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Russia-Israel Relationship In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

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Atıf/ Citation
Bijan, Aref. “Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War.” Israiliyat:
Journal of Israeli and Judaic Studies, no. 7 (Kış 2020): 90-104.

RUSSIA-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP: IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE

SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Aref BIJAN *

PhD Candidate, Political Science and Regional Studies, St. Petersburg State
University, Russia
Doktora Adayı, Siyaset Bilimi ve Bölgesel Çalışmalar, St. Petersburg Devlet Üniversitesi, Rusya
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1545-8770
<[email protected]>

Article Type: Research Article

Received Date: 09.11.2020, Accepted Date: 30.04.2021

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the dynamics of the Russian-
Israeli relations since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2015. Moscow and Tel
Aviv have deep historical ties in the political, military, economic and cultural spheres.
Russia's important role in international developments, especially after Russia's
intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015 has forced Israel to expand relations with
Russia due to threats from proxy forces of Iran and Hezbollah in southern Syria (Golan
Heights). In this article, we seek to analyze the relations between Russia and Israel in
the Syrian civil war and its consequences to the other countries within the context of the
current geopolitical changes. Realpolitik-based national interests are key to explain the
current level of diplomatic and security relations. Regarding the Syrian civil war, the
relations between Russia and Israel warmed. The prospect of Russian policy in Syria
deserves further attention for the security interests of Israel. The method in this paper is
descriptive-analytical.

Keywords: Israel, Iran, Syria Crisis, Security Interests, Russia

SURİYE İÇ SAVAŞI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN RUSYA-İSRAİL İLİŞKİLERİ

*
This article is an expanded and revised version of an oral presentation of the same title
presented at the Fourth International Conference on Israel and Judaism (7-10 December 2020)
and whose abstract published in the Proceeding and Abstract Book.
This document is published under the terms of Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) License, which permits
free use (such as link to the content or permission for its download, distribution, printing, copying, and reproduction in any medium)
except change of contents and for commercial use, provided the original work is cited.
Bu belge ticari kullanım amacı ve içerik değişikliği dışında kaynak gösterilmesi koşuluyla yayınlanmış makalenin tüm kullanımına
(çevrimiçi bağlantı verme, kopyalama, baskı alma, herhangi bir fiziksel ortamda çoğaltma, dağıtma vb.) izin veren Yaratıcı
Ortaklıklar Atıf-Gayriticari-Türetilemez 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) lisansı altında yayınlanmaktadır:
Aref Bijan 91

Öz: Bu makalenin amacı, 2015 yılında Suriye iç savaşının başlamasından bu yana

Rusya-İsrail ilişkilerinin dinamiklerini incelemektir. Moskova ve Tel Aviv'in siyasi, askeri,
ekonomik ve kültürel alanlarda derin tarihi bağları bulunmaktadır, Rusya'nın
uluslararası gelişmelerdeki önemli rolü, özellikle Rusya'nın 2015 yılında Suriye iç
savaşına müdahalesinin ardından İran ve Hizbullah'ın vekil güçlerinin Suriye'nin
güneyindeki (Golan Tepeleri) tehditleri sebebiyle İsrail’I Rusya İsrail'i Rusya ile
ilişkilerini genişletmeye zorladı. Bu makalede, Suriye iç savaşında Rusya ve İsrail
arasındaki ilişkileri ve bunun diğer ülkelere olan sonuçlarını mevcut jeopolitik değişimler
bağlamında analiz etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Realpolitik temelli ulusal çıkarlar,
diplomatik ve güvenlik ilişkilerinin mevcut seviyesini açıklamak için anahtardır. Suriye iç
savaşı bağlamında, Rusya ile İsrail arasındaki ilişkiler ısındı. Rusya'nın Suriye'deki
politikası beklentisi, İsrail'in güvenlik çıkarları için daha fazla ilgiyi hak ediyor. Bu
makaledeki yöntem betimsel-analitiktir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İsrail, İran, Suriye Krizi, Güvenlik Çıkarları, Rusya

