Tactical Methods For Combatting Insurgencies: Monograph by Major Gregory Heritage Infantry

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/Tactical Methods For Combatting Insurgencies\

A Monograph
by
Major Gregory Heritage
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies


United States A r m y Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 92-93
Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMS No 0704-0188 /

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i_
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Maior Greaorv Heritaae

Title of Monograph: Tactical Methods for Combating


Insuraencies: Are U.S. Armv Liaht Infantrv Battalions
Prewared?

Approved by:

Monograph Director
Dr. Robert Berlin, Ph.D

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies

Director, Graduate
Philip 6 . Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this
ABSTRACT
TACTICAL METHODS FOR COMBATING INSURGENCIES: ARE U.S.
ARMY LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS PREPARED?
This monograph assesses U.S. Army light infantry
battalions training for conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Military forces should be trained and ready
for counterinsurgency warfare because they might be
committed to fight in an insurgency.
Army training doctrine requires units to identify
their mission essential tasks and then train to execute
those tasks, The light infantry battalionsr mission
essential task lists are analyzed to determine if
training on those tasks prepares the infantry
battalions to conduct counterinsurgency operations.
The research methodology involved studying
revolutionary warfare, historical experiences,
counterinsurgency theory, and U.S. doctrine for
combatting insurgencies. An analysis based on the
nature of the insurgency and U.S. Army doctrine
determines the criteria used to evaluate the mission
essential tasks of the light infantry battalions.
Although training on the light infantry
battalions1 mission essential tasks prepare those units
for a conventional conflict, training on their mission
essential tasks will not prepare those units for
unconventional counterinsurgency warfare. The light
infantry battalions need additional training on
specified tasks and on the nature of insurgencies to
conduct counterinsurgency operations. The current
infantry battalions' mission essential task lists are
not comprehensive for counterinsurgency operations. The
battalions' mission essential task lists need
additional tasks such as cordon and search, search and
attack, area ambush, encirclement, movement security,
civil military operations, and training of indigenous
forces. U.S. Army light infantry battalions require
extensive training prior to commitment into
counterinsurgency warfare.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Title Page ........................................ i
Approval Sheet.................. ................. ii
Abstract .......................................... iii
Table of Contents......... ........................ iv
Introduction................ ...................... 1

Nature of the Insurgency ......................... 3

Analyzing Historical Experiences .................. 16

Analyzing Mission Essential Task Lists.. .......... 27


Conclusions..... .................................. 40
Appendixes: -.

A. Definitions
B. Light Battalion METL
C. ~ i r b o r n eBattalion METL
D. Ranger Battalion METL
Endnotes........................ ............... 42
Bibliography ..................................... 46
INTRODUCTION

American military forces have a long association


with revolutionary.warfare. During the American
Revolution, George Washington sent General Nathanael
Greene to North Carolina in December 1780 to lead
Continental troops and militia in unconventional
warfare against the British. Between 1898 and 1934 the
U.S. Marines fought a series of small wars in Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Honduras, Mexico, Guam, Samoa, China,
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.' From 1898 to
1902, American forces fought in the Philippines. The

American military thus has an extensive history of


fighting unconventional wars.
Despite this significant historical experience in
unconventional warfare, American military forces were
unsuccessful defeating the communist insurgency in
Vietnam from 1964 to 1973. The Vietnam experience may
have taught America's political leadership to avoid
committing conventional forces to counterinsurgency
warfare. Yet, this is a strategic lesson, not a
tactical lesson. Military leaders must learn the
tactical lessons of conducting counterinsurgency
operations because they are responsible to ensure
soldiers are trained to fight.
U.S. Army training doctrine requires units to
identify their mission essential tasks based on the
commander's analysis of war plans and external
directives. Units then train to execute these
designated mission essential tasks.
Consequently, unit commanders allocate resources to
insure units train to standard on mission essential
tasks. The proper identification of mission essential
tasks and training to standard helps insure military
units are prepared to fight.
This monograph answers the question, does
training on current mission essential tasks prepare
U.S. Army light infantry battalions to conduct counter-
insurgency operations? Accordingly, this monograph
analyzes the nature of insurgencies and the insurgent.
A historical perspective of French and American
experiences in Vietnam provides insight concerning
practical application of counterinsurgency tactics.
Finally, the mission essential task lists of a
airborne, ranger, and light infantry battalions are
analyzed to determine if those tasks prepare the units
for counterinsurgency warfare.

NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY


A critical analysis of mission essential task lists
requires knowledge about the nature of the insurgency
and the insurgent because insurgencies (see definitions

