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Deception
in the Marketplace
Deception
in the Marketplace
The Psychology of Deceptive Persuasion
and Consumer Self-Protection
%BWJE.#PVTIt.BSJBO'SJFTUBEt1FUFS8SJHIU
New York London

Routledge Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group Taylor & Francis Group
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© 2009 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

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Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and
are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Boush, David M.
Deception in the marketplace : the psychology of deceptive persuasion and
consumer self protection / David M. Boush, Marian Friestad, Peter Wright.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8058-6086-3 (hardback : acid-free paper) – ISBN
978-0-8058-6087-0 (pbk. : acid-free paper)
1. Deceptive advertising--United States. 2. Marketing--United States. 3.
Consumer protection--United States. I. Friestad, Marian. II. Wright, Peter. III.
Title.
HF5827.8.B68 2009
659.101’9--dc22 2008043548
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at

http://www.taylorandfrancis.com
and the Psychology Press Web site at
http://www.psypress.com
Dedication
We dedicate this book to our grandchildren.
v
Contents
Preface xi
The Authors xv
1 Deception in the Marketplace 1

Deception in the Modern Marketplace 3
Misleading and Deceptive: Defining Marketplace Deception 6
Legalistic Definitions 8
Marketplace Deception Is Persuasion 11
Deceptions Are Context Bound 13
A Deception Agent’s Definition: It Is Deception if Persuasion Targets
Perceive It as Such 14
Ethics and Morality 15
Marketplace Deception Is a Special Domain of Societal Deception 16
A Framework for Examining Marketplace Deception 17
The Scope of This Book 18
2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deceptive Persuasion 21

Deception Theory 22
Persuasion Theory 29
Dual-Process Models of Persuasion 29
Social Influence and Persuasion Tactics 30
Resistance to Persuasion 31
The Persuasion Knowledge Model 32
Metacognition and Deception Protection 34
Protection Motivation Theory and Regulatory Focus Theory 35
Aversion to Feeling Duped 37
3 Marketplace Deception Tactics I 39

Overview of Marketplace Deception Strategy 40
Types of Deception Tactics 43
Distraction and Camouflage 45
Corrupted and Subverted Persuasion Tactics 49
Suppressing Deception-Protection Motivation and Opportunity 52
vii
viii Contents
The Run-Around 55
Omissions 56
4 Marketplace Deception Tactics II 59

Simulation 59
Deceptive Framings 62
Impersonation 64
Language That Misleads and Avoids Responsibility 65
Exploiting Automatized Inferencing Tendencies 67
Verbal and Visual Misrepresentation 68
Exploiting Limited Numeracy, Research, and Statistical Understanding 70
Rhetorical Deception: Visual and Verbal Figures of Speech 73
Marketing Bullshit 74
5 How Deception-Minded Marketers Think 79

A Mental Model of a Professional Deception Planner 79
Social Engineering 86
The Mind of a Telescammer 88
Marketing Managers’ Deception Decisions 90
6 How People Cope With Deceptiveness: Prior Research 95

Uncertainty and Suspicion 96
Suspicion Effects on Processing of Subsequent Persuasion Attempts 100
Omissions, Misleading Inferences, and Message Tactics 102
The Heard-It-Before “Truth Effect” 111
The Use of Marketplace Persuasion Knowledge 114
Detecting Deceptions 117
7 Marketplace Deception Protection Skills 123

Deception Protection Skills: Detection, Neutralization, Resistance 124
Proactive Coping Skills: Preparing for Battle Before It Begins 131
Resource Management Skills 133
Marketplace Deception Protection Self-Efficacy 136
8 Developing Deception Protection Skills in Adolescence

and Adulthood 143
Growing Up Targeted 145
Children’s Beliefs About Television Advertising 146
Developing Persuasion Knowledge 149
Developmental Psychology and Theory of Mind 154
Domain Specific Skills and Cross-Context Transfers 156
Adolescence and Marketplace Deception-Protection Skills 160
Contents ix
9 Teaching Marketplace Deception Protection Skills: Prior Research 163

Coping With Implied Claims 164
Coaching Consumers to Detect Omitted Information 166
Coaching Consumers to Detect and Resist Corrupted
Persuasion Tactics 168
Coaching Adolescents to Cope With Deceptive
Alcohol Advertising 175
Coaching Adolescents to Cope With Deceptive
Cigarette Advertising 178
The “Off the Hook” Program to Reduce Participation in
Telemarketing Fraud 181
10 Societal Perspectives: Regulatory Frontiers, Societal Trust,

and Deception Protection Education 187
Changes in Communication Technology 187
Regulatory Protections 190
Deception’s Effects on Societal and Marketplace Trust 197
Societal Education on Deception Protection 201
References 209
Author Index 227
Subject Index 233
Preface
ἀ is book grew out of conversations among the authors that began about
four years ago. When we considered the immense literature on market-
place persuasion, there seemed to be a 500-pound gorilla in the room
that no one really wanted to recognize—deception. ἀ e more we talked
about it, the more we agreed that deception is a more fundamental issue
in consumer research and marketing than was reflected in the research
literature. After exploring the diverse writings on deception in the social
sciences, humanities, marketing, and popular culture literatures, and
wrestling with how to integrate and synthesize these perspectives usefully,
we crafted this book.
Our goal here is to motivate more research on marketplace deception.
We view this as the first research-grounded book to fully address the topics
of the psychology of deceptive persuasion in the marketplace and the psy-
chology of consumer self-protection. Deception permeates the American
marketplace, harms consumers’ health, welfare, and financial resources,
and ultimately undermines trust in society. Individual consumers must
try to protect themselves from marketers’ deceptive communications by
acquiring personal marketplace deception protection skills that go beyond
reliance on legal protections. Deception protection skill is a critical life
skill. ἀ erefore, we believe that understanding the psychology of decep-
tive persuasion and consumer self-protection should be a central goal for
future consumer behavior research.
Marketplace deception is not solely or mainly a legal issue, although
that is how current marketing textbooks and writings on marketplace
deception treat it. Further, deceptiveness in persuasion is a more important
topic than is acknowledged in research and writing on the science of social
influence. ἀ ere is a tremendous opportunity and need for educational
interventions that focus directly on teaching people deception protection
skills applicable to the marketplace. Our motivation for analyzing the
social psychology of deception in the marketplace is not just intellectual
xi
xii Preface
curiosity about a fascinating and underresearched topic. Rather, it is a vital

step toward designing effective training programs that help youngsters
and adults better protect themselves from marketplace deception.
In this book, we explore these questions: What makes persuasive com-
munications misleading and deceptive? How do marketing managers
decide to prevent or practice deception in planning their campaigns? What
skills must consumers acquire to effectively cope with marketers’ decep-
tion tactics? What does research tell us about how people detect, neutral-
ize and resist misleading persuasion attempts? What does research suggest
about how to teach marketplace deception protection skills to adolescents
and adults?
Chapters in the book cover theoretical perspectives on deceptive per-
suasion; different types of deception tactics; how deception-minded mar-
keters think; prior research on how people cope with deceptiveness; the
nature of marketplace deception protection skills; how people develop
deception protection skills in adolescence and adulthood; prior research
on teaching consumers marketplace deception protection skills; and soci-
etal issues such as regulatory frontiers, societal trust, and consumer edu-
cation practices.
Our primary audience is scholars, researchers, and advanced students
in consumer behavior, social psychology, communication, and marketing.
Marketing practitioners and marketplace regulators will find it stimulat-
ing and authoritative, as will social scientists and educators who are con-
cerned with consumer welfare. We hope it will serve as a mind-stretching
text for students in upper division and graduate courses in those areas.
We intend the book to be rigorous enough for a scholarly audience but
accessible enough for marketing and advertising practitioners. We hope to
provide consumer researchers with the outline of a research agenda and,
for some, a better appreciation of legal issues in the marketplace. We hope
marketing practitioners will gain added perspective on the pressures they
may feel to act deceptively, the costs of doing so, and how to effectively
prevent consumer deception. For regulators we hope to provide a con-
sumer researcher’s perspective on the frontier regulatory and public policy
topics they must deal with in the near future.
ἀ is book’s content and ambition grew substantially as we considered
the suggestions of insightful scholars who reviewed early drafts. We thank
Meg Campbell, University of Colorado; L. J. Shrum, University of Texas–
San Antonio; Kent Grayson, Northwestern University; Esther ἀ orson,
University of Missouri; and David Shulman, Lafayette College, for help
in shaping the book’s overall structure and directions. We especially
Preface xiii
thank Dave Schumann, University of Tennessee, and Norbert Schwartz,

University of Michigan, for their careful analysis of the semifinal draft and
for motivating us to make the book’s content as significant as its topic. ἀ e
generous support of the University of Oregon and the Lundquist College
of Business enabled our work, and we thank the Edwin E. and June Woldt
Cone family foundation for their support.
David M. Boush
Marian Friestad
Peter Wright
The Authors
David M. Boush is the head of the marketing department and associate

professor of marketing at the Lundquist College of Business, University of
Oregon. He was previously a visiting professor at ESSEC in Cergy-Pontoise,
France, and has taught e-commerce classes in Mexico City, Buenos Aires,
Santiago, and Bogota. Professor Boush’s research on trust, consumer social-
ization, and brand equity has been published in the Journal of Consumer
Research, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Business Research,
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sciences, Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing, and the Journal of International Business Studies. He has served
on the editorial board of the Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sciences.
Marian Friestad is the vice provost for graduate studies at the University of
Oregon, and professor of Marketing in the Lundquist College of Business. She
was previously dean of the graduate school and a visiting scholar at Stanford
University. Professor Friestad’s research on persuasion and social influ-
ence has been heavily cited and won a best-paper award from the Journal of
Consumer Research. Her work has been published in the Journal of Consumer
Research, Journal of Consumer Psychology, Psychology & Marketing, Journal of
Public Policy & Marketing, and Communication Research. Professor Friestad
is a past president and fellow of the Society for Consumer Psychology.
Peter Wright is the Edwin E. and June Woldt Cone Professor of Marketing at
the Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon. He was previously
a professor and head of the marketing department at the Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University, and a visiting scholar at the Harvard University
School of Business. His work has been published in the Journal of Consumer
Research, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Marketing
Research, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Management Science, Journal
of Marketing, and the Journal of Applied Psychology. Professor Wright is a
past president and fellow of the Association for Consumer Research.
xv
1
Deception in the Marketplace
Deception pervades human social life. Practicing deceptive persuasion

and coping with other people’s attempts to deceive you are fundamental
social activities in every domain of daily life. In writing this book we will
explore varied perspectives on deceptive persuasion. ἀ ere are, of course,
similarities across these domains regarding concepts of how deceptive
persuasion is practiced, detected, and resisted. People may try optimis-
tically to develop some broad general understanding about deceptive
behaviors, which they hope they can apply across all social domains. ἀ ey
then will try to rely on these general beliefs, theories, and skills as they
move from one social context to another. However, our goal in this book
is to motivate more research on marketplace deception. Deception is one
of the most important phenomena in the American marketplace. It is not
solely a legal issue. Most marketing text books and writings on market-
place deception treat deception as a legal topic that is mainly of interest to
corporate attorneys, judges, juries, and government regulators. However,
in this book we will showcase it as a central problem of consumer behav-
ior. As such, we propose that individual consumers must act on their own
to protect themselves from marketers’ misleading and deceptive commu-
nications. ἀ ey need to be self-reliant, and their first line of defense is their
own self-protection skills. Individual consumers cannot rely on govern-
ment policies and regulations, or the byzantine legal enforcement system,
to protect them from being deceived. ἀ erefore, the socio-psychological
processes and socio-cultural factors that influence a consumer’s market-
place deception-protection knowledge and skills go well beyond reliance
on legal or regulatory protections.
Deception protection skill is a critical life skill. So our first port of entry
for studying deception in the marketplace is through the minds of indi-
vidual consumers as they struggle to acquire practical deception-protec-
tion skills attuned to the modern marketplace. Deception protection is
1
2 Deception in the Marketplace
an important component of a person’s general self-efficacy, shaping their

confidence to effectively handle the problems they confront in the major
social domains of their life. Our second port of entry is a concern that
the American marketplace has a cancer, and that cancer is deception.
Deceptive marketing is pervasive, and deceptive marketing harms con-
sumers. It harms their health and their welfare, their financial resources,
their privacy, their self-esteem, and their trust in society. Deceptive mar-
keting undermines fair competition, and it demeans the profession and
practice of marketing.
So, because we believe consumers can learn to protect themselves
from marketplace deceptions we arrive at our third port of entry,
which is the opportunity and need for educational interventions that
focus directly on teaching people deception-protection skills applicable
to the marketplace. Our motivation for analyzing the social psychol-
ogy of deception in the marketplace is not just intellectual curiosity
about an under-researched topic. Rather, we see it as a vital step toward
designing effective training programs for youngsters and adults that
are based on research into how consumers learn (or do not learn) and
how they can protect themselves from marketplace deception. In addi-
tion to a deeper understanding of how consumers cope with deception,
we seek to examine how individual marketing managers think about
whether or not to attempt deception. What makes a brand manager or
advertising strategist decide to embed some form of deceptiveness into
a marketing communication campaign? What leads other marketing
managers to do their best to avoid misleading and deceiving consum-
ers? We examine this for its inherent interest and because teaching
consumers deception protection skills may require teaching them how
deceptive marketers think.
Although marketplace deception engages the minds and arouses the
passions of a wide spectrum of society—individual consumers, parents,
social commentators, child advocates, educators, government regulators,
legal scholars, consumer protection activists, marketing practitioners,
media satirists and cartoonists—research on marketplace deception is
scarce and out of balance with the importance of the topic in society. ἀ e
legal perspective has guided most of the prior behavioral discussions of
marketplace deception. For example, the groundbreaking books about
marketplace deception by Ivan Preston (1975,1994) and Jef Richards
(1990) drew on behavioral theories and measurement tools to help readers
understand how Federal Trade Commission regulators and the courts
can and do deal with deception. It is our position that much of the prior
Deception in the Marketplace 3
research on deceptive marketing was done with the goal of influencing

public policy or legal practices, rather than with building sound theoreti-
cal understandings of the social psychology of consumer and marketer
behavior regarding deception.
We hope to motivate scholars in the fields of marketing and consumer
behavior, social psychology, communication, education, and sociology,
to think much more about the important research questions related to
the process, practice, perception, and prevention of deception in the mar-
ketplace. We also hope to motivate all those who study persuasion and
social influence to refocus their research toward this complex and fasci-
nating topic, and do more research on how to educate and motivate lay
people to detect, control, and resist real-world deceptions. We want read-
ers who have not thought much about deception in the marketplace to
think more about it and to think differently about it. We want readers who
have thought a lot about deception in general, and in social contexts other
than the marketplace, to understand more about deception in the context
of the twenty-first century marketplace. ἀ is book is written in the spirit
of what is now being called “transformative” consumer research (Mick,
2006). Transformational consumer research is research aimed at helping
consumers help themselves. Its goal is to transform the lives of consumers
positively and to help serve consumer welfare interests more so than the
interests of corporate marketing mangers. Doing such research will also
transform the field of consumer research.
Deception in the Modern Marketplace
Deception is a central and inevitable part of marketplace interactions

