Stratification
Stratification
Stratification, ¢
and inequality
things defined as desirable and avoiding those things defined Because different societies have different value systems,
as undesirable in their society. Gerth and Mills, referring to the ways of attaining a high position will vary from society
Western society, state that life chances include: to society. Parsons argued that American society values
individual achievement and efficiency, and ‘puts primary
Everything from the chance to stay alive during the emphasis on productive activity within the economy’. Thus
first year after birth to the chance to view fine arts, successful business executives who have achieved their
the chance to remain healthy and grow tall, and if
position through their own initiative, ability and ambition,
sick to get well again quickly, the chance to avoid
and run efficient and productive businesses, will receive high
becoming a juvenile delinquent and, very crucially,
rewards.
the chance to complete an intermediary or higher
Parsons’s argument suggests that stratification is an
educational grade. Gerth and Mills, 1954, p. 313
inevitable part of all human societies. If value consensus is
Having considered social stratification in general terms, an essential component of all societies, then it follows that
we will now look at this subject from various sociological some form of stratification will result from the ranking
perspectives. of individuals in terms of common values. It also follows
from Parsons’s argument that there is a general belief that
Social stratification — a stratification systems are just, right and proper, because they
are basically an expression of shared values. Thus American
rewarded positions are indeed the most important. Many to ensure a shortage of doctors in order to maintain their
occupations, however, which afford little prestige or high wages.
economic reward, can be seen as vital to society. Tumin Inequality of opportunity
therefore argued that ‘some labour force of unskilled Tumin concluded that stratification, by its very nature, can
workmen is as important and as indispensable to the factory never adequately perform the functions which Davis and
as some labour force of engineers’. Moore assigned to it. He argued that those born into the
In fact, a number of sociologists have argued that there is lower strata can never have the same opportunities for
no objective way of measuring the functional importance of realising their talents as those born into the higher strata.
positions.Whether lawyers and doctors are considered as
Tumin maintained:
more important than farm labourers and refuse collectors is
simply a matter of opinion. It is only when there is a genuinely equal access to
recruitment and training for all potentially talented
Power and rewards persons that differential rewards can conceivably
Tumin argued that Davis and Moore ignored the influence of
be justified as functional.And stratification systems
power on the unequal distribution of rewards. Differences in
are apparently inherently antagonistic to the
pay and prestige between occupational groups may be due
development of such full equality of opportunity.
to differences in their power rather than their functional
Tumin, 1953, in Bendix and Lipset, 1967, p.55
importance.
economies as the best basis for organising society. Market economic rewards, force must be used. Saunders even
forces encourage competition, which stimulates innovation predicts that as countries such as China and the states
and efficiency. Businesses have to make products that are of the former Soviet Union move towards market-based
cheaper or better than those of their competitors in order economies, ‘state coercion may be expected to decline’.
to survive. Free market economies are based upon the
choices made by individuals when spending their money, Equality and justice
selling their labour or purchasing other people’s labour. They In developing his own theory of stratification, Saunders
therefore promote individual liberty. distinguishes three types of equality:
Like their 19th-century liberal counterparts, neoliberal 1. Formal or legal equality involves all members of society
sociologists believe that excessive state intervention in being subject to the same laws or rules. Individuals are
the economy must be avoided. The state should not act judged according to what they do (for example, whether
to redistribute resources and interfere with the workings they break the law) and not according to who they are.
of the free market. If it tries to do so it will undermine Saunders sees this type of equality as being an integral
economic efficiency. Inefficient concerns propped up by the part of Western capitalist societies, although he admits
government needlessly use up resources. State intervention that ‘in practice it is not always as rigorously applied
may take away the motivation for people to work hard. as it might be’. Legal equality does not imply that
There is little incentive to strive for success if individuals everybody ends up in the same position.
know that the state will help them no matter how little 2. The second type of equality, equality of opportunity,
effort they make. Government interference may also create means that people have an equal chance to become
injustice, taking from those who have earned their rewards unequal. Individuals compete for success and those with
and giving to those who are undeserving. Furthermore, as greater merit achieve more. Merit might involve the
the state becomes stronger, the freedom of individuals may ability to work harder or the possession of attributes
be suppressed. For all these reasons neoliberals are strongly or characteristics which are valued in a society.
opposed to Marxism and socialism. A society based on this type of equality is often called
a meritocracy.
Peter Saunders = stratification
3. Equality of outcome goes further than the idea of
and freedom
equality of opportunity. Saunders explains:
Peter Saunders (1990) is generally sympathetic to Davis and
If a meritocracy is like a race where everybody lines up
Moore's theory of stratification: he is certainly much less
together at the start, a fully-fledged egalitarian society
critical than Tumin. He points out that even critics like Tumin
would be like a perfectly handicapped race where
accept that all societies have been stratified — there has
everyone passes the finishing tape at the same time
never been a completely egalitarian society. Furthermore,
no matter how hard and fast they have tried to run.
he suggests that systems which reward different positions
Saunders, 1990, p. 44
unequally can be shown to have beneficial effects, such as
motivating people to work hard. Broadly, Saunders accepts the principles behind the first two
However, Saunders does not argue that unequal rewards conceptions of equality but rejects the third. Following the
are the only way that a society can fill the important ideas of Hayek, he argues that attempts to create equality of
positions with capable people. He says that ‘it is possible to outcome undermine equality of opportunity and legal equality.
imagine a society where all positions are rewarded equally To obtain equality of outcome you have to treat people
in terms of material resources and formal status’. Such a differently. For example, ‘affirmative action’ programmes
society would have serious problems, however. Some people or ‘positive discrimination’, designed to equalise the
would not be happy to do the jobs they were allocated and achievements of men and women or blacks and whites, result
others would not put in the effort needed to do their jobs in discrimination. Whites and males are discriminated against
properly. Saunders believes: while blacks and females enjoy discrimination in their favour.
Saunders uses an example put forward by another
In the absence of economic rewards and penalties,
neoliberal writer, Robert Nozick (1974), to show how
the only sanctions available would be those involving
pursuing equality of outcome leads to injustice.A group of
the threat or use of physical force. Such people, in
students could agree before an exam that they should all
other words, would have to be jailed, or forcibly set
be given a mark of 50 per cent.All would pass and none
to work in supervised colonies, or even executed as
would have to fear failure, but the result would not be just.
an example to others. Saunders, 1990, p. 65
Some individuals would feel rightly aggrieved if they were
This would be necessary because allowing people to get stripped of 30 per cent of the marks they would normally
away with doing less than their fair share of work would have gained and which they had earned through their own
undermine the whole system, because it would reduce the efforts.
commitment of others. Saunders and Nozick therefore adopt a conception of
Saunders does not therefore accept the functionalist equality based on legal equality and the idea of entitlement.
claim that stratification systems based upon economic Social justice is served when people are allowed to keep
differences are inevitable. However, he certainly agrees those things to which they are entitled. So long as people
with functionalists that they are desirable. He admits that have earned the resources or money they possess legally
capitalist societies tend to create more inequality than through their own work or ‘uncoerced exchanges with
socialist societies. He also argues that socialist societies are others’, then there should be no question of them being
bound to be more repressive than capitalist ones in making robbed of their possessions. If people pass their wealth on
people perform their roles. In the absence of adequate to others, then the recipients become entitled to keep it.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Saunders does, however, admit that there is one flaw creates more well-paid, skilled and white-collar jobs for
in this argument. In a society such as Britain it is not clear which people from all backgrounds can compete. Saunders
that all of the wealthy are actually entitled to what they concludes:
own. Some of the land in private hands has been passed Capitalism is dynamic because it is unequal, and any
down to the descendants of Norman warlords who helped attempt to equalise wealth and income will succeed
William the Conqueror conquer England. Saunders does only at the expense ofstifling initiative, innovation
not want to see the wealth of landowners such as the Duke and social and economic development. Saunders,
of Westminster or the Queen taken from them.To do so
1990, p. 53
would undermine ‘the whole basis of modern-day property
ownership’. He therefore turns to a second justification for
A critique of the neoliberal
inequality that comes from the work of Hayek.
perspective
Both Saunders and Hayek believe that inequality is
The neoliberal perspective on stratification is open to a
justified because it promotes economic growth. Allowing
number of criticisms. Some of Tumin’s criticisms of Davis
and encouraging people to pursue their own self-interest
and Moore are also relevant to neoliberal theories. For
promote the interests of society as a whole. Some
example, neoliberals can be accused of playing down the
entrepreneurs who set up businesses fail. VWhen this happens
possible harmful effects of stratification in undermining
they bear the costs of their own failure. When they succeed,
social cohesion and integration. Saunders’s view that socialist
they may, as Saunders says, ‘accumulate a fortune, but in
societies are inevitably more repressive than free market
doing so they will have added to the productive power and
capitalist ones could be seen as an unjustified, sweeping
wealth of the society as a whole’.
generalisation. For example:
Competition ensures that goods and services increase
in quality and fall in price, making them available to a wider |. Early capitalism was partly based upon the use of slave
section of the population. Not everyone will be able to labour.
afford consumer products initially, or indeed in the end, 2. In South Africa, until relatively recently, a capitalist free
but living standards will constantly increase. The efforts of market economy went hand-in-hand with the apartheid
entrepreneurs make some of them rich, but at the same system, which separated ‘races’ and gave black South
time ‘the rest of society grows more affluent as it gains Africans very few opportunities.
by their efforts’. Saunders cites cars, air travel, colour 3. In Chile, a democratically elected socialist government
televisions, home computers and central heating as examples under the leadership of President Allende was
of things that have become affordable for ordinary people. overthrown in the 1970s in a coup led by General
Pinochet. Pinochet followed free market economic
Opportunity and inequality
policies and his seizure of power was partly engineered
Saunders clearly believes that competition in capitalist
by the USA. Yet his regime was far more repressive than
societies benefits the population. He argues that Britain is
that of his predecessor. One of the Pinochet regime’s
close to being a meritocracy (Saunders, |996).Although he
first actions was to round up thousands of potential
does not claim that Britain or similar societies are perfect
opponents and take them to the national football
meritocracies, in which everyone has genuinely equal
stadium, where many were executed.
opportunities to use their talents to achieve success, he
does believe that the distribution of economic rewards is Examples such as these suggest that the free market and
closely related to merit. freedom do not inevitably go hand-in-hand.
He argues that much of the apparent inequality of
opportunity between classes in capitalist societies may be
Gordon Marshall and Adam Swift -
social class and social justice
due to the unequal distribution of ability and effort. In other
Gordon Marshall and Adam Swift (1993) make a detailed
words, the children of middle-class parents may deserve
evaluation of Saunders’s views on stratification. They
to be more successful than those from working-class
criticise him for trying to argue in favour of both equality
backgrounds because they tend to have greater genetically
of opportunity and formal or legal equality. These two
inherited ability and because they work harder. If this is the
principles may sometimes coincide, but often they do not.
case, then it is not surprising if the children of the middle
For example, Marshall and Swift argue:
class get better jobs and higher pay than the children of
the working class. Nor is this evidence of inequality of If amillionaire chooses to bequeath his money to
opportunity, as the differences of outcome may well be an untalented layabout then justice as entitlement
based on merit. demands that he be permitted to do so, and forbids
Saunders's claim that Britain is close to being a taxation of the inheritance despite the fact that any
meritocracy is highly controversial. It will be discussed in normal conception ofjustice as desert or merit is here
detail later in the chapter in the light of studies of social clearly violated. Marshall and Swift, 1993, p. 191
mobility (see pp. 80-7).
Saunders also emphasises the increasing opportunities Marshall and Swift then go on to examine the meritocracy
for people from all backgrounds as the proportion of thesis. They question the view that market forces necessarily
well-paid, middle-class jobs in the occupational structure reward merit. Success in business, for example, may depend
steadily increases. In societies such as Britain and the as much on luck as on the hard work or personal attributes
of the entrepreneur.
USA there are fewer people who are unsuccessful than
there were in the past. Whatever the relative chances of Furthermore, Marshall and Swift provide evidence that
people from different classes getting a higher-class job, the they claim shows that capitalist societies are not genuinely
absolute chances have increased for everybody. Capitalism meritocratic. They use data from a study conducted by
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David Rose and ‘dysfunctional societies’. It is relevant to neoliberal theories
Carolyn Vogler (1988).This study found that patterns because Wilkinson and Pickett’s research suggests that
of social mobility were influenced by class even when neoliberal policies lead to greater inequality, and they argue
educational attainment was taken into account. People from that greater inequality is harmful. Wilkinson and Pickett
working-class backgrounds had less chance than those do not argue for the elimination of inequality, but they do
from higher-class backgrounds of obtaining a position in believe that low levels of inequality are desirable, while high
one of the top classes even when they had the same level of levels of inequality are undesirable.
educational qualifications.
