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Modernism and Postmodernism

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 CHAPTER 22

Modernism and Postmodernism

Paul‐François Tremlett

FS
O
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Modernism and postmodernism are terms associated with ongoing debates about
society on the one hand and knowledge and the knowing subject on the other. These
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debates began in the early decades of the nineteenth century and focused on the
emergence of industrial society and on the sciences as we know them today. If industrial
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modernity and the new sciences of “Man” bore the promise of a brighter, more rational
future, they also seemed to augur constant change and uncertainty. Modernism
anticipated a brighter tomorrow but at heart was a series of seemingly insoluble
EC

tensions. The centrifugal forces of industry and capital appeared to be at odds with the
centripetal ties of culture, nationhood, and belonging. The new mobilities, knowledge,
and freedoms that markets, the sciences, and secular and democratic polities made
possible promised adventure but also appeared to signal the disappearance of any stable
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center or ground for thought.

If modernism was linked to the advent of industrial society, postmodernism
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anticipated a digital revolution, predicting that this revolution would undermine the
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society and the “Man” of the modern. The successive economic crises and violent
horrors of the twentieth century did much to puncture the promises of rationality,
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freedom, and prosperity that had defined the modern. After World War II, feminist and
postcolonial critiques of power and knowledge claimed to expose fissures of gender,
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race, and power at the heart of the modern: modernism’s knowing subject was shown
to be not as a universal subject but as male, white, and privileged.
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The Wiley Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion, Second Edition.

Edited by Robert A. Segal and Nickolas P. Roubekas.
© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2021 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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 326 PAUL-FRANÇOIS TREMLETT 

Did postmodernism replace modernism? Hardly. Postmodernism instead intensified

a sense of crisis that was already at the heart of the modern. Did postmodernism go too
far? Postmodernists have been accused of nihilism, of ignorance of science, of hysteria,
of being French, and of being incomprehensible or worse. Many have stuck with
modernism, though some, this author included, are inclined to think that modernism
and postmodernism are intertwined. Moreover, there are also new “isms” – the new
materialism is a notable example – which revisit the terms modernism and
postmodernism.

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Modernism

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Let us begin with Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte (1798–1857). For

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Comte, who was writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution, it seemed that a
new, rational, and modern industrial‐scientific order was emergent. The old, feudal

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formation of aristocracy, Church, and monarchy, with its arbitrary privileges, had
been eclipsed in the violent energies of the revolution of 1789. Comte, like many of
his contemporaries, such as Henri Saint‐Simon, saw an opportunity to establish a
new, industrial society, built on rational‐secular principles and led by scientists and
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industrialists. In his early writings Comte sought to understand the post‐
revolutionary crisis as a “social system which is dying” but also as a sign of a “new
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system whose time has come and which is in the process of taking definitive shape”
(Comte 1998, 49). Comte also began to recognize that the industrial‐scientific
modernity which he and others had at first uncritically associated with progress,
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demonstrated “a continuous tendency to deterioration and dissolution” (Comte 1998,

210). Comte believed that a new science was therefore needed to reorganize society
by raising “politics to the rank of the sciences of observation” (Comte 1998, 81). Initially,
he called the new science “social physics” (Comte 1998, 158), but toward the end of
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the Course in Positive Philosophy (1830–1839) he coined the term “Sociology” and
for this reason is often considered the founder of the discipline. (Ibn Khaldun [1332–
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1406)] offers an alternative genealogy for the discipline.) Comte’s sociology drew its
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initial methodological inspiration from physiology, but by the late 1830s he had
fleshed out a vision of the new science to include “statics” and “dynamics,” the one
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to analyze the structure of a given society and the other to consider its historical
development.
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Comte’s vision of sociology emerged not only from his analysis of the society of his
day but also from his interest in the long historical development of the sciences. Comte
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argued that the value of the sciences lay in their methods: in astronomy this was
observation, in biology it was comparison. He coined the term “positivism” to identify
scientific knowledge, which could be distinguished from theological and metaphysical
knowledge.
Like Comte, Karl Marx (1818–1883) understood that the historical transition
to a modern, industrial and political order had unleashed at once progressive and
dissipative energies. Moreover, he understood that the rise of modernity was tied to

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  MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 327

the decline of religion. In The Communist Manifesto (1968 [1848]) he and Engels
wrote that

constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions,

everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
All fixed, fast‐frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and
opinions are swept away, all new‐formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All
that is solid melts into air. (Marx and Engels 1968 [1848], 83)

FS
According to Marx, at the heart of capitalism lay a fundamental contradiction of
profit and wages: the pursuit of profit by the factory owner was inevitably pitted against

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the pursuit of wages by the factory worker. Marx argued that the energy of history
derived precisely from struggles between classes, predicting that a decisive battle would

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be fought once those classes had polarized into two rival blocks, the bourgeoisie and
proletariat, with the proletariat destined to triumph.

