Anatozoftheory: Roland Barthes'S Mythologies: A Critical Theory of Myths
Anatozoftheory: Roland Barthes'S Mythologies: A Critical Theory of Myths
Anatozoftheory: Roland Barthes'S Mythologies: A Critical Theory of Myths
IN THEORY, NEW IN CEASEFIRE - Posted on Friday, September 30, 2011 12:54 - 19 Comments
The most explicitly political aspect of Barthes’s work is his ‘mythology’, or analysis of myths.
Many of the myths he studies come from the fields of politics and journalism. Barthes’s work on
myths prefigures discourse-analysis in media studies. He is discussing the type of discourse
which is particularly typical of right-wing populism and of the tabloid press.
The main purpose of his work in ‘Mythologies’ is to dissect the functioning of certain insidious
myths. Myth is a second-order semiotic system. It takes an already constituted sign and turns it
into a signifier.
Barthes’s example is a magazine cover which shows a black soldier saluting the French flag. At
the level of first-order language, this picture is a signifier (an image) which denotes an event (a
soldier saluting a flag). But at the second-order mythological level, it signifies something else:
the idea of France as a great multi-ethnic empire, the combination of Frenchness and
militariness.
Myth is a metalanguage. It turns language into a means to speak about itself. However, it does
this in a repressive way, concealing the construction of signs. The system of myths tends to
reduce the raw material of signifying objects to similarity. For instance, it uses a photograph and
a book in exactly the same way.
Myths differ from other kinds of signifiers. For one thing, they are never arbitrary. They always
contain some kind of analogy which motivates them. In contrast to ideas of false consciousness,
myths don’t hide anything. Instead, myths inflect or distort particular images or signs to carry a
particular meaning. Myth doesn’t hide things, it distorts them. It alienates the history of the
sign.
Barthes’s main objection to myth is that it removes history from language. It makes particular
signs appear natural, eternal, absolute, or frozen. It thus transforms history into nature. Its
function is to freeze or arrest language. It usually does this by reducing a complex phenomenon
to a few traits which are taken as definitive. Barthes uses the example of a Basque chalet in
Paris, which ostentatiously displays certain signs of what is taken as Basque style, minus other
aspects of Basque houses as they would be found in the countryside (it has a sloping roof, but not
a barn).
It is crucial to emphasise that Barthes is not saying that all language-use is myth. He does not
believe that myth is necessary. His social constructivism is also partial. He believes there are
things, with specific attributes, separate from their mythical constructions (accessible, perhaps,
through denotative language). But a semiotician can only study the signs or myths, not the
things.
According to Barthes, he can tell us about the myth of the goodness of wine, or the way wine is
signified as an essence it doesn’t really have. Wine may, in fact, for contingent reasons of sense-
experience, be good. But a semiotician can’t tell us this.
In a sense, therefore, this is a negative approach to myth: it breaks down rather than replacing.
One might speculate that eventually, language would need to be reconstructed in a non-mythical
way, in order to move beyond myth – perhaps by talking directly of situated experiences, rather
than essences. But this is outside the scope of Barthes’s project.
Crucially, myths remove any role for the reader in constructing meanings. Myths are received
rather than read. A message which is received rather than read does not require an interpretation
through a code. It only requires a certain cultural knowledge. (One might add that it also needs
a certain form of life corresponding to the resonance of this knowledge).
The consumer of myth must here be differentiated from others who actually do read myths. To
the semiotician, like Barthes, a myth is just an ‘alibi’, a way of covering up the lack of ground
which essences really have. To a producer of myths, such as a newspaper editor choosing a
cover photo, they are simply examples or symbols, consciously chosen. In either case, the myth
is not ‘received’ as such. Both the journalist and the semiotician knows very well that the myth
is constructed.
According to Barthes, someone who consumes a myth – such as most tabloid readers – does not
see its construction as a myth. They see the image simply as the presence of the essence it
signifies. For instance, they see in the saluting black soldier the presence of French imperiality.
They are then convinced that what they’ve seen is a fact, a reality, even an experience – as if
they’d actually lived it. It is this kind of reader who reveals the ideological function of myth.
Myths are not read as statements of particular actors, but as outgrowths of nature. They are seen
as providing a natural reason, rather than an explanation or a motivated statement. They are read
as ‘innocent’ speech – from which ideology and signification are absent. To consume a myth is
not to consume signs, but images, goals and meanings. The signified of connotative myths is
‘hidden’, since it can’t be reconstructed through the language or images used to carry it. The
utterance is structured enough to affect the reader, but this reception does not amount to a
reading.