Inequality and well-being
This undermines Saunders’s claim that inequalities
Wilkinson and Pickett’s work is based upon the use of a
between classes could be the result of genetic differences.
wide range of measures of well-being, along with statistics on
Working-class people with, for example, the ability to get
inequality. They identify the extent of inequality in each country
a degree were still disadvantaged because of their class
by comparing the income of the richest 20 per cent with that
background.As Marshall and Swift say:
of the poorest 20 per cent,as illustrated in Figure |.1. The
If people find their place in the occupational order income measure used is ‘household income after taxes and
according to meritocratic principles, then the benefits adjusted for the number of people in each household’
impact of class background should not be apparent (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010).
in class destinations, except as this is mediated by The figure demonstrates that Japan, where the income
educational achievements. Marshall and Swift, 1993, of the richest 20 per cent is less than four times that of
p. 202 the poorest 20 per cent, is the least unequal society shown,
while Singapore is the most unequal, with the richest getting
The free market does not guarantee that merit is equally
nearly ten times the income of the poorest. The USA,
rewarded for all social groups. Social justice may therefore
Portugal and the UK are the next most unequal societies
be promoted if the state intervenes to try to make job
after Singapore.
allocation meritocratic. (For more details of the study
Wilkinson and Pickett then examined a wide range of
by Marshall et al. see pp. 56-7. For a fuller discussion of
data on many different types of health and social problems.
Saunders on whether Britain is a meritocracy see pp. 47-8.)
These included mental illness, infant mortality and life
Richard Wilkinson and Kate expectancy, obesity, number of teenage births, homicide
Pickett - The Spirit Level rates, rates of imprisonment, the educational performance
of children, drug and alcohol addiction, and social mobility
Inequality and society
(or lack of it). Taken together these were used to create
In an influential book, The Spirit Level (2010), Richard
an index of social and health problems, with the higher
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett examined the effects of
the number on the index the greater the extent of the
inequality on society. This was not directly intended to be a
problems.
discussion of either functionalist or neoliberal viewpoints,
Figures |.2 and |.3 represent their findings for richer
but it has great significance for both these theories of
countries. Figure |.2 shows a very close and strong
stratification. It has relevance to functionalism because it
relationship between high levels of income inequality and
puts forward the proposition that inequality can lead to
Japan
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
Germany
Netherlands
Spain
France
Canada
Switzerland
Ireland
Greece
Italy
Israel
New Zealand
Australia
Singapore
0) 2 4 6 8 10
Income gap: income of richest 20 per cent in proportion to income of poorest 20 per cent
Figure 1.1 How much richer are the richest 20 per cent than the poorest 20 per cent in each country?
Source: R.Wilkinson and K. Pickett (2010) The Spirit Level: Why Equality Is Better for Everyone, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. !7.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Portugal @
Greece »
Ireland e @ New Zealand
problems
social
and
health
of
Index
Better
Worse
@ Portugal
e Greece
© New Zealand e Ireland
Australia
Francee ® e Austria
Italy @ ® Germany ® Canada
e ® Denmark
Belgium
Finlande
® Netherlands ® Switzerland
® Sweden
problems
social
and
health
of
Index
® Japan
Better
upon a hopelessly idealistic and utopian vision. Indeed, there structure. They see it as a mechanism whereby some exploit
are several countries where what they see as acceptable others, rather than as a means of furthering collective goals.
levels of inequality already exist. These levels of inequality Marxists focus on social strata rather than social
can be produced in two ways: inequality in general. Functionalists, such as Parsons and
Davis and Moore, say little about social stratification in the
1. You can discourage big inequalities in the incomes
sense of clearly defined social strata whose members have
received by workers, so that few people start out
shared interests. However, this view of social stratification is
with very high or very low incomes. This situation is
central to Marxist theory.
characteristic of Japan, which has seen wage differentials
Marx’s views will first be briefly summarised and then
reduce considerably over recent decades (whereas they
examined in more detail. For details of Marx’s theory of
have increased in the USA and the UK).
stratification, see Marx (1970 [1867], 1974 [1909]), Marx
2. Governments can directly change the distribution of
and Engels (1848), and Bottomore and Rubel (1963).
income through taxation and welfare policies, taking a
high proportion of the income of the best paid in taxes
and redistributing it through benefits and welfare. This
is more characteristic of Norway, Sweden and Finland,
which have low levels of inequality.
Evaluation
The work of Wilkinson and Pickett has generally been well
received and widely discussed, though its influence on actual
policies may have been more limited. Nevertheless, there
have also been some strong critics.
Christopher Snowdon (2010) argued that Wilkinson and
Pickett were too selective in the countries they included
in their analysis, excluding countries such as South Korea,
Slovenia and Hong Kong, which would, Snowdon claims,
make a significant difference to the findings. Snowdon claims
that there is better evidence for a link between low income
and poor health than there is for a link between inequality
and poor health. Snowdon also argues that Wilkinson and
Pickett pay too much attention to figures on imprisonment
while neglecting actual crime rates (and Snowdon argues
there is nothing wrong in sending people to prison).
However, Wilkinson and Pickett have rebuffed these
criticisms. They deny that they have been selective in A Marxist view of the class system
choosing countries, arguing that they have simply confined
Classes
their analysis to countries where the necessary data are
available. They support the evidence they put forward by |. In all stratified societies there are two major social
referring to the large number of studies by other academics groups: a ruling class and a subject class.
finding similar relationships. Contrary to Snowdon’s claim, 2. The power of the ruling class comes from its ownership
they do examine the relationship between some types of and control of the means of production (land, capital,
crime and inequality in detail, particularly violent crime. labour power, buildings and machinery).
Wilkinson and Pickett do not claim that all social 3. The ruling class exploits and oppresses the subject class.
problems can be related to inequality. Social problems which 4. Asaresult, there is a basic conflict between the two
do not tend to be concentrated in lower classes tend not classes.
to be related to inequality, and they cite alcoholism as an 5. The various institutions of society, such as the legal
example. However, they believe that their evidence across a and political systems, are instruments of ruling-class
wide range of social problems is sufficiently robust to show domination and serve to further its interests.
that the pursuit of greater equality is a very worthwhile 6. Only when the means of production are communally
objective. owned will classes disappear, thereby bringing an end to
the exploitation and oppression of some by others.
Social stratification — a Marxist From a Marxist perspective, systems of stratification derive from
the relationships of social groups to the means of production.
perspective Marx used the term ‘class’ to refer to the main strata in all
stratification systems, although most modern sociologists would
Marxist perspectives provide a radical alternative to reserve the term for strata in capitalist society. From a Marxist
functionalist views of the nature of social stratification. They viewpoint, a class is a social group whose members share the
regard stratification as a divisive rather than an integrative same relationship to the means of production.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
For example, in a feudal epoch, there are two main societies. In particular, they provide the preconditions for
classes distinguished by their relationship to land (the the emergence of a class of producers and a class of non-
crucial element of the means of production in an agricultural producers. Some people are able to acquire the means of
society). They are the feudal nobility who own the land, production, and others are therefore obliged to work for
and the landless serfs who work the land. Similarly, in a them. The result is a class of non-producers that owns the
capitalist era, there are two main classes: the bourgeoisie means of production, and a class of producers that owns
or capitalist class, which owns the means of production, only its labour.
and the proletariat or working class, whose members
Dependency and conflict
own only their labour which they hire to the bourgeoisie in
From a Marxist perspective, the relationship between
return for wages.
the major social classes is one of mutual dependence and
Classes and historical epochs conflict. Thus, in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie and
Marx believed that Western society had developed through proletariat are dependent upon each other. Wage labourers
four main epochs: primitive communism, ancient society, must sell their labour power in order to survive, as they
feudal society and capitalist society. Primitive communism do not own a part of the means of production and lack the
is represented by the societies of prehistory and provides means to produce goods independently. They are therefore
the only example of a classless society. From then on, all dependent for their livelihood on the capitalists and the
societies are divided into two major classes: masters and wages they offer. The capitalists, as non-producers, are
slaves in ancient society, lords and serfs in feudal society, and dependent on the labour power of wage labourers, since,
capitalists and wage labourers in capitalist society. without it, there would be no production.
During each historical epoch, the labour power required However, the mutual dependency of the two classes
for production was supplied by the subject class, that is not a relationship of equal or symmetrical reciprocity.
is, by slaves, serfs and wage labourers respectively. The Instead, it is a relationship of exploiter and exploited,
subject class is made up of the majority of the population, oppressor and oppressed. In particular, the ruling class gains
whereas the ruling or dominant class forms a minority. The at the expense of the subject class and there is therefore a
relationship between the two major classes is discussed conflict of interest between them. This may be illustrated by
below. Marx’s view of the nature of ownership and production in
Classes did not exist during the era of primitive capitalist society.
communism, when societies were based on a socialist
The capitalist economy and exploitation
mode of production. In a hunting and gathering band, the
The basic characteristics of a capitalist economy may be
earliest form of human society, the land and its products
summarised as follows:
were communally owned. The men hunted and the women
gathered plant food, and members of the band shared |. Capital may be defined as money used to finance the
the produce. Classes did not exist since all members of production of commodities for private gain.
society shared the same relationship to the means of 2. Ina capitalist economy, goods, and the labour power,
production. Every member was both producer and owner; raw materials and machinery used to produce them, are
all provided labour power and shared the products of given a monetary value.
their labour. 3. The capitalists invest their capital in the production of
Hunting and gathering is a subsistence economy, which goods.
means that production only meets basic survival needs. 4. Capital is accumulated by selling those goods at a value
Classes emerge when the productive capacity of society greater than their cost of production.
expands beyond the level required for subsistence. This
Capitalism therefore involves the investment of capital
occurs when agriculture becomes the dominant mode of
in the production of commodities with the aim of
production. In an agricultural economy, only a section of
maximising profit in order to accumulate more capital.
society is needed to produce the food requirements of the
Money is converted into commodities by financing
whole society. Many individuals are thus freed from food
production; those commodities are then sold and converted
production and are able to specialise in other tasks.An
back into money at such a price that the capitalists end up
increasingly more complex and specialised division replaces
with more money than they started with.
the rudimentary division of labour of the hunting and
A minority, the capitalist class, privately owns capital.
gathering band.
In Marx’s view, however, this capital is gained from the
For example, in the early agricultural villages, some
exploitation of the mass of the population, the working class.
individuals became full-time producers of pottery, clothing
Marx argued that capital, as such, produces nothing. Only
and agricultural implements.As agriculture developed,
labour produces wealth. Yet the wages paid to the workers
surplus wealth — that is, goods above the basic subsistence
for their labour are well below the value of the goods they
needs of the community — was produced. This led to an
produce.
exchange of goods, and trading developed rapidly both
The difference between the value of wages and
within and between communities. This was accompanied by
commodities is known as surplus value. The capitalists
the development of a system of private property. Goods
appropriate this surplus value in the form of profit.
were increasingly seen as commodities or articles of trade
Because they are non-producers, the bourgeoisie are
over which the individual rather than the community had
therefore exploiting the proletariat, the real producers of
right of ownership. wealth.
