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    of 5

    Princeton University Press

    Chapter Title: Foreword

    Book Title: The Theory of Incentives


    Book Subtitle: The Principal-Agent Model
    Book Author(s): Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
    Published by: Princeton University Press. (2002)
    Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv7h0rwr.3

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    Foreword

    The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance in eco-
    nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access
    to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate students in economics. Our
    goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many
    contributions that have flourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our
    contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some initial clues
    for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored
    the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been
    divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic
    principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the
    transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without
    having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
    The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters
    are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should
    concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers
    who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most
    essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-
    ering the starred sections will enable students to manipulate the concepts for better

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    xii • Foreword

    assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
    Going through the text and checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-
    dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the
    heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive
    theory.
    We thank our students whose excitement for the topic has led to this enterprise
    of trying to synthesize what we have learned in incentive theory. We are grateful
    also to Cécile Aubert, Gary Biglaiser, Xavier Carpentier, Pierre Dubois, Yolande
    Hiriart, Wu Kai, Fahad Khalil, Claudio Mezzetti, Jérôme Pouyet, and Stéphane
    Straub, who have offered comments on the first draft and to Marie-Pierre Boé who
    cheerfully and repeatedly revised our chapters.

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    The Theory of Incentives

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