Anisa Begum V
Anisa Begum V
Anisa Begum V
14. In view of the aforesaid criteria an order under Section 451 of the Code
must be said to be essentially interlocutory in nature. Section 451 empowers a
criminal court to make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of the
property produced before it during any inquiry or trial, pending conclusion of
the inquiry or trial. The purpose of such an order obviously is to preserve the
property either as evidence or in order to make a proper order after the case is
over. No doubt, Section 451 gives wide discretion to the court to make orders
for proper custody of the property pending trial but it does not confer
jurisdiction upon it to investigate and decide the question of title or ownership
of the rival claimants to the property. An order under Section 451 is not
intended even to decide the right of the parties to pass on the property produced
before the court and it is only intended to ensure proper custody of the property
during the pendency of the trial. Of course, the order being discretionary in
nature the Court has to exercise the discretion vesting in it judicially keeping in
view all the circumstances of the case. In the process the Court may incidentally
be guided by the consideration as to who is the person prima facie entitled to the
possession of the case property and hand over its possession to him with a view
to safeguard his interest but that may not be the sole consideration for the Court
while entrusting custody of the case property or property used in the
commission of an offence etc. to any of the rival claimants. One cannot be
oblivious to the fact that the property produced in Court during the course of an
inquiry or trial it custodia legis and it remains so even when its custody is
entrusted to anyone of the rival claimants or anyone else because he is liable to
produce the same as and when directed by the Court. The power to recall
entrustment for any reason which the Court may deem fit inheres in the Court in
the very nature of the circumstances and the purpose for which the property is
entrusted on Superdari. The duration of such entrustment can at best be until the
conclusion of the trial. So, in the eye of law, his possession or custody is only
that of Court. Section 452 specifically deals with the disposal of such property
at the conclusion of the inquiry or trial. It is at that stage that the Court has to
determine as to which of the rival claimants is entitled to possession thereof. As
a necessary corrolary it would follow that the entrustment of the case property
to any of the rival claimants under Section 451 does not amount to adjudication
of any right much less the competing rights of the rival claimants. Of course,
other ways of the disposal of the case property as envisaged in the said Section
have also to be considered. Looked at the whole matter from this angle it cannot
be said that the order of the learned Magistrate purported to decide or affect the
right of the rival claimants in the instant case. Obviously he made the order
giving custody of the seized goods to the petitioner as she was the complainant
and had claimed that the goods in question belonged to her deceased husband
No doubt, the respondent, who is arraigned as lin accused, produced some
documents to show that he had purchased such uke goods but it was not the
stage for the learned Magistrate to embark upon a detailed inquiry. The stage for
evidence regarding the stolen nature of the goods has yet to arrive and it is only
at the conclusion of the trial that the Court can come to the conclusion whether
the goods in question belonged to the deceased husband of the complainant or
not. So, the order of the learned Magistrate cannot be said to suffer from any
jurisdictional or legal infirmity. It cannot be said to be even unjust, improper or
capricious as adversely affecting the rights of the respondent. By no stretch of
reasoning it can be said to be a “matter of moment” as envisaged in Amar
Nath (supra).