Tactical Methods For Combatting Insurgencies: Monograph by Major Gregory Heritage Infantry
Tactical Methods For Combatting Insurgencies: Monograph by Major Gregory Heritage Infantry
Tactical Methods For Combatting Insurgencies: Monograph by Major Gregory Heritage Infantry
A Monograph
by
Major Gregory Heritage
Infantry
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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL
Approved by:
Monograph Director
Dr. Robert Berlin, Ph.D
Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies
Director, Graduate
Philip 6 . Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program
Accepted this
ABSTRACT
TACTICAL METHODS FOR COMBATING INSURGENCIES: ARE U.S.
ARMY LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS PREPARED?
This monograph assesses U.S. Army light infantry
battalions training for conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Military forces should be trained and ready
for counterinsurgency warfare because they might be
committed to fight in an insurgency.
Army training doctrine requires units to identify
their mission essential tasks and then train to execute
those tasks, The light infantry battalionsr mission
essential task lists are analyzed to determine if
training on those tasks prepares the infantry
battalions to conduct counterinsurgency operations.
The research methodology involved studying
revolutionary warfare, historical experiences,
counterinsurgency theory, and U.S. doctrine for
combatting insurgencies. An analysis based on the
nature of the insurgency and U.S. Army doctrine
determines the criteria used to evaluate the mission
essential tasks of the light infantry battalions.
Although training on the light infantry
battalions1 mission essential tasks prepare those units
for a conventional conflict, training on their mission
essential tasks will not prepare those units for
unconventional counterinsurgency warfare. The light
infantry battalions need additional training on
specified tasks and on the nature of insurgencies to
conduct counterinsurgency operations. The current
infantry battalions' mission essential task lists are
not comprehensive for counterinsurgency operations. The
battalions' mission essential task lists need
additional tasks such as cordon and search, search and
attack, area ambush, encirclement, movement security,
civil military operations, and training of indigenous
forces. U.S. Army light infantry battalions require
extensive training prior to commitment into
counterinsurgency warfare.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Title Page ........................................ i
Approval Sheet.................. ................. ii
Abstract .......................................... iii
Table of Contents......... ........................ iv
Introduction................ ...................... 1
A. Definitions
B. Light Battalion METL
C. ~ i r b o r n eBattalion METL
D. Ranger Battalion METL
Endnotes........................ ............... 42
Bibliography ..................................... 46
INTRODUCTION
2
in appendix A) are different from conventional
conflicts. Consequently, military units execute many
different mission tasks in an insurgency.
Insurgencies are not won by defeating the enemy on
the battlefield, rather they are won by alleviating the
causes of discontent among the population to achieve
popular support. Thus, popular support becomes the
ultimate goal, because without popular support the
insurgent can not survive. To achieve popular support
during an insurgency, political considerations dominate
strategy and tactics much more than during conventional
conflicts.'
Understanding the insurgent's methods of operation
remains important to analyzing mission essential tasks.
Counterinsurgency forces leadership must understand the
insurgent's strategies, tactics, strengths, and
weaknesses. Understanding the insurgent allows military
units to train more effectively and hopefully achieve
fewer casualties on the battlefield.
A country becomes vulnerable to insurrection due
to underlying social, economic, and political causes.
Insurgent leadership will use these underlying causes
to gain support for rebellion against the government.
The government's ability to solve these underlying
causes of discontent remains the key to success in an
insurgency. The insurgency continues to develop if the
government will not or can not alleviate the underlying
social, economic, and political causes of discontent.
There are three phases of development for an
insurgency.' First,is the latent and incipient phase
which includes the period the insurgent organizes,
prepares, and starts subversive and terrorist
a~tivities.~During this phase, counterinsurgency
forces may directly support police operations to defend
key installations, conduct riot control operations, and
conduct antiterrorist activitie~.~
Phase two is guerrilla warfare. The insurgent
deploys guerrilla forces within the country and
attempts to seize the military initiative. The
insurgent uses both terrorist and guerrilla force
operations to create an environment of instability and
force the legitimate government on the defensive.
During this phase counterinsurgency forces may continue
to support police operations and conduct
counterguerrilla operations.
