Money As Tool Money As Drug The Biologic

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29, 161– 209
Printed in the United States of America
Money as tool, money as drug: The

biological psychology of a strong
incentive
Stephen E. G. Lea
University of Exeter, School of Psychology, Washington Singer Laboratories,
Exeter EX4 4QG, United Kingdom
[email protected] http://www.exeter.ac.uk/SEGLea
Paul Webley
University of Exeter, School of Psychology, Washington Singer Laboratories,
Exeter EX4 4QG, United Kingdom
[email protected] http://www.exeter.ac.uk/pwebley
Abstract: Why are people interested in money? Specifically, what could be the biological basis for the extraordinary incentive and
reinforcing power of money, which seems to be unique to the human species? We identify two ways in which a commodity which is
of no biological significance in itself can become a strong motivator. The first is if it is used as a tool, and by a metaphorical
extension this is often applied to money: it is used instrumentally, in order to obtain biologically relevant incentives. Second,
substances can be strong motivators because they imitate the action of natural incentives but do not produce the fitness gains for
which those incentives are instinctively sought. The classic examples of this process are psychoactive drugs, but we argue that the
drug concept can also be extended metaphorically to provide an account of money motivation. From a review of theoretical and
empirical literature about money, we conclude that (i) there are a number of phenomena that cannot be accounted for by a pure
Tool Theory of money motivation; (ii) supplementing Tool Theory with a Drug Theory enables the anomalous phenomena to be
explained; and (iii) the human instincts that, according to a Drug Theory, money parasitizes include trading (derived from
reciprocal altruism) and object play.
Keywords: economic behaviour; evolutionary psychology; giving; incentive; money; motivation; play; reciprocal altruism
1. Why are people interested in money?

STEPHEN LEA is Professor of Psychology at the Univer-
This target article seeks to provide a biological explanation sity of Exeter, U.K. He is the author of more than 150
publications spanning the areas of animal cognition,
for one of the strongest motivations of humans living in behavioural ecology, economic behaviour, and human
modern societies: the desire to obtain money. We start visual perception. As well as being one of the founders
by establishing some definitions. What do we mean by a of modern economic psychology in Europe, he is well
“biological explanation”? What do we mean by money? known for his research on pattern recognition and
And what do we mean by the motivation to obtain money? concept discrimination in birds, and for bringing
together ecological, economic, and psychological
approaches in the analysis of both human and animal
1.1. Biological explanation behaviour. Within economic psychology he has special-
By the 1950s, the “grand theories of everything” that had ised in the study of debt and giving, as well as the
psychology of money, but has also co-authored or
emerged in early twentieth-century psychology seemed
edited several more general books with Paul Webley.
to have become extinct. But with the publication of
Richard Dawkins’ (1976) book The Selfish Gene, the PAUL WEBLEY is Professor of Economic Psychology
strongly Darwinian approach that has been called, with and currently Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the Univer-
slightly varying nuances, sociobiology or evolutionary psy- sity of Exeter, U.K. His books include The Individual
chology emerged as a new and potentially universal way of in the Economy (Lea et al. 1987), Tax Evasion: An
addressing the Why questions about human behaviour. If Experimental Approach (Webley et al. 1991), New
people do something, the sociobiological argument runs, it Directions in Economic Psychology: Theory, Exper-
must be because (a) doing it confers a selective advantage; iment and Application (Lea et al. 1992), Children’s
or (b) although doing it does not now confer a selective Saving (Sonuga-Barke & Webley 1993), and The Econ-
omic Psychology of Everyday Life (Webley et al. 2001).
advantage, it did at some period in our evolutionary past, His current research is concerned with the economic
most likely in the early history of Homo sapiens, within psychology of personal money management (saving,
the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation; or (c) the debt, investment), tax compliance, and children’s econ-
tendency to do it is a by-product of some other tendency, omic behaviour.
which does or did confer such an advantage.
# 2006 Cambridge University Press 0140-525x/06 $12.50 161

Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
Biological explanation does not imply that human beha- We treat these effects of money as “stylised facts.” They
viour is “innate,” “hard-wired,” or will inevitably take a could be questioned, but in this article we accept them
particular form. Humans are social and cultural animals, without further discussion. Our aim is to explain them
and any observed human behaviour is the product of a par- by reference to other known human motivations, known
ticular social and cultural environment interacting with features of human nature, or particular features of the
human nature: genetically adaptive instincts are always socialization of children.
manifested in culturally specified ways. Selective advan-
tage is not an alternative to social and cultural factors as
1.4. The problem
a kind of explanation, but if an explanation is to be
classed as “biological,” then selective advantage must be Most strong human motivations have two characteristic
part of it – even if the behaviour currently being properties, which make them easy to explain in evolution-
explained, in current circumstances, confers no such ary terms:
advantage. 1. Adaptiveness: The motivations direct people
towards, or away from, stimuli of obvious significance for
the survival of individuals or the propagation of their
1.2. The nature of money genes. This is true not only of motivations such as
hunger and thirst that are related to individual tissue
In talking about money, we mean just that – money itself,
needs, but also of such motives as the need for social com-
money as a distinctive economic institution and its physical
panions, sexual drives, and parental care.
embodiments in particular kinds of money stuff. We are
2. Darwinian continuity: The motivations are either
investigating the psychology of money, not using it as a
exact homologues of motives that exist in all or many
metaphor for property and possessions (for which see
related species of animals, or (more commonly) they are
Rudmin 1991) or economic activity generally (for which
obviously derived from such motives. Continuity does
see, e.g., Lea et al. 1987; Webley et al. 2001). It may
not require that human motives should be identical to
well be that someone who seeks out money is seeking it
those of other animals. Humans hunger for a wider and
out for the sake of what it can buy. Indeed, one of the
more culturally defined range of foods than do other
two theories that we consider here supposes that this is
apes (cf. Mennell et al. 1992); human sexual motivations
always the case (we call this the Tool Theory). But the
are unusually independent of the biological need to repro-
point of our target article is that this is not the only concei-
duce (e.g., Symons 1979); human curiosity takes us into
vable theory, because although the desire for money is
scientific explorations that are unparalleled by the explora-
undeniably closely connected to the desire for the things
tory motivations shown by many other species (cf. Berlyne
that it can buy, the two are logically distinct and need to
1960); human politics are much more complex than the
be investigated separately. Part, but only part, of that
socially motivated behaviours of, say, chimpanzees (cf.
investigation is to establish whether and how the psychol-
de Waal 1982; 1996). Many of these variations on motiva-
ogy of possessions, and of other human motives, leads to a
tional themes are informed by, and informative about,
psychology of money.
cultural differences. But we have no difficulty in under-
Although we are talking about money in a narrow, con-
standing where these complex human motivations come
crete sense, our notion of money stuff is broad. We include
from, evolutionarily speaking, and we can speculate in
the coins and notes that are at the core of people’s concept
sensible ways about how they have become more
of money in present-day societies (cf. Snelders et al. 1992),
complex over the five million years or so since the diver-
but we also include both the so-called primitive moneys
gence of the ancestral lines that led to chimpanzees and
(Einzig 1966) and more modern ones, such as cheques,
bonobos on the one hand, and humans on the other.
credit cards, marks in bank ledgers, and memory states
Most human motives show adaptiveness and Darwinian
of bank computers. Any substance or medium is within
continuity in an obvious way. It is therefore reasonable to
the scope of our discussion if it fulfils or appears to fulfil
talk about people as displaying a “hunger instinct” or a “sex
the three basic functions of money: as a medium of
instinct” or even a “political instinct” – though we must
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value (discussed
always recognise that the way in which those instincts
further in sect. 3.1).
play out in actual human behaviour is a function of
culture and individual experience; they are not instincts
in the sense of being inflexible, hardwired micro-
1.3. The motivation to obtain money
mechanisms. The motivation to acquire money, however,
By saying that people are motivated to obtain money, we is not directly adaptive, and has no obvious parallels in
mean that when people live in a culture where money is the behaviour of other animals. Furthermore, it cannot
used, money enters into human behaviour in some of be imagined to result from some evolutionary process
the same ways as commonly recognised motivators such that has occurred within the hominid period: money has
as food or sex. More specifically, (a) money acts as an emerged only within the last 3,000 years or so (Davies
incentive: if people can perceive or understand that a par- 2002), too short a time for significant genetic adaptation
ticular action is likely to lead to them obtaining money, to its existence; besides, individuals born into cultures
they are more likely to perform that action (though they that have never used money quickly come to use it if
will not inevitably do so, since there may be constraints they move into a money-using culture. Money, therefore,
from conflicting motivations); and (b) money acts as a rein- is a problem for a biological account of human motivation.
forcer: actions that in the past led to a person receiving We cannot reasonably talk about a “money instinct.”
money are more likely to be repeated (though again, It is possible that there is no biological basis at all for our
they will not inevitably be). attraction to money, that it is a pure creation of culture,
162 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2

with no connection to human nature at all. That would familiar ends. For example, humans (and only humans)
make it an exception, perhaps even a unique exception, will use time and effort to acquire such modern artefacts
among strong human motives. We do not consider this as newspapers, radios, or television sets. The incentive
“pure cultural” hypothesis directly in this target article, value of newspapers is not biologically problematic. They
but indirectly it is under test since our task is to offer the are a means of gaining information about the environment,
best account we can of the biological origins of the money and most advanced animals can benefit from such infor-
motive. If that account fails to convince, the pure cultural mation: dogs use time and effort to sniff lampposts and
option would be all that remained. However, we cannot chaffinches use time and effort to listen to one another’s
leave culture out of our account, because human instincts songs. The biological value of information has been
are always manifested in a cultural context. Much empirical formally analysed in studies of group foraging in many
and theoretical work on the human interest in money has species of vertebrate (e.g., Mesterton-Gibbons &
been done within the culture-dominated sciences of Dugatkin 1999; Ward & Zahavi 1973), and operant
sociology and anthropology. We will draw on data from psychologists have shown that information may function
these sources throughout this article, and in particular we as an effective reward in nonhumans (e.g., Catania 1975;
will return to those analyses when we come to offer a Hendry 1969b), though only when it is correlated with a
synthetic account of the money motive (sect. 5). reduction in the delay before reward (Case & Fantino
1981). Similarly, many mammals seek out shelter to
1.5. Previous work spend the inactive period of their daily cycles and to
hide their developing offspring; many manufacture shel-
Despite the obvious power of the money motive, money has ters for such purposes; badgers dig setts, beavers build
been given little attention by psychologists writing about dams, and chimpanzees weave nests. None use bricks,
human motivation. There are no chapters devoted to it in mortar, and timber to build themselves houses, but we
general textbooks such as those by Mook (1987) or do not regard human house building as a biologically pro-
Weiner (1992), though extended accounts of specific blematic activity, or the incentive value of building tools
psychological theories in relation to money can be found and materials as a biologically problematic motivation.
(e.g., Bornemann 1976). Conversely, although economics The Tool Theory sees money in the same light. Econ-
naturally deals with money, it has been so little influenced omists have argued since the earliest days of the discipline
by evolutionary ideas (at least until fairly recently; cf. that when two people exchange scarce resources, the
Boulding 1981) that economists have not recognized the exchange can increase the wealth of both parties (e.g.,
problematic nature of the money motive. The questions Smith 1776/1908). Money is the most efficient means yet
we are interested in have mainly been addressed by discovered of making such exchanges possible. It is not
writers who have crossed disciplinary boundaries and con- the only means: among the other examples that have
sidered money from an economic but also from a more been analysed are the gift-mediated exchanges that were
general point of view: these include economists (e.g., used by the Trobriand Islanders (Malinowski 1922), and
Maital 1982; Scitovsky 1976), but also anthropologists the bartering systems by which tools were traded over
(e.g., Crump 1981), sociologists (e.g., Simmel 1900/1978; quite long distances in New Guinea and Queensland
Zelizer 1989), cultural historians (e.g., Seaford 2004), and (Sahlins 1974, Ch. 6). But these exchanges do not circulate
literary theorists (e.g., Shell 1982), as well as psychologists goods anything like so quickly, nor do they produce such a
(e.g., Furnham & Argyle 1998; Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12; Van large social gain in wealth, as money-mediated exchanges.
Veldhoven 1985). However, these sources offer general, On this view, money is not an incentive in itself; it is an
comprehensive accounts of the psychology of money. The incentive only because and only insofar as it can be
present article addresses a single more specific question: exchanged for goods and services. Those goods and ser-
Is there a biological reason why money is such a powerful vices are among that majority of incentives that do demon-
incentive? The question necessarily assumes that there is strate adaptiveness and Darwinian continuity, and if
coherent set of behaviours that we can class as human reac- money is a strong incentive, it is because the goods and
tions to money as an incentive, and that they have a single services it will buy are strong incentives. According to
explanation. To the extent that we are able to find a biologi- Tool Theory, we do not need a psychology of money at
cal reason for the strength of the money motive, we will be all, or we need it only in a limited sense: we only have to
giving support to that assumption. understand the job that money does and the human cogni-
tive system that enables us to use it. Cognitive psychology
2. Tool Theory and Drug Theory may allow us to understand why a system of a 100 cents to
the dollar has replaced Charlemagne’s system of 12 pence
Although money is unusual among powerful human to the shilling and 20 shillings to the pound, but such
motivators in having no immediate adaptive origins, it is understanding hardly deserves the name of a psychology
not unique. There are other examples, and between of money. In the same way as a literal tool like a screwdri-
them they furnish two classes of theory that can be ver mediates between our need to connect pieces of wood
applied to the problem of money motivation. We argue and the limited strength and dexterity of our hands and
that between them these exhaust the possibilities for a arms, so money mediates between our need to exchange
biological psychology of that motivation. commodities and the limited evaluating power of our
brains.
Obviously money is a tool only in a metaphorical sense.
2.1. Tool Theory
You can use money as a literal tool – as when you use a
Frequently, humans’ advanced culture and technology coin to undo the battery compartment of a bicycle lamp
provide us with biologically unprecedented means to or use a $100 bill to light a cigar. Flaunting a well-filled
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2006) 29:2 163

wallet as a means of social display is almost as crude. But meet the essential definition of a psychoactive drug as
such aberrant uses of money are not what we are talking having a nonfunctional, direct, effect on the nervous
about in Tool Theory. Tool Theory accepts the metaphori- system that affects our mental state. An instructive
cal extension of the idea of a tool inherent in the word example is saccharin, which produces much the same
“instrumental”; it sees money as a means to an end. As motivational effect as natural sugars like fructose or
we shall discuss in sect. 3.1, economic theory recognises lactose, without being a nutritive carbohydrate. It differs
that money has more than one function: it serves as a from alcohol or caffeine in that it produces an instant,
unit of account and a store of value, as well as a means perceptual effect instead of a longer lasting effect on
of exchange. But that does not undermine the notion of mood, and in the fact that the receptors it acts on are in
money as a tool – it means that, like a screwdriver, it is a our sense organs, not in our central nervous system. But
tool with a number of uses. Similarly, the possibility that neither seems to be an important point of principle: we
money is used for purposes such as social display, social might reasonably call saccharin a “perceptual drug” to
communication (Buchan 1997), or social protection note that it has a drug-like action, but not directly on the
(Doyle 1998) merely extends the range of uses for central nervous system. The historian of sugar, Sidney
money as a tool. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to Mintz, refers even to sucrose as a “drug food” (e.g.,
describe money, or anything else, as a “mere” tool; the Mintz 1986), on the grounds that its psychological effects
idea of a tool is a potentially powerful one, and has been are disproportionate to those of the sugars found in unpro-
used by philosophers such as Heidegger (e.g. 1927/1962) cessed foods.
and Innis (1984) to provide an account of basic phenom- If we grant this extension of the notion of a drug, we can
ena of cognition and perception. see that there are many other stimuli that produce the
same perceptual effect as some natural motivator, but
are not associated with any benefit to the perceiver.
2.2. Drug Theory Early ethologists discovered many stimuli that resembled
Although Tool Theory is the obvious account of the the Sign Stimulus for a Fixed Action Pattern sufficiently
motivation to acquire money, tools are not the only class to trigger a response: for example, cardboard disks elicited
of biologically unprecedented objects that can acquire sexual pursuit in Grayling butterflies, a striped knitting
strong incentive properties. A second class can be briefly needle elicited begging in herring gull chicks, and an
described as “drugs.” Just like the Tool Theory, the Easter egg elicited brooding in greylag geese (Tinbergen
Drug Theory of money depends on a metaphorical exten- 1951). Although it is to a male Grayling’s evolutionary
sion of the core idea, but we start with the most literal idea advantage to court a female Grayling, the butterfly gains
of a drug. nothing in fitness terms by pursuing a cardboard disk.
Furthermore, many natural sign stimuli will act as reinfor-
2.2.1. Drugs sensu stricto. Certain chemical substances, cers or incentives (e.g., Thompson 1963), and in all cases
such as alcohol, nicotine, caffeine, tetra-hydro cannabinol, that have been investigated, the artificial sign stimuli
cocaine, and morphine, can all become strong incentives, discovered by the ethologists have the same reinforcing
but their incentive power does not depend on their or incentive effects as the natural stimuli they mimic.
ability to produce other goods and services. Instead, they They therefore constitute a kind of functionless motivator.
produce distinct physiological states by direct action on Like saccharin, they could be called “perceptual drugs.”
some part of the body, usually the brain. The nervous Any “dishonest signalling” system exploits this perceptual
system contains numerous receptors for natural sub- drug action, and there are many such systems in nature.
stances that play a role in the body’s normal functioning, Well-known examples include the chicks of cuckoos or
and the existence of these receptors is readily explained other brood parasites eliciting feeding from the host
as adaptive. Drugs in the strict sense usually act on such parents by means of gaping behaviour and throat linings
receptors, changing a person’s nervous state. But we do that resemble those of host chicks, and deceptive orchids
not explain the existence of binding sites for drugs as adap- eliciting copulatory probing from bumblebees and
tive. We do not envisage early humans, or our pre-hominid thereby achieving pollen transfer. There are also situations
ancestors, gaining a selective advantage by smoking mari- within human cultures that seem to work in the same way.
juana. Instead, a psychoactive drug is thought of as a Visual pornography, or the exaggerated drawings used in
substance that by chance or by chemical similarity acts cartoons and advertising, can elicit and in some sense
in the same way as a body chemical, and which is therefore satisfy sexual or parental motivations (Lea 1984).
able to intrude upon the normal functioning of the nervous Such stimuli are only functionless in the strict,
system. By mimicking the action of some natural evolutionary sense of function. Within the life of the indi-
substance, it produces an abnormal response without vidual organism, they provide the same kind of gratifica-
being part of an ordered, functional sequence. The Drug tion as the corresponding fully functional stimulus. But
Theory of money motivation asserts that money, too, unlike that stimulus, they are not associated with the incre-
intrudes on the normal functioning of the nervous ment of biological fitness that, we assume, drove the
system. Clearly, however, money is not a psychoactive evolution of the motivational system in question.
chemical, so to develop the Drug Theory we need a meta-
phorically extended concept of a drug, just as the Tool 2.2.3. Cognitive drugs. Pornographic pictures mimic
Theory of money requires an extended concept of a tool. natural visual stimuli that are instinctually sexually arous-
ing, for functional reasons that are well understood in prin-
2.2.2. Perceptual drugs. Alcohol, nicotine, and the other ciple even if the details are open to much debate. But what
substances listed above are all familiarly recognized as psy- about pornographic text? Such material can undoubtedly
choactive drugs. There are other substances, however, that be sexually arousing, but it does not mimic any stimulus

that could be supposed to have an innate effect. Porno- help make the metaphor persuasive. Drugs can be very
graphy here serves as an extreme example of a general strong motivators; they are often addictive; an attraction
fact: we can be emotionally engaged by many kinds of to them frequently has bad consequences for the individ-
text, and therefore motivated to read them. Any such ual; and they give immediate reward where “real” motiva-
text must be thought of as a “cognitive drug.” Its effect tors can only do so over an extended period. As we discuss
depends on what we know and understand, not on what in section 4, all these features have been alleged of money.
we perceive; but like nicotine, like saccharin, and like But while these additional features of the money motiv-
the knitting needle that Tinbergen showed to herring ation make the idea of “money as drug” attractive, they
gull chicks, it elicits a response without delivering the do not define it. Finding that money did not possess
effects that make it adaptive for the organism to make these additional drug-like properties would make the
that response. Drug Theory less attractive, but not useless; finding
that money never acts as a functionless motivator would
2.2.4. The drug metaphor and Drug Theory. It may seem undermine it completely.
that we have extended the concept of a “drug” unreason-
ably, so let us recapitulate what we have discarded and
what we have retained. We have discarded the idea of a 2.3. Alternatives
chemical with an identifiable locus of action in the Could there be other accounts of the incentive value of
central nervous system. But we have retained the idea of money which do not fit within either Tool Theory or
a drug as a deceiver: a stimulus that is of no biological Drug Theory? Both assert that money gives access to bio-
significance in itself, but which has motivational properties logical rewards. Tool Theory covers cases where money
because it produces the same neural, behavioural, or gives real but indirect access to such rewards; Drug
psychological effect as some other stimulus that is Theory covers cases where it gives direct access to the
biologically significant. A drug in this extended sense is systems that subserve such rewards, but in an illusory,
any functionless motivator, obtaining its motivational nonfunctional way. Given that we are looking for a biologi-
effect by a parasitic action on a functional, evolutionarily cal understanding of money motivation, and given that we
adaptive system. are taking as unarguable that there has not been time for
It is from this metaphorical definition of a drug that we the evolution of a direct, functional, brain system to
derive our second biological account of the psychology of detect and respond to the acquisition of money, the two
money, which we call Drug Theory. On this account, theories seem to exhaust the range of possibilities
money acquires its incentive power because it mimics the between them. Tool Theory covers the cases where
neural, behavioural, or psychological action of some acquiring money is motivated by a real underlying func-
other, more natural incentive. Obviously, we are not tion; Drug Theory covers the cases of functionless
suggesting that there are biochemical receptor sites in the money motivation. It remains possible that an alternative,
brain on which, say, chemicals released by used five- completely nonbiological, model could give a more econ-
pound notes react. Nor are we suggesting that money has omical account of the phenomena (see sect. 1.4). This
a direct effect via the sense organs, like saccharin or means that only in a limited sense can we infer a role
visual pornography. But we do suggest that money can for Drug Theory from any failure of Tool Theory. If
“act like” natural incentives at a cognitive level, and its moti- Tool Theory fails, Drug Theory is then the only possible
vational power flows at least partly from this. In describing biological theory, and vice versa. But that is not evidence
money as a cognitive drug, however, we do not mean to dis- that it is a satisfactory biological theory, only that there
embody its action. Although the response to money must be is no better biological alternative.
mediated through the cognitive system, it is nonetheless an Money is neither literally a tool nor literally a drug.
affective response, just as the response to pornography, or These are both metaphors, which we have used in an
fiction, is not coldly cognitive. Cognitive drugs involve hot attempt to capture and contrast two distinct ways of
cognition (Anderson 1981). Furthermore, cognitive pro- explaining money within a biological approach to motiv-
cesses do imply correlated brain processes. The rapidly ation. We believe that between them they do exhaust the
expanding research field of neuroeconomics (Glimcher field of human behaviour towards money, but clearly
2003) has already shown, through brain imaging studies, they are not the only conceivable way of partitioning
that specific brain centres are activated in the presence of that field. With sufficient sophistication, it is virtually
money (e.g., Zink et al. 2004), and immediate monetary certain that the tool metaphor could be extended to
incentives stimulate parts of the brain that are associated cover all the phenomena which we shall conclude are
with immediate reward, not delayed reward (McClure better explained by a drug metaphor, and vice versa.
et al. 2004). This is the opposite of what would be expected Our most fundamental aim in this target article, therefore,
from Tool Theory, since on such a theory money is only is not to establish the superiority of one of these metaphors
interesting because of the biologically relevant rewards it over the other, but to deploy these metaphors in a rela-
can produce at a later time – a conclusion that is reinforced tively simple form to demonstrate the complexity of the
by the fact that in McClure et al.’s experiment, money was phenomena of money psychology.
delivered in the form of tokens for an online bookshop, so
the final reward could only be obtained after a delay of days.
Why should we use the drug metaphor for money, 3. Theories of money and money motivation
rather than some other alternative to Tool Theory? The
core reason is that a drug is a functionless motivator, and Tool Theory and Drug Theory, as we have developed them
that is what we want to assert that money sometimes is. here, are broad classes of psychological theories about the
But there are also other features of classic drugs that money motive. We now consider some particular theories

that explicitly or implicitly specify psychological mechan- government may well be motivated to change the value
isms for money motivation. We are not attempting an for policy reasons, to the detriment of economic affairs?
assessment of the plausibility of these theories, but Bell (2001) and Ingham (2001) trace from Adam Smith,
rather characterising them as versions either of Tool through Keynes and other twentieth-century economists,
Theory or Drug Theory. These categorizations are of the argument that government gives fiat money its value
course ours, not those of the original authors, who might by declaring that it is acceptable in settlement of tax liabil-
well have disagreed with them. ities. Ingham extends the argument, suggesting (following
Grierson; e.g., Grierson 1978) that the process of money
creation has an older history in the use of money to
3.1. The economic theory of money settle other kinds of non-market debts such as bride-
A typical economic textbook account states: price and the compensations for injury (Wergeld) that
whether money is shells or rocks or gold or paper, in any were common in early Germanic societies. The creation
economy it has three primary functions: it is a medium of of value through tax demands answers the metallists’
exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. Of these theoretical questions, and the historical observation that
three functions, its function as a medium of exchange is what governments often do interfere with the value of money
distinguishes money from other assets such as stocks, bonds is good evidence that modern money is in fact fiat money.
or houses. (Mishkin 1992, p. 21) The chartalist account of money is an obvious Tool
All that matters, for something to function in these ways, Theory. However, from our perspective, the metallist
is that all members of the relevant society should accept notion that abstract money must be backed by real
that it does so function. As Carruthers and Babb (1996) goods is a version of Drug Theory. Gold and silver make
put it, money is a “self-fulfilling collective prophecy.” good coinage because of their durability. But, according
Economists (and others) have divided sharply on what to metallism, nothing can work as money unless there is
enables something to be accepted as money. On the one a market for it for non-money purposes. Such a market
hand, there is the view – which, as Schumpeter (1954/ requires the substance to be scarce (which is true of
1994) shows, goes back to Aristotle – that money must gold and silver) but also desirable as a result of some
either have an “intrinsic” value, or at least be backed by human motive, which must therefore ultimately have a
a reliable promise from the issuing authority to exchange biological grounding. In the case of precious metals,
it for something of intrinsic value. Money that has this their ultimate incentive value is aesthetic: the desire for
property is called “commodity” money, signalling that beauty seems to be a biologically grounded motivation
the substance that is used as money, or that backs for our species, and gold and silver are useful in making
money, would be sought for its own sake even if it were beautiful and durable objects. According to the metallists,
not used as money. It is also referred to as “convertible” money backed by gold functions as a representation or
money, signifying that the money substance can be con- symbol of that desirable thing, and though they were at
verted into the underlying commodity. Because in pains to distinguish the symbol from the thing symbolised
complex economies the source of intrinsic or commodity (see Carruthers & Babb 1996), they were clear that it is
value has usually been gold, the view that money must because of the thing symbolised that money, the symbol,
be convertible in order to be effective is known as “metal- is desired. It is only because of this drug-like, mimicking
lism” or “bullionism.” It is by no means extinct; modern property that money is able to function as a tool.
monetarist economic theory is its direct descendant (Bell
2001; Ingham 2001).
The alternative view claims that money becomes 3.2. Psychological theories of money
acceptable by government fiat, that is, by its designation We review briefly here some historically important
as legal tender. Money with this property is called “fiat,” accounts of the psychology of money; they have been sur-
“fiduciary,” “chartal,” or “nonconvertible” money. As Bell veyed in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Furnham & Argyle
(2001) shows, this view, too, is ancient, but it first came 1998, Ch. 1; Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12).
to prominence with Adam Smith (1776/1908). Fierce
political debates between bullionists and chartalists arose 3.2.1. Depth psychology. Freud (1908/1959) commented
in Great Britain following a suspension of convertibility explicitly on the question of money, and in his discussion
in 1797 (Perlman 1986), and in the United States after of the anal character acknowledged that style of money
the end of the Civil War, during which both sides management was one of the most obvious ways in which
suspended convertibility (Carruthers & Babb 1996). people differ. Like modern evolutionary psychologists,
Both commodity and fiat accounts of money face diffi- Freud recognized the need to provide a biological expla-
culties. The well-documented emergence of cigarettes as nation of social behaviour. His explanation for the
a money substitute in prisoner-of-war camps looks like money motive was, characteristically, developmental. He
excellent evidence for a commodity theory, but it poses suggested that psychological involvement with money
two core problems: Why should people trade with a com- must start with its most familiar form, coins, and that inter-
modity instead of consuming it, and if they do use a com- est in these must derive by displacement from interest in
modity for trade, why does it generally circulate at a higher faeces. Thus, for Freud, and for later psychoanalysts like
value than it is worth for consumption (Burdett et al. Ferenczi (1914/1976) who developed Freud’s ideas, the
2001)? To bullionists, on the other hand, fiat money different individual behaviours and attitudes towards
poses two problems. First, why should people ever trust money, from the miser’s hoarding to the spendthrift’s
a purely arbitrary token? Second, if the value of money self-destructive carelessness, represented varieties of
is created by the mere act of declaring it to be legal anal eroticism. This is a basic Drug Theory: money acts
tender, what is to stabilise its value – especially as the on the developing human brain in the same way as

