ON EMENDING AND NOT EMENDING THE TEXT OF SOME PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE'S

"ETHICA EUDEMIA"
Author(s): PETER L.P. SIMPSON
Source: The Classical Quarterly , DECEMBER 2013, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 2 (DECEMBER
2013), pp. 660-679
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

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Classical Quarterly 63.2 660-679 © The Classical Association (2013) 660
doi: 1 0. 1 0 1 7/S000983 88 1 3000 1 65

ON EMENDING AND NOT EMENDING THE TEXT OF SOME

PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICA EUDEMIA

The text of Aristotle's Ethica Eudemia (EE)1 is often in need of emendation,

because of the particular fault in the manuscripts of misreading one letter for
misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in c
many of these errors (especially at the beginning of 8.1), but more needs to
A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or
(or even of punctuation), but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, a
have noted,2 the EE is marked by considerable compression of thought, and
pression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration,
shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed.
The following article is divided into two parts. The first is about passages
scholars have judged emendation to be necessary but where, or so it will here b
not emendation of the Greek but only change in comprehension is required. T
is about passages where some emendation is indeed required but where there is
further suggestion about what the emendation should be. In both parts the p
discussed in order of appearance in the text. First the Bekker text is given, the
lation (sometimes excessively literal), then discussion of emendations, then
revised translation (where necessary). Reference to the manuscripts is by
the OCT gives them. These passages have, of course, already been subject
scholarly discussion and emendation, always learned and sometimes ingen
the suggestions to be made here are new and have not, to my knowledge, been
elsewhere.

1 The two main editions of EE are F. Susemihl, [Aristotelis Eudemia Ethica] Eudemii Rhodii
Ethica (Leipzig, 1884) and R.R. Walzer and J.M. Mingay, Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia (Oxford,
1991). Bekker' s original text of all of Aristotle's works is also invaluable but its apparatus criticus
is thin (I. Bekker, Aristotelis Opera [Berlin, 1831]).
F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles. Eudemische Ethik (Darmstadt, 1962), 363, who speaks, in this regard, of
Aristotle's 'Brachylogie' in EE, and A.J.P. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford, 1992), 115,
141, who uses the word 'telegrammatic' in the same regard; see also A. von Fragstein, Studien zur
Ethik des Aristoteles (Amsterdam, 1974), 397; J. Mingay, 'How should a philosopher live? Two
Aristotelian views', History of Political Thought 8 (1987), 21-32, at 27, 29, 31. Why such com-
pression of thought, in both logic and grammar, should be a mark of EE when it is not, say, a
mark of NE, is worth pondering. One suggestion, following Kenny (n. 2), 141, is that NE (which con-
tinues immediately into the Politica ) is addressed to would-be legislators or politikoi , while EE seems
aimed at a philosophically more sophisticated audience. The former would likely not be able or eager
to follow a highly compressed piece of reasoning, but the latter almost certainly would, and might
indeed relish a good intellectual workout. This suggestion, however, must remain merely a suggestion
here. An adequate defence of it would require an article by itself.

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 ETHICA EUDEMIA 661

SOME PASSAGES NOT NEEDING TEXTUAL EMENDATION

2.10.1226b2-5

éTieiôf] o')v orne ôó^a orne poú^riaíç èaxi 7tpoaípeaiç, éaxiv cbç émiepov, o')Ô' àficpcD ...
co ç éÇ àficpoív ápa. àjicpco yàp imápxei xćo 7ipoaipot>|jévco Tama.

So, since choice is neither opinion nor will, it is as each but not both ... As from both, then; for
both of them are present in one who chooses.

The main problem here is éoii Tipoaípeotç, éoiiv coç émiepov, for not only does there
seem to be an unnecessary reduplication of éoii but this reduplication also seems to give
a false sense. For how can choice be as each and yet not both? Indeed P and C seem to
reflect this puzzle because they omit eon rcpoaípeoiç altogether. The OCT, by contrast,
follows Allan in deleting the first eon and the comma after rcpoaipeoię to give the
sense: 'So, since choice is not opinion or will as each of them nor both ...' It also
notes in the apparatus Ross's suggestion to read eoiiv «f|> rcpoaípeoiç {éoiiv} còç
émiepov. Susemihl leaves the text as is save for removing the comma, but notes in
the apparatus that Bussemaker also deleted éoiiv after rcpoaipeoię and that Bonitz (in
part anticipating Ross) suggested deleting eon before 7ipoaípeoiç and replacing it
with f). However, there is no real need to add r' (and the OCT does not add it) nor,
more importantly, is there need for any other emendation. In fact the emendations
give a false sense for, although it looks odd at first sight to say that choice is each
but not both, Aristotle's meaning seems to be precisely of this sort when he concludes,
in the next line, that choice is from both. For, as he says later, it is from both in the sense
that choice is both opinion and appetite (of which will is one species) when these, as a
result of deliberation, are brought together in a conclusion (1227a3-5). A better sol-
ution, then, is to keep Bekker's text as it is and construe éoiiv coç the way phrases
like eonv öie are construed ('there is a time when ...') and get the meaning 'there is
a way that ...' Hence we should accent differently and print rcpoaipeoię, eoi iv coç
and translate: 'So, since choice is neither opinion nor will, there is a way that it is
each but not both ...' The 'there is a way that' will now be qualifying the 'it is each
but not both' in anticipation of the conclusion about the nature of choice that
Aristotle finally reaches.

3.1.1229all-16

eau 5' 8ÏÔT1 àvÔpeíaç Tcévxe teyójaeva Ka0' ójaoiÓTrrua- . . . Seuxépa r' GipaiuoiiK
8ť é|i7C£ipíav Kai to eiÔévai, ov% œcrcep ScoKpáxriç ëcprj, ià ôeivá, àXX' öti xàç Por|
ôeivcov.

There are five kinds of bravery spoken of by likeness ... A second is military bravery,
based on experience and knowing, not terrible things, as Socrates said, but that helps f
things.

The problem word here is the on in àXX' on tcxç porjGelaę icov ôeivcov which is not only
unnecessary but disrupts the sense. Susemihl prints Bekker's text but notes in the appar-
atus that Sylburg proposed deleting oil, which is followed by the OCT, and that Bonitz
proposed instead adding ïoaoï. A simpler solution is to leave things as they are and
regard the construction as an infinitive and accusative clause with pleonastic oil (LSJ
s.v. II.2), the on serving, in this case, to show that the accusatives are not objects of

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 662 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

eiôévoci but an indirect statement depen

Socrates said, but that there are helps for

3. 4.1231 b38-32a4

ôi%coç ôè xà %piļļiaxa Xéyofiev Kai xrçv %prļ|iaxiGxiKfiv. iļ jièv yàp Ka0' amò XPflalÇ x°û
Kxrpaxoç éaxív, olov iwtoôfuxaxoç fļ iļiatiou, f' ôè mxà a')(ißeßr|K0c; jllév, ou (lévxoi oíkcoç
cbç àv e'i xiç Gxa0ļico %pf|Gaixo xco ùrcoôfmaxi, àkX' olov r' 7cco>,r|Giç Kai f] 1iîg0cogiç- %pfļxai
yàp imoÔrpaxi.

We speak of things monetary and of business in two ways. For there is the using of a piece of
property per se , as of a cloak or a shoe, and there is a using of it per accidens , not however in
the way one might use a shoe for a weight, but as selling and lending, for it uses a shoe.

