’s
famous remark that the account of nature is a mere “likely story”. Rather
than discuss the limitations of an account of the natural world, Proclus’
main aim in his inventive interpretation is to demonstrate how such an
account facilitates the ascent to knowledge of the intelligible causes of the
universe. A crucial element in the account’s fulfilment of this function

respectively), will be left out of consideration. These passages are preparatory, accord-
ing to Proclus, and as opposed to the other preparatory passage of the Timaeus, the
prooemium, hardly elicit remarks on his part concerning the nature and methods of υσι-
λγα.
 introduction 

is the ontological nature of its subject, the natural world. Because the
natural world is an ontological image (εκ%ν) of its own transcendent
causes, an exposition about that world is an iconic account in the sense
that it is a direct presentation of ontological images.
I moreover show that for Proclus all discourse, including that about
the natural world, can have a didactic function due to its two ‘directions’,
namely one of natural resemblance to its subject matter, comparable to
emanation, and one of a further assimilation to its subject matter by the
author/speaker, comparable to reversion.
In the conclusion I bring together the findings of chapters ii to v.
 chapter two

PLATONIC ΦΥΣΙΣ ACCORDING TO PROCLUS

ii.. Introduction

The subject of this chapter is Proclus’ concept of σις. Our primary

focus will be on the content and role of this concept as the subject matter
of the Timaeus, but since such a crucial and complex notion as σις
deserves more than just an isolated contextually bound study, we will
also delve into more general issues regarding Proclus’ concept of nature.1
The last part of Proclus’ introduction to his commentary on the Timae-
us is a treatise on σις (In Tim. I .–.).2 At first sight this trea-
tise does not fit among the elements that traditionally constitute the
introduction to a commentary, the schema isagogicum. Its presence can
be explained, however, as a further delimitation of the σκπς of the
Timaeus, which is in first instance determined as “all of υσιλγα”.3 As
we have seen in chapter i, Proclus immediately delimits this σκπς by
digressing on the different kinds of υσιλγα, and selecting the study
that focuses on the true causes of everything natural as the real Platonic
philosophy of nature. This leaves us in the dark with respect to the actual
subject of the Timaeus, as long as we do not know what the natural is.
At I .– we see that the natural is what “becomes by nature” (τ$ν -
σει γινμ!νων).4 This implies that the character of the entire dialogue,
and of its σκπς, is ultimately determined by what is meant by σις,5
although of course the actual subject of the Timaeus has a wider extension
than σις alone. Since σις is a highly polysemous word,6 the discus-
sion of the σκπς is not complete until we have reached an agreement
on what its meaning—or range of meanings—is in the context of Plato’s

1 In the following, I will write Nature (capitalized) to indicate universal, divine σις,
which is a hypostasis (on σις as hypostasis see below).
2 For useful notes on this passage see Tarrant (:  ff.).
3 See t i..
4 Cf. In Tim. I .–, . ff.
5 Cf. Hadot, I. (: ).
6 See e.g. RE s.v. Natur.
 chapter two

Timaeus. Or, as Proclus remarks, since different people have understood

σις in different ways, we should find out what exactly σις means for
Plato, and what he thinks its essence (<σα) is, before moving on to the
main text.7
It is for this reason that Proclus devotes a section towards the end of
his introduction to a systematic treatise on Plato’s notion of σις, and
how it differs from—and of course improves on—that of just about any
non-platonic philosopher.8
Of course, another reason for presenting an answer to the question
“what is nature?”, apart from determining the σκπς of the dialogue at
hand as precisely as possible, is the wish to comply with a standard of
physical works, set by Aristotle, who starts his Physica from answering
the question what nature is, and includes a doxographical discussion.9
Because in the introduction to the In Tim. Proclus is emphatically
giving an account of a Platonic notion of nature as part of Platonic
philosophy of nature, he puts Plato’s notion in a polemic contrast to
that of others. As a result, the description of the notion of nature is
purposefully stripped of any Aristotelian or Stoic aspects. Elsewhere,
however (mainly in the discussion of Timaeus e, and in book III
of the In Parmenidem) different features of nature are discussed more
extensively, resulting in a more subtle picture. The fact that the treatise
takes up over three pages of the fourteen page introduction cannot but
be indicative of its significance. Nonetheless, no systematic explanation
of its contents has been given in modern scholarship.10 In the following,
this treatise on Platonic nature, which is the most concise description
of Proclus’ own ideas regarding σις, will be the starting point for a
broader discussion of Proclus’ notion of σις.

7 In Tim. I .–.. Note that the meaning of σις in the treatise in the In Tim.—
and consequently in this chapter—is limited to nature as it figures in the =στρα περ
σεως, accounts of origin and generation of and in the universe. On this topic in Plato
see Etienne (: ), Naddaf ().
8 Hadot, I. (: , ) suggests that the purpose of such systematic treatises on

the σκπς was to ensure that the reader is forewarned of the difficulty of the subject
matter. In the In Tim., however, there is no sign of such a warning.
9 Arist. Phys. II  b ff., cf. Festugière (–: vol. I,  n. ). Cf. Arist. Met.

V  for an enumeration of different meanings of σις.

10 See, however, Phillips (: –) for a discussion of parts of the treatise in

the context of a treatment of Proclus’ doctrine of evil. For a critical discussion see below
ii...iii.
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

ii... Plato’s σις

One of the difficulties Proclus must have encountered in describing a
Platonic notion of nature concerns his source material: Plato himself
hardly ever characterizes nature as such, let alone discusses it. Of course,
in accordance with good Neoplatonic practice, the theory on σις
offered is really that of Proclus, rather than Plato, but as we will see our
commentator does find the source of his theory in Plato. There are few
Platonic passages that today are considered informative with respect to
Plato’s notion of nature, namely Phaedo a ff., Phaedrus a ff., Sophist
c–e, and Laws X b–c.11 At Phaedo a ff. Socrates refers to
the study of nature (περ σεως =στρα) as concerning the causes of
generation, perishing, and being (existential or predicative).12 Crudely
speaking, nature here refers to the class of objects that are subject to
generation and perishing. Phaedrus a ff. clearly makes a connection
between the σις that figures in περ σεως =στρα and σις as the
essence of something (to understand the nature of something, one has to
understand the nature of the universe). Again, Sophist c–e and Laws
X c–c are both criticisms of the common opinion that everything
growing owes its existence to mindless nature and chance, rather than to
a divine cause (in the Laws, that cause is soul). So here we find another
meaning of σις, that of an irrational automatic agent. The Timaeus,
paradoxically, is not considered by modern scholars to contain valuable
information regarding Plato’s concept of σις,13 although according to
Proclus it does. For him Tim. e, where the Demiurge is said to show
the souls the nature of the universe ( τ1 παντ(ς σις), is a crucial
addition to the source material. Today this passage does not sparkle
any scholarly discussions with respect to the concept of nature, but we
will see that it is central to Proclus’ analysis of the ontological level of

11 E.g. Etienne (: , n. ), Claghorn (: –), Naddaf (), Solmsen
(:  f.). The other passages mentioned by Etienne (Lysis b, Prot. c, Tim.
d, Epist. VII d) are mere mentions of natural inquiry. Some dialogues abound
in mentions of σις, but most of them involve nature in the sense of the essence of
something. On the notion of σις in antiquity see Holwerda ().
12 Cf. Plato Phil. a. For an assessment of Plato’s place in the περ σεως tradition
see Naddaf (), Runia ().
13 E.g. Claghorn (:  ff.). As he has shown, the word σις is hardly used
in the Timaeus, and when it is, it has the sense of substance (d, d, c), basis of
characteristics (d, a, b, b, b, b, d), or proper order of action (b, b).
See also Johansen (: ch. , esp. –), who argues that the cosmology of the Timaeus
is primarily a defence of a life of reason.
 chapter two

nature. Another passage Proclus relies on is the myth of the Statesman,

and especially d ff., where the universe is abandoned by the helmsman
and turned over to its natural motions (ε=μαρμ!νη τε κα σ μ υτς
.πιυμα, e).
Like Proclus, modern authors tend to overlook or ignore the fact that
there is hardly such a thing as Plato’s doctrine of σις and describe
“Plato’s concept of nature” in a manner that is tailored entirely to their
own purposes, e.g. interpreting Plato’s utterances through the Aristote-
lian material. By way of illustration, let us briefly look at Claghorn, who
writes in an Aristotelian context, and at the more recent discussion of
Naddaf. Claghorn claims that Plato in the Timaeus “had taken the name
σις to apply to Reason, rather than to the world of things”, and that
he “identified the >ντως >ντα with the σει >ντα.” His main source
is Tim. de, in which Plato speaks of  ?μ ρ$ν σις—where σις
is clearly to be read as “essence” or “being”. What Claghorn could have
said, then, is that Plato ascribes to Reason, rather than to nature, the
creation of order and motion in the world. But this in no way implies
an identification of nature and Reason.14 In general Claghorn confuses
Reason, Mind and Soul: “ ‘Mind’ in the Timaeus then, is the σις of the
world, for it basically is rationality, and this is what directs its movements
. . . To Plato, therefore, Nature is the world of Reason. It is described as
Soul to emphasize its ability to initiate motion, since only soul can do
that, and mind dwells in soul.”
More recently, Naddaf has argued that σις is the “development of
the contemporary world ( . . . ) from beginning to end”,15 and that we find
it in this sense in Plato’s Laws X.16 The disadvantage of Naddaf ’s inter-
pretation of Platonic σις is that it is made subservient to his attempt to
demonstrate that early Greek περ σεως literature contained a ‘polito-
gony’.17 Thus it cannot, in fact, be considered an interpretation of σις
as such. For example, he selects from Laws X the passage in which -
σις is opposed to τ!6νη (a–e), while at the same time taking the