faeces, with the important difference that it is acceptable 3.3. Money in other social sciences
to parents and society at large for a child to take a close 3.3.1. Classic sociology of money. The classic social
interest in money. science view of money was shaped by Marx (1867/1932,
vol. 1, Chs. 1 –3) and Weber (1904/1976, Ch. 5). Both
3.2.2. Operant psychology. A very different kind of bio- linked the psychology of money to the capitalist mode of
logical psychology provides a further example of a Drug economic production. In Marx’s view, tradable economic
Theory. Skinner (1953, p. 79) accounted for money commodities are the products of human labour appearing
within his radical behaviourism as a generalised token as “independent beings endowed with life” (Marx 1867/
reinforcer. It is well established that stimuli paired with 1932, vol. 1, Ch. 1, sect. 4) through a process he describes
unconditioned reinforcers can acquire reinforcing power as “commodity fetishism,” in which certain compelling
and are then called conditioned (or secondary) reinforcers; images come to eclipse the objects they portray. The
if the stimuli are tangible objects, they are called token conversion of labour into money requires a double trans-
reinforcers. Skinner argued (p. 77) that if a single kind formation (Ch. 3, sect. 2), and therefore a double alien-
of conditioned reinforcer was paired with many different ation (of labour into the commodity produced, and of
kinds of unconditioned reinforcers, its reinforcing effect the commodity into money). For Marx, this abstraction,
would become independent of deprivation of any of or alienation, of perceived value from its origins in
them. Operant psychologists have seen this process as pro- human labour is a necessary step in the historical develop-
viding a good account of the reinforcing power of money. ment of a modern capitalist economy. Although lacking
To a cognitive psychologist, the token reinforcement technical psychological input, Marx’s account is plainly a
would be seen as a means to an end, and a conditioned theory about the psychology of money, and in our terms
reinforcement theory of money would be a version of it is a clear example of a Drug Theory; a “fetish” is a
Tool Theory. But within a radically behaviourist account, very reasonable description of a “functionless motivation,”
the incentive power of tokens, and hence of money, and incorporates well the notion of deception that is at the
derives from mere association with the goods and services core of the drug metaphor. Weber also saw the accumu-
it can buy; behaviour is not to be explained by supposing lation of money as essential to the development of capital-
that organisms understand causal relations. Skinner is ism, though in his account accumulation flows not from
deliberately agnostic about the brain mechanisms of desire, but from the paradoxical way in which Protestant-
reinforcement processes, but it is clear that, however ism equated working at worldly callings with virtue while
unconditioned reinforcers act, conditioned reinforcers disallowing consumption. This view leads to a Drug
must act in the same way, marking Skinner’s theory as a Theory more by default: since the tool use of money is
pure Drug Theory. Skinner’s is not the only behaviourist disallowed, money can only be sought for its own sake,
account of secondary or conditioned reinforcement (see even though, as Weber recognised, it is not within
the collections edited by Hendry 1969a and Wike 1966), human nature to do so (cf. Needleman 1994, pp. 143 –44).
though it is the one that has been applied most explicitly These classical views are capable of wider application
to explain behaviour towards money. However, other than the specific economic historical settings in which
accounts share the essential feature of Skinner’s, that Marx and Weber deployed them. The idea of commodity
the attraction to money develops through mechanistic fetishism continues to be used in modern sociological
principles of conditioning, and they too are therefore and anthropological analyses (e.g., Carruthers & Babb
drug theories. 1996; Desforges 2001; Snodgrass 2002), and the Protes-
tant Ethic has acquired new significance in the psycho-
3.2.3. The functional autonomy of drives. A similar metric analysis of behaviour towards money (Furnham
approach to money comes from social and personality 1990). But long before the recent period, a wider view
psychology. Allport (1937) coined the phrase “functional of the sociology of money had been taken by Simmel
autonomy” to describe motives that emerge from antece- (1900/1978) in his major work, Philosophie des Geldes
dent systems but become independent of them, so that (The Philosophy of Money). Simmel explored “just about
the link with the original motive is historical and not func- every conceivable topic connected to money” (Deflem
tional and “‘young’ systems may become stronger than the 2003). He agreed with Marx in seeing money as an instru-
older systems” (p. 363). Money can be seen as a good ment of alienation, but he did not see it solely in the
example of this process. This too is a kind of Drug context of the emergence of capitalism. For Simmel, it is
Theory: though the motive to acquire money is a self- money itself, not capitalism, that transforms goods into
sustaining system, its origins are in more basic motives commodities. Money is both the means and the symbol
and it presumably acts on the brain in the same way as of the process by which in modern society impersonal,
the comforts that it procures. quantitative social relations between autonomous individ-
uals replace the determinant relations imposed by
3.2.4. Cognitive development and money. As Webley traditional society. Simmel was specific about money
(2004) explains, Piagetians have proposed that children’s motivation: normally money is not a purpose in itself,
understanding of money passes through a series of but it has infinite capacities of application in exchange
stages. The number of stages proposed has varied, but in relations, and so it becomes desired for itself. In our
all cases the notion is that children are, step by step, learn- terms, we can see here both an assertion of Tool Theory
ing how to operate within the economy of adults and how and an assertion of its inadequacy, and the need for
to use its institutions, especially money. This approach some kind of Drug Theory. This is most obvious in the
clearly focuses on the instrumental use of money, and extreme case: “For the miser, all other goods lie at the
thus qualifies as a Tool Theory. periphery of existence and from each of them a straight

road leads to the centre, to money. The whole specific that its representation by a commodity is merely contin-
sense of enjoyment and power would be misinterpreted gent; for him, money stuff always symbolises abstract
if one were to reverse this direction and wished to lead money. But he is at one with Zelizer and other sociologists
it back again from the terminal point to the periphery” of money in rejecting the simple economic view that
(Simmel 1900/1978, p. 245). “money is what money does.” From a different back-
Although Simmel was a significant figure in the history ground comes the striking hypothesis of Seaford (2004)
of sociology, he had relatively little immediate influence; that it was the invention of coinage that enabled pre-
for example, Philosophie des Geldes was not translated Socratic Greek metaphysicians to conceive of impersonal
into English until nearly 80 years after its first publication. universal forces: on this view, money can actually be said
The major development of social science thinking about to give birth to abstract symbolic thought (see also Shell
money in the early twentieth century came instead from 1982).
anthropology, with the work of Malinowski (e.g., Mali- The sense that money is essentially a symbol, perhaps
nowski 1922) and, in particular, Mauss (1925/1954) on multiply symbolic (cf. Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12), seems
gift exchanges in non-Western cultures. These ethno- hard to reconcile with any kind of biological analysis of
graphic studies supplied an empirical basis, lacking in money motivation; it leads, furthermore, to a cognitive
the classic sociologists’ work, for assertions about what rather than a motivational analysis of behaviour towards
exchange might be like in the absence of money. They money. We will return later (sect. 5.2) to the question of
showed that exchange can take place without money – whether there is a fundamental conflict between this
but also that it is distinctly different from exchange in a kind of social-cognitive theory of money and our attempt
modern economy. They thus tended to confirm that to construct a biological account. Within the confines of
money is not just a neutral tool, but an institution with a our current account, however, we need to classify the
transformative potential. modern sociological theories. Clearly they go beyond the
Even from this brief survey, it can be seen that there are simple notion of money as a tool for economic exchange,
many different nuances within the classic sociological and but they do not align in an obvious way with what we
anthropological analyses of money. However, these ana- have called Drug Theory. Rather, modern sociology
lyses share a rejection of a purely economic account – tends to see money as a tool, but as a tool for more than
not necessarily as wrong, but certainly as inadequate. In exchange, and, as we have already noted, that idea is expli-
different ways, they see its invention or introduction as cit in several modern social accounts of money function;
corrupting or transforming previous patterns of exchange; see, for example, Buchan (1997). In the final section of
but even if money diminishes the social content of this target article (sect. 5.2), however, we shall argue
exchanges, it does not abolish it. As a result, money is instead that the modern sociological account should be
sought for reasons that go beyond its instrumental func- classified as a Drug Theory, because its conclusions paral-
tion. To varying degrees and in differing ways, therefore, lel those of the specific version of Drug Theory we develop
these classic sociological accounts are versions of Drug there. At this point, we merely note that if money is sought
Theory. for the meanings it carries, that allows for a disconnection
between those meanings and the reality that is believed to
3.3.2. Modern sociology of money. Recent decades have underlie them, and thus creates an opening for the decep-
seen a revival of interest in the sociology of money, often tive processes that characterize Drug Theories.
involving a fusion of ideas from classic sociological
theory (especially that of Simmel) with more recent
anthropological data. Important contributors to the 3.4. Summary
modern sociological theory of money include Carruthers This brief survey has shown that a number of leading the-
(e.g. Carruthers & Espeland 1998), Dodd (1994), Doyle ories of money in psychology and other social sciences are,
(e.g., 2001), Ingham (e.g., 1996; 2001), Singh (e.g., in terms of the metaphorical dichotomy we have drawn up,
1996), and Zelizer (e.g., 1994). Less strictly academic best classified as Drug Theories. However, we have not
accounts such as those of Buchan (1997), Millman found a simple economics versus psychology opposition.
(1991), and Needleman (1994) have also contributed to Surprisingly, the most conservative economic theory of
the modern view of the place of money in society. money (metallism) appears to be a Drug Theory, while
These writings cover many aspects of money other than at least one much-used psychological theory is clearly of
the motivation to acquire it, so a full review of them would the Tool Theory type, and modern sociological approaches
be beyond the scope of this target article. A recurring may be best described as “sophisticated tool” theories.
theme within them, however, is the social interactionist
perspective, resulting in a tension between two pervading
ideas. On the one hand is the notion that money anon- 4. The empirical psychology of money
ymizes social interactions, and on the other is the recog-
nition that money is imbued with social meaning and Modern approaches to the psychology of money have been
thereby links things and people together (Newton 2003). strongly affected by the emergence of the specialised sub-
Zelizer, who has taken a less hostile and pessimistic view disciplines of economic psychology and behavioural econ-
of money’s role in society than have many other modern omics. A number of lines of investigation have proved
social theorists, particularly stresses how money retains fruitful within the empirical economic psychology of
meaning beyond the particular transaction in which it is money, and these shed some light on the issue of Tool
obtained or used (e.g., Zelizer 1989; 1996). Conversely, Theory versus Drug Theory. Several of them overlap
Ingham (2001) argues that the fundamental nature of with recent empirical work in the sociology and anthropol-
modern money is the abstract recognition of a debt, so ogy of money. Not surprisingly, these lines of investigation

have shown that quite a lot of human behaviour towards Money illusion disconnects the psychological impact of
money can be accounted for in terms of what we are money from what money can do. Shafir et al. (1997) argue
calling Tool Theory, because this is the “obvious” that the disconnection is only partial, and that money illu-
account. In this section, we review several lines of evi- sion in fact arises from people’s struggles to work with both
dence showing that something beyond the rational use of real and nominal values. But even a partial disconnection
a tool is involved. We argue that many of these exceptional of the motive for money from its instrumental effect is evi-
findings are well accounted for by a Drug Theory. dence that a pure Tool Theory cannot be adequate.
4.1. Perceiving coins 4.3. Money conservatism

Bruner and Goodman (1947) found that children tend to People frequently resist new forms of money, even when
overestimate the sizes of coins relative to other, physically the innovation is quite trivial. When the U.K. pound
similar, stimuli. This report caused considerable contro- note was replaced by a coin in 1983, reaction in the
versy, and a series of experiments by other authors clari- press was absurdly hostile; and Hussein (1985) showed
fied the result, without however shaking the basic claim experimentally that people did indeed behave differently
that there is something special about money objects at with the coins, spending them more quickly than notes.
the psychological level (Saugstad & Schioldborg 1966). In the United States, the introduction of the Susan
More recent research has supported that claim by B. Anthony dollar coin in 1979 largely failed because of
looking at how the perception of money is changed by his- public rejection (Caskey & St. Laurent 1994). Current
torical changes in the money system and the value of attempts to introduce a dollar coin are again meeting
money. Lea (1981) found that pre-decimal British coins with hostility and very low levels of usage; the coins
were remembered as larger than the identical coins barely circulate, except for a few special purposes such
under their decimal names, devalued by a decade of as the purchase of subway tickets in slot machines, while
rapid inflation. Furnham (1983) found a similar effect dollar bills remain in widespread use. The reaction
for an obsolete design of pound note, and further research against the euro in countries such as the United
along the same lines has been carried out in other Kingdom (see Routh & Burgoyne 1998) is similarly dispro-
countries by Leiser and Izak (1987) and Brysbaert and portionate to any economic facts. Indeed, people are more
d’Ydewalle (1989). A Drug Theory can account for these agreed about their dislike of the euro than they are about
phenomena by asserting that the value of money gives it the reasons for that dislike, a strong indication that their
a special status, which interferes with normal perceptual/ hostility is rationalised rather than rational. That is not to
cognitive processing. It is not obvious how a Tool Theory say, of course, that it is unreasonable: the euro is recogni-
can accommodate these phenomena. sable as both a means and a symbol in the ongoing project
of “Europeanization” (Borneman & Fowler 1997) to which
many people in the United Kingdom remain opposed. Its
4.2. Money illusion
rejection is the rejection of an institution that is literally
In the presence of inflation, economic events and choices foreign to them, and thus incapable of supporting the
that take place over time can be denominated either in trust that money is required to elicit.
terms of nominal values – the actual money amounts – or At first sight, money conservatism seems to give strong
in terms of real values – purchasing power. If people are support to a Drug Theory. However, it is not an unlimited
influenced to some extent by nominal rather than real phenomenon, and its limitations tend to support a Tool
values, they are said to be suffering from “money illusion” Theory. Caskey and St Laurent (1994) produce an entirely
(Fisher 1928). Although the possibility of money illusion instrumental analysis of the rejection of the U.S. dollar
was for decades dismissed by theoretical economists, it coins. When currencies lose their value because of econ-
has now been demonstrated in economic experiments omic or political change, people lose interest in them pre-
(Fehr & Tyran 2001) and survey studies (Shafir et al. cipitately, as a Tool Theory would predict. Furthermore,
1997). It is also ubiquitous in ordinary economic life. At not all new forms of money are rejected. Credit and
the population level, consumers demonstrate money illu- debit cards have won wide acceptance quite quickly,
sion in relation both to the entire economy (e.g., Dowd, though penetration varies greatly between countries
1992) and to individual commodities (e.g., Franke 1994). (Humphrey 2004; Snellman et al. 2001). Nevertheless,
Consumer money illusion can also be seen at the individ- some of the phenomena of money conservatism do seem
ual level, for example in price estimation in different cur- to call for a Drug Theory. The loss of interest in super-
rencies (e.g., Gamble et al. 2002) and in the effects of seded forms of money is rarely total. Anecdotes of
currency change on charitable donation (Kooreman et al. people hanging on “irrationally” to foreign or devalued
2004). Money illusion can also be demonstrated in produ- currencies are common, suggesting that money does not
cers: for example, in the borrowing behaviour of small lose quite all its power when it loses its function. Further-
firms (Machauer & Weber 1998) and in the response of more, although dramatic devaluations certainly do cause
independent professionals to changes in state-mandated people to lose confidence in a particular currency, they
fees (Mayer & Rozier 2000). Investors, too, suffer from have much less effect on people’s confidence in money
money illusion (e.g., Miller & Schulman 1999; Modigliani in general. The high inflation that has characterised
& Cohn 1979). The downward trend in the value of non- many Latin American and African countries for decades
resident fathers’ child support payments in the United has certainly caused their citizens to lose interest in acquir-
States seems to be in part attributable to money illusion ing their local currencies, but they remain very interested
on the part of judges, lawyers, and parents (Hanson in acquiring dollars (e.g., De Boeck 1998; Guidotti &
et al. 1996). Rodriguez 1992). The collapse of the rouble following

the end of the Soviet Union caused a return to barter in of technology. But money is, specifically, a tool for exchan-
many sectors of the Russian economy (Woodruff 1999), ging. Any limitation on its exchangeability is a restriction
for lack of any alternative. But in Central Europe, where on its tool use. Economic psychologists have shown that
other forms of money (dollars, Deutschmarks, and now money in modern society, like primitive money, has
euros) were more readily available, it was these rather restrictions on its use, particularly in connection with
than barter that filled the gap. Moreover, although some gifts. In Britain, young adults do not feel it is appropriate
forms of “plastic money” have spread successfully, others to use money as a gift for their mothers (Webley et al.
have failed spectacularly. There have been a number of 1983), and identifiable social rules prohibit or allow
high-profile attempts to introduce “electronic purses”, a using money as a Christmas gift, depending on the
kind of “smart card” where the record of money available relationship, and relative age and status of the giver and
is stored on the card itself rather than in a central bank recipient (Burgoyne & Routh 1991; Webley & Wilson
computer; all have failed to gain public acceptance, 1989). For example, the person giving money as a gift
despite apparent technical advantages (Truman et al. must be of higher status, if only by virtue of being older
2003). New forms of money are in general not less func- (cf. Motel & Szydlik 1999). Furthermore, the evaluation
tional than old forms, indeed the reason for introducing of gifts, whether by the giver or the receiver, does not
them is that they will be better tools for exchange; but depend only on their monetary value (Pieters & Robben
they seem to need to show a substantial advantage over 1999). A related phenomenon is the partial taboo on the
old forms before people will adopt them. The reaction to use of money to repay neighbourly help (Webley & Lea
them is often emotive rather than calculative. We 1993a). These particular social rules are not universal:
conclude the people become attached to money objects there are cultures where to give money is a sign of
themselves, as predicted by Drug Theory. respect (e.g., in Ghana: van der Geest 1997) or is socially
required in certain contexts (e.g., in Cyprus: Hussein
1985). Whatever form it takes, however, there is a
4.4. Money attitudes
general tendency to maintain a distinction between
Economic psychologists have developed a number of market exchanges (where money is acceptable and
psychometric scales that assess attitudes towards money – usually required) and gift exchanges (where money may
for example, the Money Attitudes Scale (Yamauchi & not be acceptable), to the point where some market-
Templer 1982), the Money Beliefs and Behaviour Scale motivated exchanges may be given the outward form of
(Furnham 1984), and the Love of Money Scale (Tang gifts in order to appropriate a different social meaning
1995). These scales are always multifactorial, yielding (Offer 1997).
anything from three to eight factors. Although the details A second sphere where money is often an unacceptable
vary between scales and studies, the common experience medium of exchange is within sexual relationships.
is to find more or less orthogonal factors relating to Historically, cultures have generally provided ways of
power and prestige, to distrust and anxiety, and to reten- legitimising the exchange of money or money’s worth for
tion and other temporal issues. Tang and his colleagues sexual access, whether through bride price, bride
have found separate and virtually orthogonal factors for service, or the convention that husbands should be the
an affective component (assessment of money as good or “breadwinners” for their wives and families. But it is not
evil), a cognitive component (money seen as an indicator socially acceptable for the exchange to be made too
of achievement, respect, and freedom or power), and a starkly, or in other than the conventional forms: to do so
behavioural component relating to practical budgeting. incurs the stigma of prostitution. The exchange has to be
Furthermore, these factors enter into different relation- cast within the rhetoric of gifts and giving rather than as
ships with other variables of both economic and psycho- payment. Millman (1991) argues that this social conven-
logical interest, such as job satisfaction, business ethics, tion acts to mask the real financial exchanges that do
work motivation, and life satisfaction (Luna-Arocas & take place within close relationships and are exposed
Tang 2004; Tang & Chiu 2003; Tang & Gilbert 1995). when relationships break down. Simpson (1997) takes a
These results demonstrate a dissociation between the slightly different position, arguing that on relationship
instrumental and affective aspects of money. In our breakdown there is a shift of transactions from the non-
terms, therefore, they do not suggest that either Tool monetised gift sphere to the monetised sphere, and this
Theory or Drug Theory is correct and the other wrong; causes many extra difficulties between divorcing
they suggest that money has both tool-like properties couples – even as they seek that shift to symbolise the
and drug-like properties, and the two are psychologically social distance that now exists between them. Zelizer
dissociated, so that neither kind of theory could give a (1996) has documented some of the ways in which
complete account on its own. people in Western cultures try to keep spheres of
exchange distinct, using sex as a leading example; Wojcicki
(2002) describes the ways in which South African women,
4.5. Restrictions on money use
with a very different cultural background, camouflage
The primitive moneys of non-Western societies often money-for-sex exchanges as social relationships; and
could only be used for certain kinds of exchange, or Knauft (1997) reviews how the monetisation of extra-
there might be several different money systems, each con- marital affairs in both Amazonia and Melanesia has
fined to a particular class of commodities or a particular resulted in increasing stigma for the women involved.
group of people. Such restrictions on use represent a Converging evidence for the convention of separating
failure of the tool function of money. It might be argued sexual from monetary exchanges comes from situations
that special-purpose moneys correspond to special- where the monetisation of the transaction is actually
purpose tools, which are after all common in most kinds sought, precisely because it removes sexual acts from any

affectional context. Thompson et al. (2003) document how as a neutral medium of exchange, ways we sometimes want
topless dancers in the United States use the fact that they to avoid. It might be argued that the restrictions on money
are paid for what they are doing to help distance them- use can also be reconciled with a Tool Theory by taking the
selves psychologically and emotionally from it, and from tool metaphor more seriously and pointing out that tools
their clients. Prasad (1999) shows that prostitutes’ clients do not have to be universally useful. But the problem
use similar mental strategies to distance themselves with exchanging money for sex, for example, is not that it
morally and emotionally from the women they use. cannot be done, but that it is not socially acceptable for
The sense that there may be exchanges that should not it to be done because the effects of doing it are socially
be conducted in money goes wider than gifts or sex. Devel- and psychologically destructive. It appears that money
oping ideas from Simmel (1900/1978), Holt and Searls exchanges have side effects, and that these give it drug
(1994) list the family sphere, and consumption of religion, qualities.
high art, and education, among the areas where people
resist “the market’s commodification of the good” that is
4.6. Money in relationships
mediated by money. Even this list is not exhaustive:
Desforges (2001) documents how Western tourists some- Sociologists and psychologists have shown that money
times feel that any monetary transactions at all between often has as a special status within relationships and a
them and local inhabitants in “exotic” travel destinations special impact on them (e.g., Burgoyne 1990; Millman
render their travel experiences inauthentic. Fiske and 1991; Pahl 1989; 1995; Simpson 1997). Within families,
Tetlock (1997) make the point that people do not just access to and influence over money is rarely distributed
find it difficult to estimate the value of their children, equally, and this inequality is frequently a focus for dissa-
their loyalty to their country, or acts of friendship: they tisfaction, strain, and dispute. Money issues are reliable
find it morally offensive even to be asked to try. Zelizer predictors of divorce (Amato & Rogers 1997), and as
(1996) makes similar points about bonuses given by Millman has shown, divorce courts (and also courts
firms. Thus, there are many situations where money is adjudicating disputed wills) provide many illustrations of
not the preferred tool for exchange, or even is not accep- the money problems that arise in close relationships.
table at all. Surprisingly, it is often much more acceptable Family financial disputes are not only about money. In
if money is replaced by something that is clearly money’s part, they are about the real power that money gives to
worth, even something with a precise monetary value buy real goods and services, and in part they are about
such as a book token, a gift certificate of defined value more general issues of freedom and constraint within the
that can be used only for the purchase of books (Webley relationship (Vogler 1998). But they are also about
et al. 1983). money as such. Disputes about money within the family
These data suggest that money has special properties can concern the distribution of limited financial resources
that are not captured by the Tool Theory. But do they (e.g., Zelizer 1994), but they can also be triggered when
give any direct support to the Drug Theory? What seems one partner acquires new resources, disrupting the pre-
to lie at the root of these social rules is a perhaps-unformu- vious distribution of power. James et al. (1992) recorded
lated belief that to give someone money is to move the how some wives of unemployed men in Britain withdrew
transaction out of the realm of ordinary social exchange from the labour market to avoid the marital strain that
into a different, economic, sphere, so that what should went with their acquiring the powerful position of the
be a gift or a means of thanks becomes payment – and major earner. Money is a potent symbol and channel of
that is something quite different. The prevailing rhetoric the power relationships within a family, and because this
of most societies is that gifts are given, and sex is shared, is a direct impact of money rather than one mediated
for reasons other than material benefit. Gifts and sex are through what money can buy, we argue that it has a
the currency of the moral and romantic economy, and to strongly drug-like quality.
confuse them with the currency of the material economy
is somehow to contaminate them. These social rules
4.7. Sacred and profane uses of money
restricting money use could be taken to suggest that
money is different from “real” incentives, such as “real” The most systematic recent approach to the psychology of
praise, “real” affection, or “real” gratitude, and therefore money is that of Belk and Wallendorf (1990). Using
that money is a mere tool, different from the real objec- anthropological data, they draw a distinction between
tives it subserves – that though you can in a sense buy “sacred” and “profane” uses of money. In many ways this
love, happiness, and truth, there remains a love, a truth, parallels our distinction between Drug Theory and Tool
and a happiness you cannot buy (Needleman 1994, pp. Theory. Belk and Wallendorf’s profane uses are the
237ff). We argue, however, that these results show pre- mundane, functional uses of money that fit easily into a
cisely that money is not, or not just, a tool. If it was a Tool Theory. But they put forward the hypothesis that
tool, it would always be an acceptable surrogate for even modern money can be sacralized precisely in order
other objectives. From an instrumental point of view, to explain “some of the more puzzling ways in which
money is the best gift of all because the recipient can people behave towards money.” Among such money
use it to buy exactly what he or she wants. The empirical puzzles they include the social bar on the direct use of
results show that this point of view cannot be complete. money to buy slaves, brides, political office, or children;
Money-mediated exchanges are different from other the distinction made between earned and unearned
exchanges, and under at least some circumstances, income; the restrictions on the use of money as gifts;
people avoid them. Under a Drug Theory, this avoidance gender and class differences in the uses of money; and
is easy to explain: such a theory asserts that money is psy- the paradoxes and contradictions in the ethics of money
chologically special and that it acts on us in ways other than use. In sections 4.4 to 4.6, we construed many of the

same money puzzles as evidence in favour of a Drug ambiguities that this produces in the lives of low-paid
Theory. Like the data on money attitudes, therefore, Brazilian bank employees, who face deteriorating pay
Belk and Wallendorf’s analysis supports the need for a and conditions under circumstances where the money
dual theory. they are processing is increasingly powerful. Given the
Related research includes Oliven’s (1998) examination contradictions inherent in their situation, it is not surpris-
of the social functions of money in the United States ing that he found the Marxian concept of money fetishism
from the standpoint of an anthropologist from a less finan- useful in describing their psychological processes. More
cially developed society, Brazil. Oliven argues that in commonly, people’s work has a direct financial dimension
America, money is what Mauss called a “total social which can be given more or less psychological promi-
fact.” Oliven argues that whereas in a society like Brazil’s nence. Schweingruber and Berns (2003) have analysed
money is seen as polluting, in the mature capitalist the behaviour and attitudes of U.S. students recruited as
society of the United States it pervades all social relation- door-to-door commission booksellers, and show how
ships and takes over all metaphors, being associated with they had to both involve themselves in and distance them-
love, death, blood, semen, food, and God. Again in our selves from the financial rewards that would be associated
terms, it is hard to see how money can be regarded only with a successful sale. The idea of money acquired an
as a tool when it has become so involved in a society’s almost magical content for them.
expression of itself, though the dramatically extended con-
ception of the importance of tools found in the views of
4.10. Money addiction
philosophers of technology such as Innis (1984) might
provide a viable approach. We argue, however, that it is If money is to be thought of as a drug, we might expect to
easier to take these wide-ranging social phenomena as find addictive processes associated with it, though evi-
evidence of a drug dimension to the motivation for money. dently they would constitute a “non-substance addiction”
in the same way as compulsive gambling. The concept of
non-substance addiction remains controversial, but it has
4.8. Money and social status
been widely used. The idea of money addiction has been
Both classic and recent sociologists and social psycholo- put forward to explain some of the oddities of people’s
gists have stressed the importance of money as a marker financial behaviour (Boundy 1993; Cameron & Bryan
of status within modern societies. To some extent money 1992; Forman 1987; Goldberg & Lewis 1978; Needleman
here serves as shorthand for general wealth, possessions, 1994, e.g., pp. 115ff; Slater 1980). Most of these sources
and consumption: Veblen’s (1899/1979) original develop- are popular or semi-popular rather than academic, and
ment of the idea of a status symbol was much more the idea of money addiction has found little use in soci-
concerned with things that money can buy than with the ology or clinical psychology. Furthermore, many of the
possession of money itself. Status is established through references to it in fact deal with more specific addictions
consumption in non-monetised or weakly monetised or supposed addictions, such as “workaholism” (Harpaz
traditional societies as well as in modern economies & Snir 2003), compulsive gambling (Dickerson 1984), or
(e.g., in the potlatch ceremonies of Northwestern Native compulsive buying (Black 1996). It is an interesting possi-
Americans; see Aldona 1991). Nevertheless, statements bility that all these are manifestations of a broader addic-
of people’s wealth or income, in numerical money terms, tion to money, but there is as yet no evidence to support
are a common part of discourse about status; nineteenth that proposition; and given our interest in understanding
century English fiction is rich in examples. People differ the motivation to acquire money as such, rather than the
in the extent to which they interpret wealth as a sign of things that it can buy, compulsions to spend in various
status, and indeed the extent to which they attribute ways are not relevant to our argument.
value to objects on the basis of their financial cost; the Slater (1980) did consider one case that is more specifi-
tendency to do so is referred to as “materialism” and, cally relevant to our argument: the hoarding of money per
from Belk (1984) on, reliable and valid scales to measure se, or miserliness. Hoarding in Slater’s sense is distinct
it have been developed [see Richins (2004) for a recent from the accumulation of money for precautionary or
review]. People high in materialism seek happiness investment purposes, though of course it is possible that
through wealth and possessions (and tend not to achieve at the mechanistic level there is overlap between these
it; see, e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch 2002). This self- motivations, or indeed the many other recognised
defeating nature of materialism might lead us to claim motives for saving (see Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 8). As we
this area as one that is well explained by a Drug Theory have seen in section 3.2.1, miserliness was historically a
of money. However, it is probably better seen as calling particular concern of psychoanalysts. Clinical and psycho-
for an elaborated Tool Theory in which money is used as metric work gives some support to the Freudian notion
an instrument to assess or obtain social status and happi- that miserliness and hoarding are components of obses-
ness. This is not among the functions of money conceived sive-compulsive disorder, and both seem to have some
of by economic theory, but it is different from the pursuit connection to compulsive shopping (Frost et al. 2002;
of money for its own sake. Grilo 2004). As such, there does seem to be some
support for a Drug Theory of money motivation from
the evidence on money pathology. More recent clinical
4.9. Money work
psychological approaches, such as cognitive behaviour
Even in societies that are not as money-dominated as the therapy, have also been applied to money pathologies,
United States, the ubiquity of money means that many and as these too would see the pathological interest in
people work directly and continuously with money money as disproportionate the money’s actual usefulness,
they do not own. Jinkings (2000) explores some of the they would also favour a Drug over a Tool account.