Introduction
After since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to
reestablish Moscow as a superpower. To achieve this, Kremlin has tried to
affirm Russian influence in various regions around the world. As such, the
Middle East as an important Geo-strategic region has become more important
than ever before for Russia. One of the most important countries in the region
is Israel and Moscow has sought good relations with this regional power. Such
an approach can be analyzed based on Vladimir Putin's foreign policy doctrine
that is based on realism. When Russia emerged from the collapsing USSR in
December 1991, it inherited a fraught relationship with Israel. Although the
Soviet Union had been one of the first countries to recognize Israel in 1948,
relations cooled rapidly in the shadow of the Cold War. While the new state of
Israel leaned heavily towards the United States, Moscow expanded relations
with its Arab neighbors. After October 1991, two countries have successively
deepened their relationship on the societal, economic and political levels.
Russia’s military intervention in the Syria conflict in September 2015 opened a
new stage in Russian-Israeli relations as both are now concerned with the
questions of order and security in the Middle East.
Moscow and Tel Aviv have been "neighbors" to the Levant since 2015, and
the Kremlin is increasingly acting as a security actor for the Hebrew state.
Russia also intends to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue but has so far
failed to convince Tel Aviv of its centrality, despite its military successes in
Syria. Finally, their bilateral relationship has also a significant trade section,
92 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

since Israel is one of the few Western sources of technology for Russia after
the imposition of sanctions related to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. 1
Israel is closely allied with the United States – the country which Russian
leader Vladimir Putin regards as Russia’s greatest adversary. Russia
cooperates closely with Iran – the country that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu regards as an existential threat to the Jewish state. Especially
since the rise of Putin at the turn of the century, Russia and Israel have
developed close, friendly relations. They cooperate extensively in the
economic, military and intelligence spheres. In addition to their government-to-
government relationship, there is also a strong societal connection between
the two countries because the fact that over a million Russian-speaking Jews
immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union and large numbers of
Russian tourists visit Israel every year (including over 550,000 in 2016).2 There
are, of course, some serious disagreements between Russia and Israel –
including over Moscow’s relations with Tehran. Russia and Israel, however,
have pursued good relations with each other despite these divergences.
Despite these divergences, the common fear from radical Islamist movements
in the region, good personal relations between leaders and willingness to
maintain bilateral cooperation bring actors to intensify relations. ). 3 Therefore,
in this article, the relations between Russia and Israel in the Syrian civil war
are examined with reference to other influential actors of the Syrian crisis.
1. Moscow- Tel Aviv Realpolitik
Russia and Israel share important aspects in their strategic cultures. Both
pursue decisive interest-led realpolitik. Free of value-driven concerns, they
have no difficulty to pursue pragmatic and selective co-operation when shared
interests exist, even if normative differences persist. Both states exhibit a
siege mentality, and both are guided by the primacy of security and primarily
military understanding of power. This enables to understand and accept each
other’s security-oriented interests and largely refrain from criticizing the other’s
actions as long as these do not clash with their own security needs. The
shared perception of the Islamist terrorism threat since the beginning of the

1
Igor Delanoë, “Russia-Israel: Syria, a new structural challenge of Israeli-Russian relations,”
Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, April 11, 2019, p.3,
https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-
arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/201916.pdf
2
Mark N. Katz, “Russia and Israel: An Improbable Friendship,” in Russia’s Return to the Middle
East, building Sandcastles?, Ed. Nicu Popescu and Stanislav Secrieru, chaillot Papers, Nº 146,
(European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2018), 103.
3
Mark N. Katz, “Russia and Israel”, 103.
Aref Bijan 93