Phase three is the war of movement and occurs when
the guerrilla achieves the necessary strength to
challenge government forces through direct military
confrontation. During this phase counterinsurgency
forces will conduct conventional operations to destroy
organized enemy forces. The insurgent requires popular
support to organize conventional forces and conduct a
war of movement.
Insurgent forces rely on popular support for
success and survival. Mao Tse-Tung stated, "we must
rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only
thus that we can have a guarantee of success."6 The
insurgent depends on the population for food, housing,
and intelligence information which protects insurgents
from government forces." Popular support allows the
insurgent to organize military forces and replace
casualties. The insurgent's survival often depends upon
a close bond with the population.
Success for government forces in this type of war
requires separating the insurgent from the population.
Isolating the insurgent from the population deprives
his forces of necessary supplies and information.
Without this critical support, the insurgent forces
become ineffective.' Consequently, counterinsurgency
forces may be assigned tasks to defend the population
which may include assisting police operations and
training local forces. If counterinsurgency forces can
win the allegiance of the population, the insurgent
becomes isolated.
Gaining allegiance of the population remains
essential in counterinsurgency warfare.' A population
that supports the government forces can provide the
necessary intelligence to conduct strike operations
allowing decisive destruction of insurgent field
forces. A supportive population can also provide
information about the insurgent organization allowing
government forces to eradicate the organization's
influence. Finally, a supportive populace can deny the
insurgents intelligence information and necessary
logistical support.
To achieve popular support, political
considerations affect military operations. Political
considerations govern strategy and tactics in
insurgencies. Mao Tse-Tung stated,
The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not
determined exclusively by military arts, but
depends above all on political consciousness,
political influence, setting in motion the broad
popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and
inducing the broad popular masses to accept our
leadership. All the plans of a guerrilla unit,
whether they be political, military, or of any
other nature, are all directed toward this single
end. 'O
The insurgent's strategy and tactics directly support
the political objectives designed to gain popular
support and increase political strength.
Counterinsurgency forces' military actions must
support the government's political goals that solve
underlying political, economic, and social issues.
Counterinsurgency forces must understand that military
operations by themselves will not defeat an insurgency.
U.S. Army doctrine states:
The successful counterinsurgent must realize that
6
the true nature of the threat to his government
lies in the insurgent's political strength, not in
his military power. Although the government must
contain the insurgent's armed elements,
concentration on the military aspect of the threat
does not address the real danger. Any strategy
that does not pay continuing, serious attention to
the political claims and demands of the insurgents
is severely handicapped."
16
fought conventionally often using armored thrusts
combined with airborne assaults to envelop and destroy
the Viet Minh in set piece battles. Bernard Fall, an
expert and author on the Vietnam wars who was killed
while accompanying an American patrol in South Vietnam,
observed that,
this desperate search for the set-piece battle
became an obsession of the successive French
commanders-in-chief in Indochina until the end of
the war."
Early in the War General Giap attempted to fight the
French in a series of conventional battles. Giap's
forces were soundly defeated. Giap then adopted a
protracted strategy of guerrilla warfare and avoided
large scale battles with French forces.% French
conventional tactics became unsuccessful because the
Viet Minh avoided large scale battles unless
concentration of their forces ensured success. The
powerful French war machine was shadow boxing by
throwing punches at an elusive target.
The French attempted to fight a conventional war
due to their training. They tried to fight the
Vietnamese according to French doctrine designed to
defeat an opposing conventional force. Thus, the French
became a victim of their training and previous war
experiences. The Viet Minh would not accommodate France
by fighting a conventional war which French forces were
fully capable of winning." French tactics adapted
17
slowly and they lost the war before they learned how to
fight it.%
The French used defensive tactics to combat the
insurgents and built extensive fortifications. Over 51
million cubic yards of concrete were used to build the
2,200 pillboxes in the "de Lattre Line.ff37
These
fortifications defended the eight million inhabitants
of the 7,500 square mile Red River delta."
However, these defensive fortifications failed to
hinder the Viet Minh forces. French defensive
operations were ineffective because the Viet Minh
infiltrated and bypassed French strong points.