4.11. Summary users (Card et al. 1983) because it relies on recognition
A consistent theme emerges from these very different rather than recall memory. The good tool always comes
kinds of empirical research on money. The evidence is with overtones of drug, whether it is a tool for data proces-
not that Tool Theory is wrong, but rather that it is sing or exchanging. Thus we argue that, though money
inadequate, and inadequate in specific ways. In a range certainly is a tool, it is too successful a tool for the Tool
of situations, money is found to have a value and an Theory to be entirely right.
emotional charge that is not predicted by its economic But the Drug Theory is not without problems. First, the
use. In some situations this leads to only marginal phenomena that we have identified as requiring some kind
effects, such as the sentimental clinging to a few outdated of Drug Theory are not a coherent set. They could easily
coins. In other, closely related situations, the effects are be regarded as a mixed bag of marginal, second-order
strong enough to determine the economic policies of phenomena that all have different explanations. This argu-
nations. ment, however, only carries force if we are implicitly per-
It is one thing to accept that money is not just a tool for suaded that Tool Theory must be the correct explanation
carrying out the functions that economic theory prescribes for most money motivation. If Drug Theory covers any
for it. It is another to accept our suggestion that its phenomena at all, then it may also cover some of the
additional psychological effects can be captured by cate- phenomena that could be accommodated by a Tool
gorising it as a cognitive drug. We argue, however, that Theory. It need not be confined to the margins.
this analysis is fruitful, on two grounds. First, because it More seriously, Drug Theory is feeble unless we can
captures the parasitic, functionless quality of money specify what the natural incentives are that money
motivation that characterises many of the situations we mimics, and in this final section we therefore seek to do
have described. Second, however, it leads on to an evol- that. For convenience, we refer to the incentive systems
utionary account of these phenomena, and of the incentive concerned as “instincts,” though, as explained in section
value of money in general, which we will set out in the final 1.4, we mean that term only in the sense of a motivational
section of this article. If that explanation is accepted, the system so widely observed that it can be taken to be cultu-
importance of the drug metaphor fades; it will have done rally universal, like hunger or parenting. Those examples
its job in linking together phenomena and rephrasing the are sufficient to remind us that even when motivations
question about money motivation in a form that can be are universal, the way they are manifested varies greatly
more readily answered. between cultures and periods of history. Here, we
suggest two motives that we believe are universal among
humans, and argue that they manifest themselves in
modern cultures as a desire for money. These are certainly
5. A synthetic theory of money not the only possibilities, but we are seeking to establish
that there is at least some plausible means by which the
5.1. The need for synthesis
drug-like effects of money could have evolved.
Lea et al. (1987) tried to accommodate what was then
known about the psychology of money within a loose
5.2. Reciprocal altruism, trade, and money
theoretical framework in which money was seen as multi-
ply symbolic. In evolutionary terms, this account is vague A prime use of money, considered as a tool, is to facilitate
and underspecified: What is meant by a symbol, and trade. Could trade itself be the incentive that money
what selective pressures does it respond to? What that mimics? At first this seems an unhelpful suggestion, since
analysis did capture was the notion that money in it simply moves the problem from the evolutionary origin
modern society has more forms, and more functions, of money to the evolutionary origins of trade, which is
than the simple economic Tool Theory would allow. In also a uniquely human behaviour (see Lea 1994). Division
section 4 we showed that modern research in economic of labour occurs in other species, but there is little doubt
psychology is uncovering an increasing range of money that its integration into a system of trade is uniquely
phenomena that Tool Theory cannot account for. We human; chimpanzees may be induced to barter in the lab-
have argued here that these phenomena call for some oratory (Hyatt & Hopkins 1998), but there is no evidence
version of the Drug account: money seems to act on the that trade forms any part of their natural social life. The
human brain in ways that mimic more natural incentives, problem of the evolution of a motivation for trade,
not just by being an instrument for access to them. however, may be tractable in a way that the problem of
It would be foolish to deny the force of the Tool Theory. the evolution of a money motive is not. Ridley (1997,
Money does have functions, and new forms of money are Ch. 10) has argued, from the archaeological evidence,
constantly being invented to fulfil those functions in new that though trade originates with Homo sapiens, it must
ways. The range of new forms that money has taken in have done so early, in fact it must be as old as the species
recent decades, and the speed with which people have itself; he sees trade as one of the distinguishing marks of
adopted some of them (see sect. 4.3), show that the instru- our species. So, whereas the use of money is too recent
mentality of money is fundamentally important: the only to allow the evolution of a money instinct, trade could be
thing all forms of money have in common is their function a human instinct on which the money motive might be
(cf. Ingham 2001). But not all tools for a given function built through drug action. But Ridley concedes that most
come equally easily to human hands or minds. All compu- anthropologists have thought of trade as a late develop-
ter operating systems perform roughly the same oper- ment in human prehistory; and even if he is right in assign-
ations on stored information, but the menu and pointer ing it an early origin, we would still have to specify the more
system used in modern operating systems is more efficient widespread instincts from which it could have evolved,
than a command line interface for all but the most skilled because it does not occur in other apes.

The most obvious such instinct is reciprocal altruism. one extreme are truly altruistic exchanges within
Sociobiological theory came to prominence because it households, where reciprocation need not be exact or
managed to reconcile the existence of altruistic behaviour immediate, and may indeed never happen at all; at the
with the neo-Darwinian concept of the selfish gene. Most other are exchanges with members of other villages,
altruism can be explained by kin selection – indirect selec- where reciprocation must be immediate and exact or no
tive advantage to an individual achieved through benefits exchange will take place. Conversely, in modern societies,
to his or her kin (Hamilton 1963). Humans, who have where there is repeated trading between the same individ-
long periods of juvenile dependency and tend to live in uals, for example, in a continuing employment relationship
groups of related individuals, should show such kin altru- and particularly where employer and employee live
ism instinctively. But, in addition, Trivers (1971) showed together, the language of trade tends to be replaced by
that there were circumstances under which instinctive the language of kinship; for example, we hear of “paterna-
altruistic behaviour between unrelated individuals could listic” employers – particularly where the reciprocation is
be favoured by evolution, because of the possibility of reci- in fact unbalanced.
procation. Humans fit precisely Trivers’ specification for a The idea of a trading instinct allows for a much more
species within which such reciprocal altruism could precisely specified version of Drug Theory. Considered
evolve: we are long-lived, intelligent, and live in perma- as a tool, money is used extensively to serve the trade
nent social groups. But what Trivers and other sociobiolo- motivation. In this role, it multiplies the reasonable oppor-
gists describe as reciprocal altruism would usually, if it tunities for exchange by making it more instant, more sure,
occurred in humans, be referred to as trade, because it and easier; it removes the need for an exact reciprocal
depends critically on exchange: it is only sustainable if an return of action for action, good for good. Considered as
organism that gives up fitness at one moment can expect a drug, however, it seems to be capable of giving the illu-
to gain fitness in the future. Trivers’ argument can thus sion of trade and reciprocation even when it is absent. If
be restated as implying that it might be adaptive for trade is a human instinct, we would expect there to be a
humans to trade with unrelated individuals. And if trade specific region of the human brain that has an innate
is adaptive for humans, and has been over a substantial tendency to be active when the opportunity for trade
period of time, it is reasonable to suppose that natural arises – a suggestion that once would have seemed out-
selection will have equipped humans with a motivation landish but, in the light of recent developments in neuroe-
to trade, and ensured that we will enjoy doing it – in a conomics, seems merely obvious (cf. Glimcher 2003).
word, that we might have an instinct to trade, in addition Money, we argue, acts like a drug on that centre, activating
to our instinct for unreciprocated giving towards kin. it even when there is no real possibility of trading, or no
Although this may sound an odd idea, there are both real advantage in it. And just as an artificial sweetener
theoretical and empirical arguments in its support. like saccharine can stimulate our sweetness receptors far
At the theoretical level, Trivers’ (1971) argument sets more than the natural substances it mimics, so money
minimum conditions under which reciprocal altruism can can overstimulate our trading receptors, with the effect
emerge. But once it is established, reciprocation has adap- that, as Wordsworth put it, “getting and spending we lay
tive value over and above the goods or services a particular waste our powers.”
trade makes available, because it makes it possible to have This specification of Drug Theory fits perfectly with the
with strangers at least some of the kinds of interactions that social rules that constrain the use of money as a gift. The
normally only occur between kin. Long before money came data surveyed in sections 4.5 and 4.6 show that money is,
on the scene, humans developed networks of social in a range of ways, socially awkward. The idea that
relationships, involving individually known and at least par- money is a trade-based drug explains that awkwardness
tially individually trusted persons, that were larger than from the fact that trade is socially awkward, because it is
those of any comparable animal. In the Environment of in tension with a different but overlapping instinct.
Evolutionary Adaptation, a person whose extended social Within the circle of close kin, reciprocation need not be
network was larger had many advantages – the primary insisted on – indeed, to insist on it would be to label the
one being that he or she was safer against both social and interaction as taking place outside that circle. Within the
environmental threats. This added adaptive value should circle of slightly less close kin, where some reciprocation
strengthen the instinct to trade. The implication is that is needed, too speedy reciprocation is equally a solecism.
there is not just a human possibility to engage in reciprocal Although it might be advantageous to mislabel a trade
altruism in case of need, but a motivation to do so whenever relationship as kinship, to mislabel kinship as trade could
a reasonable opportunity presents itself. Margolin (1978/ be a biologically fatal mistake, since it would be to relin-
2003, pp. 89– 102) gives a graphic description of the motiv- quish the claim of kinship, a much more powerful and
ation for reciprocal altruism and trade, and its adaptive reliable source of altruism than reciprocation.
value, among the Ohlone peoples of the Californian As would be expected from its close fit to the data on
Central Coast. Studies of informal transactions in modern money as a gift, the idea of money as a trade-based drug
society, within the “black economy” (Henry 1978) or in con- also fits well with modern sociological and anthropological
sumer “swap meets” (Belk et al. 1988), have shown that this accounts. From a theoretical perspective, Newton (2003)
social function of trade remains strong. Interestingly, such has argued that modern money and credit create increas-
informal transactions are often imperfectly monetised. ingly extended “dependency networks” of the sort
Empirically, much evidence supports the idea that implicated in the civilising process as it is described by
there are two different motivational systems underlying Norbert Elias (e.g., 1994). Much modern empirical soci-
human giving and receiving. Economic anthropologists ology of money has aimed to uncover the social meanings
such as Sahlins (1974) have shown that in societies money acquires from the exchanges by which it is obtained
without money there is a continuum of exchanges. At and in which it is spent, and the social meanings that are

created when money is used to facilitate an exchange that manage plaything-like money as adults. We have argued
might have taken place by other means. Thus, Granovetter elsewhere (Webley & Lea 1993b; Webley & Webley
(1985) insists on the “embeddedness” of economic action 1990) that playground exchanges of toys are a more realis-
within social structure and social relations; Offer (1997) tic scene of economic socialisation than the limited
argues that where it is important to establish mutual exposure young children have to the formal economy of
“regard,” money is avoided even when reciprocation is adult shopping. Money might be an especially potent
needed; and Zelizer (e.g., 1989; 1996) shows how money drug because it can mimic the satisfaction both from the
from different sources is used in different ways because instinct to play and from the instinct to trade, as children
of its different social meanings. From the symbolic inter- first begin to play at trading or to trade their playthings.
actionist point of view, money has symbolic value that
both derive from and help construct the social interactions
5.4. Synthesis
in which it is used, sometimes helpfully and sometimes
destructively (Schweingruber & Berns 2003). The nature We explained at the beginning of this target article that
of its symbolic value varies between societies, and van there cannot be a “money instinct.” If we are to fit
der Geest’s (1997) cautionary reminder that in West money motivation into the framework of biological expla-
African societies money can be a symbol of happiness nation that applies to other strong human motives, then
and security, and a vehicle of love and respect, needs to we must explain how money gets its incentive power
be set against the generally corruptive symbolism of through its action on other instincts. If we cannot do so,
money in European-derived cultures. Knauft (1997) simi- we would be faced with a situation that would be scanda-
larly emphasises that in previously non-monetised lous within the terms of a biological psychology – a power-
societies, money often symbolises modernity, under- ful human motivation, perhaps even the most powerful,
cutting earlier cultural values – a tendency that can be so with no real biological roots.
extreme that dollars are animized as wild, undomesticated Reviewing a range of phenomena and theories of human
items that behave in unpredictable or even demonic ways behaviour towards money, we have reached three
(De Boeck 1998). There is also theoretical dispute about conclusions.
exactly what money symbolises in the modern economy: 1. Although money is an efficient tool, and so gains
Ingham (2001) argues that previous sociologists of incentive power by enabling us to fulfil a wide range of
money, such as Zelizer, have paid too little attention to instincts, a Tool Theory of money motivation is
money’s symbolisation of the promise to pay. But the inadequate. The majority of non-economic accounts of
idea of money as a vehicle of some kind of symbolic money (and even some economic accounts) either take
meaning, and therefore as more than a neutral tool in this view or require a more elaborated Tool Theory than
the economy, is universal among both theoretical and is usually assumed. Modern empirical work has uncovered
empirical sociologists of money. The language of sociology substantial evidence in favour of this conclusion, and we
differs from the sociobiological approach we have taken believe that it would be widely if not universally accepted.
here, but in different terms both are saying that money 2. The inadequacies of Tool Theory can be overcome,
has value – which may be positive or negative – over and and the phenomena that it fails to explain can be inte-
above its usefulness. grated, by asserting that money also acts as a drug. That
is, we conclude that money derives some of its incentive
power from providing the illusion of fulfilment of certain
5.3. Play and money
instincts. This argument has formed the core of the
A second human instinct on which money might act as a present article, and although we believe it is well grounded
drug is object play. Considered as mammals, and even as in the data we have reviewed, it will inevitably be more
primates, humans are remarkable both for the length of controversial. In particular, the alternatives of a more elab-
time we spend in a juvenile state and the strength of the orate Tool Theory, or an entirely different way of partition-
motive to play among juveniles (and even adults). Object ing the possible kinds of theory, cannot be ruled out at this
play is particularly well developed, as the extraordinary stage, and perhaps they never could be.
scale of the toy market testifies. Lea and Midgley (1989) 3. The incentive power of money depends partly on the
argued that this might be one of the factors that have illusory fulfilment of the human instincts for reciprocal
allowed the evolution of money use. We agree with altruism and object play, though there may well be other
Freud in seeing the interest in money developing first instinctive systems that money can also parasitize. This
out of the instinct to play with objects that can be held in conclusion is more speculative, and is likely to be the
the hand, though we reject the Freudian belief (see most controversial of all. However, insofar as it is persua-
Bornemann 1976, p. 17) that faeces constitute a privileged sive, it would provide the best evidence in favour of the
class of such objects. The plausibly instinctive human liking Tool/Drug analysis, since it would show that the analysis
for carrying around a few easily handled objects provides a had been deployed fruitfully.
natural setting within which a money system can develop. Thus, we are arguing that the scandal of a non-biological
Money may be a drug partly because it provides something motivation for money can be avoided, but not by the most
of the same kind of stimulation as a plaything. obvious means, which is a Tool Theory. We are not
The trading and play accounts of money motivation are arguing that Tool Theory is wrong, but that it needs to be
not in competition, but complementary. If playthings are supplemented by a Drug Theory, and a Drug Theory of a
valued because of an instinct towards object play, they particular type. This is not a sloppy “much to be said on
would make natural props in our first hesitant steps onto both sides” argument. Rather, we argue that the extraordi-
the stage of economic exchange: having learned to nary effectiveness of money depends on a synthesis
manage playthings as children, we are better equipped to between its two modes of action. One of the striking facts

Commentary/Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
about money is its cultural dominance: it is taken up irresist- manifestations, money reflects a variety of phenomena rooted in
ibly by any human society that encounters it. Other equally diverse aspects of diverse societies. These are of no interest to
functional social inventions are much less immediately L&W. Looking for the universally human, biological roots of the
attractive. In both developed and less-developed countries, interest in money (no matter what counts as roots and why),
they deliberately overlook social diversity. They center only on
governments have to engage in extensive and expensive pro-
consumers’ attitudes towards money. And, when they refer to
motional campaigns to get beneficial health, education, or people, they exclude those who do not know what money is, or
birth control practices widely adopted, because those prac- who live in small communities or communes, or who are other-
tices are not so readily compatible with human instincts and worldly. Thus, L&W set the scene for discussion of their question
therefore with perceived immediate self-interest. sufficiently narrowly so as to lead to their biological, universalistic
A prediction follows from this analysis. If, in the future, answer. Are leading questions permissible in research? It depends
money is presented in forms that fit less well with the on how interesting the discussion is.
instinctual structure of the human brain, it may be a less The program of L&W is acceptable, then, on the condition that
effective tool. An obvious example is the representation we remember that their question is set towards a biological bias,
of money by abstractions such as the totals in bank or leaving the sociological and psychological biases for another day.
It is an error to claim more than that, in line with the “grand
credit card accounts, or the amounts in microchips on
theory of everything,” in what is known as intellectual imperialism
smart cards. Such abstractions would not stimulate (the claim that only one approach fits). L&W agree: they stress in
humans’ instincts towards object play, and therefore our the opening of their article that a “biological” approach (involving
management of them will not benefit from our early learn- “selective advantage”) “is not an alternative to social and cultural
ing, through play, of how to manage objects effectively. It factors as a kind of explanation” (sect. 1.1; see Agassi [1977],
is consistent with this view that each new form of money pp. 184, 281, 320, and 326). So they merely sketch a few alterna-
seems to bring in horror stories of people who cannot tive theories – psychological, cultural, economic – that they
control their spending with it (see Prelec & Simester legitimately put aside.
2001; Schor 1998). Our argument, therefore, is that if Let me go along with the attitude of L&W and follow the bias
money had not been an effective drug, it might never that leads them to seek the biological roots of the attraction of
money. They take for granted that what comprises such biological
have emerged as an efficient tool. It is because it is both
roots is conduct, specifically the use of tools and of drugs. They
tool and drug that it is such a strong incentive. view money, first, as a tool (for those who intend to use it) and,
second, as a drug (for misers and for those who play with
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS money in the widest sense that includes all sorts of social
We thank the Department of Psychology, University of California games). The tool that money is, however, is a means for the
Berkeley, and the CentER for Economic Research, University of acquisition of other tools – all those goods and services that
Tilburg, for providing the authors with visiting research positions are on the market for sale. Hence, money always denotes sets
that made the writing of this paper possible. We also thank of options that are available for sale on the market. It is these
Carole Burgoyne, Lesley Newson, and Jana Vyrastekova for options, and not the money itself, that most people desire. This
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Earlier versions of desire – for a range of options as wide as possible – has
this paper were presented at the British Association Festival of deeper biological roots than money. Nor is “interest” the same
Science, Cardiff, U.K., September 1998, and at the conference as attraction: people in the capacity of researchers, including
of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioural Economics L&W, have an interest in money different from what they have
and the International Association for Research in Economic as consumers, as do entrepreneurs, politicians, economists, econ-
Psychology, Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A., July 2004. omic journalists, gossip columnists, and so forth. So we should
include curiosity among our root biological drives. As to the
idea of money as a drug, L&W use the word “drug” loosely,
and include pornography as a drug though it usually functions
otherwise. Some people use pornography – and any other item
that stands for sex – as sex objects proper, in a kind of fixation
Open Peer Commentary on them, as a diversion of the sex drive from the normal sex
object. These (and other fixations) are then often called (inade-
quately) fetishes. And fixation is nearer to biological roots than
addiction. (Addiction is a fixation of sorts.) In addition, money
helps in the acquisition of power and other abstract qualities
The biology of the interest in money that are not commodities on the market. And the desire for
Joseph Agassi power or the wish to lead others is generally deemed as having
deep biological roots. Perhaps.
Department of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel, and
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M3J 1P3.
[email protected] http://www.tau.ac.il/agass/ What good are facts? The “drug” value of
Abstract: Why are people interested in money? This question is too money as an exemplar of all non-instrumental
broad: there are many kinds of money, interest, and people. The value
biological approach of Lea & Webley (L&W) makes them seek the roots
of this interest, and they contend that tool making and addiction qualify George Ainslie
as the roots. Curiosity and the quest for power, however, qualify too. As Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320.
L&W rightly admit, other approaches supplement their biological one.
[email protected] http://www.Picoeconomics.com
Lea & Webley (L&W) ask “Why are people interested in money?” Abstract: An emotional value for money is clearly demonstrable beyond
They expand on the concepts of “people,” “interest,” and “money,” its value for getting goods, but this value need not be ascribed to human
but these are too broad for their concern. They mention different preparedness for altruism or play. Emotion is a motivated process, and
kinds of money, from unfamiliar primitive kinds to plastic money, our temptation to “overgraze” positive emotions selects for emotional
only to ignore the differences between them. In its diverse patterns that are paced by adequately rare occasions. As a much-

competed-for tool, money makes an excellent occasion for emotional It has now been widely reported that there is a basic tendency
reward – a prize with value beyond its tool value – but this is true also to discount delayed reward in a hyperbolic rather than an expo-
of the other facts by which we pace our emotions. nential curve (Green & Myerson 2004; Kirby 1997). This lets us
conceive of emotions as rewarded processes, with positive feed-
Lea & Webley (L&W) demonstrate well that money is often back restrained as follows: An occasion for negative emotion
valued for more than what it can buy. Among other things the offers an immediate reward for participating in it, but the pro-
target article should warn experimental psychologists that when spect of its brief reward lasts only long enough to seduce; it is
they reward their subjects with money, the rewards have two com- experienced not as pleasure but as an urge. The dynamic I
ponents: the value of possible purchases, which are necessarily propose is the same as that for a binge, except that each cycle
delayed, and an emotion attached to acquisition, which is immedi- of seductive high and non-rewarding hangover is condensed
ate and imperfectly correlated with the amount and timing of into the fraction of a second (Ainslie 2001, pp. 51 – 61; 2005).
possible purchases. L&W have documented many situations in For an acrophobic on a cliffside path, say, each moment of
which money takes on value beyond that of its potential to be giving in to the urge to panic is followed not by relief but by a
exchanged for goods. They point out that this value comes from renewal of the urge, and by a growing inhibition of all other
emotion, and they liken it to that of “being emotionally engaged sources of reward.
by many kinds of text” (sect. 2.2.3). In doing so, they have ident- But L&W are talking about a positive drug effect. If positive
ified a gap in motivational theory, a gap which, I argue, affects far emotions are indulged in ad lib they become attenuated into
more than the theory of money. Since social constructivists have mere daydreams through habituation. This process cannot be
pointed out the extensive role of motivation in determining controlled voluntarily because of the hyperbolically weighted
those beliefs that are not shaped by the risk of failure, it has overvaluation of small, immediate satisfactions relative to
been unclear what distinguishes belief from make-believe, and larger, delayed ones. As a result, only patterns of generating
texts1 that can support belief (which get called facts) from texts emotions in the presence of adequately rare occasions remain
that cannot. From the question of how money takes on value robust. This contingency creates the familiar gambles that
beyond its tool value it is a short jump to ask how any facts that seem to govern our positive emotions: Feats in sporting events,
do not help you get goods or avoid “bads” – non-instrumental news items, objects of collection, and, notoriously, victories in
facts, those that are not tools – are worth attending to. And after romance incite feelings in proportion to their perceived rarity.
that, what about text that is not factual at all – pornography to The rarity factor is what makes factuality important: Texts that
be sure, but also fiction in general? I agree that text is valuable qualify as facts (by any stringent selective process, including com-
beyond its instrumental usefulness insofar as it is emotionally munal folklore) are more potent than a story, and the facts we
engaging. I agree also that conventional motivational theory have reason to seek are more potent than facts in general. In
lacks a rationale for this engagement, not just for the case of this manner, instrumentality, the value of facts for getting other
money, but for all non-instrumental texts. goals, confusingly becomes a source of non-instrumental value.
The authors look for specific underlying instincts that might be Gambling for money has more kick than gambling for points,
energizing money’s drug effects. (“Drug Theory is feeble unless even when we gamble for money purely as recreation. In the
we can we specify what the natural incentives are that money United States, at least, the variability of gasoline prices among
mimics”; sect. 5.1, para. 4) This search seems unnecessarily stations makes the search for cheaper gas a challenging game;
specific, like the early behaviorists’ attempts to trace each several acquaintances have admitted to a temptation to drive
emotion to a conditioning experience (Watson 1924). Nor does uneconomically far out of their way just for the sensation of
the authors’ suggestion that money in its drug mode provides winning at this game, even though they would not be playing it
“the illusory fulfillment of the human instincts for reciprocal altru- if it did not ostensibly save them money. Once we authenticate
ism and object play” (sect. 5.4) stand up well in application to their money as a prize, it becomes a tool for occasioning emotion;
own list of the anomalies that make drug theory necessary: What is that is, it becomes a drug.
it about reciprocal altruism or object play that should make coins Some of money’s drug value may come from how it fits into
appear larger than they are, nominal values be impervious to specific hardwired preparednesses, among them not only
changes in real purchasing power, new forms be unwelcome, or L&W’s altruism and playfulness but also competing, gloating,
the purchase of some social relationships be taboo? All that envying, and especially hoarding. But all that is necessary to
these two instincts supply is a nonspecific rationale for the value give money emotional power is for it to serve as a sufficiently
of money to have an emotional component, and this can be hard-to-get goal that is set apart from equally hard but arbitrary
done at a more general level. goals by its peerless tool value. As a tool it has many uses, but that
I have suggested that, instrumentality aside, the usefulness of very fact makes it a unique pacing device in our quest for positive
externally supplied texts comes from their pacing the consump- emotions per se. When a currency loses its tool value it loses its
tion of emotional reward; the usefulness of factuality comes uniqueness and hence its pacing value, but this usually occurs, as
from its selecting adequately rare texts for this purpose (Ainslie the authors point out (sect. 4.3), after a lag. When McClure
2001, pp 175– 79; 2005). The motivational power of money- et al.’s (2004) subjects won an “immediate” Internet token,
as-drug is then an especially potent example of the power con- they consumed the prize emotionally on the spot, even though
ferred by factuality itself. To briefly summarize the theoretical the token as tool would take some days to provide a “reward.”
background: Emotion is well known to be a strong motivator, There are many situations where tool and drug value are
but there is also substantial evidence that emotion is itself motiv- clearly separable, not the least of which arises when income
ated. Granted that emotions are only marginally voluntary, the becomes so predictable that it loses its value as an emotional
voluntary control that is possible argues for their motivational prize even though its tool value remains unchanged (Ainslie
basis, for their being selected by expected reward rather than eli- 2003). But the “drug” value of money does not differ in kind
cited peremptorily by trigger stimuli. However, the lack of a from the emotional pacing value of anything else that has some
rationale for how a process that both motivates and is itself motiv- claim to be a prize.
ated can avoid collapsing into positive feedback has confined us
to the theory that emotions are unmotivated responses to external
turnkeys (Ainslie 2001, pp. 65– 70, 164– 71). Why not pig out on NOTES
The author of this commentary is employed by a government agency
positive emotions and simply withhold negative ones? The and as such this commentary is considered a work of the U.S.
answers to these questions reveal a motivational role for events government and not subject to copyright within the United States.
that do not necessarily have either instrumental value or a con- 1. An irreplaceable term, despite abuse by deconstructionists, for
nection to an innate instinct. patterns of information that might or might not be factual.