PR
We might smile wryly at Marx’s conception of history, in which a chosen subject – the
proletariat or working class – plays a redemptive and eschatological role bringing
freedom to all. But his sociological modeling of society and processes of social change
deserves to be taken seriously. In the “Preface” to A Critique of Political Economy (1992
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[1859]) he distinguished the “real foundation” or the economic structure of society
from the “superstructure” (Marx 1992 [1859], 425). Where the economy could be
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empirically specified “with the precision of natural science” (Marx 1992 [1859], 426),
the superstructure was merely a collection of “ideological forms” (Marx 1992 [1859],
426). The distinction between “the real” and the “ideological” is significant: Marx was
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arguing that, to understand society, we need an objectivity that cannot be found in the
partial and limited, or ideological, perspectives of subjective experience. In The German
Ideology (1970 [1932]), as in the “Preface,” Marx was searching for this objectivity – “a
critical attitude” to the “phantoms of their brains” (Marx 1970 [1932], 37) – like a
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doctor seeking a diagnosis for a sick or perhaps even a deluded patient.

But was not Marx part of the very object (society) that he was studying? If so, on
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what basis could he claim to see society objectively? And if he could not, is not all
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knowledge ideological, or saturated by the values and experiences of the time of its
articulation? Whither, then, the “precision of natural science”? For Marx, as for Comte,
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the scientific method was the guarantee of objectivity, a claim that would in time come
to be attacked by the postmodernists.
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Émile Durkheim’s (1858–1915) sociology, like Comte’s, addressed the questions of

progress and dissipation in the transition to modernity and of the development of
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sociology as a social science. According to Durkheim, the advent of the modern meant
the transition to an increasingly complex kind of society characterized by what he
called “the division of labor,” in which social roles were increasingly formalized and
specialized. Contrasting “mechanical” to “organic” and traditional to modern forms of
social solidarity and society, Durkheim explored the consequences of greater individual
autonomy for modern societies. In The Division of Labor (2014 [1893]) and in Suicide
(1952 [1897]) he attended to a phenomenon he called “anomie.” Anomie refers to the

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 328 PAUL-FRANÇOIS TREMLETT 

breakdown of the norms and values of ordinary thought and behavior. For Durkheim,
anomie functioned contagiously, with the potential to spread through and fatally disrupt
the social body. Durkheim’s sociology was conceived to “find an objective criterion,
inherent in the facts themselves,” that would “allow us to distinguish scientifically
health from sickness in the various orders of social phenomena” so that “science will be
in a position to throw light on practical matters while remaining true to its own method”
(Durkheim 1982 [1895], 86).
Durkheim’s interests in modernity and anomie informed his later work on religion. In

FS
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]) he developed a highly original
and influential theory of religion. Drawn from accounts of aboriginal rituals and beliefs
it had significant implications for theorizing both traditional and modern societies and

O
their solidarities. According to Durkheim (1915 [1912], 225), the “primary object” of
religion was “not to give man a representation of the world” but to give “a system of

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ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are
members and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it.” These

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“obscure but intimate relations” were organized symbolically: the totemic rite assembled
individuals who felt compelled by some external force. However, this external force was
not any religious being or power but society itself, as symbolized by the totem, which is
the “flag” or “emblem” of the society (Durkheim 1915 [1912], 206). Durkheim was
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suggesting that social solidarity depended on the misrecognition by worshipers of the
real source of the religious and moral power of the deity. For him, all societies need
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something like the unifying power of ritual and religion to resist the disruptive forces
unleashed by the transition to modernity.
Let me summarize. First, Comte, Marx, and Durkheim understood that the heart of
EC

the modern were forces of progress and transformation (the historical transition to an
industrial, scientific society) but also ones of dissipation and disintegration (the
transition had the potential to unravel the social fabric). Second, they assumed that the
emergence of new sciences such as sociology, together with the increasing specialization
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of the sciences generally, was related to the decline of traditional religion although for
Durkheim this did not rule out the preservation of religion in new forms, such as
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nationalism.
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Max Weber’s (1864–1920) notion of “disenchantment” offers a very different take