between marketers and consumers. Consumers and marketers engage
in what is best thought of as adversarial cooperation. As long as mar-
ketplaces have existed, merchants, marketers, advertisers, salespeople,
and con artists have tried to mislead and confuse the potential buyers of
their products and services. In ancient Rome, Cathay, and Alexandria,
merchants used misleading persuasion tactics that are still used in mod-
ern Hong Kong, Nairobi, Los Angeles, and the global community of the
World Wide Web. In this contest of minds an atmosphere of suspicion,
caveat emptor—buyer beware—has long been the prevailing rule of play.
In today’s world, we can be even more pointed in our borrowing from
ancient Latin: Caveat lictor—readers of marketing materials and corpo-
rate publications beware! Caveat spectator—viewers of television ads and
marketplace visual representations beware! And because we now live in

the cyber world—caveat “surfer”—Internet users beware!
In the early twenty-first century our everyday world has become super
saturated with marketing persuasion attempts. Because so many of these
attempts are potentially misleading, we spend our lives as consumers in
constant self-protection marketplace-survival mode. U.S. Federal Trade
Commission surveys show that consumer fraud in America victimizes
almost twenty-five million people each year, which is over 10% of the
entire population. And this is just the tip of the deception iceberg because
it only includes detected and reported deceptions that are illegal. Children
and adolescents grow up as the targets of marketers’ persuasion attempts,
living what has been called a commercialized childhood in a persuasion
nation. Adult consumers struggle throughout their lifespan to cope with
an ever-changing array of misleading marketing techniques and tactics.
ἀ ese range in scope and sophistication from the well- planned multime-
dia marketing campaigns of large corporations to the modern versions
of small-scale scams, con games, and swindles that have been with us for
centuries. On the other side of the marketplace, managers and salespeople
try to understand how various marketing activities may mislead, harm,
or alienate customers and thereby damage company reputations and
personal careers. ἀ ey think about whether to intentionally, or through
willful negligence, practice deceptive marketing. ἀ ey sometimes think
about how to intentionally do the very best they can to keep from deceiv-
ing consumers.
Marketers operate at a boundary between providing consumers
with deceptions that the consumers will embrace and adore (enter-
tainment, comedy, drama, story telling, visual effects) and avoiding
deceptions that will harm consumers and competition. We propose
that this borderline is an interesting area of behavior to consider from
a research standpoint. Does this blurring of the lines between taboo
deceptiveness and valued deceptiveness influence how marketers and
consumers make those distinctions? How can consumers sort through
all that and self-protect adequately? How does this blurring of lines
affect individuals whose professions require them to move back and
forth between creating valued deception experiences that consumers
crave, and trying to avoid all deceptions that misdirect a person’s buy-
ing decisions?
We acknowledge that consumers often engage in deception-seeking
behaviors such as devouring novels or attending movies and plays, and
that deception is a vital aspect of art and entertainment. In this context
consumers evaluate and enjoy the author’s skillful deception of the

audience in the plot and characters, as well as the drama of the char-
acters themselves who discuss and expose their interpersonal decep-
tions of one another. ἀ rough these experiences the audience learns
about how deception is conceived and executed in a character’s mind
and actions. ἀ e marketplace also provides the opportunity to purchase
professional services in deception detection (e.g., police interrogators)
or deceptive skills (e.g., attorneys, advertising professionals, doctors).
In this context there may be difficult issues raised about the level and
types of deceptions the buyer wants and does not want versus the pro-
vider’s views of how to provide the service effectively with or without
using some deception. Providing these types of professional services
could be thought of as akin to dramatic performances, in that there is
tension and negotiation and possible misunderstanding and misalign-
ment between what level and type of deceptions the buyer wants and
needs versus those the provider believes are essential to successfully
provide the service.
ἀ is book is focused on how consumers can detect, neutralize and resist
the varied types of deception that face modern consumers on a daily basis.
Examples of these include
1. Deceptions that are rooted in the careful choice of words and the con-
struction of prose texts to imply things without stating them
2. ἀ e strategic digital alteration of photos, videos, and other visual
representations
3. Misrepresentations via numerical information and calculations, statis-
tical information, and research results
4. ἀ e artful omission, masking, camouflage, and obfuscation of information
5. Strategic uses of distraction and information overload
6. Using persuasion tactics that depend on deceptiveness to be effective,
and using subverted persuasion tactics as accomplices to deception to
decrease consumer caution and suspicion
7. Actions designed to build friendship and shared-interests relationships
with customers
8. Displaying false emotions in sales and service delivery situations
9. Incomplete and misleading framings of comparisons, risk information
and decision problems
10. Inadequate information search and product usage instructions
11. Brand mimicking and artful advertising confusion
12. Fabricated brand personalities and brand images
13. Disguising product placements in movies, television shows, and
Web sites
14. Disguising hired laypeople as everyday consumers to execute so-called

ambush or guerilla marketing
15. Exaggeration, puffery, and marketing bullshit
16. Blatant outright lying about product attributes and usage consequences
ἀ e topic of marketplace deception is important because when people see

deceptions and frauds everywhere, even in high-consequence markets
such as health care, financial services, and housing, overall levels of soci-
etal mistrust may increase. Societal mistrust is further magnified when
people perceive an imbalance between the limited skills and resources
consumers have to protect themselves from being duped compared to the
substantial resources and expertise of modern marketing organizations.
We suspect that in the public mind, the perceived threat from marketplace
fraud and deception is magnified by other societal happenings, such as
the spectacle of lying and deception by national leaders and political can-
didates, and the dangers of personal privacy invasions opened up recently
by the global Internet.
Misleading and Deceptive: Defining Marketplace Deception
ἀ e concepts of “deception” and “deceptive” are ambiguous, socio-cultur-

ally constructed notions. Conceptions of deception vary across cultures
and across generations in a culture. We examine the definitions offered
from the perspectives of the community of western academic research-
ers, the American legal community, and the professional deception plan-
ner. First, drawing on the research literatures of the social sciences, Masip,
Garrrido, and Herrero (2004) thoroughly reviewed various definitions of
deception. ἀ ey proposed an integrative definition that describes decep-
tion as “the deliberate attempt, whether successful or not, to conceal,
fabricate, and/or manipulate in any other way factual and/or emotional
information, by verbal and/or nonverbal means, in order to create or
maintain … [in someone] … a belief that the communicator … considers
false” (p. 1487). ἀ is definition incorporates notions of a communicator’s
intentionality and prior beliefs. We will elaborate on this definition in sev-
eral ways to make it more relevant and applicable to real world market-
place deception.
First, the inclusion of the concepts of “intentional” and “deliberate”
deceptiveness in general social sciences definitions are there to provide an
exception for cases where people do inadvertent deception, deception out
of ignorance, and deception due to the understandable inability to know,

remember, and communicate “the truth” competently. In general discus-
sions much is made of distinguishing inadvertent or unintentional decep-
tion from real deception, which requires a consciously intended attempt
to deceive. Usually, this distinction is meant to excuse individuals who did
not know that what they were saying, showing, or implying was actually
false. So, for example, a child or adolescent who misremembers or misre-
ports on something she did or witnessed is not, in this view, really doing
deception. ἀ e key issue here is that sometimes people will act deceptively
without intending to even though they have done the best they can to be
nondeceptive. It is our position that no such excuses should apply for mar-
ketplace deceptions.
In marketplace communication, all deceptiveness is intentional. All
marketing communications are consciously planned, designed, and exe-
cuted by communication professionals. In our view, a marketer is always
responsible for any actions or inactions that have a reasonable likelihood
of misleading and deceiving consumers. Marketers have access to the
resources and expertise necessary to fully educate themselves about the
deceptive implications of their marketing activities. So, for marketers to
do “the best they can” to be nondeceptive requires that they educate them-
selves so they are in a position to understand when and how their actions
or omissions may mislead. By taking this step marketers can control their
actions so as to avoid deceiving consumers, unless of course they want to
deceive consumers.
Our second adaptation of the Masip group’s definition relates to the
requirement that the belief being espoused is considered false by the
communicator. We accept that in the realm of everyday deception by lay
people, everyone cannot be expected to invest heavily in learning about
the validity of their statements every time they utter something. However,
in the marketplace, a better standard is that marketers should be held
responsible if they even “suspect” that a belief they encourage consumers
to hold is false, and that marketers should know if their representations
are likely to create misunderstandings or inaccurate beliefs. ἀ e marketer,
who has the resources, time, expertise, and responsibility to learn as much
as possible about the validity of statements and about the way the overall
presentation of those statements could mislead consumers, should be held
accountable for deception that occurs through malevolence, negligence,
recklessness, or carelessness.
Finally, in social science domains other than the marketplace, decep-
tion is typically defined so that it includes a wide range of inconsequential
and benign communications which can be described as everyday,

interpersonal “little lies” about one’s beliefs, feelings, or autobiography
(Depaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). For
example, in two studies where participants kept careful diaries of their
conversations, college students reported lying in approximately one out
of every three of their social interactions, and people drawn from the
larger community said they lied in one out of every five social inter-
actions (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). ἀ ese lies
were mainly self-presentational statements about individuals’ personal
feelings, beliefs, achievements, past actions, future plans, and immediate
whereabouts. In those studies, as in most of the research on lay people’s
deceptiveness in everyday conversations, the definition of deception
included misrepresenting a private internal state, for example someone
saying that they felt fine when they really felt a little stressed or sickly, or
that they like someone when they actually do not. Also, in everyday social
life, lay communicators may be deceptive because they have unreliable
communication competencies that result in “unprepared” deceptions.
ἀ ey do not elaborately construct, redesign, rehearse, and pretest these
little deceptions, so message recipients may often be misled and deceived
because the speaker simply cannot craft and deliver a clear, nondecep-
tive, relevant message. ἀ us, for everyday interpersonal exchanges, the
layperson’s deceptions and communication incompetence may be con-
founded. However, it is our position that neither the claim that commu-
nicated misinformation is inconsequential nor that the communicator is
incompetent applies to the marketplace where messages are profession-
ally developed and delivered.
Legalistic Definitions
Deceptiveness in commercial speech, which includes all marketing com-

munications, is defined and regulated more strictly than any other form of
speech in America. Because of this, professional marketing organizations
often have their own in-house or outside consulting legal staff and screen-
ing process to judge possible deceptions from a technical, legal standpoint.
Beyond that, there are specialized legal consulting services that provide
advice on how to interpret legal rules and precedents on deception. We
suspect that many social scientists will be surprised at how broadly legal
rules on deception are construed. Indeed, the legal viewpoint is more
all encompassing and stricter in assignment of responsibility than the
viewpoint on lying behavior that is found in most social science research.

ἀ is is because marketplace deceptions are often serious and consequen-
tial to both consumers and to fair competition in general. ἀ e various
definitions of marketplace deception that have been proposed within the
American legal system reflect different purposes. One such purpose is reg-
ulation to protect consumers, making the legal definition by the Federal
Trade Commission a good place to start. We examine legal definitions
here because these provide us a distillation of societal thinking. ἀ ese
definitions reflect the thinking over time of legal scholars, educated lay
people, and pragmatic attorneys and regulators.
ἀ e Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibits unfair or decep-
tive business practices defined as “a representation, omission, or practice
that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circum-
stances, to the consumer’s detriment” (FTC, 1984). ἀ e word represen-
tation suggests a wide variety of possible means by which deceptive
practices can be conveyed, including different modalities (e.g., words,
statistics, pictures, facial expressions) and different tactics. ἀ e defini-
tion explicitly notes that omissions can be deceptive. ἀ e phrase “likely
to mislead the consumer” suggests that a practice can be deceptive even
if no one has as yet actually been deceived, which is consistent with a
focus on protecting the public from deception rather than punishing
the seller after deception has been proven. By omitting any mention of
seller motivation, the law does not require that deception be proven to be
intentional. Proving intention would add a layer of difficulty to policing
or prosecuting deception.
ἀ e Federal Trade Commission’s policy on what specific acts will be
considered as deceptive also provides an important perspective on cur-
rent societal views (Richards & Preston, 1992). ἀ e FTC states that its staff
members will presume any of the following to be potentially deceptive:
(a) express claims by a marketer; (b) omitted information the seller knew,
or should have known, ordinary consumers would need to evaluate the
product or service; (c) claims the seller knew, or should have known, were
false; (d) implied claims, where there is proof the seller intended to convey
them; (e) misrepresentations or misleading information involving health,
safety, or other areas with which the reasonable consumer would be con-
cerned; and (f) misrepresentations or misleading information pertaining
to the product’s central characteristics, for example, anything involving
the product’s purpose, safety, efficacy, price, durability, performance, war-
ranties, quality, or regarding findings by another agency (e.g., a research
and testing firm; the Food and Drug Administration) about the product.
Further, marketing misrepresentations are deceptive in the FTC’s view if

they affect any important cognitive or overt behavior by a consumer that
influences the person’s prepurchase decision process, the actual purchase
event, or postpurchase behaviors in using the product. So misleading acts
that affect any of the following consumer activities, among others, can be
defined as deceptive according to this perspective: (a) information search
activities, such as a person’s decision to stop searching for more infor-
mation about the advertised product or another competing product; (b)
consideration set formation—that is, a person’s decision to exclude cer-
tain products from further consideration based on what he or she already
believes about the advertised product or those other products; (c) impor-
tant and useful evaluative criteria, that is, a person’s judgments about
which product attributes they want to learn about and how to weight dif-
ferent attributes; (d) usage beliefs, that is, beliefs about how to use a product
effectively and safely under foreseeable usage conditions and given limited
information-processing and physical skills; (e) purchase timing decisions,
for example, a person’s decision to not buy anything in a product category
in the near future; a person’s decision to buy the advertised product hur-
riedly and soon; or (f) the final choice of one specific product over another
final contender.
ἀ e academic literature on marketplace deception, which usually has
focused on deceptive advertising, has generated definitions that both mirror
the legal definition and differ in some respects. Richards (2000) reviewed
the differences between some consumer psychologists’ definitions and the
FTC’s perspective. For example, Gardner (1975, p. 42) offered the follow-
ing: “If an advertisement (or advertising campaign) leaves the consumer
with an impression and or belief different from what would normally be
expected if the consumer had reasonable knowledge, and that impression
and/or belief is factually untrue or potentially misleading, then deception
is said to exist.” Gardner elaborated three categories of deception. ἀ e first
was an “unconscionable lie” in which a claim is completely false; the sec-
ond is a “claim-fact discrepancy” in which a claim would require a clarifi-
cation for it to be properly understood and evaluated; and a “claim-belief
interaction” which occurs because of an incorrect inference by consumers
based on their prior beliefs. Gardner’s focus on overt deceptive statements
and claims thus excluded a large set of other deceptive tactics.
Jacoby and Hoyer (1987) expanded the boundaries of deception by
describing a misleading or deceptive marketing communication as one
that “causes … through its verbal content, design, structure, and/or visual
artwork, or the context in which it appears, at least N% (some percentage
to be decided) of a representative group of relevant consumers to have a

common impression or belief regarding the advertised product, brand or
service … that is incorrect or unjustified.” ἀ is definition reflects a con-
cern with the operational measurement of deception to establish legal
proof in court cases. By stipulating causality, this definition requires elab-
orate testing procedures in order to rule out other sources of incorrect
belief. ἀ is definition also champions the idea that there should be some
threshold quantitative standard (although unspecified) for the number of
buyers who are misled, and that those who are misled should be “relevant”
consumers. ἀ e stipulation that consumers have a common misimpres-
sion differentiates legal deception from consumers’ own random-error
mistakes in comprehension and seems to exclude cases where a marketing
presentation creates a variety of misperceptions rather than one that all or
most consumers share in common.
However, we believe that the most important thing to appreciate about
legal definitions is that in actual legal proceedings the system relies heav-
ily on human judgments about deceptiveness. While some researchers
favor an empirically valid test procedure, the legal code defines a range
of possibly deceptive acts and then lets judges, jury members, attorneys,
expert witnesses, and FTC staff members determine whether or not spe-
cific actions by a marketer will be or have been deceptive and misleading.
So, in many cases, it is the culturally learned lay theories or mental models
of deception in the minds of these individuals that define given instances
of illegal, sanctionable, or impermissible marketing communication. It is
also worth noting that the FTC’s broad perspective reflects the active par-
ticipation by consumer behavior researchers in the agency’s rule-making
processes over the past three decades. ἀ at participation helps assure that
deception is interpreted in this highly serious domain as realistically as
makes sense, according to prevailing behavioral research on human judg-
ment and social cognition.
Marketplace Deception Is Persuasion
All of marketplace persuasion need not involve deception, but all of

marketplace deception is done to persuade. Marketplace deception is,
in essence, persuasion (Miller & Stiff, 1988) and is always instrumental
to a marketer’s persuasion goals. It is not done purely to affect consumer
beliefs as an end in itself, nor to simply entertain, amuse, or amaze. To be
sure, marketplace deceptions seek to attract and hold attention and create
a state-of-mind or state-of-mood, but the end goal is always persuasion.