Scarcity begets addiction value either through oversupply, as when governments print
money to cover their debts, or in competition with other
Giorgio A. Ascolia and Kevin A. McCabeb monies, as seen in international exchange rate fluctuations.
a
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, Psychology Department, and In experiments, people continue to trade money (McCabe
Neuroscience Program, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444; 1989) even when it is losing value, thus providing evidence that
b
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, Economics Department, and School of money itself is seen as valuable (consistent with the money as
Law, George Mason University, Arlington, VA 22201. drug hypothesis). A plausible explanation is that even as money
[email protected] http://krasnow.gmu.edu/L-Neuron itself loses value, the barter it is producing continues to be valu-
[email protected] http://www.neuroeconomics.net able. So the built-in desire for money may be a secondary reinfor-
cer for barter. The anticipation and realization of earning money
Abstract: As prototypical incentive with biological meaning, food is known to activate the same dopaminergic pathways as drugs
illustrates the distinction between money as tool and money as drug.
However, consistent neuroscience results challenge this view of food as
and other rewards (Knutson et al. 2001b), and contingent man-
intrinsic value and opposite to drugs of abuse. The scarce availability agement strategies use monetary rewards as a substitute for
over evolutionary time of both food and money may explain their drugs in drug treatment programs (Higgins et al. 2000).
similar drug-like non-satiability, suggesting an integrated mechanism Food and barter exchange have interesting correlates in that
for generalized reinforcers. both were scarce (meaning hard to obtain) over evolutionary
time, and yet both contributed strongly to the inclusive fitness
In their discussion of the reinforcement power of money, Lea & of humans. Because they were scarce, it is reasonable to
Webley (L&W) use the biological value of food to distinguish assume that the biological system would recognize them as
between tools (useful to eventually obtain a biological incentive) rewarding. As suggested by reinforcement learning models
and drugs (parasitizing the biologically meaningful incentive (Sutton & Barto 1998), it is important to encode these rewards
system). This opposition between intrinsically valuable food (including money as a secondary reinforcer for barter) as
and addictive drugs of abuse, however, may be less innocuous values, which can then act as inputs into the actor-critic circuitry
than it appears on the surface. in order to learn experientially about better action sequences.
As a source of metabolic energy, regulation of food intake Since the ecology makes the future availability of these rewards
could be expected to be controlled by the hypothalamus, the uncertain, it seems advantageous that the value systems associ-
brain region that monitors and manages the neuroendocrine ated with seeking behavior would evolve as non-homeostatic
system, ultimately modulating the blood concentration of and non-satiable (i.e., linear or non-depreciated) and thus have
glucose. Instead, the subjective feeling of “hunger,” as meant in drug-like properties.
the industrialized world, does not seem to correlate primarily Paradoxically, then, the dopaminergic system underlying drug
with hypothalamic activity. Brain imaging showed that, in addiction might have evolved precisely to incentivize mammals,
human subjects craving food after skipping one or two meals, it whenever possible, to eat above and beyond the minimal, and
is instead the dopamine system that lights up (along with the in fact ideal, amount of food. Offsetting this impulse must then
orbitofrontal cortex), with an activation pattern similar to that be inhibitory systems of control, which seem to be more variable
recorded in drug addicts awaiting their fix (e.g., Pelchat et al. across humans. Scarcity thus constitutes a powerful evolutionary
2004; Volkow & Wise 2005). However, in subjects fasting for explanation for the addictive feature of money, food, and in fact
36 hours, the hypothalamus does show increased activation any scarcely available generalized reinforcer.
(Tataranni et al. 1999). This protracted fasting period correlates Research suggests that there are two systems competing for
with considerable metabolic changes and subjective reports behavioral control. The first system locks in behavioral responses
nearly opposite to the feelings of people waiting to be seated at to predicted rewards using temporal difference learning (Shultz
restaurants (depressed state as opposed to unrest). et al. 1997). This system allows for habituation and may be the
A converging (if on the face unrelated) line of evidence indi- primary route for a drug theory of money. Much of the proces-
cates that caloric restriction significantly increases longevity in sing in this system involves the dopaminergic neurons in the
laboratory animals. In particular, rats whose daily caloric intake striatum (O’Doherty et al. 2004). The second system uses contin-
is limited to approximately 60% of ad libitum controls have a gent goals to build the value of representative pathways for
life expectancy about 30% longer (Hadley et al. 2001; Mattson decision-making, and may be the primary route for a tool
2005). If confirmed in humans, these findings would complement theory of money. Much of this processing occurs in the prefrontal
the recent recognition of obesity as one of the most lethal preven- cortex (Cohen et al. 2000). Recent theories attempt to explain the
table diseases in the United States (Allison et al. 2001; Goldin arbitration of these two reinforcement learning systems (prefron-
2005; Volkow & Wise 2005). Moreover, irregular diet (normal tal and striatal) in terms of the cost/benefit ratio of each system in
meals alternated with fasting periods) is more beneficial in rats different circumstances. Such models can help clarify the neuro-
than regular feeding (consistently light meals). Several mechan- biological bases of the tool – drug distinction (or at this point,
isms have been proposed to explain these observations, including integration), and at the same time extend it to the broader
reduction of oxidative stress, strengthening of the shock-absorber domain of reinforcement learning with scarce resources.
systems, and stimulation of growth factors (Mattson 2002; 2005;
Mobbs et al. 2001). Taken together, brain imaging and caloric
restriction studies invite the provocative hypothesis that
humans with virtually unlimited access to food do not normally The desire to obtain money: A culturally
eat to gain a biological advantage, but rather because they are ritualised expression of the aggressive
addicted to food.
Now let us consider barter, which operates on the principle of instinct
mutual advantage (McCabe 2003): each party has something the
Ralf-Peter Behrendt
other wants, and, by trading, both parties can be made better off.
MRC Psych, The Retreat Hospital, 107 Heslington Road, York, YO10 5BN,
The tool theory of money emerges from the observation that the
United Kingdom.
value from barter can be greatly expanded by using money to (1)
[email protected]
reduce the search costs of finding a potential trading partner, (2)
reduce the default risk of trading with a partner by getting money Abstract: Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms
in return, (3) define the relative value of goods and services by whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given
pricing them in terms of money, and (4) allow greater specializ- rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of
ation of human activity (North 1990). However, money can lose phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive

instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much Psychoanalysis provides another vantage point. As the infant
of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange. starts to crave a particular mental state that he senses in his care-
giver (“object”), namely admiration and devoted interest, he
What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, . . . the starts to become sensitive to any threat to the exclusivity of this
tackling of a task or problem, the self-respect [in] everything that a relationship. To the competitive presence of a third person, the
man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the infant starts to respond with a particular kind of anger – that is,
sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; every- envy directed at the third person’s admirable qualities that
thing associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other attract the caregiver (Oedipus complex). The origins of envy
equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disap- and jealousy lie in the infant’s loss of complete control over his
pear from human life. object. It is the realisation of his dependence on his object and
— Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269) the development of object-relations that turns constitutional
anger and aggression into envy, hate, and jealousy. Not only
One can agree with Lea & Webley (L&W) insofar as “we must may envy arise when there is a threat to the exclusivity of one’s
explain how money gets its incentive power through its action object-relation, but also when others’ qualities, being perceived
on other instincts” (sect. 5.4). Of course, money has “a value to be more attractive than one’s own, prevent one from establish-
and an emotional charge that are not predicted by its economic ing such a relation. Competitive aggressiveness derived from the
use” (sect. 4.11), but affect and cognition that accompany the Oedipal complex is a nonpathological and constructive force in
pursuit of money do not testify to an underlying trading or altruis- human relations (e.g., Wolf 1988, p. 78). Competitiveness is a
tic instinct, if ever one existed, but portray an attitude of envy, defence against unacceptable feelings of envy (e.g., Joseph
greed, or quest for status or security. Money is indeed “an indi- 1986; Spillius 1993), which accords with Lorenz’s notion of
cator of achievement, respect, and freedom or power” (sect. cultural ritualisation of conflicting impulses. Thus, the function
4.4) and a potent symbol of “power relationships” (sect. 4.6). It of money may be related to suppressed but unconsciously
may be money’s ability to mediate satisfaction of the instinct of omnipresent envy (being an expression of the aggressive or
intraspecific aggression in a culturally conditioned way, not its “death” instinct).
supposed “strongly drug-like quality” (sect. 4.6), that explains Much of psychopathology can be related in one way or another
some of what Belk and Wallendorf (1990) describe as the “puz- to failings of this ritualised interplay of aggressive impulses and
zling ways in which people behave towards money” (as quoted reciprocal fear impulses that normally maintains us in social hier-
by L&W in their sect. 4.7) and why it is “taken up irresistibly archies, including compulsive gambling, hoarding, and other pro-
by any human society that encounters it” (sect. 5.4). blems subsumed by the authors under “addiction to money” but
Lorenz (1963) observed that adaptive behaviour is commonly with which money essentially has very little to do. The “miser’s
determined by impulses of several instincts, often one inhibiting hoarding” and the “spendthrift’s self-destructive carelessness”
the other. Phylogenetically, ritualisation creates new instinctive are both ways of dealing with interpersonal anxieties that
motor coordinations by welding together conflicting impulses. abound in groups and societies organised by ritualised aggression
Social behaviour is dominated from a drive-motivational point with the omnipresent threat of rejection.
of view by successive impulses of “aggression, fear, protection- What is there to suggest that money “seems to be capable of
seeking and renewed aggressiveness” (Lorenz 1963, p. 55). giving the illusion of trade and reciprocation even when it is
Norms of social behaviour that developed by cultural ritualisation absent” or that money “acts like a drug on that centre, activating
started to play an important part in human society “when inven- it even when there is no real possibility of trading” (sect. 5.2, para.
tion of tools was beginning to upset the equilibrium of phylogen- 5)? In its social dimension, trade may not be altruistic but yet
etically evolved patterns of social behaviour” (p. 249), the another culturally ritualised expression of intraspecific aggression
“equilibrium between the ability and the inhibition to kill” aimed at organising hierarchies in social groups. McDougall
(p. 242). As Lorenz remarked, on the basis of “the instincts of (1924) argued that the parental instinct is the only truly altruistic
animals,” “human culture has erected all the enormous super- instinct in man. One should not postulate a “trading instinct” just
structure of social norms and rites whose function is so closely because trading is ancient and adaptive, in as little as one can
analogous to that of phylogenetic ritualization” (Lorenz 1963, speak of a tool-making instinct. We are not endowed biologically
p. 240). with a specific disposition to trade, although we do have various
Ranking order is an essential principle of organisation of social physiological needs for which trading is primarily a culturally
life in higher vertebrates; it is maintained dynamically by individ- conditioned strategy through which to ensure their satisfaction.
uals’ aggressive impulses, although it has the effect of inhibiting There is no difference in principle between trading and foraging.
aggression within a society and limiting fighting between its If Tool Theory suggests that money “is an incentive only
members (Lorenz 1963). Interaction between members of a because and only insofar as it can be exchanged for goods and ser-
group, particularly in highly fluid forms of society, like ours, vices” (sect. 2.1), then this should be true for its social function too:
involves frequent symbolic and paralinguistic display of each Money is an incentive because it can be exchanged for social status
individual’s potential for aggression and submission. Money is (if only in one’s fantasy), thus satisfying intraspecific aggression in
but one symbol for self-esteem and self-respect, which are reflec- a culturally ritualised manner. As L&W acknowledge: “the possi-
tions of social ranking, particularly in modern society. Money has bility that money is used for purposes such as social display, social
become an increasingly important mediator of social organisation communication . . ., or social protection . . . merely extends the
as traditional networks of social reference became fragmented range of uses for money as a tool” (sect. 2.1). It seems the drug
and transient in modernity. As L&W summarise Simmel (1900/ metaphor had to be invoked to make acceptable the otherwise
1978) in section 3.3.1 of the target article: “Money is both the unfeasible argument that our desire to obtain money is related
means and the symbol of the process by which in modern to a trading instinct. The fact that money acquisition is not
society impersonal, quantitative social relations between auton- obviously adaptive to such instinct had to be reframed as deceit
omous individuals replace the determinant relations imposed (“parasitic action on a functional evolutionarily adaptive
by traditional society.” L&W themselves acknowledge “the system”; sect. 2.2.4). In contrast to the authors’ assertion that
importance of money as a marker of status within modern money “gives direct access to the systems that subserve . . .
societies” and recognise that references to wealth or income rewards . . . in an illusionary, nonfunctional way” (sect. 2.3)
“are a common part of discourse about status” (sect. 4.8). (money as a “functionless” drug), it can be summarised here
Indeed, money is a tool to obtain social status, allowing the that, unlike drugs of abuse, money’s access to these systems is
aggressive instinct to be expressed in accordance with our real and functional because it is linked to the culturally adaptive
culture. satisfaction of an instinct – that of intraspecific aggression.

Money as civilizing ritual Play is a more likely a basic human motivation, but its link to
money motivations is very weakly developed by L&W. Based
Russell Belk on their reference to children exchanging toys on the playground,
David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah it appears that L&W see play as a tool facilitating trade rather
84112. than as an end in itself. Like reciprocal altruism, this conception
[email protected] www.business.utah.edu/mktrwb of play is ultimately described by L&W as more tool-like than
drug-like. Contrary to assertions by L&W, children’s play with
Abstract: Although theorizing the non-tool motivations for desiring toys is initially more possessive than exchange-based (e.g.,
money is a worthwhile goal, Lea & Webley (L&W) offer a view that is Furby 1978). Like shopping, (e.g., Falk & Campbell 1997), chil-
too individualistic, too biological, and ultimately too linked to a tool- dren’s exchange of toys is another socialized, imitative, civilizing,
based view of money motivation. I argue that our fascination with
money is social, learned, and ritualistic. Through the magic of money
ritual behavior that must be learned.
rituals we overcome biological motivations and become civilized. Alternative underlying non-tool motivations for money-related
behaviors are more likely than reciprocal altruism and play. They
Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) contention that money is a tool with include the drive for power, the need for distinction, and the
which to accomplish objectives is hardly surprising, new, or a desire for social acceptance. Money is a means to power.
challenge to existing thought. It might have been more so if, Money and the things it can buy can bring prestige and status.
rather than as a utilitarian tool, money had been regarded as a Certain things money can buy make us more attractive to
metaphor for possibility. It frees and stimulates our imagination. others and help us fit in with similar others. Within these social
As Sartre (1943) observed, “Stop before a showcase with money realms, accumulated money can become a means of “keeping
in your pocket; the objects displayed are already more than half score.” However, because we learn civilizing rules not to directly
yours” (p. 753). It is this imaginative hedonism (Campbell 1987) tell people how much money we have, we indirectly make claims
that leads to consumer culture. That money is a drug is a more to wealth, power, and taste via our possessions and expenditures.
novel contention, but it is sketched out so roughly that no impli- Money motivations are learned in the same way that manners
cations or predictions can be drawn. That is, the present account are learned. This learning includes “civilizing” social rituals that
offers little theoretical understanding of money as drug. facilitate mating and social relationships (e.g., rituals of
The non-tool, “drug uses” of money discussed are especially romance and gift-giving), that announce or claim individual or
centered around restrictions on money usage (sect. 4.5), or group status (e.g., conspicuous consumption, consumption com-
what McGraw and Tetlock (2005) call taboo exchanges. L&W munities, and displays of cultural capital), and that curb envy
explain that “Gifts and sex are the currency of the moral and (e.g., tipping, staging banquets, and other forms of wealth redis-
romantic economy, and to confuse them with the currency of tribution involving either real or symbolic sops; cf. Foster 1972),
the material economy is somehow to contaminate them” (sect. thereby reducing the threat of violence by the have-nots of
4.5, para. 4). This is an important observation, but it is ill- society toward the haves. Most of these civilizing rituals overcome
explained without invoking ritualistic notions (e.g., Belk 1996; rather than indulge more basic motivations. They are social and
2005; Belk & Coon 1993). Recognizing that gifts and romance cultural in nature rather than purely psychological or biological.
are key ritual motifs in contemporary society is necessary for They are what make us most fully human.
understanding these “magical” non-tool uses of money by
individuals.
Ritual money magic is also found at the institutional level.
While U.S. monies proclaim “In God We Trust,” in using
money we express our trust in social institutions including Money as tool, money as resource: The
money-coining governments, lending, savings, and credit insti- biology of collecting items for their own sake
tutions, merchants, stock markets, insurers, and retirement
funds. These are the social institutions that “magically” safe- David A. Booth
guard, multiply, and guarantee the worth of our money. The School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham,
rituals that these institutions perform, and in which we partici- West Midlands B15 2TT, United Kingdom.
pate, are civilizing rituals that express our shared peaceful and [email protected] http://psg422.bham.ac.uk/staff
cooperative intent, without which our lives would be solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Abstract: Money does not stimulate receptors in mimicry of natural
agonists; so, by definition, money is not a drug. Attractions of money
Seeking a non-ritualistic, non-cultural, biological basis for other than to purchase goods and services could arise from instincts
money motivations is misguided. As L&W point out, money is similar to hoarding in other species. Instinctual activities without
too recent a human development to have direct evolutionary evolutionary function include earning a billion and writing for BBS.
bases. Their attempt to link it to other supposed instincts with
presumably evolutionary bases is not useful. That such links Stephen Lea and Paul Webley (henceforth L&W) spoil a strong
might be speculated offers no evidence of their merit. It would case for a biologically based desire for money itself by inventing
be similarly specious to speculate on biological motivational the incoherent concept of a “cognitive drug.” They fail to
links for other recent strong incentives like television viewing, recognise the hoarding instinct as a likely evolutionary origin of
Internet usage, or fashion purchasing. Such behaviors are more enjoying accumulated money for its own sake. More broadly,
likely socially motivated and learned. They too are part of our they do not allow that an inherited capacity can provide the
cultural rituals. Any connection of these acts to biological basis for nonfunctional activities. Most generally of all, they
motivations is tenuous, superficial, overly speculative, and quite seem to presuppose that, to have a biological basis, behaviour
probably fallacious. must be reducible to operations on material entities such as nic-
Even if it were worthwhile speculating on biologically linked otine, saccharin, and coins; as a result, they miss the realities in
money motivations, the choice of reciprocal altruism and play social institutions and culture, and indeed of conscious and
as underlying “instincts” is problematic. Reciprocal altruism is a unconscious mental processes.
cynical view of human nature based on problematic sociobiologi- Many species collect items of food, in stocks far larger than
cal analogies. Non-reciprocal genuine altruism also exists (e.g., needed at the moment or anticipatable from past individual
Rachlin 2002), and not just among close kin. Learned motivations experience (Morgan et al. 1943). Size of cache is not tightly regu-
better explain our exchange-related money behaviors. Children lated by selective value to ancestors, such as duration of seasonal
have no inherent attraction to money and must instead learn to lack of food or of torpor while hibernating (Munro et al. 2005).
desire it, use it, and thus become “civilized.” Ageing affects hoarding in mice nonfunctionally (Chen et al.

2005). Laboratory rats even hoard blocks of wood. That is, adap- recipient: resorting to money instead of a personally appropriate
tive behaviour is not always functional. Indeed, evolution could object shows lack of empathy, which is poor acculturation of the
hardly work without useless activities becoming functional in biological capacity for altruism.
new ecologies. A hoard of flints knapped by hominids (Wynn In summary, the capacity to develop the cooperative or indi-
2002) need not be evidence of an instinct for armouries among vidual activity of collecting items for their own sake is likely to
survivors of battles between groups; the collecting instinct have selective advantage in ecologies where resources are much
could have run free in makers of axes for butchering or hunting. more limited at some times than at others. In a species with
Thus, adaptive capacities for hoarding could account for much nonmaterial culture and activity, resources hoarded to
accumulation of coins. The gold or silver need not be felt to be no extrinsic purpose can include artefacts of society that are
beautiful to look at or delightful to touch (as reductionism dis- also nonmaterial, such as a balance at the bank that others
poses L&W to suggest). The miser may simply be scrabbling only dream of. Money may derive all its attractions from
through his hoard. The cop-out of invoking play is unnecessary, services and goods it buys. Then (contrary to L&W) money
gambling is not analogous and it is unhelpful to relate drug addic- can fulfill the hoarding instinct in biosocial cognitive actual-
tion to obsessive-compulsive disorder (Grisham & Barlow 2005). ity – no illusion and not dependent on brains that can use
Hoarding needs no coins (nor money-processing chips, as coins as neurotransmitters.
L&W revealingly invoke twice), nor marks on a screen or in a
ledger; the miser can go through his fortune in his head. Some
people find entertainment in mining caches of data. Selfishness
or incompetence about potential for knowledge from one’s own
database is a serious problem in the information industry Hoarding behavior: A better evolutionary
(Lai et al. 2005). account of money psychology?
Just credit information can be “a functionless motivator,”
although the strength of a delight in money as such is likely to Paul Bouissac
come from its use to acquire immediate or delayed access to Department of French Linguistics, University of Toronto, Victoria College,
goods and services. It adds nothing to claim that money activates Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1K7, Canada.
the brain’s bump for collecting (or the cultural role of a collec- [email protected] http://www.semioticon.com/bouissac.htm
tor). Like any mental processes, thoughts and feelings about
money activate neural pathways and also pathways through the Abstract: The target article authors have been drawn into two
economy when overt in social activity. Hence, locating critical metaphoric models of attitudes toward money that have prevented
brain areas for people’s normal or abnormal collecting of them from developing a convincing evolutionary theory able to account
useless objects (Anderson et al. 2005) in no way substantiates for the various behaviors they list and categorize as either tool-type or
the “metaphor” of a drug; it merely provides a starting point drug-type. Instead, hoarding could provide an evolutionary model that
is better supported by behavioral and neurological evidence and could
for characterizing the cellular expression of genes for the instinc- account for the whole range of behaviors they review. Moreover, the
tual capacities that develop into accumulation of resources – or authors’ focus on money as the common denominator of these
of junk. The irreducibly social system of an economy is also behaviors brings an ideological bias to their inquiry.
necessary for the hoarded resource to be the tool for collecting
any purchasable resource. Metaphors play an important role in scientific heuristics. The
So why do L&W start with the idea of a psychoactive drug’s spontaneous or systematic identification of common properties
mimicry of neurotransmitters at receptors in the brain and across distinct categories of objects and the transfer of models
then stepwise empty it of all content, even metaphorical? The across phenomenal modalities may indeed reveal essential simi-
only necessity is if money’s power has to be physical, in cause larities that were not obvious in the first place. This is often the
and in effect. Psychoactive drugs are substances that alter ion first step toward the construction of a hypothesis which may
movements at synapses. What L&W call “sensory drugs” are eventually lead to a scientific theory that explains a set of pre-
material stimuli to sensory receptors of the rare sort that elicit viously unrelated observations as resulting from the same
greater and greater reactions as the stimulation becomes extre- general laws. Metaphors are nevertheless double-edged
mely strong. This monotonic relationship is peculiar to unlearned because there is always a risk that they trap the imagination of
reflexes however; liking for sweetness becomes contextualised scientists and preclude further advances. Niels Bohr’s planetary
socially or nutritiously to the particular level familiar in a food model of the atom provides an example of this phenomenon.
or drink, for rats (Booth et al. 1972) as well as for people Lea & Webley (L&W) select two metaphors among the many
(Booth et al. 1983; Conner et al. 1988). Furthermore, this may that may bear upon money in contemporary Western cultures.
be the only piece of appetitive behaviour that is innate in Mindful of the limits involved in the heuristic use of metaphors,
human beings. (The baby-like rounded profile does not elicit they nevertheless embrace drug and tool as the most likely to
particular movements.) The game is up when the only example provide insights into the biological significance of the behavior
of a “cognitive drug” (the metaphor for money) is pornographic of contemporary humans toward money. The case they make is
pictures and text. Contrary to L&W, there is little or no evidence persuasive, but in the rhetorical rather than scientific sense, as
in human beings for innate sexual arousal at the sight of the real it is difficult to see how their dual theory could be falsified. Of
thing: the power of pictorial erotica results from acculturation, course, as topologist René Thom used to say, a metaphor
not genetically programmed wiring between inferotemporal cannot be false. But the point is: how much trust can we place
cortex and autonomic efferents to the genitalia. The clincher is in such intuitions and for which purpose? All that glitters is not
textual erotica, and indeed spoken words: linguistic capacities gold. At best, the authors’ two root metaphors can help classify
may be instinctive but not English or French verbiage, about the other metaphors which have been propounded in the past
sex or food. to explain money-oriented behaviors.
Sexy sights or sounds are not “illusory” either. What’s missing It is surprising that L&W have not taken into consideration
when they are bought rather than freely offered, in the flesh or hoarding behavior, also called collecting behavior, as a possible
just by photo or phone, is the other person. Even intense sweet- evolutionary ground to account for the various forms of attitudes
eners are not illusions: their sweetness conveys what the consu- toward money that they review. From the beginning of modern
mer wants them for (Freeman et al. 1993). Similarly, it is not psychology, hoarding has been considered a human “instinct”
an illusory quality of money that makes monetary gifts “socially (e.g., James 1890, Ch. 24); and the continuum between this
awkward,” nor is it a trade instinct somehow separate from reci- self-preservation strategy and the behavior of many animals
procal altruism. A gift is expected to be attractive to the particular (mammals, birds, and insects) that hoard food or collect

nonfood items that may be displayed in courtship is well docu- cultural, ideological, and socio-economical differences. Thus,
mented (e.g., male bower birds). The adaptive value of storing they remain within the universalist discourse of the political
nonperishable food in caches when seasonal variations bring economy that regulates contemporary globalization, construing
scarcity is obvious (e.g., Sherry 1985; Smith & Reichman capital as a tool to generate profit but ignoring the immediacy
1984). Likewise, the adaptive value of demonstrating fitness by of salaries (or food coupons) as a scarce index of threatened live-
flaunting collections of nonfood items can be construed as a lihood. Hence, their surprising notion of money as a “functionless
behavioral “handicap,” in the evolutionary sense of the term motivator” (sect. 2.2.2) that can “mimic. . .natural incentives” (see
(Zahavi & Zahavi 1997), similar to phenotypic features such as Abstract, sects. 2.4, 5.1) – a case that may perhaps apply to
oversized feathers or other conspicuous and costly ornamental Monopoly type of games or extreme financial speculations, but
appendages. In archaeology, hoarding is also considered to be not to everyday experiences in the greater part of the world.
an expected behavior in past cultures at least from the Neolithic By shifting the focus toward the evolution of the behaviors
on (Hamon & Quilliec 2005). However, hoarding behavior concerned and their neurological substrates (which could not
appears in L&W’s article only marginally in association with have evolved with respect to the too-recent institution of
the term “miser,” perhaps because it has come to designate in money), the hoarding model seems to be more apt for explaining
contemporary psychology a behavioral dysfunction, usually in evolutionary terms, and more economically, the range of beha-
associated with cluttering, and often connected with senescence. viors L&W address in their article. Confronted with this some-
But this is a recent semantic change particular to clinical psychol- what baroque, two-headed theory, one cannot help thinking
ogy. As noted above, it has kept its functional value as an adaptive that the authors could have made a better use of Occam’s razor.
strategy in other fields of inquiry.
Anderson et al. (2005) offer a neurologically based model of
hoarding behavior that could explain more economically within
a single evolutionary theory the two types of behaviors toward
money contrastively described by L&W in the target article. Money, play, and instincts
Anderson et al.’s investigation of patients with mesial prefrontal
lesions who show compulsive collecting behavior suggests that Gordon M. Burghardt
the drive to collect and hoard, which “primarily originates from Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
subcortical bioregulatory nuclei” (p. 208) (i.e., limbic subcortical TN 37996-0900.
and mesolimbic cortical structures), is modulated by self- [email protected] http://web.utk.edu/gburghar/
regulatory functions associated with mesial prefrontal regions.
Anderson et al. tentatively submit that “the drive to collect Abstract: The metaphor drug model of money slights the possibility that
would be assisted in part by a weighting system, whereby the money may literally tap into and exploit brain systems underlying
neural representation of a stimulus item would be associated motivational systems, and it also ignores growing evidence on the
common neural substrates of behavioral and “physiological” addictions.
with a particular signal value, which would serve as an index of
Additionally, many objects other than money can gain such drug-like
the relative worth of the stimulus” (p. 208). This is all the more properties. The treatment of play in the evolutionary explanation for
relevant to the case of money attitudes in that it does not the unique role of money in people ignores key conceptual and
appear that “the targets of acquisition behavior are specified at empirical issues.
a genomic level” (p. 207).
In view of such evidence and plausible assumptions, it is One of my professors at the University of Chicago back in the
possible to formulate a hypothesis: Natural selection both 1960s, the brilliant David Bakan, was very pleased with his defi-
favored (1) a drive to collect and hoard a broad range of items, nition of money as “a medium of exchange accepted by stran-
as this behavior enhances self-preservation and reproductive gers.” Lea & Webley (L&W) realize, however, that money does
fitness; and (2) an inhibitory system that monitors the process not just have an instrumental or tool function; there are con-
and decides when this drive runs the risk of reaching a maladap- straints on its use. They point out that money is not considered
tive threshold either by overloading the carrying capacities of the an appropriate gift in some contexts (though, of course, that is
organism at the expense of other vital functions, or by collecting also true of any other object). L&W invoke money as a drug,
and hoarding indiscriminately. The latter could be explained by mimicking human instincts, to deal with all those aspects of
the fact that the properties of the stimuli should not be too money that their “tool theory” cannot accommodate. They
narrowly specified, since excessive specialization would not argue that money readily comes to act as a motivator similar to
be adaptive with respect to changing environments. It can also biologically based instinctive drives.
be expected that, if both behaviors are indeed genetically con- Skinner and his followers viewed money as the ultimate gener-
trolled, it will ensue that there will be variations among individ- alized reinforcer developed through instrumental (tool) con-
uals in congruence with the emerging structural variation ditioning. That the ultimate bedrock of even the most artificial
theory of the human genome (Check 2005). Therefore, it is not and arbitrary training regimes for rats, pigeons, and people was
necessary to hypothesize a maladaptive addictive model (the access to primary or secondary reinforcers (or “drives”) was
drug metaphor), but simply natural variations and occasional assumed as obvious, though uninteresting and not in need of
dysfunctions that cause a more or less drastic disinhibition of an evolutionary explanation beyond the connections made in
the hoarding drive. As frontal cortical functions are associated Skinner (1966). Now we find out that the operant approach
with cognitive competences, such as the representation of the was based on money (tokens) as drugs. I rather thought that
context and the comparative evaluation of stimuli, it is natural token economies, when instituted in mental hospitals, were
that they would appear to constitute the rational norm that is means to wean people from unproductive, destructive, incompe-
captured by the tool metaphor. From this point of view, money tent, impulsive, compulsive, or self-injurious (e.g., drug-like)
would not be a specific object but a mere cultural index for behaviors we now know to be largely due to malfunctioning neu-
resources, and the intellectual conundrum created by the discre- rotransmitters resulting from genetic and developmental events.
pancy of the two attitudes identified by L&W would result from Are we now to consider token economies as just another drug
the incompatibility between the two root metaphors rather than therapy, a trading of one addiction for another?
from the attitudes to which they refer. Although L&W make much of the fact that money developed
But there is more. By using the abstract notion of money as the late in human history, automobiles appeared even more recently.
common denominator of all the forms of behavior they take into Like David Bakan, my major professor at Chicago, Eckhard
consideration, L&W operate a conceptual reduction by creating Hess, was also very pleased with one of his definitions: an auto-
a kind of epistemological commodity that tends to erase all mobile is merely a means to get from point A to point B safely