14 Claghorn (: , ). For criticism of Claghorn see Solmsen (: , n. ),
who brings forward some suggestion concerning Plato’s notion of σις in which inad-
vertently—or at least without warning—the word is used in three different senses within
one paragraph: first as “essence”, then as “the realm of movement”, and finally as “some-
thing relating to the realm of movement” (:  f.).
15 Naddaf (: , –).
16 Naddaf (: –). Unfortunately volume II of Naddaf ’s work, which will deal

with an analysis of σις in Plato, and especially with regard to Laws book X (: ),
is not published yet.
17 Naddaf (: ).
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

latter as concerning the development of human culture and therefore as

part of σις in the sense defined. Naddaf does not, however, include
the sequel of Laws X (c–c), where the argument culminates in the
analysis of the relation between σις and ψυ6 , and as a consequence he
leaves the main point of the Laws discussion out of consideration, which
is the question whether the gods exist and whether the natural world is
ensouled.
It may not be possible to come up with a meaningful account of Plato’s
concept of nature, and it certainly is not needed here. By way of starting
point, let me merely state the very general claim that since σις is
associated with growth, we tend to assume that Plato takes it to go hand
in hand with generation and decay, temporality, perceptibility, and with
irrationality. Interestingly, the passages in which he speaks of nature in
the sense of περ σεως =στρα, do not warrant that assumption. For
example, in the Phaedo, Socrates hopes to discover the rationality of
nature (c–d). According to the Sophist, Nature does not produce
everything natural, as the Athenian stranger says, “by some spontaneous
cause that generates it without any thought”, but “by a cause that works by
reason and divine knowledge derived from a god” (Sophist c, trans.
White). Nature is here not replaced by a divine cause, but supplemented
with it. Proclus, we will see, takes this more optimistic angle in his views
of nature.

ii.. The essence of nature

In ancient philosophy, very generally speaking, the range of concepts

referred to by the word σις runs from nature as a class of things char-
acterized by growth and change, matter, and spatiotemporality, through
nature as a principle active in that class of things, to nature as the essence
of a thing, not tampered with by man, as opposed to e.g. τ!6νη or ν-
μς.18 In Proclus we find the same spectrum. For our present purposes
the latter, nature as the essence of a thing, is least relevant.19

18 For general literature on the early and classical Greek concept of σις: Lloyd,
G.E.R. (c), Naddaf () (mainly Presocratics, and somewhat controversial, cf.
Mansfeld ()), Schmalzriedt (:  ff.) for a description of the development from
“Individualphysis” to “Allphysis” in the second half of the th century bc, and Vlastos
(: –).
19 But see ii...
 chapter two

Proclus commences his treatise on nature at In Tim. I .–. with

three questions:
t ii. τς  σις κα πεν πρεισι κα μ!6ρι τνς διατενει τς @αυτς
πι σεις;

What is nature, where does it come from, and how far does it extend its
activities?20 In other words: () what are nature’s essence, () ontological
origin and () causal power? () The question of the essence of nature
divides into two subquestions: (i) Is nature a kind of, or a part of, lower
soul (treated in ii..), and (ii) if not, then is it identical to “everything
natural”? (ii..) It will become clear that nature for Proclus is neither
soul nor the aggregate of everything natural, but primarily a hypostasis
of its own in between the two, where hypostasis is to be understood in the
narrower technical sense of “fundamental ontological level”—something
that does not merely have, but also is a hypostasis.21
() The second question, regarding the origin of nature, results in a
discussion of the different levels of reality on which we find nature, of the
interdependence of those different “natures” and of the question which
of them is primarily considered nature (which is not the same as the
question which of them is ontologically primary) (ii.).
() And finally, the third question concerns the activity of nature as
source of motion and unity of all bodies (ii.). These are all questions
that were at the heart of the late ancient debate on nature.22

ii.. Nature, soul, and the natural

According to Proclus Plato surpasses other philosophers in giving an

account of the essence of nature. Proclus’ support of this claim, an
explanation of the mistakes made by other philosophers, amounts to
a nice—albeit incomplete—history of the concept of nature through
antiquity, presented in ascending metaphysical order.23 Let us briefly

20 In Tim. I .–.
21 Cf. Steel (: –), Dörrie (), Witt () on the history of the notion. Cf.
Gersh (: –), who apart from the causal dependence also emphasizes the complex
(often triadic) structure of many hypostases.
22 See Sorabji (a: esp. –) for a selection of discussions on these and related

issues from the ancient commentators on (mainly) Aristotle, and Remes (: chapter )
for a concise overview of Neoplatonic themes regarding nature and the sensible.
23 For reff. to similar doxographies see Festugière (–: , n. ).
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

review it before taking a closer look at two aspects thereof: the relation
between nature and soul (ii..), and between nature and the natural
(ii..).
Proclus starts out with Antiphon, who identified nature with matter.
This unexpected presence of Antiphon reveals that Proclus’ main source
for the doxographical material is Aristotle.24
The second target is Aristotle himself, and his equation of nature
with form.25 In this polemic context Proclus does not refer to Aristotle’s
definition of nature as the source of motion, probably because Proclus in
fact maintains that definition (see below ii.).26
Thirdly, Proclus mentions some anonymous predecessors of Plato who
underestimated nature by identifying it with “the whole” (τ Aλν), as
those who are scolded by the Athenian stranger in book X of the Laws
for calling the products of nature “natures” (τ σει σεις πρσηγ-
ρευν).27 In light of the fact that τ( Aλν is subsequently called τ( σ%μα,
we have to assume that it refers to any whole consisting of both matter
and form, rather than to the sum of everything physical.28 Proclus here
seems to be repeating Aristotle’s criticism that that which is constituted
of matter and form is not a nature, but natural, for example a man.29
Yet another mistaken conception of nature Proclus mentions, and
which is like the previous one criticized in the Laws, is that nature is iden-
tical with physical powers such as weight or density.30 The philosophers
who adhere to such notions are identified as Peripatetic philosophers31
and “even older ones” (probably atomists).32

24 In Tim. I .–. Proclus’ source is Arist. Phys. II  a–, but as Festugière

shows Antiphon is also part of the Aetian tradition. Tarrant (: , n. ) refers to
Dox. .., .., .., .., ... Cf. Alex.Aphr. In Met. . ff., Simpl. In Phys.
. ff., Philop. In Phys. . ff.
25 In Tim. I .–. For nature as form see Arist. Phys. II  a ff.; cf. Met. XII 

a–.
26 Cf. Schneider (: ). For nature as source of motion see Arist. Phys. III 

b–, Cael. I  b.

27 In Tim. I .–, see below, ii...
28 In Tim. I .. Cf. Festugière (–: vol. I,  n. ).
29 Arist. Phys. II  b–.
30 Plato Laws X b ff.
31 In Tim. I .–. Perhaps Proclus is here confusing the Peripatetic theory that

physical changes start from the four δυνμεις cold, warm, dry and moist (Arist. Meteor.
I  b ff.) with lists of ‘secondary’ physical properties such as weight and density, e.g.
at Arist. PA II  a ff. See also Alex. In Meteor. . ff. and . ff.
32 In Tim. I .–.
 chapter two

Proclus ends the list with two theories that he does not ascribe to
anyone, namely the theory that nature is the craft of (a) god (τ!6νη
ε1),33 and finally the theory that equates nature and soul.34 With
respect to the latter theory we can safely assume that Proclus has in mind
Plotinus, who maintained that nature is the lowest, non-descended, part
of the World Soul.35 The former, that nature is a divine craft, has been
identified as Stoic, according to the reasoning that if Stoic nature is a god,
as well as a π1ρ τε6νικν, then nature is also a divine τ!6νη.36 I will argue,
however, that instead Proclus here has in mind a Platonic passage (Soph.
e, see below ii..).
In general Proclus’ judgment is harsh: Plato would not deem matter,
form, the body, or physical powers worthy of being called σις primar-
ily. And as to the option he mentions last, Plato shrinks (BκνεC) from
calling nature soul just like that (α<τεν). Instead, in Proclus’ view Plato
gives us the most exact description, saying that the essence of nature is
in between soul and physical powers. It is significant that Proclus does
not reject the theory of nature as a craft of (a) god. We will return to this
later.37
As Festugière points out, the doxographical character of the above
listing of definitions of nature could indicate that it was copied from a
handbook, but the real paradigm of the list is Aristotle’s Physics.38 More
importantly, the list is not given merely for reasons of scholasticism, but
to demarcate the area of the Platonic notion of nature by eliminating
notions that are too high or too low. The order of presentation is revealing
of a Proclean (or at least Neoplatonic) interpretation: rather than present
the different definitions in chronological order, Proclus gives them in an
increasing order of ontological status ascribed to nature (ranging from
the lowest, matter, to the highest, soul).
The most interesting aspects of Proclus’ little history of the concept of
σις for our purposes are the fact that the theory of nature as a craft of

33 In Tim. I .. This is a separate theory, and not a further explanation of the

previous, pace Romano (: ). On nature as τ!6νη ε1 see below ii...
34 In Tim. I .–. He adds “or some other similar thing” (5λλ τι τι1τν), but

this seems to be an addition for the sake of completion rather than a real alternative for
soul.
35 See below, II...
36 This is the argument of Festugière ad loc, who refers to Zeno’ s π1ρ τε6νικν (= ap.

Diog. Laert. VII  τ+ν μ)ν σιν ε-ναι π1ρ τε6νικ(ν 0δD$ EαδFν ες γ!νεσιν = SVF
I ). Tarrant also refers to SVF II , –.
37 See below ii...
38 Festugière (–: vol. I  n. ).
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

(a) god is not rejected, and that the Plotinian theory of nature as soul,
although it is not rejected forthright, is at least considered in need of
modification.

ii... Nature is not soul

The relation between nature and soul was a matter of debate among
ancient philosophers, primarily with regard to the question whether
lower animate and inanimate beings possessed soul, or only nature.
Another issue in the Platonic tradition was how both nature and soul
could be the ,ρ6+ κιν σεως.39 A more implicit issue in the discussion
of soul and nature concerns the ontological relation between nature and
soul themselves. For our purposes the most interesting position on the
latter issue is that of Plotinus, as this is the position Proclus challenges.
In short, Plotinus maintained, as is well known, that nature is the lowest
part of soul, and more precisely of the World Soul.40
Proclus’ position on the ontological relation of nature to soul has been
assessed in different ways, but the general assumption is that Proclus
follows Plotinus. Romano (: ) points to the difference between
nature and soul (he capitalizes only soul: “natura e Anima”), but incor-
rectly ascribes to Proclus the Plotinian view that nature is nothing other
than the activity of Soul in matter.41 Siorvanes (: ) is not very spe-
cific on this point (e.g. “ . . . Platonists came to regard nature as a kind of
lower soul”), but also seems to assume that Proclus’ position was the same
as Plotinus’. Leisegang, however, identifies Proclean σις, correctly, we
will see, as a separate entity in between the corporeal and the psychic.42