Deception is a major omnibus persuasion and social influence strategy.
Any act or strategy of persuasion can entail deception. Any act or strategy
of persuasion can be used as a “deception accomplice,” so that it bolsters
the success of a deception carried out somewhere in a given message or
campaign. However, when we examined the prominent writings on social
influence theory and research, we found scant mention of deception as a
central defining characteristic of persuasion or as an essential class of per-
suasion strategies. In parallel, when we examined the abundant theorizing
on deception in everyday social life, there is scant reference to or inte-
gration of the theoretical views offered by prominent persuasion theories.
ἀ is latter void may be because deception research has initially focused
so much on the everyday unprepared telling of little lies in conversations
between individuals that conceiving of this as persuasion makes it seem
overly formal and ominous.
We suspect however that this historic compartmentalization of decep-
tion research and persuasion research is due mainly to the pervasive spe-
cialization that occurs within fields in the social sciences, together with
the way in which early influential research streams guided the topical
progression in a field. For example, the pioneering deception researchers
(e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969) did not approach deception from the per-
spective of the social psychology of persuasion, nor was it those research-
ers’ forte or realm of expertise; they were initially concerned with facial
and other signals of inner emotions. Similarly, attitude change theories
did not develop in such a way that deceptiveness (vs. nondeceptiveness)
was a theoretical concern. Indeed, the science of social persuasion is,
to a large degree, a science of deceptive social persuasion. Lab experi-
ments provide the lion’s share of empirical evidence on the psychology
of persuasion. And, in most of the lab studies that social psychologists
and consumer researchers have done on persuasion, the message content
and the contextual information vital to the persuasion tactics that were
presented to the subjects were simply fabricated and staged (made up)
by a researcher. ἀ e true goals of the actors and impostors playing their
parts in the researcher’s staged reality were hidden or misrepresented.
ἀ e actual truth of the message statements in the stimulus messages was
of little concern because these messages were made up to create content
that operationalized a construct of interest to the researcher. DePaulo,
Wetzel, Sternglanz, & Wilson (2003), leading deception scholars, discuss
exploitative deception as follows: “We think that the skills of impostors
and confidence artists are akin to those of the best experimental social
psychologists. Working in a private lab, they need to stage a compelling

reality, draw people into it, and then keep them so involved in the show
that they have no time to question the authenticity of the performance”
(p. 402). We are not criticizing these uses of deceptiveness for research
purposes. However, it is important to recognize that what has actually
been studied in lab experiments on persuasion is in essence successfully
deceptive persuasion.
Deceptions Are Context Bound
An act’s deceptiveness must be assessed within the overall communica-

tion context in which it is embedded. Some actions are deceptive across
a wide range of contexts and audiences. However, an act which, by itself,
is not inherently deceptive or misleading when taken out of its real-world
communication context can nevertheless be misleading and deceptive
within the specific communication context in which it is used by a mar-
keter or encountered by a consumer. For example, a verbal statement that
by itself might be clear and accurately interpretable in isolation from other
message ingredients and external distractions, may well be deceptive and
misleading when it is buried amidst unrelated information in a fast-paced,
high-information-load telemarketing call or television commercial. So,
examining an act out of context (e.g., having a consumer carefully read,
reread, and consider, a written sentence shown to them in conspicuous
typeface and asking them if they understand its meaning, when the state-
ment was actually said aloud to consumers amidst a barrage of infor-
mation in a telemarketing call or flashed on-screen in small print in a
television ad) would be a meaningless way of judging the deceptiveness of
the actual act by a marketer.
As another example of how overall context matters, an honestly exe-
cuted persuasion tactic—for example, a valid statement that medical doc-
tor so-and-so prescribes XYZ prescription drug for his own family—can
be presented so that it bolsters the deceptiveness of a subsequent conceal-
ment, misrepresentation, or omission, in the same message. Buller and
Burgoon (1994) noted that even in everyday deception, liars may not rely
on a solitary lie, but rather they weave several lies together such that ancil-
lary deceptions are used to bolster the apparent credibility of the false core
deception, and to bolster the impression that the liar is a truthful person.
ἀ e view that deception is more than a single act taken out of context is
essential to understanding marketplace deception.
A Deception Agent’s Definition: It Is Deception

if Persuasion Targets Perceive It as Such
A compelling account of how a deception agent would think about practic-

ing deception is contained in a remarkable document prepared for the U.S.
Department of Defense. In this well-researched treatise, Fred Cohen and
his colleagues (Cohen, Lambert, Preston, Berry, Stewart, & ἀ omas, 2001)
explain how a deception strategist who is well versed in cognitive social psy-
chology should plan and execute deceptions in the domain of covert military
intelligence and national defense operations. Cohen et al. (2001) presented a
definition of deception that is different in perspective from the social sci-
ences and legalistic definitions. ἀ eir definition, which views deception
strictly from the vantage point of a brutally realistic deception perpetrator,
states that “Deception is the set of acts that seek to increase the chances that
a set of targets will behave in a desired fashion when they would be less likely
to behave in that fashion if they knew of those acts.” ἀ e last half-dozen
words are critical. ἀ is definition emphasizes the pivotal role of the target’s
perception of a deceiver’s deceptive acts and intent. If a target believes or
suspects, based on their own thought processes or through being told by a
third party, that an act or a sequence of acts by the agent is “deceptive,” then
that belief itself ruins or seriously reduces the deception’s intended effects,
and thus dilutes or eliminates the impact of the agent’s overall persuasion
attempt. ἀ us, an action is deceptive if the target perceives it to be decep-
tive, and that interpretation by the target alters the whole of the person’s
responses to any other actions taken by the perpetrator.
Extending this highly pragmatic point of view from the world of secret
agents to the world of consumer behavior leads us to a provocative repre-
sentation of how a professional marketer bent on accomplishing persua-
sion could think. In this scenario, the marketer believes that they must not
be suspected at all, certainly must not be caught, and must indeed pull off
the entire deception (i.e., get total buy-in by the target consumers to the
intended altered reality) in order to successfully achieve their marketing
persuasion goals. If successful persuasion is the paramount and overrid-
ing goal, then acts that are perceived as deceptive by their targets must be
defined as deceptions by the persuasion planner, because perceived decep-
tions act as “discovered” deceptions in a consumer’s mind. It is the con-
sumer’s perception that gives the persuasion-related act a special meaning
that then alters the psychology of the persuasion attempt (cf. Friestad &
Wright 1994). ἀ at interpretation can undermine and ruin the market-
ing presentation’s persuasive impact. ἀ e implication of this perspective
is that for a persuasion planner, something that target consumers “could”

reasonably interpret as a deception “must be” treated as a deception in
judging what to include in a deceptive persuasion attempt.
ἀ is definition of deception highlights the target consumers’ decep-
tion beliefs, and raises those beliefs to a position of great power because of
their presumed impact on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a decep-
tion perpetrator’s persuasion attempt. ἀ us, it does not matter if the com-
municator’s act(s) do not adhere to a social scientist’s, or a judge’s, or a
regulator’s definition of a deception. What matters ultimately is that the
intended effect of the act on a target consumer has been ruined by his
or her belief that the communicator was attempting deception. ἀ is is a
highly pragmatic, instrumental-effects definition of deception. Perceived
deceptiveness is the significant issue in the case of marketplace decep-
tions. Consumers judge for themselves whether a perceived action by a
marketer is to be treated as a deception attempt. ἀ e cognitive process by
which that occurs is of central interest to researchers, as well as the pro-
cess by which consumers issue their own penalties for perceived betrayals,
without recourse to the lie-detection technologies, specialized definitions,
or formal deception-detection security systems that get used in some
other contexts (e.g., criminal investigations and national defense). ἀ us,
even well intentioned marketers must be highly concerned, as Cohen
et al. argue, with avoiding even the appearance of acting deceptively to
individual consumers who are applying their own personal deception
detection rules.
Ethics and Morality
One thing that makes marketplace deception complex to analyze is that

in general, deceptiveness per se is not considered inherently unethical or
immoral. In reading about deception, we sometimes found that decep-
tiveness gets confounded with ethicality. However, judging or believing
that some act of communication is deceptive is not the same as judging
or believing that that act is unethical. ἀ is is because people in and out of
academia argue that deception can be used for benign purposes “in the
target’s best interest,” that deceiving someone into doing something that
turns out to be beneficial to them is indeed moral (or at least not immoral),
and that deception enables gracious and cooperative human relationships,
which would likely be destroyed by full disclosure of true opinions and
beliefs. For example, in the authoritative Handbook of Moral Development
(Killen & Smetana, 2006), which reviews research on how children and
others develop moral values and belief systems, there is scarcely a men-
tion of how people learn to think about deception. When we asked one of
the editors about this, she explained to us unhesitatingly that researchers
on moral behavior believe that deception is not inherently immoral. It is
relatively easy to think of situations where the ends appear to justify the
deceptive means, at least according to some systems of ethics beliefs. For
example, deceiving someone who is reluctant to try a new pharmaceutical
drug into using it can seem justifiable and ethical when in fact using that
drug alleviates their pain and cures their illness, while not using the drug
leaves them in pain and debilitated. However, our point of view is that, in
the marketplace, corporations rarely perpetrate deceptions on consumers
“in the consumer’s best interests,” or with benign intent, and that actual
deceptions harm consumers, harm fair competition, harm corporate
assets, and destroy corporate cultures. Moreover, using or appearing to
use intentional or negligent deception is a risky, desperate, and often ill-
conceived management strategy. Relying on deceptive marketing is a fail-
ure of intelligent management, true innovation, and long-range vision.
Marketplace Deception Is a Special Domain of Societal Deception
To function competently in the clutter of the twenty-first century market-

place, people need to take into account the specific details of marketers’
strategies and the real world task environment of marketplace decision-
making. We believe that marketplace deception is itself a sufficiently com-
plex domain of deception to warrant its study as a distinct research topic.
Marketplace participants and observers are separated by the thought-
worlds of their particular educational backgrounds, academic disciplines
and professional training; by their personal value systems and the val-
ues they attribute to other groups; and by their chosen profession. People
have difficulty communicating with each other about the problem or the
realities of marketplace deception. Individuals and groups see only a part
of the overall marketplace deception problem through the filter of their
expertise (or areas of ignorance), personal values, and professional career
agendas. However, the modern marketplace is a morass of specific contex-
tual features, including its different types of communication media, mar-
keting methods, product markets, and decision-making problems. And,
with apologies to Mies van der Rohe (1969), the Devil rather than God is
in the details. For example, what a twenty-year old adolescent has learned
about how to cope with her friends’ and suitors’ persuasion and deception
ploys will not, by itself, prepare her sufficiently to engage competently with
sophisticated telemarketers, trained salespeople, or multimedia marketing
campaigns. A major challenge for today’s consumer is to become skilled
at making successful cross-context adaptations when protecting against
deceptive persuasion. Deception self-protection among high school friends
or in everyday work environments is not the same as effective self protec-
tion against professional marketers’ ploys. We highlight throughout this
book the unique environment of marketplace deception. Doing so should
help us better understand how research on deceptive persuasion in other
specialized contexts (e.g., autobiographical lying between acquaintances;
eyewitness reports; interrogations of suspected criminals; courtroom tri-
als; auditing of corporate financial reports) applies, or does not apply, to
the modern marketplace, and how future research on deception in the
marketplace must proceed.
A Framework for Examining Marketplace Deception
In this section we present a basic general framework that we hope will give
readers an organized overview of the phenomenon of marketplace decep-
tion. ἀ is framework is not a general theory or model of marketplace decep-
tion — that would be premature. Rather we describe what a complete theory
of marketplace deception should ultimately be able to explain. Studying
marketplace deception makes for an important, but manageable, domain
of inquiry. It is sufficiently bounded to get researchers to initiate research
projects. It gives us a specific, familiar, important, well defined, and richly
detailed real world context to stimulate our thinking. And it yields insights
of practical value to consumers, educators, managers, and regulators trying
to make sense of and intervene in the marketplace. So, a conceptual frame-
work of marketplace deception should include the following factors.
We must ultimately explain how marketing planners think about
deception, that is, the belief systems, learning experiences, acquired skills,
judgment processes, personal and professional values, organizational cul-
tures, and situational conditions that influence marketing managers and
their helpers in planning and executing attempts to mislead and deceive
consumers, or in planning (or failing to plan) how to take reasonable
preventive actions to protect consumers from being misled. A complete
theory must explain how marketplace institutions and societal values
shape the deception-related actions of marketers. In America societal
values create a system aimed at promoting fair and vigorous competition,

protecting free speech, encouraging consumer choice, and protecting
consumer safety. ἀ e institutions that regulate marketplace deception in
the U.S. were created by federal legislation, and reflect a societal attempt
to accomplish the four goals cited above even when those goals may be
in conflict with each other. Second, a complete theory would explain the
specific belief systems, learning experiences, acquired skills, judgment
processes, values, and situational conditions that influence how consum-
ers try to self-protect themselves from marketers’ deceptive persuasion
attempts, and that influence their success at accomplishing this decep-
tion self-protection across their marketplace decisions. ἀ ere is scant sys-
tematic research on how individuals can effectively detect, neutralize, and
resist deceptive marketing. A third factor to explain is the role of regula-
tory bodies, communication technology and media, consumer education
programs, popular culture, the economic system, and related cultural val-
ues in facilitating and hindering consumers’ achieved level of protection
from the effects of marketplace deception. And finally, a theory of market-
place deception should address the societal and economic consequences of
all the above. At the societal level, pervasive marketplace deception prob-
ably contributes to the erosion of societal trust in all social domains. A
marketplace where nothing can be believed makes it impossible to reward
marketers for offering better products than competitors. Deception affects
mistrust at the level of the individual consumer, and at another level, an
organization’s apparent reliance on, tolerance for, and rewarding of mar-
ketplace deceptions will affect the internal level of trust among its own
employees and by extension its overall organizational culture.
The Scope of This Book
ἀ is book is not an encyclopedic research review. Rather, it is an attempt

to selectively analyze and weave together some of the theoretical concepts
and research from different fields that we believe help in understanding and
researching marketplace deception in its many forms. ἀ e questions and
issues that we discuss are the following:
What makes marketing communications misleading and deceptive?