Although the French immob.ilized more than 80,000 troops
in 900 defensive fortifications, the Viet Minh kept the
initiative within the Red River ~ e l t a . ~ ~
The Viet Minh subversive organization and military
forces controlled the Vietnamese people in the Red
River Delta. French defensive operations failed to
eradicate the Viet Minh organization that controlled
the population. Despite the presence of French forces
in fixed defensive positions, the Viet Minh
organization remained effective and hidden among the
people. Consequently, Viet Minh forces used the
population to provide logistical support and
replacements for casualties. Thus, Viet Minh forces
became stronger due to their control over the
population.
In contrast, French forces suffered attrition and
became weaker. French defensive dispositions
immobilized their forces and provided lucrative and
isolated targets for the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh
concentrated their forces and attacked the isolated
French outposts at their discretion. French casualties
increased as their units were attacked in detail.
French defensive operations proved ineffective
because the Viet Minh kept the initiative and
controlled the population. The Viet Minh control over
the population allowed resupply and replacements for
their forces. French forces, isolated and attacked
individually, suffered attrition. Yet, Viet Minh forces
continued to grow more powerful by the replacements
provided through their access to the population. French
offensive operations were as unsuccessful as their
defensive operations.
Offensive patrolling operations proved marginally
effective because the French patrols never eliminated
the insurgent's influence over the population. French
patrols effectively covered their area of operations,
but never provided long term presence. Thus, French
patrols never effectively challenged the Viet Minh's
control over the population. The patrols passed through
the area leaving the insurgent organization intact.
Often, when French patrols entered an area, Viet Minh
field forces would leave but immediately return to the
area after the French patrol left. The Viet Minh
organization remained in control of the populace.
For the same reasons French large unit search and
clear operations were also ineffective. Search and
clear operations failed to provide a permanent presence
controlling the population and allowing destruction of
the insurgent subversive organizati~n.~
The French
units advanced through the area and passed by. The Viet
Minh, true to Mao Tse-Tung's doctrine, retreated while
the enemy advanced. The Viet Minh returned after the
French forces left. Once again the temporary presence
of French forces would not eradicate the insurgent's
influence over the population.
Therefore, a valuable insight from the French
experience in Vietnam concerns search and hold
operations. Search and hold operations are essential to
successfully defeat an insurgency." The French
aggressively projected military power throughout
Vietnam attempting to destroy Viet Minh forces.
However, the French failed to provide a permanent
presence among the Vietnamese and eliminate the
insurgent subversive organization. Search and hold
operations establish a permanent presence in an area
allowing the destruction of the insurgent organization.
Because the Viet Minh subversive organization
controlled the population, their forces grew
increasingly powerful. They finally accepted a pitched
battle with French forces once they established
conditions to concentrate combat power at Dien Bien
Phu. Elite French forces were surrounded and decisively
defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The French War in Indochina
ended on 20 July, 1954. The French withdrew from
Vietnam leaving a legacy of combat experience.
A decade later, strong American forces began
fighting for South Vietnam. Attrition warfare became
American strategy during the Vietnam War. As General
Westmoreland, Commander of American Forces in Vietnam,
noted, "the U.S. military strategy employed in Vietnam,
dictated by political decisions, was essentially
that of a war of attrition.'1JZ America gradually
escalated into a protracted war of attrition during the
Vietnam War. American leadership accepted a strategy of
attrition against a determined opponent.
The American strategy of attrition warfare proved
ineffective because the American public never fully
supported the long Vietnam War. The American people
became unwilling to suffer the casualties from a
protracted war of attrition. Lieutenant General Harold
Moore states,
General Westmoreland thought he had found the
answer to the question of how to win this war: He
would trade one American life for ten or eleven or
twelve North Vietnamese lives, day after day,
until Ho Chi Minh cried uncle. Westmoreland would
learn, too late, that he was wrong; that the
American people didn't see a kill ratio of 10-1
or even 20-1 as any kind of bargain."