Private property and the accumulation of surplus Marx maintained that in all class societies, the ruling class
wealth form the basis for the development of class exploits and oppresses the subject class.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Power and the superstructure minority of the population. Major changes in history have
Political power, in Marxist theory, comes from economic involved the replacement of one form of private property
power. The power of the ruling class therefore stems from by another, and of one type of production technique by
its ownership and control of the means of production.As another: capitalism involved the replacement of privately
the superstructure of society — the major institutions, owned land and an agricultural economy by privately owned
values and belief systems — is seen to be largely shaped by capital and an industrial economy.
the economic infrastructure, the relations of production Marx believed that the class struggle that would
will be reproduced in the superstructure. Therefore, the transform capitalist society would involve none of these
dominance of the ruling class in the relations of production processes. The protagonists would be the bourgeoisie
will be reflected in the superstructure. In particular, the and the proletariat, a minority versus a majority. Private
political and legal systems will reflect ruling-class interests property would be replaced by communally owned property.
since, in Marx’s words, ‘the existing relations of production Industrial manufacture would remain as the basic technique
between individuals must necessarily express themselves of production in the new society.
also as political and legal relations’. Marx believed that the basic contradictions contained
For instance, the various ownership rights of the in a capitalist economic system would lead to its
capitalist class will be enshrined in and protected by eventual destruction. The proletariat would overthrow
the laws of the land. Thus the various parts of the the bourgeoisie and seize the means of production, the
superstructure can be seen as instruments of ruling-class source of power. Property would be communally owned
domination and as mechanisms for the oppression of the and, since all members of society would now share the
subject class. same relationship to the means of production, a classless
In the same way, the position of the dominant class society would result. Since history is the history of the class
is supported by beliefs and values that are systematically struggle, history would now end. The communist society that
generated by the infrastructure. Marx referred to the would replace capitalism would contain no contradictions,
dominant concepts of class societies as ruling-class no conflicts of interest, and would therefore be unchanging.
ideology, since they justify and legitimate ruling-class However, certain changes were necessary before the
domination and project a distorted picture of reality. For dawning of this utopia.
example, the emphasis on freedom in capitalist society,
Class consciousness
illustrated by phrases such as ‘the free market’, ‘free
Marx distinguished between a‘class in itself’ and a ‘class
democratic societies’ and ‘the free world’, is an illusion that
for itself’.A class in itself is simply a social group whose
disguises the wage slavery of the proletariat.
members share the same relationship to the means of
Ruling-class ideology produces false class
production. Marx argued that a social group only fully
consciousness, a false picture of the nature of the
becomes a class when it becomes a class for itself.At this
relationship between social classes. Members of both classes
stage, its members have class consciousness and class
tend to accept the status quo as normal and natural and
solidarity. Class consciousness means that false class
are largely unaware of the true nature of exploitation and
consciousness has been replaced by a full awareness of the
oppression. In this way, the conflict of interest between
true situation, by a realisation of the nature of exploitation.
the classes is disguised and a degree of social stability is
Members of a class then develop a common identity,
produced, but the basic contradictions and conflicts of class
recognise their shared interests and unite, so creating class
societies remain unresolved.
solidarity. The final stage of class consciousness and class
Class and social change solidarity is reached when members realise that only by
collective struggle can they overthrow the ruling class,
Class struggle
and take positive steps to do so.
Marx believed that the class struggle was the driving force
Marx believed that the following aspects of capitalist
of social change. He stated that ‘the history of all societies
society would eventually lead to the proletariat developing
up to the present is the history of the class struggle’.
into a ‘class for itself’:
A new historical epoch is created by the development
of superior forces of production by a new social group. |. Capitalist society is by its very nature unstable. It is
These developments take place within the framework based on contradictions and antagonisms that can
of the previous era. The merchants and industrialists only be resolved by its transformation. In particular,
who spearheaded the rise of capitalism emerged during the conflict of interest between the bourgeoisie
the feudal era. They accumulated capital, and laid the and the proletariat cannot be resolved within the
foundations for industrial manufacture, factory production framework of a capitalist economy. The basic conflict
and the system of wage labour, all of which were essential of interest involves the exploitation of workers by the
components of capitalism. The superiority of the capitalist capitalists.
mode of production led to a rapid transformation of the 2. Marx believed that this first contradiction would be
structure of society. The capitalist class became dominant, highlighted by a second: the contradiction between
and although the feudal aristocracy maintained aspects of social production and individual ownership. As
its power well into the 19th century, it was fighting a losing capitalism developed, the workforce was increasingly
battle. concentrated in large factories where production was
The class struggles of history have been between a social enterprise. Social production juxtaposed with
minorities. Capitalism, for instance, developed from the individual ownership illuminates the exploitation of the
struggle between the feudal aristocracy and the emerging proletariat. Social production also makes it easier for
capitalist class, both groups in numerical terms forming a workers to organise themselves against the capitalists. It
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
machinery, take strike action, or attempt to organise elites largely reserve such positions for themselves and
other members of their class in an effort to overthrow their children. (For details of elite self-recruitment see
capitalism. Weber admitted that a common market Chapter 9.)
situation might provide a basis for collective class
Class and status groups
action, but he saw this only as a possibility.
In many societies, class and status situations are closely
4. Weber rejected the Marxist view that political
linked. Weber noted that ‘property as such is not always
power necessarily derives from economic power. He
recognised as a status qualification, but in the long run it
argued that class forms only one possible basis for
is, and with extraordinary regularity’. However, those who
power and that the distribution of power in society
share the same class situation will not necessarily belong to
is not necessarily linked to the distribution of class
the same status group. For example, the nouveaux riches (the
inequalities.
newly rich) are sometimes excluded from the status groups
of the privileged because their tastes, manners and dress are
Status situation defined as vulgar.
While class forms one possible basis for group formation,
Status groups can cut across class divisions. For example,
collective action and the acquisition of political power,
homosexuals from different class backgrounds are involved
Weber argued that there are other bases for these activities.
in gay rights organisations and events such as the annual Gay
In particular, groups form because their members share
Pride celebration in Britain.
a similar status situation. Whereas class refers to the
Weber’s observations on status groups are important
unequal distribution of economic rewards, status refers to
because they suggest that in certain situations status rather
the unequal distribution of ‘social honour’.
than class provides the basis for the formation of social
Occupations, ethnic and religious groups, and, most
groups. In addition, the presence of different status groups
importantly, lifestyles, are accorded differing degrees of
within a single class, and of status groups which cut across
prestige or esteem by members of society.A status group
class divisions, can weaken class solidarity and reduce the
is made up of individuals who are awarded a similar amount
potential for class consciousness. These points are illustrated
of social honour and therefore share the same status
by Weber’s analysis of‘parties’.
situation. Unlike classes, members of status groups are
almost always aware of their common status situation. They Parties
share a similar lifestyle, identify with and feel they belong to Weber defined parties as groups that are specifically
their status group, and often place restrictions on the ways concerned with influencing policies and making decisions in
in which outsiders may interact with them. the interests of their membership. In Weber’s words, parties
Weber argued that status groups reached their most are concerned with ‘the acquisition of social “power”’
developed form in the caste system of traditional Hindu Parties include a variety of associations, from the mass
society in India. Castes and sub-castes were formed and political parties of Western democracies to the whole range
distinguished largely in terms of social honour; lifestyles of pressure or interest groups, which include professional
were sharply differentiated and accorded varying degrees of associations, trade unions, and organisations such as the
prestige. Automobile Association, Greenpeace and the RSPCA.
Parties often, but do not necessarily, represent the interests
Social closure of classes or status groups. In Weber's words, ‘Parties may
Castes also provide a good example of the process represent interests determined through “class situation” or
described by Weber as social closure. Social closure “status situation” ...In most cases they are partly class parties
involves the exclusion of some people from membership of and partly status parties, but sometimes they are neither:
a status group. In the caste system, social closure is achieved The combination of class and status interests can be
through prohibitions that prevent members of a caste from seen in a group such as the Nation of Islam in the USA.As
marrying outside their caste. The caste system is an extreme well as being a religious group it is also active in trying to
example of social closure, since the exclusion of outsiders achieve political change. It represents a status group but it
from the status group is so complete. also represents class interests — the majority of its members
Another example of social closure was the apartheid are working-class.
system in South Africa, which lasted from the 1940s until Weber's view of parties suggests that the relationship
1992. The population was divided into whites, Asians, black between political groups and class and status groups is far
Africans, and ‘coloured’ people descended from more than from clear-cut. Just as status groups can both divide classes
one ‘race’. These different groups were kept apart in public and cut across class boundaries, so parties can divide and
places (for example, they were required to use different cut across both classes and status groups. Weber's analysis
public toilets), they had to live in different neighbourhoods of classes, status groups and parties suggests that no
and they were prohibited from marrying someone from single theory can pinpoint and explain their relationship.
a different group. Not surprisingly, the better facilities and The interplay of class, status and party in the formation
neighbourhoods were reserved for the dominant white of social groups is complex and variable and must be
population. examined in particular societies during particular time
Other status groups erect less formidable barriers to periods.
entry. In modern Britain, studies of elite self-recruitment Marx attempted to reduce all forms of inequality
suggest that those who have attended public schools usually to social class and argued that classes formed the only
fill certain types of job, such as senior positions in the civil significant social groups in society. Weber argues that the
service.Although individuals who went to state schools have evidence provides a more complex and diversified picture of
some chance of entering these jobs, public-school-educated social stratification.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
firms of City accountants’, who have marketability. Runciman is somewhat controversial. Runciman himself admits that
specifically excludes very highly paid entertainers because such groups might be distinctive in terms of‘intergenerational
their role is ‘irrelevant’ to ‘the institutional processes of mobility rates’ and ‘socio-political attitudes’, but he is still
production, distribution and exchange’. unwilling to allocate them to a separate class because they do
Runciman chooses to divide the middle class into three not necessarily have similar amounts of economic power.
groups. The higher-grade professionals, senior civil servants and Rosemary Crompton (1993), however, argues that
managers are placed in the highest of these three classes, and Runciman’s scheme is one of the few approaches to the class
routine white-collar workers in ‘more or less “deskilled”’ jobs structure that has had some success in coming to terms with
are placed in the lowest. He argues that there is a sufficient the social changes that have taken place in Britain since the
gap in the economic power of these two extremes in the Second World War. She argues that these changes include:
middle class to justify the inclusion ofa third group in between.
a move away from the conventionally established
This middle middle class includes lower professions and middle
‘class’ boundary between manual and non-manual
managers. Proprietors who are not in the upper class are
work following the expansion of the service sector
allocated to one of the middle classes according to what ‘the
and the routinization and feminization of much
scale and kind of their property makes appropriate’.
lower-level white-collar employment; an emphasis
Runciman argues that workers such as shop assistants,
on the diversity of middle-class locations, and the
checkout operators and copy- and audio-typists have
identification of the poorest and most deprived
insufficient economic power in terms of the marketability of
as an ‘underclass’— this identification being linked,
their skills to be placed in the middle class. Instead, they are
to varying degrees, with the condition of state
seen as part of the working class.
dependency.A major element of continuity, however,
The working class itself is divided in two: an upper or skilled
lies in the persisting concentration of economic,
working class, and a lower or unskilled working class. Semi-
organizational and political power within an ‘upper’
skilled workers are seen as belonging to the lower working
class which comprises only a small minority of the
class since, according to Runciman, it has become common for
population. Crompton, 1993, pp. 191-2
workers with minimal skills to be defined as semi-skilled. When
he uses the terms skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, Runciman is Her description of changes in the class structure provides
not referring to some abstract measure of technical knowledge a succinct summary of some of the main social trends
which is required to carry out jobs. He is thinking instead of which will be discussed in this chapter. Changes in three
the different degrees of marketability, control and ownership of the main elements of the stratification system — the
that individual workers possess. Thus a worker might be placed occupational structure, the distribution of income, and the
in the upper working class on the grounds of ownership if they distribution of wealth — will be examined below.
own their own tools, on the grounds of control if they have
control over the operation of machinery, or on the grounds of john Goldthorpe and the NS-SEC
marketability if their skills are in demand. scheme
Runciman also distinguishes an underclass at the bottom john Goldthorpe’s class scheme
of the stratification system. It consists of those ‘whose roles John Goldthorpe (1980) adopted a Weberian viewpoint in
place them more or less permanently at the economic level developing a class scheme which became extensively used
where benefits are paid by the state to those unable to in research (see pp. 63-6). Goldthorpe used Weber's idea of
participate in the labour market at all’. In effect, members of market situation to distinguish between the class positions
the underclass have no control, ownership or marketability. of different groups in the stratification system. Those with an
(We discuss Runciman’s views on the underclass in more advantaged position (with skills that were scarce and therefore
detail later in the chapter; see p. 71.) in demand) were seen as being in a better position than those
whose market situation was weaker. Goldthorpe also took
Operationalising the class scheme
account of work situation, which referred to factors such
Runciman made no attempt to use his class scheme for
as the amount of job security and control over work that
research, but he did suggest how that might be done. It
individuals had, as well as whether they managed or supervised
would be necessary to determine individuals’ jobs, the
others.As Ken Roberts (2011) notes, because it was based
amount and source of their income, their ‘actual and
on market and work situation, Goldthorpe’s scheme is widely
prospective capital resources’, and their economic position
seen as a new Weberian (or neo-Weberian) perspective.
within the household. These different types of information
On the basis of these factors, a seven-class scale was
could then be combined to determine a person’s class.
produced, which was often simplified into three classes: the
Evaluation of Runciman service class (professionals, large employers and managers),
There are a number of problems with Runciman’s class the intermediate class (routine white-collar workers such
scheme. It would be extremely difficult to use in research as clerks, small employers, some of the self-employed, and
since it means gathering a wide range of data on individuals supervisors) and the working class (see Figure |.4). Using
and the households in which they live. Many respondents to this scheme, almost any job could be classified into a class
a survey might be unwilling or unable to give precise details position, making it possible to use the scheme to carry out
of, for example, their wealth. detailed empirical research.