2
in appendix A) are different from conventional
conflicts. Consequently, military units execute many
different mission tasks in an insurgency.
Insurgencies are not won by defeating the enemy on
the battlefield, rather they are won by alleviating the
causes of discontent among the population to achieve
popular support. Thus, popular support becomes the
ultimate goal, because without popular support the
insurgent can not survive. To achieve popular support
during an insurgency, political considerations dominate
strategy and tactics much more than during conventional
conflicts.'
Understanding the insurgent's methods of operation
remains important to analyzing mission essential tasks.
Counterinsurgency forces leadership must understand the
insurgent's strategies, tactics, strengths, and
weaknesses. Understanding the insurgent allows military
units to train more effectively and hopefully achieve
fewer casualties on the battlefield.
A country becomes vulnerable to insurrection due
to underlying social, economic, and political causes.
Insurgent leadership will use these underlying causes
to gain support for rebellion against the government.
The government's ability to solve these underlying
causes of discontent remains the key to success in an
insurgency. The insurgency continues to develop if the
government will not or can not alleviate the underlying
social, economic, and political causes of discontent.
There are three phases of development for an
insurgency.' First,is the latent and incipient phase
which includes the period the insurgent organizes,
prepares, and starts subversive and terrorist
a~tivities.~During this phase, counterinsurgency
forces may directly support police operations to defend
key installations, conduct riot control operations, and
conduct antiterrorist activitie~.~
Phase two is guerrilla warfare. The insurgent
deploys guerrilla forces within the country and
attempts to seize the military initiative. The
insurgent uses both terrorist and guerrilla force
operations to create an environment of instability and
force the legitimate government on the defensive.
During this phase counterinsurgency forces may continue
to support police operations and conduct
counterguerrilla operations.
Phase three is the war of movement and occurs when
the guerrilla achieves the necessary strength to
challenge government forces through direct military
confrontation. During this phase counterinsurgency
forces will conduct conventional operations to destroy
organized enemy forces. The insurgent requires popular
support to organize conventional forces and conduct a
war of movement.
Insurgent forces rely on popular support for
success and survival. Mao Tse-Tung stated, "we must
rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only
thus that we can have a guarantee of success."6 The
insurgent depends on the population for food, housing,
and intelligence information which protects insurgents
from government forces." Popular support allows the
insurgent to organize military forces and replace
casualties. The insurgent's survival often depends upon
a close bond with the population.
Success for government forces in this type of war
requires separating the insurgent from the population.
Isolating the insurgent from the population deprives
his forces of necessary supplies and information.
Without this critical support, the insurgent forces
become ineffective.' Consequently, counterinsurgency
forces may be assigned tasks to defend the population
which may include assisting police operations and
training local forces. If counterinsurgency forces can
win the allegiance of the population, the insurgent
becomes isolated.
Gaining allegiance of the population remains
essential in counterinsurgency warfare.' A population
that supports the government forces can provide the
necessary intelligence to conduct strike operations
allowing decisive destruction of insurgent field
forces. A supportive population can also provide
information about the insurgent organization allowing
government forces to eradicate the organization's
influence. Finally, a supportive populace can deny the
insurgents intelligence information and necessary
logistical support.
To achieve popular support, political
considerations affect military operations. Political
considerations govern strategy and tactics in
insurgencies. Mao Tse-Tung stated,
The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not
determined exclusively by military arts, but
depends above all on political consciousness,
political influence, setting in motion the broad
popular masses, disintegrating the enemy army, and
inducing the broad popular masses to accept our
leadership. All the plans of a guerrilla unit,
whether they be political, military, or of any
other nature, are all directed toward this single
end. 'O
The insurgent's strategy and tactics directly support
the political objectives designed to gain popular
support and increase political strength.
Counterinsurgency forces' military actions must
support the government's political goals that solve
underlying political, economic, and social issues.
Counterinsurgency forces must understand that military
operations by themselves will not defeat an insurgency.
U.S. Army doctrine states:
The successful counterinsurgent must realize that
6
the true nature of the threat to his government
lies in the insurgent's political strength, not in
his military power. Although the government must
contain the insurgent's armed elements,
concentration on the military aspect of the threat
does not address the real danger. Any strategy
that does not pay continuing, serious attention to
the political claims and demands of the insurgents
is severely handicapped."

Military forces support political goals by ensuring a


secure environment allowing the government to improve
the living conditions for the populace. Participation
by military forces in civil affairs operations can
directly improve living conditions for the people.
Political objectives may also dictate rules of
engagement that are often necessary to win popular
support. The population becomes alienated when
excessive use of firepower results in civilian
casualties and damage to private property.
To develop this popular support, the insurgent
will use propaganda. General Giap, Commander of the
North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War, stated,
Therefore, to make good preparations for armed
insurrection, the most essential and important
task was to make propaganda among the masses and
organize them to develop and consolidate the
organizations for national salvati~n.'~
Ho Chi Minh's revolution in Vietnam began in 1946 by
sending out cadres of people using propaganda to
influence the people and develop a political support
base. Insurgents try to rally the population around
legitimate issues which especially appeal to the
younger generation. For example, fighting colonialism
was the cause used by insurgents in Vietnam, Algeria,
and Malaysia to encourage popular support. Insurgents
attempted to influence people by developing political
groups among the populace and gradually convincing
people that communism could resolve political issues.
Insurgent forces develop close bonds with the
population to gain popular support. General Giap issued
the following instructions to his soldiers in Vietnam:
In contacts with the people: Respect the people;
help the people; defend the people in order to win
their confidence and affection and achieve a
perfect understanding between the people and the
Army.'3
Insurgent soldiers develop popular support by
respecting and helping the people, or at least creating
the perception that they are helping.
Hence, the counterinsurgent must also respect the
people and avoid breaches of discipline.
Insurgent forces take advantage of discipline lapses of
counterinsurgency forces. Mao Tse-Tung states,
A guerrilla unit should pay particular attention
to all the atrocities of the enemy, and to all the
instances in which he massacres our Army or our
people, and carry out propaganda...I4

Any perceived or real atrocity committed by


counterinsurgency forces will be used for propaganda
purposes. Counterinsurgency forces must instill high
standards of discipline within their forces to avoid
incidents that alienate the people.
When the insurgent cannot use propaganda to
achieve popular support, then the insurgent may use
terrorism to coerce support from the population. The
purposes of terrorism include: coercing support from
the population, demonstrating the government's
weaknesses and inability to provide security, and
encouraging the legitimate government to implement '

severe security measures that alienate the populace."


Terrorism is effective and difficult to prevent. During
the Malayan insurgency 3,283 civilians were abducted or
murdered; In Vietnam, estimates of civilians abducted
or murdered exceed 25,000 people just between 1956 and
1965.16 By killing so many people, the terrorist

creates an environment of disorder and instability.