and efficiently. To him a car was totally a tool, confirmed by the Mutualism, symbiosis, and similar “trading” phenomena are
fact that he rarely drove except to travel out of town. But he, endemic in organic life. The roots of trading may run deep in
nevertheless, bought his wife, Dorle (a stylish and artistic our phylogenetic heritage, and the evolution of money may
matron from European wealth), a Mercedes convertible. As have been a small evolutionary step, albeit with major
she zipped around Hyde Park with the top down and her consequences.
blond hair blowing in the wind, Hess realized that for his wife The second instinct that is invoked to explain the origins of
a car was far more than a means of transportation, and he felt money is play. Having just written a treatise on this topic
obliged to humor her “drug” habit. Fast sporty cars are fun, (Burghardt 2005), I was anxious to see how L&W deployed the
even exhilarating, to drive, and a Mercedes in the 1960s was concept. I was surprised that play is invoked without any con-
still an uncommon status symbol as well. Obviously, there were sideration of what it is or the nature of its instinctive origins. In
constraints on what one could do with such a vehicle. It was fact, the only topic discussed is toy exchange, based on the
not very useful for transporting more than two persons, had authors’ own studies published in economic venues. To end
limited trunk space, and insurance and repairs were costly. So, their paper on such a thin two-paragraph thread of support is dis-
I guess the way to understand automobiles is to invoke both appointing. First, whether play, even object play, is a separate
the tool and drug metaphors. But wait, any use of food that instinct (or behavior system) or is derived from other systems
does not just provide nutrition and calories should be looked at (such as predatory or fighting), is still an open issue in many
in this way also – as a drug. Food was also one of the first species. Second, whether exchanging toys is a means of learning
mediums of exchange and the spice trade a most important how to manage resources rather than a behavioral relic or a pre-
early part of international trade. cocial performance of adult behavior with no important “prac-
The point of these examples is to argue that, as formulated, I tice” component, is largely unknown. A just-so story does not
find this proposed drug metaphor an “emperor” theory of constitute data, especially when the adaptive function of play in
money that has no clothes. Oops, clothing also is both instrumen- juvenile animals has rarely been demonstrated experimentally
tal and a drug of choice for shopaholics, and has been an import- (Burghardt 2005). If play exchange is training for money manage-
ant means of exchange (cloth, silk, cotton, wool, not to say ment, as L&W assert, the problems so many people have with
boutique “rerun” shops). money management makes such play quite ineffective.
Does money act as a drug on dopamine receptors in the basal Finally, the loose use of the term “instinct” is disturbing and
ganglia and related structures or is the drug idea merely a meta- shows that the new style of evolutionary psychology, by largely
phor? The authors opt for the latter, but much of the article eschewing engagement with data on other species, is in danger
seems to argue the former. To them money “intrudes on the of losing any claim to be a naturalistic evolutionary science.
normal functioning of the nervous system” (sect. 2.2.1) by The classical ethologists, along with their critics, made remark-
mimicking substances involved in basic instincts that are, in able progress in conceptualizing instinctive behavior and motiva-
fact, centered in these same brain areas. Although still somewhat tional systems. I fear that articles such as this one will make the
controversial, these areas seem to contain often overlapping current incarnation of evolutionary psychology problematic to
systems involved in basic motivations, cravings, feelings, compul- both evolutionary biologists and social scientists.
sions, conditioning, and both behavioral and drug-based addic-
tions, including excessive running, gambling, and so forth
(references in Burghardt 2001; 2005). I think that the drug
word may have shock value, but essentially adds nothing since
any behavior not based on rational or instrumentally adaptive Money as epistemic structure
behavior is, for L&W, acting as a drug. This dichotomy is just
another learning – instinct contrast that neglects the biological Sanjay Chandrasekharan
processes connecting instrumental and instinctive behavior. Centre for Behavioural and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad,
L&W also assert that money is unique in having no intrinsic Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, 211002, India.
drive-reducing or instinctive properties based on current or [email protected] http://www.sce.carleton.ca/schandra
past environments, and thus is an entirely new phenomenon
that needs formal incorporation into an evolutionary account of Abstract: A testable model of the origin of money is outlined. Based on
the notion of epistemic structures, the account integrates the tool and
behavior. In doing this they have to deal with the origins of drug views using a common underlying model, and addresses the two
money in our evolutionary past. This they view as a challenge puzzles presented by Lea & Webley (L&W) – money’s biological roots
since they claim that money is unique to our species (an interest- and the adaptive significance of our tendency to acquire money.
ing assertion itself since tool use, tool making, language, count-
ing, altruism, even moral behavior have fallen by the wayside Epistemic structures (ESs) are structures that organisms add to
as qualitative distinctions between humans and other species). their environment to lower the cognitive complexity associated
So what to do? After going through the first four sections of with tasks (Chandrasekharan 2005). For instance, wood mice
the target article, I awaited the new ideas that were going to (Apodemus sylvaticus) distribute small objects, such as leaves
emerge from their evolutionary analysis. Surprisingly, the critical or twigs, as points of reference while foraging. Such “way-
heart of the paper on the origins of money is in but a fraction of marking” has been shown to diminish the likelihood of losing
the text (sects. 5.2 and 5.3) where we find that reciprocal altruism interesting locations, and is exhibited even under laboratory con-
and play are the roots of the origins of money as drug. ditions, using plastic discs (Stopka & MacDonald 2003). The
Insofar as altruism as a source of money is concerned, I will male bower bird builds colorful bowers (nest-like structures),
focus just on the claim that, while altruism is old, the trading which are used by females to make mating decisions (Zahavi &
instinct is unique to our species; an assertion that cannot be sus- Zahavi 1997). Bacterial colonies use a strategy called “quorum
tained. We have known for decades of gift-bearing flies and gift sensing” to know that they have critical mass to attack a host.
exchanges among birds (see Judson 2002). Indeed, these gifts Individual bacteria secrete molecules known as auto-inducers
may become divorced from their original reinforcer (food) and into the environment; when the chemical breaches a threshold,
become symbolic. Although ethology (Tinbergen 1951) is cited, the colony attacks (Silberman 2003).
the seminal concept of ritualization is not. While such “gifts” in We have developed and implemented an evolutionarily plaus-
other species may not always be explicit payoffs or serve as gen- ible model of the origin of such external structures, using artificial
eralized reinforcers, they certainly are trades. Furthermore, agents that possess only reactive behaviour (the agents just sense
exchanges are the essence of many social insect societies, even and act, they do no internal processing). The model uses
interspecifically (aphids pay for protection with secretions). cognitive load reduction in a recursive fashion: it is an effect of

ES generation, but it is also the cause that drives generation. We rewarding event, but with training this response “migrates” to pre-
make two assumptions: (1) organisms sometimes generate dictive cues. This behaviour, where learning chains backwards in
random structures in the environment (pheromones, leaf piles, time to identify (and reinforce) successively earlier predicators of
etc.) as part of their everyday activity; and (2) organisms can reward, has been modeled by Montague et al. (1996) using a tem-
track their physical or cognitive effort (i.e., they get tired), and poral difference learning algorithm (similar to Q Learning). Such
they have a bias to reduce tiredness. The term “tiredness” indi- a dopamine-based model would explain the tendency to acquire
cates the “felt” quality of the feedback, which allows tracking of money (and the pleasure it provides) as an adaptive extension of
cost using affect – that is, without using a separate computational money’s role in lowering tiredness.
module. Besides cognitive load, two other factors could drive this
Some of the randomly generated structures in the world are migration. One, epistemic structures like money significantly
now encountered by the agents, and in some random cases, expand the space of actions possible (see Kirsh 1996). Being
these structures make tasks easier for the organisms (following the connector of all possible paths in a trading system, money
pheromones reduces travel time, avoiding leaf-piles reduce fora- expands the action space of agents exponentially. Two,
ging effort). In other words, these structures shorten paths in the epistemic structures make a system more robust, by raising
task environment (see Kirsh 1996). Given the postulated bias to task-success in noisy and high processing load environments
avoid tiredness, these paths get preference, and they are (see Chandrasekharan 2005). These two advantages, combined
reinforced. Since more structure generation leads to more of with lowered energy use, make the tendency to acquire
these paths, structure generation behaviour is also reinforced. money a highly adaptive response.
We have implemented this model using both genetic algorithms
(evolutionary learning) and the Q-Learning algorithm. The latter
implementation shows that reactive agents can learn, within their
lifetime, to add ESs systematically to their world to lower cogni-
tive load (Chandrasekharan & Stewart 2004). Such within- Money and the autonomy instinct
lifetime learning to reduce cognitive load has recently been
shown in homing pigeons. They follow railways and highways Siegfried Dewitte
to reach their target, even taking exits (Guilford et al. 2004). Marketing Research Center, K.U.Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, Leuven, 3000
The tiredness model explains the process underlying the Belgium.
generation of two of the three ES types possible (structures for [email protected]
oneself, structures for oneself and others, structures exclusively http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/siegfried.dewitte
for others). It only partially explains the third. The second type
is explained by appealing to the similarity of systems: if a struc- Abstract: Applying the reciprocity instinct to monetary transactions
ture provides congeniality for me, it will provide congeniality implies that the reaction to monetary debt and monetary credit are
similar. However, evidence suggests an asymmetry. I suggest that the
for other systems like me. The similarity of agents led to them “autonomy instinct” fits better with human behavior towards money. I
forming structures that were useful for everyone, even though show that people value autonomy, and I show how money can serve
they were just concerned about reducing their own tiredness. this instinct.
A similar learning system could explain the first of Lea &
Webley’s (L&W’s) puzzles: the origin of money. The tiredness I concur with Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) analysis that human
approach is suited to modeling money because, given a barter behavior towards money is consistent with Drug Theory rather
system, money lowers both physical and cognitive effort, as it than with Tool Theory. I also concur with their claim that this
helps lower the number of physical transactions, and reduces implies that money should hinge on a pre-existing instinct. I do
the computational complexity of tracking branching transactions not concur with L&W’s claim that money mainly parasitizes on
(agent X has Good B and she wants Good A, but agent Y, who has humans’ reciprocity instinct.
Good A, doesn’t want Good B. Agent X now needs to find an effi- Applying the reciprocity instinct to monetary transactions
cient and guaranteed path from her Good B to Good A.). With requires two cognitive tools: a sensitivity to what others owe
multiple goods, the branching transaction problem becomes you (cf. cheater detection module; Tooby & Cosmides 1992)
extremely complex, particularly with added constraints like per- and a sensitivity to what you owe others (cf. the reputation
ishability, security, and so forth. Money can be seen as an episte- concern; Axelrod 1984). The function of both is to bridge the
mic structure that emerged to shorten such complex paths in the time lag between the two transaction phases (i.e., giving and
barter environment, by providing a common structure that can receiving) that define an exchange situation. L&W claim that
connect any path, reducing both cognitive and physical load. money fills the gap between giving and receiving. Money
Applying our model of ES generation to such a view of money, removes the temporary imbalance between giver and receiver
given any barter environment with sufficient cognitive load and and the negative affect related to that imbalance.
transaction costs, and agents that seek to lower their tiredness, It is critical to L&W’s claim that people are willing to fill the
a commodity that is in demand by most agents (salt, sugar, time lag between the two transactions with money in both direc-
spice, gold, etc.) would be used to connect branching paths effi- tions. They should be motivated not only to get the money they
ciently. The commodity would acquire this money role the same deserve but also to pay the money they owe. Credit cards
way pheromones acquired an epistemic role in our simulation. In should be equally as aversive as prepay cards. However,
this view, money emerges not because of evolutionary or genetic common intuition and recent findings suggest that people do
advantages, but because of a central survival advantage – the low- not want to pay their debts as quickly as possible to get rid of
ering of energy utilization. To test this hypothesis, we are cur- the feelings of obligation. People are willing to live on credit
rently designing a network-based barter experiment and a and use simple heuristics to decide how much they can borrow
parallel simulation model. (Soman & Cheema 2002). Credit cards are very popular (turn-
What about L&W’s second puzzle: the tendency to acquire over in Europe in 2004: E617.3 billion), whereas prepaid cards
money? In the model above, this could be explained by including remain marginal and often remain tied to one retailer (e.g.,
dopamine as a second reinforcement factor, acting in tandem with BþS Card Service GmbH 2005), although there is no practical
tiredness. So, once the use of money is learned by agents in a reason why people would not be willing to prepay their expenses.
barter environment, a dopamine-based system takes over. This There just seems to be no demand for such a product, although
system “extends” the use of money as a path-connecter – to a ten- prepay cards would be an efficient way to self-regulate expenses
dency to acquire money. Schultz (1992; reported by Braver & (Trope & Fishbach 2000). Further, there is evidence that living
Cohen 2000) has shown that dopamine responds initially to a on credit does not hurt when durables are involved (Prelec &

Loewenstein 1998). Finally, the mental accounting framework Individual differences, affective and social
(Shefrin & Thaler 1988) does not fit nicely with the reciprocity factors
principle: People borrow money even when they have money
available on different (mental) accounts. By borrowing, they Adrian Furnham
increase the amount they owe without increasing what others Department of Psychology, University College London, London, WC1 OAP,
owe them. Borrowing increases the imbalance between giver United Kingdom.
and receiver, which is inconsistent with a reciprocity instinct. [email protected]
My claim is that money either (1) parasitizes only on the
receiving part of the reciprocity instinct (cf. cheater detection) Abstract: The target article overestimates the power of money as a
or (2) parasitizes on another instinct. A candidate alternative motive/incentive in order to justify trying to provide a biological theory.
instinct is the need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan 1985). I first A great deal of the article is spent trying to force-fit other explanations
present a series of human behaviors that suggest the existence into this course categorization. Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) account seems
of this instinct. I proceed by explaining how money might to ignore systematic, individual differences, as well as the literature on
many negative affective associations of money and behavioural
hinge on this instinct. I finish by reviewing several money economics, which is a cognitive account of money motivation.
phenomena that fit better with the autonomy instinct than with
the reciprocity instinct. The authors are to be congratulated on an interesting, innovative,
The value of autonomy can be inferred from several human and thoughtful paper on a woefully neglected topic. The under-
behaviors. I here define autonomy as independence from social standing of how people think about and use money seems at once
influence. Autonomy reduces the likelihood that others can the concern of all disciplines and of none. Economists have been
exploit the agent for their own benefits, and therefore increases consistently wrong in asserting that money is the measure of all
survival. Is there evidence that such an instinct exists? Brehm things but is itself unable to be measured. The everyday
(1966) showed that people are willing to forgo their favorite meaning and use of money may be a neglected topic in the beha-
option in order to establish that they are in charge. Bown et al. vioural sciences but that situation is thankfully changing
(2003) showed that people prefer options that allow further (Furnham & Argyle 1998).
freedom of choice. People also prefer a larger option set for its Perhaps the first point to be addressed and one that is comple-
own sake (Suzuki 1997). Iyengar and Lepper (2000) replicated tely overlooked in the target article is the extent to which money
this finding but added that people are less likely to come back is a powerful motivator, particularly at work. Although both psy-
to the same choice situation, which suggests that choice has a chologists and lay persons hold the view that money is indeed a
cost. Together, these findings support the notion that people powerful motivator, the psychological research is far more scep-
are willing to incur costs to preserve their freedom of choice. tical about the power of money as a work incentive. Important
How might money serve this instinct? Money may provide a experimental (Deci et al. 1999) and popular (Kohn 1993) litera-
buffer against dependency. In times of scarcity, poor people have tures have demonstrated that money has paradoxical and nega-
to sell their labor or their bodies to survive. Rich people manage tive effects on work motivation. In the old Herzbergian
to acquire the means and the labor they need to survive. As a terminology, money is a hygiene factor, not a motivating factor:
result, people might value money for its own sake, even in times it prevents dissatisfaction rather than causing satisfaction.
of plenty when they cannot spend all the money they possess. Money, in short, is over-rated as an incentive. It seems not be
I sketch four observations suggesting that money might be a a powerful incentive, instinct, or motivator except under specific
drug fitting the autonomy instinct rather than the reciprocity circumstances.
instinct. (1) Parents are allowed to give money to their offspring, Indeed, Lea & Webley (L&W) overlook the literature which
but not vice versa. Although parent-offspring relationships suggests that social comparison in terms of money earned is a
become reciprocal later in life and are reciprocal in the long much more important source of satisfaction and motivation
run (e.g., when children care for the elderly), this monetary than absolutes earned (Furnham & Arygle 1998). It is unclear
asymmetry survives adulthood. Gaining autonomy from parents how either Tool Theory or Drug Theory copes with that. More-
is an important step in life, which suggests that the monetary over, the literature on what people are willing to trade-off money
asymmetry between parents and offspring is related to the auton- for (e.g., time) seems at odds with either theory.
omy instinct. (2) Intrinsic saving motives (Wärneryd 1999) do not Further, there is a literature on the affective associations on
make much sense from a reciprocity perspective because they money – that is, on what people associate with money (see
reduce reciprocity. Money that is not spent is removed from Furnham & Argyle 1998). For money to be a positive cognitive
the social dependency network and does not build reputation drug one would imagine that nearly all associations would be
in a reciprocal interaction. However, intrinsic saving motives positive. The results suggest precisely the opposite: Money is a
do make sense from an autonomy perspective. Saving leads to major source of anxiety, worry, and depression for many –
accumulation, which increases independence. (3) Borrowing hardly an incentive.
money from third parties while owning money is difficult to It seems that L&W want to start with a powerful motive so that
understand from a reciprocity perspective. In fact, borrowing they can offer a novel biological or evolutionary psychological
increases the amount you owe others (which is aversive if recipro- explanation and theory that parsimoniously explains the pro-
city underlies behavior towards money), without increasing what cesses and mechanisms for money motivation better than all
others owe you. However, borrowing from third parties distri- the other theories. But what is the nature of those theories?
butes social dependency and hence increases average autonomy. Are they any better than simple metaphors? The authors seem
(4) According to the autonomy instinct, money should function as happy to dismiss Tool Theory as such but want to supplement
a signal of some hidden intrinsic quality of the owner. Money may it with Drug Theory. The ideas are novel but I believe the
signal that the owner managed to become independent from the authors fail on three counts.
environment. According to the reciprocity instinct, however, First, half of the target article is dedicated to showing how all
accumulated money should raise concern of cheating. Money the other theories in areas as diverse as classic psychoanalysis,
reflects that the owner received more money than he gave economics, and developmental psychology can be fully
away. Probably both evaluative reactions to wealth exist, but I accounted for by either the tool or drug metaphor. So we get
found evidence only for the first one (Christopher et al. 2005). many sections (Depth psychology; Cognitive development) in
To conclude, I submit that human’s behavior in the context of which, after a short description, the authors suggest that the
money fits better with an autonomy instinct than with a recipro- area fits into one or other metaphor. This is woefully overplayed
city instinct. Money might reduce interpersonal dependency and often not well argued. Depth psychology is categorized as a
rather than organize interpersonal dependency.

Drug Theory and cognitive development is categorized as a Tool species of complex system, come to serve other functions in
Theory, yet it seems pretty simple to suggest a way in which it is descendents of that system, while still retaining sufficient resem-
the opposite way around. The authors seem far too eager to blance to their precursors to be recognizable as homologs. There
“scoop up” all the explanatory processes and mechanisms from are innumerable examples. Engineering examples include the
all areas of behavioural science in terms of their two metaphors. modification and reuse of subroutines in the development of
Second, there are many characteristics of a good theory apart computer programs (perhaps especially “object-oriented”
from its heuristic appeal: parsimoniousness, consistency, validity, programs; e.g., Kehtarnavaz & Kim 2005), and the “evolution”
and so forth. A good theory both explains the current data and of large buildings and bridges (Petroski 1985). Natural examples
leads one to be able to derive clear testable hypotheses to include the evolution of the human hand and the bird’s wing
verify the theory. It seems unclear as to how tool/drug theory from the primordial vertebrate forelimb; also, the evolution of
does this. For instance, whence money pathology and the innate components of behavior, such as the patterns of rhythm-
whole issue of individual differences? How does tool/drug generating circuitry in the spinal cord that serve swimming in
theory explain pathological and irrational money hoarding or fishes and walking in terrestrial animals, and the emotions under-
spending or gambling any better or differently than psychoanaly- lying greeting behavior in diverse species of social animals.
sis? And what is the source of gender differences in money use Enhanced depth perception, attending overlapping binocular
(which should not be particularly problematic from an evolution- visual fields, is another robust phenomenon with diverse uses;
ary perspective)? In short, what is the incremental validity of the it serves largely to increase the accuracy of traveling among
theory/metaphor from what has gone before, or is it merely a tree limbs by monkeys and the accuracy of predatory pouncing
classificatory device for all other theories in the area? by cats. For only the past 100 years or so, this complex neurobio-
Third, the question must be asked: Is L&W’s theory only one logical apparatus has been subject to a new form of natural selec-
theory of why people seek out money as well as of how and when tion, as humans try to accurately drive cars at highway speeds,
and why they save and spend it? Is the theory aiming to be a new, and often live to tell the tale.
overarching, universalist theory of money usage which supplants Related to emerging autonomy, the concept of “modularity” is
all earlier “partial and inadequate” theories that ignore all import- widely used in present-day biological and social theorizing. This
ant biological factors, or simply a corrective taxonomic challenge concept is now also deeply rooted in cognitive science theorizing,
to those working in the area? I would suggest it succeeds as the whose beginnings, circa the 1960s, happen to be coincident with
latter but not the former. those of evolutionary grand theories. However, typical uses of the
concept of modularity do not sufficiently capture the degree of
autonomy of evolving subsystems. Money, for example, virtually
has a life of its own. L&W note that it has quickly taken root in
Metaphysics of money: A special case of every society that has discovered it. The ferment of multiple
emerging autonomy in evolving subsystems ongoing changes in every complex evolving system means that
even when none of these dynamics is internal to a particular sub-
Robert B. Glassman system, the subsystem’s buffeting about among other subsystems
Department of Psychology, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045. is tantamount to a process of “seeking.” This point, approximately
[email protected] the same insight that led Darwin to use the term “natural selec-
http://campus.lakeforest.edu/glassman/ tion,” has been explained particularly well by Donald
T. Campbell in his works on evolutionary epistemology. Camp-
Abstract: There is “something more” to money, as this incisive review bell discusses the ubiquity of “unjustified variation and selective
shows. The target article’s shortcoming is its overextension of the retention,” or “blind variation and selective retention” (Campbell
“drug” metaphor as a blend of features that do not fit the rationalistic
1974a; 1974b; Kim 2001). I would push L&W’s history of the
economics and behavioral psychologies summarized as tool theories,
but this may be resolved by viewing money as a particular case of the
origins of biological “grand theories of everything” to earlier in
more general evolutionary phenomenon of emergent subsystem the mid-twentieth century, certainly at least as far back as
autonomy. E. O. Wilson’s grand tome Sociobiology (Wilson 1975), which,
by the time of Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1976; cf.
Money is not alone. Examples of robust, “drug-like” phenomena target article, sect. 1.1), was in its fourth printing. Campbell
other than money include humor and music. How did these (1976) announced it vigorously in his presidential address to
things originate and become widespread and varied? To what the American Psychological Association.
degree can these pervasive human phenomena be explained in L&W provide some important examples from ethology (sect.
terms of exaptations or present adaptiveness? Another possible 2.2.2), but their use of these examples, particularly in regard to
analogy to the emergence of money: How do humans come by dishonest signaling, parasitism, and other “drug-like” phenom-
the remarkable aptitude and brain circuitry for reading written ena, seems inherently conservative in its emphasis on a seamy
words and passages, given that the history of writing seems to side of evolution. L&W also cite Thorstein Veblen (1899), who
be only several thousand years old? offered a delightfully droll and cynical view of the seamy side
When a fleeting occurrence in living systems repeats itself, and of the social evolution of uses of wealth, while describing the
then becomes frequent and widespread, it may achieve its own sheer, showy nuttiness of some of those familiar uses (also see
“entification” or “thinghood.” Entification entails further oppor- Brooks 1981). But new evolutionary branches may also be
tunities to accumulate additional raisons d’être. Sufficient robust- “good” ones. Yes, human archetypes are often exploited in adver-
ness may then be achieved to abet new evolutionary branches, tising or for other selfish ends; however, they are exploited as well
and proliferation of forms. Gradually increasing autonomy in in great literature, which helps its human consumers to better
subsystems of complex systems (either living or engineered by orient themselves and to find new adaptations as they face
humans) is a much more general phenomenon than is captured civilization and its discontents.
by Allport’s personality theory principle of “functional auton- Citing Campbell, Konrad Lorenz perceptively argued that a
omy,” which Lea & Webley (L&W) cite (target article, sect. high degree of subsystem autonomy, coupled with internally
3.2.3; Allport 1937).1 This crucial aspect of complex systems generated spontaneity, is crucial in any living system, for
(Glassman 1973; Glassman & Wimsatt 1984; Simon 1996) reliability and continued survival (Lorenz 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt
underlies the fact that every evolved entity or feature of every 1970). It is unfortunate that the more speculative aspects of
living system originates as something else. Lorenz’s work elicited polemics that have led to the neglect of
The biological and social living world is always in motion. many of his ideas by English-speaking behavioral scientists. For
Features that had served a particular function within one example, Lorenz compellingly explains the vital importance of

spontaneity of the heart’s atrioventricular node, which ordinarily, One can talk of a “biological” response to gold because of its
but not always, remains subordinate to the sinus node, as a model shininess and hue, and its feature of being rust-proof, leading
instance of the much more general phenomenon of subsystem to its universally evidenced function as a symbol for immortality.
spontaneity and semi-autonomy (Lorenz 1966, p. 86). These Paper banknotes and coins of vile metal are of a different nature
ideas about subsystem spontaneity also seem related to William and their link to riches is conventional; in financial parlance, their
James’s argument that “Man has more instincts than any other nature is “fiduciary,” requiring an act of trust that a central bank
mammal” (James 1890, pp. iv –v, 383– 441). will honour cash of this sort, guaranteeing it will maintain it in its
Whether the spontaneous “motion” of a subsystem is generated role of a universal equivalent of worth. L&W mention times
internally or by the “chaos” of its surroundings, the principle of (such as in the aftermath of the American Civil War) when con-
natural selection implies that when the subsystem encounters vertibility of cash into precious metal gets suspended. When this
an opportunity in its environment, it may exploit that opportunity, happens, precious metal is restored in its role of a depository of
and will then persist in its new form or behavior, so long as any value, confirming that money as such might very well be – as the
costs or risks of its new functionality provide a net increase in its authors hint – an entirely cultural phenomenon, impossible to
“inclusive fitness,” or longer-term probability of survival in itself analyze profitably within any alternative framework.
or the copies it generates. Taking a few steps back from such indi- Analyzing money as a cultural phenomenon, beyond immedi-
vidual cases to better conceptualize “the forest” over and beyond ate survival concerns, does not preclude tracing it back to its “bio-
its individual swaying “trees,” we can envision the larger ecology of logical basis.” It requires, however, an extension from a two-term
a living environment comprising autonomously “entified” loosely relationship between a subject and money to a three-term
coupled components and features of components. All of these are relationship between one subject and at least one other, with
engaged in the same general game of seeking new opportunities money acting as a mediator between the two. In the two-term
for exploitation of each other or for mutualism. In human social model, a subject holds a representation of money (as with cash
systems such ferment is extremely rich because our exquisitely as a “fetish”); in the three-term model, a subject owning money
developed abilities to learn, remember, and imitate make it par- holds a representation of another subject’s representation of
ticularly easy for a feature to decouple from its host entity and him/herself owning that cash.
jump to a new vector. In other cases, instead of such decompo- The three-term nature of money is best illustrated in a
sition and recomposition, an entity or feature of an entity simply “Keeping up with the Joneses” example: Let’s buy a 7000 flat
accumulates additional functions, thereby achieving greater and screen TV because the Joneses own a 5000 ! The drive behind
greater robustness. In much of their argument for “money as a the purchase is not improved viewing (only a secondary benefit
drug” I think this is what L&W are getting at. here) but competition: the satisfaction obtained derives from
representing to oneself the Joneses’ envious state of mind. By
NOTE out-competing them we’ve made ourselves the centre of their
1. I thank the fourteen undergraduates in my Psychology 325 class own attention: their attention has been captured by us; they
(“Persuasion and truth in sales communications”) for their enlivening dis- are, literally speaking, captivated. Money is used as a tool to
cussion of the L&W target article during our September 26, 2005 evening
achieve this effect and its drug-like quality lies in the altered
meeting.
state of consciousness we reach when subordinating some
other subjects’ attention to our persons, meaning that we’ve
altered at the same time their own mindsets.
L&W say of their tool/drug dichotomy that “the two theories
Keeping up with the Joneses: The Desire seem to exhaust the range of possibilities between them” (sect.
of the Desire for money 2.3, para. 1). This is correct but, as we’ve just seen, not in the
simple “either/or” way they imply: the complexity of the relation-
Paul Jorion ship requires a more sophisticated model combining both tool
Interdepartmental Program in Human Complex Systems, University of and drug within a three-term model. In that perspective, the
California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. drive to acquire money amounts to a special case of a desire for
[email protected] http://pauljorion.com recognition. A psychological theory of recognition has been pro-
posed before; its source lies in philosophy where it was initially
Abstract: The biological basis of money lies in a three-term relationship formulated by G. W. F. Hegel as the “desire of desire” – that is,
between one subject and some others, with money acting as a mediator. my desire for another’s desire, either of an object or, in the
The drive to acquire money is a special case of a desire for recognition. case of love, of my own person (Hegel 1807/1949, pp. 225– 27;
What is aimed at by subjects is their desire for the desire of some
others: the former derive satisfaction from representing to themselves Roth 1988, p. 97). The theory was further developed in the twen-
the admiration, or envy, of these others. This raises reproductive tieth century by Alexandre Kojève (Kojève 1969, pp. 6 –7; Roth
advantage. 1988, pp. 97 – 99), then given a psychiatric/psychoanalytical for-
mulation by Jacques Lacan (Wilden 1968, pp. 83 – 85, 192– 96).
The object of Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) inquiry is to find a “bio- In Lacan’s interpretation, the “desire of desire” becomes the
logical basis” for money, meaning a basis reducible to a Darwinian linchpin of a theory of the Self where the sole foundation for
trait such as reproductive advantage. Both their “tool” and “drug” my own Self – my proper identity – is the attention other subjects
approaches refer to a two-term relationship where a subject are paying to me, that is, it is constituted of my own capacity for
experiences cognitive and emotional states linked to a represen- captivating others. What constitutes the subjects’ Self is therefore
tation centred on money. The most obvious instance of this, not internal to them but distributed among a network of other
which the authors unfortunately fail to mention, is sustenance. subjects, although centred on them.
For anyone below the poverty level, cash remains foremost When applied specifically to money, the “desire of desire”
the means to the essential end of subsistence. The “biological model means that what is aimed at by subjects through their pos-
basis” of money needs therefore to be understood in the session of money is their desire for the desire of some others: the
authors’ analysis as meaning “when cash as a tool for straight- satisfaction they derive from representing to themselves the
forward biological survival has been discounted.” Examples of admiration or the envy of others. The theory is instrumental (it
such a two-term relationship would then be those of Harpagon, has a “tool” quality), in that money is in truth sought after to
Molière’s Miser, clinging to his cherished casket, or Uncle obtain something, but that something is not of a material
Scrooge, diving and tunnelling through gold coins and hundred- nature: it is the altered state of consciousness achieved (hence
dollar bills in his pool-designed vault. In such cases, cash has the “drug” quality) through captivating the attention of a
been “fetishized,” adulated as such, as a symbol of wealth. number of other subjects. One example presented by the