Runciman also offers no clear dividing lines between The Goldthorpe scheme had its limitations. For example,
the classes: it is unclear how much marketability, power or it failed to identify a separate, wealthy ruling class or an
control a person needs for them to be placed in a particular underclass who were not employed, and critics thought
class. His view that groups such as the self-employed or small it applied better to men than to women. It tended to be
proprietors should not be seen as constituting separate classes criticised, therefore, both by Marxists and by feminists.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Figure 1.4 The 1998 official class scheme (NS-SEC) and Goldthorpe’s three-class model
Source: K. Roberts (2011) Class in Contemporary Britain, 2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 21.
The NS-SEC classes in any system of stratification as stemming from differences
Nevertheless, Goldthorpe’s scheme was adopted in an amended in the ownership of wealth, and specifically ownership of the
form (with the incorporation of the long-term unemployed, means of production. Weber also saw ownership of wealth
for example) as an official class scheme used from 1998 by the as an important criterion for distinguishing classes. Weber,
Office for National Statistics in the UK (Roberts, 201 1).This however, placed more emphasis than Marx on divisions
scheme is illustrated in Figure |.4 and is known as the National within the propertyless class — the class whose members
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). did not own sufficient property to support themselves
The NS-SEC scheme identifies eight classes, but this without working. Income levels and other life chances for
is sometimes simplified to four. The top class (NS-SEC | this group depended largely upon the market situation of the
and 2, the service class or middle class) includes managers, occupational group to which the individuals belonged.
employers and professionals. The second, or intermediate, No system of class stratification is fixed and static. The
class includes non-manual workers whose work is relatively distribution of resources within the class system constantly
routine, and the self-employed and small employers (NS-SEC changes, and the size and market situation of occupational
3 and 4). The third class is the working class of unskilled groups also alter over time. The next sections will describe
workers and manual workers (NS-SEC 5, 6 and 7). The final some of the broad patterns of change in the occupational
class (NS-SEC 8) could be seen as an underclass of the long- structure and the distribution of income and wealth in
term unemployed or those who have never worked. Britain in the 20th century. Later sections will examine the
Roberts (2011) generally sees the scheme as useful changing situations of particular classes in more detail.
because it has a clear theoretical rationale, it combines both
market and work situation, and the inclusion of intermediate Changes in the occupational
classes helps to clearly distinguish the working class and middle structure
class. However, he accepts that it fails to identify an upper or Sociologists from Marx and Weber onwards have debated
ruling class. Partly this is because in survey research, for which how best to define social classes. Many, though not all, now
this scheme is often used, the ruling class is too small to be base their class categories, at least partly, upon occupational
detected. However, Roberts argues that such a class can simply groupings. Official government statistics distinguish among
be added to the top of the scheme to make it complete. socioeconomic groups, which, it is claimed, bring together
Whatever its limitations, the NS-SEC scheme has been people with jobs of similar social and economic status.
the basis for collecting many statistics on class differences
Scales of social class
which have been used to understand social class differences
Although there are disagreements about where the boundary
and inequalities.
between the middle and working classes should be placed, it
is often the case that manual workers are regarded as being
Changes in the British working-class, and non-manual workers as middle-class.
Until recently, official statistics on occupations
stratification system were based upon the Registrar General’s scale, which
distinguished manual jobs according to levels of skill, with
As we discovered in the previous section, most contemporary separate categories being used for the unskilled, semi-
theories of stratification have been influenced by the skilled and skilled manual worker. Non-manual jobs are
pioneering work of Marx or Weber. Despite the differences also usually divided into three categories: routine non-
between these sociologists, both gave primary importance to manual jobs, which include clerical and secretarial work;
material inequalities. Marx saw the most important divisions intermediate non-manual jobs, which include teachers,
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
nurses, librarians and some managers; and the highest class Although calculated in different ways, Tables |.2 and
in this scheme, which includes professionals, such as doctors |.3 are both based upon the idea of socioeconomic
and accountants, as well as senior managers. grouping. Table |.2 shows changes in the occupational
The old scale was replaced in 2001 by the National structure between 1911 and 1971. Table |.3 is calculated
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), which on a different basis but shows changes between 1975 and
provides broadly similar data but using different categories. 2000. (Table |.3 includes personal service workers in the
Because of this it is difficult to make precise statements same category as semi-skilled manual, and so includes a
about recent changes in the occupational structure, but it is wider range of workers in the lower classes than
certainly possible to identify broad changes. Table |.2.)
Table |.2 Occupational classes of the working population in Great Britain, 191 1-71: percentages in different classes
Reuter
1 Professionals a oa ee eee ati nou ee ad eee ec
0.20
3.05 |3.52] 3.46| 470[ 7.78| 1.61] 202] 203] 316] 5.95] 6.49] 7.07] 6.83| 8.18|10.95]
2 Employers, administrators, managers
proprietors
administrators
10.68 |13.90| 5.48 | 5.40 Saba helele — j=) ww5 N 2° 5B _—
4 Foremen, inspectors, | 1.29 1.44 3:87) keto) wh OI le 2.00) 3.28 0.32 | 0.45 ary = pS
supervisors
(op) (o>)
32.30 |29.96 |30.36 |29.08 |24.78 |20.50
nn o|™~N N fe)oO 25.23 |33.63
|28.30 |28.85 |27.92 |20.82 |53.42 |47.11 |49.51
|43.12
[Unskilled manual | _9.63 |14.17|14.81 |12.03] 11.94]11.55 |16.72 |17.92 |13.84] 11.89| 5.05|8.07|7.45] 7.94|12.02
fe) foe) [o)
Source: G. Routh (1980) Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79, Macmillan, London, pp. 6-7.
Table !.3 Socioeconomic groups in Great Britain by gender, aged 16 and over, 1975-2000: percentages by year
5
Employers and managers 15 15 N
i
a NN N fo)
Total
Professional
4
a — sanUl — ui =NN}
eau
N Cl
uw
Ww
ao;u
W}o]—
N
Wiel]
N
Intermediate and junior managers | 32 WWN WiwWwiw
wWwi—
Ww un
Skilled manual and own account 24 N5 Nw N}w
WwWul
N Wiwlis
aay
N
(oe) NWw
[o)
—|h4j)uW
N
ul
N}iw]- N]wl] N Oo
non-professional
Semi-skilled manual and personal | 24 N NN = ioe) stirsioe) peleite} pSoO
service
Unskilled manual ia / i
Source:A.Walker et al. (2001) Living in Britain: Results from the 2000 General Household Survey, Stationery Office, London,
p. 22.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
The shift to non-manual employment of employees in 1990 to 12.1 per cent in 2010.The report
The information contained in Tables |.2 and 1.3 shows that also found that, among less skilled jobs, employment was
there was a long-term trend during the 20th century for the expanding in care and leisure and other services and also in
proportion of non-manual jobs to increase, and for manual sales and customer service, while the percentage employed
jobs to decrease. In 2000 just 44 per cent of all workers had in manufacturing and industrial jobs was declining.As well
manual jobs, whereas in 1911, according to Routh (1980), as contracting, employment among working-class and
79 per cent of jobs were manual.According to the General intermediate groups is also changing.
Household Survey, the proportion of manual and personal The shift towards non-manual employment has been
service workers declined from 55 per cent to 44 per cent caused both by the decline of manufacturing and by the
between 1975 and 2000. However, there have been marked growth of services:
increases in professional, managerial,
and routine non-manual
|. Manufacturing industry has declined, while service
work.
industries, which employ a lower proportion of manual
Table 1.4 contains more recent information based
workers, have expanded. Ken Roberts (2011) comments
upon the NS-SEC scale. This scale uses seven occupational
that ‘Over half of the manufacturing jobs that existed in
groupings and the statistics distinguish between employees
the 1970s have gone. In some industries the workforces
and the self-employed. In the table, small employers and own
really have collapsed. Roberts points out that at
account workers (group 4) are not included in the figures
one time three-quarters of a million people were
for 2001 because the figures refer to employees and most
employed in coalmining and in 1981 it still employed
of this group are self-employed or employers. In the 2010
218,000 miners. By 1994, however, there were just 8,500
figures, though, they are included, because the figures refer
coalminers left.
to all in employment. The long-term unemployed are not
Other traditional heavy industries in which
included in either set of figures.
employment has declined rapidly include steel
manufacture, shipbuilding and dock work. Other
Table |.4 Employees in England and Wales by
manufacturing industries have also declined. This
socioeconomic classification (NS-SEC), 2001 and 2010
is partly because new technology has increased
productivity so that fewer workers are needed to
produce the same quantity of goods. Roberts notes
that industrial output has increased slightly in Britain
1 Higher managerial
despite a declining workforce.A second reason is that
and professional
British manufacturing has lost out in competition
2 Lower managerial
with businesses in lower-wage economies in Latin
and professional
America, Eastern Europe and the Far East. Workers
3 Intermediate 14.9
in such countries produce an increasing proportion of
occupations
manufactured goods consumed in Britain. This is part of
4 Small employers and oe
a trend towards a more global economy with increased
own account workers
trade. Since the recession that started in 2008, the
5 Lower supervisory 12.8
remaining employment in manufacturing has also been
and technical
hit by falling disposable income, which has reduced
6 Semi-routine
occupations demand in the economy.
13.4 9.6 There have also been important changes in manual
7 Routine occupations
work connected to the decline of manufacturing:
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey, Office for National Statistics, The old working class was employed in coalmines,
London. shipyards, steel plants and engineering workshops; the
new working class is employed in supermarkets, security
In the NS-SEC scheme, groups | and 2 are similar to the
firms, contract cleaners, fast food and other catering
highest classifications in the Registrar General’s scale and
establishments, and suchlike. Roberts, 2011, p. 65
they are sometimes combined to form a ‘managerial and
2. The service sector has grown considerably. According to
professional occupations’ category.Although the categories
Roberts, there was considerable growth in public sector
do not correspond exactly to the manual/non-manual
services (such as local government, health and education)
divide, groups 5,6 and 7 are sometimes combined to form a
from the 1940s to the 1970s, but growth then came to
‘routine and manual occupations’ category, and groups 3 and
a halt. Financial and business services grew rapidly from
4 are sometimes linked in an ‘intermediate class’.
the 1960s to the 1980s, but were then hit by the effects
Table 1.4 suggests that in England and Wales there
of computer technology, which reduced the size of the
was a continuing, although perhaps slowing, shift towards
workforce needed. Some service sector employment
managerial and professional employment in the first few
has been particularly hit by the post-2008 recession, with
years of the 2|st century, and a continuing decline in routine
financial services being badly affected initially. According
occupations. On the basis of these figures, there is no
to Roberts, recent growth in the service sector has largely
evidence that the expansion of higher classes at the expense
come from the development of consumer services in
of lower classes is coming to a halt. leisure industries such as hotels, catering and retailing.
However, there is evidence that some types of white-
Roberts points out, though, that the service sector
collar work are becoming less common.According to the includes manual jobs as well as white-collar jobs — for
Working Futures report (UKCES, 2011), administrative and example, hospital porters, cleaners and security guards.
secretarial employees in the UK declined from 15.4 per cent
40 SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Gender, full-time and part-time work However, it remains the case that women are much
Women, particularly married women, increasingly started more likely to work part-time than men.According to
taking paid employment during the 20th century, but they the UK Labour Force Survey, in the first quarter of 2012
are not equally distributed throughout the occupational there were 2.07 million men and 5.86 million women
structure. In 2010, a higher percentage of women than men employed part-time (an increase from 1.66 million men
were employed in professional occupations, administrative and 5.69 million women in 2006).Although a large majority
and secretarial work, and caring, leisure and other services, of part-time work is still done by women, part-time work
with men predominant in other occupations. among men has been rising faster than among women.
Women still tend to be concentrated in some lower- Nevertheless, overall, women still have a disadvantaged
paid and lower-status occupations (such as secretarial position in the labour market, and still earn less than men
work and caring work), and are under-represented in the (see pp. 130-3), even though there is a move away from
highest category (managers, directors and senior officials). men working full-time.
