Bachelor arbeit struktur : The IIAF , iranian aviation and the knowledge transfer by the americans

INEDX :

IFF : if friend or foe

BVR : beyond visual range

WVR : within visual range

RWR : Radar warning reciever

TID : tactical indicator display

VDI : vertiacal diplay indicator

HSD : horizontal situation display

AoA : angle of attack

HUD: Heads up display

DSCG : digital scan converter group

A/G : air to ground

A/A : air to air

STBY : standby

UHF : ultra high frequency

Iran has been the center of middle eastern escalation news in the past 20 years and still continues to
be the main focus of international news to this day along with other nations at war and or conflict in
the middle east. What is most reported is the military capabilities of iran and the threat that its
posing to israel, specially the air power of iran.

In this thesis I want to research the topic of American knowledge transfer troughout the beginning
days of the Iranian airforce up until the revolution of 79 and how the training and received knowledge
was applied in the subsequent iran Iraq war of 1980-88.

This thesis will be structured as followed:

- The history of the Iranian aviation and airforce till the end of world war 2
- The political dynamic of iran and the world (nato fortress of the middle east) (post WW2 and
cold war)
- Purchases of aircraft from Europe and America
- The American air-training programs for pilots
- The Iranian airforce in training ( f4 & f14 )
- The golden crown acrobatic group
- The 79 revolution and its consequences for Iranian airforce pilots
- The nojeh coup de etat
- The iran Iraq war and the application of western training in air combat
- post war and current day

DISCLAIMER

Due to the fact that this research topic is very niche in nature and also still very safely guarded by the
Iranian government , I am confined to a limited amount of secondary sources. However I have had
the great pleasure of having interviews with pilots and soldiers from the iran Iraq war as well as the
time of the shah era where they have been trained. In no circumstance is this a excuse to deliver a
thesis paper lacking in quality and quantity but rather visualize the difficulty of researching into a
topic that is still relatively safeguarded by the Iranian government and also a sensitive topic for most
of the Iranian pilots and personnel involved in the sector of aviation.
 The history of Iranian aviation

Iran's 70-year history of air transportation can be divided into five distinct periods: the initial take-off
in 1927; a twelve-year gap from 1932 to 1944 with no traceable information; the modest yet
commendable era of Iranian Airways; the remarkable ascent of Iran Air during the 1960s and 1970s;
and the developments of Iran Air post-1979, which will be briefly addressed in this thesis.

Iranian commercial aviation commenced in 1927 with the introduction of limited air services on
specific domestic routes. In that year, Junkers, a prominent German aviation company known for
manufacturing the iconic Junkers aircraft, entered the nascent Iranian commercial aviation market.
They established an airline with support from the Iranian government.

At the time, the Iranian Air Force operated Junkers F13 aircraft at the Ghale-Morghi airfield near
Tehran. The availability of these aircraft and trained Iranian pilots prompted Junkers to propose a
commercial flight operation to the Iranian government. Following the approval of a parliamentary bill,
Junkers received a five-year concession to conduct commercial flights within Iran, with plans for
gradual regional expansion.

This initiative marked the foundation of commercial air transportation in Iran. Junkers established
'Company Havapeimai Yunkers dar Iran' (Junkers Airline Company in Iran) under Iranian law.
Additionally, Junkers was required to open a flight school and provide the necessary expertise and
facilities for training Iranian pilots.

Junkers' operations, in collaboration with the Iranian Ministry of Post and Telegraphs, primarily aimed
to transport mail and small parcels, as well as civilian passengers willing to experience the novel flying
machines. Initial routes included Tehran to Bandar Pahlavi (now Bandar Anzali) in the north, and
Tehran to Ghasr-Shirin via Hamedan and Kermanshah in the west. During the postwar period, the
Junkers F13, a single-engine, four-seater aircraft capable of flying at approximately 150 to 160
kilometers per hour, gained popularity as a commercial aircraft. Consequently, the airline's fleet
expanded to include larger Junkers models.

The northbound route was extended to Baku in Azerbaijan (then part of the USSR), and the
westbound route continued to Baghdad. Additional routes were established: southwest to Bushehr
via Isfahan and Shiraz, northeast to Mashhad, and northwest to Tabriz via Ghazvin.

The Tehran-Baku flight connected Iran to Europe for the first time, linking with Moscow and
subsequently mainland Europe. This development preceded the arrival of the first European airline,
Imperial Airways (the precursor to British Airways), which began operations to Iran in March 1929,
followed by KLM in September of the same year.

The Junkers aircraft and their frequent flights from Tehran airport became a significant attraction for
Tehran residents, who would travel by horseback, bicycle, or on foot to witness the new aviation
phenomenon. The era of Junkers operations concluded in 1932.