39 Mohr (: esp. ), reprinted in Mohr (:  ff.), cf. Sorabji (a: ). For
σις as source of motion see ii...
40 Enn. IV  [] , esp. –: Gνδαλμα γρ ρν σεως  σις κα ψυ6ς ?σ6ατν
and III  [] .–. See also Armstrong (: ), Brisson (: –,  n. 
and forthcoming), O’Meara (: ), Phillips (: –), Wilberding (:
esp. –).
41 Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (:  f. and n. , cf. ), who refer to Syr. In Met. .

and Simpl. In Phys. . ff. as indicating that nature is the lowest level of soul. In both
these passages, however, nature is mentioned next to soul, and there is no indication in
either passage that nature should be understood to be ontologically included in or part
of soul. As to the former, Proclus’ teacher Syrianus, it is difficult to assess his view on the
relation between nature and World Soul (see below). It is clear, however, that Syrianus
distinguishes an ontological level of nature from that of soul. In Met. ., cf. ., .–
, ., .. Cf. Praechter (: ).
42 Leisegang ().
 chapter two

That Proclus distances himself from Plotinus has hitherto been noticed
only recently by Phillips (: ,  ff.).
Proclus summarizes the ontological position Plato assigns to nature as
follows:
t ii. [Plato] locates the essence of nature in between the two, I mean
soul and corporeal powers, inferior to the former due to being divided
over bodies and by not reverting upon itself,43 but rising above everything
that comes after it44 by possessing their λγι and producing everything
and giving it life.45
The second half of this description concerns the relation between nature
and the natural and will be treated in the next section. For now let us
focus on the relation between nature and soul. Nature’s place on the
ontological ladder just beneath soul is explained from two points of view,
namely their respective relations to body and their capacity of reversion
(.πιστρ ). In his treatise on nature, Proclus is more interested in the
relation to body (for nature’s lack of reversion see below):46
t ii. Intellective (νερ) soul is not the same thing as nature. For nature
belongs to bodies, immersing itself in them and being unseparable from
them, but soul is separate and roots in itself and belongs at the same time
both to itself and to another, having the “of another” through being partic-
ipated, and the “of itself ” through not sinking into the participant . . . for
these things are continuous: itself, its own, its own and another’s, another’s,
other.47 The latter is, of course, everything perceptible, which is full of all
kinds of separation and division; and of the former the one (another’s) is

43 Accepting Festugière’s reading α7τ ν for Diehl’s α<τ ν.

44 This cannot, as Tarrant (: , n. ) proposes, mean ‘after soul’.
45 In Tim. I .– .ν μ!σDω δ) ,μ Cν τ+ν <σαν α<τς !μενς, ψυ6ς λ!γω
κα τ$ν σωματικ$ν δυνμεων, 7 ειμ!νην μ)ν .κενης τD$ μερFεσαι περ τ σ%ματα
κα τD$ μ+ .πιστρ! ειν ες α7τ ν, 7περ!6υσαν δ) τ$ν μετI α<τ+ν τD$ λγυς ?6ειν τ$ν
πντων κα γενν/ν πντα κα FDωπιεCν.
46 In his essay on the Myth of Er, instead, Proclus focuses on divinity and motion: he

speaks of the nature of the all, which he identifies with Fate, and which is inferior to
soul because it is not a god, but is superior to body because it does not move (In Remp.
II .–).
47 Cf. In Tim. I . ff., where the same enumeration from “itself ” to “other” is given

to argue for the principle of plenitude. Tarrant (: , n. ) suggests that the five
members of the series may be related to the five causes, and shows that this works for the
paradigmatic cause (itself) and the efficient cause, the Demiurge (its own). His tentative
connexion of soul, nature and the sensible world with final, formal and material cause is
not convincing. Soul is not the final cause of the universe, the Good is. And nature is a
sixth cause, namely the instrumental cause (see below).
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

nature, which is inseparable from bodies, and the other (its own and
another’s) is soul, which is in itself and illuminates something else with
a secondary life.48

The word ‘intellective’ (νερ) in the first line of this passage leaves open
the possibility that σις is a non-intellective kind of soul, but in view of
Proclus’ emphatic distinction between soul and nature in this passage a
reading of the adjective as a pleonasm here as at I . is more likely to
present Proclus’ theory accurately. We have as yet no conclusive evidence,
however, that this is the right interpretation.49
The main difference between soul and nature, according to this pas-
sage, lies in their different relations to body. Nature is not only intrin-
sically and essentially related to bodies (τ$ν σωμτων, ,6%ριστς ,π’
α<τ$ν), but is also physically immersed in them (δ νυσα κατ’ α<τ$ν).
As such, it is “the of another” (τ( 5λλυ): it is not self-sufficient. Intellec-
tual soul, on the other hand, is separate from bodies, and roots in itself
(6ωριστ .στι, .ν α7τJ Kδρυται).50 As opposed to nature, soul has an exis-
tence that is somehow tied up with bodies—which is expressed by its
being “of another” (τD$ μ)ν μετ!6εσαι τ( 5λλυ ?6υσα)—yet does not
sink into them, and is therefore “of itself ” (τD$ δ) μ+ νε ειν ες τ( μετα-
σ6(ν τ( @αυτς). Soul is an α<υπστατν, i.e. it is capable of maintain-
ing its own existence, without depending on a lower entity.51
Later on in the second book (In Tim. I .–) we find a subtle
indication of the same difference between soul and nature, pertaining
to their respective degrees of divisibility. When discussing the ques-
tion whether Timaeus’ definitions of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ encom-
pass all of reality, Proclus points out that by assuming the summits, the
intermediates are included. The intermediates, following the principle of
plenitude, are ‘being-and-becoming’ and ‘becoming-and-being’.52 Soul is
said to be intermediate between being and becoming in that it is being
and at the same time becoming, just like Time, whereas the “summit of

48 In Tim. I .–.. This passage gives us important information regarding the

question whether there exists an imparticipable nature, for which see section ii.. Cf. In
Tim. I .–.
49 In El.Th. prop.  Proclus distinguishes between souls connected with their proper

intelligence, i.e. intellective souls, and ‘bare souls’. See further below, the discussion on
irrational souls.
50 Accepting Festugière’s α7τ ν instead of Diehl’s α<τ ν.
51 See also below.
52 In Tim. I .– τ( Lν κα γινμενν, τ( γινμενν κα >ν. See on this passage

also iii..
 chapter two

things that have become” ( ,κρτης τ$ν γενητ$ν), to which (univer-

sal) Nature belongs, is becoming and at the same time being.53 These some-
what obscure formulations “being-and-becoming” and “becoming-and-
being” are more than a mere dialectical spinning out of possibilities. They
are intended as what we might call dynamic conjunctions,54 in which
the former member takes precedence over the second, and the terms
cannot be inverted without semantic consequences—as opposed to an
ordinary conjunction, in which such an inversion would not have any
consequences. The predicate that comes first expresses the predominant
property, while the second predicate is that of the minor property. In a
normal conjunction the two properties, in whichever order, would add
up to the same. In these dynamic conjunctions, however, soul, having
the ontologically more valuable property of “being” before the less valu-
able property of “becoming”, has a sum total of properties that is more
valuable (more real in the sense of “being”, and less divided) than that
of nature, which has the lower property of “becoming” first and “being”
second. Note that in this context the participles “being” and “becoming”
(at I .–) pertain not so much to existence in time, as to degree of
divisibility and dependence.55 The word “becoming” in this context is an
expression especially of nature’s divisibility over bodies, and “being” of
its incorporeality.56
The formulation using the two dynamic conjunctions also tells us that
both Soul and Nature are what we might call transitional hypostases, i.e.
hypostases that bridge or close the gap between the indivisible (Being)
and the divisible (Becoming), by essentially belonging to both.57 This
is confirmed by Proclus’ discussion elsewhere of the two intermediates
(μεστητες) between true indivisibility and true divisibility.58 These two

53 Proclus’ formulation suggests that not only Nature belongs to this category (τια τη
δ! .στι κα  τ1 παντ(ς σις, I .–), but he names no other occupants. Perhaps
one should think of the lower universal natures (see below ii..).
54 This is a notion from dynamic semantics. Dynamic semantics is used mainly to

explain and formalize anaphora. See Asher ().

55 I thank Jan Opsomer for pointing out the importance of divisibility in the notion of

nature. On the different senses of “becoming” see Lernould (:  f.) and chapter iii.
There are other differences between soul and nature that accompany their respective
combinations of Being and Becoming, such as degrees of rationality and causal power,
but Proclus is not interested in these differences at this point.
56 In Tim. I .– κα γρ α3τη πντως Mς μ)ν μεριστ+ περ τCς σ%μασι γενητ

.στιν, Mς δ) παντελ$ς ,σ%ματς ,γ!νητς, cf. Theol.Plat. I  .–.

57 Cf. Schneider (: ).
58 In Tim. II .–.
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

intermediates are soul and ‘the divisible essence’ ( μεριστ+ <σα), and
their description is similar to that of soul and nature in the passage
discussed above. The reasoning is the following: the divisible essence is
a second transitional hypostasis (μεστ ς), just below soul. Just as there
are two intermediates between true Being and true Becoming, so too are
there two intermediates between the corresponding true indivisibility
and true divisibility (i.e. divisibility into infinity): soul is divided (over
some things, but not everything, cf. II . ff.), and yet remains a unity
through having a separable existence. The divisible essence on the other
hand is divided into many (but not divisible into infinity, as is body) and
has its existence in another (is 5λλυ), not in itself. The terminology here
is so similar to that of the passage quoted above that we can assume that
by ‘the divisible essence’ Proclus intends nature.59
In general, the impression that Nature for Proclus constitutes a hypos-
tasis separate from Soul is reinforced by the many enumerations of the
main (ontological) strata of reality (or corresponding aspects of e.g. the
universe or human beings). These enumerations differ from one context
to the next, and therefore as such can be used only to reconstruct a picture
of all the different levels Proclus assumes. That is, they should not be
taken separately as exhaustive representations of reality. This said, the
following can cautiously be stated. Nature figures next to soul in quite a
number of those enumerations, which supports the thesis that Proclus
takes nature to be a separate level of reality.60 On many other occasions,
however, nature is not mentioned.61 This would weaken our thesis, if it
implied that nature, in these cases, is subsumed under soul. However,
rather than to take the absence of nature as an indication that nature
is there subsumed under soul, I propose that in these cases nature and
body are implicitly folded into one, since the former constitutes the latter
(see below). This is moreover suggested by the fact that, when “body”
is mentioned in the enumerations, it is often in the plural (e.g. In Tim.
I . ff.), or in some other way that indicates that Proclus is speaking