The only problem here is the word imoSiļļian, for the manuscript tradition is unclear.
The OCT reports that P has 'mo8r| with jit added as a superscript, that C has ')tcoôt1ji
with T added as a superscript, and that L has 'mo0iļļiaxa. The reading imoÖrpaxi is pro-
posed by Victorius and is adopted by Susemihl. The OCT, however, thinks that this
proposal is not sufficient by itself and follows Richards in adapting from Pol.
1 .8. 1257al 1-12 and writing %pf|Tai yàp <fļ> 'moôfi|iaTi <ó 5eóji8voç> (Tor the one
who needs it uses it as a shoe'). This more extensive emendation gives a better sense
than moSfijiaxi by itself but it has the disadvantage precisely of being more extensive
and so harder to explain philologically. The OCT also puts the whole phrase into par-
entheses, which may well be an improvement but does nothing by itself to favour or
disfavour the emendation. An alternative to the emendation, then, would be to follow
L and write TÎmoôfuiœua but understand %pfļxai as passive ('are provided') and not as
middle ('it uses'), and so translate: 'for shoes [sc. and not weights] are provided [sc.
by selling and lending shoes].' Aristotle will thus be playing on the double meaning
of the verb xpáco: to provide, and (in the middle) to use; the point is that in selling
and lending one is using shoes as a medium of exchange and not for wearing (so
that the use is per accidens ), but one is nevertheless providing people with shoes and
not, say, with weights. The drawback with this suggestion is, of course, that it depends
on exploiting a double use of xpáco, which, in the absence of any warning of the fact,
might be hard to catch, even for native Greek speakers. But perhaps Aristotle intends
such readers to catch it when they see that without a double use the phrase will be
ungrammatical. Compression of statement, both in grammar and logic, is after all a fea-
ture of EE so that to posit another instance of it here is hardly out of keeping with the
rest of the text; it speaks more in favour of the suggestion than against it.

3.6.1233b6-15

ó ôè Kax' á^íav Kai coç ó Àóyoç, |j,£yata)7tp£7iriç- xò yàp rcpércov mx' à^íav egxív- oi)0èv yàp
7tp£7iei xcòv Ttapà Trļv à^íav. Ô£i ôè 7tpÉ7iov Eivai. Kai yàp xoû TCpéitovxoç Kax' à^íav, Kai
7ipÉ7lOV Kai 7ī£pi Ö, OlOV 7t£pi OÍK£XOD yá|LlOV £X£pOV XÒ 7lp£7lOV Kai 7l£pi épCOJlévOD, Kal
a')XG), £Ï7t£p £7tÍ XOGOÛXOV Tļ XOIOÛXOV, OlOV XT1V 0£(DpíaV OÚK Cp£XO 0£1IIGXOkX£Î 7lp£7C£lV TJV
£7toiriGaxo 'OÀi)|jmaÇ£, ôià xfļv TcpoÜTiáp^aGav xa7i£ivóxr|xa, àXka Kiļicovi. ó ô' otccûç
£X')%£V £%CDV Tipòç xfļv à^íav, ö o')0£Íç xoúxcov. Kai £7i ' £X£')0£pi0xrļxo(; cûGamcoç* £Gxi yàp
XIÇ cbç £^£D0épiOÇ, oxav £>£Ú0£pOÇ.

But he who does what is according to worth and as reason says, he is magnificent. For the fitting
accords with worth; for nothing is fitting that is contrary to worth. But it must be fitting, for
indeed of the fitting in accord with worth, and fitting and as regards what (for example, one

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 663

thing fits the marriage of a servant and anot

so much or of such a sort; for example the
to Olympia was not fitting for him (on a
Cimon. He who is disposed to worth as it
way too with liberality, that there is some

There are several problems here, as the

lows Fritzsche in marking a lacuna aft
o')0eiç xoúxcov. He also includes in on
Kať àÇíav Kai ttpéttov and follow
éXeuôépioç, öxav éXeúGepoç to read eon yáp xiç oik' éteirôépioç om'
ócveÀ^úGepoç ('it is possible for someone to be neither liberal nor illiberal'). The
OCT follows Casaubon' s emendation, does not delete ö in ö oi)0eiç xoúxcov, accepts
Susemihl' s parenthesis, and marks as corrupt the whole of ttpéttov eivai
(Kaì yàp xoû ttpéttovxoç Kax' a^iav Kai ttpéttov). The passage is certainly obscure
but there is a way to make sense of Bekker's text as it stands if, in particular, one
gives to Tov ttpéttovxoç a verbal force and treats it as a compressed genitive absolute:
'But he who does what is according to worth and as reason says, he is magnificent
(for the fitting accords with worth; for nothing is fitting that is contrary to worth).
But it must be fitting, for as indeed the fitting is in accord with worth, there must in
fact be a fit both as regards what (for example, one thing fits the marriage of a servant
and another the marriage of a beloved) and for him, if he is really up to so much or such;
for example the thinking was that the embassage Themistocles made to Olympia was not
fitting for him (on account of his former low condition), but it was for Cimon. He who is
disposed to worth as it chances is the nobody among these. Things are the same way too
with liberality, that there is someone who is as a liberal man is - when he is free to be.'
The sense of the last two sentences is that someone might be disposed as the liberal man
is but only be able to behave so when the conditions are met, namely when he is free of
restraints (financial or physical), just as also in the case of magnificence. For one could
be disposed as the magnificent man is but be unable to behave so because of lack of
preconditions, like Themistocles who, though he had, like Cimon, the resources to
put on a splendid display, did not have the right family status, and so, when he tried
to be magnificent, only succeeded in being a swaggerer. He should have refrained
because he was out of his league, or a 'nobody', in the context.

7. 2.1236bl-5

(pavepòv Ô' £K toútcdv öxi f| Ttpcoxr) cpiÀáa fļ xéov àyaBœv éaxiv ávxupiÀía Kai àvxircpoaípeaiç
rcpòç àÀXriA.ouç. cpíÀov |ièv yàp xò (piÀoújievov xœ cpiÀoûvxi, cpíÀoç ôè xco cpi^oufiévco Kai
ávxupiXcòv.

From this it is clear that the first friendship is the mutual loving and choosing of the good for
each other. For dear to the lover is the object beloved but dear ?is he? to the beloved when he
also loves back.

The oddity here is the abrupt change from the neuter cplÀov in the first clause to the mas-
culine cpí^oç in the second. Susemihl leaves the text as it is but notes in the apparatus
Fritzsche' s suggested emendation of cpíÀoç ôè xœ cpiÀ,o')jiévco to cpíÀ,oç ôè ó (piÀoú^evoç
('the beloved is dear when he loves back) as well as his own to cpíXoç Ôè xco (piXoDjiévco
Kai ávxi< cpiXoúvxi Kai ó> cpiÀcòv ('dear to the beloved and to the one who loves back is
also he who loves'). The OCT adopts Fritzsche' s emendation. However, Fritzsche' s

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 664 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

sense, which seems right, can be found

economy of expression (a particular fea
what is beloved, but dear to the belove
made, then, about the thing loved (in t
remark is made about him who loves ba
is loved (i.e. in this case, loved back). The
so as to highlight the point at issue: ina
animate things like other human beings
into the beloved. That is why, as Aristo
only possible in the second case and not

7.2.1237bl0-13

to yàp K£Kpi1Liévov ßeßaiov, xà ôè jllti xa%ù yivófieva jir|Ôè paÔícoç où rcoieî xrçv Kpíaiv op
oÚK eaxi 5' ávev rcíoxecoç cpiÄAa ßeßaux;- iļ 5è 7iícxiç oúk aveu xpóvou.

For what has passed judgement is firm, but things that do not happen quickly or easily do
make judgement right; and there is no firm friendship without trust, and there is no trust wit
time.

The problem scholars find with this passage is the où in oi) rcoieî, for it seems the oppo-
site must be true, that things that do not happen quickly and easily do make judgement
right and not that they do not make it right. At any rate the following remarks about
friendship and trust seem to mean that friendship is only rightly judged after passage
of time. Hence both Susemihl and the OCT agree with Bonitz in deleting où The del-
etion is unnecessary. The sense is that things that happen quickly and easily make for
correct judgement because what they really are is soon seen, while things that do not
happen quickly and easily do not make for right judgement because what they really
are is not soon seen. Friendship is of the latter kind because it needs trust and trust
needs time. So translate more along the lines: 'For what has passed judgement is
firm, but when things do not happen quickly or easily the judgement is not made rightly,
and there is no firm friendship without trust and there is no trust without time.'