On February 25, 1925 (5 Esfand 1304), Colonel Ahmad Khan Nakhjavan, the first Iranian pilot trained
in France along with Colonel Yadolah Azam Zangeneh, flew a Breguet-19 aircraft from France to Iran's
Ghale-Morghi Airport. This flight, marked by the Iranian flag and insignia on the aircraft, was
significant as Reza Khan Mirpanj (later Reza Shah) personally greeted them, making it the first
instance of an Iranian Air Force aircraft piloted by an Iranian crossing international borders into
Iranian airspace.
Up to this point, Iranian pilots received training in three ways:

a) Groups were sent to France for pilot training.

b) Other groups were sent to Russia for pilot training.

c) In Iran, training was conducted by a German instructors.

While purchasing aircraft was relatively straightforward, training pilots, ground crews for
maintenance and repair, and constructing airports were more challenging and time-consuming tasks.
During this period, the Air Force transitioned from a small office within the Army to a separate
department, becoming the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF).

Colonel Ahmad Khan Nakhjavan was appointed as the first Air Force Commander. In 1924 (1303), the
first group of student pilots and mechanics were sent to Russia and France for training. By 1929
(1308), the Iranian Air Force had 15 pilots, with 6 graduates from the Eastern flying school in France
and 9 from the Sebastopol flying school in Russia. At this time, the IIAF had a total of 33 aircraft of 9
different models.

Over the next 15 years, leading up to World War II, the IIAF operated over 400 aircraft of 18 different
models from four countries. During this period, eight air bases were established, which included pilot
training and instructor pilot schools, as well as a maintenance training school. An aircraft factory
named "Shahbaz" was also established, producing three different types of aircraft.

At the onset of World War II, Iran maintained a position of neutrality. However, on August 23, 1941 (3
Shahrivar 1320), Iran's neutrality was violated when the country was attacked by British forces from
the south and Russian forces from the north (Operation "Y" under Lt. Gen. E.P. Quinan). The fledgling
Iranian Air Force was ill-prepared to resist such an onslaught. The Allied forces took control of two
Iranian air bases in Tehran: the British seized the Dooshan Tappeh IIAF complex, including the
Shahbaz factories, while the Russians took over the Ghale Morghi Air Base.

The invaders shut down the IIAF Technical Officers Academy, the pilot training school, the
maintenance school, and six air bases across the country. Personnel were dismissed from service, and
most of the aircraft were dismantled. Reports indicate that British troops cut some aircraft in half to
render them unusable. Of the 15 Curtiss H75 A-9 Hawk aircraft purchased from the USA and
delivered in May 1941, the British seized and shipped all 10 operational aircraft (SN 15252 to 15261)
and the remaining 5 still in crates to India.

As a result, the young Air Force was effectively dismantled. The Iranian Air Force, established by Reza
Shah, was significantly weakened by the British and Russian occupation from 1941 to 1946. Reza Shah
was forced to resign as part of the ceasefire conditions imposed by the British, and his son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, eventually ascended to the throne. After the war, the British withdrew
from Iran, but the Russians remained in control of northern Iran for an extended period.

Sources used : https://www.iiaf.net/history/iiaf.html

https://iranian.com/History/June97/IranAir/index.shtml
 The political dynamic of iran and the world post WW2

In 1941, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran led to the deposition of Reza Shah due to his perceived
alignment with the Axis powers. The invasion resulted in the establishment of a critical supply route,
known as the Persian Corridor, which facilitated the transfer of substantial Lend-Lease war materials
to the Soviet Union. From 1942 onward, U.S. troops were actively involved in the operation of this
corridor.

In 1953, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British MI6 orchestrated a coup that
overthrew the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. This event, along with
subsequent U.S. support for the Shah, is viewed by many liberal Iranians as a key factor in the
arbitrary rule of the Shah, which ultimately contributed to the anti-American sentiment that fueled
the 1979 revolution. One consequence of the 1953 coup was the United States securing a 40% share
of Iranian oil, a shift that marked a broader transition from British to American dominance in the
region and globally.

Prior to World War II, the United States did not have an active policy towards Iran. However, the
onset of the Cold War heightened U.S. concerns, particularly regarding Soviet attempts to establish
separatist states in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and its demand for military rights to the
Dardanelles in 1946. These concerns were further exacerbated by the loss of China to communism,
the discovery of Soviet spy rings, and the outbreak of the Korean War.