authors, that of playground exchanges of toys, confirms a desire review). Therefore, the operant account is not easily categorized
of desire interpretation much more convincingly than it does a as either a tool or drug theory, because it combines aspects
“trading instinct” hypothesis of a drug-like nature, as it is the of both. Moreover, because the tool/drug distinction is closely ana-
simple fact that another child holds an object that makes it desir- logous to that between the discriminative and hedonic properties
able for a second one. of conditioned reinforcers, ultimately it may be difficult to
As for the Darwinian fitness advantage that money confers, distinguish L&W’s account from the operant theory.
subjects who are admired extend the range of their potential Nevertheless, we outline one approach to testing L&W’s
partners, gaining access in particular to those who are themselves theory, and show that some existing data are consistent with it.
objects of admiration. The overall benefit of admiration is fitness We are not attempting to distinguish their account from the
or reproductive advantage. Cash is a universal tool to this aim. In operant theory, but rather to test the idea that money has both
other words, the psychological function of money turns out to be tool and drug properties.
precisely what the popular press assumes it to be. Money is understood to resemble a drug with “the idea of a
drug as a deceiver” (sect. 2.2.4). The implication is that, insofar
as money operates as a drug rather than a tool for a particular
individual or in a particular situation, it will be overvalued, in
the same way that, for example, the taste of saccharin promises
Operant contingencies and “near-money” a food value that it does not actually have (sects. 2.2.2, 5.2).
Simon Kemp and Randolph C. Grace Misers can be thought to fall victim to this deception (sect.
4.10); however, as a general test of the theory, misers are unsatis-
Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand.
factory since their behaviour is counterbalanced by that of spend-
[email protected] [email protected]
thrifts, who, in the eyes of most of us, do not attach sufficient
value to money. Is there any phenomenon that suggests that
Abstract: We make two major comments. First, negative reinforcement the average person might generally overvalue money?
contingencies may generate some apparent “drug-like” aspects of money One approach is to examine the way that people value “near-
motivation, and the operant account, properly construed, is both a tool money” (the phrase is from Lea et al. 1987, p. 328). Near-
and drug theory. Second, according to Lea & Webley (L&W), one money, like primitive money, is a currency that can be used
might expect that “near-money,” such as frequent-flyer miles, should to buy a limited variety of services. One prominent example
have a stronger drug and a weaker tool aspect than regular money. of near-money in Western societies is frequent-flyer miles.
Available evidence agrees with this prediction.
Frequent-flyer miles have many of the attributes of money and,
Lea & Webley (L&W) describe an interesting and provocative indeed, airlines often set up “accounts” for their customers. We
framework for the analysis of money-related behaviour. Their suggest that, in terms of L&W’s theory, frequent flyer schemes
goal is to provide a biological account of money motivation, are set up so as to retain as much as possible of the drug
and they claim that, if their attempt fails, the alternative would nature of money, while having rather little (although still some)
be a purely cultural explanation. But they overlook the role of of its tool nature. Given this assumption, we would expect to
conditioning and learning processes that operate within an indi- find even more overvaluation of a near-money such as fre-
vidual’s lifetime. An operant theory of money, properly con- quent-flyer miles than of regular money. Or, alternatively,
strued, may be difficult to distinguish from L&W’s drug/tool because of this greater drug component, near-money should be
theory, although money-related behaviour is so varied and overvalued relative to regular money.
complex that all three levels – biological, individual learning, This possibility has not been rigorously researched, but two
and cultural – are probably necessary for a full understanding. recent studies have produced results suggesting it might be
In their discussion of the operant theory, L&W do not mention true. Liston-Heyes (2002) found that respondents in the
the role of negative reinforcement or avoidance contingencies. It United Kingdom were willing to pay more for 100 air miles
is well known that avoidance responding is highly resistant to (about 23 pound sterling) than the air miles were apparently
extinction; dogs that learn to jump over a hurdle in a shuttlebox worth (around 7 to 12 pound sterling). Kemp (2005) found
to avoid an electric shock continue to respond vigorously long New Zealand respondents were willing to pay a median NZ
after the shocks have been discontinued (Solomon et al. 1953). $50 for 1,000 Air New Zealand frequent-flyer points. Estimates
Neo-liberal economic reforms that create “incentives” to work of the real cost of these were NZ $12.50 (based on cheap ticket
by reducing social welfare expenditure can be viewed, at least cost) and NZ $3.61 (Air New Zealand company estimate of the
in part, as massive avoidance contingencies. Thus, it is possible marginal cost). Moreover, members of frequent-flyer programs
that some apparent “drug-like” effects of money, such as worka- were willing to pay more than non-members (median ¼ $20),
holism, reflect the resistance to extinction of responding main- as might be predicted from the drug theory.
tained by negative reinforcement. Although the aversive Thus, at least one independent test of L&W’s tool/drug theory
event – joblessness, poverty – may never be experienced, the seems to support it.
workaholic individual, like the unfortunate dogs in Solomon
et al.’s experiment, lives in fear of an unhappy future.
According to L&W, traditional operant theory, based on the
idea that money functions as a conditioned reinforcer, is a “pure
Drug Theory” (target article, sect. 3.2.2). But it has long been
recognized that stimuli that function as conditioned reinforcers
Show me the status: Money as a kind
have discriminative as well as reinforcing (i.e., hedonic) properties of currency
(Rachlin 1976). For example, a keylight that signals transition from
a lower- to a higher-valued situation in terms of reward rate comes Kevin M. Kniffin
to act as a conditioned reinforcer for pigeons (i.e., discriminative Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin– Madison, Madison, WI
53706.
function; Baum 1974a). And recent research has found that
[email protected]
single dopamine neurons show a spike in activation following
the onset of a stimulus that predicts subsequent reward that is Abstract: Currencies that are recognized as money cannot be easily
similar to the spike following the reward itself. This phenomenon distinguished from alternative currencies such as status. Numerous
provides neurophysiological support for the traditional view, examples demonstrate the need for status to be recognized as a
dating back at least to Pavlov (1927), that conditioned stimuli motivator alongside, at least, money. Lea & Webley (L&W)
have hedonic value (Fiorillo et al. 2003; see Schultz [2004] for acknowledge the roles of status; however, a closer focus is warranted.

To the extent that we can commonly recognize “money,” we can their agents are staking claims on the need for maximized
also agree that it is not a category that is carved at Nature’s joints. status (independent of how closely they consider their relation-
Although Lea & Webley (L&W) acknowledge some examples, it ships with teammates). The leapfrogging that happens in this
is worth clear recognition that money coexists as a currency and other contemporary environments (Gerhart & Rynes 2003)
alongside a range of alternatives that includes meat, frequent- is driven in part by a concern for status in which salary is inter-
flier miles, collectibles (e.g., special coins or clothing), and preted as a reflection of one’s relative standing. In the movie
status. Indeed, the way in which frequent customers of airline Jerry Maguire (Brooks et al. 1996), when a dominant football
and hotel companies are recognized with redeemable credits player and his sports agent celebrate their goal of a superior con-
that can accompany “elite” (or “gold,” “silver,” or “platinum”) tract and exclaim “Show me the money!,” they might as well be
“status” provides an entertaining juxtaposition of currencies. shouting “Show me the status.” L&W acknowledge the roles of
Illustrative of the reasons why money and other currencies status in parts of their paper; however, (1) the distinction
need to be considered alongside each other, Frank (1985) notes between money and status cannot be neatly made, and (2) the
that people who work closely with others often appear willing importance of concerns about status over the course of human
to make trade-offs between salaries and status. Frank reports a evolution warrants closer focus.
pattern of within-firm salaries in relatively interactive or social
organizations where high-performers are paid less – and low-
performers are paid more – than would be predicted by
traditional economic, pay-for-performance models. Frank con- Sacredness in an experimental chamber
cludes that (1) high-performing individuals who work closely
with peers accept lower-than-predicted salaries in exchange Vladimir A. Lefebvre
for higher within-firm status while (2) lower-performing co-- School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697.
workers endure lower within-firm status in exchange for [email protected]
higher-than-predicted salaries. This notion that people can buy
and sell status is similarly illustrated by the willingness of hotel Abstract: I focus on the problem of whether a specific biologic basis
and airline “frequent-users” to narrow their shopping of compe- exists for reinforcing the power of money. I argue in favor of its
titors and sometimes pay above-competitor prices and consume existence based on a new interpretation of data obtained in
more in pursuit of increased “status.” Loyalty programs, in experiments with pigeons and rats in an experimental chamber. The
experiments demonstrated that in the animals’ behavior we can observe
general, rely on this incentive to build their associated businesses. some features that had been considered pertinent to human beings
Adopting one of L&W’s models, status has many “drug”-like only, such as making certain sources of utility “sacred.”
features and, in fact, has been shown to affect individuals’ bio-
chemistry. When considering the evolutionary basis, or origin, We all know cases in which people agree to receive lower
for their Drug theory, L&W accept that “trade could be a payment for work related to higher values than for equal work
human instinct on which the money motive might be built” unrelated to such values. For example, a person requires
(sect. 5.2). While the authors’ recognition of the social nature smaller salary for participation in building a cathedral, than in
of commerce (and childhood play) is interesting and relevant, it commercial construction. Thus, some “agencies” where a
is also true that status could be a human instinct on which the person exchanges his labor for money possess a special quality
money motive might be built. Research showing drug-like that will be called sacredness (Lefebvre 2003). A person agrees
changes in human biochemistry after changes in status (e.g., to work for these agencies for smaller reward than for other
Mazur & Booth 1998) provides material support for this agencies. Something similar can be observed in the behavior of
argument. rats and pigeons
More consequentially in the genetic domain, Smith (2004) Experiments with rats and pigeons were conducted in a
shows that relatively successful hunters in hunter-gatherer com- chamber with two pedals (left and right keys), each connected
munities tend to have relatively greater reproductive fitness. to its own food-hopper from which food bits were distributed
Similar to L&W’s observation that “we cannot reasonably talk according to a special schedule (Baum 1974b). Animals were
about a ‘money instinct’” (sect. 1.4), it would be incorrect to studied individually in a series of sessions; in each session a
infer from Smith’s findings that hunter-gatherers have an instinct schedule of reinforcement was fixed for the pedals. An import-
for dead animals. Instead, it is helpful to recognize the fact that ant detail is that the frequency of reinforcements could be
status can motivate individuals (e.g., to be among the best regulated by the animal itself by means of multiple pushes on
hunters) and, when acquired in sufficient quantities, relatively the pedals. In analyzing the animal behavior in the experimental
high status can translate into material benefits (e.g., relatively chamber, we use the metaphor of an “agency”: the left key with
high reproductive fitness). its food-hopper being the first agency, the right key with its
L&W ably show that money cannot be reduced to some uni- food-hopper being the second agency. The animal behavior
versally liquid currency of status; however, the use of money consisted of “addressing the agencies” and performing “work”
can, and should, be recognized in large part as a consequence by pushing a pedal, and this was reinforced with a scarce
of individual “status instincts.” Predictably, just as money, food supply.
meat, and furs carry different values across individuals, we For a time it seemed that in these experiments the animals
should expect variation among individuals with regard to the chose a specific line of behavior which is described by the Gen-
importance of personal status. Schwartz et al. (2002) report a eralized Matching Law (Baum 1974b), but recently Baum put
series of studies in which they find individuals vary according forth a hypothesis that this law only approximately describes
to whether they tend to be “maximizers” or “satisficers.” Maxi- the behavior of animals and in reality there are two different
mizers strive to be the best, to complete perfect projects, and behavioral patterns (Baum 2002). Analysis of these patterns
get the best deal, while satisficers are more easily accommodated allows us to suppose that in each session the alternatives
and less demanding of themselves and others. This dimension of (pushing a left or a right pedal) were polarized by the animal’s
individual differences might profitably guide future research on cognitive system, and one of them started playing the role of
money as drug or tool. the positive agency, and the other that of the negative one. By
Good examples of the importance of status regularly originate using the reflexive model of bipolar choice (Lefebvre 2004) we
with professional athletes since their contract negotiations are so obtain the following correlation describing the behavior of the
deeply open to media coverage. When professional athletes who animals:
are already earning millions of dollars and are dominant
members of their team argue that they are underpaid, they and N2 =N1 ¼ exp (S)n2 =n1 , (1)

where N1 and N2 are numbers of addresses to the positive the classroom had a high need to smoke, and those outside the
and negative agencies, and n1 and n2 are numbers of classroom had a low need to smoke.
reinforcements received from the positive and negative Participants were offered the opportunity to purchase raffle
agencies during one session. The value of S is constant tickets for 25 pfennigs apiece. For half of the subjects, the prize
was three cartons of cigarettes. For the other half, the prize was
on the entire set of sessions and S 0.
an amount of cash about equal to the cost of three cartons of ciga-
Correlation (1) indicates the existence of the analogue to
rettes. Participants were only aware of the raffle they were
sacred behavior in animals. Let us demonstrate this.
offered. The students were told that the raffle drawing would
It follows from (1) that
be held the following week, so any prize could not be used to
n1 =N1 n2 =N2 : (2) satisfy their current goals.
Ratio n1/N1 can be interpreted as the mean payment for one Those offered the raffle to win cigarettes were slightly more
appeal to the positive agency and n2/N2 as the mean payment likely to purchase tickets when they had a high need to smoke
for one appeal to the negative agency. We can see from (2) that, than when they had a low need to smoke. This greater preference
on average, the subject never requires more payment for one for a goal-related item when the goal is active than when it is inac-
appeal to the positive agency than for one appeal to the negative tive is called valuation. Of importance, students who were
one. Is it possible that in these experiments, we observe behavior offered the raffle to win cash purchased tickets at a reasonably
evolutionarily preceding the sacral behavior of human beings? If high rate when they had a low need to smoke, but rarely pur-
it is so, then the sacral aspect of money has deep biological roots. chased tickets when they had a high need to smoke. This lower
preference for a goal-unrelated item (cash) when the goal is
active than when it is inactive is called devaluation (for more dis-
cussion, see Brendl et al. 2003; Markman & Brendl 2005).
This finding suggests that cash is not considered relevant to the
goal of smoking when people have a high need to smoke. This
Money and motivational activation result is consistent with the drug theory of money, for money is
being treated as a specific entity that is relevant in particular cir-
Arthur B. Markman, Serge Blok, John Dennis, Micah cumstances. Other needs, such as smoking, can lead to devalua-
Goldwater, Kyungil Kim, Jeff Laux, Lisa Narvaez, and tion of money. Had money been conceptualized motivationally as
Jon Rein a tool, then it should have been perceived to be relevant to any
Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712. situation in which it could be used to purchase an object that
[email protected] would satisfy an active goal. On the basis of evidence like this,
http://www.psy.utexas.edu/psy/FACULTY/Markman/index.html we believe that money is treated as a drug in motivationally
[email protected] [email protected] active states.
[email protected] [email protected] There are also cases in which money is conceptualized as a
[email protected] [email protected] tool. One area where this view of money is obvious is in studies
[email protected] of taboos and social exchanges. As an example of a taboo,
Tetlock et al. (2000) showed that people find it morally repugnant
Abstract: Different aspects of people’s interactions with money are best for a hospital to consider denying an expensive treatment to a
conceptualized using the drug and tool theories. The key question is when patient in order to save money for another hospital project.
these models of money are most likely to guide behavior. We suggest that
the Drug Theory characterizes motivationally active uses of money and Even considering the proposal taints the decision maker.
that the Tool Theory characterizes behavior in motivationally cool As a second example, McGraw and Tetlock (2005) describe
situations. varieties of social exchanges. Most transactions in our culture
permit money to be used freely. Indeed, currency is the basis
Money acts as a drug or as a tool in different circumstances. We of our day-to-day purchases. Nonetheless, we have certain
suggest that money acts like a drug when there is a strongly active special relationships for which money is inappropriate. If a neigh-
current goal that may or may not relate to money. In contrast, bor helps us to fix a flat tire, we can reciprocate by helping him or
money is treated as a tool in motivationally cool states, such as her to rake leaves in the yard, but not by paying them money. An
those for which there is significant psychological distance offer of money for help from a neighbor would likely be seen as
between the individual and the choice situation. To illustrate an insult. As another example, parents perform duties for their
this point, we refer to specific data. children without keeping track of the effort spent and with no
Research on mental accounting suggests that people set up expectation that the effort will be returned in like kind. Again,
mental accounts for different kinds of money to protect active the idea that parents would receive payment for their services
short-term goals from desired long-term goals (Brendl et al. is strange.
1998; Shefrin & Thaler 1992). This view is consistent with the Determining that it is inappropriate to offer money directly in
drug theory of money. When people are faced with tempting exchange for human lives or in certain close social relationships
short-term alternatives, they are likely to spend money without rests on money being recognized as a tool. A significant com-
recognizing that money spent in the present has opportunity ponent of the negative reactions to these situations arises
costs in the future. Thus, people create both mental accounts because people do not wish to place these dimensions into the
and physical forms of money that are hard to spend in order to market economy where they can be traded against other goods
create barriers that protect long-term goals, precisely because and services for which money can be used.
they cannot treat money as a tool (see also Zelizer 1994b). These moral and social exchange situations involve psychologi-
Consistent with this interpretation, we have data suggesting cal distance between money and the situation in which money is
that people do not recognize the general value of money as a used. Most considerations of the taboo uses of money involve
tool in motivationally hot states (Brendl et al. 2003). In one situations in which one is not actively engaged in the choice
study, we approached German college students who were ciga- process itself. Indeed, most of the evidence obtained by
rette smokers after they had completed a long lecture class Tetlock and his colleagues is done using vignette studies that
(in which they were not permitted to smoke). Half of the students assess people’s reactions to hypothetical situations. Likewise,
were kept in the classroom and were given a cup of coffee our social relationships are maintained in situations that do not
(which stimulated their need to smoke). The other half were have strongly active goals relating to exchanges. Thus, it is
brought outside the classroom, were encouraged to smoke, and easier in these contexts than in motivationally active contexts to
were also given a cup of coffee. Thus, the participants inside treat money conceptually as a tool.

The investigation of neural correlates of conditions are associated with greater neural response during the
monetary reward by using functional choice phase but not the prospect phase. Likewise, were there
specific brain activations that characterized the outcome of a
neuroimaging techniques monetary reward? With the same parametric task described
Harold Mouras earlier, Knutson et al. (2003) showed that a particular region of
the mesial prefrontal cortex is activated when an expected
Inserm, U742, Paris, F-75005 France; Université Pierre et Marie Curie-Paris 6,
UMR S 742, Paris, F-75005 France and Socio-Affective Development Group,
reward is obtained, and a previous study (Knutson et al. 2001b)
Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, CH-1205 Geneva, showed that this particular region is deactivaed in response to
Switzerland. reward omission. Thus, the use of fast neuroimaging techniques
[email protected] would allow demonstration of a dissociation between ventral
striatum areas involved in the prospect phase of the reward
Abstract: Money is a specifically human incentive. However, functional and more prefrontal ones involved in the outcome phase.
imaging techniques bring striking evidence that neural circuits pertaining Clearly, neural circuits involved in the prospect and the
to more “natural” addictive and rewarding processes are involved in outcome phases, although partly distinct anatomically, should
response to monetary reward. Main results are evoked here, with be functionally linked. This point has been addressed in studies
specific brain responses demonstrated along the different stages of the seeking to identify the reaction of monetary reward circuits
process.
when a difference occurs between the expected value and the
With regard to a drug theory of money, Lea & Webley (L&W) real value of the monetary reward obtained. Still using event-
address the question: “Is there a biological reason why money related fMRI, Ramnani et al. (2004) examined cerebral activity
is such a powerful incentive?” (sect. 1.5). Interesting results related to the failure of expected rewards and the occurrence
related to this question have emerged from modern neuro- of unexpected rewards, independently of any goal-directed
imaging techniques, and these results have converged with actions or decisions. Principally, this study showed that each
studies about decision processes in fields such as neuroeco- type of prediction error evokes activity in a distinct frontotem-
nomics (Glimcher & Rustichini 2004). poral circuit: whereas unexpected reward failure evokes activity
Studies developed by Breiter and colleagues are of primary in the temporal cortex and frontal pole (Brodmann area 10),
interest. After a focus on the effects of cocaine on brain circuits unpredicted rewards evoke activity in the orbitofrontal cortex,
in a cocaine users sample (Breiter et al. 1997), neural circuits the frontal pole parahippocampal cortex, and the cerebellum.
involved in monetary gain and losses were investigated (Breiter The study also showed that the activity time-locked to prediction
et al. 2001). A game of chance performed in the scanning errors in frontotemporal circuits is involved in encoding the
session included an “expectation” phase where different possible associations between visual cues and monetary reward. For the
monetary amounts were presented and an “outcome” with the purpose of this commentary, this result is very important
presentation of the gain or loss. A striking result of this study because it shows that neural mechanisms are not only temporary
was that an incentive unique to humans (i.e., money) induced and activated either during the prospect phase, the stimulus
brain activations in areas such as the nucleus accumbens, the presentation, or the outcome phase, but also that networks are
sublenticular extended amygdala, and the orbital gyrus (in the devoted to the association between these successive phases.
prospect and outcome phases) that overlap brain activations Since 1999 several neuroimaging studies have explored the
observed in response to cocaine infusions in addicted subjects neural circuits involved in other goal-directed behaviors such as
(Breiter et al. 1997) or to low doses of morphine in drug-naı̈ve human sexual motivation (Mouras & Stoléru, in press; Stoléru
individuals (Breiter et al. 2000). Such an overlap could partly & Mouras, in press). Following these reviews, several brain
explain that a dysfunction in this cerebral network could contrib- areas have been shown to be related to both monetary reward
ute to impulse disorders, such as compulsive gambling. and sexual motivation. For example, most studies on neural cor-
The study performed by Breiter et al. in 2001 identified an relates of sexual motivation have identified anterior cingulate
overlap between cerebral areas involved in monetary rewards cortex activations (often interpreted as involved in action pre-
and those involved in drug addiction, but few differences were paratory processes), and a recent study by Williams et al.
recorded in brain activations for different stages (e.g., the pro- (2004) reported a similar role for monetary reward processes.
spect and outcome phases) of cerebral processes related to mon-
etary reward. The growing development of neuroimaging ACKNOWLEDGMENT
techniques has allowed several studies to focus on specific prop- I would like to thank Naia Silveira for the correction of this manuscript.
erties of the cerebral networks involved in response to monetary
stimuli, and some results have identified brain activation differ-
ences occurring during different stages of the process. Based
on primate work, Knutson et al. (2001a) used a parametric task
that elicited anticipation of monetary reward or punishment. Avoiding drug dependency
Within a sample of eight healthy volunteers, this study was the
Paul Romanowich, Edmund Fantino, and Stephanie Stolarz-
first to demonstrate a selective recruitment of the nucleus accum-
bens (a part of the ventral striatum) for monetary gain but not for Fantino
loss; moreover, the activation was proportional to the amount of Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA
92093-0109.
the reward. Most often, neuroimaging studies on the neural cor-
relates of monetary reward have used tasks that involve prospect,
[email protected]
choice, and outcome phases. As theses phases can be temporally
close, the event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging Abstract: If Tool Theory is buttressed by fundamental concepts of
(fMRI) method with a good temporal resolution should allow conditioned reinforcement and extinction, a dependence on Drug
identification of specific brain activations related to these phases. Theory may not be necessary.
On this topic, a recent study by Ernst et al. (2004) brought very
interesting results: whereas the prominent recruitment of the Lea & Webley (L&W) insist that a Tool Theory of money, which
ventral striatum was confirmed, the choice phase involved encompasses only purely ontological behavior, is inadequate to
more “cognitive” areas such as parieto-occipital ones (visuo- deal with the profound motivational power displayed by human
spatial attention), the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate behavior in relation to money. In their provocative analysis, the
cortex (conflict monitoring), parietal (manipulation of quantities) authors depend much on the notion that money “can mimic
and premotor areas. This study also showed that high risk/reward the satisfaction both from the instinct to play and from the

instinct to trade” (sect. 5.3). Without a biological (evolutionary) Extinction is a key component in the process of operant con-
basis, such motivators would be seen as “scandalous” from ditioning. When one tangible item or behavior leads to uncondi-
certain subsets of psychology. However, empirically based the- tioned or conditioned reinforcers, those tangible items or
ories of motivation, such as the Premack Principle, explicitly behaviors will be motivators. Other equally tangible items or
state that any desirable behavior or tangible item can serve as a behaviors that do not, or no longer, lead to reinforcers will not
basis for motivation. Within this framework what qualifies for a be motivators. This means-ends relationship is identical to Tool
motivator does not depend on its biological or adaptive value, Theory. Drugs are no different in this respect. Once a drug no
but rather on the item or behavior’s value in relation to all longer offers any physiological satisfaction, its use stops. This
other possible behaviors or items. This idea about primary and chemical action is biological, but obviously has no evolutionary
secondary reinforcement is consistent with Skinner’s behavioral advantage to the individual. In most cases, as the authors point
position and suggests that it is unnecessary to consider Skinner’s out, the opposite effect can be observed. But, other conditioned
view as Drug Theory. Money has an important place in the hier- stimuli may still elicit the craving for the drug. Presenting these
archy of value because of its flexibility. Not only can it be used to conditioned stimuli without the drug also causes a decrease in
make other reinforcers available, but – like a good tool – it that response. Therefore, drugs can also be thought of in a
extends their reach, making them available at future times means-ends analysis when the concept of extinction is
when they may be even more desirable than they are at considered.
present. It can be argued that computers, too, are extremely The proposition that seemingly ubiquitous human behavior
desirable tools because of their extraordinary flexibility; one note- can be explained in evolutionary terms (instincts) has led to
book computer can replace a roomful of equipment. And, like gross overgeneralizations throughout the history of psychology
money, computers are the objects of a great deal of preoccupa- (for a discussion, see Fantino & Logan 1979, pp. 297– 301).
tion on the part of their users. There is no doubt that the ontological biology of a person will
L&W also assert that token reinforcers maintain their motiva- change in response to the use of money or tokens (i.e., changes
tional power without explicit pairings with unconditioned rein- in neural circuitry will occur). But neural changes accompanying
forcers. Indeed, such reinforcers can exert motivational conditioning do not require Drug Theory. Tools, be they money
influence even when devalued or when presented in a different or computers, are likely to be powerful generalized reinforcers
context (e.g., Fantino 2000; O’Daly et al., in press). However, since, as discussed above, they are paired with so many good
such influence is typically fleeting. In fact, the authors point things. A broadened concept of generalized reinforcers together
out that in many historical societies where rapid devaluation of with the concept of extinction can go a long way to making a
currency occurred, the old devalued currency was abandoned dependence on Drug Theory superfluous.
and either money with a stable value was used or bartering
ensued. This devalued money could then be used as a more ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
literal “tool” as in Figure 1, which shows a woman in post- The image shown in Figure. 1 is “Inflation-1923.jpg,” produced by AdsD
WWI Germany using a pile of devalued Marks as kindling. der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The preparation of this commentary was
supported by National Science Foundation Grant IBN-9870900.
Evolutionary psychology and functionally

empty metaphors
Don Rossa,b and David Spurrettc
a
Departments of Philosophy and Economics, University of Alabama at
Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260, and bSchool of Economics,
University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa; bSchool of
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus,
Durban, 4041, South Africa.
[email protected]
http://www.uab.edu/philosophy/ross.html; [email protected]
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/spurrett/
Abstract: Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) non-exclusive distinction between

tool-like and drug-like motivators is insufficiently discriminating to say
much about money that is useful, as the distinction’s equivocal
application to sex, food, and drugs shows. Further, it appears as though
the motivations of problem gamblers are non-metaphorically like those
of drug addicts.
Lea & Webley (L&W) make clear that their topic is a choice of
metaphors for money. They take care to distance themselves
from the idea that one of their two favoured metaphors could
be altogether “correct” at the expense of the other. So, arguing
against them that money is not a drug but (more like) a tool,
might seem to miss their point. We instead raise doubts about
the value of their dichotomy of metaphors in the first place.
We then say why there is indeed an interesting, but non-meta-
phorical, relationship between drugs and money.
L&W’s discussion depends on a distinction between motiva-
tors that directly subserve biological functions (tools) and what
they call (in sect. 2.2.4) “functionless motivators” (drugs). They
Figure 1 (Romanowich et al.). Inflation – 1923. Devalued recognize that money serves some biological functions much of
Marks are used as kindling in post-WWI Germany. the time and so is, to that extent, a tool. But then they argue