7.2.1238a4-8

áyaÔòç (lèv yàp ànXœç èaxi xco áyaQòç eivai, cpíÀoç ôè xco ãXXco àyaOóç ànXcòq àyaOòç
cpíÃoç, öxav aujicpcoviļcrri iam' áficpco, coaxe ö éaxiv ànXcòç àya0óv, xco xoúxod áM,co, r' Ka
ànXûq |ièv oTcouôaícp, ãXX(x) ó' àya0óç, öxi xpi1ai(ioç.

For he is simply good by being good and a friend by being good for another. Simply good
friend when these are both in harmony, so that what is simply good, by the other of this, or a
not simply good to a virtuous man but to another, because useful.

The problems here are clear from the literal translation. Susemihl and the OCT both f
low A1 and add Ô' to ànXœç <5'> áyoc0òç so as to give the new sentence its open
particle. Instead of xco toútod àXXcû Susemihl follows P2 and writes xò xoúxod áX
but with what sense is unclear since he marks the whole of ö éoxiv ... öxi xpi1oi|L
as corrupt. The OCT follows Richards in writing xò amò áXXco and, like Susemihl,
lows P and C in writing ei Kai for iļ Kai, thus giving the following sort of sense to
whole clause: '... so that what is simply good, the same is good to another, even if
one not simply virtuous, but to another he is good, because useful'. Again, howev

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 665

Bekker's text can be given an intelligible s

that Bekker puts after xéò àXXa àyaOóç a
thatno ó' needs to be inserted between
simply good man and friend, when th
being good and dear by being good fo
ànXœç áyaGóv rather differently, treats t
parison with aXkty, and retains iļ Kai b
'yes', one can translate: 'Consequently
other than this - yes, even for one not sim
he is good, because he is useful.' Alterna
the ei Kai of the manuscripts and, instead
'or even for one not simply ...' or 'even
This sort of construal of the Greek is no
that Aristotle is requiring his readers her
ismanifest from the phrase cpíÀoç ôè t
must be construed with an understood
rate, will be that the simply good man
virtuous friend, will also, because he is s
ing those who are not virtuous, for he wi
ful to other virtuous people with whom h
be virtuous friends with a few and not w
ately next sentence), because he will deal
the vicious for the same reason (the viciou
because, by rebuking them as occasion r

7.4.1239a28-33

cpúoei ôè yívovxcu oi jièv cpi^rjiiKoi 01 ôè cpilóxijioi. cpiXrixiKÒç Ôè ó ico cpiXeîv %ocípcov jiâÀÀ
f' tío cpiÀ£Îa0av ekeivoç Ôè cpiAóxi(ioç 'iãXXov. ó [lèv ovv %aíp(ov ico 0au1iáÇeG0ai
cpiteÎGÔai xrjç wtepo^fię cpíÀoç- ó ôè t r'q év ico cpiÀEÎv iļ0oviļ<; ó cpi^riTiKÓç. ëveaxi
àváyKri évepyoûvxa- tò |ièv yàp cpiÀeív GV|iߣßr|K0q- ëaxi yàp ^avGáveiv cpi^oijļiev
(piÀoûvxa ô' ou

Some are by nature love-inclined and others lovers of honour. He is love-inclined who en
loving more than being loved; the other, however, is more honour-loving. So he, enjoying be
admired and loved, is friend of excess; but the first, the love-inclined, is friend of the pleasure
loving, for necessity is present ?being active; for loving is accidental; for it can escape the no
of the one loved, but not of the one loving.

The problem words here are eveoxi yàp áváyKri évepyoúvxa- xò jnèv yàp cpiX
<yujLLߣßr|K0<;- ëoxi yàp A,av0áveiv (piÃoújievov, cpiÀotivxa ô' o'). The OCT follo
Sylburg and Robinson in replacing eveoxi yàp àváyKri evepyoövxa with ëaxi y
àvàyKTi <(piÀeîv> évepyoúvxa ('it is necessary that he love when active'), and follo
P2 and A1 in replacing xò |ièv yàp cpiAeîv ODjiße ßrjKoq with xò jièv yàp q)i^eiG
Gt>|LißeßriK0q ('for being loved is accidental'). Susemihl makes the second change
not the first though he remarks in the apparatus that the text is somehow corrupt. If
is somehow corrupt the simplest change would be to follow Richards in replac
àváyKri with àváyKTi, for then évepyotivxa (which need not be changed, wi
Richards, to évepyowxi) can be read as an accusative absolute to give the sense: '
it [sc. the pleasure in loving] is necessarily present within when he is active' (plea
is necessarily present when activity is unimpeded). It is not, however, necessary

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666 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

change cpiÀeîv to (piÀ£ÎG0ai for, despite t

press the transitive force of cpiÀeîv, take
accidental (for the object might be un
reinforced by noting that the position o
5' oí) with tò (lèv yàp cptÀeîv G')(ißeß
(piX.o')|i8vov. The translation should the
(for it can escape the notice of the objec
of love has an object that it loves and a s
dental to the act because the act can exis
the fact, but the subject is not because t

7.5.1239b29-32

egxi ôé 71C0Ç Kai iļ toó} èvavxíou qnXía xoû àyaGoû. ôpéyexai yàp à'Xr'k(ùv ôià xò jiéaov cbç
cü|ißoA,a yàp ôpéyexai àMfitaov ôiò o') xâ> ylveaöai éÇ à|icpoîv ëv |lI£gov.

But friendship of the opposite can in a way also be of the good. For opposites are drawn to each
other through the mean; for they are drawn to each other as matching tallies. Hence they are a
mean not by becoming a single thing from both.

Both Susemihl and the OCT take exception to the last phrase and instead of ...
àXkr'X(ûv Ôiò o') tćo yíveoGai write, following Spengel, àXXr'k(ùv Ôià tò oikco
yíveaGai . . . ('they are drawn to each other as matching tallies because they thus become
a single thing from both'). The emendation gives a false sense. For, as the example of
the tallies shows, the point is that the extremes do not, when coming together, cease to
be extremes, but just have their defects supplied by each other. Some confirmation is
given a few lines later (1240a 1-3) when Aristotle speaks of unlike people rejoicing
in each other (as the austere in the witty and the hasty in the sluggish) because they
bring each other toward the mean. The hasty and sluggish, and the austere and witty,
do not hereby become a one; their temperaments are just relieved by each other. We
should, therefore, leave Bekker's text (and the translation) as it is.

7.6.1240a33-9

exi xò àXyoûvxi Guva^yeîv [ir' óť exepóv xi áycacâv Gfļaoļiev . . . ßovtexai yàp (náÀiaxá xe où
jxóvov g')Ma)7C£Îg0(xi ó cpí^oç xco cpílco, àXkà Kal xfļv ai)xrļv Mrcrļv, olov ôiyœvxi Guvöi'1/f|v, ei
éveÔé%exo, öxi ļiifļ éyyúxaxa.

Further, we will lay down as love to feel pain with someone in pain not for any other reason . . .
For the friend most wishes to feel not only pain with his friend but also the same pain, as to
thirst with him when thirsty, if it was possible because not very near.