In contrast, the Vietnamese were willing to endure
great suffering to achieve final victory. Ho Chi Minh
stated,
If they force us into war, we will fight. The
struggle will be atrocious, but the Vietnamese
people will suffer anything rather than renounce
their freedom."
72,794 406
73,726 491"
26
tasks will not prepare those select units to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. These light battalions'
current mission essential task lists (METL) are missing
several essential tasks necessary for conducting
counterinsurgency operations.
The analytical process used to reach this
conclusion involved first developing criteria by
determining battalion counterinsurgency mission
essential tasks. This criteria was developed from
understanding the nature of the insurgency and the
insurgent, a historical perspective, and U.S. Arny low
intensity conflict doctrine. The next step in the
process involves identifying the current mission
essential tasks for a light, airborne, and ranger
battalion. The counterinsurgency mission essential
tasks serve as criteria to evaluate the light,
airborne, and ranger battalions mission essential
tasks.
Current U.S. Army doctrine uses the internal
defense and development strategy (IDAD) to fight an
insurgency. IDAD strategy includes all measures,
political, economic, social, and military to protect a
nation from subversion and improve the underlying
conditions that cause discontent." The IDAD principles
are unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence,
minimum use of violence, and responsive government."
'~nternaldefense and development strategy combines
military efforts with political and economic reforms to
prevent subversion while remedying underlying causes of
discontent.
The IDAD strategy includes consolidation campaigns
and strike operations. Consolidation campaigns apply
civil and military resources to establish and continue
control over designated areas.56 Consolidation
campaigns secure and hold designated areas. These
campaigns force the insurgents out of contested areas
and destroy the insurgent's subversive organization.
Local police and paramilitary forces are trained and
equipped to provide security thus preventing the
insurgent from returning. Consolidation campaigns
isolate the insurgent from the population and eradicate
the insurgent's control over the population.
Consolidation operations consist of preparatory,
offensive, development, and completion stages." The
civil-military task force prepares by planning and
gaining intelligence about the area of operations. The
police and military forces train for and rehearse the
operation.
During the offensive stage, the civil-military
task force conducts offensive operations to destroy
insurgent forces and the subversive organization. Thus,
counterinsurgent forces conduct a variety of missions
to include area ambushes, cordon and search operations,
and search and attack operations to destroy and
disperse insurgent forces." Concurrently, police and
military forces begin the process to identify and
arrest members of the insurgent organization.
Civil-military forces attempt to complete the
destruction of the insurgent subversive organization
during the developmental stage. Civil-military forces
establish government control and take action to ensure
internal ~ecurity.'~Operations continue to identify
and arrest members of the insurgent organization.
Military forces train local forces to provide a
permanent presence thus ensuring security in the area.
Concurrently, civil affairs operations improve the
people's living conditions. Living conditions may
improve by providing medical assistance, construction
support, and education reforms.
These efforts to improve the people's living
conditions continue during the completion stage as
military forces begin withdrawing leaving local forces
to defend the area. The local government expands
control and influence allowing the civil-military task
force to withdraw. The area becomes stabilized as the
civil-military task force takes action to improve
underlying social, economic, and political problems.
Strike operations often establish the conditions
for consolidation campaigns by attacking insurgent
forces in contested, or insurgent-controlled areas.60
Strike forces can include military, psychological
warfare, civil affairs, and often host nation police or
paramilitary forces. Offensive strikes missions may
include area ambushes, movement to contact, search and
attack, air assault, cordon and search, and
encirclement operations.
A comprehensive mission essential task list that
supports internal defense and development strategy,
consolidation campaigns, and strike operations would
include the following tasks:
Counterinsurqencv Force Battalion METL
Conduct area ambush
Conduct attack (hasty, deliberate, night)
Search and attack
Cordon and search
Defend
Raid
Movement to contact
Conduct military operations in urban terrain
Air Assault
Conduct encirclement
Movement security operations
Conduct combined military-police operations
Train indigenous forces
Conduct civil military operations
Protect the rear area
Conduct combat service support operations (CSS)
The light, airborne, and ranger battalion mission
essential task lists were developed by the battalion
commanders after analyzing their war plans and external
directives. The light battalion (appendix B) and
airborne battalion (appendix C) METLs were provided by
the 25th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Infantry divisions.