59 Cf. Opsomer (: ).

60 For some examples of ‘lists’ including a reference to nature, other than the ones
from El.Th. quoted above (limited to the In Tim. and the Theol.Plat., and leaving out the
introduction of the In Tim.), see: In Tim. I . f., . f., . f., . ff., .,
II .–, . f., III . ff., . f., .–, . f., .–, cf. .–.;
Theol.Plat. I  .–, II  .–, III  . f.,  .–, IV  . f.,  . ff.
61 ‘Lists’ without nature, and more precisely consisting of mind, soul, and body, are

numerous in the In Tim., mainly because of Tim. b–: ν1ν μ)ν .ν ψυ6J, ψυ6+ν δ)
.ν σ%ματι. e.g. In Tim. I . f., .– (re. Tim. b); cf. Theol.Plat. III  . ff.,
. ff., IV  . ff., V  . ff.,  .– etc.
 chapter two

of informed body (e.g. Theol.Plat. IV  ., σωματικ+ σ στασις). As we

will see (II.) Nature is the proximate cause of the information of body.
One of those enumerations, in El.Th. prop. , is especially revealing
as it describes the relation between nature and soul as that between any
two adjacent hypostases: the universal of every level is a likeness of its
immediately superior level, and the first members of any order participate
in the superior level;62 for nature that means that universal Nature is
similar to universal Soul,63 and that higher particular natures somehow
participate in Soul, whereas the lower ones do not, but are mere natures.
In other words, Nature is no more a kind of soul than Soul is a kind of
Intellect.
The above is evidence in favour of assuming that universal Nature
is a real hypostasis in Proclean metaphysics. We have to keep in mind,
however, that there are also indications that it is only barely so. What
qualifies something as a hypostasis are primarily the following proper-
ties: self-sufficiency, self-constitution and self-motion. Nature is primar-
ily Becoming, however, and only secondarily Being, it is irrational, divisi-
ble, and most importantly, it does not revert upon itself.64 And that nature
does not revert upon itself means that it has no self-contemplation and
hence is not self-sufficient or self-constituted (α<υπστατν). It also
tells us that nature is not self-moving, as everything self-moving is capa-
ble of reverting upon itself.65 So Nature does not possess the properties
that would qualify it as a hypostasis.
Proclus’ motivation for nonetheless separating nature from soul is
more than just obedience to, for example, the principle of continuity
or of plenitude, which result in the seemingly endless proliferation of
ontological levels. Rather, following his teacher Syrianus,66 he hereby tries
to dissolve the incongruity he felt in the fact that there are things which
are considered entirely soulless (i.e. they do not even have a vegetative
soul), yet have some properties normally associated with being ensouled:

62 For these principles see El.Th. prop. –.

63 Cf. In Tim. III .–.
64 See In Tim. I .–, quoted above as t ii..
65 El.Th. prop. . On reverting upon oneself see also El.Th. prop. –, and Dodds’

comments (:  ff.), cf. prop. –. Steel (: with bibl. in n. ). Nature does,
however, possess a kind of self-motion due to its divine user. See below ii...
66 Syrianus In Met. .–, see also below ii.. For more references on nature in

Syrianus see Cardullo (: –).

 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

t ii. Nature . . . through which even the things that are most devoid of
soul (,ψυ6τατα) participate in a kind of soul (ψυ6ς τινς).67

Saying that something participates in a kind of soul (ψυ6ς τινς) either

means that it partakes in something that belongs to the genus of souls,
and more precisely to a certain species thereof, or that it partakes in
something that does not belong to the genus of souls, but to another
genus that has some properties primarily belonging to souls, and hence
is similar to a soul. Proclus could have chosen the former alternative, by
adding a yet lower species to Soul, similar in part to the Peripatetic veg-
etative soul. As Opsomer’s discussion of irrational souls reveals, Proclus
does not explicitly do this.68 The indications that Proclus supposed a veg-
etative part, or vegetative capacities of the soul, are part undecisive and
part indirect and based on the assumption that Proclus’ doctrine can be
gathered from that of later Neoplatonists (Ammonius and Philoponus).69
It is exactly on this issue of irrational souls, and their relation to nature,
that Proclus’ philosophy becomes rather inarticulate. For example, when
answering the question whether there is an Idea of Soul, Proclus informs
us that the irrational souls proceed both from the paradigm in rational
souls, and from one monad and one Idea, which is called “the highest,
spring-like Nature, which exists before the many natures”.70 This seems
to contradict the ontological separation of nature from soul, and might
lead one to believe that nature is a kind of soul after all.71 There is another

67 In Tim. I .–. Considering the use of the very rare superlative of 5ψυ6ς

there is an undeniable presence in the background of Tim. e, where Timaeus describes
different kinds of bones, the ones full of soul, which are covered with little flesh, and
the soulless ones (Tim. e–, N δI ,ψυ6τατα .ντς), which are instead very meaty.
Syrianus mentions spontaneous generation and the procreations of trees and grasses.
Other examples of the soulless are stones and pieces of wood (see e.g. In Parm. .
(– Cousin)).
68 Opsomer (: –, –) shows that Proclus limits the name ‘soul’ to

anything rational, but does distinguish lower faculties of the irrational ‘souls’, among
which the vegetative powers. The latter, however, are often said by Proclus to coincide
with .πιυμα.
69 For the evidence see Opsomer (: –). See e.g. In Remp. I .–.
70 In Parm. .–. (.– Cousin), esp. .– (– Cousin): ,π( τς

υσ!ως τς ,κρττης κα πηγαας πρϋπαρ6 σης τ$ν πλλ$ν σεων). Note that
nature is the source only of their appetitive powers (>ρε8ις). The irrational souls owe
their cognitive powers to the Demiurge (In Parm. .– (– Cousin)). Moreover,
they also descend from the paradigms in the rational souls, and depend on those rational
souls (. ff. (Cousin  ff.)). Cf. In Remp. ΙΙ . ff. for the relation σις, fate, and
vegetative part/kind of soul, and why τ υτ . . . ,π( σεως Pνμασται.
71 Cf. Opsomer (: ). Note that awareness of this complex metaphysical level

of irrational souls, where nature and soul are hardly distinguishable, may be why Proclus
 chapter two

option, however, which is that irrational souls are in fact natures. This
option is to be preferred, because, as Opsomer (:  ff.) has shown,
according to Proclus the irrational souls are not really souls, but rather
images of souls.72 So, without going into the details of Proclus’ notion of
irrationality, we can say that also with respect to irrational souls there is
no need to assume that nature is a kind of Soul.

Another rather complex issue is that of the relation between the World
Soul and Nature. In general, Proclus is hopelessly vague on this topic.
Sometimes he ascribes to the World Soul properties that elsewhere be-
long to universal Nature (e.g. the animating of things that have no life of
their own),73 but there are three clinching arguments, I submit, against
an identification. First of all, nature is entirely inseparable from the
corporeal, but the World Soul is considered to be separable and partly
separate from the corporeal.74 After all, soul, as opposed to nature, does
not really reside in body. As a consequence, nature is not a kind of
soul.75 Secondly, when wondering what Fate is in his essay on the Myth
of Er, Proclus clearly rejects the option that it is the World Soul, only
to embrace the option that is the Nature of the universe, which is a
clear indication that he thinks of them as separate strata of reality, with
distinct properties.76 And finally, the Demiurge is said to insert a life into
the universe in order to make the universe receptive to soul.77 This life,
which must therefore be ontologically distinct from soul, is in fact nature
(see ii.). The conclusion is warranted, therefore, that nature is neither
identical to the World Soul, nor a part of the World Soul.78

speaks of ‘intellective soul’ when first stating that nature is not soul at In Tim. I .. See
above ii...
72 El.Th. prop.  Gνδαλματα ψυ6$ν, Theol.Plat. III  . εGδωλα ψυ6$ν.
73 In Tim. I .–, cf. II –. Cf. Praechter (: ). On the World Soul

in Proclus see Siorvanes (: –).

74 E.g. In Tim. I .–..
75 Cf. In Tim. III . ff., where Proclus limits the productivity of the mixing bowl

of Tim. d to psychic life, and excepts physical and noeric life. That is, physical life and
psychic life do not have the same source.
76 In Remp. II .–. Note that Linguiti () has shown that for Proclus Fate and

Nature are not identical. That does not diminish the use of the above paraphrased passage
as argument for the separation of nature from soul.
77 In Tim. I . ff.
78 Also in Syrianus the relation between nature and World Soul is unclear. See on this

subject Praechter (: ) and In Tim. III . ff., where Syrianus’ view on the
mixing bowl is described in a way that seems to imply that nature is a kind of encosmic
soul.
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

In conclusion we can say that for Proclus, as opposed to Plotinus, Nature

is not a part of Soul, but rather is a separate level of reality, the lowest
transitional hypostasis between the intelligible and the perceptible.
For Plotinus, Nature had to be a kind of Soul because there are no
more than three hypostases,79 while at the same time Nature, as a cause of
Becoming, cannot be in Becoming but has to be ontologically prior to it.80
Proclus has a different solution for Nature’s causality. Before discussing
that, however, we return to Proclus’ doxography on nature to see why, just
as those ancient philosophers who claim that nature is a part of soul were
off the mark, so too the ones who equated nature with physical powers,
are wrong.

ii... Nature is not the natural

As we have seen above, Proclus puts nature above “corporeal powers”,
i.e. physical powers such as weight and density,81 and thereby also above
matter, form, and the combination of both.82
Just as Plotinus did, Proclus denies that nature is somehow identical
with its products.83 Proclus initially bases his rejection of the equation
of nature with its products, a theory held by “some predecessors of
Plato”, on Laws X.84 Proclus mentions how those philosophers “called
the natural ‘natures’ ” (τ σει σεις πρσηγρευν). This echoes
Plato’s “ . . . the natural, and nature, that which they incorrectly call just
that . . . ” (τ δ) σει κα σις, Qν <κ Bρ$ς .πνμFυσιν α<τ(

79 Enn. V  [], esp. .

80 See below.
81 In Tim. I .–.
82 It is clear from I . ff. that this is what Proclus has in mind. He rejects the

described theories in two clusters, soul on the one hand, and matter, form, their combi-
nation, and physical powers on the other, and consequently states that Plato places nature
“between the two” (.ν μ!σDω δ) ,μ Cν), namely below soul, and above corporeal powers
(i.e. the highest of what is below nature).
83 For Plotinus see Enn. III  [] .–, cf. Wagner (: ) and Enn. IV  [] ,

esp. –, with Brisson’s discussion of the passage (forthcoming). Brisson points out
that the notion of identity of nature with its products is Aristotelian and Stoic. It is true
that at times Aristotle equates nature with its products (see below), but on occasion he
also explicitly distinguishes between nature and the natural, Phys. II  b–a;
cf. II  b f. Note that Proclus, who connects the identification of nature and its
products with the passage from Laws X, is aiming his criticism primarily at pre-Platonic
philosophers.
84 In Tim. I .–, see above.
 chapter two