However, Table |.5 shows that a higher proportion of
Flexible working, self-employment and
women than men now work in professional occupations
geographical dispersal
and the proportion of women in administrative and
Ken Roberts (2011) notes that there has been a shift
secretarial work has declined considerably. Men, though,
away from full-time working towards part-time work and
remain much more likely than women to have jobs in
self-employment. Men are more likely than women to
skilled trades.
be self-employed, and some have welcomed the shift to
Changes in the overall occupational structure have
self-employment as an indicator of a more entrepreneurial
affected men and women rather differently. However, in
society. However, Roberts argues that much of this change
both the middle class and the working class, women are still
has been driven by rising unemployment, which has pushed
somewhat more likely than men to be concentrated in the
some people to find alternatives to employment out of
lower-paid and lower-status sectors of each class.
necessity.
Table |.5 All in employment by gender and occupation, Nevertheless, technological change and particularly
1990 and 2010 the availability of cheap home computing have made it
more feasible to become self-employed and set up small
businesses in some sectors. But this trend has also been
affected by the growth of subcontracting which enables
Managers, firms to avoid direct employment of workers, thus reducing
directors and their employment responsibilities and costs but providing
senior officials less security for workers.
Professional 4 Say BZ 18.8 9: Partly because of these changes, and the decline of large
occupations workplaces, the workforce has become more geographically
Associate 1323 Vis} 14.2 11. dispersed. More people work at home or on the move
professional and (for example using laptops on trains). With fewer ‘jobs for
technical life’ and fewer people working in large workplaces, this has
implications for class solidarity.
The measurement of income distribution Overall taxation and benefits reduce the final income
Official statistics measure income in a variety of ways: of richer groups in the population, although less than the
higher rates of income tax for high earners would suggest.
1. Original income refers to income from sources
This is partly because poorer groups in the population tend
such as employment, occupational pensions, gifts,
to pay a higher proportion of their income in indirect taxes
alimony payments, and investments. Figures on original
(such as VAT and duties) than richer groups.
income do not include benefits such as state pensions,
The official government figures need to be treated
family credit and income support, which are paid by the
with some caution. Only about 70 per cent of households
state.
approached agree to participate in the Family Expenditure
2. Gross income is a measure of all sources of income.
Survey. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the information
Most individuals are not, however, free to spend all of
obtained is entirely reliable. Individuals may not declare all their
their gross income, because some of it is deducted to
income, particularly if they have not been truthful to the Inland
pay income tax and national insurance contributions.
Revenue or the DSS.The figures may be particularly prone to
3. Disposable income is a measure of gross income less the
underestimating the income of the highest earners, who have
above deductions.
more opportunities to hide substantial amounts of income than
4. Some taxes (indirect taxes) are not paid directly out
middle and lower income groups.
of income, but are paid by consumers as part of the
purchase price of goods. For example, value added tax Sources of income
(VAT) is payable on most categories of goods in the Income comes from a number of sources. According to
UK. Duties are also payable on products such as petrol, British government statistics, wages and salaries are the most
tobacco and alcohol. Post-tax income is a measure of important source of income in the UK. For those of working
income after the above taxes, and taxes such as the age, in 2006-9, 64 per cent of all household income came
council tax, are deducted. from wages and salaries, 9 per cent from self-employment,
5. Final income adds on to income after taxes the value 6 per cent from state retirement pensions, 7 per cent from
of benefits provided by the state which are not given in other pensions, 7 per cent from social security benefits,
cash, for example medical care and education. 3 per cent from investments, 2 per cent from tax credits and
2 per cent from other sources (Social Trends, 2011).
By examining these different measures it is possible to
The sources of income vary considerably for households
discover the effects of government policy on the distribution
in different socioeconomic groups. For example, !0 per cent
of income. Figure |.5 gives data for 2010-11 based on the
of the income of Pakistani/Bangladeshi ethnic groups comes
Family Expenditure Survey.
from self-employment, whereas self-employment accounts
The effects of taxation and benefits for just 5 per cent of the income of Black Caribbean ethnic
Figure |.5 demonstrates that even in terms offinal income, groups (Social Trends, 201 1).
considerable income inequality remains between the fifth
Trends in income distribution 1949-79
of the population with the highest income and the fifth
Despite the limitations of the official figures, they do at least
with the lowest (ONS, 2012, The Effects of Taxes and Benefits
provide some indication of the overall historical trends in
on Household Income, 2010/2011). Government statistics
the distribution of income. In 1979 the Royal Commission
show that in 2010/11 the richest fifth of households had
on the Distribution of Income and Wealth published a report
an average income of £81,500, some 16 times that of
examining the changes in the distribution of income and
the poorest fifth, whose average income was just £5,100.
wealth between 1949 and 1978-9. They found that over this
However, when all taxes and benefits were taken into
period there was some income redistribution, but mainly
account, the income of the top fifth was reduced to £61,400
towards middle income groups rather than those on the
and that of the bottom fifth was raised to £15,200 (changing
lowest levels. The top |0 per cent of income earners reduced
the ratio to around four to one). Indeed, the top two
their share of total income by 3.7 per cent, but the bottom
quintiles on average pay more in taxes than they receive
30 per cent also had their share reduced, in this case. by
in benefits.
2.5 per cent.Although there was a slight shift in income
90,000 distribution — from the top half of income earners to the
@ Original income | bottom half — middle income groups were the beneficiaries.
80,000
_| @ Final income |
70,000 Changes in taxation
60,000 The Royal Commission report was published in 1979, the
50,000 same year as Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government
40,000 came to power. Successive Conservative governments
30,000 implemented policies that reversed the slight trend for
income redistribution to poorer groups. The policies that
20,000
had the most direct impact concerned income tax.
per 10,000
Average
(£
household
year)
Income tax is a progressive tax because higher earners
0 pay a higher proportion of their income in this tax than lower
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top All
households earners. If overall levels of income tax are cut, and if the higher
rates in particular are reduced, the redistributive effects of
Figure |.5 Original income and final income, by quintile groups, for
all households, 2010/1 | taxation become smaller. Between |979 and 1997 the basic
rate of income tax was reduced from 33 to 23 per cent,
Source: ONS (2012) The Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Household
while the highest rate fell from 80 to 40 per cent. In 1992 a
Income, 2010/2011, Office for National Statistics, London.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
lower-rate band of 20 per cent was introduced on the first affluent. In 1979 there were twin rates of VAT at
£2,000 of taxable income; this was widened to £4,300 in 1998. 8 per cent and 12.5 per cent, but this was increased under
By the early 1990s the government was running into Conservative governments to reach |7.5 per cent in 1991.
problems financing government spending and was forced Other important types of indirect tax are the duties
to raise extra taxes.Although most of the extra revenue levied on petrol, alcohol and tobacco. The New Labour
needed was raised through increases in indirect tax, there government of 1997-2010 introduced a range of indirect
was an increase in national insurance contributions of taxes on items such as air travel which had not previously
| per cent in 1994. National insurance contributions are been taxed.
effectively a form of direct tax, and between 1979 and 2001
Recent changes in the distribution of
contributions were raised from 6.5 per cent to 10 per cent.
income
In 1997 a new government was elected in Britain, the
As outlined above, the Royal Commission on the
first Labour government for |8 years. Although traditionally
Distribution of Income and Wealth found that there was
committed to a redistributive tax system, the incoming
some income redistribution from the rich to the poor
government pledged not to increase income tax rates and
between 1949 and 1978-9. However, there is clear evidence
to stick to Conservative spending limits in its early years
that changes in taxation introduced by Conservative
in government. However, after this period a number of tax
governments between 1979 and 1997 reversed this trend.
changes were introduced, many of which were designed
Studies of changes in household income show different
specifically to help the low-paid by cutting their tax bills. The
patterns under the Conservative governments of 1979-97
main changes were as follows:
and the Labour governments of 1997-2010.
|. The introduction of a Working Families Tax Credit, Figures 1.6 and |.7 show that under the Conservatives
which reduced the income tax bills for families with one there was a clear gradient in income growth, with the
or more children and at least one adult in employment. richest quintile of the population seeing their income grow
Poorer families received the full tax credit, but the value by an average of 2.5 per cent a year and the poorest quintile
of the tax credit tapered off to zero for higher earners. experiencing an average growth of just 0.8 per cent per year.
2. A Children’s Tax Credit was introduced in 2001 which Over the full term of the Labour governments, real income
lowered tax bills for those with children, although growth was between |.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent in all
this benefit was gradually withdrawn for higher-rate quintiles, with middle and upper-middle earners seeing their
taxpayers. In 2003 the Working Families Tax Credit income grow slightly more slowly than other groups.
and Children’s Tax Credit were combined into the
3%
Integrated Child Credit.
3. In 2003 an Employment Tax Credit was introduced,
reducing tax bills for lower wage earners.
4. The standard rate of income tax was cut from 2%
23 per cent to 20 per cent.
5. National insurance rates were raised by | per cent.
6. In April 2010 a 50 per cent rate of income tax was 1%
introduced for those earning over £150,000.
0.35
coefficient
Gini
0.30
0.25
19791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08 2010-11
2008-09
2009-10
Figure |.8 The Gini coefficient, Great Britain, 1979 to 2010-1 |
Source:J.Cribb, et al. (2012) Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2012, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, p. 36.
Furthermore, chief executives of the hundred largest sociologists. Like income, wealth can affect life chances, but
British companies experienced income growth averaging to Marxists, ownership of the means of production also gives
|| per cent between 1996 and 2006. By 2006 these chief power. (Today, ownership of the means of production usually
executives were earning one hundred times the amount of takes the form of share ownership.) Wealth is also important
the average pay in their companies, but back in the early in Weberian theories of stratification, although it is given less
1980s such executives earned only 25 times what an average emphasis than in Marxist theories.
employee earned. Lansley quotes figures showing that those If it could be shown that over the years there had been
working in finance accounted for about 75 per cent of the a major redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor,
increase in top pay, and much of this had come through this would indicate a reduction in class inequalities. However,
bonuses. wealth is perhaps even more difficult to measure than
The High Pay Commission (2011) found that the share income, and reliable data prove elusive.
of national income paid to the top 0.| per cent of earners
Measuring wealth
rose from |.3 per cent in 1979 to reach 6.5 per cent in
The definition and measurement of wealth, like income, are
2007 — a 500 per cent increase. The Commission found that
not straightforward. One problem is that the government
there was no evidence of a link to performance: executives
does not collect information on wealth for tax purposes.
were getting handsome rewards whether or not they were
There is no wealth tax on the living, but taxes do have
successful. This was particularly evident in the years from
to be paid on the estates of those who have died. Figures
2008 to 2011! when, despite the recession, top earners saw
on the value of estates left by the deceased are sometimes
pay and bonuses continue to grow. In 2011 it was reported
used to calculate the overall distribution of wealth and until
that Britain’s four biggest banks (HSBC, Lloyds Banking
2004 this method was used to estimate wealth distribution
Group, RBS and Barclays) paid their 32 best-paid executives
in Britain. However this may not be a reliable guide to
a total of £103,000,000 (Mustoe and Finch, 2012). This was
the distribution of wealth among the living; for instance,
despite the fact that two of them (Lloyds and RBS) were
individuals may transfer some of their wealth to other family
part state-owned, having been bailed out by the British
members before they die. Moreover, those who die tend to
government during the financial crisis.
be older than other members of the population, and wealth
Ken Roberts (2011) agrees that the explanation for
is not equally distributed between age groups.
the massive increases in the rewards of the best-paid,
Another method of collecting information on wealth
particularly directors of large companies and those working
distribution is to use survey research, but this too has
in banking and other areas of finance, has little to do with
its drawbacks. Those who refuse to cooperate with the
their contribution to the economy or market forces. While
research may be untypical of the population as a whole,
the pay of the best-paid is often justified on the grounds
and their failure to take part may distort the findings.
that high levels of remuneration are needed to attract
Those who do cooperate may not be entirely honest,
talented individuals, Roberts gives another explanation. He
and the richest members of society may be particularly
argues that company directors often sit on remuneration
prone to underestimating their wealth. Such surveys do
committees and fix each others’ pay. Not surprisingly they
not usually provide detailed information on the most
are keen to reward each other well.
wealthy — since there are so few of them, they are unlikely
Lansley (2012) argues that the boom in executive and
to feature in sample surveys. Nevertheless, from 2006 the
bankers’ pay has been made possible by the relaxation of
government introduced the Wealth and Assets Survey, which
regulations surrounding banking finance and takeovers. This
has reported results from 2006/8 and 2008/10. This is a
has allowed a boom in speculative investment banking and
longitudinal survey with data collected using interviewers
an increase in takeover activity. Such activity can generate
from just over 30,000 households in wave | and just over
very large short-term profits for traders and businesses, but
20,000 in wave 2 (ONS, 2012, Wealth in Great Britain). This
it does little to actually increase economic output or add to
is the most comprehensive set of data on overall wealth
economic growth. Furthermore, such activity can also lead
distribution in the population.