The nation's people lose faith in a government that
cannot provide security and may then support the
insurgent out of fear. Thus, terrorism becomes an
effective method to force people's support of the
insurgency.
To prevent the rise of terrorism and instability,
counterinsurgency forces require training .on
antiterrorist measures. They must take defensive
actions to protect the population from terrorist
acts." Antiterrorist training includes measures to
protect installations, military units, and key
personnel. Counterinsurgency forces may conduct
counterterrorism operations which are offensive
measures to strike at terrorist organizations if Army
special operation forces cannot respond immediately.
Thus, counterinsurgency forces require training on
antiterrorist and counterterrorist measures.
Often, the insurgent's subversive organization
directs the terrorist attacks. The insurgent
organization controls the population and provides
insurgent forces with the necessary support to conduct
combat operations. Robert Thompson, a former British
military officer who gained expertise during the
Malayan Insurgency and subsequently advised General
Westmoreland in Vietnam, states,
Unless the communist subversive political
organization in the towns and villages is broken
and eliminated, the insurgent guerilla units
will not be defeated. If the guerrillas can be
isolated from the population, i.e. the 'little
fishes'removed from the \water1,then their
eventual destruction becomes auto ma ti^.'^
The insurgent organization conducts the propaganda
campaign, provides intelligence, logistical support,
and replacements for combat losses. This organization
lives among the people and directs the terrorist acts.
Therefore, the destruction of the insurgent's
organization among the people remains essential for
suc~ess.'~
Government military forces may soundly
defeat insurgent forces on the battlefield; however,
the insurgent forces will then retreat and the
organization will provide logistical support and
personnel to regenerate fighting capability. Thus, the
insurgent's organization that controls the population
requires destruction. This insurgent subversive
organization provides the means to implement the
insurgent's strategy.
The insurgent strategy seeks protracted war and
avoids decisive battles. The insurgent attempts to gain
the advantage of time by conducting protracted warfare
and concurrently extending control over the population
thus increasing his strength. General Giap used a
protracted strategy against the French and Americans."
The North Vietnamese fought a war of exhaustion
suffering extreme losses while inflicting unacceptable
casualties on the French and ~mericans." Insurgent
forces use a strategy of protracted warfare avoiding
decisive combat while gradually attriting government
forces.
Insurgent tactics support the strategy
protracted warfare. Mao Tse-Tung advises,
the enemy advances, we retreat,
the enemy retreats, we advance,
the enemy halts, we harass him.22
The insurgent executes carefully planned and rehearsed
operations after obtaining detailed intelligence. The
ambush becomes the preferred tactic because it allows
surprise and defeats the enemy with minimal losses to
the insurgent. The insurgent avoids conventional
battles unless concentration of their forces allows
victory.
Conventional thrusts by miliary forces into
insurgent controlled areas are often indecisive. The
guerrilla retreats and avoids contact except for
delaying forces. Insurgents use booby traps to inflict
casualties. By avoiding decisive battles, the insurgent
conserves his forces while gradually attriting their
enemy, thus eroding the will to fight. The following
example illustrates the insurgent's tactics of avoiding
battle by fading away while inflicting casualties on
government forces. The 3rd brigade of the 1st Cavalry
division air assaulted into the Bong Son plain on 28
January, 1966. The brigade suffered 82 men killed and
318 men wounded to liberate Bong Son.U The Viet Cong
were forced out of the area but returned to Bong Son
within one week of the American unit's departure. This
example demonstrates that conventional tactics
attempting to destroy enemy forces in decisive battles
will not defeat an insurgency.
The insurgent forces are vulnerable to defeat if
external military support is interdicted. External
military support provided by sympathetic countries is
usually necessary for the insurgent to achieve his
aims. The successful insurgencies since World War I1
required external support to win." The military
support provided by the Soviets and Chinese during the
Vietnam War allowed the North Vietnamese Army to
suc~eed.~
During the Vietnam War, the French failed
to interdict the Viet Minh supplies of arms and
ammunition. Consequently, Viet Minh forces using modern
Soviet supplied weapons often achieved greater
firepower than French forces at the tactical level. As
a result, French forces suffered higher casualties in
combat while Viet Minh forces increased strength.
In contrast to the their experience in Vietnam,
the French successfully interdicted the insurgent's
supplies of arms and ammunition during the Algerian
insurrection. By 1959, the insurgent's supplies were
critically depleted.26 Successfully interdicting the
insurgent's external supplies prevents the insurgent
from developing effective forces and increasing his
strength.
Insurgent forces often have several strengths that
provide advantages to their forces. The insurgent
strives to develop an effective intelligence network to
provide information about government forces. This
intelligence network allows insurgent forces to seize
the initiative by attacking under favorable
circumstances. Another insurgent strength often
includes knowledge of the terrain. This knowledge helps
the insurgent to successfully execute tactical missions
while minimizing his casualties. Insurgent soldier
strengths often include motivation, discipline, and
physical c~nditioning.~
These strengths often help
create insurgent forces that are tough and determined
in combat.
To defeat a tough and determined opponent, the
enemy's weaknesses must be exploited. Insurgent forces
often have exploitable weaknesses that increase their
vulnerability. These weaknesses often include limited
access to technology. Specifically, a lack of modern
communications capabilities often hinder insurgent
operationsiZ8This weakness deserves attention, because
insurgent forces lacking communication capabilities are
often vulnerable to a mobile and versatile opposing
force.
Another exploitable insurgent weakness is
logistical support owing to the lack of extensive
popular and external support early in the conflict.29
Resupply of food can become particularly difficult for
insurgent forces. Che Guevara, who served as a
guerrilla leader during the Cuban revolution, states,
One of the fundamental problems of the troop is
food supply; in this everyone from the last man to
the chief must be treated alike. This acquires a
high importance, not only because of the chronic
shortage of suppplies, but also because meals are
the only events that take place daily.M
Lack of food is a weakness counterinsurgency
forces can exploit by keeping military pressure on
enemy field units while protecting the population's
food supply.
Another insurgent weakness is the resupply of
ammunition." Early in the conflict, the insurgent
forces often rely on captured government forces arms
and ammunition. Thus, adequate supplies become
dependent on success in battle. As the insurgent forces
equipment becomes sophisticated, continuous resupply of
arms and ammunition becomes critical. These supplies
are delivered through lines of communication. Resupply
becomes an exploitable weakness because
counterinsurgency forces can establish ambushes that
interdict the enemy lines of communications. Thus area
ambushes are essential tasks for counterinsurgency
forces.
To analyze mission essential task lists, one must
comprehend the nature of the insurgency and the
insurgent. Insurgencies require innovative approaches
because of the political nature of the conflict. The
government must solve the underlying political,
economic, and social problems to gain popular support.
The insurgent relies on popular support for success and
survival. Consequently, the insurgent must be separated
from the population. To accomplish this, government
forces must defeat the enemy on the battlefield and
eradicate the insurgent organization among the people.
Thus, counterinsurgency forces must adapt their tactics
in insurgencies. In Vietnam, French and American
conventional forces fought the insurgents without
significantly adapting their traditional strategies and
tactics.

ANALYZING HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES


The French and American experiences in Vietnam
provide a historical perspective to understand the
practical application of counterinsurgency operations.
Although all insurgencies are different, the
experiences of French and American soldiers provide
insight concerning tactical methods to combat
insurgents.
France fought to dominate Vietnam from 1946 to
1954. French Union forces which included Foreign
Legionnaires, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians,
Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese fought heroically
but unsuccessfully for eight years. Nearly 95,000
French Union soldiers lost their lives." Francee's
tragic experience provides a historical perspective for
counterinsurgency forces.
French strategy and tactics sought decisive
battles to destroy Viet Minh forces. French forces