on progress, knowledge, and modernity. According to Weber, disenchantment marked
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the moment when “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play”
and “one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber 1991 [1922], 139).
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It implied the reduction of the world to a series of instrumentally oriented forms of

decision‐making purged of empathic, sacred, or emotional elements. The pursuit of
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personal interest and advantage was a blueprint for all human action. If the modernisms
of Comte, Marx, and Durkheim rested on the conception of historical time as
developmental and progressive, Weber’s conception of disenchantment reversed the
flow, arguably anticipating a wider exhaustion. At the end of The Protestant Ethic and
Spirit of Capitalism (2002 [1905]), he suggested that Protestant modernity was “bound
to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which today determine
the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism,” speculating that it

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  MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 329

would “determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt” (Weber 2002
[1905], 123). This bleak vision was mitigated only by Weber’s claim that eruptions of
charisma could break the bars of the “iron cage” (Weber 2002 [1905], 123):

Charisma in its most potent forms disrupts rational rule as well as tradition altogether and
overturns all notions of sanctity. Instead of reverence for customs that are ancient and
hence sacred, it enforces the inner subjection to the unprecedented and absolutely unique
and therefore Divine. In this purely empirical and value‐free sense charisma is indeed the

FS
specifically creative revolutionary force in history. (Weber 1978 [1922], 1117)

Weber’s modernism envisioned the increasing subordination of social life to the

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calculations – the disenchantments – of secular, scientific rationality, posing the
unfettered experience of charisma, which is shorthand for a powerful religious

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experience, as the only potential source for restoring meaning to human life.
The contrast between Comte, Marx, and Durkheim on the one hand and Weber on

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the other illustrates the double‐life of the modern: from the celebration of progress and
the expanding powers of industry and the sciences to the problematization of progress
and the turn to experience. The binary opposition of reason to experience mobilized
much of the critique of the modern, with experience constituting a kind of excess that
seemingly could not be contained by the sciences.
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Postmodernism
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In The Postmodern Condition (1984 [1979]) Jean‐François Lyotard (1924–1998) defined

the postmodern “as incredulity toward metanarratives” (1984 [1979], xxiv). According
to Lyotard, the modern and its legitimacy rested in a linked series of linear
“metanarratives.” Postmodernism was a rejection of the modern and its discourses of
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legitimacy, whether founded in “the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning,

the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth”
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(Lyotard 1984 [1979], xxiii). For Lyotard, the expectations of Marxism and
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liberalism – that we could be free and prosperous and also that our freedom and
prosperity could be founded upon sound knowledge of the world – were no longer to be
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taken seriously. These fables could no longer legitimate either the sciences or the social
bond.
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According to Lyotard, the modern conception of knowledge had been based on the
idea of representation and on a “realistic epistemology” for which knowledge consisted
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in the “reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it” or, what has
been called a “mirror theory of knowledge” (Jameson 1984, viii). The social bond was
constituted through the same epistemological apparatus of political representation. For
Lyotard, the postmodern coincided with the emergence of a new kind of post‐industrial
society and, in particular, with the emergence of new, digital information technologies
poised to alter radically the epistemological and political configurations of knowledge,
the sciences, and society. The advent of the postmodern, then, signalled the eclipse of

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 330 PAUL-FRANÇOIS TREMLETT 

the modern linear metanarratives by myriad, incommensurable, and nonlinear little

narratives. Moreover, these “petit[s] récit[s]” (Jameson 1984, 60) would now do the
work of legitimating the sciences, knowledge, and society.
Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–1995) essay on “Postscript on the Societies of Control”
(1992) is similarly an anticipation of the end of the modern, though it is also a reflection
on Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) work on the prison and disciplinary society. In
Discipline and Punish (1991 [1975]) Foucault analyzed a plan for a prison designed by
the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) called the “Panopticon.”