According to this reading of myth, a myth occurs only if someone is a true believer who
consumes the myth innocently. This is why, for certain later writers, a postmodern ‘ironic’
reading, which recognises and plays with the constructedness of myths, is deemed subversive. It
is also why ironic uses of stereotypes are sometimes differentiated from their simple
deployment. And why the ‘play’ of signs in fields such as the Internet, or reader-response
models of global culture, where each user is aware they are appropriating and redeploying signs,
is sometimes seen as progressive even if the signs deployed are capitalist, conventional, racist,
etc.
Barthes sees myth as functioning in a similar way to Althusserian interpellation. It calls out to
the person who receives it, like a command or a statement of fact. The content of the injunction
is to identify the sign with the essence.
In fact, mythical signs look as if they have been created on the spot, for the viewer. They look
like they are simply there to perform their role in the myth. The history which causes or creates
them is rendered invisible.
Myth is parasitical on language. It requires the meaning of the initial sign for its power, but at
the same time it denies this specificity, making it seem indisputable and natural, rather than
contingent. There is always a remainder of denotation without which the connotation could not
exist.
It is only because of this remnant of denotation that the connotation can naturalise something. It
is as if it needs the innocence of denotation to pose as innocent itself. Meaning is thus torn
between nature and culture, denotation and connotation.
It also has a tendency to empty language. It removes signs from their context, hiding the process
of attaching signifier to signified. It thus strips signs of their richness and specificity. The
function of myth is to empty reality of the appearance of history and of social construction. The
initial sign is ‘rich’ in history. Myth functions by depriving it of history and turning it into an
empty form to carry a different meaning.
If the ‘political’ is taken to encompass all human relations in their actual structure, as power to
transform the world, then myth is depoliticised speech – the active stripping of politics from
speech. Usage (or doing) is mistakenly portrayed as nature (or being).
This draining of history strips represented phenomena of their content. What is actually a
contextually specific action is taken to stand for something else: a timeless, eternal essence. This
is termed the ‘concept’ of the myth. Barthes expresses it by adding -ness or -ity onto ordinary
words.
This emptying is also a kind of filling. The concept carried by a myth appears to be eternal and
absolute. In fact, the concept carried by a myth implants into the sign an entire history and
perspective. It speaks to a very specific group of readers. It corresponds closely to its
function. For instance, it refers back to particular stereotypes embedded in gender, racial, or class
hierarchies.
What is put into the myth as meaning is always in excess over what remains of the meaning of
the sign itself. An entire history or perspective is put into the concept which the mythical sign
signifies. On the other hand, the image or example itself is almost incidental. There is a constant
rotation of mythical images and significations. Myth functions like a turnstyle which constantly
offers up signs and their mythical meanings. The sign is emptied so that it can present a meaning
(the concept) which is absent but full.
As a result of myth, people are constantly plunged into a false nature which is actually a
constructed system. Semiotic analysis of myth is a political act, establishing the freedom of
language from the present system and unveiling the constructedness of social realities. The
contingent, historical, socially constructed capitalist system comes to seem as ‘life’, ‘the world’,
‘the way it is’.
One way to become aware of myths is to consider how they would seem, from the standpoint of
whatever they represent. Myth is always clear when seen from the standpoint of the signifier
which has been robbed. For instance, the mythical nature of the use of the image of the black
soldier is apparent if the soldier’s actual narrative is known or considered.
Another aspect of the functioning of myth is that it refuses the explanatory or analytical level. It
states facts and posits values, but it does not use theories to explain social phenomena. Facts are
taken as self-present, not as mysteries to be explained. The statement of facts or values without
explaining them gives an illusory clarity, making it seem that they are obvious, they go without
saying.
1) Inoculation – admitting a little bit of evil in an institution so as to ward off awareness of its
fundamental problems. For instance, admitting the existence of ‘a few bad eggs’ in the police so
as to cover up the abusive nature of official police practices.
2) Removing history – making it seem like social phenomena simply ‘exist’ or are there for the
viewer’s gaze, eliminating both causality and agency. Neoliberalism, for instance, is often
treated as ‘globalisation’ or ‘modernisation’, as an abstract economic necessity rather than a
political strategy.
3) Identification of the other with the self – projecting inner characteristics onto the other. For
instance, in trials, treating a deviant person as a version of the self which has gone astray, based
on a view of crime as rooted in human nature. The actual person, their motives and meanings are
written out of such accounts.
4) Tautology – treating the failure of language as expressing the essence of a thing – “theatre is
theatre”, “Racine is Racine”, or “just because, is all”. Barthes believes this device is an order not
to think.
Andrew Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. His book Power,
Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and
Hierarchies (co-authored with Athina Karatzogianni) was published in Sep 2009 by Routledge.
His ‘In Theory’ column appears every other Friday.
19 Comments
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Oct 26, 2012 20:33
Where did you find the list of seven common figures of myth ? There are no references in your
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