The 75th Ranger Regiment provided their battalion METL
(appendix D). All the METLs are current as of December,
Liaht Battalion
Execute readiness standard operating procedures
Move tactically
Assault
Defend
Conduct Non-combatant evacuation
Fight a meeting engagement
Perform air assault
Perform CSS operations
Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief6'
Airborne Battalion
Alert, marshal, and deploy
Airborne assault/Airfield seizure
Movement to contact/Hasty attack
Search and'attack
Deliberate attack
Night attack
Noncombatant evacuation operations
Military operations in urban terrain
Defend in sector/Anti-armor defense
Air assault operations
Link-up operations
Man, maintain, resupply, and transport
Protect the rear area
Marshal and redeploy62
Ranaer Battalion
Deploy the battalion
Conduct raid
Conduct relief in place
Conduct airborne assault
Conduct air assault
Conduct hasty defensea
Comparing and contrasting these light battalions'
METLs to the proposed counterinsurgency METL reveals
significant differences with mission tasks.
Counterinsuraencv METL Liaht Airborne Ranaer
Area ambush NO * NO NO
Attack Yes* Yes No
Search-attack NO Yes No
Cordon-search NO NO NO
Defend Yes Yes Yes
Raid NO No Yes
Move to contact Yes Yes No
Air Assault Yes Yes Yes
Encirclement NO NO NO
Movement security No NO NO
Military-police opns NO NO NO
Train indigenous forces No NO NO
Civil military opns Yes NO NO
Protect the rear area Yes Yes NO
CONCLUSIONS
Insurgencies are different from conventional wars
and require innovative approaches to defeat the
insurgent. Traditional military training can hinder
innovative approaches for conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Military forces using traditional concepts
for concentrating combat power for decisive battles may
leave the insurgent organization intact and in control
of the population.
39
The insurgent subversive organization must be
destroyed. This organization provides logistical
support, intelligence, and replacements for insurgent
forces. Thus, the insurgent depends on the organization
for survival and a protracted war of attrition can
occur unless the subversive organization's control over
the population is eradicated.
Allegiance of the population to the legitimate
government is the key to success in an insurgency. The
government's ability to gain popular support and
legitimacy determines success. U.S. Army doctrine
emphasizes internal defense and development to gain
popular support and combat the insurgency.
Internal defense and development strategy uses
the full spectrum of power to include military,
economic, and political measures to correct the
underlying causes of discontent. Strike operations and
consolidation campaigns support internal defense and
development.
A counterinsurgency force mission essential task
list to support strike operations and consolidation
campaigns includes tasks such as area ambushes, search
and attack, cordon and search, raid, encirclement,
movement security, combined military-police operations,
training indigenous forces, and civil affairs. These
tasks are significantly different from the tasks
currently expressed in the light infantry battalions1
mission essential task lists.
The light, airborne, and ranger battalion mission
essential task lists help prepare those units for
conventional combat operations. However, training on
their current mission essential tasks will not prepare
these units for counterinsurgency operations. The
infantry battalion mission essential task lists are not
comprehensive for counterinsurgency operations.
Military leaders must recognize that U.S. Army
infantry battalions are untrained to immediately deploy
and fight in an insurgency. The light battalions
require additional training for counterinsurgency
war-re. Including counterinsurgency tasks on the
infantry battalions' mission essential task lists would
improve the units1 capabilities to conduct contingency
operations.
ENDNOTES
1. Ronald Schaffer, Small Wars Manual, (Manhattan,
Kansas, 1972) p. V.
2. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-20. Militarv Overations in
Low Intensitv Conflict,(Washington D.C., December, 1990)
p.1-5.
3. U.S. Army, FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla
Overations,(Washington D.C., August, 1986) p. 1-3.
4. Ibid., p.1-4.
5. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare ,(London, England,
1964) p.18. Field Manual 90-8 Counterauerrilla
Overations, p. 3-21.
6. Mao Tse-tung, Basic Tactics, (New York, 1966), p. 57.
7 . Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weavon, (Novato, CA.,
1982) p. 29.