The problem words here are si éveôé%8T0, öti |lItì éy y morca. Susemihl deletes jLifļ with
Fritzsche but notes in the apparatus Fritzsche's further suggestion of replacing si with iļ
ei ļLif). The OCT also deletes jllt|, adopts Fritzsche's further suggestion (P and C have f| in
place of L' s ei), but adds a comma, with Robinson, to give Tļ, ei 'ir' ('... to thirst with
him when thirsty or, if it was not possible, as nearly as could be'). Bekker's text can,
however, be given an acceptable sense, and perhaps indeed a better sense, if we take
the verb éveôé%eTO not in its meaning of 'it was possible' but in its primary meaning
of 'to take upon oneself and translate: '... to thirst with him when thirsty, if he took
it upon himself . . . ' The main problem here is that the verb évÔé%eG0ai so often has

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 667

the modal force of 'can' or 'be able' that

here too. There is, however, another p
seems to require being understood in
Poet. 24.1460a33-35 where Bekker'
xoioúxovç- áv ôè 0fi Kal cpaívr|xai e-ò
poet] should not construct such plots.
fairly plausible, he should accept even
év8é%ea0ai in place of á7ioóé%ea0ai a
in certain late manuscripts.3 The emen
primary sense means 'accept' or 'take u
to à7to8é%£G0ai.4 Accordingly, one sh
been using the same verb in the same
As for the final phrase öxi ļifļ èyyóxax
is ambiguous. The words öxi jn-q can eith
'except', or be taken separately with t
phrase will mean: '[... took it upon him
'[... took it upon himself,] because no
more or less the same, that the friend w
as his friend is suffering (e.g. to thirst w
by to come to his aid and relieve him di
tical problems, öxi ļLifļ taken as a single
v. oxi II), and öti taken separately wou
regards the problem of the negative pa
but also conditional (it is a subordinate p
ible.5 As regards the problem of the neg
of öxi. For oxe jnfļ is likewise a phrase
means 'unless', 'except', 'save when'

7.6.1240Ò28-34

Çrjieî 5è ó ànXcòq cov àya0òç eivai Kai aúxòç aúxco cpíÀoç, óxnrep eiprixai, öxi ôú' e%ei év
aí)T(õ a cpúcei ßo^texai eivai cpíÀa Kai ôiaorcáoai áôúvaxov. ôiò éiť àvBpcárcou jièv Ôokcí
emaioç amòç amcò cpíÀoç, èni ôè xcov á^cov Çcócov olov ïnnoq amòç amcò- oúk ápa
cpíÀoç. àXk' oúôè xà rniôía, àXk' öxav f1ôri e%r' rcpoaipeaiv- f1ôri yàp xóxe ôiacpcoveí ó Ttaîç
7cpòç xnv é7ti0')(iíav.

He who is simply good seeks to be also himself a friend to himself, as was said, because he
has two parts in himself that naturally want to be friends and it is impossible to split them
asunder. Hence in the human case each seems to be himself a friend to himself, while in
the case of the other animals as a horse itself to itself; so it is not a friend. But children
are not either, except when they already have choice, for then the child is already discordant
in relation to its desire.

The problem phrase here is èni ôè xóòv áÀÀcov Çcócov olov ïnnoc, aúxòç amcò.
Susemihl follows Spengel in adding oü after áMxov Çcpcov ('while in the case of

3 D.W. Lucas, Aristotle. Poetics (Oxford, 1968), 42, 231.

4 A point forcibly made in defence of èvôé%ea0ai by Alfred Gudeman, Aristoteles PIEPI
nOIHTIKHZ (Berlin, 1934), 27.
W.W. Goodwin, A Greek Grammar (London, 1968), § 1462 notes that ^if| is used in causal rela-
tive clauses that have also a conditional force.

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 668 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

the other animals it is not so ...') a

after orúxòç ocòxcò. The OCT also ad
òpEKxóç after aúxòç ocòxcò i('... it is no
to itself). However, again Bekker's te
stands: 'Hence in the human case each
while in the case of the other animals
so it is not a friend.' An animal, unli
an 'itself) and so cannot be a friend to
have desire but no choice and so do n
brought into friendship with each othe
Susemihl or the OCT (themselves follow
the next sentence. When a child is old
with itself in relation to desire (it ju
drawn by desire to something else); h
be, a friend to itself. Animals, by con
never get to have choice.

7.10.1242a20-5

Kai yap oXcoç xò ôúcaiov àrcav rcpòç cpíXov. xó xe yàp Ôírnióv xiai Kai koivcûvoîç, Kai ó (píXo
koivcovóç, ö (lèv yévovç, ö 5è ßlou ó yàp ávGpomoç oů (lóvov rcotaxucòv àXkà Ka
oíkovojliikòv Çcoov, Kai o')% coarcep xaXXà noxe avvÔuáÇexai Kai xá) xu%óvxi Kai 0f)À£i Ka
áppevi ...

For in fact generally the just is all in relation to a friend. For the just is for certain people, that is,
for sharers, and a friend is a sharer, the one in family and another in way of life. For man is not
only a political but a household animal and does not, like the other animals, couple together by
occasion and with any chance male or female . . .

However, the words ó yàp àvôpomoç oú jióvov rcoÀaxiKÒv are Casaubon's emendation
(followed also by Susemihl and the OCT), and what the manuscripts have is ó yàp
ávGpcÓTcou jióvov ov ttoAxxikòç ('for he of man is only not political'). The emendation
seems obvious, but if we supply the word for 'friend' from the preceding sentence we
can translate: 'For he who is friend of a man alone does not belong6 to a city [= is not
political], but he is indeed a household animal ...' The phrasing is peculiar but it does
have a sense. Moreover this sense serves a logical role in the argument in the context.
For he who is 'friend of a man alone' will be someone who is friends with one or a few
and not with many in a city. But such a person, even if he is not part of a city, must at
least be part of a family (he is a household animal), for man, unlike other animals, sets
up permanent relations with another and does not pass from one chance encounter to the
next. Hence, if everyone is either part of a city or not, and if those who are not are still
friends and sharers with others, at least in a household, and if, further, being friends and
sharers in city and household is a relation of justice, then all relations of friends are
relations of justice, which is the statement Aristotle began with (or part of it; the con-
verse, that all relations of justice are relations of friends, is something he argues for
in the larger context).

6 Or alternatively, taking (lóvov où together and not separately, 'he who is friend of a man almost
belongs i.e. is almost part of a city, for all he has left to do to become a part is to advance to the
next stage beyond the household.

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 ETHICA EUDEMIA 669

7.10.1243014-18

noXkà eyK^rpaia yívexai év xaîç cpiAáaiç xoîç ļifļ mx' e')0i)copiav Kai xò ôúcaiov iÔeîv. où
páôiov yàp xatercòv jiexprjaai évi xcoôe xco ļifļ Kax' ei)0Dcopíav, olov GUjißalvei G7ci xcòv
épcoxiKwv. ö fièv yàp ôicokei còç xòv fiÔùv érci xò a')Çf1v, ö Ô' ekeívov évíoxe cbç xpfiaijiov*

Many complaints arise in friendships for those not in a straight line and to see the just. For it is
not easy hard (?) to measure by a single thing for him who is not in a straight line, as happens in
love affairs. For the one pursues as after one pleasant to live with, and the other after him some-
times as useful.

The problems here are clear from the literal translation (note, though, that the meaning
of 'not in a straight line' is clear from the example: those are friends 'not in a straight
line' who are friends on different bases, as one on that of pleasure and the other on that
of utility). Both Susemihl and the OCT (following Bonitz and Fritzsche) transpose yàp
to follow %atercòv and change the punctuation, writing: ... mx' eúGucopíav, Kai xò
ôímiov iÔeîv ot) páôiov. %akčnóv yàp (lexpfjoai évi xcoôe xò 'ir' Kax' ei)0i)coplav
('... in a straight line, and to see the just is not easy. For it is hard to measure by
this one thing what is not in a straight line'). The emendations seem obvious.
However, Bekker's text can again be given a sense and, though nothing of significance
seems to hang on the fact, the sense is worth noting: 'Many complaints arise in friend-
ships for those not in a straight line even to see the just. For to measure a difficult thing
by this one thing is not easy for him who is not in a straight line, as happens in love
affairs ...' Those who are not friends on the same basis are 'not in a straight line
even to see the just' because each is looking in different directions, as one at pleasure
and the other at utility. Friendships on different bases are 'a difficult thing' and to
measure such a difficult thing by 'this one thing', namely by justice (each friend getting
his due), is 'hard' for 'him who is not in a straight line', namely for each of the friends,
for neither is in a straight line with the other.