that it doesn’t always serve this function, and even systematically that refer their input robotically back to a fixed stock of ancestral
subverts fitness in some circumstances (e.g., when used to reward types and thereby get tricked in bars and casinos. Biologi-
facilitate transactions within families), and so is also, to that cal brains, that is, are multi-modal evaluation and resource allo-
extent, a drug. cation machines; it would be surprising if any creature capable of
This distinction applies to too many things too easily. Most representing multiple such evaluations to itself proved incapable
sexual activities of modern humans are recreational and costly, of latching onto money given the chance. Capuchin monkeys, for
and so do not support, and sometimes subvert, their expected example, have been trained to use multiple fungible fiat currency
fitness. In wealthy societies, the same goes for food. Psychoactive (Chen et al., in press).
drugs, for that matter, are also tool-like; consider the familiar Study of the brains of problem gamblers suggests there is
sequence that begins with a drink bought in a bar and leads to indeed an interesting relationship between drugs and money,
the production of children. Perhaps L&W would say that sex but not one resembling L&W’s metaphor (see, e.g., Potenza
and food are both tool-like and drug-like, just as money is, et al. 2003). Problem gamblers don’t appear to value money for
while drugs are also tool-like. But metaphors are valuable only its own sake. But they do appear to be typical, perhaps even pro-
insofar as they discipline and structure thought. Contrasts that totypical, addicts. Cocaine addicts may not value cocaine for its
exclude nothing are (functionally) empty. own sake. Rather, gamblers and cocaine addicts have more diffi-
L&W say things that suggest the following response. Sex and culty than other people convincing their brains that they are
food are pre-cultural motivators, but money is not. Therefore, receiving enough reward, at a fast enough rate, as a generalized
sex and food in general must be tools for enhancing fitness, target. Here reward just means: anything that mobilizes neural
whereas in the case of money the jury is out until we devote attention. Thus, as Rachlin (2000) has stressed, gambling and
theoretical reflection to the matter. But L&W have no indepen- chemical stimulants are close substitutes for social interaction.
dently stable ontology of types of motivators at their disposal. Behavior with respect to money is just like behavior with
There is no human instinct for “sex in general”; there are just dis- respect to stereotypical drugs because money is such a reliable
positions to particular sorts of sexual activity in particular sorts of tool for getting what the brain is always looking for, namely,
circumstances and not any one of these dispositions is always relief from boredom. But it isn’t money itself that is the drug,
fitness-promoting. it is gambling. Money in the gambling addict is – literally – a
Our objection would be churlish if money were, like cocaine tool for getting drugged.
but unlike most sex, typically pathological with respect to func-
tion (fitness-enhancing or otherwise; again, sex is typically patho-
logical with respect to fitness). But this would be so only if true
miserliness – sheer hoarding of money for the sake of having it
and not for status, security, and so forth – were widespread. Tools, drugs, and signals in the road
Such miserliness is in fact extremely rare. (When they mention from evolution to money
it in support of their argument, L&W cite no prevalence
studies, surprising or otherwise.) Federico Sanabria
The poverty of L&W’s case here is a special case of the poverty Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-1104.
of a whole species of evolutionary psychology. This species aims [email protected] http://www.public.asu.edu/fsanabri/
to identify a restricted set of basic pre-cultural motivators. Then
it hypothesizes modules for seeking and evaluating instances of Abstract: The problem of the biology of money is twofold: It subsumes
these motivators. The modules, being narrow specialists, can be both the identification of behavioral mechanisms that account for the
fooled into misevaluation by things that mimic the targets for power of money as an incentive, and the elucidation of the phylogeny
of such mechanisms. The drugs–tool distinction, as articulated by Lea
which the modules were selected; these are drug-like rewards.
& Webley (L&W) in their fascinating synthesis, is a welcome step
Human cognitive architecture is probably modular to some toward their solution. Compared to the direct invocation of instinctual
extent. But hunting for definite, cross-environmental reward drives, however, conditioning processes provide a conceptually and
types that are the agents responsible for selection of the empirically clearer road from evolution to money.
modules reflects a simplistic and naive view of evolutionary
dynamics and complexity. Such hunts can sometimes have heur- The nearly absolute displacement of weaker non-monetary
istic value if they are taken with a pinch of salt and if the expla- modes of production by the global expansion of capitalist econ-
natory target has very shallow cognitive interpenetration – for omies, begs the question that the authors ask: Why are people
example, human preferences for sweets and fats, or male hetero- so interested in money? The answer is less trivial than it
sexual preferences for curvaceous women, the prototype appears. The obvious answer is not incorrect, but rather, as is
instances that show off evolutionary psychology in its best light. made crystalline in the target article, it is incomplete. To
Money isn’t very much like ripe fruit or rounded hips in that explore the shortcomings of that explanation, the authors have
respect – very little of widespread attraction to people is. So christened it as “Tool Theory,” characterized its means-to-end
money, like almost everything, is tool-like and drug-like. Is connotations, and moved forward to evaluate one exciting possi-
saying this really a helpful contribution to scientific bility: that there is a biological rationale, beyond the mere utili-
understanding? tarian, for the rewarding character of money. For motivation
L&W twice allude to a truly powerful way of studying reward theorists, the reality of a connection between biological functions
when they mention “neuroeconomics,” including the study of and motives is as obvious as Tool Theory (e.g., Maslow 1943);
differential brain responses to variances in reward types, fre- nevertheless, biological explanations are, at best, a growing but
quencies, delays, and contexts. They are wrong, though, to cite still marginal element of economic discourse. The science of
neuroeconomics, specifically Glimcher (2003), as having ident- money is still disconnected from the science of life, and the
ified a “trade module” or a distinctive neural response to trade- target article insightfully points at issues that may bridge this gap.
related stimuli. There is no such finding. What Glimcher and The question of the biology of money is meaningful only if it
other neuroeconomists report are neural capacities to learn to inquires about how a specific motivated behavior (money
predict values of rewards in many contexts, not in specifically seeking) is mapped to specific evolutionary demands. The con-
trade-related contexts. In fact, the early progress in neuro- ventional character of money and its short natural history,
economics is bad news for evolutionary psychology of L&W’s however, preclude any direct connection between money and
type, for it shows that brains nimbly learn to compare rewards nature. This point is well argued by the authors, who conclude
across whole ranges of settings and cultural manipulations of that there cannot be a “money instinct.” Consequently, the
setting (e.g., McClure et al 2004), not that they are systems research question is only viable through a roundabout: Money

must operate through basic behavioral mechanisms which them- learn to cooperate in this game, but only if each choice
selves are related to (or, rather, must be related to) fitness max- between cooperation and defection produces a stimulus that is
imization. The mediatory role of these presumed behavioral predictive of reciprocation (i.e., a conditioned reinforcer or
mechanisms breaks the problem of the biology of money into punisher). Pigeons are obviously not hardwired to reciprocate
two parts: (a) what behavioral mechanisms are involved in the actions of a computer at the expense of immediate gratifica-
money seeking (proximate causes)? and (b) what is the evolution- tion, but they can learn it. Maybe money operates, partially, as an
ary rationale of such mechanisms (ultimate causes)? These two analogue of the cooperation stimulus, bridging over what we give
distinct problems are not clearly separated by the authors, as evi- up for money, and what we obtain for it.
denced by the mechanisms selected for their synthetic theory of The tool– drug metaphors bring economic motivations closer
monetary behavior. to their biological substratum, but they can be improved. Their
According to L&W, money may be metaphorically described symmetry with conditioning mechanisms suggests a fruitful
as a tool, or as a drug. These two functions are easily mappable course of action. These mechanisms may well function as
to two general behavioral mechanisms familiar to behavior ana- mediators between evolution and some socially arranged beha-
lysts: operant and Pavlovian conditioning. In operant terms, vior (Gutnisky & Zanutto 2004; Skinner 1984). Such function,
money may serve as the lever that, when properly manipulated, unlike instinctual drives directly linked to evolution, is readily
yields reinforcing consequences. In Pavlovian terms, money verifiable in nature.
may serve as the cue signaling the availability of attractive
stimuli, eliciting responses of approach and anticipation, among ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
others. The tool versus drug distinction, however, does not Preparation of this commentary was supported by NSF IBN 0236821 and
fully match the operant versus Pavlovian dichotomy. Tools NIMH 1R01MH066860. Thanks to Peter Killeen for his feedback on
yield “real” rewards, whereas drugs are “nonfunctional” substi- early drafts of this commentary.
tutes for “real” rewards. The tool – drug dichotomy presumably
encompasses all possible motivational roles of stimuli like
money, which in themselves are not “real” rewards. The terms
in quotation marks are defined by their contribution to fitness.
Certainly, operant and Pavlovian conditioning, as general mech- Memetics and money
anisms, are significant contributors to the fitness of complex
organisms, and they are demonstrably facilitated by a congruency Keith E. Stanovich
of stimuli and responses that is only attributable to evolutionary Department of Human Development and Applied Psychology, University of
processes (e.g., Garcia & Koelling 1966). But once operational, Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6 Canada.
conditioning is agnostic of the “reality” of the reinforcement [email protected]
process. And so is money: it may work as a tool to obtain http://leo.oise.utoronto.ca/kstanovich/index.html
fitness diminishers like crack cocaine, and it may work as a “func-
Abstract: Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) Drug Theory solves many puzzles
tional drug,” signaling incoming food ingestion when we inspect surrounding money-related behavior. I explore supplementing the
our wallet in a restaurant. It is not clear how either one of these Drug Theory with ideas from gene-culture coevolution theory and
two cases fits the tool versus drug distinction. The completeness memetic theory.
of the tool – drug approach is undermined when we consider the
possibility of using a tool to obtain a drug, or of using a drug as a Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) discussion of money as a drug rep-
tool. The basic metaphors are conceptually close to conditioning resents an ingenious synthesis of disparate literatures. The
mechanisms, but they need to reconfigure their link to selective theory is, however, specifically oriented toward explaining the
advantage as a separate problem. origins of money (“our task is to offer the best account we can
In the target article, the Skinnerian operant approach is of the biological origins of the money motive”; sect. 1.4). I
described as a “Drug Theory” on the basis of its characterization would like to raise the possibility that a theory that moves
of money as a conditioned reinforcer. Interestingly, “operant beyond the origins of money to focus on its ongoing manifes-
money theory” could be described also as a “Tool Theory” on tations might find a greater role for culture. That is, once
the same basis, if one is of the persuasion that conditioned money is in existence, the symbolic aspects of money-related
reinforcement derives its value from signaling the relative proxi- behavior may function in such a way as to make them not
mity of other reinforcing events (e.g., Preston & Fantino 1991). If simply classifiable as instances of the Drug Theory (as argued
such is the case, there is no reason to agree with the authors’ in sects. 3.3.2 and 5.2). To account for the ongoing manifestations
claim that conditioned reinforcers must work in the same way of money-related behavior, I believe that the Drug Theory will
as unconditioned reinforcers. Furthermore, positive informative need to be supplemented with ideas from gene– culture coevolu-
signals may elicit behavior completely unrelated to the signaled tion theory and memetic theory.
reinforcer (e.g., a ringing phone may signal an awaited call, but In L&W’s discussion, “function” always refers to biological
few would engage in a conversation with the phone), or very function. This is true in both their Tool Theory and their Drug
similar to the consummatory response (e.g., autoshaping in the Theory. In the former, money gives indirect access to biological
pigeon; Allan & Zeigler 1994). In other words, money, qua con- rewards, and in the latter, money “covers cases where it gives
ditioned reinforcer, may be described as a tool or as a drug, and direct access to the systems that subserve such rewards but in
neither description appears to be exclusive. The compatibility of an illusory, nonfunctional way” (sect. 2.3). But what about
these descriptions is an issue that goes beyond money and into human goals and desires that have completely slipped their
the discussion of the interaction/identity of operant and genetic/biological moorings? Neither the Tool nor the Drug
Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., Lajoie & Bindra 1976). Theory would seem to have much to say about such cases, or at
Although reciprocal altruism and play may be involved in the least both theories need to be supplemented to encompass this
interest for money, their invocation as instincts to explain monet- situation. The alternative is to contest a fundamental assumption
ary behavior is unwarranted. The connection between behavioral of most memetic theorists – that memetic goals can become
mechanisms and evolution is not examined to such an extent as to detached from genetic fitness considerations and indeed can
rule out the empirically verifiable possibility that both behaviors become detached from the interests of the vehicle (person)
are derivable from general mechanisms. Consider the situation of hosting them (Blackmore 1999; Dennett 1995; Stanovich 2004).
cooperating in a prisoner’s dilemma game, when playing against a A view of money that recognizes memetic goals that are
perfectly reciprocating strategy (or tit-for-tat; Axelrod 1984). detached from genetic goals does have affinities with views in
Sanabria et al. (2003) have demonstrated that pigeons may the modern sociology of money discussed by L&W. However,

broader notions of symbolization than those represented in the Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) target article explores the important
sociological literature might not be as easily subsumed under question of what the biological basis of our monetary motives
the Drug Theory – for example, notions of symbolic utility associ- might be. One obvious explanation involves their Tool Theory,
ated with Robert Nozick. Nozick defines a situation involving according to which money is a tool and our reasons for desiring
symbolic utility as one in which an action (or one of its outcomes) it are to be understood like our desire for any tool in terms of
“symbolizes a certain situation, and the utility of this symbolized what other goods it is able to help us obtain (sect. 2.1). L&W
situation is imputed back, through the symbolic connection, to argue that while this has some intuitive appeal, a Tool Theory
the action itself” (Nozick 1993, p. 27). Money use in highly afflu- of money motivation fails to explain fully the strong pull of
ent societies can often have this property. Nozick notes that we money as a motivator. A full explanation requires that we under-
are apt to view a concern for symbolic utility as irrational when stand money as acting sometimes, in a metaphorical sense, as a
the lack of a causal link between the symbolic action and the drug. According to their Drug Theory, money intrudes meta-
actual outcome has become manifestly obvious, yet the symbolic phorically on the normal functioning of the nervous system:
action continues to be performed. Many dysfunctional inter- money acquires its incentive power because it mimics the
actions surrounding money seem to have this property of being psychological action of some other more natural incentive (sect.
detached from real-world outcomes and becoming attached to 2.2.4). Accordingly, it involves irrationality.
very abstract memeplexes (political memeplexes that seem My interest here concerns money motives and morality. What
to serve neither personal interests nor genetic interests come to applicability might this have to normative theories regarding the
mind). L&W recognize the difficulty here when they acknowl- extent to which we should be motivated by money in the way that
edge “that money is essentially a symbol, perhaps multiply we so obviously are. For the moral philosopher, any interest here
symbolic (cf. Lea et al. 1987, Ch. 12), seems hard to reconcile would be in justification rather than explanation. How well might
with any kind of biological analysis of money motivation; it L&W’s template fit onto the history of what R. H. Tawney (1926)
leads, furthermore, to a cognitive rather than a motivational called “economic casuistry”? Unlike more radical approaches that
analysis of behaviour towards money.” This seems right, and would cast all monetary motives as immoral, the economic casuist
the cognitive substrate that it relies upon would seem to be in distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate monetary
the domains of simulation and metarepresentation (Carruthers motives.
2002; Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; Dienes & Perner 1999; We can discern two central schools of thought regarding money
Nichols & Stich 2003; Sperber 2000) – precisely the domains motives in this more moderate tradition. The first of these derives
upon which memetic evolution is dependent. from the work of Immanuel Kant, and sees money as a tool or
If the origins of money are in the mechanisms outlined in the instrument which is only to be used for buying “tool-like”
Drug Theory, then I would argue that a further exaptation has things. For Kant, money is a pure means. He contrasts this with
taken place in the service of memetic evolution. An exaptation persons who are ends-in-themselves and should be accorded
for memetic purposes would likewise be consistent with the respect in keeping with their status as persons. Kant argues that
many findings of biological nonfunctionality that L&W find sup- every thing has either a price or a dignity and if it has a price it
portive of the Drug Theory, and it would additionally be consist- cannot have a dignity (Kant 1785/1946). Although it is quite legit-
ent with many findings in the heuristics and biases literature imate to regard mere things as means and therefore to ascribe to
which show that interactions involving money are instrumentally them a price, this is not the case with persons. Clearly, what we
irrational (Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Raghubir & Srivastava have here is a Tool Theory of normative evaluation. Money is a
2002; Shafir et al. 1997; Stanovich 1999), that they do not serve tool and it is wrong to treat persons as if they were tools.
the interests of the individual (whether or not they are consistent The second great tradition is Aristotelian in origin and focuses
with genetic fitness maximization; see Stanovich 2004). on the role that money plays in the best possible life. Aristotle,
In L&W’s Drug Theory, money parasitizes trading that is and later philosophers such as Aquinas, regarded money as the
derived from reciprocal altruism. However, L&W might just as very embodiment of an instrument and, as such, it could not
easily (and additionally) have posited money parasitizing be a proper end of activity (Aristotle 1952). However, immersion
trading derived from strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher in commercial life often leads people to regard money as an end-
2003) – altruistic acts performed when no reciprocal benefit is in-itself. For the Aristotelian this is an irrational mistake. In
possible. This uniquely human form of behavior is increasingly explaining this irrationality, Aristotelians focus on the inability
viewed as the product of gene/culture evolution (Fehr & of money to function as an ultimate goal. Proper activities have
Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Richerson & a realizable goal. When one aims to build a boat, one realizes
Boyd 2005). This, in part, puts the Drug Theory on a memetic one’s goal when the boat is completed and ready to sail. But in
foundation as well as a biological one. the case of money there is no point at which one realizes one’s
goal of making money. Having no satisfaction conditions, it end-
lessly iterates (Walsh 2004). Obviously, this second tradition can
be cast as a Drug Theory. According to the Aristotelian tradition,
the person who takes the pursuit of money as their fundamental
goal is irrational since the very nature of money is such that it
Money motives, moral philosophy, and cannot function in this way.
biological explanations It appears, then, that L&W’s template fits neatly onto the two
main ethical traditions in Western philosophy that seek to dis-
Adrian J. Walsh tinguish between legitimate or illegitimate money motives.
Philosophy Discipline, School of Social Science, University of New England, These accounts of the moral difference conform either to the
Armidale, NSW, 2351, Australia. Drug model or to the Tool model, since the normatively undesir-
[email protected] able motives here are either understood as cases of “inappropri-
www.une.edu.au/arts/Philosophy/STAFF/awalsh.htm ate tool-treatment” or of irrational drug-like behavior. Built into
such a model is the assumption that non-instrumental motives
Abstract: Lea & Webley (L&W) provide two alternative biological towards money must be irrational. We can see this assumption
accounts of human monetary motivations, the Tool Theory and the Drug
Theory. They argue that both are required for an adequate explanation. at work in L&W’s discussion of restrictions on money use (sect.
I explore the applicability of these models to philosophical discussions of 4.5). Money is said to function as a drug in those cases where it
how we might justify such motivations. I argue their approach is not is “found to have a value and an emotional charge that are not
entirely satisfactory for normative questions, since it precludes the predicted by its economic use” (sect. 4.11). If not a means,
possibility of rational non-instrumental attitudes towards money. then the behavior belongs to the realm of irrationality.

Response/Lea & Webley: Money as tool, money as drug
But should we accept this last assumption? In moral philosophy R1. Introduction
the suggestion that non-instrumental attitudes are fundamentally
irrational is highly controversial. Value pluralists, such as Raz Our target article started from four core assumptions
(1986) and Anderson (1993), have argued persuasively for the (sect. 1): (1) For humans (but not for other species),
existence of forms of moral value that arise from the ideals and money has an extraordinary incentive power, similar to
attitudes expressed in action itself, rather than its consequences. that of other motivators such as food and sex. (2)
Anderson, in particular, explores how our use of money might
Whereas the incentive power of food, sex, and most
express ideals and attitudes that in certain circumstances might
be inappropriate. She claims that in such cases it is rational to other motivators is easily understood in biological terms,
refuse monetary exchanges on grounds which are fundamentally that of money is not. (3) A biological explanation of the
non-economic and which reflect the basic values of the agent incentive power of money therefore needs to be provided
concerned. This seems right, for surely one can refuse money because “the science of money is still disconnected from
for some good, no matter how much money is on offer, without the science of life” (to use Sanabria’s elegant expression),
being thought irrational. If this is correct, then there would and the gap needs to be bridged. (4) This task has hitherto
appear to be cases in moral theory not covered by the Tool and been neglected.
Drug Models, at least as described – namely, those where one From those assumptions we argued, through a consider-
might rationally choose, on non-instrumental normative ation of past theories and current data, to three con-
grounds, to avoid certain monetary transactions.
clusions (sect. 5.4): (i) The “obvious” Tool Theory of
Although the account is insightful, my concern is that if it
were to be applied in its current form to the normative money motivation, according to which money is valued
realm, it would exclude rational non-instrumental attitudes because it enables us to fulfil other biologically explicable
towards money from the possible set of human motives in instincts, is inadequate; (ii) the inadequacies of a Tool
this area. This would be an undesirable outcome. A further Theory can be overcome by combining it with a Drug
question, which might be pursued elsewhere, concerns the Theory, according to which money provides illusory fulfil-
extent to which rational non-instrumental attitudes towards ment of other instincts; and (iii) the instincts for which
money could have a role in biological explanations of our money particularly provides illusory fulfilment are the
desire for money. instincts to trade and to play.
We predicted (sect. 5.4) that our three conclusions
would find decreasing levels of acceptance, and a
reading of the commentaries bears this out. Similarly,
not all of our assumptions were challenged: everyone
Authors’ Response pretty much agrees that the biological explanation of the
money motive has been neglected. However, by no
means does everyone agree that such an explanation is
needed; some commentators clearly feel that the biology
Money: Motivation, metaphors, and mores of money has been neglected, is continuing to be neg-
lected, and ought to be neglected further.
Stephen E. G. Lea and Paul Webley Hence, we can divide the arguments in the commen-
University of Exeter, School of Psychology, Washington Singer Laboratories, taries into those that challenge our assumptions; those
Exeter EX4 4QG, United Kingdom. that (broadly) agree with our assumptions but challenge
our conclusions, because they challenge the arguments
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/SEGLea
by which we reached them; and those that accept our
http://www.exeter.ac.uk/pwebley
assumptions and our conclusions as far as they go, but
Abstract: Our response amplifies our case that money is best seek to extend them in various ways. Naturally, several
seen as both a drug and a tool. Some commentators challenge of the commentaries involve elements of all three of
our core assumptions: In this response we, therefore, explain in those positions. In responding to the commentaries, there-
more detail why we assume that money is an exceptionally fore, we reflect on these three approaches in succession,
strong motivator, and that a biological explanation of money rather than taking each commentary in turn. We start
motivation is required. We also provide evidence to support with a response to critiques of our assumptions.
those assumptions. Other commentators criticise our use of the
drug metaphor, particularly arguing that it is empirically
empty; and in our response we seek to show how it can be
submitted to test – aided by some commentaries which suggest R2. Money is an important human motivator
such tests. In addition, we explain, with evidence, why we do
not think that the notion of money as a generalised conditioned Several commentators (e.g., Burghardt, Glassman) chal-
reinforcer provides a satisfactory alternative to the tool/drug lenge our assumption that the money motivation is unique.
account. The largest group of commentaries suggests To some extent these challenges miss the point of our
alternative instincts on which the drug-like effects of money article. For example, we have no problem with the fact
might be based, other than the reciprocation and play instincts
that human sexual motivation is decoupled from procrea-
we propose; in our response, we explain why we still prefer our
original proposals, but we accept that alternative or additional tion (Ross & Spurrett); that does not undermine its bio-
instincts may indeed underlie money motivation. A final group logical continuity in the terms in which we define it (sect.
of commentaries carries the argument further, suggesting 1.4). A more serious challenge, however, is Furnham’s
extensions to the tool/drug model, in ways with which we are claim that money is not in fact a very powerful motivator.
broadly in sympathy. The purpose of the tool and drug Furnham argues that money is actually a hygiene factor (in
metaphors is to encourage reflection on the biological origins the sense of Herzberg et al. 1967) rather than a motivator.
of money motivation, and to that extent at least we believe that In support of this claim, he points out that at least some
they have succeeded. affective associations with money are in fact negative,

and that this is not what one would expect from a cognitive only jobs offered them for the pay they are offered, prefer-
drug, nor from something that is a strong motivator. ring to become marginalised or outcast, or to work in the
It is fundamental to our argument that money is a subsistence economy. There are jobs that people take
powerful motivator. Accordingly, at the risk of belabouring only with great reluctance, and where the pay has to be
the obvious, we need to briefly review some of the evi- at a premium because of their non-pecuniary disadvan-
dence that supports our position. Such evidence comes tages: prostitution and related occupations such as
from everyday discourse, the stylised facts of the ordinary topless dancing are the obvious examples (see Reynolds
labour market, empirical studies of some less usual 1986; Thompson et al. 2003). But the evidence of labour
markets, and finally from direct experiment. The culturally market history is that there is no job that absolutely no
invasive nature of money, which we discuss in section R4.1 one could be induced to do, if sufficient money was
of this response, provides additional evidence. offered. And beyond legitimate employment, it is clear
that if a crime is apparently profitable, there is no level of
punishment, up to and including death, that will completely
R2.1. Everyday discourse: Proverbs, aphorisms, and
eliminate it so long as there is some chance of escaping
familiar quotations
detection. In the right circumstances, then, money has
Both formal literature and traditional wisdom contain the capacity to overwhelm all other motivations.
large numbers of aphorisms and comments referring to We are not saying that the money motive is all-powerful.
money. Indeed, there are so many that Furnham and We are not saying that anyone can be persuaded to
Argyle (1998) are able to open each of their chapters perform any act for enough money: some people are
with a list, and Jackson (1995) has collected a comprehen- able to resist bribery. But the same is true of other power-
sive anthology. Formal analyses of such lists have been ful motives; the power of hunger or sex are not disputed
carried out: for example, Doyle and Li’s (2001) compari- because some people manage to fast and many people
son of Chinese and Japanese proverbs about money. are sexually faithful.
Examination of lists of such aphorisms suggests that
they fall into two types, which we call the cynical and
the sceptical. Cynical aphorisms assert the power of
R2.3. Empirical studies: Unusual markets
money, in the face of explicit or implicit protestations to
the contrary. Sceptical aphorisms assert the limitations Just as some people will, under some circumstances, do
of the power of money, in the face of an assumed consen- almost anything for money, so also some people, under
sus that such limitations barely exist. It might be thought some circumstances, will sell almost anything for money.
that the two groups cancel each other out. However, The most discussed example in the recent literature is the
given the social function of aphorisms, it is clear that sale of organs for transplantation, particularly kidneys, and
both types are evidence that there is a widely held belief there is extensive discussion in the medical ethics and
in the power of money. policy literature as to whether this should be encouraged
Examples of cynical aphorisms include: “[Money] is the or not (e.g., Kahn & Delmonico 2004). Significant
sovereign queen of all delights: for her the lawyer pleads; numbers of people have made this kind of sale: Goyal
the soldier fights” (R. Barnfield, spelling modernised from et al. (2002) found more than 300 individuals who had
the 1598 original); “What makes all doctrines plain and done so in one city in India – about .05% of the population.
clear? – About two hundred pounds a year” (Butler); In everyday speech, someone who would do anything
“Wine maketh merry; but money answereth all things” for money is described as being ready to sell his grand-
(Ecclesiastes 10:19) (all quotations from Benham 1935). mother. There is no formal evidence that people do
On the more sceptical side we have, from the same exactly that, but they will certainly sell their children.
collection (Benham 1935): “No man’s fortune could be The widespread tradition of brideprice is, objectively, a
an end worthy of his being” (F. Bacon); “A good name is matter of selling a daughter, though it might be thought
rather to be chosen than great riches” (Proverbs 22:1); a relatively innocuous example. The public concern
“Honour and money are not found in the same purse” about international adoption in recent years has partly
(Spanish proverb). been driven by the possibility that it can lead to the sale
Of course, literature as such is not evidence. But these of children (Hollingsworth 2003). It is also claimed that
sayings are evidence that people have long believed child prostitution in developing countries often involves
money to be a powerful force, and that some people the sale of children by their parents. Some widely circu-
have believed it to be a dangerously powerful force in lated stories (see, e.g., Flowers 2001) are hard to docu-
people’s lives. ment, but even authors who are sceptical of them
recognise that there are parents in some of these countries
who are willing, however reluctantly, to be supported by
R2.2. Stylised facts: The labour market and crime
their adolescent daughters’ earnings from the sex trade
The second line of evidence for the power of the money (Bagley 1999).
motive again comes from the realm of everyday experi- As in the case of crime, the existence of these markets
ence, though it belongs to the academic disciplines of does not mean that people are universally or even com-
labour economics and occupational psychology and partly monly willing to sell their body parts, or their children,
to criminology. Put crudely, there is no job so unpleasant, for money. What it does show is that in the right circum-
hazardous, or immoral that no one will take it if the pay stances, the money motive will overwhelm even the
is right. motives to preserve one’s own body and one’s own descen-
This generalisation may seem questionable. In any dants. Biologically speaking, that places the money motive
society, there are some people who refuse to take the at the highest level there is.