century has strengthened further relations and cooperation between Russia

and Israel.4
Russia understands the importance of Israel and therefore seeks to
strengthen cooperation with Israel on a growing range of issues, such as the
pursuit of common interests in the Middle East. At present, however, Russia's
current relations with Israel are based on a good level of reciprocal
pragmatism, as well as boasting a significant improvement in the depth of its
political, military and trade cooperation over the past few years. Russia's direct
involvement in Syria (since 2015) has added a new layer of communication,
coordination and cooperation to Russian-Israeli military relations; Despite its
multilateral foreign policy, Russia has sought to maintain a balance of power
between influential actors in the Middle East, especially the Syrian crisis such
as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and considered itself as a powerful mediator
and regional leader against American unilateralism.5
In recent years, the number of the bilateral visits at the highest level
between the two countries have been increasing. In fact, the Israeli leader,
Binyamin Netanyahu, has visited Moscow eleven times in his fourth term in
office, including the January 2020 meeting, while Putin has visited Tel Aviv
twice between 2012 and 2020. Apart from a resurgence in the political
relationship, Russia and Israel have also decided to improve their economic
ties despite the volume of trade has so far remained modest. Russian exports
to Israel were at USD 1.9 billion in 2018. It exports a number of products to
Israel including crude petroleum, precious metals and stones, food products,
chemical products etc.6 Russian imports from Israel stood at USD 764 million
in 2018 with products such as electrical machinery and equipment, edible
vegetables, pesticides, plastics etc. In 2015, Russia and Israel signed a
military cooperation pact, to step up military and technological cooperation.
Moscow also purchased a package of drones from Israel for USD 300 million.
The presence of a large Russian diaspora in Israel has helped forge a special
bond, with more than 17% of Israel’s population being Russian-speakers.7

4
Lidia Averbukh and Margarete Klein, “Russia-Israel Relationship Transformed by Syria Conflict:
Political Interests Overshadow Social and Economic Ties,” German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, NO.37, September, 2018, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C37_avk_kle.pdf
5
Zvi Magen, “Russia and the Challenges of a Changing Middle East: A View from Israel,” in
Russia and Israel in the Changing Middle East, Ed. Zvi Magen and Vitaly Naumkin, , (Institute for
National Security Studies, 2013), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172130/Memorandum129_2013.pdf
6
Pritish Gupta, “Russia and Israel: Towards a pragmatic partnership,” Observer Research
Foundation, Mar 05, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/russia-and-israel-towards-a-
pragmatic-partnership-61949/
7
Pritish Gupta, “Russia and Israel”
94 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

In an overcrowded Middle East, the relationship between Moscow and Tel

Aviv has been centered on ‘co-operation’ especially in the Syrian civil war. The
gradual US retrenchment has allowed Russia to step in and fill the vacuum as
a regional power broker even though US remains a pre-eminent player in the
region. Moscow wants to convey the message to the Middle Eastern states
that it is a reliable ally that believes in multilateral engagement to resolve
disputes. Given its proximity to the region, Russia remains concerned about
instability in the Middle East and its impact on national security. The Syrian
civil war has created an opportunity for Russia to be viewed as a trusted player
in the region. When Russia has established its military presence in Syria,
Israel finds it critical to counter the challenges posed by Iran and other non-
state actors in Syria. In this context, Israel remains an important regional actor
for Russia. Two countries have strategic interests that bring them act together
in the Middle East. As a result, despite some of their divergences on Iran and
Hezbollah, they try to focus on their common interests.
Having presented itself as a reliable player in the region, Russia has
engaged with both Israel and Iran, marking a highlight of Putin’s foreign policy
maneuvers. Russia has been able to accomplish this by following a pragmatic
policy that does not engage in alliance relationships. Israel too has wanted to
diversify its foreign partnerships and has broadened its reach while remaining
committed to its alliance with the US. Russia and Israel are to continue their
entente based on their pragmatic policies. Incrementalism adopted by both
Russia and Israel in their foreign policy approach is yielding the desired
results, making the Russia-Israel relationship a classic example of ‘realpolitik’.8
2. The Syrian Conflict: A Platform for Cooperation
In addition to social relations and economic cooperation, the prospect of
reviewing Russia's policy in Syria to pay more attention to Israel's security
interests has been another important criterion. Military intervention in Syria in
September 2015 opened a new phase in Russia’s Middle East policy in
general and Moscow’s relations with Israel in particular. Relations with Israel
now require greater coordination and are characterized by greater fragility. The
conflict dynamic in Syria and the associated questions of regional order and
security represent a stress test for the Russian-Israeli relationship.
Russia’s intervention in Syria created a need for both sides to avoid
unintentional military clashes by establishing functioning communication
channels and dependable arrangements. To this end, the two armed forces
set up a de-conflicting mechanism in autumn 2015. It is embedded in a format
of frequent high-level discussions between the Russian president and the
Israeli prime minister, as well as between the defence ministers and