7. 12. 1245b 1-7

xoûxo 5' éoxìv óxè jièv 7tá0oç, óxè ôè rcpâÇiç, óxè Ôè exepóv xi, ei ôuvaxòv e') Çfjv, Kai orneo
Kai xòv cpíÀov. év ôè xâ> guÇÍ1v auvepyeív, f' Koivcovlav xcòv év xéXei iiáÀioxá ye. Ôiò
auv0£copeív Kai auvevco%eîa0ai . . .

And this [sc. contemplating oneself in a good] is sometimes a feeling, sometimes a doing, some-
times something else, if it is possible to live well, and thus also one's friend; and in living
together working together, or community of things included in the end, surely most of all.
Hence it is to contemplate together and feast . . .

Again the problems are clear from the literal translation. Note first, however, that
jiá^ioxá ye is from the Aldine editio princeps ; the manuscripts read jiá^iGxá xe.
Susemihl and the OCT both write as follows: ... óxè ôè exepóv xi. ei ô' aúxòv eu
Çf|v, Kai oikcD Kai xòv (píXov, év ôè xco GvÇfjv auvepyeív, fļ Koivcovía xcòv év xé^et
jiá^iaxá ye. ôiò <ôeí> GDvGecopeív Kai ouveuco^eĪaGai ... ('... sometimes something
else. But if it is pleasant [supplied from the previous sentence] to live well oneself and
for one's friend also to live thus, and if in living together there is working together,
surely their sharing will be mainly in things included in the end. Hence it is necessary
to contemplate together and feast together ...'). Here the ô' aúxòv comes from L, iļ
Koivcovía from D, and Ôeî from Fritzsche. Nevertheless, the readings of all the remain-
ing manuscripts, including 1iáÂAGxá xe (which there is no compelling reason to change

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670 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

to jiáXiaxá ye), can be given an acceptab

cance seems to hang on the fact,this se
feeling, sometimes a doing, sometimes
and one's friend in this way too; and it [5
at living together or at a community of t
Hence it is to contemplate together and fe

8.1.1246a26-9

«TcopfiaeiE ó' av xiç ei ëcmv émcrcco epigeo xpr]aaG0ai Kai éq>' a rcecpuice Kai áMxoç,
Tomo Tļ amò fļSi) Kaxà Gi)1j,ߣßr|K0<;, olov rj òcpGa^jiòç iÔeîv f| Kai aM-coç Ttapi
ôiaaxpéyavxa, coaxe ôúo xò ëv (pavfļvai.

One might raise the puzzle whether it is possible to use each friend in fact for the things w
are natural to him and otherwise, and this either as itself pleasant accidentally. For examp
either an eye is to see or also in another way to mis-see, when distorting it so that one th
appears two.

First, L and C2 omit cpíÀcp, followed by both Susemihl and the OCT. In addition ècp'
the reading of Laur. 81.12; the other manuscripts have ècp' <î>. Instead of Kai xom
amò r'òv Kaxà GU|iߣßr|K0q Susemihl follows Spengel in writing Kai xomo
<Ka0'> amò iļ Kaxà cru|ip£pr|KÓç ('... and this either by itself or accidentally')
the OCT follows Dirlmeier and Jackson in writing Kai xomo fļ <Tļ> amò f' av
ai)|ißeßriK0(; ('... and this either qua itself or again accidentally'). The emendat
are plausible (and Jackson's iļ aí for fi8ù ingenious), but if one combines them w
the deletion of epigeo one loses any connection to what has gone before, an
makes the beginning of this book (or chapter; 8.1 is also numbered 7.13) very abr
An alternative is to note that the topic that ends the previous chapter is about the
man using his friend badly by killing him along with himself because he judges it pl
santer, or less painful, to know his friend will die with him than go on living beyond
(7.12.1246al8-25). If, however, epigeo is kept the question with which this book be
is a natural continuation, for it is about whether one can indeed use each friend, or e
dear thing, both for what he is naturally for and otherwise (that is, badly, as the bad
does). The chapter does, indeed, range beyond the limitation of this question to fri
and raises it about virtue and prudence, but each of these is just a particular case of t
same general puzzle. A suggestion, then, is to keep fļ0') as well as epigeo, prefer é(p' ¿
ècp' à, and follow Jackson in writing Kai xomo iļ amò instead of Kai xomo iļ a
'One might raise the puzzle whether it is possible to use in fact each thing th
dear on the basis natural to it and otherwise, namely this [treating Kai as epexege
in so far as it is pleasant incidentally [5c. the way the bad man uses his friend b
because of the incidental pleasure he gets from knowing his friend will not surv
him].' In this way too the example Aristotle immediately gives of an incidenta
of an eye, namely to eat it (b31), falls neatly into place,7 for an eye might very
be judged pleasant to eat (by those who like eyes).

7 The example seems otherwise so peculiar that scholars think the text needs emending,
Dirlmeier (n. 2), 473 and P. Moraux, 'Das Fragment VIII 1. Text und Interpretation', in P. Mo
and D. Harlfinger, Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik (Berlin, 1971), 253-84, at 257.

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 671

8.3.1248b39-49a3

eioi yàp 01 oïovxai xpv àpernv Ôeîv jièv ë%ew, àXkà xcov cpúaei àyaGcov eveicev. ôiò àyaGoi
jièv àvÔpeç eiai- xà yàp qyÙGei |ièv àya0à aùxoîç èoxiv mta)Kàya0íav yàp oijk e^ouow. oí)
yàp ')7cáp%ei ocùxoîç xà köXöl Sť ama...

There are people [the Spartans have just been mentioned] who think it necessary to have virtue
but for the sake of natural goods. Hence they are good men; for they have the natural goods; for
they do not have the quality of gentlemen; for they do not have noble things for their own sake.

Susemihl and the OCT print the same as Bekker save that both follow Victorius and A1
in writing KocÀ,oicàya0íav ôè oůk sxodgiv ('but they do not have the quality of gentle-
men'), and the OCT follows Solomon in writing xà yàp cpúoei jièv àyoc0à <àya0à>
ocùxoîç 8GXÍV. The ôè seems a definite improvement over the yàp of the other manu-
scripts (it nicely answers the preceding (lèv), but the extra áyaOà seems unnecessary.
However, the main issue is that none of the manuscripts have Ôiò àyaOoi |ièv àvôpeç
sioí. In place of àyoc0oi they all have àypioi ('wild'); àyaOoi is first found in the
Aldine editio princeps. The reason for the change is clear. If the people in question,
the Spartans notably, have the virtues, though they have them for the sake of natural
goods, they must be good men (for to have the virtues is to be good). They do not
fail to be good, then; they just fail to be gentlemen (they are àyaôol but not kocXoí).
Hence it must be wrong to say they are wild.
The reasoning is not compelling. Aristotle does think the Spartans were like wild
beasts, and precisely because they pursued virtue for the ultimate sake of gaining the
natural goods {Pol. 2.9.1271a41-bl7, 7.15.1334a40-b3). Indeed when speaking of
the Spartans' training he actually uses of them the word Oripicoôeiç, compares them to
animals and nations that are áypicoxáxoiç, and says they thus make their sons
PavcrÒGOuç (8.4. 1338bl2- 13, 18, 29, 33). Recall too that the brutality of the Spartans
when in possession of rule over others was notorious. Aristotle's point would seem
to be (and it is a point suggested by the whole of the chapter on the gentleman) that
virtuous acts, like most acts, can have two ends: the immediate end which is internal
to the act, and the remote end which is the sort of overall life for which the act is
done.8 A Spartan soldier, for instance, is brave in battle for he holds bravery to be a
noble thing. He is thus really brave (for intending the beauty of the virtuous act is a
mark of virtue). But he is brave so that he and his fellow Spartans can live a life of dom-
inance over others in enjoyment of the natural goods, whether the others be helots at
home or Greeks abroad. The problem, as Aristotle remarks (Pol. 2.9.1 27 lb3- 6), is
that Spartans only practised with a view to war and did not know how to be at leisure;
hence, while they had the virtues of occupation (courage, endurance, justice, moder-
ation), they did not have the virtue of leisure, philosophy (Pol. 7.15.1334al9-34). In
other words, they knew only of the secondary happiness of the political life and not
also the primary happiness of the contemplative life (for the sake of which, however,
politics exists, EN 10.7.1 177b4-6, 12-15). So they were drawn, as simply political
men are, to covet the material goods and occasions in which the virtues of the politica
life are best displayed (EN 10.7.1 1 77b6- 1 2, 8.1 178a28-b7). To call such men wild does
not seem inappropriate. The gentleman, by contrast, is brave and moderate and just for