16
fought conventionally often using armored thrusts
combined with airborne assaults to envelop and destroy
the Viet Minh in set piece battles. Bernard Fall, an
expert and author on the Vietnam wars who was killed
while accompanying an American patrol in South Vietnam,
observed that,
this desperate search for the set-piece battle
became an obsession of the successive French
commanders-in-chief in Indochina until the end of
the war."
Early in the War General Giap attempted to fight the
French in a series of conventional battles. Giap's
forces were soundly defeated. Giap then adopted a
protracted strategy of guerrilla warfare and avoided
large scale battles with French forces.% French
conventional tactics became unsuccessful because the
Viet Minh avoided large scale battles unless
concentration of their forces ensured success. The
powerful French war machine was shadow boxing by
throwing punches at an elusive target.
The French attempted to fight a conventional war
due to their training. They tried to fight the
Vietnamese according to French doctrine designed to
defeat an opposing conventional force. Thus, the French
became a victim of their training and previous war
experiences. The Viet Minh would not accommodate France
by fighting a conventional war which French forces were
fully capable of winning." French tactics adapted
17
slowly and they lost the war before they learned how to
fight it.%
The French used defensive tactics to combat the
insurgents and built extensive fortifications. Over 51
million cubic yards of concrete were used to build the
2,200 pillboxes in the "de Lattre Line.ff37
These
fortifications defended the eight million inhabitants
of the 7,500 square mile Red River delta."
However, these defensive fortifications failed to
hinder the Viet Minh forces. French defensive
operations were ineffective because the Viet Minh
infiltrated and bypassed French strong points.
Although the French immob.ilized more than 80,000 troops
in 900 defensive fortifications, the Viet Minh kept the
initiative within the Red River ~ e l t a . ~ ~
The Viet Minh subversive organization and military
forces controlled the Vietnamese people in the Red
River Delta. French defensive operations failed to
eradicate the Viet Minh organization that controlled
the population. Despite the presence of French forces
in fixed defensive positions, the Viet Minh
organization remained effective and hidden among the
people. Consequently, Viet Minh forces used the
population to provide logistical support and
replacements for casualties. Thus, Viet Minh forces
became stronger due to their control over the
population.
In contrast, French forces suffered attrition and
became weaker. French defensive dispositions
immobilized their forces and provided lucrative and
isolated targets for the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh
concentrated their forces and attacked the isolated
French outposts at their discretion. French casualties
increased as their units were attacked in detail.
French defensive operations proved ineffective
because the Viet Minh kept the initiative and
controlled the population. The Viet Minh control over
the population allowed resupply and replacements for
their forces. French forces, isolated and attacked
individually, suffered attrition. Yet, Viet Minh forces
continued to grow more powerful by the replacements
provided through their access to the population. French
offensive operations were as unsuccessful as their
defensive operations.
Offensive patrolling operations proved marginally
effective because the French patrols never eliminated
the insurgent's influence over the population. French
patrols effectively covered their area of operations,
but never provided long term presence. Thus, French
patrols never effectively challenged the Viet Minh's
control over the population. The patrols passed through
the area leaving the insurgent organization intact.
Often, when French patrols entered an area, Viet Minh
field forces would leave but immediately return to the
area after the French patrol left. The Viet Minh
organization remained in control of the populace.
For the same reasons French large unit search and
clear operations were also ineffective. Search and
clear operations failed to provide a permanent presence
controlling the population and allowing destruction of
the insurgent subversive organizati~n.~
The French
units advanced through the area and passed by. The Viet
Minh, true to Mao Tse-Tung's doctrine, retreated while
the enemy advanced. The Viet Minh returned after the
French forces left. Once again the temporary presence
of French forces would not eradicate the insurgent's
influence over the population.
Therefore, a valuable insight from the French
experience in Vietnam concerns search and hold
operations. Search and hold operations are essential to
successfully defeat an insurgency." The French
aggressively projected military power throughout
Vietnam attempting to destroy Viet Minh forces.
However, the French failed to provide a permanent
presence among the Vietnamese and eliminate the
insurgent subversive organization. Search and hold
operations establish a permanent presence in an area
allowing the destruction of the insurgent organization.
Because the Viet Minh subversive organization
controlled the population, their forces grew
increasingly powerful. They finally accepted a pitched
battle with French forces once they established
conditions to concentrate combat power at Dien Bien
Phu. Elite French forces were surrounded and decisively
defeated at Dien Bien Phu. The French War in Indochina
ended on 20 July, 1954. The French withdrew from
Vietnam leaving a legacy of combat experience.
A decade later, strong American forces began
fighting for South Vietnam. Attrition warfare became
American strategy during the Vietnam War. As General
Westmoreland, Commander of American Forces in Vietnam,
noted, "the U.S. military strategy employed in Vietnam,
dictated by political decisions, was essentially
that of a war of attrition.'1JZ America gradually
escalated into a protracted war of attrition during the
Vietnam War. American leadership accepted a strategy of
attrition against a determined opponent.
The American strategy of attrition warfare proved
ineffective because the American public never fully
supported the long Vietnam War. The American people
became unwilling to suffer the casualties from a
protracted war of attrition. Lieutenant General Harold
Moore states,
General Westmoreland thought he had found the
answer to the question of how to win this war: He
would trade one American life for ten or eleven or
twelve North Vietnamese lives, day after day,
until Ho Chi Minh cried uncle. Westmoreland would
learn, too late, that he was wrong; that the
American people didn't see a kill ratio of 10-1
or even 20-1 as any kind of bargain."
In contrast, the Vietnamese were willing to endure
great suffering to achieve final victory. Ho Chi Minh
stated,
If they force us into war, we will fight. The
struggle will be atrocious, but the Vietnamese
people will suffer anything rather than renounce
their freedom."

Despite the loss of a generation of men, the North


Vietnamese continued to fight.
American tactics supported the attrition strategy.
American units arrived and prepared to fight a
conventional conflict. To minimize casualties, American
tactics relied on firepower to destroy the enemy. For
example, the 1st Infantry division fundamentals of
infantry tactics in Vietnam emphasized that infantry,
armor, and aviation find the enemy so air and artillery
assets could kill the enemy.45 American tactics
supported attrition warfare using firepower to destroy
enemy forces and save American lives.
American firepower effectively killed enemy
soldiers. By 1972 there were an estimated at 851,000
communist soldiers killed by Allied and American forces
in vietnam." The North Vietnamese field commander in
South Vietnam, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, complained
22
bitterly that General Giap should minimize okfensive
operations due to excessive casualties." Ironically,
General Nguyen Chi Thanh was killed in an American B-52
airstrike.
Although firepower provided significant advantages
to American forces, there are limitations to the
effectiveness of firepower. American tactical units
allowed firepower to substitute for maneuver.48
American forces surrendered maneuver to the enemy by
avoiding closing with and destroying the enemy units.
Instead, American units often backed away from enemy
forces and called for fire support assets. However,
North Vietnamese units kept the initiative and broke
contact. Firepower assists by establishing conditions
allowing ground force maneuver to destroy the enemy.
American forces often allowed firepower to substitute
for maneuver and left the initiative with the enemy.
To survive against American firepower, the North
Vietnamese adapted their military tactics. These
tactics included tunnels, fortifications, and hugging
American units so using firepower could result in
fratricide. Another tactic involved occupying populated
areas with communist forces. Often American forces
would attack these communist forces with firepower
assets and inflict casualties among the civilians. The
communist would use the incident to serve propaganda
purposes.49 The North Vietnamese continued throughout
the war to adapt their tactics to reduce the American
firepower advantage.
Another significant American advantage was air
assault operations. Air assault operations allowed
American forces to rapidly move and concentrate combat
power. American forces could concentrate combat power
to prevent enemy success and insert troops to
aggressively attack enemy forces. Further, resupply and
medical evacuation became more efficient. Helicopters
provided a means to rapidly transport troops to combat.
However, helicopters could not substitute for
maneuver. The initiative to maneuver remained with the
Viet Minh despite American air mobility capabilities.
Dave Palmer, an author and American military officer
who served in Vietnam, writes,
Once on the ground and out of their helicopters,
U.S. units were for all intents and purposes
immobilized. NVA units maneuvered, attacked,
broke contact, withdrew, sidestepped, and
continued their march; Americans dug in,
defended, and watched the enemy fade away to
fight again. If the enemy chose to fight, a
battle ensued and the Americans, with their
greater firepower from air and artillery were
almost sure to inflict disproportionately
severe casual tie^...^^
American units failed to aggressively close with and
destroy enemy forces after air assaulting into the
objective area.. The Americans left the initiative to
maneuver with the enemy. Americans attempted to use air
assault and firepower to substitute for maneuver.
Despite attempts to use firepower to minimize
casualties, American casualties gradually increased. By
1974, South Vietnamese killed in action were 254,256