8
Gupta, “Russia and Israel”.
Aref Bijan 95

intelligence service chiefs. The mechanism permitted Israel to conduct air

strikes on Hezbollah positions and convoys without interference by Russian air
defence. The Israeli leadership’s assurance that Israel is interested only in the
threat from pro-Iranian forces – and not in toppling Assad – was crucial for
Moscow’s consent to the arrangement. Unlike the Russian-Turkish
relationship, which was plunged into deep crisis by the shooting down of a
Russian warplane in November 2015, Russian-Israeli relations long remained
unproblematic even as both operated militarily in Syria. However, as the
conflict intensified, the de-conflicting mechanism came under pressure. Israel’s
threat perception and strategy changed after Assad and his allies recaptured
large parts of Syria. Netanyahu’s government is now concerned that Tehran is
establishing a permanent military presence in Syria, especially along the
border to Israel. In order to prevent this, Israel seems to have shifted from a
policy of containing pro-Iranian forces through isolated air strikes to one of
driving its forces out of Syria by military means, and greatly expanded its air
strikes on Syrian territory from February 2018. in November 2017 Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov was still describing the presence of Iranian fighters in
Syria as legitimate, at a meeting with Assad on 17 May 2018 Putin called for
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syria after “the launch of an active
phase of a political process” – with the exception of Russia which is there at
the invitation of the Syrian regime. Both developments suggest a partial
recalibration of Russia’s policy on Syria, with greater willingness to take
account of Israeli security interests. This reflects the priority placed by the
Russian leadership on safeguarding its own armed forces in Syria: In the event
of an escalation, Israel would be capable of significantly complicating the
military situation for Russia. Moscow also expects Israel’s cooperation when it
comes to shaping a new Syrian political order. 9
Between Israel and Russia to avoid any confrontation, political and military
level consultations allow for the maintenance of the necessary channels of
communication and flow of operational information. Despite the coordination,
there have been cases of violations of Israeli airspace by Russian planes and
unmanned aerial vehicle or Israeli jets being fired upon in Syria by the
Russians. A strong reaction from Russia came in mid-March when, after an
attack on a Hezbollah convoy and shooting down of a Syrian S-200 missile
(targeting Israeli fighter jets) by the Israeli Arrow-2 system, Moscow
summoned the Israeli ambassador to the Russian MFA for consultations.
Russia remains aware of Israel’s interests and military capabilities and is trying
to limit, to some extent, the anti-Israeli actions of its Syrian allies. From Israel's
point of view, the cooperation has meant Russia ensured there was no
definitive response from Hezbollah or Syria to the Israeli attacks and that the

9
Averbukh and Klein, “Russia-Israel Relationship,” 5-6.
96 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

delivery of a Russian S-300 anti-aircraft defense system to Iran was delayed

(resumed in early 2016). 10
While the exact size and nature of the military forces which Russia has
deployed to Syria remains unclear—just as Moscow’s ultimate endgame
remains shrouded in secrecy—the Israelis nonetheless view Russia’s
expanded intervention in Syria as a development that could ultimately serve
their policy aims. From the Israeli perspective, the increased Russian military
presence in Syria will prevent the downfall of the Assad regime, thus
prolonging the conflict while simultaneously depleting the resources of the
Syrian state and people. As Israeli military analysts predict, it will also turn the
Syrian coast—a region they refer to as “Syria Minor”—into a Russian sphere of
influence in which Bashar al Assad is kept in power. This fits in to a wider
Israeli strategy, declared at the outset of the Syrian revolution, where a
weakened Bashar al Assad would remain in power as a titular head of state
with whom compromises could be reached. Israeli worries, meanwhile, revolve
around Tel Aviv’s continued ability to impose its own “red lines” on the
progress of events on the ground in Syria, amidst a notably enlarged Russian
military presence in Syria.11
The restrictions which the Israelis placed on Damascus at the outset of the
revolution, threatening military intervention if they were violated, included: that
the Syrian regime shall not transfer heavy artillery, chemical weapons,
advanced air defense systems, long-range surface-to-surface or any anti-ship
missiles to Hezbollah or other groups in Lebanon; and that Iranian or
Hezbollah forces would not be allowed into the territories adjoining the Israeli-
occupied Golan Heights and the de-facto armistice line between Syria and
Israel. Nevertheless, Israel has welcomed Iranian and Hezbollah armed
support for the Syrian regime, viewing this intervention on the part of the Shia
partisans as inflaming the sectarian conflict in Syria and the wider Arab Middle
East, while ensuring a prolonged conflict in Syria. Such military involvement
would also, Israeli military analysts believed, help to tie up Hezbollah and Iran
in a war of attrition and thereby deplete their resources. Since 2013, the Israeli
military has enforced these “red lines” through no fewer than 10 air strikes
carried out against military targets across Damascus and Latakia provinces, to
which there was no Syrian response. 12