8 The distinction is noted by D.J. Allan, 'The fine and the good in the Eudemian Ethics in Moraux
and Harlfinger (n. 7), 63-72, at 70, who uses it precisely to explain the relation between individua
virtuous acts and an overall virtuous life.

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 672 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

the sake of a life of philosophic leisure,

not only, like the Spartan, the beauty of e
life of virtue, and especially of the virtu

SOME PASSAGES NEEDING TEXTUAL EMENDATION BUT DIFFERENT

TEXTUAL EMENDATION

7.6. 1240b 1-3

ëxi xa xoiáôe kéyexai rcepi xfjç cpiÀíaç, cbç ígóttiç (piAóxriç, Kai jlltì jxíav cpi>Aav eivai x
àXriÔœç Cpí^ODÇ.

Further, these sorts of things are said about friendship, as 'equality is amity' and that those tr
friends are not one friendship.

Both Susemihl and the OCT follow Casaubon in deleting ļiiļ and replacing cpiXlav w
'|A)Xiiv. That there is something wrong with ļLifļ is evident, for if a negative is necessary
should really be où (an indirect statement regularly retains the negative of the ori
direct statement, which here would be otj) and, further, true friends would seem
those whose friendship, or whose soul, is most single or united rather than not b
so. The deletion of (ifļ is philologically easy since it could have arisen by dittogra
from the ļilav that follows.10 Jackson, however, following Susemihl thinks somet
more has gone wrong and suggests emending Kai to mv ei to give: Káv ei ļiiļ
'|n)%fļv ('even if we do not allow the exaggeration ļula iļ/u^iļ').11 But if indeed m
has gone wrong here than can be corrected by deletion of a simpler solution p
logically would be to regard jLifļ as a scribal error for jufļv (the same scribal error occurs
1245al5 where Bekker himself changed the manuscripts' òXka ļLifļ to òXka ļirļv).
addition of ļirļv to Kai makes a certain sense anyway because Aristotle is giving
common sayings about friendship, but the first he gives in direct speech and in the n
native while the second he gives in indirect speech and in the accusative and infini
This grammatical change is no doubt because the first repeats the actual words pe
use (ioóxriç cpi^órriç is a sort of Ancient Greek jingle), but the second reports peo
meaning and not necessarily their precise words. Now, as we learn from Denniston
Kai ļiTļv can be used to indicate more than another addition to a list but also to exp
some further sense of difference or newness. Perhaps, then, Aristotle uses Kai ļLirļv h
to indicate not merely the new item but the newness too of the grammatical construc
The replacement of cpi^lav with 'ļfu%fiv is motivated in part because this very poin
made a few lines later at b9 where the manuscripts do have jiia r' and not ļjia cpi
Also, friends being ļila ''fv% r' is a common saying but their being [ila cpiAáa seems n

9 The argument of this paragraph is admittedly controversial and there are able defences of t
emended reading áyaGoi, as S.A. White, Sovereign Virtue (Stanford, 1992). But since the MSS rea
ing of ãyptoi can also be given a plausible sense, one should at least give this reading se
consideration.
10 Dirlmeier (n. 2), 425-6.
The suggestion is not listed in the apparatus criticus of the OCT. It comes from H. Jackson
Some Passages in the Seventh Book of the Eudemian Ethics Attributed to Aristotle (Cambridge, 1
29.
12 J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, 1950), 352, who also suggests a translation of
especially'.

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 ET H IC A EUDEMIA 673

be. Further, Aristotle is here showing how th

referred back to the individual, and while a
say he is one friendship. Probably the emend
theless worth noting that something can be
that text is finally rejected. First, to say true
explains, all the features Aristotle mentions i
are one soul repeats one of them. Second, t
seem to be a saying that lies behind, and also ex
listed later (7. 10. 1243bl5- 37). Third, bad me
selves but different and conflicting ones, bein
giving in to temptation but friends in util
(1240b21-4), so that it can make a certain sen
that they are one friendship, because they
same way at the same time and not friends in
another.

7. 12. 1244b34-45al

ôeî yap ajxa cruvôeîvai ôúo év xcò ^óycp, öxi xe xò Çt1v Kai aipexóv, Kai öxi xò àyaOóv, Kai ¿k
xoúxcov öxi xò amò xoîç 'máp%eiv xrjv xoiaúxrjv cpúaiv. ei ouv èaxiv àei xfjç xoiaúxriç
GDGX0i%íaç, fļ éxépa év xrļ xoû éxépoD xá^ei. . .

For it is, at the same time, necessary to put two things together in the argument, both that living
is indeed a thing to be preferred and that the good is to be preferred (or: that living is the good),
and from these that the same to the ... such a nature to be present. If then always in this sort of
ordered series one of two things is in the column of the other of them . . .

Both Susemihl and the OCT follow Fritzsche in deleting Kai in tò Çfjv Kai aipexóv.
However, the main problem in the passage is Kai 8k xomcov öxi xò amò xoîç
imápxeiv xfļv xoia'>TTļv cpúaiv and especially xò amò xoîç, which makes no sense in
the context (as the literal translation above shows). Susemihl leaves the manuscript read-
ings as they are but reports in the apparatus Brandis' s emendation amoîç and Fritzsche' s
emendation xò amò ôeî 'máp%eiv xfļ xoiamri cpúoei. The OCT prints Mingay' s emen-
dation xa) am© [sc. xpórcco] amoîç 'máp%eiv xrļv xoiaúxriv cpúaiv. Presumably both
Brandis and Mingay are supplying aipexóv [éoxi] or the like from the previous lines,
for otherwise the infinitive imáp/eiv will be ungrammatical. At any rate Rackham
and Solomon in their translations13 adopt Brandis 's emendation and translate: 'that it
is desirable for ourselves to possess that sort of nature [sc. good].' Fritzsche' s emenda-
tion will give the sense: 'that the same thing must be present to such a nature', which is a
bit obscure.
All these emendations suppose that imápxeiv is falling within the scope of the öxi
clause; hence the need to supply a finite verb to govern it (Fritzsche' s ôeî or
Brandis' s and Mingay' s aipexóv [éaxi]). An alternative grammatical construction is
to regard it as falling outside that clause and as being governed instead by the ôeî at
the beginning, thus giving the sense 'it is necessary ... that this sort of nature be

13 H. Rackham, Aristotle. The Athenian Constitution. The Eudemian Ethics. On Virtues and Vices
(Cambridge, MA, 1961), 439 and J. Solomon, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle
(Princeton, 1984), 2.1973. A.J.P. Kenny's translation is similar, Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics
(Oxford, 2011), 137.