with 783,602 wounded in action; American killed in


action were 46,370 with 153,313 wounded in action."
The ability to reduce friendly casualties while
inflicting severe casualties on the enemy is dependent
on intelligence information. The population remains the
chief source of intelligence during counterinsurgency
operations. A lack of accurate tactical intelligence
often hindered Allied operations in Vietnam. In 1964
some typical monthly figures for minor operations were
(Includes battalion, company, platoon, and squad):
Onerations contacts
59,996 451

72,794 406

73,726 491"

These figures show a poor rate of contact with the


enemy during military operations. The ratio of contact
with insurgents to military operations is -8% for the
first month, .6% for the second month, and -7% for the
third month. During these three months in 1964, less
than one percent of military operations engaged enemy
forces. A high rate of contact with enemy forces seizes
the initiative from the insurgent. By gaining the
population's allegiance, accurate intelligence becomes
available to conduct military operation^.'^
In summary, both French and American efforts in
Vietnam were unsuccessful. Both countries attempted to
fight a conventional war. French forces fought
courageously, yet suffered severe defeats which
encouraged their decision to withdraw. American
courage, firepower, air assault, and technological
capabilities ensured the North Vietnamese suffered
severe casualties. Still, the North Vietnamese were
willing to suffer these casualties for ultimate
victory. Neither, the French or the Americans
successfully attacked the subversive organization that
exercised control over the populace. The South
Vietnamese government failed to correct the underlying
problems creating the people's dissatisfaction with the
government. The population's allegiance and willing
support remained uncommitted to the fight against
communism.

ANALYZING MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS


Understanding the nature of the insurgency and
gaining a historical perspective establishes a
knowledge base to analyze mission essential tasks and
form conclusions. In fact, training on the light,
airborne, and ranger battalions' mission essential

26
tasks will not prepare those select units to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. These light battalions'
current mission essential task lists (METL) are missing
several essential tasks necessary for conducting
counterinsurgency operations.
The analytical process used to reach this
conclusion involved first developing criteria by
determining battalion counterinsurgency mission
essential tasks. This criteria was developed from
understanding the nature of the insurgency and the
insurgent, a historical perspective, and U.S. Arny low
intensity conflict doctrine. The next step in the
process involves identifying the current mission
essential tasks for a light, airborne, and ranger
battalion. The counterinsurgency mission essential
tasks serve as criteria to evaluate the light,
airborne, and ranger battalions mission essential
tasks.
Current U.S. Army doctrine uses the internal
defense and development strategy (IDAD) to fight an
insurgency. IDAD strategy includes all measures,
political, economic, social, and military to protect a
nation from subversion and improve the underlying
conditions that cause discontent." The IDAD principles
are unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence,
minimum use of violence, and responsive government."
'~nternaldefense and development strategy combines
military efforts with political and economic reforms to
prevent subversion while remedying underlying causes of
discontent.
The IDAD strategy includes consolidation campaigns
and strike operations. Consolidation campaigns apply
civil and military resources to establish and continue
control over designated areas.56 Consolidation
campaigns secure and hold designated areas. These
campaigns force the insurgents out of contested areas
and destroy the insurgent's subversive organization.
Local police and paramilitary forces are trained and
equipped to provide security thus preventing the
insurgent from returning. Consolidation campaigns
isolate the insurgent from the population and eradicate
the insurgent's control over the population.
Consolidation operations consist of preparatory,
offensive, development, and completion stages." The
civil-military task force prepares by planning and
gaining intelligence about the area of operations. The
police and military forces train for and rehearse the
operation.
During the offensive stage, the civil-military
task force conducts offensive operations to destroy
insurgent forces and the subversive organization. Thus,
counterinsurgent forces conduct a variety of missions
to include area ambushes, cordon and search operations,
and search and attack operations to destroy and
disperse insurgent forces." Concurrently, police and
military forces begin the process to identify and
arrest members of the insurgent organization.
Civil-military forces attempt to complete the
destruction of the insurgent subversive organization
during the developmental stage. Civil-military forces
establish government control and take action to ensure
internal ~ecurity.'~Operations continue to identify
and arrest members of the insurgent organization.
Military forces train local forces to provide a
permanent presence thus ensuring security in the area.
Concurrently, civil affairs operations improve the
people's living conditions. Living conditions may
improve by providing medical assistance, construction
support, and education reforms.
These efforts to improve the people's living
conditions continue during the completion stage as
military forces begin withdrawing leaving local forces
to defend the area. The local government expands
control and influence allowing the civil-military task
force to withdraw. The area becomes stabilized as the
civil-military task force takes action to improve
underlying social, economic, and political problems.
Strike operations often establish the conditions
for consolidation campaigns by attacking insurgent
forces in contested, or insurgent-controlled areas.60
Strike forces can include military, psychological
warfare, civil affairs, and often host nation police or
paramilitary forces. Offensive strikes missions may
include area ambushes, movement to contact, search and
attack, air assault, cordon and search, and
encirclement operations.
A comprehensive mission essential task list that
supports internal defense and development strategy,
consolidation campaigns, and strike operations would
include the following tasks:
Counterinsurqencv Force Battalion METL
Conduct area ambush
Conduct attack (hasty, deliberate, night)
Search and attack
Cordon and search
Defend
Raid
Movement to contact
Conduct military operations in urban terrain
Air Assault
Conduct encirclement
Movement security operations
Conduct combined military-police operations
Train indigenous forces
Conduct civil military operations
Protect the rear area
Conduct combat service support operations (CSS)
The light, airborne, and ranger battalion mission
essential task lists were developed by the battalion
commanders after analyzing their war plans and external
directives. The light battalion (appendix B) and
airborne battalion (appendix C) METLs were provided by
the 25th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Infantry divisions.
The 75th Ranger Regiment provided their battalion METL
(appendix D). All the METLs are current as of December,