10
Michal Wojnarowicz, “Israeli-Russian Relations in the Context of the Syrian Civil War,”Bulletin,
No. 48 (988): 1, 17 May, 2017, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=23171
11
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Netanyahu’s Moscow Visit Cements Russian-
Israeli Cooperation in Syria Policy Analysis Unit,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies,
September, 2015, p.2, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-
PDFDocumentLibrary/Russian_Israeli_Cooperation_in_Syria.pdf
12
Amos Harel, For Israel, Syria Red Lines Matter More Than a Hotline to the Kremlin,” September
30, 2015, Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.677183
Aref Bijan 97

While Barack Obama and some other Western leaders sought to embrace
the political change represented by the Arab Spring, Putin and Netanyahu both
preferred the preservation of the status quo and feared that the overthrow of
ruling regimes would unleash forces hostile to both Russia and Israel. 13While it
had long objected to the Assad regime’s cooperation with Iran in aiding the
highly anti-Israeli Lebanese Shia movement, Hezbollah, the Israeli government
did appreciate that Damascus had maintained peace on the Syrian-Israeli
armistice line established after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.14 Israeli fears that
this border would no longer remain calm if the Assad regime was weakened or
replaced has made the Netanyahu government more sympathetic to Russian
arguments that the Assad regime remaining in power is the least bad
alternative for Syria.15 What has been disturbing for Israel about Syria, though,
is the role played there by Iran and Hezbollah. Israel does not want to see
these two actors gain predominant influence in Syria and thus be in a better
position to attack Israel. 16 However, that being the case, the Russian
intervention in Syria that began in 2015 which was so upsetting to the West
was actually somewhat reassuring to Israel since Iran and Hezbollah could be
more easily restrained by the Russians if they are present in Syria than if they
are not. Indeed, as Samuel Ramani noted, ‘Putin’s March 14 [2016]
announcement of a partial Russian military drawdown from Syria surprised the
Israeli political establishment, and increased fears of Iranian belligerence.’ 17
While it is not clear whether, or what sort, of agreement Israel and Russia may
have reached regarding Syria, what is known is that Netanyahu and Putin
have consulted extensively about it and Moscow has not stopped Israel from
attacking Hezbollah targets in Syria. 18 Indeed, now that Russia, Iran, and
Hezbollah have largely defeated Assad’s internal opponents, not only has
competition heated up between Moscow and Tehran for influence in

13
Jeffrey Martini, Erin York, and William Young, “Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition,”
RAND, 2013, p. 2,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR213/RAND_RR213.pdf.
14
Ian Black, “Israelis watch intently as Syrian rebel forces approach Golan Heights border,” The
Guardian, June 19, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/on-the-middle-
east/2015/jun/19/israelis-watch-intently-as-syrian-rebel-forces-approach-golan-heights-border.
15
Cnaan Liphshiz, “Can Israel benefit from sheriff Putin policing the Middle East,” The Times of
Israel, October 13, 2015, https://www.timesofisrael.com/can-israel-benefit-from-sheriff-putin-
policing-the-middle-east/.
16
Judah Ari Gross, “Netanyahu: Israel acts to keep game-changing arms away from Hezbollah,”
The Times of Israel, January 9, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-israel-acts-to-
keep-game-changing-arms-away-from-hezbollah/.
17
Ramani, Samuel, “Why Russia and Israel are cooperating in Syria,” Huff post, June 23, 2016,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-russia-and-israel-are-cooperating-in-
syria_us_576bdb68e4b083e0c0235e15?guccounter=1.
18
Amos Harel, “Putin’s phone call with Netanyahu put end to Israeli strikes in Syria,” Haaretz,
February 15, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/putin-s-call-with-netanyahu-
called-time-on-israel-s-syrian-strikes-1.5809118.
98 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