What are the psychological processes that underlie deceptive persua-
sion tactics?
How do marketing managers decide to prevent or practice deception in

planning their marketing campaigns?
What skills must consumers learn to recognize and effectively cope with
marketers’ deception tactics?
What does research tell us about how people detect, neutralize and resist
misleading persuasion attempts?
What does research suggest about how to teach marketplace deception pro-
tection skills to adolescents and adults?
What should educators of adolescents, emerging adults, and mature adults
understand to design teaching materials and learning environments
that help consumers gain self-protection skills for detecting, neutral-
izing and resisting deceptive persuasion by marketers?
What roles can consumer behavior researchers and other social scientists
play in helping others to understand the problem of misleading and
deceptive marketing tactics?
And, especially, what are the exciting research opportunities?
More specifically, in Chapter 2, we examine behavioral scientists’ the

orizing about deceptive persuasion processes. In Chapters 3 and 4, we
discuss the types of deception tactics that others have identified or that
we have identified in writing this book. In Chapter 5, we examine how
professional deception perpetrators think about strategic deception, as
evidenced by their writings and by analyses of what they do in prac-
tice. We then shift our focus to deception from the consumer’s perspec-
tive. In Chapter 6, we examine research conducted on how lay people
cope psychologically with deception protection without the benefit of
coaching and training programs. In Chapter 7, we discuss the types of
deception-protection skills that consumers need to acquire. In Chapter 8,
we discuss the learning and cognitive development processes that influ-
ence how children and adolescents develop deception protection skills,
and the problems that make it difficult for people to master deception
protection skills. In Chapter 9, we review studies in which researchers
have designed and tested the effects of various formalized coaching
procedures on consumers’ deception protection behaviors. Finally, in
Chapter 10, we discuss research needs and opportunities related to con-
sumer deception protection programs, frontier issues that face regula-
tory agencies, and how marketplace deception practices affect trust in
specific marketers, in marketing in general, and in the overall sociocul-
tural environment.
2
Theoretical Perspectives on
Deceptive Persuasion
To help understand marketplace deception, we first consider the

erspectives offered by general theoretical conceptions of deception.
p
ἀ ese include Anolli, Balconi and Ciceri’s (2002) miscommunication the-
ory; Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) interpersonal deception theory; Cohen et
al.’s framework for deception (Cohen, Lambert, Preston, Berry, Stewart, &
ἀ omas, 2001); Depaulo et al.’s (Depaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck,
Charlton, & Cooper, 2003) self presentation perspective on everyday
deception; Ekman and Friesen’s (1992) theory of deception cues; Johnson,
Grazioli, and Jamal’s information processing theory of adversarial decep-
tion (Johnson, Grazioli, & Jamal, 1993; Grazioli, 2006); McCornack’s (1992)
information manipulation theory; and economists’ game theoretic mod-
els (Ettinger & Jehiel, 2007; Gneezy, 2005). ἀ ese provide insights more or
less applicable to the realm of marketplace deception. However, many of
these accounts deal with everyday interpersonal deception in conversa-
tions between lay people, which limits their pertinence to the marketplace
realm of organized professional deception campaigns affecting important
consumer buying decisions.
Because deception is persuasion, we also consider what some contem-
porary theories of persuasion and social cognition imply about deceptive
persuasion. ἀ ese include dual-process theories of persuasion (Chaiken,
1987; Petty & Wegener, 1999), models of social influence principles
and tactics (Cialdini, 2001; Pratkanis, 2008), and theorizing about lay
people’s persuasion knowledge (Friestad & Wright, 1994, 1995), meta-
cognitive social judgments (Petty, Brinol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007),
self-protection motivation (Block & Keller, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Rogers,
1993), and aversion to being duped (Campbell, 1995; Vohs, Baumeister,
& Chin, 2007).
21
Deception Theory
In pioneering theorizing on deception, the phenomenon examined was

everyday lying in interpersonal conversations where the deceiver talks
about their personal inner world and past behavior (Zuckerman, Depaulo,
& Rosenthal, 1981; Ekman, 1992; Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al.,
2003; McCornack, 1992). ἀ ese deceptions concern the liar’s purported
personal feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and future plans, and their autobiog-
raphy—what they claim they did, observed, said, thought about, where
they were and when, on prior occasions in the past, and their past achieve-
ments. ἀ at research has focused on cues to lying in everyday interper-
sonal conversations, and lay theories of lie-detection—that is, what cues
lay people use in deception detection and how accurate they are. In this
domain of everyday lying, the lie telling is largely constructed and exe-
cuted on the spot; these are unprepared, unpackaged, unrehearsed little
lies. People deliver such lies for momentary personal convenience; to feel
better about themselves; to appear more virtuous, sophisticated or desir-
able than they believe they are; or to protect themselves and others from
disapproval, conflict, and hurt feelings. ἀ e liars and their target audi-
ences regard these little lies as inconsequential; people feel little discom-
fort in telling them, and do not spend time planning them or worrying
about being caught (Depaulo et al., 2003).
ἀ e rationale for spotlighting everyday lie telling was that these little
interpersonal lies comprise the majority of deception experiences that fill
up people’s lives; everybody does this type of lying all the time and every-
body has to cope with other people doing it. In their impressive review
paper, DePaulo et al. (2003) express that viewpoint, saying that (they think
that) only occasionally do people tell lies in pursuit of material gain or
have to cope with other people’s lies for material gain. However, a different
view (our own) is that marketplace deception is a most important part of
people’s deception experiences over their lifespan because the deceivers
transmit deceptions widely to large segments of the population, and those
deceptions can influence people’s health, safety, and financial choices.
In initial theorizing on everyday deception, Ekman and Friesen (1969)
emphasized the “leakage cues” that liars emit but try to hide, cues which
might convey inner emotions they are experiencing. ἀ ey focused largely
on facial expressions that might distinguish the experience of lying and
concealing from honest conversation. Similarly, Zuckerman et al. (1981)
focused on the thoughts, feelings and psychological processes that are
likely to occur when telling lies versus not telling lies. In particular, they
Theoretical Perspectives on Deceptive Persuasion 23
singled out arousal, guilt and anxiety, and the purported complexity of
lying, relative to truth telling. Ekman (1992) focused more deeply on the
role of emotions in lying. He examined, for example, leaked displays of
emotion due to a liar’s supposed detection apprehension, guilt, excitement
from “duping delight”, and the faking of emotions. Buller and Burgoon
(1996) emphasized, in addition to inner emotions, the stresses and dynam-
ics of ongoing social interactions that entail sequences of give-and-take
actions and adjustments. Buller and Burgoon (1996) emphasized that the
liar’s early discomfort and awkwardness may dissipate as the interaction
moves along, if the liar invests in monitoring the target’s reactions, adapt-
ing the delivery, and thereby gaining more control, and experiencing less
emotionality. ἀ ey introduced a realistic but complicated view of everyday
lying and lie detection, in which the deceiver’s expectations, motivations
and relationship to the target, and the target’s general suspiciousness,
interact.
Depaulo and her colleagues (Depaulo et al., 2003) have emphasized a
self-presentational perspective on everyday lying. ἀ ey focus on the large
subset of instances when everyday lying about inner self and autobio-
graphical details is done for self-presentational purposes. ἀ ey noted that
effective self-presentation requires effortful deception and equally effort-
ful truth telling. ἀ is explains the now-abundant empirical evidence that
cues to deception of the types studied so far are at best faint. ἀ ey derive
five theoretical propositions about better cues that might distinguish lie
telling from not-lie-telling in everyday conversation. ἀ ey predict that
liars will be “less forthcoming” than truth tellers (slow to respond; express
limited details); that their stories will be less compelling (less internally
consistent, engaging, fluent, and active voiced); that liars will be less pleas-
ant and more tense than truth tellers; and that liars will include in their
stories fewer ordinary “imperfections” and less “unusual” content (e.g.,
meanderings in self reports of prior events from memory that stray off
into unexpected associative “asides”).
In our minds, the domain of marketplace deception is in many ways
the polar opposite of the everyday lie-telling context. So, even though
these pioneering ideas about everyday deception are rich and stimulating,
they strike us as fairly irrelevant to understanding marketplace deception.
In marketplace deceptions, there is lying per se, and there is also a huge
array of other clever, deceptive acts and tactics beyond a blatant lie. ἀ e
deception agents are professionally trained and professionally invested in
the success of their deceptions. ἀ ey collaboratively plan a deceptive stra
tegy, consider alternate combinations of tactics to accomplish it, pretest it,
and revise it before using it on key targets, and then monitor and revise it
once it begins. ἀ ey use professional communication craftspeople to con-
struct every element of it. ἀ ey rehearse and rehearse until the speakers
perfect their deliveries and the story presentation is as they intend it to
be. ἀ ey carefully assess targets’ vulnerabilities, distinguishing the easy
prey from the vigilant, skilled consumers. ἀ ey usually do not display
emotional leakage cues, or reflect ongoing cognitive complexities from
suddenly overloading their cognitive processes during execution. ἀ ey
choose the time and place for every transmission. ἀ ey subjugate personal
self-presentational motives to strategic motives. ἀ ey treat their profes-
sional deception activity as a distinct domain of deception, and try not to
confuse it with other interpersonal domains. ἀ ey are savvy about what
psychologists and others believe will be “give-away” cues; they eliminate
such cues, pointedly do the opposite (display “truth-telling” cues), or
invalidate deception cues strategically by varying how they do a deception
attempt and how they do truth telling.
McCornack (1992,1997) presents the useful idea that deception can be
understood, generally, as doing the opposite of cooperative communica-
tion as described by the Gricean principles. ἀ e starting point here is the
well-accepted principle that in every communication between humans,
a listener must, to determine what a speaker means, go beyond his or
her understanding of the simple literal content of the message. To make
this interpretational process work fluently, there is a social “contract” in
which both parties apply shared pragmatic rules to allow the receiver to
accurately infer what the speaker intends to convey via the literal utter-
ances. ἀ ese Gricean maxims of cooperative communication (Grice,
1975) are:
1. Maxim of quantity: ἀ e speaker will hard try to make his or her message
as informative as required, but not more so, for the current purposes of
the exchange. Say just enough so the receiver can understand what you
intend to convey, but no more than that.
2. Maxim of quality: ἀ e speaker will try hard to maximize the message’s
“quality” in terms of veracity and validity. Do not say anything that you
believe to or suspect to be false or for which you lack adequate evidence
about its validity, one way or the other.
3. Maxim of relevance: ἀ e speaker will try hard to say only what he or she
believes will be directly relevant to the receiver for the purposes of the
conversation or exchange.
4. Maxim of manner: ἀ e speaker will try hard to be brief, clear, and crisp,
while avoiding ambiguity and obscurity of expression.
McCornack’s robust insight is that a deception attempt invariably proceeds

by violating one or more of these maxims or deviating from them signifi-
cantly in some way. ἀ e deception agent willfully or recklessly provides too
little or too much information, provides false or inaccurate information or
information of unknown validity, includes information that is irrelevant
and excludes information that is relevant, and presents in ambiguous lan-
guage, arcane visual symbols and numerical forms. Turning this around,
whenever we notice that someone deviates from or violates one or more of
these maxims, that alone should alert us that deception (intentional and/
or reckless) is being attempted. Hence, a consumer’s default interpreta-
tion in a social domain like the marketplace, where deception attempts are
common and the communicators are skillful, should be that all apparent
violations of cooperative communication norms are malevolent in intent,
not just clumsy or discourteous communication.
Sperber and Wilson (1986) describe three pragmatic message interpre-
tation strategies that message recipients can use which differ in sophistica-
tion. In using any of the three strategies, consumers realize that there are
two basic ways in which the communication process can flounder: (a) the
speaker may be incompetent, or (b) the speaker may want to deceive the
consumer. Given that, the consumer can use an interpretive strategy of
“naïve optimism.” In doing this, a consumer assumes the marketer is both
competent and benevolent (cooperative), so that the principle of relevance
is operative, and the first interpretation available to the recipient con-
sistent with that should be accepted. ἀ ere is an intentional bias toward
believing in the communicator’s honesty, and confirming that interpreta-
tion. ἀ e second strategy is “cautious optimism.” ἀ e consumer assumes
the marketer is benevolent but quite possibly incompetent. ἀ e consumer
believes the marketer is trying hard to be honest and relevant but is simply
a poor communicator or did not understand fully what the consumer feels
to be relevant, clear, and sufficient information. So potential deceptions
are given the benefit of the doubt and attributed to poor communication
skills. Sperber and Wilson (1986) call the third strategy “sophisticated
understanding.” In this case, the consumer does not necessarily believe
the marketer is competent or benevolent, but assumes the marketer only
wants to seem competent and benevolent. We can add to this a fourth
interpretation strategy, which we call “sophisticated marketplace under-
standing.” Here, a consumer assumes the marketer is competent but is also
malevolent. ἀ e consumer thinks the marketer fully knows how to craft a
clear relevant presentation tailored to the recipient’s need and fully knows
how to avoid being deceptive if he chooses to, but wants to be deceptive if
it suits his or her purposes. So the sophisticated consumer stays vigilant

because he or she expects a marketer to blend skillful honesty with skillful
deception, and to shift from being competently relevant to competently
deceptive within a message and across presentations.
Anolli, Balconi, and Ciceri (2002) describe deceptive miscommunica-
tion theory (DeMiT) as an attempt to move toward a viable general theory
of deception. ἀ ey echo McCornack’s (1992) view that the early theories of
everyday conversational lying embodied and promoted “hopeful myths”
about the nature of deception and deception detection. ἀ ese myths were
(a) that the deception agent’s act of constructing (encoding) deceptive
messages necessarily entails on the spot active, strategic, and detailed cog-
nitive processing; (b) that constructing and delivering deceptive messages
therefore requires greater cognitive load than constructing and delivering
clear, relevant, truthful messages; (c) that producing deceptive messages is
significantly more physiologically arousing than producing truthful mes-
sages; (d) that there is an identifiable and consistent set of arousal-based
behavioral cues, such as facial expressions, that accompany construction
and delivery of a deception which deceivers “leak” when executing their
messages; (e) that individuals are innately capable (without being tutored)
of successful everyday deception detection; and (f) that deceptive mes-
sages have simple specifiable characteristics that render them distinct
from truthful messages regardless of context.
Anolli et al. (2002) pursue what they see as the ultimate goal for a
theory of deception: to explain how communicators and audiences dis-
tinguish benign fabrication of deceptive acts versus exploitative fabrica-
tion (Goffman, 1969). Anolli et al. make basic distinctions between acts of
deception that help us locate marketplace deception relative to other decep-
tion contexts. First, they distinguish prepared deception from unprepared
deception. A prepared deception is cognitively planned in advance and
its main elements are carefully analyzed. Another distinction is between
high-content deception and low-content deception. High-content decep-
tion concerns a serious topic, is carried out in an important context, and
features notable consequences for the deceiver, the recipient, and other
people. In contrast, low-content deceptions concern a fairly trivial topic,
can occur in any kind of context, and have unimportant consequences for
all concerned. In this framework, high-content deceivers risk losing face,
being considered untrustworthy, losing self-esteem, and suffering strong
negative emotions from being apprehended, such as guilt or shame. ἀ ey
also risk being openly accused of deceit by others who feel aggressive and
prone to retaliate. And in the high-content case, the deception victim risks
feeling duped, and suffering significant actual harm. High-content decep-