The Abadan Crisis of 1952-1953, triggered by Prime Minister Mossadeq’s nationalization of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), further complicated U.S.-Iran relations. The AIOC, established by the
British in the early 20th century, was a major economic force in Iran, yet shared profits heavily in
Britain’s favor (85% for Britain, 15% for Iran) and withheld financial records from the Iranian
government. By 1951, nationalization had widespread support in Iran, and Parliament unanimously
agreed to take control of the AIOC, which was then the largest company in the British Empire. In
response, the British government imposed an embargo on Iranian oil, supported by international oil
companies, leading to economic deterioration in Iran as negotiations over control and compensation
reached a stalemate.

U.S. President Harry S. Truman urged Britain to adopt a more moderate stance in negotiations and
avoid military intervention in Iran. American diplomacy during this period fostered the perception in
Iran that the U.S. was sympathetic to Mossadeq’s position, and there was optimism that the oil
dispute would be resolved with innovative proposals that would provide Iran with substantial
economic aid. Mossadeq’s visit to Washington and frequent expressions of support from the U.S.
government further reinforced this belief.

As the Cold War intensified, oil negotiations stalled, and Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower
succeeded Democratic President Harry S. Truman, the United States took steps to destabilize Prime
Minister Mohammed Mossadeq. The prevailing theory was that "rising internal tensions and
continued economic deterioration...might lead to a breakdown of government authority and open
the way for at least a gradual assumption of control" by Iran's well-organized Tudeh communist party.
During the spring and summer of 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British MI6
executed Operation Ajax, a covert mission launched from the American Embassy in Tehran to
orchestrate a coup d'état against Mossadeq's government. The initial attempt failed, prompting the
Shah to flee to Italy, but a subsequent effort succeeded, leading to Mossadeq's imprisonment.

A study conducted by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne suggests that the primary motivation
for the coup was geostrategic, rather than a desire to dismantle Mossadeq's movement, establish a
dictatorship in Iran, or gain direct control over Iranian oil. Gasiorowski concludes that while the
United States delivered the final blow to Mossadeq's regime, the involvement of Iranian actors,
alongside the British and major international oil companies, was crucial in the coup's success.

The nationalization of Iran's oil industry directly precipitated the events leading to the coup. Prior to
nationalization, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlled Iran's oil resources. Following the
coup, in 1954, oil control was restructured, with 40% allocated to AIOC (which was renamed British
Petroleum), 40% to U.S. oil companies, 13% to Royal Dutch/Shell, and 6% to CFP (French).

In an editorial that reflected the sentiments of the time, The New York Times celebrated the coup,
stating: "Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost
that must be paid by one of their numbers which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism.”

Following the 1953 coup, the United States provided substantial financial support to the reinstalled
Shah of Iran. Within the first three weeks after the coup, Washington allocated $68 million in
emergency aid to Iran, followed by an additional $1.2 billion over the subsequent decade. During this
period, which lasted until the Shah's fall in 1979, Iran emerged as one of the United States' closest
allies.

The U.S. played a pivotal role in establishing the Shah's secret police, known for its brutal methods
used to maintain his power. In September 1953, a U.S. Army colonel working for the CIA was
dispatched to Iran to assist in creating this organization. By March 1955, this initial effort was
reinforced by a more permanent team of five CIA officers, including experts in covert operations,
intelligence analysis, and counterintelligence. Among them was Major General Herbert Norman
Schwarzkopf, who was instrumental in training the first generation of personnel for what later
became known as SAVAK, the Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar, reorganized and officially
named in 1956. By 1965, SAVAK had developed its own instructors, replacing the initial U.S. advisors.

Throughout his reign, the Shah received consistent support from the United States, frequently
making state visits to the White House and earning praise from various American presidents.
However, the Shah’s close alignment with Washington and his policies of Westernization began to
provoke resentment among some segments of the Iranian population, particularly among Islamists.

In 1957, the United States played a key role in initiating Iran's nuclear program by providing the
country with its first nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel. This collaboration deepened after 1967, when
the U.S. supplied Iran with weapons-grade enriched uranium. Iran's nuclear program was part of the
broader Atoms for Peace initiative, which aimed to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The U.S. and Western European governments continued their support for Iran's nuclear ambitions
until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Following the revolution, while many non-aligned nations
supported Iran's right to enrich uranium, the U.S. and the European Union began to view Iran as a
significant threat to international peace. Despite reports of Arab governments supporting the U.S.
stance on Iran, polls indicate that Arab populations do not perceive Iran as a serious threat, instead
viewing Israel and the United States as greater dangers.

In 2015, the United States brokered an agreement to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities, which included
significant sanctions relief for Iran. This relief unblocked over $100 billion in frozen assets overseas
and facilitated greater foreign access to Iran's economy. In return, Iran agreed to halt certain nuclear
activities, including the development of a nuclear bomb. However, in 2018, the United States
withdrew from the agreement.

“Nato fortress of the middle east”