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674 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

present'. The problem now is what to do

follows. Since something has to be done
suggestion is to see if we do not have he
spelling and misdividing words. Now in
manuscripts were written in capitals
would appear as TOAYTOTOIX. But TOAYTOTOIZ looks not unlike
TOAYnOTOB, and might look very like it depending on how carefully formed the
letters were in the manuscripts being copied, and TOAY1TOTOB, when written out
with proper word divisions, becomes tò A imo tò B or 'the A is under the B'. The
expression is not uncommon in Aristotle's logical works (An. pr. 1.9.30a40, 30bl3,
11.31a30, a37, bl7, b20) to mean that one term falls under another. Hence the sense
will be: 'it is necessary that, because the A is under the B, this sort of nature be pre-
sent/available'. How this sense fits the argument will be discussed directly. One
immediate advantage of it, however, is that it gives a ready sense to the phrase that
next follows: ei ow éoTiv óceì xrjç touxúttiç <xuaToi%íaç f| éTépa èv tt1 totj éTspoi)
Tá^ei. The reference of 'this sort of ordered series' (tt1ç TOiaúxriç crucruoi^iaę) is usually
said to be to some table or column of opposites, probably the Pythagorean, which
Aristotle is understood to be pointing to as he makes the remark. But on the alternative
suggested here, the ordered series is what he has just said, namely A falling under B or
one term falling under another (hence we should follow Bekker in preferring the reading
év TÍ1 toû £T£po') Tá^ei with P and C rather than év tt1 toó) aipeTOÍ) xá^ei with L).
This advantage will count for little, however, if the overall translation does not make
sense in the context. So first, as regards the A and B, these will refer to the two prop-
ositions just stated (about the preferable and the good), and the sense will be that the
predicate of the first falls under the predicate of the second. The first proposition speaks
of living as to be preferred, and living in this sense, as Aristotle has argued in the pre-
ceding lines (b23-34), is the living that is our living - the living that we, and not some-
one else, experience as us being alive (hence we should probably keep Kai at b35
because, rendered as 'indeed' or 'in fact', it serves to emphasize this point).
However, when Aristotle first introduced this discussion he said that the thing will be
plain if we take life 'in actuality and as end' (tò Çfjv tò Kať évépyeiav Kai cbç
téXoç, b23^), and life taken as end is happy life, for happiness is the end and the
good. We should probably, therefore, translate the second proposition as 'living is the
good' and not as 'the good is to be preferred', and understand the argument Aristotle
is going to give as showing that, because the living that is to be preferred falls under
the good, this 'sort of nature', that is, life as the good, must be 'present' to us, that
is, available to us as something we can possess as our own. The argument will thus
be that it is necessary to put 'life as preferable' together with 'life as the good', and
then necessary, because life as preferable is under life as the good, that such a life is
in fact available to us for our own living.
Interestingly enough, what Aristotle does in the long passage that follows ( 1245a 1-
bl9) is these two things. First he explains how the life that is preferable is or can become
the good. For life as preferable for us exists in perceiving and knowing, and perceiving
and knowing are perfected through sharing with friends; but such sharing, when it is a
matter of doing the best things with the best friends, is the human equivalent of the
divine life; and, of course, the divine life is the good simply. Hence life as preferable
falls under life as the good. But, second, this life must therefore be available to us,
because doing the best things with the best friends is available to us, at least if we
and our friends pursue and achieve virtue together. The argument is lengthy and

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 ETHICA EUDEMIA 675

involved but it is ultimately clear. It

beginning of the chapter, how the
the need of friends. For the good li
only available to us through sharing
opposed to the self-sufficient God) w
self-sufficient life and not as an extr

8.1.1246bl9-22

àxonov yòcp eí xfjç (lèv év tco XoyiaxiKcò àpexriç ļio/0r|pia tcoté éyyevo1j,évr| juév ico Xóyc
axpéij/ei Kai TtoifjGei àyvoeîv, fļ ô' ápexr] év xco à^óyco àyvoíaç évoúariç où axpéij/
Taimļv ...

For it is odd if of virtue in the calculating part wickedness coming to be on the one hand to the
reasoning part will distort and make ignorant, but virtue in the unreasoning part when folly is
present will not distort this . . .

Susemihl and the OCT follow A1 and change Trjç ļiev év tío ÀoyiGTiKÔ) àpeTrjç to read
xf)v [lev év tío XoyiöTiKco apeifļv, thus making it object of GTpéyei Kal rcoiTļaei àyvoeîv
('will distort virtue in the calculating part and make it ignorant'), and follow Spengel in
changing |io%0r|pía noxe éyyevojiiévri jLxèv tco Xóyą> to read ļLio%0r|pia noxe éyyevojiévri
év tćo àXóyco ('wickedness, when once it comes to be present in the unreasoning part,
[will distort ...]'). The first change, following A1, seems necessary (if one prefers to
regard the phrase as a genitive absolute one must provide a verb for it, as Spengel
does by adding évoúcrriç from the lines following). The second change is less compel-
ling. Certainly if éyyevojiévri is left as it is Xóyco must be changed to ócXóyco. But per-
haps we have here another case of the EE manuscripts misrecognizing letters and
misdividing words. For while it seems necessary to change |Lièv to év, it is not necessary
simply to get rid of the ļi. One may instead regard it as a misspelling for v and add it on
to the end of éyyevojiévri to give éyyevo|uévr|v. One will thus make éyyevo|iévr|v agree
with apexrjv in the line above, and so obviate the need to change Xóyco to à^óycp. The
sentence will then read: 'For it is odd if, on the one hand, wickedness will distort virtue
in the calculating part (when it [sc. virtue] at any time comes to be present in reason) and
make one ignorant, but . . . ' The philology is perhaps now more intelligible, but in any
event the philosophical point remains the same (it is just expressed from the opposite
direction). The apparent redundancy ('virtue in the calculating part ... comes to be pre-
sent in reason') is only apparent. The phrase 'virtue in the calculating part' refers to the
kind of virtue in question (namely intellectual virtue and not moral), and the phrase
'comes to be present in reason' refers to this virtue actually being present in the soul.
Note too that, if this emendation is accepted, it will no longer be necessary, with the
OCT, to add év xco ÀoyiGxiKco to àyvoíaç évoÚGriç in the next line (b21) since év tćo
X-óyco can be supplied from the éyyevo|iévr|v év tío À,óyco that precedes.
An alternative suggestion is to regard the jll as a misspelling for ç and read the whole
passage thus: axorcov yàp eí xfj ç ļiev év tío XoyiaxiKco àpeTrjç jiox0r|pía noxè
éyyevofiévriç év tco Xóycp axpeysi Kai 7ioifļG8i àyvoeîv fļ Ô' apexfļ év tío àXóycp
àyvoíaç évoúcrriç oi) GTpé'1/ei xat)Tr|v. We will now have a verb for making tÍ1ç jiièv
év ico ÀoyiGTiKCo àpeTrjç into a genitive absolute (namely éyyevojiévriç), but this geni-
tive absolute will, oddly, split and be split by the main clause ļiox0ipia . . . GTpé'j/ei Kai
7iovriGei àyvoeîv. On the other hand we will also now have a balance with the genitive
absolute àyvoíaç évoÚGriç in the next line, which itself will split the main clause r' Ô'

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 676 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

àpETTi év tío oko y co ... ov crcperei tocú

as happy as the former but its peculiar st

8.2.1 247b 15-18

tí ouv KcoÀúei aujjßfjvai tivi ecpe^fję ta xoiaúxa TtoÂAáKiç, oí)% öxi xoîç ôeî, àkX' olov dv eîev
to KÚpouç àei ļiaKpav ßodteiv;

What then prevents such things happening to someone often one after the other, not because it is
necessary to the ... but the way they would be always the throwing high in dice?

