GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their applicationfor a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
“marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that the
Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is
insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authenticone issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis
for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso factorestored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court
mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of
the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.

REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got married in May 24, 1981. Both are Filipino citizens. They
cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went to the U.S. in 1986 with one son.

Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and sometime in the year 2000, Orbecindo learned that his wife
obtained a divorce decree and remarried. Orbecindo then filed a petition for authority to remarry. The court granted
the petition since there was no opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition for the declaratory relief. The following are the requisites:

1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship and remarried can also be allowed to remarry.

However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no sufficient evidence submitted and on record and are only based
on bare allegations that his wife was a naturalized American citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had remarried
an American. Such declaration could only be made properly upon submission of evidence in his favor.

VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen in Hongkong in 1972. They had two
children. They got divorced in Nevada U.S.A in 1982 and both certified that they do not have any community
property to divide. Alice remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

Upton filed a suit in June 1983 stating that Reyes’ business in Manila is conjugal property. He demands to render an
accounting to the business and declare his right to manage the business. Reyes moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the action is barred by the previous judgment in Nevada divorce wherein they both acknowledged
having no community property as of June 11, 1982.
Reyes’ motion was denied by the lower court stating that the property is located in the Philippines so that the
divorce decree has no bearing.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties to their property in the Philippines?

HELD:
Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to sue in the case
where the husband is entitled to control over conjugal assets.

 The divorce obtained abroad being valid in his country’s court may be recognized in the Philippines. The
divorce decree granted in Nevada released Reyes from the marriage for the marriage had been severed by
one party ceases to bind either.
 Getting a divorce decree in the US court and contending that it is not valid and binding in the Philippines
being contrary to local law and public policy estopped Upton’s declaration.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying
for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the
marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went
to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that
Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and
dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusband’s last
name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the
divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied
the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the
substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
par of Art 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the
petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being
a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce
decree with conformity to alien’s national law.

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and
respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the ruling.

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
Case Digest

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
Facts: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F.
Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit. 5 The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974,

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known
of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a
person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with
Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes
against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six
( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived
together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage
license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. The RTC refused to
reverse her conviction and held thus: 11Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is
null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants
this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The
best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of
Santos. Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved
the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a
vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction
for bigamy. 12

ISSUES: petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of
Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She
alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993.
Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

Held: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only
if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in
the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1)
when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval
of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang,
who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a
marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which
reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer
shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage.31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six
months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner
testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never
cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage
disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993,
she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not
show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that
the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least
five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them
that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein
petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we
had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same
breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted
by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act
to escape criminal conviction.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of
petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to
four years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

James Capili vs People of the Philippines

700 SCRA 443 – Civil Law – Family Code – Void Marriages – A Void 2nd Marriage is not a Defense in Bigamy

Criminal Law – Bigamy – Elements

In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in December 1999, he
married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In
June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.

Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage
with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili
filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the second marriage was already declared void ab
initio that marriage never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.

The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It
is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The
outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in
the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot
simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as void. The parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Veronico Tenebro vs Court of Appeals

423 SCRA 272 (467 Phil. 723) – Civil Law – Family Code – Bigamy – Exists even if one marriage is declared void

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and
without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage
with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered
that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his
second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be
charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would
be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a
Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. On May 14,
2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC of San
Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first marriage was
already declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983. The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity. RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the ground that both
wedding were governed by the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, hence, no judicial declaration of absolute
nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage in 2003 justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.

HELD: NO. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain judicial declaration of nullity to
escape from the bigamy charges against her.

Republic vs Tampus GR 214243

FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days
thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he
was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to
locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four
(4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four
(4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active
effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of
any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his
parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him.
Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called
or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even
seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was
sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the
AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's
mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him
by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death.

Republic vs. Jose Sareñogon, Jr. [G.R. No. 199194] Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

On November 4, 2008, the respondent, Jose Sareñogon, filed a petition before theRTC of Ozamiz to declare the
presumptive death of his wife Netchie Sareñogon. The petitioner testified that they got married and had lived
together as husband and wife for amonth only because he left to work as a seaman, while his wife, Netchie, went
toHongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not receive any communicationfrom Netchie and likewise
had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, hetried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned
home after his contract expired,then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts but they
alsodid not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife, Netchiewas already dead. He
filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant toArticle 41 of the Family
Code.Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo
Sande. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchielived together as husband and wife only for one month
prior to their leaving thePhilippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no
informationregarding Netchie’s location.On January 31, 2011, in the RTC’s decision found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeedalready dead.The
OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of evidence.
The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse in elevating a
declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

Issue:
WON the “well-founded belief” requisite underArticle 41 (FC) was complied with.

Held:

No. This requisite needs the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the resultof diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that basedupon these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absentspouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort. At the case at bar,
therespondent, Jose Sareñogon, failed to satisfy the required “well-founded belief” standard.The respondent’s
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie arenotches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For,aside from his bare claims that he had inquired form alleged friends and relatives as
to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose Sareñogon did not call to the witness stand specificindividuals or persons whom he
allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or questfor the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that
he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that
heundertook a thorough, determined, and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least twoyears, and naming the
particular places, provinces, cities, barangays, or municipalitiesthat he visited, or went to, and identifying the
specific persons he interviewed or talkedto in the course of his search.

Domingo vs. CA

226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in
1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore,
when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited
with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter
claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also
necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not
lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s
prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them.
Castillo v Castillo G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January
1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and
contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither
of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a
bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista
was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering
it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and
could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first
marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In
reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at
the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code
does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage
to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES / GR No. 207406 / January 13, 2016 /
LEONEN, SECOND DIVISION
(MARRIAGE LICENSE, DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE)

FACTS:

On 1994, Alice Eduardo married petitioner. After some time, Eduardo discovered that petitioner was married to a
Gina Gaerlan on July 1987, before the Family Code became effective. She then filed for bigamy.

The RTC held in favor of Eduardo and the CA affirmed that decision. In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
argues that there is no bigamy as there was no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage in the first
marriage which was the marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether the essential requisites of marriage was present in the first marriage.

RULING: YES.

The SC held that petitioner was indeed guilty of bigamy. The SC stated that “petitioner was still legally married to
Gina when he married Alice.”

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage
void from the beginning:

No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

“The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides. The marriage license represents the state’s “involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.”

“To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.”

“Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar” but the SC held that the Certification
“does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically
state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.”

“Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and
his first wife. The first marriage contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first
marriage.”

“A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage
licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.”

“In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily
signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was
celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven
(7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage
as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue
by his own actuations.”
“Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner
remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina
judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.”

“As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.”

“The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family
Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Cariño vs Cariño

Article 40

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted
a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already
bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence
of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the
absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out
about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to
bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC).
Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is
because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC
which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed
by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not
have contributed at all.