to equally large losses, and in the case of the banks the costs
of some of these losses were borne by the government, not Defining wealth
those who took the risks. Lansley concludes: Not only is wealth difficult to measure, but defining it is
Excessive economic inequality not merely drove us also problematic. Official statistics distinguish between
over the cliff in 2008, it is now sabotaging economic
marketable wealth and non-marketable wealth:
recovery ... The last thirty years has seen the
|. Marketable wealth includes any type of asset that can
emergence of a fast-buck model ofcapitalism that is
be sold and its value realised. It therefore includes land,
as likely to destroy as create wealth, while business
leaders have enriched themselves not by activity shares, savings in banks, building societies or other
which adds to the cake but by grabbing a bigger accounts, homes (minus any outstanding mortgage
share of it for themselves. Lansley, 2012, pp. 268-9 debts), and personal possessions such as cars, works of
art and household appliances. The figures on marketable
The changing distribution of wealth wealth exclude the value of occupational pensions,
The importance of weaith which cannot normally be sold. If such pensions are
included in the figures, the statistics show wealth
Inequalities in the distribution of wealth, like inequalities in
as being more equally distributed than is otherwise
the distribution of income, are an important indicator of class
the case.
divisions and class inequality.A particular form of wealth —
2. Non-marketable wealth includes items such as salaries
the means of production — is especially important to Marxist
and non-transferable pensions.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
From a sociological point of view, the official figures on Table |.6 Total wealth, by occupational social class,
wealth are not ideal. They fail to distinguish between wealth Great Britain, 2006-8
used to finance production and wealth used to finance
consumption. Wealth used for production (for example,
shares) is of particular interest to Marxist sociologists
Large 532,500 16
because they believe that power largely derives from
employers
ownership of the means of production. The distribution of and higher
wealth used for consumption is of less interest to Marxists, managerial
though it does give some indication of lifestyle. Such figures Higher 450,500 Pylon 96
are also useful for indicating the distribution of various life professional
chances, for instance the chance that different social groups Lower 325,000 31 24 64
have of owning their own home. managerial
and
Trends in wealth distribution professional
Despite the limitations of the available figures, it is Small
possible to discern overall trends in wealth distribution employers
in the UK over the 20th century. Research by Westergaard and own
and Resler (1976) showed that there was some reduction account
workers
in inequalities of wealth between 1911 and 1960.In 1911,
Intermediate 200,400
69 per cent of personal wealth was owned by the
occupations
richest | per cent of the population, and 92 per cent by
Lower 161,100 79
the richest 10 per cent. By 1960 the share of personal
supervisory
wealth owned by the richest | per cent had fallen to
and technical
42 per cent and the share of the richest 10 per cent
Semi-routine 86,700
had gone down to 83 per cent. These data suggest that occupations
there was a considerable reduction in the degree of
Routine 74,000 92
wealth inequality during the early and middle years of occupations
the 20th century, with much more redistribution of Never 15,000
wealth than of income. worked/
The trend towards greater equality of wealth long-term
distribution continued until the early 1990s, when it went unemployed |
into reverse. The share of marketable wealth owned by
the richest | per cent fell from 21 per cent to |7 per cent Source:J.Hills et al. (2010) An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the
between 1976 and 1991, but increased to 23 per cent by UK: Report of the National Equality Panel, Government Equalities
2002 (Social Trends, 2006). The share of the most wealthy Office, London, p. 215.
25 per cent was 71 per cent in 2002, leaving the other
75 per cent of the population to share the remaining A number of factors have contributed to the trends
29 per cent between them. noted above. Westergaard and Resler (1976) suggested
The most recent figures on wealth distribution are based that in the earlier years of the 20th century the most
upon households rather than individuals and so are not significant redistribution was within the wealthiest groups,
strictly comparable with earlier figures. They nevertheless rather than between them and the less well-off.A major
show that there are enormous inequalities of wealth. For reason for this was the transfer of assets from wealthy
example, taking net financial and physical wealth (similar to individuals to friends and other family members in order to
marketable wealth) in 2006-8, 2.4 per cent of households avoid death duties.
had no wealth or minus amounts of wealth (their debts In recent decades a rising proportion of the population
were greater than their assets). On the other hand, more have become home owners, and the rapid rise in house
than 2 per cent of households had more than £1 million in prices between 1991 and 2004 helped increase the wealth
wealth, and the top | per cent owned on average more than of many. However, more recently the value of housing has
£1.5 million (Hills et al., 2010). fallen. For example, according to Wealth in Great Britain
Wealth is much more unequally distributed than (ONS, 2012), property wealth fell by 3.7 per cent between
income. For example, the top | per cent had approximately 2006/8 and 2008/10.
five times the median net income of the population as a Housing is the single most important type of personal
whole, but 13 times the median net wealth (Hills et al., wealth in the UK, followed by assets held in life assurance
2010). policies and pension funds, and currency and bank deposits
Although income, wealth and occupational class are (Social Trends, 201 1).When non-marketable wealth such as
different aspects of inequality, they are all closely linked. investments in pension funds is included in the statistics,
Table |.6 shows that wealth and social class, as measured by wealth is less unequally distributed. Although an increasing
the NS-SEC scale, are closely connected, with the median proportion of the population have some significant assets, the
wealth of the highest class being over £500,000 in 2006-8, rise in housing values and in pension and life assurance assets
while that of the lowest class was under £75,000 and that of in the long term has benefited those in the richer half of the
the never worked/long-term unemployed was just £15,000 population more than those in the poorer half. Few of the
(Hills et al., 2010). poor have substantial pension rights or own their own homes.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
The recent increase in the proportion of total wealth companies in which they have invested, and in reality they may
owned by the richest | per cent is particularly marked. This have little influence upon the way that the companies are run.
has been seen by some commentators as being part of the Most privately owned shares remain in the hands
rise of a new group, the super-wealthy (Lansley, 2006). of a small minority of the population. Furthermore, the
A combination of factors has contributed to this situation, importance of privately held shares has declined. In 1963
including the enormous bonuses that can be earned by finance individuals owned 54 per cent of the equity in private
workers in the City of London, and the profits that can be companies, but by 2004 this was down to 14.1 per cent
earned by those companies that are successful in a global and by 2010 it stood at just 11.5 per cent (Share Ownership
economy (see pp. 47—51 for more discussion of the wealthy). 2005; ONS, 2012, Ownership ofUK Quoted Shares, 2010). On
In addition, the taxation system has not been tightened the other hand, the proportion of share equity held by life
up sufficiently to close loopholes which allow the very assurance and pension funds increased from |6.4 per cent
wealthy to minimise the UK taxes they pay or to avoid to 32.9 per cent between 1963 and 2004, but by 2010 it had
paying them altogether (see below). Thus, whether the top fallen again to just 13.7 per cent.
rate of income tax has been 40 per cent, 45 per cent or While these assets might belong to individuals, they
50 per cent, many of the wealthiest have avoided paying a have little control over how their money is invested. An
good deal of what they would have owed without finding increasing proportion of share equity is owned by non-UK
loopholes. citizens, companies or institutions, rising from just 7 per cent
The British government estimated that in 2009-10 the in 1963 to 32.6 per cent in 2004, and 41.2 per cent in 2010,
amount of unpaid tax was £4 billion, a further £5 billion was reflecting the globalisation of capitalism (Share Ownership
lost through legal tax avoidance and £26 billion was lost 2005; ONS, 2012, Ownership of UK Quoted Shares, 2010).
through illegal tax evasion, making a total of £35 billion (Tax
Taxation and wealth
Research UK, 2012). Tax Research UK, though, puts the total
Successive governments in Britain have put much less
loss at £123 billion. The campaigning organisation UK Uncut
emphasis on taxing wealth than income. Before 1974 the
(which campaigns against spending cuts and tax avoidance)
main tax on wealth was estate duty, paid on the estate of
claims that individuals and corporations actually avoid paying
someone who had died. It was easy to avoid this tax by
about £96 billion per year (UK Uncut, 2012).
transferring assets before death. The rules were tightened
On a global scale the value of hidden assets is enormous.
up in the 1970s and 1980s so that some tax could be
A 2012 study commissioned for the Tax Justice Network
levied on wealth handed over within seven years before
used data from the World Bank, International Monetary
death. However, it is still possible to avoid paying the tax by
Fund and finance ministries of various countries to estimate
establishing trusts. The current wealth tax, inheritance tax,
that the super-rich and large corporations were hiding
has a tax-free allowance (in 2012, the first £325,000 of an
some £13 trillion in assets, largely to avoid taxation (Prieg,
estate was tax-free, and for married couples or civil partners
2012). (A trillion is one million million, and in 2012 the latest
there was a combined allowance of £650,000), and it is
estimates put the total wealth of the UK economy at just
possible to give away some money in the years before one
over £10 trillion.) All these figures are somewhat speculative
dies without paying tax on it.
as they are trying to measure what, in many cases, is being
As well as taxes directly concerned with wealth, company
deliberately concealed, but it is clear that enormous sums
taxation and the taxation of individual income also have
are involved; the main beneficiaries are corporations and
important consequences for the overall distribution of
the rich; and without the loss of revenue there could
wealth. Drawing on a range of sources, Stewart Lansley
be substantial cuts in taxes or increases in government
(2006) suggests that the rich enjoy much more advantageous
spending or cuts in borrowing, or all three. (For further
tax arrangements than the rest of the British population. He
discussion of tax avoidance, see below.)
provides a range of evidence and examples to back this up.
Share ownership A study by C. Larkin (2004) found that since 1985, the
Shares are a particularly important type of wealth, used to richest 20 per cent in Britain have actually paid a lower
finance production. In Britain there has certainly been an proportion of their income in taxation than the poorest
increase in recent years in the percentage of the population 20 per cent. The study estimated that in 2002 the richest
who own shares. Westergaard and Resler estimated that in 20 per cent paid about 35 per cent of their income in taxes
1970 only 7 per cent of adults over the age of 25 owned while the poorest 20 per cent paid around 38 per cent.
shares. In 1995-6, according to the Family Resources Survey, Offshore trusts are used to avoid paying tax. There
around 1|6 per cent of adults in the UK owned shares. are now around 70 countries which act as tax havens.
Much of the increase in share ownership was due to the The Cayman Islands is one of the most important. The
Conservative government's privatisation programme, which country’s population is just 35,000 but there are around
encouraged small investors to buy shares in companies 48,000 corporations and trusts registered there. It has been
such as British Telecom and British Gas. In the 1990s share estimated that $11.5 trillion has been put into offshore tax
ownership was increased by the demutualisation of building havens where the funds are exempt from tax. Big British
societies such as the Halifax, and the flotation of insurance companies owned or partly owned by wealthy individuals
companies such as Norwich Union. For example, around take advantage of such arrangements. Richard Branson’s
9 million people were entitled to shares as a resu!t of the Virgin Group consists of some 300 companies, and most of
flotation of the Halifax in 1997. them are registered offshore to avoid taxes.