Damascus, but also Russia has indicated support for Israeli calls for Iranian
forces to depart from southern Syria.19 There are other areas besides Syria in
which Russian and Israeli interests either coincide or do not clash.
3. The Iranian factor in Russian-Israeli Relations
Today, when Bashar al-Assad’s regime is no longer on the verge of collapsing,
Israel has seen one of the worst scenarios it feared materialize: a Syria, saved
from collapse by Moscow, but on the way towards reunification under Tehran's
influence.20 Although the Jewish state has adopted a withdrawn stance since
the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the increase in Iran's footprint in Syria is
perceived in Tel Aviv as an existential threat that is likely to justify an Israeli
military intervention. Israel has established two "red lines" against the
backdrop of a growing Iranian presence in the Arab Republic: The Golan and
Hezbollah. While the former must be secured from becoming a base for
attacks against Israel, the Lebanese militia must be prevented to establish
itself there and receive sophisticated equipment that could challenge, even
locally, Israel’s superiority. Iran, which has drained, trained, paid and armed
tens of thousands of Shia militiamen who went to fight in Syria, has also
deployed Revolutionary Guard units, and is now reportedly expanding its
military infrastructure on Syrian territory and building weapon manufacture
factories, particularly for Hezbollah. However, a Syria under Tehran's control is
neither in Israel's nor Russia's interest, while Bashar al-Assad does not want to
be the puppet of either the Russians or the Iranians.21
Russia’s tacit acceptance of Israeli air strikes in Syria and its change in
rhetoric towards the Iranian military presence reflect a concern that
Washington might abandon the restraint it has shown if the Israeli-Iranian
conflict were to escalate in Syria. A serious US military intervention could
gravely endanger the military and political gains Russia has achieved to date.
The outward convergence with Israel also reflects a growing rivalry between
Russia and Iran in Syria. The more Assad regains his grip on power, the more
pressing the question of Syria’s future political and economic order. The state
of the Syrian army offers little grounds to believe that it could soon take over
the military tasks hitherto under-taken by pro-Iranian forces. A meaningful
weakening of the groups supported by Tehran would therefore automatically

19
Joost Hiltermann, “Russia can keep the peace between Israel and Iran--but following the
hostilities over the weekend, does Putin want to?,” The Atlantic, February 13, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/israel-syria-iran-hezbollah-putin-
assad/553217/
20
Chuck Freilich, “Syria's Assad Regime Won the Civil War,” Haaretz, 10 March, 2019,
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-syria-s-assad-regime-won-the-civil-war-can-it-
survive-an-israeli-attack-1.6999227
21
Delanoë, “Russia-Israel,” 4.
Aref Bijan 99

demand greater military engagement by Russia – which President Putin would

be keen to avoid for domestic political reasons. Moscow has no immediate
interest in massively weakening Iran in Syria, nor would it be in any position to
do so. However, it appears that Russia is willing to exert a moderating
influence on Tehran and Hezbollah and establish a buffer zone in southern
Syria. Russia does not share Israel’s interest in driving Tehran completely out
of Syria and massively weakening Iranian influence in the Middle East as a
whole. Moscow’s return to the region is predicated above all on its ability to
maintain good relations with all parties, especially those that are hostile to one
another. Being courted by all sides is what could potentially make Russia the
region’s most important “go-to-power”. For that to occur it requires advantage
in all directions. This realpolitik would deter Moscow from siding firmly with
Israel.
The defeat of ISIS, the emergence of Russia as the patron of the Assad
regime, and President Trump’s announcement of the withdrawal of US forces
from Syria have affected the policies and alliances of Israel, Iran, the US, and
Russia with respect to that country, potentially leading to a wide-scale
conflagration. Israel is concerned about Iran’s deepening strategic military
presence in Syria, which involves the building of military bases and the
provisioning of Hezbollah with precision missiles. Over the past two years, and
especially since the defeat of ISIS, Israel has led a systematic air campaign
against Iranian assets in Syria that Russia, despite its control of the Syrian air
space, has done little to stop. Yet as Tel Aviv began to align its military
strategy in Syria with that of the US, Moscow apparently signaled its
discontent. In February 2018, an Iranian drone penetrated the Israeli airspace.
As expected, Israel retaliated by downing the drone and carrying out air strikes
across Syria and against the Iranian drone’s point of origin. Nevertheless,
Israel and Russia continued their coordination, concluding an agreement in
late July 2018 according to which the Syrian armed forces redeployed on the
Golan Heights. On September 17, Israel carried out air strikes against Iranian-
Syrian positions near Russia’s Hmeimim air base in Latakia. Syrian regime
forces fired back and in the process accidentally downed a Russian
surveillance plane, killing all 15Russian service members aboard. Since
Russia would not give up on its investment in the Assad regime, and may well
supply that regime -and Iran -with sophisticated weapons should Moscow find
itself painted into a corner, Washington’s strategy of ensuring the departure of
Iranian forces from Syria entailed the risk of a costly confrontation.
Paradoxically, in a surprising shift of policy, President Trump has ordered the
withdrawal of US troops from Syria, ending the military campaign against ISIS
and removing any barrier to Tehran’s military presence in Syria. This has put
the onus on checking Iranian power on Israel, whose government has been
steadfast in trying to prevent Tehran from entrenching itself in Syria, and has
100 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