τ1τ, Laws X b–).85 In the latter passage, the Athenian stranger

is in the process of explaining to Clinias that philosophers of nature
tend to have the “mindless opinion” (,νητς δ8α, c) that the
natural (e.g. the elements) is identical to nature, where nature is “the
coming into being of the first things”.86 They are wrong, the stranger
says, because in fact soul is prior to those natural things, and hence soul
should be called “natural” a fortiori. As in other Platonic passages, it is
difficult to decide which value Plato gives to “nature” and “natural” here,
as he is playing on the whole semantic spectrum between “what grows”
and “what is primary”.87 His main point, however, can be construed
as follows. The conclusion Plato wants to reach is that soul is ‘more
natural’, i.e. ontologically prior to what the Presocratics call nature. This
conclusion is reached from the starting point “whatever is the origin of
the ‘coming into being of the first things’ is nature”, and the subsequent
demonstration that soul is the origin of everything, and hence is ‘more
natural’ than the elements. In this way, the philosophers who hold their
‘mindless opinions’ and ignore the superiority of soul to nature are
refuted.
Proclus in the In Tim. and elsewhere makes very selective use of
the above argument and leaves out the mention of soul altogether. For
example, in the essay on the Myth of Er he refers to the Laws passage, and
states that the fact that nature is obviously (δηλαδ ) not identical to the
natural is reason to suppose that nature is something beside (5λλη τις)
bodies, i.e. the natural. When discussing the superiority of ‘the origin
of everything’ to everything natural, Proclus assigns that superiority to
nature, rather than to soul.88

In support of Plato’s position (as Proclus sees it) that nature is distinct
from its products, our commentator adduces three arguments.
() First of all:

85 The relevant passage starts at b, where the equation of physical substances to
nature is first mentioned. The argument runs up to d.
86 τ πρ$τα here refers to the four elements, cf. c.
87 This meaning of ‘natural’ can be understood only against the background of the

wider context: the debate on the relation between σις, τυ6 , and νμς, and the
question whether the faculties and products of soul belong to the former or the latter.
See esp. e–e and a–c.
88 In Remp. II .–. Note that in the In Remp. Proclus uses the singular σιν,
which we also find in the Platonic text. As said above, nature is there identified by Proclus
as Fate (Ε=μαρμ!νη).
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

t ii. . . . in accordance with our common notions (κατ τς κινς

.ννας) ‘nature’ is one thing, and ‘according to nature’ and ‘by nature’
another. (In Tim. I .–)

Although Proclus does not explain this claim—after all, the whole point
of introducing a common notion is that it is self-evident—, the emphatic
juxtaposition of “nature” ( σις), “according to nature” (τ( κατ σιν)
and “by nature” (τ( σει) suggests that he is referring to the purely
logical sense in which anything is prior to that which is derived from
it (as the prepositional phrase and the ‘dative of agent phrase’ are derived
from the noun).89
() The second argument adduced is one from a well-known analogy,
namely that between nature and τ!6νη: “After all,” Proclus states, “the
product of art is not the same as art” (κα γρ τ( τε6νητ(ν 5λλ παρ
τ+ν τ!6νην, In Tim. I .–), which allows him to infer that therefore
the natural, understood as the product of nature, is not the same as
nature. The parallel between nature and art, which assumes that art
imitates nature and that therefore observations concerning art allow us to
draw inferences about nature, is of course a common one in antiquity.90
This particular argument, however, stating that the artificial is not the
same as art, and that the natural is not the same as nature, was first
formulated by Alexander of Aphrodisias, in an explanation of Plato’s
motivations for supposing the existence of Forms (“natures”) besides
everything natural.91 Proclus’ formulation of it, which concerns not the
Forms themselves, but Nature as a lower cause transcending its products,
may contain an implicit criticism of Aristotle: in Phys. II  we find a
passage that is verbally very similar, but in content almost the opposite:
“just as we call what is artificial and a work of art ‘art’, so too do we call
what is according to nature and natural ‘nature’ ”.92

89 Which is also expressed by the δηλαδ in In Remp. II ..

90 See e.g. the well known passages in Aristotle: Phys. II  a ff., II  a ff.
The parallel between art and nature, on which see Lloyd, G.E.R. () and Fiedler
(: –), of course plays a crucial role in the Timaeus itself, in the sense that the
Demiurge is portrayed as a craftsman who chisels, moulds and constructs the universe.
On this theme see Brisson (: esp. I..). For the relation between nature and the
Demiurge according to Proclus see below, ii.. On the parallel between Timaeus and the
Demiurge see chapter v.
91 Alex. In Met. . ff.
92 Phys. II  a f. Sσπερ γρ τ!6νη λ!γεται τ( κατ τ!6νην κα τ( τε6νικν, 3τω

κα σις τ( κατ σιν [λ!γεται] κα τ( υσικν. A small but revealing difference

between the two passages is the fact that Aristotle has the verbal adjective τε6νικν,
whereas Proclus uses a (post-classical) passive participle (τε6νητν). The passive form has
 chapter two

() The final argument brought in for nature’s separation from and in
fact priority to its products is that nature contains the creative principles
of “what comes after it” (Proclus is not bothered by the fact that with
regard to the thesis he is arguing for this argument is merely begging the
question):
t ii. . . . rising above (7περ!6υσαν) everything that comes after it by
possessing their λγι and producing everything and giving it life.93

Behind this argument lies a principle of causation that is central to

Proclean metaphysics.
One of the tenets of Neoplatonic metaphysics is the rule that every pro-
ductive cause is superior to what it produces.94 The hidden assumption
in the context of the argument quoted above is, of course, that nature is
indeed a productive cause. The fact that nature contains the creative prin-
ciples of everything coming after it, and in that sense produces every-
thing, implies that nature must be superior to, and therefore distinct
from, those products.95 Nature’s incorporeality, which is also brought up
in the treatise in In Tim.,96 can be explained from this same principle.
Since nature is the cause of everything corporeal, and a cause is altogether
different from its effect (παντα61 .8 λλακται), nature is incorporeal.97
Thus, when considered as the aggregate of all that which is caused by
nature, “the natural” cannot be identical to nature. Instead, there has to
be a separate, incorporeal, causally efficient nature. Siorvanes and Rosán
take this to imply that there has to be a transcendent monad of Nature,98
which brings us to the question on which ontological level nature should
primarily be placed.

a connotation that the verbal adjective lacks, namely that of an efficient cause of what is
artificial that is distinct from the artificial (i.e. τ!6νη). The parallel then suggests that there
is also an efficient cause of the natural, and distinct from it: σις. The same connotation
cannot be summoned by the corresponding adjective derived from σις, υσικς (and
υτν is semantically too limited).
93 In Tim. I .–, quoted above as part of t ii..
94 El.Th. prop. , Π/ν τ( παρακτικ(ν 5λλυ κρεCττν .στι τς τ1 παραγμ!νυ

σεως and , Π/ν τ( κυρως αGτιν λεγμενν .8J ρηται τ1 ,πτελ!σματς.
95 Cf. In Tim. III .– = ,π( τς σεως [λγι πρϊντες] υσικ [πι1σι].
On the working of nature see ii..
96 In Tim. I ., see further below.
97 Theol.Plat. II  .–. Cf. In Tim. I .– παντελ$ς ,σ%ματς.
98 Cf. El.Th. prop. , In Tim. III .–, Theol.Plat. V , .– for indications

in that direction. For Siorvanes and Rosán see the next section.
 platonic ΦΥΣΙΣ according to proclus 

ii.. The ontological level of Nature

In summary, the preceding paragraphs yield the following picture. On

the one hand, nature is set apart from soul, because of its immersion
into bodies, its divisibility, and its lack of self-sufficiency. On the other
hand, that which is called nature primarily, especially in the introduction
to the in Tim., is an incorporeal productive cause, and hence, Proclean
metaphysics would suggest, a transcendent monad (Nature).
These two sides do not sit easily together. Immanence and divisibility
as such are incompatible with transcendence and productive causality.99
The tension becomes even more acute if one considers nature in terms of
participation, i.e. assuming that everything natural somehow participates
in Nature, which presupposes the existence of an imparticipable Form
of Nature. We have seen above (ii..) that Nature is the “of another”,
whereas soul is “of another and of itself ”, and mind is “of itself ”. These
expressions were explained among other things with reference to partic-
ipation: Soul is “of another” because of being participated, and “of itself ”
due to not descending into the participant (τD$ μ+ νε ειν, I .). From
this we can conclude by analogy that nature, being “of another”, is par-
ticipated, and does descend into its participant (cf. δ νυσα, I .)—
if it did not, it would also be “of itself ”. If nature is participated, how-
ever, according to Proclean metaphysics there should be an unpartici-
pated Nature,100 i.e. a Nature that is not connected with body.101
One can see this tension very nicely illustrated in Lowry’s table of
(im-)participables, which I reproduce at the end of this chapter.102 Low-
ry’s table ii presents an overview of all of Proclean reality in terms of
what is participated and imparticipable, and the corresponding levels of
divinity found in the Platonic Theology. It is revealing that the table has
two question marks, where by analogical reasoning one would expect ()
divine unparticipated Nature with the hypercosmic and encosmic gods
and () divine participated Nature with the encosmic gods.103

99 This tension is present in Platonic metaphysics as a whole, but is most acutely

felt in the case of nature, since, as opposed to other levels of reality that are related to
the corporeal, such as soul, nature is explicitly denied any existence separate from the
corporeal.
100 According to the general principles expressed in El.Th. prop. .
101 This has been pointed out by Siorvanes (: ), albeit in confusing terms, as

he takes ‘monadic’ to be an equivalent of ‘imparticipable’. Proclus does not use the word
‘monadic’ only or even predominantly in this sense.
102 Lowry (: ). Note that Lowry gives a Hegelian reading of Proclus.
103 On Nature’s divinity see also ii...
 chapter two

As I will argue, Proclus himself is well aware of the impossibility of

an imparticipable Nature, and the first question mark will remain. The
second question mark, however, will be shown to be the place of the
Nature of the universe.

ii... Hypercosmic-and-encosmic—Siorvanes’ solution

Rosán () and Siorvanes () have assumed the existence of impar-
ticipable Nature, and have assigned to this imparticipable Nature a par-
ticular level of divinity, namely that of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic
gods.104 This identification is nowhere made by Proclus, yet Rosán as-
sumes it to be correct without any argumentation. Siorvanes does present
an extensive argumentation. In the following, we will look into his main
arguments, which will be shown to be untenable. The question whether
there is an imparticipable Nature will not be answered here, but in the
next section.