tion is done in complicated relational situations, where candid disclosure
is a big issue. So the high-content deceiver’s dilemma is, Is it better for me
to be as nondeceptive as possible, as effectively as possible, and risk failing
to persuade, or to do the deception, prepare some ways to avoid detec-
tion and accusation, and to fight an accusation or deflect it, and to live
with having deceitfully harmed consumers physically, psychologically, or
economically?
We urge that consumer researchers and other social scientists stay
focused on the many highly consequential deceptions that consumers
have to cope with, those that make marketplace deceptions so injurious
to people’s health and welfare. While marketers certainly attempt a lot
of low-content deception concerning trivial products and illusory brand
distinctions, we are more concerned in our book with marketers’ well-
prepared high-content deceptions. We believe that fretting about market-
ers’ more trivial deceptions is a distraction. Of course, brand managers
who advertise inexpensive, homogeneous, relatively harmless products
may view their tactics to fabricate perceived distinctions between their
brand and other brands as important to their career. And achieving a lot
of these insignificant deceptions, each of which marginally influences
brand choices by a lot of consumers, can add up to significant market
share changes and cumulative profits. Still—eyes on the prize; research on
high-consequence marketing trickery should be our priority.
Anolli et al. (2002) argue that a lay conversationalist’s deceptive mes-
sage generation usually does not result from a holistic top-down sort of
planning system. ἀ at is, everyday lay deceivers rarely do prescriptive
deception planning. ἀ ey do not spend a lot of thought in constructing a
deception plan. ἀ ey do not carefully consider and choose among func-
tionally indexed high-level strategies and forms of deception. Lay people
adaptively construct deception attempts in the moment, in much the same
way that they construct a process for making a decision (Bettman, Luce, &
Payne, 1998). In Anolli et al.’s (2002) terms, lay conversationalists who try
to deceive will quickly select concrete linguistic utterances, gestures, and
facial expressions from functionally indexed, low-level forms of potential
deceptors, using an interleaved planning system that goes back and forth
from saying something, reading the response it generates, saying some-
thing else, and so forth. However, marketers do use top-down planning
of holistic deception campaigns, selecting tactics to combine based on
accumulated experiences in trying different tactics, and different ways of
executing tactics. ἀ ey use pretesting and revision in which strategies and
executions in different forms are tried and refined. ἀ ey formally build

contingencies into their deception plan. Salespeople are given an “utter-
ance library” to draw on to adjust what they say as the interaction with
a customer gets cocreated. But “winging it” completely is rare in profes-
sional marketing, except in the case of a neophyte untrained salesperson
or advertiser.
A different approach to analyzing deception is Johnson, Grazioli, and
Jamal’s (1993) examination of professional auditors’ attempts to discern
deception in corporate financial reports. In this work, now called the infor-
mation processing theory of adversarial deception (Grazioli, 2006), these
authors focused initially on financial frauds, commercial lending mis-
representations, and other contexts where corporate financial documents
are constructed to mislead professional financial auditors and investment
managers. ἀ is is the realm of corporate finance, cost accounting, and
the financial investments marketplace. It is an environment that involves
highly specialized expertise, high-stakes deceptions, modern accounting’s
arcane concepts, and formalized models. ἀ is marketplace is virtually
unfathomable to laypeople and to most business managers, in the view of
Bill Sharpe, winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize in economics (Sharpe, 2007).
So, understanding how frauds are perpetrated and how to detect decep-
tions in corporate disclosures and capital markets must also be daunting
and highly specialized. ἀ is work is especially helpful in understanding
deception-protection skills (Grazioli, 2004; Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, &
Berryman, 2001). ἀ erefore we will discuss it in more depth in Chapter 7
where we deal with deception protection skills.
Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2000, 2003) argue that Internet deception is
distinctive from other deception venues because it takes advantage of spe-
cific features of the Internet technology. ἀ ey cite “page-jacking” as a par-
ticularly malicious deception tactic. In page-jacking one Internet marketer
redirects an Internet user away from that user’s intended destination site
to another site that is controlled by the hijacker. ἀ is tactic is especially
deceptive when the hijacker substitutes a site that looks very similar to
the consumer’s intended site. ἀ e hijacking is accomplished by engineer-
ing confusion via adjacency in a list, electronic redirection, and ad or site
layout similarity. Further, the Internet can make it very easy to falsify the
identity of information providers and marketing organizations, because
it enables low-cost credible-looking “storefronts,” and gives broad oppor-
tunity to reach potential victims privately (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2000).
Using the Internet also makes it easy for deceptive marketers to hide the
proceeds from their deceptions and to escape consumer redress efforts
and legal penalties. We add as another problematic factor the extremely

transient nature of an Internet Web site content and display. ἀ e Web site
design, icons, transfer routes, and page contents can be altered by a mar-
keter significantly in a brief time, again and again, without leaving behind
any lasting record of what information displays the site originally pre-
sented to a consumer when the consumer originally searched on it. ἀ is
high transience is also the case with an oral interpersonal sales presenta-
tion, of course, which also leaves no record of its contents aside from what
lingers in a consumer’s memory and the salesperson’s memory. However,
the extreme transience of the Internet marketer’s statements and decep-
tions may be more invisible to consumers because the site presents written
and graphical information. Consumers are accustomed to written state-
ments and visual images in other media that leave behind a lasting trail of
evidence. Unless consumers create such a record of a Web site’s contents
by printing it out and storing the copy of a Web site whose content they
think they will rely on or need to reinspect, the content that deceived them
may not be there to demonstrate the deception later on. ἀ e Internet mar-
keter can do posthoc sanitizing of their deceptions overnight.
Finally, completing our overview of deception theorizing, we found
that economists’ theories of market exchanges have embraced decep-
tion in only superficial ways. Game theoretic models have tradition-
ally considered concepts of deception not related to belief manipulation
(Ettinger & Jehiel, 2007; Gneezy, 2005). For example, these models deal
with things such as playing mixed strategy and signaling games (Spence,
1973; Crawford, 2003) or repeated games (Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982) to avoid being detected. Ettinger and
Jehiel (2007) recently argued that from the viewpoint of game theory,
belief manipulation and deception are “delicate to capture” because tra-
ditional equilibrium approaches assume the players fully understand the
strategy of their opponents.
Persuasion Theory
Dual-Process Models of Persuasion
Dual-process theories have been used widely by social and consumer

psychologists to explain persuasion (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989; Petty &
Wegener, 1999), social cognition (Petty, Brinol, Tormala, & Wegener,
2008), and consumer behavior (Schwartz, 2004), In these models, System
1 processes are quick, intuitive, and effortless, while System 2 processes

are slow, analytical, and deliberate, and occasionally correct the output
of System 1. System 2 processes are activated by cognitive experiences of
threat, error, suspicion, difficulty, or disfluency during the processing of
marketplace communications. Cognitive and metacognitive experiences
like these serve as an alarm and a “disrupt” that activates analytic forms
of thinking. ἀ e more analytic System 2 thought processes assess and
sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning. In the
context of deception, System 2 analytic thinking enables and facilitates
deception detection, neutralizing, resistance, and penalizing activities.
Further, the long-term result of a person’s repeated System 2 thinking
about deception protection can be to convert such thinking into System
1 marketplace deception protection heuristics. An important question for
deception research is therefore, When will consumers notice that their
System 1 processing of marketers’ messages might be producing faulty
(misled; invalid) beliefs and shift into System 2 thinking that makes good
use of deception protection knowledge and skills?
Social Influence and Persuasion Tactics
Cialdini (2001) and Pratkanis (2008) describe types of persuasion strate-

gies that research indicates can bolster persuasive impact. Each can be
executed via deception, and each can become an accomplice to decep-
tion, whether it is executed honestly or via deception. Cialdini (2001)
concludes that research indicates these persuasion tactics succeed mainly
when they evoke only System 1 processing by consumers, that is, when
they fly under the deception-protection radar. Cialdini identifies six fac-
tors that drive people to using automatized pattern matching responses
to persuasive messages: being indifferent about the topic, being in a rush,
feeling stressed in general, feeling uncertain, being distracted, and being
fatigued. ἀ is is an important insight for our purposes. It implies that
marketers will try to engineer situations characterized by several or all of
those factors when executing a persuasion tactic deceptively or for decep-
tive purposes. While these conditions (e.g., indifference, distractedness,
cognitive fatigue) may arise coincidentally in some situations, deception
agents will tend to create those conditions. Indeed, if these persuasion tac-
tics do depend on establishing conditions that weaken and suppress a per-
son’s deception protection capability, then these are inherently exploitative
tactics. In a very real sense, therefore, the science of persuasion developed
from lab experiments over the past 30 years may be a science of deceptive
persuasion, that is, of persuasion as it occurs when one party skillfully
creates a fictional psychological reality in another’s mind via misdirec-
tion, lying, concealment, omissions and simulations of false reality. It is
useful to appreciate, if readers already do not, that in many psychology
experiments which are the backbone of the science of persuasion, inten-
tional deceptions are common and rampant. Neither social psychologists
nor marketers wait for favorable circumstances; they engineer them even
if deception is required. Arguably, the level of and totality of deception
in social psychologists’ fabricated situations exceed that in marketplace
analogs, because psychological researchers often just make up the content
of the messages they present to subjects, without substantiating the valid-
ity or veracity of the statements made on a topic; routinely attribute the
message’s authorship to some person or source other than the true author
(themselves); and routinely camouflage from target subjects the fact that
some deception is likely to occur under the disarming easy-to-exploit
mask of “this is research,” a mask not available to marketers for the most
part. We will not belabor this point, but readers should keep it in mind
as they interpret (or reinterpret) the persuasion tactics that Pratkanis and
Cialdini have catalogued as effective.
Resistance to Persuasion
Psychologists have not studied people’s active resistance to persuasion

nearly as much as compliance and persuasion acceptance (Knowles &
Linn, 2004a). Research on resistance has increased recently and fresh
perspectives on the mechanisms of resistance have been offered (e.g.,
Ahluwalia, 2000; Brinol, Rucker, Tormala, & Petty, 2004; Pfau, Comption,
Parker, Wittenberg, An, Ferguson, Horton, & Malyshev, 2004; Sagarin,
Cialdini, Rice, & Serna, 2002; Tormala & Petty, 2004; Wheeler, Brinol, &
Hermann, 2007). In general, researchers believe that resistance to persua-
sion is motivated by a desire to hold valid attitudes and to gain control
and consistency (Wegener, Petty, Smoak, & Fabrigar, 2004). Resistance is
influenced by a variety of factors, for example, characteristics of the atti-
tude under attack, the importance of the topic, and a message recipient’s
ability to resist (Brinol et al., 2004.)
However, none of this work directly identifies a person’s skilled, learned
deception-protective thinking as a particularly beneficial and effective
mechanism of resistance to persuasion, and none explores the notion
that persuasion resistance is a specialized type of acquired procedural

expertise. Further, the prevailing view in the existing work is that resis-
tance to persuasion is a bad thing, a problem for influence agents to
overcome, rather than that self-protective resistance to deception and
misleading persuasion is a very good thing. For example, in Knowles and
Linn’s (2004) recent volume on resistance to persuasion, only one of the
13 chapters deals with helping people learn to resist. ἀ e majority of these
papers deal, more traditionally, with devising persuasion strategies for
overcoming other people’s self-protective resistance. Similarly, Wilson’s
(2002) book titled Seeking and Resisting Compliance exhaustively reviewed
the research on compliance-gaining skills, but despite its title, the book’s
almost 400 pages include less than 30 pages on resisting compliance. In
Chapters 7 and 8, we will present an opposing viewpoint (we resist tradi-
tional views on resistance) and discuss how deception-protective think-
ing, and indeed persuasion-resistance in general, is a basic survival skill to
be refined and encouraged, rather than a barrier to be overcome to maxi-
mize persuasion.
The Persuasion Knowledge Model
Friestad and Wright (1994) take the view that people are “consumers of
marketplace persuasion.” ἀ e fundamental premise of the persuasion
knowledge model (PKM; Friestad & Wright, 1994, 1995) is that people
try to become skilled consumers of persuasive messages, and that skillful
persuasion consumption is instrumental to successful product consump-
tion. How skillful a person is at evaluating and judiciously using market-
er’s persuasion attempts determines in part the wisdom of their ultimate
buying decisions and product consumption experiences. ἀ e persuasion
knowledge model emphasizes a consumer’s capacity to learn about per-
suasion and to eventually self-regulate in detecting, neutralizing, resist-
ing, and penalizing unfair and deceptive persuasion. In first presenting the
PKM, Friestad and Wright did not single out deceptive persuasion; their
discussion of consumer self-protection dealt with persuasion in general.
Here, we summarize some of the PKM’s propositions with the emphasis
on deception protection beliefs and skills.
According to the PKM’s principles, lay beliefs about deceptive persua-
sion and metabeliefs about our own deception protection knowledge are
an especially important interpretive belief system because these tell people
about situations where an intelligent purposeful outside agent is skillfully
trying to mislead their inner self (their beliefs, emotions, attitudes,

decisions, thought processes) and thereby alter the course of their lives.
Individuals who allow unnoticed, uncontrolled invasions of their internal
psychological world and consequent changes in their behavior do not sur-
vive and prosper. Consumers’ deception protection beliefs help them to
recognize, analyze, interpret, evaluate, and remember deception attempts,
and to select and execute coping tactics they believe will be effective and
appropriate. Lay people’s deception protection beliefs and skills are devel-
opmentally contingent. ἀ ey depend in part on an individual’s develop-
ment of basic capacities for social thinking, in part on continuous skill
learning that is self driven over the lifespan, and in part on absorption of
formal or semiformal coaching about marketplace deception protection.
What consumers believe about marketplace deception is also historically
contingent. ἀ e culturally supplied wisdom on marketplace deception
changes over time, so that each new generation’s thinking may differ
somewhat from that of earlier generations. In general, deception-protec-
tion behavior encompasses cognitive and physical actions in anticipation
of a foreseeable persuasion attempt, during a persuasion episode, after a
persuasion attempt, or between episodes in an agent’s extended campaign
of persuasion attempts.
Friestad and Wright (1994) originally proposed that there are three
critical belief systems that come into play when consumers process
marketing messages. ἀ e most general belief system is marketplace per-
suasion knowledge (PK), beliefs about all marketers’ goals and tactics,
and about one’s own persuasion-coping knowledge and skills. A second
belief system is agent knowledge (AK), beliefs about the traits, competen-
cies, and goals of the specific marketer who is presenting an immediate
message. A third is message topic knowledge (TK), beliefs about whatever
specific product, service, consumption problem, or transaction a market-
er’s immediate message deals with. We could now add, as a fourth belief
system, the individual’s system of marketplace deception beliefs or knowl-
edge (MDK). However, we believe that MDK and PK are wedded belief
systems, so we will refer in this book to marketplace deception knowledge
as a third system of beliefs, not a fourth. Following Friestad and Wright
(1994), an individual’s allocation of mental resources to these different
knowledge systems (deception protection knowledge, agent knowledge,
topic knowledge) will vary across persuasion episodes. ἀ is will depend
on how accessible and relevant each specialized belief system is at that
time, on immediate message processing goals, and on message processing
opportunities in the immediate environment. A person’s use of deception
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Kyllä vielä virttä saisi,
Waan on aika aivan tärkki —
Lyhyt kesä, kylmä talvi,
Kuka meiän työt tekevi.
Tämä on kirja kirjotettu