Liaht Battalion
Execute readiness standard operating procedures
Move tactically
Assault
Defend
Conduct Non-combatant evacuation
Fight a meeting engagement
Perform air assault
Perform CSS operations
Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief6'
Airborne Battalion
Alert, marshal, and deploy
Airborne assault/Airfield seizure
Movement to contact/Hasty attack
Search and'attack
Deliberate attack
Night attack
Noncombatant evacuation operations
Military operations in urban terrain
Defend in sector/Anti-armor defense
Air assault operations
Link-up operations
Man, maintain, resupply, and transport
Protect the rear area
Marshal and redeploy62
Ranaer Battalion
Deploy the battalion
Conduct raid
Conduct relief in place
Conduct airborne assault
Conduct air assault
Conduct hasty defensea
Comparing and contrasting these light battalions'
METLs to the proposed counterinsurgency METL reveals
significant differences with mission tasks.
Counterinsuraencv METL Liaht Airborne Ranaer
Area ambush NO * NO NO
Attack Yes* Yes No
Search-attack NO Yes No
Cordon-search NO NO NO
Defend Yes Yes Yes
Raid NO No Yes
Move to contact Yes Yes No
Air Assault Yes Yes Yes
Encirclement NO NO NO
Movement security No NO NO
Military-police opns NO NO NO
Train indigenous forces No NO NO
Civil military opns Yes NO NO
Protect the rear area Yes Yes NO

CSS operations Yes Yes NO

*Yes=The task is on the unit METL.


*No=The task is not on the unit METL
Training on the light, airborne, and ranger
battalions1 mission essential tasks will not prepare
those units for counterinsurgency operations. The
battalion mission essential task lists are missing
several critical tasks that directly support
consolidation campaigns and strike operations.
Collectively, none of the battalions train to
conduct battalion level area ambush, cordon and search,
encirclement, movement security operations, military-
police operations, or training of indigenous forces.
Only the airborne battalion trains to conduct the
search and attack. Only the ranger battalion trains to
execute a battalion raid. Only the light battalion
trains for civil affairs operations. Thus, the
battalions currently remained untrained to conduct many
counterinsurgency essential tasks.
The battalion area ambush is an essential task to
support consolidation campaigns and strike operations.
The battalion level area ambush denies enemy movement
through a large area and helps seize the initiative
from the insurgent. General Julian Ewell, commander of
the 9th Infantry Division and I1 Field Force in
Vietnam, writes,
During the period from January through March 1969
the Division conducted over 6,500
ambushes...Trained snipers provided expertise not
previously available and gave the infantrymen a
new confidence in their weapons and capabilities.
Thus, using intelligence, stealth, cunning, and
aggressive tactics the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry
and other battalions in the division were able to
take the night away from the Viet Cong by
interdicting his route of communications thus
upsetting his time schedule, his flow of
supplies, and his per~onnel.~
The properly executed area ambush effectively
interdicts insurgent forces and seizes the initiative.
Although light infantry battalions train on the
ambush task at squad, platoon, and perhaps company
level, the area ambush requires training at battalion
level to avoid fratricide. Battalion area ambushes
saturate a large area with numerous ambush patrols.
There are many ambush patrol infiltration and
exfiltration routes requiring time and distance
separations to avoid fratricide. Each ambush patrol
needs direction of fire guidance to avoid firing
towards other friendly forces. All the ambush patrols
require fire support from artillery or battalion
mortars along their routes and at the ambush site. The
properly trained battalion can integrate attack
helicopters and other fire support assets including the
Air Force AC-130 which provides thermal sensors and
computer directed 105mm artillery support. The
battalion's tactical operations center personnel need
training and procedures to control the numerous ambush
units. Due to the complicated planning factors, the
area ambush requires training at battalion level.
Only the airborne battalion trained on the search
and attack mission. Search and attacks strike insurgent
forces and base camps in the field and help seize the
initiative. The large scale search and destroy
operations used in Vietnam often dispersed guerrilla
forces rather than destroying them. Search and attack
involves infiltrating squad, platoon, and company size
forces to find enemy units and base camps. The
battalion then moves into the area by air assault,
vehicle, or infiltration to destroy the enemy. Smaller
sized units are necessary to find the enemy to achieve
stealth and surprise. Aggressive search and attack
operations characterized by infiltration of small
search units and rapid deployment of larger forces to
encircle and destroy the enemy are effective methods to
fight insurgent forces.
All the infantry battalions remain untrained on
cordon and search operations which are essential for
counterinsurgency operations. These operations provide
opportunities to identify and eradicate the insurgent
subversive organization's control over the populace
thus directly support the offensive stage of
consolidation campaign^.^' The cordon and search
surrounds and encloses an area allowing a systematic
search. Search teams assist identification of the
insurgent organization members and uncover weapons.
Field manual 90-8 states,
The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct
search operations or to employ search procedures
is a continuous requirement. Most search
operations support strike operations or
consolidation operations, or they may be conducted
as the main effort in populace and resources
control operations.~