R2.4. A formal demonstration of the strength of the in which we mean such an explanation. A number of com-
money motive mentators express concerns about our biological approach
Few experimental psychologists have thought it necessary to money, feeling that in taking this approach we had paid
to demonstrate the strength of the money motive. insufficient attention to cultural and social explanations.
However, Schwab (1953) has reported an experiment in This view is expressed most forcefully by Belk, who
which he asked patients to hang from a horizontal bar in claims that money motivations are learned along with civi-
a gymnasium for as long as they possibly could, which lising rituals that overcome rather than indulge basic
turned out to be about 45 seconds. If he subjected them motivations. Others (Jorion, Kniffen) have drawn atten-
to “suggestion and strong urging (hypnosis in some tion to the significance of money as a marker of status.
cases),” they managed to hang on for somewhat longer, The general issue here is the nature of the relationship
about 75 seconds. But if he held out a $5 bill (worth between biology and culture: behaviours may be largely
around $30 at today’s prices), and told them they could determined by genes, there may be gene –culture coevolu-
have it if they beat their previous records, they managed tion, or behaviours may be “off-the-leash” and basically
to hang on for an average of 110 seconds. Any incentive culturally determined.
that enables someone to perform at tasks at 250% of
their previous best level has, we argue, some right to R4.1. Is money purely cultural?
be regarded as strong.
The most radical alternative to our kind of biological expla-
nation is the one that we identified early in the target article
R2.5. Is money a uniquely human motivator? (sect. 2.3): money must be understood purely at a cultural
level, detached from human biology except insofar as bio-
While not questioning the strength of the money motive logical evolution has given humans the capacity to be cul-
for humans, Ross & Spurrett raise the possibility that tural beings. The position taken by Belk seems to us to
animals other than humans can also acquire the motivation fall within this camp; where we see drug-like effects, he
to use money. They cite the results of Chen et al. (in press), sees the effects of social ritual. The trouble with this pos-
showing that capuchins would trade tokens with an exper- ition, as we have argued elsewhere (Lea & Webley 2005),
imenter in exchange for food reward. Impressive as these is that, like nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic
results are, they do not add anything in principle to other theory, it “abolishes the body” (Gagnier & Dupré 1999).
demonstrations of conditioned reinforcement in animals. Of course, we cannot abolish culture either: we are not pro-
A number of other commentators have also suggested posing, as Belk seems to suggest, that children come into
that conditioned reinforcement provides an adequate the world desiring money. We entirely agree that they
alternative biological explanation of the money motive. have to learn the desire for money – that is precisely why
We respond to this argument later, in section R6.2. it is biologically problematic. As economic psychologists
we have a responsibility to account for tastes, in Becker’s
(1996) phrase: we have to explain why this particular
R3. Money motivation is unusually difficult to
desire is learned when other possible desires are not, and
explain biologically
why this desire becomes so strong. If money motivation is
Few if any commentators suggest that money is easy to indeed learned in the same way as manners are learned
explain biologically. However, some commentators ques- (as Belk argues), then either people should be a lot less
tion whether it poses a special or unique difficulty. Essen- interested in money, or we should be a lot better mannered.
tially they argue that many or even all human motivations To put it another way, if money is a pure cultural artefact
are so transformed by our uniquely cultural biology that and behaviour towards it a pure function of ritual, then
they are as detached from any obvious function as its presence or absence in societies, the forms it takes,
money is. As we have pointed out in the preceding and the taboos about it, would be essentially arbitrary, con-
section (R2), however, this is to misunderstand what strained only by history. They are not, and the evidence on
we mean by biological continuity. Continuity does not the cultural history of money shows that they are not.
require that a human function is identical to that of Money is not an inevitable result of human culture. A
other primates. It does require that there should be a great many of the world’s cultures did not use any form
plausible path of evolutionary and historical development of money until they came into contact with the European
from the kind of motivations seen in other animals (and, or East Asian cultures that had invented the kinds of
therefore, presumably shown by our prehuman ancestors) money we are familiar with. Complex economies could
to those seen in modern humans. There is a plausible path be sustained by other means, such as systems of ritual
from chimpanzees’ monkey hunting (Teleki 1973) (see, e.g., Dole & Carneiro 1958) or barter (Chapman
to “Laughing Stock Farm pork cooked two-ways with 1980; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones 1992). A large number
winter squash and red wine panade and Belgian endive” of “primitive” societies did use money, however, and
at Chez Panisse; but there is no such path to the platinum studies in economic anthropology have shown that their
American Express card with which we might pay for the moneys included a wide range of materials. Some
dish. We do not even know where such a path would start. examples are listed by Einzig (1966) and they include fam-
iliar examples such as cows and cowrie shells, but also less
likely sounding objects such as bolts of cloth, granite
R4. The culture and biology of money boulders, pearl necklaces, and woodpecker scalps. Com-
pared with this rich array of different money substances,
Commentators differ sharply on whether there is a real the number of independent inventions of money seems
need for a biological explanation for money in the sense to have been quite small, probably fewer than twenty

(Grierson 1978). So all the different money-using societies R4.3. Gene–culture coevolution
must have acquired the idea of money from this relatively Stanovich takes a more radical, and to us a more interest-
small number of roots, with subsequent cultural radiation ing, approach to biological explanation: he argues that, in
of the actual substances used as money. This shows that order to explain current behaviour with money, a biologi-
the money idea is culturally highly contagious, or, to put cal approach needs to be supplemented by a cultural
it another way, powerful. If a money-using society and a approach (specifically ideas from gene –culture coevolu-
non-money-using society come into contact, it is likely tion and mimetic theory). He believes that there are a
that the non-money-using society will adopt money; it is number of human goals and desires that have “slipped
unheard of for a money-using society to stop using their genetic/biological moorings,” that money is one of
money. Furthermore, the developed world’s style of these, and that this leads to situations where money
money, using coins, notes, and bank accounts, seems to becomes attached to abstract “memeplexes.” Although
be as dominant within money use as money use is over we might wish to disagree with some of the details of
other exchange systems. When modern money makes Stanovich’s proposals, we agree with the general position
contact with a more primitive money system, even that human behaviour has to be understood in terms of
though there may be some initial resistance, the modern gene –culture coevolution, and that this applies to econ-
form quite quickly displaces its primitive competitor. omic behaviour as much as to any other behaviour
We conclude from this evidence that money in general, (cf. Lea & Newson 2005). In our view, nature-nurture
and modern forms of money in particular, are culturally arguments are sterile, and in arguing for a biological
invasive. This in turn suggests that they are not arbitrary; basis for money motivation we certainly are not arguing
rather, they are peculiarly compatible with enduring fea- against a cultural basis for the expression of that motiv-
tures of human nature, and it follows that if we are to ation. Neither could exist without the other. Therefore,
understand money fully, we must understand its biological we agree with Jorion’s position that analysing money as
as well as its cultural history. a cultural phenomenon does not preclude tracing it
back to its biological basis, though we disagree with his
R4.2. What kind of biological explanation should we conclusions from that position (see sect. R5).
have?
Some commentators accept, to a greater or less extent, that
R4.4. The problem with instinct
a biological explanation is needed, but disagree with the
particular kind of biological explanation we seek to Finally, and inevitably, we need to explain again our use of
provide. We are accused of peddling a style of evolutionary the term “instinct.” Both Behrendt and Burghardt seem
psychology which is universalistic (Agassi), or intellec- to misunderstand it. Although we have no quarrel with the
tually feeble; of relying on modular explanations (Ross Lorenzian concept of fixed action patterns, or with rituali-
& Spurrett); of not being part of a naturalistic evolution- sation as a possible account of their emergence, we are not
ary science (Burghardt); or of believing that brains can talking about this kind of microinstinct (cf. Lea 1984) but
use coins as neurotransmitters (Booth). about instinct in the sense of a reasonably universal human
We will turn to Burghardt’s and Booth’s comments in motive of plausibly biological origin. Behrendt has no
sect.R4.4 below. On the issue of modularity in human problem with a biological approach as such; for other com-
cognition (or motivation), our target article takes no mentators (e.g., Booth), using the term “instinct” seems to
explicit position. As a matter of fact, we prefer to construe suggest that our argument can be dismissed as biological
evolutionary psychology in the broad sense rather than determinism. But, as we point out repeatedly (e.g., sect.
the narrow sense: we are much more persuaded by the 1.4 of the target article and sect. R4.3 above) and as
assumption that modern human behaviour can be inter- most commentators (e.g., Agassi) understood, we are
preted in the light of evolutionary theory, than by the fully of the view that culture plays an essential and co-
details of Tooby and Cosmides’ “adaptive toolbox” (Lea, determining role in human behaviour. It is hard to under-
in press; for the distinction between broad and narrow stand how Booth, for example, can think that we would
constructions of evolutionary psychology, see Buller deny that acculturation is involved in pornography, when
2005). We might argue that the idea of a restricted set of we proceed to discuss pornographic texts. Does he think
pre-cultural modules is more plausible in the motivational we believe that children are born with an instinct to
than the cognitive realm, but we would be quite happy speak English or French? The idea of an instinct,
with the idea that money motivation arose as a flexible however, remains essential for distinguishing between
extension from some other human motivation that has a motivations like hunger, that do have obvious biological
convincing biological basis. However, the case for that origins and are universal or nearly so, and those like the
idea has yet to be made. We argued in the target article desire for money, that are not universal and have no
(sect. 5.1) that the Drug Theory of money is feeble obvious biological origins.
unless we can specify what biologically-grounded
motives money mimics. The same is equally true of any
alternative that is offered: If money motivation is to be R5. Is Tool Theory enough?
explained as a result of the flexibility and situation-
dependency of human motivation (cf. Ross & Spurrett), We turn now to those arguments that (to a greater or less
that argument needs to be filled out with specific and extent) accept our initial assumptions, but reject our con-
testable proposals as to what flexibility, applied to what clusions. We consider first a set of critiques that essentially
motivations, in what situations, has produced modern argue that a tool theory, suitably modified, can provide an
levels of motivation towards money. adequate biological account of money motivation.

Among these arguments we classify those put forward our second conclusion, that its inadequacies are best
by Jorion. He makes three main claims: (a) that “for remedied by supplementing it with Drug Theory (of
anyone below the poverty line, cash remains foremost course, some welcome this conclusion, e.g., Ainslie;
the means to the essential end of subsistence,” and there- Dewitte; Markman, Blok, Dennis, Goldwater, Kim,
fore, that no explanation of the desire for money is needed Laux, Narvaez & Rein [Markman et al.] and some
for the very poor; (b) that the drive to acquire money is a others share our belief that money is valued for more
special case of the drive for recognition (for the desire of than its exchange value even if they do not find the tool/
desire); and (c) that people who are admired (desired) drug dichotomy helpful, e.g., Behrendt). Two classes of
extend the range of their partners – in other words, that critique emerged: attacks on the tool/drug metaphors as
cash is a universal tool for reproductive advantage. It is such, and alternative proposals for overcoming the
useful to consider Kniffen’s complementary commentary deficiencies of Tool Theory, of which by far the most sig-
at the same time. He claims that the distinction between nificant is the proposal that operant conditioning could
money and status cannot be made easily and that the bridge the gap between biology and money motivation.
importance of status in an evolutionary context deserves
looking at (status can motivate individuals, relatively high
R6.1. The use and abuse of metaphor
status then translates into reproductive fitness).
We disagree with the first of Jorion’s points. The fact The most trenchant comments on the tool and drug meta-
that money is spent on food does not mean that no expla- phors are those from Ross & Spurrett and Burghardt.
nation of the desire for money is needed – in our terms, Both claim that the distinction between tool-like and
what Jorion is saying is that among very poor people, the drug-like motivators is vacuous and could be applied to
desire for money is fully explained by its use as a tool. virtually anything that is desired (e.g., automobiles, cloth-
We do not find this convincing because for most of ing, sex, food). Furnham claims that anyway, Tool/Drug
history money has not been used by poor people to Theory is simply a classificatory device for all other
obtain subsistence, nor was it even very useful for doing theories and has very limited incremental validity; further-
so. Until the mass urbanisation of the twentieth century, more, he disputes our classification of historic theories as
for most people in the world (and especially for most “tool” or “drug,” implying that the distinction is not well
poor people) cash was not in fact important for subsistence. defined. Other commentators feel that our notion of a
Food was something one farmed or hunted, and most other cognitive drug is poorly specified (Belk) or incoherent
things that provided for people’s basic needs were not part (Booth).
of the cash economy. This is still true in many parts of the It is important to be clear about what we are claiming in
world, if not for the majority of the population. So the the target article. Tool Theory and Drug Theory are
desire to have money seems to have no necessary connec- indeed broad classes of theories rather than theories in
tion with the need for subsistence. Furthermore, Jorion’s themselves. (Furnham is right that this is a classificatory
second and third points (and those of Kniffen) essentially device.) They are two distinct general ways of explaining
claim that money equals status. Put simply, people want money and, as Walsh says, this is a distinction that fits
money for the goods they can obtain, goods give them neatly into the two main ethical traditions in Western
status, and status leads to higher inclusive fitness. This is thought as they try to distinguish between legitimate and
very clearly a tool theory of money. In the target article illegitimate uses of money. On the one hand, Kant
we devoted much space to showing that tool theories as a asserts that money is a “pure means” – in our terms, a
class are not wrong but inadequate, because money has tool – whereas persons are “ends in themselves,” and
an emotional value that is not predicted by its role as a tool. ethical rules about the roles of money in society derive
We agree with the idea that status leads to greater from the fact that, in Walsh’s words, “Money is a tool
inclusive fitness, and money (representing overall assets) and it is wrong to treat persons as if they were tools.” On
obviously plays a part both in signalling status and in secur- the other hand, Aristotle recognises that some people
ing its benefits. But we find it hard to believe that this is pursue money as an end in itself (as Walsh notes, a Drug
where the biological roots of the desire for money are to theory), but condemns such people as irrational because
be found. Two points are relevant here: the idea of in reality money can only be the means to an end and
spheres of exchange (discussed in the target article) and not the end in itself. According to a Kantian analysis,
the role of money in subsistence societies. On spheres of therefore, drug-like uses of money are wrong because
exchange, it is arguable that money does not provide money is a tool and to use it as a drug offends against
access to women, whereas other status markers do the dignity of persons. And according to an Aristotelean
(Bohannan 1959). On the role of money, there are many analysis, money can be a drug but to use it as one is
societies that have had money in some form for centuries wrong because it is irrational. We are not claiming that
or even millenia, but where the cash economy is a very these classes of theory are unique to money, and in fact
recent development. Polynesia is a good example: the it would be surprising if they were. Just like money, cloth-
core of Polynesian society was land and the sea (and ing and cars can be either a means to an end (clothes might
their products), not cash. And it was chiefs, not the help you get a job, a car might help you get a partner) or an
market, who controlled and distributed land and produce. end in themselves (clothes keep you warm or dry, cars get
you from A to B as Burghardt’s professor pointed out). So
we agree that our tool/drug distinction could be applied to
R6. Critiques of Tool/Drug Theory other areas; indeed, in the target article we cite Mintz’s
(1986) argument that sugar should be regarded as a
The majority of commentators accept that a pure Tool “drug food.” But we are not aware of a wide range of car
Theory will not do. However, many do not agree with or clothing behaviour that needs to be explained, or car

and clothing theories that need to be classified, whereas regardless of whether the subject is motivated to obtain
money motivation is in serious need of deeper explanation any particular associated unconditioned reinforcer.
than it currently receives. 4. Such functionally autonomous conditioned reinfor-
The idea of a cognitive drug was felt by some to be weak. cers will be unusually powerful.
According to Booth, the only cognitive drug we mention is 5. These phenomena are shown in a wide range of
pornographic pictures and text – and “there is little or no species and thus result from biological processes that are
evidence for innate sexual arousal at the sight of the real common to humans and our prehuman ancestors.
thing.” What we actually say (sect. 2.2.3) is that we can If all these assumptions were true, conditioned
be emotionally engaged by many kinds of text and that reinforcement would indeed do the job that the commenta-
any such text can be thought of as a cognitive drug. Porno- tors want it to do. Kemp & Grace furthermore point out
graphy is just an extreme example. Fiction and film are that if the conditioned reinforcing effect was based on
more general examples: these elicit responses (tears, avoidance learning, we might expect it to be highly resistant
laughter, fear) without the effects that make these to extinction, and we agree that that could happen. Nor do
responses adaptive. we question proposition (1): conditioned reinforcement is a
On one point, we entirely agree with these critiques of real phenomenon (and both Kemp & Grace and Chandra-
Drug Theory. As we argue in section 5.1, a drug theory sekharan present physiological data that offer a mechan-
of money is only useful if one can specify what the ism by which it might work). The problem is that (1) is
natural incentives are that money mimics (see sect. the only one of the five propositions that is well supported
R4.2). Tool/Drug Theory as such may well be difficult to by data from any species other than humans. Virtually all
falsify, an issue that bothered Bouissac and Ross & studies of token reinforcement (or other kinds of con-
Spurrett, though Kemp & Grace manage to derive a ditioned reinforcement) involve pairing the token with a
testable prediction from it. However, what Drug Theory single type of unconditioned reinforcer. Under these cir-
does is to direct attention to the question: What more cumstances, the incentive value of the token then varies
ancient motivations is money motivation related to? Hypoth- as a function of deprivation states that affect the incentive
eses of this kind – specific drug theories, if you will – are value of the unconditioned reinforcer. This is as true of
potentially falsifiable, though, like all evolutionary hypoth- modern demonstrations of token exchange in an avowedly
eses, they need to be specified in a disciplined manner. economic context (e.g., Chen et al., in press) as it is of the
classic operant experiments on token reinforcement
described, for example, by Kelleher (1957; 1958). Even
R6.2. Is operant psychology enough?
proposition (2) fails: it has proved very difficult to link con-
Three commentaries (Romanowich, Fantino & Stolarz- ditioned reinforcers to more than one unconditional rein-
Fantino [Romanowich et al.]; Sanabria; and Kemp & forcer at all (Lea & Midgley 1989; Midgley et al. 1989).
Grace), in rather different ways, make the case that Consequently, there is no evidence to support (3) or (4).
operant psychology could provide the necessary link Furthermore, in relation to proposition (5), the simple
between evolution and socially maintained behaviours, application of principles of animal operant psychology to
such as those associated with money. For these commen- human behaviour has been proved to be highly proble-
tators, the idea that money functions as a powerful gener- matic (e.g., Horne & Lowe 1993). We therefore need to
alized conditioned reinforcer is not a pure drug theory (as look for direct evidence of functional independence in
we claim in sect. 3.2.2 of the target article) but can encom- human conditioned reinforcement. But the evidence for
pass all the phenomena we attribute to both drug and tool conditioned reinforcement from studies with human par-
theories – especially if the phenomena of negative ticipants is slender. It is certainly true that token reinforce-
reinforcement and extinction are properly taken into ment systems can work very powerfully with humans, as in
account. If this argument is correct, it would make our the classic studies of token economies (e.g., Ayllon & Azrin
tool/drug distinction redundant. The argument of these 1968); however, in all such studies, it is entirely possible
commentators is attractive because it appears to place that it was the clients’ prior understanding of money that
the biology of money within a well-established framework allowed the token economy to work, rather than the
of experimental facts about conditioned and token success of token economies providing evidence for a
reinforcement. However, the evidential base for the Skinnerian explanation of money. In sum, the explanation
claim that conditioned reinforcement can explain human of money as a generalised conditioned reinforcer is at
interest in money is in fact much weaker than is often present no more than a plausible speculation.
claimed. It rests on unproved assertions about animal For these reasons, we do not believe that the
behaviour, and unproved generalisations from animal conditioned reinforcement theory can replace the Tool/
behaviour to human behaviour. Drug Theory, at least in the present state of the evidence.
The basic assumptions required to underpin the asser- Nonetheless, it remains one of the best articulated
tion that conditioned reinforcement can provide a biologi- accounts of money motivation, and because it is strongly
cal account of human money motivation are the following: grounded in empirical ideas it does lead to interesting
1. Arbitrary stimuli (including physical tokens) associ- elaborations and falsifiable hypotheses.
ated with reinforcers can acquire reinforcing power, and
are then called conditioned reinforcers.
R6.3. In support of Tool/Drug Theory
2. When stimuli such as tokens are paired with multiple
unconditioned reinforcers, they can become associated Some commentators provided additional evidence in
with all of them. support of Tool/Drug Theory. For example, Kemp &
3. Conditioned reinforcers associated with multiple Grace reinterpret our tool/drug distinction as an analogy
unconditioned reinforcers will show a reinforcing effect to that between discriminative and hedonic properties of

conditioned reinforcers (and give some recent neurophy- point. Indeed, we pointed out (sect. 5.2) that barter can
siological evidence to support this). They also deploy the be induced in laboratory animals. But we are not con-
tool/drug distinction to make a prediction about behaviour vinced that either this, or the examples of ritual
towards near monies, and furthermore the prediction presentation that Burghardt gives, really constitute the
turns out to be correct: people do in general overvalue integration of division of labour into a system of trade,
money (as when they are willing to pay £23 for 100 air which is how we characterised human trading (sect. 5.2).
miles that are actually worth £7– 12). Kniffin agrees that On play, our own reading of the evidence is that,
users of near-moneys may pay more than they are worth. however much the adaptive value of play may come
Similarly, Lefebvre interprets the well-established “con- from other motivational systems such as aggression,
trafreeloading” phenomenon to argue that for animals within the life of the individual organism it is motivation-
(like humans) certain forms of utility are different ally independent from them.
(Lefebvre uses the term “sacred”) in that the animal will An impressive list of alternative instinctual origins for
work in some areas for smaller rewards than in others. the drug aspects of money is produced. We consider first
He thus argues that “the sacral aspect of money has the proposal that a wholly asocial motivational system
deep biological roots”; while we would not necessarily may be a sufficient explanation. Bouissac and Booth
agree with his interpretation of contrafreeloading, if it is both argue that natural selection favoured the evolution
accepted, it tends to support the idea of a dual motiva- of a hoarding “instinct” and an inhibitory system, and
tional role for money. both point out that such instincts are found quite widely
in the animal kingdom and commonly show a dissociation
from their obvious functions. Here they diverge, however,
R7. Human instincts: Some alternative with Bouissac making money essentially a cultural index
candidates for the biological underpinnings for resources (corresponding to other commentators who
of money seek to explain money motivation in terms of status and
power), and Booth linking money motivation to the
In a key section of the target article (sect. 5) we proposed general tendency of humans to collect things for their
two instincts (or motives) that we believe are universal own sake. This idea seems strange to us: most people are
among humans and that are manifested in modern not collectors of money – in general, as Katona (1975)
culture as a desire for money. We do not claim, and we pointed out, we save less than we intend or think desirable.
certainly do not take for granted (pace Agassi), that Misers are interesting, but as Ross & Spurrett point out,
these are the only possibilities. The commentators have they are also unusual.
enthusiastically put forward several additional or alterna- Several commentators seek to root a money instinct in
tive specific candidates. We shall explain in this section social motivations other than the trading instinct that
why we prefer our original choices to these specific we propose. There are many differences among these
alternatives, but we should say at the outset that if the approaches, but we draw them together here because
general structure of our argument is accepted, it is more they all point to instincts that are more competitive than
likely than not that there will be changes or additions to cooperative. Agassi claims that people desire wide
be made to the list of more basic instincts on which the options (and that is what they want money for), and also
drug-like aspects of the money motive depend. In the that money provides power. What Agassi appears to be pro-
end we may even arrive at a list as long as that offered posing is that the natural incentives that money mimic are
by Ainslie, though he basically argues that there need not just trading and play, but curiosity and power. Curiosity
not be any specific underlying motives, so we leave discus- seems to us to be rooted in the play instinct, so this does not
sion of his proposal to section R8. add to our synthetic account, though it might provide an
At the outset, too, it is important to note Mouras’s obser- alternative way of looking at it. Agassi’s emphasis on
vations on the neural correlates of monetary award. Mouras power, however, allies him with other commentators who
provides an fMRI perspective and reviews a range of see the major origin of money motivation in the drive to
imaging data to show that neural circuits linked to natural social status (e.g., Jorion, Kniffin; see also Dewitte’s
addictive/rewarding processes are involved in monetary idea that money serves as a signal for the intrinsic quality
reward. In other words, money has been found to induce of the owner). Dewitte argues for a second similar motiv-
brain activations in areas that overlap those induced by ation, the need for autonomy. Behrendt proposes that
cocaine, and several brain areas are involved in both the pursuit of money is a “culturally ritualised expression
monetary reward and sexual motivation. Studies have also of the aggressive instinct.” He further suggests that
shown different areas being activated at different phases money is used as a tool to obtain status, which in turn
of a task. What one can deduce from this (though this is allows the aggressive instinct to be expressed, and he
not spelled out by Mouras) is that money mimics a range suggests that the function of money may be related to sup-
of natural incentives, some of which are clearly “drug- pressed envy in a psychoanalytic sense. Kniffin argues that
like” in form (the cocaine example). If this is the case, status itself has many drug-like properties.
further fMRI work may help clarify what are the natural Status, power, and the desire for freedom from con-
incentives that money mimics. straint and control over one’s own behaviour and fate
Some of the commentators put forward objections to are certainly powerful human motivators, and money
our two proposed underlying instincts. Burghardt, for undoubtedly facilitates them in a modern society. But
example, argues on the one hand, that trading is not as we are not convinced that their links with money trans-
we suggested unique to humans, and on the other, that actions are direct enough for them to be plausible as the
the question of whether play is an independent motive is origins of money motivation. For an instinct to underlie
still open. We agree with both these arguments up to a money motivation, it is not enough for it to be strong:

there also has to be a reasonable evolutionary and histori- drug effect of money, we do welcome these alternative
cal pathway from it to the money motivation. Money is suggestions. The drug metaphor will have served its
directly concerned with trading, but only indirectly with purpose if it sparks an empirically driven debate about
power, status, or autonomy, and this is why we favour a the origins of the money motive, whatever conclusion
trading instinct as the most likely candidate to underlie that debate then comes to.
the money motive. As for Behrendt’s arguments from
Lorenzian drive-depletion theory and psychoanalysis, we
do not find these persuasive as general systems and R8. Some extensions
there seems no particular reason to apply them to money.
To us, the most interesting suggestion for an alternative Finally, we turn to some commentaries that take our basic
instinct on which the money motive might be based comes argument and seek to extend it. Ainslie’s thoughtful and
from Dewitte. Like us, he argues for multiple instincts insightful contribution argues that whilst money clearly
underlying the drug effect of money. We have noted his has an emotional value over and above its value in
argument for an autonomy instinct earlier, and we are exchange, this need not be linked to particular underlying
not persuaded by it. However, like us, Dewitte sees reci- instincts like play and reciprocal altruism (indeed, he
procation as also involved. But he makes the interesting believes this approach is unnecessarily specific). Second,
observation that giving and receiving, credit and debt, he claims that money gains its emotional power through
though logically interdependent, are not psychologically being authenticated as a “prize” – but that money is not
equivalent. This is undoubtedly true; when we first special in this respect. This is also true for a wide range
started to investigate the psychology of debt (see Lea of other facts through which we pace our emotions, such
et al. 1993), we expected it to be the mirror image of the as sporting feats or news items – in fact anything that is
psychology of saving (see Wärneryd 1999), but we found scarce, which links his view to that of Ascoli &
little relation between the two. Furthermore, Dewitte’s McCabe. They argue that scarcity is an excellent expla-
observation gains support from evidence cited by nation for the drug-like properties of money – but also
Mouras that monetary gain and loss have different neuro- for the drug-like properties of food and other generalised
physiological effects. However, we disagree with Dewitte’s reinforcers. Because both barter and food have been hard
interpretations of the observations he lists (which partly to obtain throughout human history, and because (cru-
depend on his idea that the key instinct for understanding cially) future availability of both is uncertain, it makes
money is the need for autonomy). To take in turn three of good sense that people are addicted (i.e., want too much
the observations he draws attention to: of) both food and money. In an affluent society, one con-
(a) The persistent asymmetry in monetary gifts sequence is that people eat more than is good for them
between parents and children, which Dewitte argues con- (they get obese and have shorter life expectancies) and
tinues until children gain psychological autonomy from (by extension) work more than is good for them to
their parents. We would argue that the asymmetry is obtain more money. This corresponds to our view that
based (in the first instance) simply on the fact that there money needs to be conceived of as a drug, but places
is an asymmetry between the amount of money parents emphasis on trading (barter) rather than play, and puts
and children have. If the relative financial situations are the ecology of early man (when barter was scarce) at the
reversed (as when a young adult wins the lottery), giving heart of the explanation. However, in an interesting
money to parents is perfectly acceptable. reverse of the conditioned reinforcement account, Ascoli
(b) Intrinsic savings motives, which Dewitte argues do & McCabe see money as a reinforcement for barter.
not make sense from a reciprocity perspective but are easily Like the operant psychologists, we would expect the
explained by a need for autonomy. A number of distinct relationship to run in the opposite direction.
savings motives have been identified. Some are indeed Both of these contributions seem to us to be valuable
related to autonomy: Canova et al. (2005) found that auton- extensions of our argument. As Romanowich et al.
omy was one of three superordinate goals for saving. But remind us, we have known since Premack (1965) that rela-
people also save in order to provide money for their chil- tive scarcity can turn anything into a reinforcer. However,
dren and in order to be able to lend money to friends we do want to defend the idea of looking for specific
(which makes a lot of sense from a reciprocity perspective). instincts on which the money motive is based, because
(c) Borrowing whilst owing money. We disagree with without that specificity Drug Theory becomes dangerously
Dewitte’s view that this is hard to understand from a reci- vague. It can also be argued that money is not a particu-
procity perspective. Since both borrowing and lending larly good prize, for some of the same reasons that it is
build up social networks and patterns of obligations, we not a particularly good gift: it is not special (i.e., scarce)
would expect people to both borrow and save. enough, even if it is difficult to acquire a lot of it.
Dewitte also argues that people are willing to live on Two commentaries suggest mechanisms that might
credit, and that this disagrees with the reciprocity principle. account for the drug effects of money. Chandrasekharan
However, this observation is at odds with the data mar- uses his concept of epistemic structure and shows how it
shalled by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) showing that could explain the origin of money and the tendency to
people generally prefer to prepay, at least for ephemeral acquire money, given a general “tiredness” or avoidance-
commodities, and hence that they like to keep their mental of-effort motive. This links well to the classic economic
accounts in credit. Prepay cards are in fact quite common, observation that money makes exchanges easier, which
though they usually occur in near-money situations such as we see as part of the tool account, but also explains how
pay-as-you-go cellphones or multi-trip transit tickets. something that provides epistemic structure might come
While we have explained here why we favour our to be independently valued. We are not convinced,
original hypothesis about the instincts supporting the however, that this adds more than some useful labels to

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Evolutionary psychology and functionally

Abstract: Lea & Webley’s (L&W’s) non-exclusive distinction between

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