Juuan köyhällä keolla,
Kirkonkellon kuuluvilla,
Tukkaherran tuttavilta;
Joista Eirikkä esinnä
Wirren viettelys alotti,
Wäyrinen vähän lisäsi,
Matin poika mahtavasti
Puolen poikaset kokosi,
Antin pojat paljo autto,
Lauri laitteli lopulle,
Halonen hyvästi päätti.
Kiitos laulun laittajille,

Suosio sovittajille,
Rauha sen rakentajille,
Maksu myöten antajille!
MEHILÄINEN W. 1840.
Huhtikuulta.
Runo tyttäristä.
Empä tieä, enkä taia,

Enkä oikein oivaltele,
Minä lauloa tytöistä,
Runoella neitosista.
Jospa olisi minulla
Raikas rinta rastahalta,
Kieli leivolta vikevä,
Soittosormet Wäinämöisen;
Tietäisinpä, taitaisinpa,
Minä lauloa tytöistä. —
Tytöt kultaset omenat,
Joille luoja antanunn' on
Sulosuuen, ihanuuen,
Myöski lemmen, rakkauen
Nuolet, paulat ja satimet.
Neiot nuoret kukostavat
Kuni kukkaset keolla,
Joihin perhot lentelevät,
Joihin mettiset menevät,
Hyvän hunajan hajussa,
Me'en makian maussa.
Rakkautt' on rinta täynnä,
Sulo syämessä asuvi,
Ilo mielessä ihana,
Monet muiskut huulillansa.
Heill' on sini silmissänsä,
Punaruusut poskillansa,
Joit' ei pane paukkatalvet,
Eikä tuiskun viimatuprut.
Heill' on äänensä heliä,
Heill' on kieli leivoselta,
Raikas rinta rastahalta,
Jolla mielen muuttelevat;
Lailla maahan Wäinämöisen
Karhut metsänki vihaset,
Kaikki muutti liikkuvaiset,
Itseki ve'en väestön,
Sulosesti suosittavat;
Wielä valkoset käetki,
Sormet soitolle sopivat,
Sekä muille askareille,
Talon töihin taipuvaiset.
Mut sa poika, lailla perhon,

Tahi mettisen mokoman,
Lentelet kukka kukalta,
Etkä tieä, kusta pistin,
Eli nuoli haavoittavi,
Sinulta syämen raukka;
Etkä tieä, koska paula
Kaulahan on kääreynnä,
Koskas neitosen iloksi,
Jo sen kaulassa käkötät. —
Kusta haava, sieltä voie,
Kusta tuska, sieltä helppo.
B—-v-ll.
Jousesta.
Seuraavan kirjotuksen jousesta olemma Oppijalta Suomen

Akademiassa, Herra J. Fr. Kajaanilta saaneet Mehiläiseen pantavaksi.
Hän oli sen Kivijärven kylästä, Wenäjän Karjalassa, sihen laatuun
kirjottanut, kun eräs vanha mies siitä oli kertonut, ja samalla lailla
tulkoon präntätyksiki, koska ei taitaisi tämä kertomus paljo
parannuksillamme kaunistua.
"Jousie oli kahenloatusie:
"1:sikse Warsijousi, jonka varsi oli petran luilla kaunisteltu ta

kaikella tavalla kirjattu. Jänne oli tehty kolmesta liinakappalehesta,
venytetty niin raskahasta, jotta ei enämpi venyisi. Selkä eli koari oli
rauasta, vielä kahesta rauasta, mellosta kai teräksestä, ulospuoli
mellosta, jotta ei katkieisi, sisäspuoli teräksestä. Selkä eli koari
pantihi remelillä (nahkalla) vartehe kiini ta pistettihi monikertasesta
reikiin läpi. Sillä remelillä pantihi jalkarauta, lipo se rengas, johon
jalka pisteteihi, kiini. Jänne veettihi rahkaha, jonka läpi helppinoakla
(helppinaula) oli, ta jonka ympärillä pyöri. Alla oli liipatin, jolla rahka
pyöritettiin ympäri ta lauastihi. Rahka oli Petran luusta loaittu, liipatin
rauasta. Teän puolella rahkoa kutsuttihi nutiksi. Ratasvyöksi sanottihi
sitä vyötä, joka pantihi ympäri mahasta, kun jousta jännitettihi. On
siinä kaksi petranluista pyöreä, jossa juoksoo ne nahkat; ei erityistä
nimeä niillä pyörillä. Ratasvyössä oli kämmenen leveys selän toakse
loaittu; se oli vahvasta nahkasta ommeltu, jotta ei venyisi. Juoni oli
vähäsen uroa pitkin vartta loaittu, joho vasama vakuutettihi. Petrat
oli selän nenissä rautaan loaittu, jotta ei kuluisi jänne.
"2:kse Käsijousi ei ollut minkähänäköstä, kun selkä ta jänne.

Piettihi sauana käyessä. Näpissähe vain piti sen vasaman nenän, sen
kera tempasi, laski nuolen. Selkä oli välistä ulospuolella
koivunkylestä, sisäspuolella pajusta; peät vuoltu, jotta yhtäläisesti
käkristyisi. Ne oli nilatuohella hienolla keäritty toinen toiseese kiini —
ei mitänä rihmoa — pikie pantihi keskehe, jotta tarttuisi kiini toinen
toiseese. Warsijousta piettihi parempana.
"Wetäessä piettihi jänne itse päin ta vartta piti ulostoo, muute ei

saanu jännitetykse, jos kuin vahva mies.
"Pahasuopaset katattihi toisen jousi (kattasivat toisen jousen).

Silmätön niekla katettihi (katkastiin) ta sen kera nakattihi sinne.
Siinä piti sanuo: 'mies nuoli, terävä kirves, päivie Jumalan kyllä.'
"Wasama loaittihi, vanutettihi (sorvattiin) vanuntahevolla. Se

vanuntahepo tehtihi kahesta patsahasta, ta sihe pissettihi
vasamapuu piikkiin välihi. Siinä toiset sitä remelillä veellähä,
pyöritetähä, toiset veitsellä vanutaha. Ei erityistä vanuntarautoa. Kun
sai vanutetukse, niin sihe jäi ruopivoa vähänen nenähä. Se siitä
veitsellä silpastihi, nakattihi lattialle, kai sanottihi: 'vasama; k' ei
vasama.' Jos putoi selällähä, niin tuli onnikas vasama; kun
kumollaha, niin ei onnikas. — Sulittamisessa piti tuohta polttuo
kaikkein pehmeimmällähä, sitä purtihi, jotta tuli pikie. Sitta otettihi
kokon sulkie, pantihi yksi isompi suorasta ta kaksi kaiempata kahen
puolen. Kun pantihi vakavasta, niin se mennä lollotti niin hyvästä.
Sulat siottihi rihmalla; sihe peällä tuohipikie, ei mitänä sen peällä.
Joho jänne löi vasaman kynänenähä, pantihi luukesrä eli rautapiikki;
kell' ei ollu semmoista, loati puusta.
"Kun ammuttihi, niin toinen vahtasi, kuunteli, kunne kirpuoo.

Keältä (käeltä) aina ammuttihi; jos pani olkapeähä, niin potkasi, löi
kipieksi sen olkaluun.
"Wiini oli selässä ta siinä vasamat. Siinä oli puu pohjassa,

ympärissä verkot, jolla se tuli kantoa kepie. Yli olkase tempai
vasaman viinestä."
Lisää suksista.
"Suksi on potasma oikiessa jalassa; kutsutaha kalhuksi, kun on

alla petrankoipia. Toinen isompi on lyly, tehty koivun lylystä eli
männyn janhuksesta. Janhusta saahaa lenkomännystä, joka on
punanen alaselta puolen. Olas on se ura lylyn alla; potasmassa ei
pietä olasta. Sauassa on sompa ta välistä sen alla rauasta eli luusta
nenähä tehty suovero. Kalhu ei tierau takkalalla. Päläs on se tuohi,
jossa jalka pietähä, varpahallinen se raksi, joho jalka pissetähä,
kannantakanen, joka estävi jalan peräymästä."
Wähänäkönen tyttö.
Oli muutamalla akalla vähänäkönen tytär. Sen näkemättömyyttä

piti äiti sekä hän itse salassa. Oli aina hyvin näkevinänsä, kun
vieraita kävi talossa. Wiimein tuli tytölle kosiomies. Äiti ja tytär
tiesivät eiltä kosiomiehen tulon. Äiti pani ompeluneulansa laattialle
tuolinjalan viereen ja sanoi tytöllensä, että hänen piki se sieltä neuoa
äitillensä, kosiomiehen tultua. Kosiomies tuli; alas vanha mummo
hakia neulaansa. Tytär istuu uunin laialla, sano sieltä äitillensä:
"tuollahan tuo on neula tuolinjalan juuressa."
"Niin se on", sanoi mummo, "vanhall' on variksen silmä, kären

silmä neitosella."
Mutta tytön näkemättömyys tuli kuitenki ilmi. Äiti rupes

kosiomiehelle ruokaa laittamaan, kanto esinnä viinaputelin pöyälle ja
rupesi muutta ruokaa hakemaan. Tyttö näki uunin laialla istuissaan
jotain mustaa pöyällä olevan, luuli kissan nousneen pöyälle, hyppäsi
pois, kaapasi kepin käteensä ja lyöä sätkäsi viinaputeliin, sanoen:
"kitis pois, kissa, pöyältä!"
O. Karjaliini.
Rikka ompeleessa.
Kerran nousi jättiläinen kirkonharjalle kenkää ompelemaan ja

hänellä oli niin pitkät pikilangat, että ylöttyivät aina maahan asti.
Sattuipa mies ratsastain ajamaan kirkon sivu. Tämä ajaa töytyytti
pikilangan pohjukkaan. Samassa sattui myös jättiläinen vetäsemään
pikilankaansa, jonka pohjukassa nousivat hevonen ja mies ylös ja
menivät kengän ompeleesen. "Ohos, sanoi jättiläinen, mistähän rikka
puuttui pikilankaan; — paljo toki olis tuon tähen lankaa peruuttaa."
Samalla otti vasaran ja takoa kapautti päälle, sanoin: "kyll' on vahva,
vaikk' ei kaunis."
O. Karjaliini.
Paakunaisen nujakka.
[Tämänlaisiaki kertomuksia mielellämme otamma Mehiläiseen

pantavaksi, mitä niitä maassa löytyy. Toimittaja.]
Ennen vanhaan Alakarjalassa olisi pitänyt tapahtuman

miesmurhan, jota syytettiin erään miehen työksi nimeltä
Paakunainen. Oikeus tuomitsi hänen mestattavaksi. Waan
mestatessa olisi pitänyt nousta semmoinen tuulen nujakka, että
ihmiset ei kestäneet seisallaan, vaan kaatuivat kaikki maahan
rujuksi. Josta päättivät, että Paakunainen oli viaton, ja että to'istajat
olivat väärin hänen päällensä haastaneet. Mutta Paakunainen oli
kuitenki jo nujakan alussa surmansa saanut. — Sama tuuli oli
katkaissut suuren petäjän Kiteen ja Tohmajärven rajakylässä, jonka
nimi on Kantosyrjä, ja olis pitänyt juuri siitä nykysen nimensä
saaman, kun kanto jäi siihen seisomaan. Saman petäjän latvapuoli
oli tuulen muassa kulkenut Uukuniemen pitäjään ja vasta siellä
puuttunut maahan, jota väliä minun luuloni jälkeen on muutamia
penikuormia. Siellä olevata kylää siitä syystä kutsutaan Latvasyrjä.
Eräs mies, Itonen nimeltä, sattui veneisin soutamaan Pyhäjärvellä,
joka on Kiteen, Kesälahen ja Uutuniemen pitäjiin sisällä. Tuulen
voima otti hänen ja alkoi lennättää järven pintaa myöten siinä
hojakassa, ettei enää parempaa kyytiä tarvinnut. Itonen luuli jo
viimeisen kyyin olevan kulettavana. Wiimein sattui veneensä
menemään pientä luotoa kohti, jossa se vähän seisattui, siksi kun
Itonen kerkeis päästä kiini muutamaan matalaan koivu käkkiään.
Wene kumminki meni vielä luovosta ja Itonen jäi kiini koivuun, josta
hän sitten jonkun ajan perästä korjattiin. Sama luoto vielä tänä
päivänä kutsutaan Itosen salo ja sanotaan Itosesta nimensä
perineen.
O. Karjaliini.
Muinonen Suomenmaa ja vanha Finlandi.
Ainaki on Suomalainen kansa muilta Euroopalaisilta niinkun nytki

kaikilta muilta, pait Wenäläisiltä, kutsuttu Finniksi, sen maa
Finlanniksi, ja Latinan kielellä: Fenni, Fenlandia, Fennia. Ainoastaan
itsille Suomalaisille on tämä nimi outo. Waan jos aina lienee niin
ollut, siitä on kysymys? Se jo on melkein tuttu asia, että Suomalaiset
muinasten asuksentelivat melkein yli nykyisen Euroopassa olevan
Wenäjän maan, jossa vieläki heitä tavataan, liijaksiki pohjoispuolella
monet Lahkokunnat, ja jota maata pian kaikki Suomalaiset kutsumat
Wenään maaksi, sen asukkaita Wenäläisiksi ja Wenakoiksi. Näitä
nimityksiä on luultu saadun siitä, että lienevät muka veneellä tulleet
ensin Suomalaisille tutuiksi, josta heitä Weneläisiksi olisi ruvettu
kutsumaan; saattaneen seki olla mahdollista. Waan sopivammalle
vielä näyttää, että nimet Wenäh, Wenään maa, Wenäläinen ovat
yhtä sukua kun Fennia (Suom. Wennia, Wennää) Fenni, Suom.
Wenni, Wenäläiset. [Sillä keraketta F ei löydy koko Suomenkielessä,
sen siaan aina käytetään W tahi H; H nimittäin tavuun lopulla, W
muissa paikoissa.] Niinmuodoin pitäisi nykyinen Wenäänmaa olla se
muinonen Fennia, joka jo Ruomalaisillenki oli tuttu.
Suomalaiset, tahi niintun sillon taisivat itsiänsä kutsua Wenäläiset,

jättäin, joku osa, entisen asuntomaansa, paeten ja hajottaien
lähemmäksi Suomen merenrantoja, alkoivat, asettauttuansa
Lappalaisilta sihenasti asuttuun Suomen maahan [Marraskuun
osassa 1839 Mehiläisessä tästä aineesta], itsiaän kutsua
Saamelaisiksi, josta sitte Suomalaisiksi; [On vielä nytki Suomessa
tapana kutsua talon ja maannimeltä sen asukasta. H… —] ja entisen
isänmaahansa jäänyttä kansaa, niinkun sinne tulleita vieraitaki
Slavilaisia kansoja, siis kutsuivatki entisellä maan nimellä.
Tämä myös todistanee, Slavonit tahi Slavilaiset Suomalaisien

muuttoaikaan asti nykyiseen maahansa, heille olleen tuntemattomat,
kosk'ei heitä Suomalaiset näytä millään muulla nimellä tunteneen,
samatekun Slavonitki eivät liene ennen tuloansa nykyseen Wenäjän
maahan tienneet Suomalaisista, eikä niiden yhteisestä nimestä
Fenni, vaan kutsuivat heitä sotiessansa ja vainotessansa Tsuhniksi,
joka lienee joku nimitys sanasta tsusoi (muukalainen) jolla
Wenäläiset vieläki Suomalaisia nimittävät.
Näin luulen siis Slavonien Wenajän maahan seisattauttua sen

entisiltä asukkailta saaneen niiden nimen, samatekun he
myöhemmin päämiestensä kotimaan nimellä muilta kansoilta tulivat
Russoiksi kutsutuksi.
Saamenmaa, jossa Lappalaiset pimiän metsän sisässä ja vuorien

välissä asuksentelivat lienee silloin ollut tuntematon ja pidetty yhtenä
Finlandina, vaikka sen asukkaat sitä toisin kutsuivat.
Muutoin, luulen Puolan maanki vanhuudesta olleen Suomalaisilta
asutuksi ja sen nimen Suomen sanasta, puola, tulevan josta sihen
maahan seisottaneet Slavonilaisetki saivat nimensä. Monta muutaki
nimeä Wenäen maassa todistanevat vielä sen muinasista asukkaista
n.k. Maskunvirta (Moskov Floden), Walkiavirta, (Wolga Floden,
Wolkom Floden), Pensa (Pense) j.m.
Toukokuutta.
Onneton naimamatka.
Olli se kylän kävijä,