made Israel-Russian coordination in Syria strategically crucial to avert

escalatory incidents. At this critical juncture, Tel Aviv has an opportunity to
prevent a regional conflagration. Russia needs Iran and Hezbollah to secure
and stabilize Syria. Serious challenges lie ahead, including defeating the
thousands of Salafi jihadists in Idlib. However, Moscow does not want either
Iran or Hezbollah to have undue influence over Syrian politics. To simply put,
Syria is a Russian protectorate. This has been transmitted to Tehran, including
demands to restrict its military actions from Damascus all the way south to the
Golan Heights.22
For Moscow, cooperation with Israel could, in a paradoxical way, serve as a
trump card in its ‘game’ with Iran. It is a sign that Russia is able to resolve the
situation in Syria on its own, without Iran. Furthermore, Russia’s partnership
with Iran impedes its relations with Arab countries, where, time after time,
there are conversations about a proverbial ‘Russian-Shiite alliance’,
complicating Russia’s relations with the Sunni-majority Islamic Ummah,
especially its Arab members. Today, the Arab world, including the Saudi
monarchy, treats Israel with understanding and even with sympathy, insofar as
both sides consider Iran to be a common threat. From that point of view, an
Israeli-Russian rapprochement can be taken as natural and even
advantageous for the Sunni world.23
Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi met his Russian counterpart, Sergey
Lavrov, on 26 October 2020 thanking him for working with the Jewish state “on
preventing an Iranian entrenchment in Syria.” “Israel appreciates the ties and
the coordination with the Russian government on preventing an Iranian
entrenchment in Syria,” Ashkenazi was quoted in the statement as saying,
calling for preventing Tehran from arming Hezbollah. Israel unsuccessfully
sought to block the sale to Iran of the S-300 system, which analysts say could
impede a potential Israeli strike on Tehran’s nuclear facilities, and would likely
oppose providing Iran with the S-400. Russia in 2015 deployed the S-400 to
Syria, where, along with Iran, it is fighting on behalf of the Assad regime in the
Syrian civil war. The deployment of the system, which is powerful enough to
track the vast majority of Israeli airspace, undercut Israel’s aerial superiority in

22
Robert G. Rabil, “Tending to Israel’s Relationship with Russia,” BESA Center, No. 1,047,
December 26, 2018, Pp. 1-2, https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/1047-Tending-
Israels-Relationship-Russia-Rabil-final.pdf
23
Alexey Malashenko, “A new stage in Russian-Israeli relations?” The Dialogue of Civilizations
Research Institute (DOC Research Institute), April 2, 2019, https://doc-research.org/2019/04/new-
stage-russian-israeli-relations/
Aref Bijan 101