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Foucault argued that this plan was more than just a blueprint for a single building. It
was a model for society:

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The celebrated, transparent, circular cage, with its high tower, powerful and knowing, may
have been for Bentham a project of a perfect disciplinary institution; but he also set out to

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show how one may “unlock” the disciplines and get them to function in a diffused, multiple,
polyvalent way throughout the whole social body. These disciplines, which the classical age

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had elaborated in specific, relatively enclosed spaces – barracks, schools, workshops – and
whose total implementation had been imagined only at the limited and temporary scale of
a plague‐stricken town, Bentham dreamt of transforming into a network of mechanisms
that would be everywhere and always alert, running through society without interruption
in space or time. The panoptic arrangement provides the formula for this generalization. It
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programmes, at the level of an elementary and easily transferable mechanism, the basic
functioning of a society penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms.
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(Foucault 1991 [1975], 208–209)

This was Foucault’s “disciplinary society” (1991 [1975], 209), where the school, the
EC

hospital, the factory, and the prison constituted distinct, closed spatial environments,
each with its own rules and hierarchies designed to concentrate, order, and administer
particular resources. Deleuze anticipated a “crisis” of these institutions (see
Deleuze 1992, 4) and the emergence of new forms of control in their stead. If disciplinary
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society was defined by the prison, societies of control would be defined by the corporation,
networked horizontally through new computer technologies and embedded in spatial
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environments that would generate an illusion of freedom.

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Where Lyotard and Deleuze seem open to the possibilities of the postmodern – as a
new kind of social, political, and epistemological space – Jean Baudrillard’s (1929–
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2007) work is marked by nostalgia and melancholia. In In the Shadow of the Silent
Majorities (2007 [1978]) he argued that “the basic temporal form of society . . . is no
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longer that of a progressive, expanding or historical society . . . . Evolution has now not
just slowed down, it has entered a phase of contraction in which a whole new series of
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laws apply: a society in a phase of inward implosion” (Gane 1991, 130). Comte and
Durkheim had transformed society into an object for scientific and sociological
analysis. But Baudrillard’s sociology envisions the increasing impenetrability of it to
the sociological gaze as “an opaque nebula whose growing density absorbs all
surrounding energy” that finally brings to an end “all those schemas of production,
radiation and expansion according to which our imaginary functions”
(Baudrillard 2007 [1978], 36–37).

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  MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 331

In Fatal Strategies (1999 [1983]) Baudrillard went as far as to pose the reversal of
Descartes’ certainties, describing a dream‐like, diabolical, and highly gendered world
that defies rational analysis and that overpowers the modern knowing subject, much as
the femme fatale of film noir overpowered and disoriented her male rivals. In Simulations
(1983) he went further, suggesting that the mirror theory of knowledge had moved
entirely away from representation and descended into simulation and hyper‐reality:

Abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept.

FS
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the
­generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no
longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the

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­territory . . . [I]t is the map that engenders the territory. (Baudrillard 1983, 2)

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Baudrillard’s poetic, vertiginous, and hyperbolic prose did much to secure the ire of
those who like some facts with their theory, but nevertheless it did point to a real

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problem: the methodology of the social sciences presupposed the availability of facts to
rational enquiry that could then be explained through testable theories and predictions,
all of which stood outside any particular observer, time, or place. The broad postmodern
riposte was to insist that predictions, facts, and theories could not be disentangled from
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the observer and were rather always already saturated with the values of the observer’s
time and place. Foucault’s work on “epistemes,” discourse, and power and knowledge
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argued that history was characterized by dramatic shifts in the organization of

knowledge, while his claim that “discourses . . . [are] practices that systematically form
the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972 [1969], 49) seemed to suggest that
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facts did not exist prior to their articulation through theories and methods.
Foucault’s ideas would inspire a range of postmodern, feminist, and postcolonial
scholarship. Edward Said’s (1935–2003) concept of “Orientalism” drew directly from
Foucault’s notion of discourse, posing the question as to whether the Orient was a real
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place or instead a product of the discourse of Orientalism that rather less than innocently
articulated the rapacious ambitions and racial prejudices of Empire (see Said 1991
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[1978], 272). Donna Haraway’s (b. 1944) interrogation of metaphors of vision in

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scientific discourse sought to reclaim the “sensory system that has been used to signify
a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere” (Haraway 1991,
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188). Arguing for the “embodied nature of all vision,” she proposed a feminist model of
objectivity or “situated knowledges” (Haraway 1991, 188). That model eschewed the
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transcendence of modernism’s (gendered) view from nowhere, so that “we might

become answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway 1991, 190). Haraway did
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remain committed to the possibility of “faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world”

(Haraway 1991, 187).
The insistence that scientific practices of observation and experiment were not value
neutral directed attention to the context of scientific enquiry, a move that had already
been made by the historian Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996). Kuhn could hardly be
described as postmodern, yet his work anticipates some of the key elements of
postmodernism. For example, Kuhn envisioned the history of science in terms of shifts