Siorvanes (: –) assumes the following. Immanent nature can-

not be imparticipable. Yet for every participable there has to be an impar-
ticipable monad. Therefore, there has to be an imparticipable monad of
Nature that “is exempt from any link with body”. His support for this the-
sis concerning the existence of an imparticipable monad of Nature rests
mainly on the assumption that the level of divinity of Nature is that of
the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods, also called—among other things—
the ‘unfettered gods’ (,πλυτι),105 due to their indivisibility, and the
‘immaculate gods’, due to the fact that they do not descend (μ+ U!πν).106
Siorvanes’ reading has several problems. First of all, apart from the
fact that Proclus never explicitly assigns Nature to this order of gods (as
Siorvanes also admits), the properties Proclus ascribes to them, i.e. being
indivisible and non-descending, are themselves associated with Soul, not
with Nature. This is enough reason to conclude that these hypercosmic-
and-encosmic gods cannot be on the same ontological level as the nature
discussed in the introduction of the In Tim., since that nature is expressly
characterized as divisible and descending (see ii.).107

104 See for a similar view Beutler in RE sv Proklos.

105 Theol.Plat. VI  . ff.
106 For the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods see Theol.Plat. VI –.
107 Cf. Russi (:  and n. ) who follows Siorvanes and Rosán in assuming a

Henad of nature, but points out that, since nature does not revert, it cannot belong to the
order of hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods.
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 GLOSSARY.
A.
Āb, water. Ābdār, water-cooler.
Abīr, red powder used in the Holī.
Ābnūs, ebony.
Achchhā, good.
Ādāb, salutation, respects, politeness.
Adālut, court of justice.
Ādam-ḵẖor, a cannibal.
Afgan, overthrowing.
Afg̱ ẖān, the name of a race of people who inhabit the country to the
north-west of Lahore; called also Pathans. They are supposed to
be of Jewish extraction.
Afīm, or aphīm, opium.
Agārī pichhārī, the ropes with which horses are tied.
Agast, æschynomene grandiflora.
Āghā, lord master.
Aghan, the eighth Hindū solar month.
Aghorī, professing ughorpanth, an order of religious mendicants,
who eat every thing, however filthy, even human carcases;
hence, a gross or filthy feeder.
Ā’īna, a mirror.
Ākās, the sky, the firmament.
Ākās-bel, the air-creeper; it has no root nor leaves, but grows on the
tops of trees.
Ākās-diya, a lamp which the Hindūs hang aloft on a bamboo in the
month Kārtik.
Akbar, very good, greatest.
Akbarābādī, of Akbar.
’Alam, a spear, a standard.
’Alam-dār, standard-bearer (Abbās).
’Ālam-gīr, conqueror of the universe.
Allāh, God. Allāhu akbar, God is great!
Ām, mango (mangifera Indica).
Amarī, a seat with a canopy to ride in on an elephant.
Ānā, a copper coin, the sixteenth part of a rupī.
Anannās, pine-apple.
Āndhī, storm, tempest.
Angethī, chafing-dish, brazier.
Angiya, a native boddice.
Ankus, the elephant goad.
Arghā, a vessel shaped like a boat, used by the Hindūs for making
libations in their devotions.
Ārsī, a mirror, particularly a mirror in a thumb-ring.
Āsan, a seat or small carpet.—See Vol. ii. p. 385.
Asārh, the third Hindū solar month (June and July).
Aswina, the first month of the Hindū lunar year.
Ātashbāzī, fireworks.
Ātash-khwar, fire-eater; name of a bird, the chakor.
Atr, perfume. Atr-dan, perfume-box.
Avatār, a descent.
Ayb, or aib, spot, mark, defect.
Ayha, a lady’s maid.
Azan, the summons to prayers, generally proclaimed from the
minārs or towers of a mosque.

B.
Baboo, a Hindū gentleman, a Calcutta merchant.
Babūl, mimosa Arabica.
Badrī-nāth, a celebrated place of pilgrimage.
Badshah, or pādshāh, a king.
Bāgh, a tiger.
Bāgḥ, a garden.
Bāghsira, gryllus monstrosus.
Bāghīchar, a small garden.
’baghnā, an ornament made of tigers’ claws.
Bahādur, champion, boaster.
Bahangī, a stick with ropes hanging to each end, for slinging
baggage to, which is carried on the shoulder.
Bahut, much, most.
Bā’ī, mistress, lady amongst the Mahrattas.
Bailī, bullock carriage.
Bairāgī, a fakīr.
Bājrā, panicum spicatum.
Bakāyan, melia sempervirens.
Baḵẖshish, a gift; bakhshnā, to give.
Bakrā, he-goat.
Bandar, a monkey.
Bandh, an embankment.
Banglā, a thatched house.
Baniya, shop-keeper.
Bāns, the bamboo.
Bā’olī, a large well.
Barā, great.
Barā-dīn, a holiday.
Bāra-singha, twelve-horned stag (cervus elaphus).
Barāt, marriage procession.
Bardār, a bearer.
Barha’ī, a carpenter.
Bārī, a garden house.
Barkandāz, a native policeman.
Basantī, yellow, the favourite colour of Krishna.
Bastī, a village.
Baṭer, quail.
Batū’ā, a small bag.
Baunā, a dwarf.
Bāwarchī, cook.
Bayā, loxia Indica.
Bāzār, market.
Bāzūbands, armlets.
Begam, lady.
Bel, ægle marmelos (cratæva religiosa).
Belā, jasminum zambac.
Bengālī, a native of Bengal.
Bér, or bar, ficus Indica.
Besan, flour or meal of pulse, particularly of chanā (cicer arietinum).
Betī, daughter.
Bhabhūt, ashes which the fakīrs use.
Bhagat, a devotee of a religious order, peculiar to the low tribes,
whose initiation consists in putting a necklace of beads around
the neck, and marking a circle on the forehead; after which the
initiated person is bound to refrain from spirituous liquors, flesh,
&c.
Bhāgulpūr, the town of.
Bhagwān, the Deity, the Supreme Being, fortunate.
Bhains, buffalo.
Bhaiyā, brother.
Bhang, or bhengh, cannabis Indica.
Bhātā, an extra allowance to troops on service.
Bhū’a, a father’s sister.
Bhūsā, chopped straw.
Bichchhū, the scorpion.
Bidrī, a kind of tutanag, inlaid with silver, used to make hukka
bottoms, cups, &c.
Bīghā, a quantity of land, containing 20 katthās, or 120 feet square,
or 1600 square yards, which is nearly one-third of an English
acre; in the Upper Provinces it is nearly five-eighths of an acre.
Bihisht, paradise.
Bihishtī, a water-carrier.
Bilva, or bilwa, cratæva marmelos (Linn.).
Binaulā, seed of the cotton tree.
Biskhopra, lacerta iguana.
Bismillāh, in the name of God.
Boxwālā, an itinerant merchant with a box of goods.
Brahm, or Brŭmhŭ, the one eternal God.
Brahma, the first person of the Hindū trinity.
Brahman, an Hindū priest.
Brahmand, the mundane egg of the Hindūs.
Bṛindāban, the forest of Bṛindā, in the vicinity of Mathurā, celebrated
as the scene of Krishna’s sports with the Gopīs.
Burāk, Muhammad’s steed.
Burhiyā, old woman.
Burj, a bastion, tower; burūj, pl.
Burjī, a turret, a small tower.
Burka, a dress, a disguise.

C.
Chabenī, parched grain.
Chābuk, a whip.
Chabūtāra, a terrace to sit and converse on.
Chādir, Chādar, mantle, garment.
Chakkī, a mill-stone.
Chakor, partridge (perdix chukar).
Chakwā, Brāhmanical duck.
Chakwī, the female of the chakwā.
Chamār, currier, shoemaker.
Champā kalī, a necklace.
Chanā, gram (cicer arietinum).
Chānd, the moon.
Chandnī-chauk, a wide and public street or market.
Chandnī kā mār-janā, a disease in horses, supposed to proceed from
a stroke of the moon. “The moonlight has fallen on him,” is said
especially of a horse that is weak in the loins.
Chāotree, or chauthī, a marriage ceremony, the fourth day.
Chapātī, a thin cake of unleavened bread.
Chaprāsī, a messenger or servant wearing a chaprās, badge.
Chār, four.
Charḵẖī, a spinning-wheel, &c.
Chārpāī, bed, four-legged.
Chatā’ī, mat.
Chatr, umbrella.
Chauk, market.
Chaukīdār, watchman.
Chaunrī, fly-flapper.
Chhach hūndar, musk-rat.
Chhallā, thumb or great toe ring.
Chhappar, a thatched roof.
Chhat, roof.
Chhattak, about an ounce.
Chilamchī, washhand bason.
Chirāgh, lamp.
Chirāgh-dān, stand for lamps.
Chiṛi-mār, bird-catcher.
Chītā, hunting leopard.
Chītthī, note.
Chob-dār, mace-bearer.
Chor, or cho’ār, thief.
Chūlee, a fire-place.
Chūnā, lime.
Chūrī, bracelets.
Chŭrŭk-pūja, a festival.
Chyūnta, black ant.
Compound, ground around a house.
Conch, a shell.
Corook. See Kurk.