Morsianten tieustaja,
Läksi koistansa kosihin
Noita Niemen neitosia.
Kävi tietä, astelevi,

Arvelee, ajattelevi:
"Joko mennen maata myöten
Wainko kulkenen vesitse? —
Menisin mä maata myöten,
Kanssa jaksaisin jalalta,
Waan ne kenkäni kuluvi,
Saappahat supi menevi;
Hyv' ois vettä viiletellä,
Myötävirtoa vilata,
Waan on nousta vaikiamp,
Päästä päälle kosken korvan."
Muisti Mustosen venehen,

Sen otti omin lupine;
Löys' airot venehen alta,
Raksit rannassa rakenti:
"Aalto ei Ollia hukuta,
Miest' ei kaaha kosken korva."
Laski korvan, laski toisen,

Kiven kiini ottamatta,
Kallion kapasematta.
Niin tulevi kolmas korva,
Wene väärähän menevi,
Kaksilaita kalliohan,
Mustosen vene musuksi.
Ele huua Huusko parka,

Ele oo Olli milläskänä! —
Juntti joutuvi hätä'än,
Karppanen tähän kahu'un,
Miestä maalle saattamahan,
Kuivalle kulettamahan;
Waikk' on koski kontin vienyt,
Wirta viinan viilettänyt,
Lihapalaset likahan,
Rapakkohon voirasiat,
Miehen mielen melkiähän,
Naimatuumat tuonnemmaksi.
(Kuhmosta.)
Kaipaksen elämäkerrasta.
Kaipas onkivi kaloja.

Joen suussa joutusasti,
Millon Weilon venehellä,
Konsa kökkivi kivellä;
Tuota katsovi kalatki,
Halusesti hauvit katso,
Ahvenetki arvelevat,
Kun oli otsa oivallinen,
Kulmaluunsa kunnollinen.
Kanssa kasvonsa leviä.
***
Kaipas kaskuja panevi,

Tarinoita taitavasti,
Pitelevi piippuansa,
Kukkaroa katselevi,
Kaiken kaunoista keseä.
Kyllä onkia osasi,
Katsoa kalojen päälle,
Palot jäivät paikoillehen;
Ei ole kynnetty kesanto,
Eikä pelto pehmitetty,
Kerran kyntävi kesässä,
Pehmittävi peltoansa,
Seki sattuvi sateella,
Päatyci pahalla säällä.
***
Kaipas suuttu sunnuntaina

Eukollensa ensistäänki,
Heinistä häjyn tavalla;
Sitte nosti noian väen,
Ja kirosi kauhiasti.
Otti hattunsa omansa,
Jonk' oli turkista turannut,
Myssyn päälle myyvittänyt,
Huonon päänsä hoitajaksi,
Kopristi kovasti kiini,
Löi lietehen lujasti,
Palamahan paiskahutti; —
Itse istuvi tuvassa,
Pöyän päässä pöllöttävi,
Walittavi vaikiasti:
"Ei ole aikaista älyä,
Eikä tointa täyellistä,
Mulle annettu ajassa,
Suotu suurelta isältä —
Suuttuvatpa suuremmatki,
Wihastuvat viisahatki.
Ei ne hattua hajota,
Polta myssyä poroksi,
Niinkuu mie polonen poika
Poltin myssyni poroksi,
Hatun ainoan hajotin,
Paratulla pakkasilla,
Jätin pääni paljahaksi."
***
Kaipas suuttu kauhiasti

Wirsistänsä viimeisellä,
Puhu tuimasti Kokille,
Siroselle siiristihen,
Wielä veitsensä vetäsi,
Puserteli puukkoansa,
Siroselle siitä syystä:
"Sie paljo pajassa lauloit
Wirsiäni viekkahasti;
Waan mie laitan lautamiehen
Keräjihin kutsumahan.
Esivallan eessä käyttä,
Saatta sakkoa samassa —
Kolme riksiä Kokille,
Siroselle siitä puoli,
Puoli Pulkkilan pojille,
Annetaanpa Antillenki,
Laamaselle laitetahan,
Saman sakon maineita,
Warvarill' on vahva rauha."
(Kerimäeltä.)
Jälkimaine. Kaipakseen sopii sanalasku: mies mennyt, liha

lahonnut, töitä maassa mainitaan.
Tarina Abrahamista.
Abrahami istui majansa ovella ja odotti vieraita, joita hän

mielellään otti vastaan, syötti, juotti ja majautti. Kerran tuli vanha
ukko, vuosistansa ja vaivoistansa köykistynyt, saua kädessä, hänen
tykönsä. Abrahami käski hänen astua sisään, pesi hänen jalkansa ja
asetti hänen iltaselle. Mutta kun näki, että ukko syömään ruvetessa
ei siunannut ruokaa, niin kysyi, miksi ei palvellut ja kunnioittanut
taivaan Jumalata. Ukko vastasi ei tietävänsä muusta Jumalasta, kun
tulesta, jota hän palvelisi ja kunnioittaisi. Tästä vastauksesta
närkästyi Abrahami, ajoi ukon ulos ja antoi hänen siellä olla yön
sateessa ja vilussa. Mutta kun ukko oli lähtenyt tuli Jumala ja kysyi
Abrahamilta, mihin hän oli vierahansa pannut. Abrahami vastasi,
ajaneensa hänen ulos, koska hän ei tahtonut palvella ja kunnioittaa
taivaan Jumalata. Silloin lausui Jumala: "voi sinuasi, Abrahami, kun
yhtä yötä et tainnut ukkoa kärsiä ja minä olen häntä jo sata vuotta
kärsinyt!" Nyt lähti Abrahami, kutsui ystävällisesti ukkoa jälle
majaansa, holhoi häntä kun parasta vierasta, jutteli mitä Jumala oli
hänelle sanonut ja sai sillä seka muulla opetuksellansa ukon
pakanallisesta tulen palvelosta luopumaan ja ainoahan taivaan
Jumalaan turvaamaan.
Kärsivällisyys.
Muinasella Greikan viisauden tutkijalla, sillä mainiolla Suokratilla oli

toranen akka Santippa nimeltä. Suokrati tavallisesti ei vastannut
hänelle mitään, vaan antoi torua, siksi että vaikeni. Mutta tästä
miehensä vaiti olemisesta vaimo muutamasti niinki suuttui, että
viskoi maljan vettä hänen päällensä. "Sen minä tiesin, että piti
jyrinätä sateen seuraamaan", sanoi sillon Suokrati ja pyhki kasvonsa
kuivaksi ja rupesi sen jälkeen jälle työhönsä.
Wakuus.
Suokrati tervehti kerran kadulla toista, joka ei vastannut häntä. "Ja

tuommoista ylpeyttä sinä kärsit!" sanoi sillon joku hänen
ystävistänsä. Suokrati vastasi: "pitäisikö minun siis suuttuman siitä,
ettei kaikki ole niin nöyrät, kun minä?" — Toisen kerran kun kuuli,
jonkun panetelleen häntä, sanoi: "jos se paha, mitä minusta
puhuttiin, on tosi, niin muistuttaa se minua parantamaan itseäni, jos
se taas on valhe, niin se ei kuulu minuun ollenkaan."
Franskan kuninkaalle, Kaarlo kuudennelle sanottiin myös kerran,

että joku oli häntä pahasti panetellut. "Se ei ole mahdollista, vastasi
kuningas, sillä minä en ole hänelle muuta, kun hyvää tehnyt."
Phrygian kuningas Antigono sattui kerran kuulemaan kuinka

muutamat keskenänsä salaa panettelivat häntä. "Menkää vähän
ulommaksi, sanoi kuningas heille, muuten minä kuulen puheenne ja
olen täydytetty rankasemaan teidät."
Arabian sanalaskuja.
1. Kieli lyö pään poikki.
2. Pidä sillon tavarastasi vaari, kun kissa ja hiiret ystävyydessä

elävät.
3. Silmäpuolten maassa elä itseki silmäpuolena.
4. Ele sillon kaikkia pyydä'kään, kun sinussa ei ole kaiken pitäjätä.
5. Alasimena ollessasi kärsi, vasarana lyö.
6. Kellä ei ole muuta opettajata, sen aika opettaa.
7. Wierottaminen katkeruutta äitin maidon.
8. Lainatakki ei lämmitä.
9. Mykän äiti ymmärtää mykän kielen.
10. Täysiikäistä on paha vierottaa.
Ihmisen ikä.
Kymmenestä samana päivänä syntyneestä ihmisestä tulee

tavallisesti yksi 74 vuoden vanhaksi; kahdeksastatoista yksi 80
vanhaksi; neljästäkymmenestä ja kolmesta yksi 85 vanhaksi;
kuudestakymmenestä yksi 88 vuoden ikään. Sadan vuoden vanhaksi
ei tule jos yksi 3500:sta ja 105 vuoden vanhaksi yksi 14 eli 15:sta
tuhannesta. 25:stä tuhannesta elää tavallisesti yksi 106 vuoden
vanhaksi ja 50:stä tuhannesta yksi 107 vanhaksi, koko millioonasta
saattaa yksi päästä 110 ikään.
Mikä on siis ihmisen maallinen elämä? — Tomu tuulessa taikka

savu ilmassa. — Sadasta tuhannesta kuolee ylipäite ensimäisenä
vuotena 25 tuhatta, toisella vuodella 8 eli 9 tuhatta, kolmannella 4
eli 5 tuhatta, neljännellä 2 eli 3 tuhatta, viidennellä puolentoista eli 2
tuhatta, kuudennella tuhannen paikkoin. Niin sadasta tuhannesta
seitsemättä vuotta ei näe, jos 60 tuhatta.
Muuten mainitaan aviisoissa välistä hyvinki vanhoista ihmisistä.

Niin olisi Puolan maalla joku lammaspaimen Demetrio Grabvuski
elänyt 169 vuoden vanhaksi ja Englannin vanhin mies Jenkinsi
samaan ikään. Eräs Englantilainen tietojen harrastaja, Johan
Sinklairi, joka on muutaman kirjan terveyden ja pitkän iän
voittamisesta kirjottanut, lausuu pitkäikäsistä ihmisistä, että niitä
kyllä löytyy erinäisissä viroissa ja erinäisellä elämänlaadulla, mutta
sanoo niiden kuitenki näissä kahdessa asiassa ei toinen toisestansa
erouman: ensiksi olivat terveistä ja voimallisista vanhemmista
syntyneet ja toiseksi aikasin aamulla ylös nousseet. Tytyväisyys
onneensa, levollinen omatunto ja vähällä täytetyt tarpeet ovat
kussaki säädyssä parahimmat keinot ikää pitentämään.
Myös sanotaan erimailla semmoinen erotus olevan kuolevaisuuden

välillä, että Italiassa, Greikan ja Turkin mailla vuosittain kuolee
30:stä 1; Hollannissa, Franskan maalla ja Preussiassa 39:stä l;
Austriassa, Helvetiassa, Portugalissa ja Hispaniassa 40:stä 1;
Euroopallisessa Wenäjässä ja Puolan maalla 44:stä 1;
pohjoispuolisessa Saksassa, Juutissa ja Ruotsissa 45:stä 1; Ruidan
maalla 48:sla l; Irlannissa 53:sta 1; Englannissa 58:sta 1;
Skottlannisja ja Islannissa 59:stä 1.
Tästä osotuksesta näemmä esiksi, että kylmemmillä mailla ikä on

pitempi, kun lämpimillä ja toiseksi, että meren likeys puoltaa iän
pituutta. Italiassa kuolee sadasta kaksi sen vertaa vuosittain kun
Islannissa.
Muutama sana soiden viljeliöille.
[Niin tämä, kun seuraavatki otteet maaviljelystaidosta ovat meille

itsekoettaneelta tarkalta maaviljeliältä annetut. Kiitollisuudella
panemma ne tähän muidenki hyväksi.]
Suot poltettakoon Juhannuksen aikoina taikka ennemmin.