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 332 PAUL-FRANÇOIS TREMLETT 

and breaks rather than as incremental progress. According to Kuhn, the history of the
sciences was less a steady growth of knowledge than a series of paradigm shifts that he
called “scientific revolutions,” or “non‐cumulative developmental episodes in which an
older [scientific] paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one”
(Kuhn 1998 [1962], 86).
Kuhn also disputed the idea that the observation of facts provided the ultimate
criteria upon which rival theories could be confirmed or falsified. Rather, the standards
of assessment were internal to the paradigm and therefore varied from paradigm to

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paradigm. Consequently, “not only are there no mutually agreed, theory‐neutral
observational facts but there are also no agreed standards of assessment to apply to
them. In both these respects, competing paradigms are incommensurable” (Keat and

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Urry 1975, 57).
Postmodernism is an intensification of a sense of crisis already at the heart of the

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modern: the suspicion that the modern historical optimism is unfounded, calling into
question the legitimacy of liberal and Marxist social and political projects, problematizing

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the knowing subject and the orders of knowledge, particularly in the social sciences.
The work of Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) is significant because of his insistence on the
emancipatory content of the modern and of critical reason and because of his critique
of the “philosophy of the subject.”
D
Habermas presents two forms of reason. The first is “subject‐centred reason,” for
which the scientific method consists in the classification, representation, comparison,
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and evaluation of objects. The second is communicative reason, where “the knowledge
of objects” is “replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects
capable of speech and action” (Habermas 1990 [1985], 295–296). At the center of the
EC

modern, according to Habermas, is the notion of a solitary reasoning or knowing

subject, that develops a knowledge of objects external to itself (as per the idea of the
mirror theory of knowledge). But Habermas claims that this view limits the manner in
which human beings can relate to one another and to the world. It confines them
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ontologically because the world becomes a realm of entities to be measured. It limits

them epistemologically to the capacity to describe particular states of affairs in the
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world or to bring them about through purposive and calculating rational action. And it
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restricts them semantically to factual statements. As such, Habermas proposes a shift to

a notion of what he calls “communicative rationality,” which purportedly provides the
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possibility for a form of reason that is not located in any all‐powerful knowing subject
but rather is one held between dialogically engaged co‐subjects. Here lies the possibility
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of knowledge generated through dialogue rather than through domination.

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Conclusion

It is not possible to do justice here to the range of literature covered by the terms
modernism and postmodernism. Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939) disturbing account of
desire, as revealed through the analysis of dreams, slips of the tongue, and religion,
seems both to confirm the enterprise of the modern through psychoanalysis as a new,

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  MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM 333

exciting science of the Self and to cut it adrift with its insistence on the entanglements
of the rational self with a panoply of instincts, energies, and appetites. Martin
Heidegger’s (1889–1976) phenomenology, with its concern for the Self and its striving
for an authentic life amidst all the distractions and seductions of mass society, makes it
influential, if not constitutive, of a certain attack on science as a form of rationalist
reductionism.
Indeed, the insistence on a kind of excess that is simultaneously beyond scientific
analysis and a site of resistance against a totalitarian rationalism cuts across both

FS
modernism and postmodernism, from Durkheim through the Collège de Sociologie to
Baudrillard and Foucault. Rationalist, feminist, and postcolonial scholars have fought
over the terms in detail. Postmodernists, including Baudrillard, Deleuze, and Lyotard,

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linked postmodernism to the advent of new, digital technologies that were supposedly
poised to alter radically the epistemological and political configurations of knowl-

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edge, the sciences, and society. The emergence of these new technologies and media
has certainly created novel forms of communication, political protest, and belonging,

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transgressing sovereignties while in turn becoming drawn into new forms of c­ orporate
and state power. As the national churches of Europe die off, new, mobile, multi‐­
platform Christianities, for example, have emerged across the global south, energizing
the diaspora. Old arrangements, sensibilities, and ideas are crumbling or being
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­reconfigured. It is difficult to judge from our limited local vantage point the import of
the technological revolution that is underway. Perhaps the only thing of which we
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can be sure is that modernism and postmodernism constitute important resources for
reflection.
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Baudrillard, Jean. 1999 [1983]. Fatal Strategies. Edited by Jim Fleming. Translated by Philip
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Baudrillard, Jean. 2007 [1978]. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities. Translated by Paul Foss,
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