Cordon and search operations are complicated


requiring extensive training. Simultaneous emplacement
of all cordon units avoids gaps between units that
allow the insurgent's escape. An outer cordon provides
35
security for the forces inside the objective area. The
inner cordon prevents the insurgents escape.
After emplacing the cordons, a search force
conducts the search. The search force cooperates with
local police and officials to isolate the population
and question designated individuals. Concurrently,
medical personnel establish stations providing medical
assistance to the population. Search teams must avoid
enemy booby traps. Cordon and search operations
requiring extensive training for efficient execution.
Again, none of the battalions train for
encirclement operations. Encirclements isolate the
insurgent force and provide the opportunity to destroy
enemy units.67 Encirclement operations require
extensive training at battalion level for efficient
execution and to avoid fratricide. Encircling forces
strive for simultaneous emplacement of units to trap
insurgent forces. Fire support assets can distract
guerrilla forces to cover the emplacement of encircling
forces. The encircling commander establishes a reserve
to counter enemy breakout attempts.
After completing the encirclement, the forces
tighten the circle while fire support assets destroy
insurgent forces. If the insurgent unit continues to
fight, the encircling forces isolate the unit into
portions for individual destruction. Encirclements
provide the opportunity to destroy enemy forces
decisively.
Although none of the battalions train for movement
security operations, these operations support
consolidation campaigns by protecting convoy movement
against ambushes along lines of communication.
Counterinsurgency forces are assigned missions to clear
routes and escort convoys and require training to
execute these mission^.^ Road clearance operations
clear the road of mines while securing the route from
enemy ambushes. Companies may conduct bounding
overwatch while artillery units stand-by with fire
support assets. Aviation assets may search the route
and unit flanks to provide early warnin-Movement
security operations require training for successful
execution in combat.
None of the battalions conduct training for
integrated military-police operations. Training is
required because police units may become attached to
military units and military units may become
subordinate to police operations. Army field manual 90-
8 states,

To control the movement of insurgents or


guerrillas, and their material, police-type
operations are conducted. These operations are
executed by host country police, paramilitary, or
military forces. For various reasons, this may
not be possible, and U.S. forces may have to
conduct police-type operations until host country
forces are available to relieve them.69
At a minimum counterinsurgency forces require training
to assist police forces to control riots and other
civil disorders.'O Further, counterinsurgency forces
may train police, paramilitary, and indigenous forces
in counterinsurgency operations.
Counterinsurgency forces must be prepared to train
indigenous forces." Field manual 90-8 states,
The brigade may be required to organize, train,
equip, and advise host country civil and
military personnel and units to perform
counterguerrilla missions."
Although Army Special Forces serve as the proponent for
training indigenous forces, a large scale insurgency
would exceed the training capabilities of Special
Forces. There are simply not enough Special Forces
-
advisors to train a million man army such as the former
South Vietnamese Army. Consequently, regular army
forces must remain ready to train and assist indigenous
soldiers.
Only the light battalion conducted civil affairs
training. Counterinsurgency forces will conduct civil
affair operations because civil affairs remain a
responsibility for all military commanders involved in
counterinsurgency operations. These operations are
important because they improve the relationship between
the populace and the militar~.~
Civil affairs tasks
may include providing medical care, handling refugees
and evacuees, providing food and shelter, issuing
38
essential supplies, clearing debris and rubble from
streets." Success in an insurgency requires popular
support and every military commander must strive to win
the population's allegiance.
Training on the current infantry battalions
mission essential tasks will not specifically prepare
those units for combat operations in an insurgency. The
infantry battalions mission essential task lists are
not comprehensive and require additional tasks such as
area ambush, search and attack, cordon and search,
raid, encirclement, movement security, military-police
operations, training indigenous forces, and civil
military operations. Although the U.S. Army light
battalions mission essential task lists are adequate
for conventional conflicts, the units need training on
additional tasks to fight in an insurgency.

CONCLUSIONS
Insurgencies are different from conventional wars
and require innovative approaches to defeat the
insurgent. Traditional military training can hinder
innovative approaches for conducting counterinsurgency
operations. Military forces using traditional concepts
for concentrating combat power for decisive battles may
leave the insurgent organization intact and in control
of the population.
39
The insurgent subversive organization must be
destroyed. This organization provides logistical
support, intelligence, and replacements for insurgent
forces. Thus, the insurgent depends on the organization
for survival and a protracted war of attrition can
occur unless the subversive organization's control over
the population is eradicated.
Allegiance of the population to the legitimate
government is the key to success in an insurgency. The
government's ability to gain popular support and
legitimacy determines success. U.S. Army doctrine
emphasizes internal defense and development to gain
popular support and combat the insurgency.
Internal defense and development strategy uses
the full spectrum of power to include military,
economic, and political measures to correct the
underlying causes of discontent. Strike operations and
consolidation campaigns support internal defense and
development.
A counterinsurgency force mission essential task
list to support strike operations and consolidation
campaigns includes tasks such as area ambushes, search
and attack, cordon and search, raid, encirclement,
movement security, combined military-police operations,
training indigenous forces, and civil affairs. These
tasks are significantly different from the tasks
currently expressed in the light infantry battalions1
mission essential task lists.
The light, airborne, and ranger battalion mission
essential task lists help prepare those units for
conventional combat operations. However, training on
their current mission essential tasks will not prepare
these units for counterinsurgency operations. The
infantry battalion mission essential task lists are not
comprehensive for counterinsurgency operations.
Military leaders must recognize that U.S. Army
infantry battalions are untrained to immediately deploy
and fight in an insurgency. The light battalions
require additional training for counterinsurgency
war-re. Including counterinsurgency tasks on the
infantry battalions' mission essential task lists would
improve the units1 capabilities to conduct contingency
operations.
ENDNOTES
1. Ronald Schaffer, Small Wars Manual, (Manhattan,
Kansas, 1972) p. V.
2. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-20. Militarv Overations in
Low Intensitv Conflict,(Washington D.C., December, 1990)
p.1-5.
3. U.S. Army, FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla
Overations,(Washington D.C., August, 1986) p. 1-3.
4. Ibid., p.1-4.
5. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare ,(London, England,
1964) p.18. Field Manual 90-8 Counterauerrilla
Overations, p. 3-21.
6. Mao Tse-tung, Basic Tactics, (New York, 1966), p. 57.
7 . Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weavon, (Novato, CA.,
1982) p. 29.
8. Field Manual 100-20, Militarv Overations in Low
Intensitv Conflict, p. 2-13.
-. 9. FM 90-8. Counterauerrilla Overations, p. 1-4.