Susemihl and the OCT both follow Sylburg and A2 in emending dv eiev to dv e'ir| ('it
[sc. throwing high in dice] would be'), and follow Fritzsche in emending jioucpàv
ßaMeiv to ļiocKocpiav ßaAAeiv ('... but the way that always throwing successfully in
dice would be?'). The first of these emendations seems necessary, and perhaps the
second too though it is perhaps not of great moment. In any event the problem words
are oi)% on toîç Sei which make no sense. Susemihl follows Sylburg in changing
toîç to oikooç ('not because it must be thus') and the OCT follows Jackson in changing
toîç Ôeî to Toioaôí ('not because he is such'). In the context Aristotle is raising questions
about luck and specifically about the puzzle that, on the one hand, some people seem to
be fortunate often or always and yet, on the other hand, luck is not the sort of thing that
happens often or always. Hence either these people are not really fortunate by luck (but
by some other cause) or, if they are, it should be possible, by luck, to go on endlessly
scoring high in games of chance (which we do not see happening). Aristotle eventually
solves the puzzle by distinguishing two kinds of fortune: the natural or divine kind
which is continuous and is a natural tendency to do the right thing because one's desires
are naturally well directed, and the ordinary kind which is simply happenstance and is
not continuous. Sylburg' s and Jackson's emendations both make the same point (the
luck involved in throwing high in dice is not a matter of any necessity nor a matter
of having a certain sort of nature), but Jackson's is philologically more likely.
However, an equally likely or perhaps more likely emendation is to change toîç ôeî
to 7CC0Ç 8eî ('not because it somehow must'). The sense produced is the same or similar
but there is perhaps more likelihood that toîç ôeî is a misreading of tccoç ôeî than of
oikcoç Ôeî or toiogôí. Also, A2 has hos oportet and it could conceivably be that what
the Latin translator read was toûç Ôeî and that ho s was the best he could make of
toûç. For a toûç could be misread in place of rccoç as easily as a toîç could.

8.2.1247b28-38

7t/teova%còç Àéyexai r' emv%ia; toc |nèv yàp rcpáxxexai ànò tííç ópjifjç Kai rcpoeXojievcov
TtpâÇai, xà 8' ou, àkXà xoúvavxíov . . . ekeívouç (xèv xoívuv emu^eīv ôià cpúaiv évÔé%exai.
ri yàp opļifļ Kai ope^iç ouaa ou ëôei KaxcopGcoaev, ó ôè ta>yia|iòç fļv fi^íGioç- Kai xoùç [lèv
évxaûGa, öxav (lèv ^oyiqiòç jlltì Ôokcov òpBcòç eivai, vo%r' 8' aùxoû aixía ouaa, a')xfļ 8'
opÖfi ouaa eÇcûGev

Or is good fortune said in more than one way? For some things are done from impulse and from
people choosing to do them, but other things are not but the opposite ... So as regards the for-
mer it is possible that they are successful through nature; for their impulse and their appetite,
being of what it should be, went right, but the calculation was silly; and as regards the latter,
when calculation not seeming to be right, luck however being cause here and it being right
?pushed? them out of the way.

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 677

In the context Aristotle is again talking

each seems to work. The first are fortun
not their choice and calculation) is wha
fortunate by mere happenstance, for t
even if mistaken, is not silly like that
stops them following it and suffering
A first emendation, then, taken from
the grammatically dubious e^cooev at t
that precede it, oxav | lèv . . . amfļ 8' 0
verb for the oxav clause. Susemihl cha
0p0fļ owoc, and, in his apparatus, m
changes òp0éoç to òp0òç and deletes th
8' amoû aixía owa and, following Al
fièv évxaí)0a . . . 0p0fļ owoc ëacooev. A
low Mingay (in the apparatus of the OC
the OCT, change Sokcov to 8okt1 to giv
to be right but chance is cause here and
Spengel by changing tv%r' to vu%% ad
thus: eivai ró%fi, fļ 8' oruxoú akia (wi
opjnļ or ope^iç in b34 just before) to
not to be right, but impulse (or appet
The problem, however, with both em
duced. For the sort of fortune in ques
people who benefit from it are not t
who go right because of some natura
of calculating well and who go right b
are fortunate by happenstance when eve
but some lucky intervention saves them
travellers who have calculated correctly t
are forced by some chance to take a
unbeknownst to them, are lying in wait
was correct, for it was not foolish or s
natural impulse) but soundly based on
calculation can be). That the results of f
been bad is no fault of the calculation
control.

Suspicion, therefore, should fall on the

òp0coç eivai. So here is a suggestion. Reg
misreading, and replace jlltì with fļv (M
duce the same construction of a past t
condition as just before at 1247b32.14 (
be dubious, one could write fļ instead
retain the 8' in xúx1! S' aúxoú, we will
seeming to be right, luck however being
sense is now just what we need for for
travellers): the calculation was right, at

14 Goodwin (n. 5), § 1421 n. 3.

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 678 PETER L.P. SIMPSON

(it 'seemed' right), but chance intervened

chance turned out to be really right (it wa
saved them.

8.2.1248a34-7

Kai xoúxcov cppovificov Kai aocpcòv ia%eîav eivai ty'v ļiavtiKiļv, Kai jxóvov oi) ifļv arc
^óyoD Ôeî arcotaxßew, cûOC oï |ièv Si* éjirceipíav, oï Ôè ôià cruvrjGeiáv xe év xco GKo
XpfjaGav

Also, that the divination of these prudent and wise is swift and one must all but take away the
one which is apart from reason; but some through experience and others through familiarity and
in using speculation.

Aristotle is still comparing the two kinds of fortune and he is here talking of those who
operate by reason (and do not go right because their desires are naturally right), and he
seems to be saying that these, like the others, are in a way operating by divination but by
some sort of rational and not non-rational divination (not a divination that is 'apart from
reason'). An obvious and first emendation is to follow Ross and A2 and replace
arcoAxxßew with vnoXafìzìv to give the sense: 'Also, one must suppose that the divina-
tion of these prudent and wise is swift and is all but (or: almost) the one which is apart
from reason . . . ' The sense is that those who have reason are also able, through their
reason, to divine things, including likely events in the future (as, say, coming changes
in weather), and their divining can be almost as quick as those whose divination is not
by reason. The main problem with the Greek, however, lies not here but with te év tćo
GK07C8ÎV %pfjG0cxi, which is without grammatical sense. Susemihl prints the text without
change while the OCT deletes te, but both record in their apparatus Spengel's sugges-
tion to read toû in its place, with the sense: '. . . through familiarity with its use in specu-
lation'. This suggestion gives some meaning to the phrase in itself, but since Spengel
thought there must be a lacuna somewhere in the preceding lines he did not endeavour
to show how his emendation gave sense to the phrase in the larger context. A better sug-
gestion, then, comes from von Fragstein15 who suggested replacing xe ev with ôúvavxai
(from a34) or the like, with the sense: '... through familiarity are able to use specu-
lation'. One problem, however, with this suggestion is that its meaning does not fit
very happily with what follows next, which talks about how both divinations (that of
those who act with reason and that of those who do not) use God, and not of how
one group uses speculation. Nevertheless, von Fragstein does seem right to suppose
that a verb is to be supplied from the context. An alternative, then, is to adapt both
Spengel and von Fragstein and write tò rather than ioti in place of te and supply
e%ouai (from a32 and a33) instead of ôúvavxai, thus giving the sense: '. . . through fam-
iliarity have the use of it [5c. divination] in their speculation'. The meaning will be that
those who act by reason have in their acts of speculation some access to divination
through their experience or familiarity with things. A case in point might be Thaïes
divining, through his knowledge of things in the heavens, a coming bumper olive har-
vest {Pol. 1.1 1 . 1259a6- 19). At all events the whole sentence now reads with fair intel-
ligibility: 'Also, one must suppose that the divination of these prudent and wise is swift

15 von Fragstein, (n. 2), 376.

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 ETHIC A EUDEMIA 679

and is almost the one which is apart fr

speculation through experience and othe

City University of PETER

New L.P. SIMPSON
York
psimpson@gc . cuny . edu

16 My thanks to my colleague Jacob Stern and to an anonymous reviewer for CQ

criticisms on earlier versions of this article.

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