However, many of the new shareholders created by Another way of avoiding tax is to live abroad, or for one’s
these flotations sold their shares very quickly. Furthermore, spouse to live abroad. Philip Green, chief executive of Arcadia
most new shareholders have only a very small stake in the (which runs BHS among other companies), is one of Britain’s
richest men. In 1998 his wife moved to Monaco, which has no Distribution of weaith
income tax. By making his wife the owner of most of his assets, To support their argument, Westergaard and Resler pointed
Green is able to continue working in Britain while paying to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small
very little UK tax. In 2005 Green’s companies paid his wife minority, the richest 5 per cent of the population. Although
a dividend of £1.2 billion. By paying it to his wife he avoided there has been some change in the distribution of wealth
paying corporation tax at 25 per cent, thus depriving the in Britain since 1900, this has largely taken place within the
British Inland Revenue of more than £300 million. richest 10 per cent. The expansion of home ownership has
Many wealthy foreigners are allowed to live in Britain, or spread wealth a little more widely, but the ownership of
run British companies, while paying little, if any, tax. Lansley capital in private industry has remained highly concentrated.
says that ‘Russian oligarchs, Greek shipping magnates and
Ruling-class power
Swedish entrepreneurs’ have all made Britain their home
Westergaard and Resler argued that the maintenance of
because of the sympathetic treatment they receive from the
inequalities of wealth was due to the power of the ruling
British tax authorities. Rupert Murdoch’s News International
class. They maintained:
has ‘paid hardly anything in tax in the UK since the late
1980s’, although one study put the profits of the subsidiaries The favoured group enjoyed effective power, even
of News Corp’s UK holding company at £1.4 billion over when its members took no active steps to exercise
|| years (Lansley, 2006). power. They do not need to do so — for much ofthe
Lansley argues that however unfair this might seem to time at least — simply because things work that way
the ordinary UK taxpayer, it is neither illegal nor surprising. in any case. Westergaard and Resler, 1976, p. 143
Tony Blair (and more recently the Coalition chancellor of the
It is generally taken for granted (by members of society and
exchequer George Osborne) in particular argued that high
governments alike) that investments should bring profit and
taxes on the rich are counter-productive since the rich will
that the living standards of the propertyless should be based
tend to take their wealth elsewhere to avoid British taxes.
on the demands of the market for their skills. In general,
However, Lansley is critical of a situation where:
governments have favoured the interests of capital, assuming
The great majority of individuals pay their dues, while that the well-being of the nation is largely dependent upon
the very rich individuals and also the large corporations the prosperity of private industry.
increasingly choose and have the power to opt out of
Composition of the ruling class
their tax obligations. Lansley, 2006, p. 197
Westergaard and Resler believed that the ruling class was
made up of perhaps 5 per cent, and at most |0 per cent, of
Classes in capitalist societies the population. It included the major owners of the means
of production, company directors, top managers, higher
professionals and senior civil servants, many of whom are
We will now examine the changing position of particular
large shareholders in private industry. The subordinate
classes within the class structure of capitalist societies,
classes consist of the bulk of the wage- and salary-earning
using British and American data. Three main classes — the
population.
upper class, the middle class and the working class — will be
Westergaard and Resler put forward what was
considered in turn, though, as we will show, the location of
essentially a conventional Marxist view of the ruling class.
the boundaries between these classes is disputed.
They assumed that the ruling class continued to exist.
Most of the views dealt with in the following sections
They claimed that it was a united group that continued to
have been influenced by Marxist or Weberian theories of
dominate British society, and argued that social changes had
stratification. ;
not significantly redistributed wealth and power. Neoliberal
theorists have challenged these views.
The upper class
Peter Saunders — a neoliberal
John Westergaard and Henrietta (New Right) view of higher classes
Resler = a Marxist view of the An influential economic elite
ruling class Peter Saunders (1990) does not deny that there is a small
Class divisions group of people in British society who have considerable
In a study first published in 1975, John Westergaard wealth and more power than other members of society. He
and Henrietta Resler argued, essentially from a Marxist accepts that many directors and top managers own shares
perspective, that a ruling class dominated Britain. They in their own and other companies, and he also accepts
claimed that the private ownership of capital provided the that there is ‘an interlocking network at the top of British
key to explaining class divisions. industry and finance in which the same names and faces
Westergaard and Resler argued that in detail the class keep cropping up with different hats on’. He notes that
system was complex, but in essence it was simple: the major the hundred largest companies produce more than half of
division was still between capital and labour. Sociologists Britain’s manufacturing output, and therefore:
who focused on the details of class — for example, the
a few thousand individuals at most are today
differences between manual and routine white-collar responsible for taking the bulk ofthe key financial
workers — merely obscured the overall simplicity of the and administrative decisions which shape the
system. Such differences were insignificant compared to the
future development of British industry and banking.
wide gulf that separated the ruling class from the bulk of Saunders, 1990, p. 88
the wage- and salary-earning population.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
However, Saunders rejects the Marxist view that such However, Roberts does accept that important changes have
people constitute a capitalist ruling class. He sees them as taken place in this class, which he sees as representing less
merely ‘an influential economic elite’. than | per cent of the population.
Wealth, ownership and the capitalist class The old and new upper classes
Saunders identifies some groups who might be seen as a Roberts adopts an essentially Weberian perspective in
capitalist class. These consist of families who continue to defining the upper class. He sees the upper class as having a
own majority shareholdings in established large companies, distinctive work and market situation. Its work situation
entrepreneurs who have built up and still own big involves the employment of other people. In many cases this
businesses, and large landowners. is not done personally and directly, but rather impersonally
Such people, however, control only a small fraction of the and indirectly. For example, it is done through ownership
British economy. Most businesses are run by directors and of shares or unit trusts. The upper class’s market situation
managers whose income and power derive principally from involves ‘having one’s life-chances depend not on the sale of
their jobs and not from their ownership of wealth. Saunders one’s labour power and associated skills and knowledge, but
claims that fewer than 25 per cent of the top 250 British the returns on one’s capital investments’.
companies are run by managers and directors who own Although this approach has some similarities with the
5 per cent or more of the company’s shares. The remaining Marxist view, Roberts does not see this group as a ruling
75 per cent are part of the ‘economic elite’, but they do not class who dominate society. Instead he sees them as an
own substantial parts of the means of production, so they upper class — they are certainly the most powerful class, but
cannot be seen as part of the capitalist class. not as dominant as Marxist theory would suggest.
Furthermore, Saunders argues that ‘it has become much To Roberts the old upper class consisted of the
more difficult than it once was to identify a distinctive aristocracy — whose wealth came from land ownership — and
capitalist class’.Although few people are very rich, many other large landowners. In the |9th century their position
people have a direct stake in owning British enterprises. was challenged by the development of manufacturing and
During the course of the 20th century the proportion of mining which created a new upper class. However, rather
shares owned by individuals declined. Banks, unit trusts, than remaining divided, these two groups gradually came
building societies and pension funds now own most shares, together. Industrialists gained titles and bought land, while
and a large proportion of commercial land. Millions of aristocrats invested in some industries or dug coalmines on
ordinary people therefore have investments tied up in the their land.
capitalist economy by virtue of their pension schemes, It takes time for new members of the upper class to
endowment mortgages, life insurance policies and savings become integrated into upper class networks.To be fully
in banks and building societies. In addition, the privatisation accepted, ‘people need to have been to the right schools
programme has widened direct share ownership. Saunders and universities, to have close connections with other upper
therefore claims that the capitalist class ‘has fragmented into class families, and to share their lifestyle’ (Roberts, 2011). The
millions of tiny pieces’, and says:‘To see these pieces look upper class has never been entirely closed, but it is cautious
around you. about who is admitted to the inner circles. Members of
minority ethnic groups, for example, find it difficult to gain
The spread of power
acceptance. Partly because of this, there is a great deal of
From Saunders’s point of view, then, directors and managers
intergenerational continuity. Roberts estimates that about a
lack the wealth to be seen as a capitalist class. He further
third of the richest families still have titles, and he notes that
argues that they lack the power to be a ruling class.Although
inheritance of wealth is by far the most common route into
they make many important investment decisions, they do
the upper class. The very wealthiest are worth thousands of
not monopolise power and they frequently fail to get their
millions — far more than could be saved up even from the
own way. There are many areas of society that they do not
highest salaries. However, some people can enter the lower
control. These include the government, the mass media and
reaches of the upper class through their careers. One way
the education system. Indeed, members of the economic
of gaining entry is through growing an enterprise that starts
elite are ‘sometimes dismayed’ when politicians, editors and
off quite small. Others gain entry through very successful
educationalists fail ‘to defer to their wishes and interests’.
careers that lead them into top management.
Saunders believes that the class divisions of previous
The upper class has some members who are more active
centuries have been weakened by the development of
than others in promoting and defending their class interests.
capitalism. Inequality is essential if a society is to be just
Wealth may be spread around family members, including
and successful, but the success of capitalism spreads wealth
females, but it is generally the males who are most active —
and power more widely. In doing so it ensures that the
for example, by sitting on company boards.
wealthiest do not rule society.
A third, if very uncommon, method of gaining entry to
Ken Roberts — the upper class the upper class is through pure luck, for example through a
large lottery win.
Ken Roberts (2011) believes that the arguments put forward
by writers such as Saunders are very misleading. He claims Acting as a class
that a small but very powerful upper class continues to Roberts sees the upper class as ‘Britain’s best example of a
exist in Britain, and that its power has not been significantly well-formed class, both as a demographic entity, and in terms
reduced by changes in capitalist society. He does not believe of its level of internal social organisation which enables
that the upper class has been significantly fragmented or the class to act effectively in accordance with its interests’.
‘rendered innocuous’. Indeed, he believes that, if anything, the Indeed, Roberts argues that the upper class has increased its
position of this class has strengthened rather than weakened. power in recent times.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Technology has allowed its members to monitor and who exercise control in large corporations, again because
control organisations and employees more effectively. of the fragmentation of share ownership, which prevents
Globalisation has allowed capital to be moved across owners from acting collectively. However, Roberts says:
national boundaries, escaping taxation and seeking the best
Studies of business decision-making have shown who
places to achieve profits. The power of financial capital,
takes decisions can be irrelevant. Salaried managers
which can be so easily moved, has required governments
may decide which new machines to install, which
to take increasing notice of the demands of the upper class.
products to develop, and which staff to hire and fire,
Money has also ‘guaranteed access to influential politicians
but they do so in a context where they know they
in virtually all countries’. Many political parties rely upon
will be judged by the implications for profitability
money donated directly by members of the upper class.
and the market value of a company’s shares. In this
Furthermore, politicians are much more likely to be re-
sense, decisions are already made before managers
elected if the economy is succeeding and unemployment is
settle the technical details and put them into effect.
low. This in turn requires investment from the upper class.
Roberts, 2011, p. 173
The activities of the upper class in Britain can be
coordinated through the operation of what is sometimes In any case, company law requires directors to act in the
called ‘the establishment’ or the ‘old-boy network’. Members interests of shareholders, and senior executives often become
of the upper class can meet and develop policies at shareholders themselves through receiving remuneration in
conferences, London clubs, the Institute of Directors, the the form of stock options, in addition to a salary.
Confederation of British Industry and social events such Following the work of John Scott (1997), Roberts argues
as the Lord Mayor’s Banquet. Other leisure activities might that at the core of the upper class is a very small group
include pheasant shooting, and attendance at elite sporting of less than 0.1 per cent of the population (about 43,500
and other events in the most exclusive enclosures (for people) who play the most active role in decision making.
example, the Derby, Royal Ascot, the Oxford—Cambridge Some members of this group sit on the boards of more
boat race or the Chelsea Flower Show). than one company, creating contacts between numerous
The class remains integrated and can pass privilege on to companies in a system of interlocking directorships.
future generations through attendance at elite educational Although they do not all know one another personally, they
institutions. These include the top public (independent) are connected through these interlocking directorships,
schools, such as Eton and Harrow, and the top universities, enabling a degree of coordination and an opportunity to act
particularly Oxford and Cambridge. Connections through as a relatively integrated class.
such institutions facilitate high rates of inter-marriage within
Contemporary capitalism and the British
the upper class. They also foster links between the rich
upper class
and those in senior positions within the state, particularly
Roberts emphasises the continuities in the position of
cabinet ministers, judges, senior civil servants and high-
the upper class over time, but he does acknowledge that
ranking military officers, who are also likely to have been
important changes have taken place. One aspect of this is the
through elite educational institutions.
growing complexity of the financial system. He says, ‘we have
However, it is through their financial power that the
entered an on-going era of mergers, takeovers and demergers’.
upper class exercise most influence on society as they
This leads to greater complexity in terms of patterns of
directly pursue their own class interests.
ownership, making it harder for members of the public to
The upper class, wealth and power know exactly who owns what. There are complex chains of
Roberts notes that writers such as Saunders (see above) subsidiaries and parent companies, hedge funds, investment
question the continued power of the wealthy because funds and private equity firms. Massive amounts of capital
individuals are less likely to own large corporations outright flow around financial markets (around $25 trillion per day),
than they were in the past. The argument goes that since often looking for short-term profits. However, behind all this
the 19th century, when joint stock companies, owned by complexity, ‘there are always private individuals who own the
shareholders, came into existence, ownership has become wealth’. Those individuals continue to act as an upper class.
fragmented among individual shareholders, pension funds However, globalisation has certainly changed the upper
and so on, meaning that a ruling class can no longer exercise class in one respect. Instead of being simply nationally
power through their shareholdings. based, they are part of a global capitalist class. This
However, Roberts regards this as a myth. He quotes class ‘operates largely beyond the control of national
research that shows that individuals or families who own governments though, of course, businesses have to respect
less than 10 per cent of the shares in a company can often national laws within the countries where they operate’.
exercise control. Most shareholders are not active; they do The development of the European Union, the deregulation
not vote or take an active interest in the management of the of the City of London and the development of information
company. Individual capitalists with the single biggest stake technology have facilitated the globalisation of finance and
can often occupy key decision-making roles. For example, trade, and with it the development of this class, for whom
Rupert Murdoch and his family have been able to maintain national borders are less and less important.
control of the huge corporation NewsCorp by occupying London, along with Tokyo and New York, is one of the
key positions, despite a minority stake in the shares of the key centres of global capitalism and the global capitalist class,
company. but many of those who work in key jobs in the City are
A related argument against the capitalist class retaining not British nationals. Many of the richest individuals living
power through wealth is the managerial revolution in Britain are also not British citizens. Equally, many British
thesis. This argues that it is managers rather than owners members of the global capitalist class work abroad.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Roberts draws upon the work of Leslie Sklair (1995, the best of all known economic systems for all classes
2000, 2001, cited in Roberts, 2011) to argue that the of people in terms of the standards ofliving that it
following groups make up this global capitalist class: delivers, and the quality oflife, measured by that
most sensitive of all indicators — how long people
> Senior executives in major transnational companies
live. Roberts, 2011, p. 179
(companies with subsidiaries in several countries) and
financial institutions such as banks. However, he also argues that the existence of the upper
» Senior politicians who encourage economic integration class offends certain widely held values, such as a belief in a
into the world capitalist economy. meritocratic system.