Syria, where it has carried out hundreds of strikes on targets linked to Iran and
the Lebanese terror group Hezbollah.24
Russia's neutral acceptance of Israeli airstrikes in Syria and its external
convergence reflects growing rivalry between Russia and Iran in Syria, putting
pressure on Assad's power and the issue of Syria's future political and
economic order. Moscow and Tehran fall under this scenario to compete for
economic and political influence. At the same time, the two countries are still
militarily interdependent in Syria. Russia's military intervention is largely limited
to the air force and its limited ground involvement, so any stabilization of the
Assad regime now requires the help of pro-Iranian forces in Syria. However,
Russia seems to want to maintain its full influence over Tehran and Hezbollah
and establish a buffer zone in southern Syria. Although Moscow has managed
to expand its cooperation with Tehran without affecting its relations with Tel
Aviv, the Iranian nuclear issue remains a problem or obstacle. Neither country
wants Iran to acquire an atomic bomb, but Moscow has maintained its
cooperation with the Islamic Republic in the field of civilian nuclear energy and
is using it as a card in relations with the West.
Conclusion
Overall, bilateral relations between Russia and Israel are positive, stemming
from a robust area of shared interests. That said, as one senior Israeli
diplomat noted, “The relationship can improve a bit more, but there is little
room for an additional dramatic increase.” On the positive side, significant
progress has been achieved in the quarter century since relations were
renewed. As the bilateral relationship unfolds within a defined framework, the
boundaries of which are well understood by both sides. Israel’s most important
relationship is with the United States. Even though Israel may want to diversify
ties, it has no interest in replacing its primary strategic partner. Russia
recognizes this situation: as one former Israeli diplomat in Moscow
commented, “they understand who we sleep next to every night.” While good
relations with Russia may serve Israel’s interests, they will never be permitted
to develop to a level that causes significant unease in Washington. If U.S.-
Russia relations continue to deteriorate, the American administration may no
longer “allow” one of its closest allies to maintain a positive relationship with
Moscow. It is also possible that the Israeli thirst for diversification will diminish
somewhat in the Trump—or more accurately, post-Obama—era. It remains
possible that as the threat to the Syrian regime decreases, Russian will
recognize the danger of mounting instability spreading from Syria towards

24
TOI staff, “Ashkenazi tells Russian FM Iranian entrenchment in Syria must be prevented,” Times
of Israel, 26 October, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ashkenazi-tells-russian-fm-iranian-
entrenchment-in-syria-must-be-prevented/
102 Russia-Israel Relationship: In the Perspective of the Syrian Civil War

Israel and Jordan. This growing potential for regional conflict could lay waste
to the many strategic benefits that Russia derived from its intervention there.
Moscow may, in turn, more critically assess Iran’s prominence in Syrian
affairs. Israeli government analysts argue that Iranian and Russian interests in
Syria are beginning to diverge, partly because Moscow’s desired regional
stability requires that Israel feels confident in its national security
environment.89As the Syrian Civil War moves to a new stage, Russia’s
dialogue with Israel is also evolving, from de-confliction to stabilization
methods. The two parties are also discussing ways to address Israel’s broader
security concerns, especially concerning Iran’s influence in the new Syria.
Therefore, as a conclusion to this discussion, the two main factors that
explain the enhanced cooperation of Israel with Russia in the Middle East, and
especially over Syria in the current situation, are as follows:
1. Netanyahu believes that Russia can mitigate the threat posed by Bashar
al-Assad and his allies, especially Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah, to Israel. At
this level of cooperation, it seems that the increase in Israeli cooperation with
Russia in Syria is a violation of a common logic. Israel's closer ties with Russia
will allow Putin to act as a mediator between Israel and its anti-Israel allies.
Thus, in a way, this mediating role of foreign policy will be significantly
important in mitigating and neutralizing any security threat to Israel.
2. Both Israel and Russia agree on the need for political stability in Syria:
Although Netanyahu does not verbally support Assad; recent foreign policy
changes show that Israel fears the security consequences of the Sunni
revolutionary takeover of Syria. The transition to greater convergence with
Russia in the Syrian conflict has been a gradual process rather than a sudden
policy change. We see that the power of Bashar al-Assad to remain and the
growing presence of ISIS has led Netanyahu to change his approach in Syria
to a strategy of closer alliance with Russia. An alliance that may be referred to
by the Israelis as a strategic alliance, but seems to be more of a tactical
alliance by the Russians, although it can ultimately be assumed that this
alliance could lead to a new regional order in the Middle East.

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