8. Field Manual 100-20, Militarv Overations in Low
Intensitv Conflict, p. 2-13.
-. 9. FM 90-8. Counterauerrilla Overations, p. 1-4.
Thomas Thayer, p . 1 0 4 .
Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation, (Boston, 1 9 8 5 ) p.
257.
Kellet specifies the causes of casuaties between 1965-
1970.
Svstem Deaths Wounds
Small Arms 5 1%
Artillery 36%
Traps/Mines 11%
Punji Stakes
52. Robert Thompson, p. 8 8 .
53. Ibid., p. 8 8 .
54. FM 100-20 Militarv Owerations in Low Intensitv
Conflict, p. 6-5.
55. Ibid., p. E-2.
56. FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p: 3-13.
FM 100-20 Militarv Operations in Low Intensltv Conflict,
p.E-5.
57.FM 100-20 Militarv Operations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-4.
FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p.3-14.
58. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensitv
Conflicts, p.E-5.
59. Ibid., p. E-6.
60. Ibid., E-6.
61. 25th Infantry Division, Battalion METL, 7 December,
1992.
62. 82nd Airborne Division, Battalion METL, 4 December,
1992.
63. 75th Ranger Regiment, Battalion METL, 7 December,
1992.
64. General Julian J. Ewell, Sharvenina the Combat Edae,
(Washington D.C., 1974) p.120.
65. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensity
Conflicts, p. E-5.
66. FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p.3-17.
67. FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p. G-1.
68. Ibid., G-13.
69. Ibid., p. 3-16.
70. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p.E-8.
FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p. G-5.
71. FM 100-20 Militarv Oaeration in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-6.
72. Ibid., p. H-16.
73. FM 100-20 Militarv Oaerations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-9.
FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p. H-11.
74. FM 100-20 Military O~erations in Low Intensity
Conflicts, p. E-9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
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Clarke, Jeffrey., United States Armv in Vietnam. Advice
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Fall, Bernard., Last Reflections on a War. Garden
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Fall, Bernard., Street Without Jov. New York:
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Farmer, James., Counterinsuruencv: Princiwles and
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Frost, Frank., Australia's War in Vietnam. Sydney,
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Greene, T.N., The Guerrilla and How to Fiaht Him. New
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Galula, David., Counter-Insuraencv Warfare Theorv and
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Guevara, Che., Guerrilla Warfare. Cambridge, Mass:
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Hackworth, David., About Face. New York: Simon and
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Herrington, Stuart., Silence Was a Wea~on.Novato, CA:
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Ho Chi Minh., On Revolution. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger., 1967.
Karnow, Stanley., Vietnam A Historv. New York:
Penguin Books., 1984.
Krauss, Clifford., Inside Central America. New York:
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Krepinevich, Andrew, F., The Armv and Vietnam.
Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University
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Manwaring, Max, G., El Salvador at War. Washington DC:
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Mao Tse-tung., Basic Tactics. New York, NY: Frederick
A. Praeger., 1966.
McCuen, John J., The Art of Counter-Revolutionarv War.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackploe Books., 1972.
Moore, Harold., We Were Soldiers Once and Young. New
York: Random House., 1992.
Paget Julian., Counter-Insuraencv Overations. New York:
Walker and Company., 1967.
Palmer, Richard Dave.! Summons of the Trumvet. San
Rafael, California: Presidio Press., 1978.
Pike, Douglas., w. Novato, CA: Presidio Press,,
1986.
*. T
.T' T
P 'I!
P T
NIQXT A'MACK P 4
NONCOMBA'LANT EVACLhTZON OPERATIONS T P '
ENCCOBURE 1
2-5. uissfon i%.sentiai ask LZst (me). Definitions: The METL
is r compilation of s o l l a d v e mission essential tasks Which must
be ~ ~ a a ~ r u lperformed
ly if aa organization is to accomplilh its
wartime mission(6). A U s i o n Essential Task is a collective
task in whion an organization'must be proficient to accomplish an
appropriate portion oL its wartine nission(s). figure 2-3
depicts ME Ranger
.
Reqimcnt's METI,.