EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. IRENEO
JUGUETA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding
accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a caliber .22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary
Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the umbilicus, directed
upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 V% years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the
accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

Contrary to law.[2]

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of
Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the
house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder,
directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some
cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his
wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors,
were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one Danilo
Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and
Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no
participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime
scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel.[4] Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant. [5]

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who
executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and
Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the
victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used. [6]

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as his
entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly
stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men
responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas
lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon" Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda
na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and
Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit.
Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut. [7]

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters were
wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the
two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine
expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. [8]

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had a
previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two
other brothers for molesting his daughter.[9]

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along
with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was
just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the
shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute
walk away from the crime scene.[10]

Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court
ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and
kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of
Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to
pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs,

SO ORDERED.[11]

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correctional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the
offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered
to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered a
Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. [13]

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued a
Resolution[14] notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested
that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the
CA.[15]

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his
failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one
holding the gun used to kill Norberto's children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the
highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and
ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.[16]

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant acted in
concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his
family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is
illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in your
house?
A: Yes., sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm? A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic) down
face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

x x x[17]

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because, as
ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting
between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts
reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all. [18] Here, the three men
undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is,
therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that
killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. [19] The presence of
any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. [20] The
trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto's two
children, thus:

xxx Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side about to sleep on
June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by
[appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilbcrto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out
of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2)
daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace
Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 lA years old respectively. In this case, the
victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There was
clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to
defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night,
xxx[21]

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina,
[22]
the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a
felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,[23] the Court held:

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical
injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b)
the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the
injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of
firearms, the words uttered[24] during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes
with approval the trial court's finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping
off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go
out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine
had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder
of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina,
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he
alone is liable for the crime committed.[25]

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning
that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant's firearm that killed the
children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's
testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,[26] "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." [27] Both the trial court and the CA found
Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should
not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People[28] that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This
is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to
assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x. [29]

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial
court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one
of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that
appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for
which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder"
and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the
trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant
is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a
single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the
crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that
the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court that an information must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The
reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao
Station, et al.,[30] thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not
heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the
Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of
this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.[31] Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder,
respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,[32] the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 48 [33] of
the Revised Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience
of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex
crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. [34]

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive
and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but
his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it
shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and
his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,[35] "each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime." [36]

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary,
aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain
sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and
the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. [37]

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

xxx the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the
said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime
of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason
of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x [38]

In People v. Agcanas,[39] the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating
because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt
him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the
crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.
[40]
The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying
the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court
should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. [41] However, pursuant to Republic Act
(RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should
be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4)
counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal cases
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are
three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise,
actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[42]

This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court
when appropriate.[43] Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity,
which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.[44]

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del
Mundo v. Court of Appeals[45] expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must
have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219[46] and Article 2220[47] of the Civil Code, x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental
pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." [48] They may also be considered and allowed "for
resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her
assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant
humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." [49]
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs ofRey Castillon: "[T]he award of
moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."[50]

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220[51] of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can
be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private
offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.[52]

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account
for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,[53] the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud [54] - that intensifies
the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. [55]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public
as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to
be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be
of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. [56]

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [57] requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample
on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has
committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it should
impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of
exemplary damages.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages
may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v,
Matrimonio,[58] the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,[59] the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada,[60] People v. Neverio[61] and People v. Layco, Sr. ,[62] the
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt
the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at P30,000.00, [63] despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to P50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence[64] sets the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed
by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws
were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. [65] Under the same law, the following crimes
are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,[66] mutiny on the high seas,[67] and simple rape.[68] For the
following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy;[69] qualified
bribery under certain circumstances;[70] parricide;[71] murder;[72] infanticide, except when committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose;
[73]
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; [74] robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons under certain circumstances;[75] destructive arson, except when death results as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article; [76] attempted or frustrated rape, when a
homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.[78] Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320,
death results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii)
when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of
the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven
years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police
or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single indivisible
penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied.

2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to
ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. [79]

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite
this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome[80] and People v.
Quiachon[81] is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender."[82]

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA
9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor[83] that the award of civil indemnity for the crime
of rape -when punishable by death should be P75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." [84] Such reasoning also applies to all
heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to P100,000.00. [85]

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa[86] P50,000.00 was awarded as
moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.[87] Subsequently, the amount was increased to P75,000.00 in People v. Soriano[88] and P100,000.00
in People v. Gambao[89]

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as
provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages
and not the actual penalty imposed.

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetna,
the latest jurisprudence[90] pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,0000.00 as moral damages.
For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of
P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the
attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00. "[T]his is
not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x." [91]

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying
aggravating circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several
crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will
depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated.
If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be
imposed,[92] then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the following
doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,[93] this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a
composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice
Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,[94] explained that composite crimes are "neither of
the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since
they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses." [95]

In People v. De Leon,[96] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the
victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation,
or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that
the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.[97]

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic sense, and
includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. [98] Hence, even if any or
all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information
have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People
v. Macabales:[99]

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is
present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However, we
find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of
the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded
them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with
homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the
circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the
homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. [100]

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA
9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be
P100,000.00 each, and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to
set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is
death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral damages and P100,000.00 exemplary
damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide[101] wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime, the
heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those
who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the
perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of
the robbers dies.[102] This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was
committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -Consummated felonies, as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it
is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each
be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each, as well as
exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil
indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P50,000.00, and an award of P25,000.00 civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the
amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same
way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes
committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted
murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P100,000.00 each, while in the
attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P25,000.00 each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers)
sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike
in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the
offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another
crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries,
regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime,
"Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms
part of the essential element of robbery,[103] which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the
nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil
indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the
damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an
attempted stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide,
death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of
the victim shall be P50,000.00 and P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded.
However, an award of P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an
aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.[104] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved.[105] In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to
P50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious
by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors — one is a mere 3 1/2-year-old toddler, and the other a
13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of
society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.

In summary:
I. For those crimes[106] like, Murder,[107] Parricide,[108] Serious Intentional Mutilation,[109] Infanticide,[110] and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages -P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages — P75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity-P50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity -P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity-P25,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages"[111] -P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:" [112]

a. Civil indemnity-P50.000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
a. Civil indemnity-P25,000.00
b. Moral damages-P25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse results,
the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual
abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity-P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes where
death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages
depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,[113] Robbery with Rape,[114] Robbery with Intentional
Mutilation,[115] Robbery with Arson,[116] Rape with Flomicide,[117] Kidnapping with Murder,[118] Carnapping with
Homicide[119] or Carnapping with Rape,[120] Highway Robbery with Homicide.[121] Qualified Piracy,[122] Arson with
Homicide,[123] Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation[124] and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual
abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed is
Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds[125] and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention,
the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
a. a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity -P50,000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages -P50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity -P25,000.00
b. Moral damages - P25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages — P25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries,[126] the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the
wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The: above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves
killed or injured in the incident.

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages
unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide,
Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, [127] Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e.,
Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity -P30,000.00
ii. Moral damages-P30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity-P20,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, [128] in addition to the
above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00 exemplary damages for
consummated; P30,000.00 for frustrated; and P20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the course of
the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: [129]

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00[l30]

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court,
the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the
amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.
[131]

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims;
(3) another PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should
pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of
the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages
payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.[132]

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto Estores
and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the
shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San
Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor,
the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the
sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no
probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a
certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the
two other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of
Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young
daughters.

After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only
attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[133] In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was
dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served
by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine
Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He
is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P50,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and
Judv Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this
Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible
criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 5, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on May 3, 2016 at 1:44
p.m.