D.
Dabāo, pressure.
Daftarī, the paper-ruler, penmaker, &c.
Dāk, post, post-office.
Dakait, or dākū, a robber.
Daldal, bog, quagmire.
Dālī, basket of fruit.
Damṛī, a coin, four to a paisā.
Dānd, oar.
Dāndī, boatman.
Darbār, hall of audience.
Dārogha, head man of an office, inspector.
Darwāza, a door; darwān, doorkeeper.
Daryā-i, or daryā, the sea, river.
Darzī, a tailor.
Dastkhatt, signature.
Dastūrī, perquisites paid to servants by one who sells to their master.
Daulut-khāna, house of fortune.
Derā, a dwelling, a tent.
Devī, a goddess.
Dewālai, dewāl, or dewālaya, temple of idols.
Dewālī, an Hindū festival, celebrated on the day of the new moon of
Kārtik; when the Hindūs, after bathing in the Ganges, perform a
shraddhā, and at night worship Laksḥmī; the houses and streets
are illuminated all night; and in Hindostan the night is
universally spent in gaming.
Dhān, rice before it is separated from the husks.
Dhanuk, a bow, a bowman.
Dhobī, washerman.
Dhotī, a cloth, passed round the waist, passing between the limbs,
and fastening behind.
Dighī, a large tank or reservoir, in the form of an oblong square.
Dil, heart; dil-kushā, heart-expanding.
Dillī, or Dihlī, the metropolis of Hindūstan; generally called by
Musalmāns Shah-jehan-abad, and by Europeans Delhi.
Dinghee, a small boat.
Dīwak, white ant.
Dīwān-i-am, public hall of audience.
Dīwān-i-ḵẖās, privy-council chamber.
Dog̱ ẖ, buttermilk.
Dohā’ī, or duhā’ī, mercy.
Dolī, a kind of sedan for women.
Domra, the name of a caste of Musalmāns, the males of which are
musicians, and the females sing and dance in the company of
females only.
Donī, a native vessel or boat.
Dopatta, or dupatta, a sheet of two breadths.
Do-shāla, or du-shāla, two and shawl, two shawls being always worn
together by the natives.
Dosūtā, two-threaded cloth.
Dūb, name of a grass (agrostis linearis).
Dūdhiyā, milky.
Duldul, a hedgehog; the name of the horse of ’Ali, the prophet’s son-
in-law.
Dūlhā, or dūlha, bridegroom.
Dulhān, bride.
Dumba, a kind of sheep with a thick tail.
Durga, one of the names of Bhawānī, the goddess Durgā.
Durga-pūja, the festival in honour of Durgā.
Durgah, a tomb, a shrine.
 E.
Eed, a festival, a solemnity.

F.
Fajr, morning; barī-fajr, early dawn.
Faḵẖr, glory, nobility.
Fakīr, a religious mendicant.
Falīta, fusee; falīta-dār, a matchlock.
Fānūs, a shade to keep the wind from a candle.
Fatḥ, victory.
Fāṭīma, the daughter of the prophet, and the wife of the caliph ’Ali.
Fidwī, devoted (your devoted servant).
Fīl, elephant.
Fīl-ḵẖāna, elephant shed.
Fīl-pāī, elephantiasis.

G.
Gaddī, sovereign’s throne.
Gāgrī, a water-vessel of brass.
Gainā, a species of small bullock.
Gaini, a carriage for a gainā.
Galahi, forecastle.
Gal’haiya, boatswain, forecastle-man.
Gālī, abuse.
Gāndar, a kind of grass, of which khas-khas is the root (andropogon
muricatum).
Ganjha, or gānja, the young buds on the leaves of the hemp-plant.
Garh, a fort, as fatīh-garh.
Garī, a cart, a carriage.
Garī-wan, carter, driver.
Gaur, an ancient city, formerly the capital of Bengal.
Ghantā, a clock.
Ghar, a house.
Gharā, an earthen water-pot.
Gharāmī, a thatcher.
Gharī, an instrument for measuring time, a water-clock.
Gharis, division of time.
Ghariyāl, a crocodile, a plate of brass for beating time.
Ghariyālī, the person who attends the gharī, and strikes the hours.
Gharna’ī, a raft supported by empty pots (gharā, an earthen water-
pot).
Ghī, clarified butter.
Ghirgut, or girgut, lizard, chameleon.
Ghulām, slave.
Ghunghrū, a small bell, or little bells on a string for the ankles.
Ghur, or ghorā, a horse.
Ghur-daur, race-course.
Ghuwā, a coarse kind of cotton cloth.
Go-mukhī, a cloth bag, containing a rosary, the hand being thrust in
counts the beads; the chasm in the Himalaya mountains,
 through which the Ganges issues.
Gobar, cow-dung.
Gola, a granary.
Gop, a cow, a caste.
Gopī, feminine of gwālā, a cowherd.
Gor-istān, burying-ground.
Gosā’īn, a holy man.
Gul-āb, rose-water.
Gul-badan, a kind of silk cloth.
Gulistān, rose garden.
Gun, track rope.
Gūnth, a pony.
Gurū, spiritual director.

H.
Hājī, pilgrim.
Hajjām, a barber.
Hakīm, a physician, a learned man.
Hakrī, a cart.
Hammām, a hot bath.
Hān, yes.
Hāndī, a pot, a small cauldron.
Hār, a necklace of pearls, a wreath, a chaplet of flowers.
Hargilla, the adjutant, or gigantic crane.
Harkāra, running footman.
Harphārewrī, or harphāraurī, the name of a sour fruit (averrhoa
acida, Linn.).
Hāth, the hand, a cubit, or eighteen inches.
Hāthī, an elephant.
Hathī-wān, elephant-driver.
Hawāldār, a native military officer of inferior rank.
Hāzim, digestive.
Hāzir, present.
Hāzirī, breakfast.
Ḥaẓrat, a title addressed to the great; majesty; highness.
Ḥaẓrat’īsā, Jesus Christ.
Hinnā, the tree lawsonia inermis.
Hirdāwal, the name of a defect in horses.
Hisāb, accounts, computation.
Howā, air.
Howdah, a seat to ride in on an elephant, without a canopy.
Hubāb, a bubble.
Hubāb-i, bubbling.
Hukāk, stone-cutter, lapidary.
Huḳḳa, or hooqŭ, a pipe.
Huḳḳa-bardar, pipe-bearer.
Hukm, order.
Huzūr, the presence.

I. J.
Jādū, enchantment.
Jādū-garī, magic.
Jafari, lattice-work.
Jāgīr, land given as a reward for service.
Jahānārā, world adorning.
Jahān-gīr, world-taking.
Jahān-pannāh, world protection, his majesty, your majesty.
Jahannam, the infernal regions.
Jahaz, a ship.
Jahāzi, a sailor.
Jai, or jaya, triumph, victory, bravo! huzza! all hail!
Ja’ī, oats.
Jamadār, head of the harkāras.
Jān, life, soul, spirit.
Janao, Brāhmanical thread.
Jangal, forest.
Janglī-kawwa, a raven.
Janwār, an animal.
Jawāb, an answer.
Jhaīhar, cymbals or bells for the ankles.
Jhāmā, pumice-stone, bricks burnt to a cinder.
Jhāmp, a matted shutter.
Jhārū, a broom.
Jhārū-bardar, a sweeper.
Jinn-ī, genii.
Ikbal, good fortune.
Imām, a leader in religious affairs.
Indra, the Hindū heaven.
Joār, or jwār, millet (andropogon sorghum).
Ishk-peshā, ipomea quamoclit.
Islām, the religion of Muhammad.
Istrī, a smoothing iron, a wife.
Jum’a, Friday.
Jum’a-rāt, Thursday, eve of Friday.
Izār-bund, the string with which trowsers are tied.

K.
Ka’ba, the temple of Mecca.
Kabr, a grave, a tomb.
Ḳabūl or ḳubūl, consent, assent.
Kābul, the capital of Afg̱ ẖanistān.
Kacharī, or kacherī, court of justice, an office.
Kachchhī, a horse with a hollow back, from the province of Kachchh,
on the banks of the Sind.
Kachnār, bauhinia variegata.
Ḳadam, a footstep.
Ḳadam-bos, one who kisses the feet of a superior.
Kadam-chūṃṇā, to kiss the feet, to bid adieu.
Kāfir, infidel.
Kāfūr, camphor.
Kāghaz, paper.
Kāghazī, paper-case.
Kāhan, an aggregate number, consisting of 17 pans, or 1280 kaurīs.
Kahār, a palkī bearer.
Kahwa, coffee.
Kālā, black.
Kālā chor, an unknown person, a domestic thief.
Kālā namak, a kind of rock salt, impregnated with bitumen and
sulphur.
Kālā pānī, the ocean, the black water.
Kālā zīra, the seeds of the nigella Indica.
Kalam, a pen, a reed.
Kalam-dan, inkstand.
Kalg̱ ẖī, an ornament on a turban, an aigrette, a plume.
Kālī, the goddess; or, Kālī Mā, the black mother.
Kalsā, the spire or ornament on the top of a dome, a pinnacle.
Kam-baḵẖt, unfortunate.
Kam de’o, the god of love.
Kamān, a bow.
Kamān-dār, an archer.
Kamarband, a girdle.
Kammal, a blanket.
Kanāt, canvas enclosure, walls of a tent.
Kanauj, the ancient city.
Kangan, an ornament worn on the wrists of Hindū women, a
bracelet.
Kangni, millet (panicum Italicum).
Kanhaiyā, a name of Kṛisḥṇa.
Kans, or Kansa, the tyrant whom Kṛisḥṇa was born to destroy.
Kapās, cotton undressed, the cotton plant (gossypium herbaceum).
Kaprā, cloth.
Karbalā, the name of a place in Irāk, where Ḥusain, the son of ’Ali,
was murdered.
Karbī, the stalk or straw of jo’ār or bājrā (holcus sorgum and
spicatus).
Kār-khāna, workshop.
Kark-nath, a fool with black bones.
Karn-phūl, a kind of ear-ring.
Karor, ten millions.
Kārtik, a Hindū month, our October and November.
Karwā-tel, oil made from mustard-seed, bitter oil.
Kās, a kind of grass of which rope is made (saccharum
spontaneum).
Ḳaṣā’ī, a butcher, cruel, hard-hearted.
Kāshī, the city of Benares.
Kāsid, courier, a runner.
Kath, an astringent vegetable extract.
Katmiram, (vulgo: catamaran,) a very small raft, used as a fishing
boat on the coast of Madras.
Kaurī, a cowrie, a small shell used as a coin (cypræa moneta).
Kāwar, the baskets in which the holy water is carried.
Kawwā, a crow.
Kāzī, a judge.
Ḵẖāla, mother’s sister.
Ḵẖalāsī, a sailor, a native artilleryman, a tent pitcher.
Khān, a lord, a title of respect.
Ḵẖāna, a house.
Ḵẖānā, food.
Khāna-pīnā, meat and drink.
Khānsāmān, head table-servant.
Ḵẖarītạ, bag, a letter.
Khas-khas, root of gāndar.—See Gāndar.
Kḥatrī, the second of the four grand Hindū castes, being that of the
military.
Kazānchī, treasurer.
Khet, a field.
Khidmatgar, table-servant.
Khil’at, dress of honour.
Khīsā, a rubber used in baths.
Khraunchī, a native carriage.
Ḵẖudā, God.
Ḵẖudā-wand, master.
Ḵẖudā-yā, O God!
Khūnd, a well, a spring.
Khush-bo, perfume, odour.
Khusrū, the king; Khusrau, the sultan.
Kibla-gāh, the place turned to when at prayer; a father, or the one
beloved.
Kibla, Mecca, an altar.
Kimḵẖwab, silk brocade worked in gold and silver flowers.
Kishan, the Hindū god Kṛisḥṇa.
Kishtī, (prop. kashtī), a ship, boat, barque.
Kismat, fate, destiny.
Kitāb, a book.
Kohī, mountain.
Kohī-nūr, the mountain of light, the great diamond.
Kohirawān, the moving mountain, i.e. the elephant.
Kot, a fort.
Krānī, a clerk.
Krishna, a descent of Vishnŭ.
Kū’ā, a well.
Kudalī, a small pickaxe.
Ḳulfī, a cup with a cover, in which ice is moulded.
Kumbhīr, an alligator.
Kumhār, potter.
Kum’hir, a crocodile.
Kur’ān, (vulgo: koran,) the precepts of Muhammad.
Kurand, corundum stone (adamantine spar).
Kurk, an order made public, that no one may be seen on the road on
pain of death.
Kurtā, a kind of shirt, a tunic.
Kurtī, a short garment for women, jacket for soldiers, coat.
Kusūr, fault.
Ḳuṭb, the polar star, the north pole.
Kuttā, a dog.
Kutwāl, native magistrate, head of the police.