10. Mao Tse-Tung, p. 130.


11. Field Manual 100-20, Militarv Overations in Low
Intensitv Conflict, p. 2-8.
12. Vo Nguyen Giap, Peovle's War. Peovle's Army, p. 77.
13. Vo Nguyen Giap, Inside the Viet Minh, (Quantico, VA.
1962) p 11-10.
14. Ma0 Tse-Tung, p.136.
15. Thomas Perry Thornton, reported in Douglas Pike's
book, Viet Conq, (Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1966) p. 249.
16. Robert Thompson, Defeatinu Communist Insuraency, (New
York, 1966) p. 27.
17. Field Manual 100-20, Militarv Operations in Low
Intensitv Conflict, p. G-2.
18. Robert Thompson, p. 116.
19. ~obert'Thompson, p. 55.
Roger Trinquier, p. 9.
20. Vo Nguyen Giap, Inside the Viet Minh, p. 1-3.
Harold Moore, We Were Soldiers Once and Younq, (New York,
1992) p.339.
21. Vo Nguyen Giap, PeoulelsWar, Peoule's Army, p. 19.
22. Mao Tse-Tung, p.84.
23. Harold Moore, p. 343.
24. Robert Thompson reported in Dave Palmer's book,
Summons of the Trumuet, (San Rafeal, CA., 1978) p. 111.
25. Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoule's War. Peoule's Armv, p. 36.
26. David Galula, Counterinsuraencv Warfare, (New York,
1964) p. 40.
27. FieldManual90-8. Counterauerrilla Oaerations,p.2-4.
28. Ibid., p. 2-6.
29. Douglas Pike, m, (Novato, California, 1986) p.
251.
30. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Cambridge, Mass,
1961) p. 95.
31. Ibid., p, 110.
32. Bernard Fall, p. 17.
33. Ibid., p. 105.
34. Ibid., p. 105.
35. Roger Trinquier, p.3.
36. Roger Trinquier, p. 4.
37. Bernard Fall, p. 176.
38. Ibid., p. 176.
39.Ibid., p. 180.
40. Roger Trinquier, p. 58.
Robert Thompson, p. 116.
4i. Robert Thompson, p.116.
42. General Westmoreland, A Soldier Reworts, (New York,
1 9 7 6 ) p . 153.

43. Harold Moore, p. 345.


44. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History, (New York, 1 9 8 4 )
p. 97.
45. U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division Combat standard
operating procedures, Fundamentals of Infantrv Tactics,
(Vietnam, 1 9 6 6 ) p. 1 4 .
46. Thomas Thayer, War Without Fronts, (Boulder,
Colorado, 1 9 8 5 ) p. 1 0 4 .
47. Dave Palmer, p . 1 2 0 .
48. Dave Palmer, p. 1 4 3 .
49. Stuart Herrington, p. 1 2 7 .
50. Dave Palmer, p.97.
51. Clarke, Jeffrey, U.S. Armv in Vietnam. Advice and
Supwort. The Final Years 1965-1973, (Washington D.C.,
1 9 8 8 ) p.275.

Thomas Thayer, p . 1 0 4 .
Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation, (Boston, 1 9 8 5 ) p.
257.
Kellet specifies the causes of casuaties between 1965-
1970.
Svstem Deaths Wounds
Small Arms 5 1%
Artillery 36%
Traps/Mines 11%
Punji Stakes
52. Robert Thompson, p. 8 8 .
53. Ibid., p. 8 8 .
54. FM 100-20 Militarv Owerations in Low Intensitv
Conflict, p. 6-5.
55. Ibid., p. E-2.
56. FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p: 3-13.
FM 100-20 Militarv Operations in Low Intensltv Conflict,
p.E-5.
57.FM 100-20 Militarv Operations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-4.
FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p.3-14.
58. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensitv
Conflicts, p.E-5.
59. Ibid., p. E-6.
60. Ibid., E-6.
61. 25th Infantry Division, Battalion METL, 7 December,
1992.
62. 82nd Airborne Division, Battalion METL, 4 December,
1992.
63. 75th Ranger Regiment, Battalion METL, 7 December,
1992.
64. General Julian J. Ewell, Sharvenina the Combat Edae,
(Washington D.C., 1974) p.120.
65. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensity
Conflicts, p. E-5.
66. FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p.3-17.
67. FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p. G-1.
68. Ibid., G-13.
69. Ibid., p. 3-16.
70. FM 100-20 Militarv Overations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p.E-8.
FM 90-8 Counteruuerrilla Overations, p. G-5.
71. FM 100-20 Militarv Oaeration in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-6.
72. Ibid., p. H-16.
73. FM 100-20 Militarv Oaerations in Low Intensity
Conflict, p. E-9.
FM 90-8 Counterauerrilla Overations, p. H-11.
74. FM 100-20 Military O~erations in Low Intensity
Conflicts, p. E-9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Bowman, Steven L., The Evolution of United States Army
Doctrine For Counterinsuruencv Warfare: From
World War 11 to the Commitment of combat Units In
Vietnam. Duke University: University
Microfilms International., 1985.
Campbell, Arthur.,Guerrillas. New York: The John Day
Company., 1967.
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Appendix A Definitions
Definitions
Consolidation Campaign-Interdepartmental, civil-military efforts
which integrate counterinsurgency activities to restore government
control of an area and its people. They combine military action to
destroy or drive out the insurgents with programs for social,
political, and economic development. (EM 100-20)
Civil Affairs-Include any activity concerned with relationships
between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in
the area. (EM 100-20)
Counterinsurgent-A person who fights or is trained to fight
guerrilla forces. (Random House Dictionary)
Insurgency-Rebellion or revolt within a group, as by members
against leaders. (Random House Dictionary)
Insurgent-A person who engages in armed resistance to a government-
a rebel. (Random House Dictionary)
Internal Defense and Development Strategy-The full range of
measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (EM 100-20)
Revolution-A forcible overthrow of an established government or
political system by the people governed.
(Random House Dictionary)
Strike Operations-Combat operations in zones under insurgent
control or in contested zones. They are targeted against insurgent
tactical forces and bases outside areas of government control. (FM
100-20)
Terrorize-To dominate or coerce by intimidation. (Random House
Dictionary)
FIGHT MEETING ENGAGEMENT 1.
1
PERFORM AIR ASSAULT I
WMANITARIAN ASSISTANCEI
%ASTER RELIEF I
B
-
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*. T
.T' T
P 'I!
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NIQXT A'MACK P 4
NONCOMBA'LANT EVACLhTZON OPERATIONS T P '

MILLTARYOPERA¶'lOE.S ZN URBAN T13RRAXti T 'I!


DEPEND I N BBCTOR/WTZ-ARMOR DEFEllBE T T
AIR ABBAUYA' OPERAKOHS A'' P
L I m - U P OPBMTZONB . ' 4 ' T
MAN, MAXNPAXN, REBWPLY, AND 'I.RAtiSPCRC T T
PROTECT T3R R ~ &El.
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MARSHAG AND REDRPG-Y
-
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ENCCOBURE 1
2-5. uissfon i%.sentiai ask LZst (me). Definitions: The METL
is r compilation of s o l l a d v e mission essential tasks Which must
be ~ ~ a a ~ r u lperformed
ly if aa organization is to accomplilh its
wartime mission(6). A U s i o n Essential Task is a collective
task in whion an organization'must be proficient to accomplish an
appropriate portion oL its wartine nission(s). figure 2-3
depicts ME Ranger
.
Reqimcnt's METI,.

Pigura 2-3. Ranger ~agimontMETL

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