Myöhemmin poltettuna on vaikia maan palamista estää. Kaksi eli
kolme vuorokautta ennen sytyttämistä pitää suot kynnettämän ja
karhittaman (äestettämän, astuvoittaman eli harattaman). Juurikot,
turpeet ja ruohot luodaan pieniin kokoihin keskelle sarkaa, että
pikemmin kuivaisivat ja paremmin palaisivat. Polttamisen jälkeen
pitää tuhka hetimmiten mullan kanssa sekasin karhittaman,
ennenkun tuuli sen viepi, jos sadetta ei kohta tulisi.
Sateisina kesinä ruohottuu maa niin äkisti, että tarvitsee kerran

kyntää ja useemmin karhita soita ennen kylvämistä, joka tavallisesti
tapahtuu alkupuolella Elokuuta, juurusjyvillä viikkoa ennemmin kun
muilla.
Kuuden syllän levyiseltä saralta on kuokkioille tavallisesti maksettu
9 markkaa syllältä lakioilla, puittomilla soilla ja 3 talaria, välistä
tolvaki korpisoilla, jossa paljo juuria löytyy. Ojittajat ovat saaneet 6
hopiaäyriä syllältä 5 korttelin levyisestä ja kyynärän syväisestä
ojasta.
Kesäkuuta.
Suomen kielen otosta opetuskieleksi kouluissa, kuin myöskin sen

käyttämisestä oikeuksissa ja muissa tiloissa on kyllä ja monessa
kohti jo ennen kirjotettu. Meidänki mielestä on hyvin osaavasti
sanottu, mitä Ulvilan kirkkoherra, professori G. Renvall siitä asiasta
lausuu, nimittäin: 1:ksi että Suomen kieli otettaisi opistoissa ei
opetus- vaan opittavaksi kieleksi ja 2:ksi, että oikeuksissa ja muissa
tiloissa itsekuki vapaehdollisesti, niin kirjotuksissa kun puheessa,
saisi käyttää Suomen kieltä, jota asianomaisten virkamiesten toisen
tulkitsematta pitäisi ymmärtää. Wasta jonkun pitemmän ajan
käyttämisellä ja korjaamalla luulee Renvalli Suomen kielen tulevan
otolliseksi sihenki tarpeesen, että opetus kouluissa ja muissa
opistoissa sillä toimitettaisi; jota pitemmän ajan valmistusta emme
myös taida vastaan sanoa, koska, jos suomi yhtäkkiä määrättäisi
opetuskieleksi, puutos epäilemättäki ilmautuisi, jos ei kielessä, niin
kuitenki opettajissa.
Mitä taas Suomen kielen vapaehdollisen käyttämiseen oikeuksissa

ja muissa tiloissa koskee, niin olisi se hyödyllinen jo siinäki kohdassa,
että se kadottaisi leivän puolivalmiilta herroilta, jota tapojen
turmioksi ja talonpoikien rasitukseksi aina enempi vuosi vuodelta
maakuntaan lisäytyy. Kun nimittäin joku voipi oppia jonkun sanan
ruotsia ja sihen lisäksi taitaa, jos kuinka puultuvaisesti kirjottaa, niin
pitää hän kohta itsensä herrana, heittää työnteon, kirjottelee
talonpojille, selittelee heille tuomioita ja muita ruotsinkielisiä
kirjotuksia, neuvo heitä yhdestä keräjästä toiseen ja viettelee
moninaisihin ilkeyksihin, kaikella sillä toimellansa talonpojan
kostannuksella hyvin eläen. Tämä herrain ja talonpoikain välillinen
sukukunta juuri on se, joka enimmasti turmelee talonpoikasen
kansan elämässänsä. Sillä paremman arvon talonpojilta
voittaaksensa pukevat itsensä ja elävät muulla tavalla mahdollisuutta
myöten herroiksi, ja talonpoika seuraa heitä niin vaatteissa, kun
muussa elämässä, pitäen itsensä heidän vertasena, niinkun hän ei
olekaan huonompi, vaan kymmentä kertaa parempi heitä. Tämä
talonpojan herrastaminen aatteissa ja muissa ulkonaisissa elämän
tavoissa on sekä muuten tuhma ja ilkiä katsella, että myöski perijuuri
koko talonpojallisen arvon menettämiseen. Se juuri todistaa, että
talonpoika itse ei tyydy oloonsa ja onneensa, alentaa hänen arvonsa
sillä tavoin muidenki silmissä, sillä vähäarvonen on aina se mies,
joka Jumalan luotuun onneensa ei tyydy. Jos talonpoika tahtoo
herrastaa, niin herrastakoon opeissa, tiedoissa ja taidoissa, erittäinki
säätyynsä sopivaisissa, siisteydessä ja puhtaudessa, mielisiveydessä
ja raittiuudessa, lastensa ihmisiksi kasvattamisessa, perheensä
hoitamisissa, karjansa, peltojensa ja niittyjensä korjaamisessa, ja se
harrastus on hänelle moninaiseksi hyväksi, antaa myös kyllä työtä,
ettei juuri jouda'kaan sihen toiseen turmelevaiseen herrastamiseen,
joka osotaksen turhissa käytöksissä, naurattavissa vaatetpuvuissa,
kiroilemisissa ja vannomisissa, juomisissa ja laiskana elämisessä,
joutavissa hypyissä ja kortinlyönnissä, Jumalan sanan ylenkatseessa
ja tuhannessa muussa ilkeydessä, jota juuri edellä mainitut joutavat
nurkkaherrat enemmin, kun mikään muu kansassa matkaansaattaa,
levittää ja voimassa pitää. — Karjalassa ja Savossa, joissa suuri osa
talonpoikia nykyaikoina selvästi kirjottaa suomea, näitä
nurkkaherroja ei ollenkaan kaivattaisi, jos saisivat talonpojat
kirjotuksensa sillä omalla kielellänsä. Kuinka kansa itseki sitä asiata
toivoo, olemma monasti kuulleet lausuttavan, ja todistukseksi
panemma tähän seuraavan, talonpojalta Petteri Makkoselta
Kerimäen pitäjästä, tehdyn runon, jonka syksyllä v. 1837 häneltä
kirjotimma.
Suruvirsi Suomen kielen tilasta.
Suvatseeko Suomen kansa,

Salliiko Savon asujat,
Wielä veisata vähäsen,
Surkutella Suomen maasta?
Suruvirsi on Suomen maasta,
Sekä vaikia valitus,
Kuinka suuri Suomen kansa
Saapi kirjoja käsiinsä,
Oikeuksista annetuita,
Pantuna paperin päälle,
Ruotsin kielen kirjotettu,
Jota ei tiennehet isämme,
Oma vanhempi osannut,
Lausuella lapsillensa,
Kanssa poikansa puhua.
Tämä on se outo kieli,

Suomen maalla muukalainen,
Joka kansan kaikki tyyni
Pitäpi pimeyen alla,
Josta juttuja tulepi,
Turhat riiat ratkiapi,
Kun ei tunne kirjojansa,
Arvioitansa osaja.
Herrat saapi suuren palkan

Pienistäki kirjoistansa,
Kuitenki en itse tieä,
Jos on kirja kelvollinen,
Mitä siinä on sisässä;
Mutta täytypi monenki
Wieä herralle hevonen,
Panna lehmä läävästänsä,
Kun ei kukkaro pitäne.
Laki on meillä laaullinen,

Aivan oikea asetus,
Jonka armas Keisarimme,
Itsevaltias vakainen,
Anto meille armostansa,
Suomen suureksi hyväksi;
Waan ei laiteta lakia,
Ei osata oikeutta,
Suomen kielen kirjotella,
Jonka itse ymmärtäisin,
Ilman toisen tutkimatta,
Sekapään selittämättä.
Kun ois kirjat kielellämme,

Suomen selvlllä sanoilla,
Itse tietäisin asian,
Osajaisin arvionki,
Kuittikirjani katsella,
Lujat päätökset lukea.
Enkä varsin vaivoaisi
Esivaltoa viatta,
Oikeutta ilman syyttä,
Eikä kukkaro kuluisi,
Tuomiskontti tyhjeneisi.
Minä vielä mielessäni

Olen toivossa ilonen,
Että armas Keisarimme,
Estvaltamme vakainen,
Suomen suureksi iloksi,
Onneksi alamaistensa,
Sekä kansan kunniaksi,
Antaa käskyn armollisen,
Suomen sääyille sanoman;
Asettapi oikeuet
Suomen selvillä sanoilla;
Että suuri Suomen kansa,
Saisi kirjat kielellänsä,
Niinkun kaikki muutki kansat,
Mainitahan maailmassa,
Onnen helmassa elävän;
Kun on kaikki kirjotukset
Sillä kielellä samalla,
Minkä heille helmassansa,
Oma äitinsä opetti.
Sitä vielä Suomalaiset

Hyvin suurella halulla,
Ikävöivät itsellensä,
Että kuulu Keisarimme,
Majisteetti mainittava,
Joka käski koulupaikat,
Akatemiat asetti,
Käskis kouluissa lukea,
Opitella oppivaisten,
Suomen selviä sanoja.
Sillon saisi Suomen kansa

Armon auringon havata,
Pimeyen paksu pilvi
Sillon siirtyisi sivulle;
Eipä puuttune puheita,
Sekä selviä sanoja,
Tämän kielen kertojilta,
Asujilta ankaroilta.
Kyllä antaisi asiat

Wielä paljonki puhua,
Waan ei anna aika myöten,
Enkä jaksane jutella;
Josta päätän pännän juoksun,
Sulan seisatan samalla.
Mehiläisen Ainehisto.
Wuosikertoina 1836, 1837, 1839 ja 1840.
1. Runoja ja Lauluja.
W. 1836.
Wiipurin linna. — Suomen synty Tammikuulta.

Tauti. — Hekkalan Maria Helmikuulta.
Wedenkantaja Anni. — Miniä. — Naija Maaliskuulta.
Neitsen rosvo. — Härjän ampuja Huhtikuulta.
Kaunis tammi. — Ukot kirkkomäellä. Toukokuulta.
Kaarlo kuningas — Kiitos Keisarille. Kesäkuulta.
Tuiretuisen poika. — Tupakkiruno. Heinäkuulta.
Immen itku. — Waaraslahden Kaisa. Elokuulta.
Lisäys Suomen syntyyn.
Inkerin valitus. Syyskuulta.
Wiisaampansa vieressä yötä maannut.
— Nuotta-ankkurista. Lokakuulta.
Kummia. — Huotarin naimisista.
— Ilolle Marraskuulta.
Tyttö kehnolle kosialle. —
Muuttamalle kirkkoherralle. Joulukuulta.
W. 1837.
Kalevalan neito. — Ylistys Tammikuulta.

Kirjavaiselle.
Yhdeksän huolilaulua Helmikuulta.
Kadonnut poika. — Naimaruno. Maaliskuulta.
Joukosen nainen. — Ollilta ja Huhtikuulta.
perehestänsä.
Yhdeksän vanhaa sanaa. — Loholahden Toukokuulta.
markkinoista.
Tansin synty. — Huoliruno Mathias Kesäkuulta.
Reineksestä.
Repo. — Kettu ja hämähäkki. — Heinäkuulta.
Talkkousruno.
Seitsemän pientä runoa. — Ihalainen. Elokuulta.
— Elias ja Anna.
Kehotus laulamaan. — Pieksiäisen Syyskuulta.
panettelemasta.
Neljä vanhaa laulua. — Pohjanmaan Lokakuulta.
surkeudesta.
Kolme vanhaa laulua. — Kolme sanaa Marraskuulta.
Savon puolesta.
Ruotus ja Tahvanus. — Murheruno Joulukuulta.
Pielisen kirkkoherran Jakoppi
Steniuksen kuolemasta. —
Neittyen ihanaisuudesta.
W. 1839.
Mehiläisen entisestä olosta ja Tammikuulta.

nyt jälle ilmaumisesta.
Kansan lauluja. Helmi-, Maalis-,
Kesä-, Heinä- ja Elokuulta
Tietäjän runo. Huhtikuulta.
Kahviruno. — Kaksi koirarunoa. Toukokuulta.
Sururuno Iin pitäjän kirkkoherran Touko- ja Kesäkuulta.
Henrikki Suntin kuolemasta.
Runo postiluukusta. Heinäkuulta.
Juttu juhlajuomisesta, koottu Elokuulta.
kirkkokohmelosta. — Huolikaihos
Karjalassa (pispa Molanderin
kuolemasta).
W. 1840.
Kansan lauluja. Tammikuulta.

Kysymys Mehiläisestä. — Helmikuulta.
Kutsumusruno.
Koulunkäymättömän valitus. Maaliskuulta.
Runo tyttäristä. Huhtikuulta.
Onneton naimamatka. — Kaipaksen Toukokuulta.
elämästä.
Runo Suomen kielestä. Kesäkuulta.
2. Suomen kansan Sanalaskuja ja Arvuutuksia.
Löytyy usiampia melkein joka kuuosan lopulla vuosikerroissa 1836

ja 1837.
3. Satuja.
W. 1636.
1. Ukko ja kuolema. — 2. Kontio ja Tammikuulta.

hiiri. — 3. Linnut, nelijalkaset
ja yöleikko.
4. Paimen ja Ahti. — 2. Hepo ja härkä. Helmikuulta.
6. Jalopeura ja kettu. — 7. Hemonen. Maaliskuulta.
8. Susi ja akka. — 9. kaksi hevoista. Huhtikuulta.
10. Talohiiri ja metsähiiri.
11. Wähämielinen härkä.— 12. Kettu Toukokuulta.
ja korppi. — 13. Wanha leiona,
metsäsika ja aasi.
14. Sudet ja lampaat. — 15. Koira ja Kesäkuulta.
varjonsa. — 16. Kettu ja marjat
17. Simpukka ja kotka. — 18. Aarre. Heinäkuulta.
19. Leiona, lehmä, muohi ja lammas.
20. Hiiret ja tammi. — 2l. Kettu Elokuulta.
ja kukko.
22. Lampaat ja koira. — 23. Mehiläinen Lokakuulta.
ja kyyhkynen. — 24. Sääski ja härkä.
25. Mettiäinen ja muurahainen. — 26. Marraskuulta.
Mettiäinen ja hämähäkki. — 27.
Kotka ja jänis.
28. Kissa ja koira. — 29. Oinas ja Joulukuulta.
härkä.— 30. Warpunen ja poikansa.
W. 1837.
1. Paimenten tolvotuksct. — 2. Tammikuulta.

Kuninkaan palvelia ja kerjaläis-ukko.
3. Kissa ja leivonen. — 4. Susi ja Helmikuulta.

Deception in The Marketplace The Psychology of Deceptive Persuasion and Consumer Self Protection 1st Edition David M. Boush

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Influence The Psychology of Persuasion Robert B.

Influence New and Expanded The Psychology of Persuasion

The Psychology of Leadership New Perspectives and

European Consumer Protection Theory and Practice 1st

The Influential Fundraiser Using the Psychology of

The Change Election Money Mobilization and Persuasion

The Psychology of Stereotyping Distinguished

Deception Counterdeception and Counterintelligence 1st

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

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We dedicate this book to our grandchildren.

1 Deception in the Marketplace 1

2 Theoretical Perspectives on Deceptive Persuasion 21

3 Marketplace Deception Tactics I 39

4 Marketplace Deception Tactics II 59

5 How Deception-Minded Marketers Think 79

6 How People Cope With Deceptiveness: Prior Research 95

7 Marketplace Deception Protection Skills 123

8 Developing Deception Protection Skills in Adolescence

9 Teaching Marketplace Deception Protection Skills: Prior Research 163

10 Societal Perspectives: Regulatory Frontiers, Societal Trust,

curiosity about a fascinating and underresearched topic. Rather, it is a vital

thank Dave Schumann, University of Tennessee, and Norbert Schwartz,

David M. Boush is the head of the marketing department and associate

Deception pervades human social life. Practicing deceptive persuasion

an important component of a person’s general self-efficacy, shaping their

research on deceptive marketing was done with the goal of influencing

Deception in the Modern Marketplace

Deception is a central and inevitable part of marketplace interactions

marketplace visual representations beware! And because we now live in

consumers evaluate and enjoy the author’s skillful deception of the

14. Disguising hired laypeople as everyday consumers to execute so-called

ἀ e topic of marketplace deception is important because when people see

Misleading and Deceptive: Defining Marketplace Deception

ἀ e concepts of “deception” and “deceptive” are ambiguous, socio-cultur-

of ignorance, and deception due to the understandable inability to know,

and benign communications which can be described as everyday,

Deceptiveness in commercial speech, which includes all marketing com-

viewpoint on lying behavior that is found in most social science research.

Further, marketing misrepresentations are deceptive in the FTC’s view if

to be decided) of a representative group of relevant consumers to have a

Marketplace Deception Is Persuasion

All of marketplace persuasion need not involve deception, but all of

a state-of-mind or state-of-mood, but the end goal is always persuasion.

psychologists. Working in a private lab, they need to stage a compelling

Deceptions Are Context Bound

An act’s deceptiveness must be assessed within the overall communica-

A Deception Agent’s Definition: It Is Deception

A compelling account of how a deception agent would think about practic-

is that for a persuasion planner, something that target consumers “could”

Ethics and Morality

One thing that makes marketplace deception complex to analyze is that

Marketplace Deception Is a Special Domain of Societal Deception

More specifically, in Chapter 2, we examine behavioral scientists’ the