L.
Lachḥman, the half-brother of Rāmachandra.
Lachḥmī, the goddess of beauty.
Lailī, also Lailā, the beloved of Majnūn.
Lākh, one hundred thousand; gum lac, a kind of wax formed by the
coccus lacca.
Lāṭ, or lāṭh, obelisk, pillar, club, staff.
Lāṭhī, staff, stick.
Lāw, a rope, cable.
Līchī, a fruit (dimocarpus litchi).
Līl, indigo.
Log, people.
Lon, salt.
Lota, a drinking vessel.
Lubāda, or labāda, a wrapper, great coat.
Lūnī, the salt that effloresces from walls.
Lunj, or langrā, lame.

M.
Mā, mother.
Mā-bāp, mother and father, parents.
Machh, or Machchh, the name of the first avatār.
Machchhar, a gnat.
Machhlī, or Machhī, a fish.
Madrasa, a Muhammadan college.
Magar, an alligator.
Magrela, a seed (nigella Indica).
Mahā-bhārat, the great war.
Mahādēo, or Mahā-deva, a descent of Shiva.
Mahā-kalī, or Kalī-mā, a terrific form of Durgā, the consort of Shiva.
Māhā-nimba, melia sempervirens.
Mahārāj, great king, excellency.
Mahārājā, an Hindū emperor.
Mahạl, house.
Mahāwat, elephant driver.
Mahū’ā, or mahu’ā, bassia longifolia, bearing flowers which are
sweet, and from which a spirituous liquor is distilled; the nuts
afford an oil used instead of butter.
Maidān, a plain.
Makka, vulgo: Mecca.
Makrī, a spider.
Mālā, Hindū rosary, a garland.
Mālī, gardener, florist.
Mālik, lord, master.
Manḍap, or mandul, a house, a temple.
Mangūs, or newalā (viverra mungo), ichneumon.
Mānjhī, master of a vessel, steersman.
Maṣālaḥ, spices, drugs, materials.
Mash’al, a torch.
Mash’al-chi, torch-bearer.
Mashk, water bag.
Masīḥ, or Masīḥā, the Messiah, Christ our Lord.
Masjid, mosque.
Masjid-i-jāmī, a great mosque.
Masnad, a throne, a large cushion.
Māyā, idealism, illusion; a deception depending on the power of the
Deity, whereby mankind believe in the existence of external
objects, which are in fact nothing but idea.
Melā, a fair.
Mem sāhiba, madam, the lady of the house.
Menhdī, lawsonia inermis.
Mihtaranī, sweeper’s wife.
Mik’hal, the instrument with which collyrium is applied to the eyes.
Mirg, a deer.
Mirg nābbī, musk, a bag of musk.
Mirzā, a prince.
Misī, or missī, a powder to tinge the teeth black.
Misrāb, a steel frame for the fore-finger when playing on the sitar.
Motī, a pearl.
Muazzin, the call to prayers.
Mufassal, the country.
Mugdar, a club.
Muḥammad, the Arabian prophet.
Muḥarram, the first Muhammadan month.
Mulākāt, interview.
Mulk, kingdom, realm.
Mumtāz, distinguished, exalted.
Mŭn, a weight, forty ser.
Mund-māl, a necklace of human heads.
Munh, mouth.
Muniyā, amadavat.
Munkir, Nakīr, the names of the two angels who examine the dead
in the tomb.
Murabbā, a preserve, confection.
Musāfir, a traveller.
Muṣāhib, aide-de-camp, companion.
Muṣallā, a carpet to pray upon.
Musalmān, a Muhammadan.
Musalmanī, fem. of Musalmān.
Mushk, musk.
Mut’h, Hindū temple.

N.
Nāch, an Indian dance.
Nadī, or naddī, a river.
Nadir-shāh, the king.
Nā’echa, a small reed, hukka snake.
Nāgā, the holy serpent.
Nahīn, or nā’īch, not, no.
Nālā, a rivulet.
Nālkī, a sort of litter used by people of rank.
Nānd, a large earthen pan.
Nārangī, an orange.
Nārjīl, cocoa-nut, or cocoa-nut tree.
Nasīb, fortune; balā-nasīb, unfortunate.
Nawab, vulg. Nabob.
Nazr, a gift especially offered to a superior.
Newala, mungoose (viverra mungo).
Newār, tape.
N’hut, a nose-ring.
Nīl-gāw, lil-gā’ī, or rojh, the white-footed antelope of Pennant,
antilope picta of Pallos.
Nīm, or neemb, margosa tree (melia azadirachta).
Nīmbu, or līmu, a fruit, the lime.
Nūn, non, or lon, salt.
Nūr, light.
Nut-log, tumblers.

P.
Pābos, kissing the feet.
Pachāsī, a game, so named from the highest throw, which is twenty-
five.
Padshāh, a king.
Pāgal, fool; pāgal-i-nāch, a fancy-ball.
Pahār, a mountain.
Pahar, a watch of three hours.
Pahare-wālā, a sentry.
Pahār-i, a hill, a mountain.
Pā’ī, the fourth part of an ānā.
Paisā, copper coin.
Pājāma, trowsers, long drawers.
Pakkā, exact, expert, built of brick.
Palang, couch, cot.
Palīta, match (of a gun).
Pālkī, or palkee, a palanquin.
Palwār, a boat.
Pān, leaves of piper betel.
Panchāyāt, a court of inquiry.
Pānī, water.
Pankhā, a fan.
Pā-posh, slipper.
Pāras-patthar, the philosopher’s stone.
Pārbatī, pārvatī, mountaineer.
Parbut, mountain.
Parda-nishīn, remaining behind the curtain.
Parī, fairy.
Pāt, a leaf, ornament worn in the upper part of the ear.
Pātā, a plank on which washermen beat clothes.
Pātāl, the infernal regions.
Patelā, or patailā, a flat-bottomed boat.
Patelī, a small flat-bottomed boat.
Pāthur, or patthar, a stone.
Pattar, puttī, or pattī, a leaf.
Pattū, a kind of woollen cloth.
Pera, a sweetmeat.
Peshkār, minister, deputy.
Peshwā, Mahratta minister.
Peshwāz, a gown.
Phāns, a bamboo.
Phānsī-gār, a strangler, a ṭhag.
Phānsnā, to noose.
Phurr, the noise of a bird, as a partridge or quail, suddenly taking
wing.
Phuslānā, to decoy.
Phuslā’ū, wheedling.
Pīlī-bhīt, the name of a town in Rohilkhand, famous for the smallness
and fineness of its rice.
Pinnace, a yacht.
Pīpal, ficus religiosa.
Pīr, a saint.
Pitārā, a basket.
Piyāla, a glass, a cup.
Prāg, the ancient name of Ilāhābād, commonly Allahabad.
Pūjā, worship, adoration.
Pul, a bridge.
Pulā’o, a dish of flesh and rice.
Pur, a town, a city.
Purā, a large village, a town.
Purāṇ or purāṇa, the Hindū mythological books.
Putla, a puppet, an image.
Pūtlī, a small puppet or image.
Puwāl, straw.

R.
Rahīm, merciful, compassionate.
Rahmān, forgiving.
Ra’īyat, tenants, subjects.
Rāj, kingdom.
Rājā, a prince, a king.
Rāj-rānī, a queen, royal consort.
Rājput, a descendant of a rājā, the name of a celebrated military
caste.
Rākkī, a bracelet or amulet, which the Hindūs tie on their arms on a
certain festival, held in the full moon of Sāwan, in honour of
Ḳrisḥṇa.
Rām, the seventh Hindū incarnation.
Rām-rām, a Hindū form of salutation.
Rāmtur’aī, hibiscus longifolius.
Rānī, a Hindu queen or princess.
Rā’ō, a prince.
Rās, the circular dance performed at the festival of Krishna.
Rās-dhārī, a dancing boy.
Rasūl, a messenger.
Rāt-alū, the yam (dioscorea sativa).
Rat-aundhā, blindness at night (nyctalopia).
Rath, a four-wheeled carriage.
Rauza, mausoleum.
Rāwtī, a kind of tent.
Ṛezai, or razā’ī, a native counterpane.
Rikhi or ṛisḥi, a sage, a saint.
Rohū, a fish (cyprinus denticulatus).
Rotī, wheaten cakes baked on an iron plate, called tawā.
Rūpiya, a rupee.
Rustam, a hero.

S.
Sach, truth.
Sāchak, hinnā presented to the bride on the day of marriage.
Sadr’adālut, supreme court of justice.
Sāgar, the sea, the ocean.
Sāgūn, teak, a forest tree.
Sahajnā, horseradish tree.
Sāhib, master, gentleman of the house.
Sāhiba, lady.
Sā’īs, a groom.
Sajjāda, a carpet or mat on which the Muhammadans kneel at
prayers.