» International professional and technocratic elites Robert's discussion of the upper class draws extensively
who provide benchmarking systems, for example on the work of other writers such as Leslie Sklair (1995) and
those relating to best management practice, and who John Scott (1982, 1997). Compared to Sklair, though, Roberts
‘perform essential ideological work in persuading the places less emphasis on the development of a global capitalist
global population that business is good for humanity’ class. Indeed, Roberts is somewhat unclear about the extent to
(Roberts, 2011). which power is held by the British upper class as opposed to
>» The elites who hold key positions in institutions that the global capitalist class. Compared to Scott, Roberts pays less
contribute to running the global economy. The World attention to divisions within the capitalist class, for example
Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the between financiers, such as bankers, and manufacturers.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are particularly Other writers, such as Stewart Lansley (2006), argue that
important. a very small ‘super class’ now dominates the upper class;
they have become incredibly wealthy over recent decades
Such groups wield enormous power, but there are limits to and have concentrated wealth and power to an even greater
how much they can control the world economic system, as extent than in the past.
the credit crunch of 2008 and subsequent recessions and debt Roberts is also less critical of the upper class than Marxists
crises demonstrate. Nevertheless, the global capitalist class such as Westergaard and Resler (1976), who see this group
does try to coordinate its activities as far as possible to ensure not just as an upper class but as a ruling class. In any case,
stability and continuing capital accumulation through profit. Roberts's work provides a useful summary of the main
features of the upper class and some of the main changes that
Power and the upper class
have taken place in this group over recent decades.
As discussed above (pp. 47-8), Peter Saunders (1990)
believes that what he calls ‘an influential economic elite’ Fe
9
Table |.7 (continued) room for a middle class. In reality, though, Marx recognised the
existence of intermediate classes (for example, members of
the petty bourgeoisie, such as shopkeepers and small business
people). Moreover, the growth of what is usually called the
£7,580 middle class has largely been the result of the increasing
ERE IIS million amount of white-collar work. In Volume 3 of Capital, Marx
6 Ernesto Pharmaceuticals | Switzerland | £7,400 noted this trend when he argued that the increasing size of
and Kirsty and UK million enterprises made it impossible for them to be run by a single
Bertarelli person. In these circumstances there was a need for ‘the
7 The Duke of | Property : employment of commercial wage-workers who make up the
Westminster ili actual office staff’.
8 David and Property and £7,083 Although he identified the trend towards more non-
Simon the internet million manual workers, Marx made no detailed attempt to explain
Reuben how they fitted into his theory of stratification. On the
9 John Shipping and oil |Norway £6,600 surface, at least, as non-owners of the means of production,
Fredriksen services million they can hardly be considered as part of the bourgeoisie.
and family Nor, it is often argued, can they be seen as part of the
10 -Galenand Retailing Canada £5,900 proletariat. Many commentators suggest that non-manual
George Fillion workers enjoy considerable advantages in employment over
Weston and their manual counterparts: they tend to enjoy greater job
family eee security, shorter working hours, longer holidays, more fringe
benefits and greater promotion prospects.
Source: The Sunday Times, 29 April 2012.
Life chances
Other views A variety of studies have shown that those in higher
socioeconomic groups are likely to enjoy advantages over
|. Elite theories accept that power is concentrated in
those in lower socioeconomic groups in terms of their life
the hands of a few, but deny that the power comes
chances. They are likely to enjoy higher standards of health,
from wealth. Instead, they see power deriving from the
and to live longer; they are less likely to be convicted of a
occupation of top jobs in society (see Chapter 9 for
criminal offence; and they are more likely to own their own
further details).
house and a variety of consumer goods. Evidence confirming
2. Pluralists deny that higher social classes monopolise
this is found in various parts of the book (see for example
power and believe that in liberal democracies the
pp. 321-4 on health inequalities, and pp. 688-90 on
wishes of the people determine government policy.
educational inequalities).
According to this view, power is dispersed and not
concentrated in the hands of the upper classes (see Conflicting perspectives on the middle class
Chapter 9 for details). In Weberian terms, the sort of evidence outlined above can
be used to suggest that there is a middle class in Britain,
Chapter 9 will examine these quite different views about
distinguished from the working class by its superior market
the ‘top’ of the stratification system and will discuss the
situation and life chances. From this point of view, the middle
distribution of power, including the extent to which a ruling
class is held to consist of non-manual workers. However,
class holds power. (See also Chapter 14 for a discussion of
many sociologists have, for a variety of reasons, rejected this
power and globalisation.)
relatively simple and straightforward view:
The middle class |. The distinction between manual and non-manual work
is not seen by some as an adequate way of distinguishing
between classes. Often Marxist and neo-Marxist
Marx and the middle class sociologists try to distinguish classes according to their
The usual way of defining the middle class is to see it
role within the economic system, while Weberians are
as consisting of those individuals who have non-manual
more likely to analyse class in terms of the market
occupations, that is, occupations which involve, in some
situation of particular occupational groups.
sense, an intellectual element. If the distinction between
2. On the face of it, the middle class contains an extremely
manual and non-manual labour is used to distinguish the
diverse group of workers, ranging from secretaries to
middle class, then, as we have indicated above (see p. 39),
accountants, shop assistants to managers, shopkeepers
it is a growing sector of capitalist industrial societies such
to social workers.
as Britain. 3
. The position of particular occupational groups — their
The attempt to analyse the position of the middle class
wages, conditions of employment and responsibilities —
in the class structure has been a major preoccupation
changed during the course of the 20th century, and these
of sociologists of stratification. This has been the case
changes may in turn have affected the class structure
particularly for Marxist and neo-Marxist sociologists, since
f as a whole.
the growth of the middle class has often been cited as
evidence against Marx's theory of class. These complications have led to a variety of views as to the
According to many interpretations of his work, Marx composition of the middle class and its place in the social
saw capitalist society as divided into only two classes of any structure. Some have argued that there is a distinctive and
importance: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This leaves no relatively homogeneous middle class; others that the middle
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
class as such does not exist. Some of those who accept the cent to 18.8 per cent among men and from 13.2 per cent to
existence of a middle class believe that it is divided into 19.7 per cent among women (UKCES, 201 1). Similar trends
many different strata; others believe that it is divided, but are evident in all Western industrial capitalist societies.
only into two main groupings. Several reasons have been given for the rapid growth
The precise location of the boundaries between the of the professions. The increasing complexity of business
middle class and the classes above and below it has also demands financial and legal experts such as accountants
been the subject of dispute. Before we examine the place and lawyers. The development of industry requires more
of the middle class as a whole in the class structure, we will specialised scientific and technical knowledge that results
examine the main strata of the middle class in detail. in the development of professions such as science and
engineering. The creation of the welfare state and the
The upper middle class expansion of local and national government have produced a
range of ‘welfare professions’, and have led to the growth of
the medical and teaching professions, as well as the greater
For the sake of convenience, different parts of the middle
employment of professionals in government bureaucracies.
class will be examined in two main sections. In this first
From another viewpoint, the growth of the professions may
section we will consider the position of the more highly
also be associated with the attempts of more and more
rewarded groups, including professionals, senior managers and
groups of workers to get their jobs accepted as ‘professional’.
administrators, and successful small business people.
In the early 20th century, small business people (the self- Higher and fower professionals
employed and shopkeepers) made up a greater proportion In terms of their market situation, the professionals can be
of the working population than they did in 1971.As the divided into two groups: the higher and lower professionals.
size of many businesses grew, the number of employers
|. The higher professionals include judges, barristers,
was reduced. Guy Routh (1980) found that the number
solicitors, architects, planners, doctors, dentists, university
of employers in Britain declined from 763,000 in 1911 to
lecturers, accountants, scientists and engineers.
621,000 in 1971. The number of self-employed also fell by
2. The lower professionals include school teachers, nurses,
24,000 over the same period.
social workers and librarians.
Obviously, larger employers might be considered part of
the upper class, but the others are often seen as part of the Historical research by Routh suggests there have long been
‘old’ middle class. Marx predicted that this group, which he significant differences in earnings between the two groups.
referred to as the petty (or petite) bourgeoisie, would be Routh found that higher professional men earned 230 per
progressively squeezed into the proletariat. They would be cent of average male pay in 1913-14 and 159 per cent in
unable to compete with larger companies which could buy 1978. The equivalent figures for male lower professionals
and sell in bulk and take advantage of advanced technology were 109 and 104 per cent.
(Marx and Engels, 1848). Recent figures show continuing high rewards for
Although up to 1971 the trends provided support for professionals in general. The Annual Survey of Hours and
Marx’s view on the likely fate of the petty bourgeoisie, Earnings 201 | showed that the median weekly gross pay
data since the 1980s indicate a reversal of previous trends. was £500.70 per week, but for professional occupations
According to official figures, the numbers of self-employed it was £712.00. The survey does not distinguish between
and small proprietors rose from 1.9 million in 1971,to higher and lower professions as a whole, but it did show
3.6 million in 2003, and in the three months to November that median weekly earnings for associate professionals and
2011 the number of self-employed alone reached 4.| technical occupations were £560.60.
million (Labour Market Trends, 1997; Social Trends, 2006; ONS, Various sociological theories have been put forward to
2012, Labour Market Statistics). Nevertheless, most of the explain both the advantaged position of the professions
expansion of the upper middle class is accounted for by the in general and the differences between higher and lower
growth of white-collar employment. professions.
Some sociologists distinguish between different strata
The functionalist perspective on professions
of the upper middle class, identifying, for example, higher
Bernard Barber (1963) offers a functionalist view of the
professionals, lower professionals, and managers as separate
role and rewards of higher professionals. He argues that
groups. Others see the upper middle class as being more
professionalism involves ‘four essential attributes’:
homogeneous. In the following section we will examine the
position of one stratum of the upper middle class — the 1. Professionalism requires a body of systematic and
professions — in the class structure. generalised knowledge that can be applied to a variety
of problems. For instance, doctors have a body of
The professions in the class
structure medical knowledge, which they apply to diagnose and
treat a range of illnesses.
The growth of the professions
2. Professionalism involves a concern for the interests
The professions were one of the fastest growing sectors
of the community rather than self-interest. Thus the
of the occupational structure during the 20th century.
primary motivation of professionals is public service
According to Routh (1980), the number of people employed
rather than personal gain: doctors are concerned
in the professions rose from 4 per cent of the employed
primarily with the health of their patients rather than
population in 1911 to || per cent in 1971. Using a slightly
with lining their own pockets.
different definition of the professions, government statistics
show a rise in the proportion of employees in the UK in 3. The behaviour of professionals is strictly controlled by
a code of ethics, which is established and maintained
professional work between 1990 and 2010, from 15.7 per
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
by professional associations and learned as part of and manipulating the labour market in such a way that
the training required to qualify as a professional. For they can maximise their rewards. Thus Noel and José Parry
example, doctors take the Hippocratic Oath, which (1976) define professionalism as ‘a strategy for controlling
lays down the obligations and proper conduct of their an occupation in which colleagues set up a system of
profession. Should they break this code of conduct, their self-government’. The occupation is controlled primarily
association can strike them from the register and ban in the interests of its members. From this perspective,
them from practising medicine. professionalism can be said to involve the following factors:
4. The high rewards received by professionals, which
|. There is restricted entry into the occupation, provided by
include the prestige accorded to professional status as
the profession’s control of the training and qualifications
well as earnings, are symbols of their achievements. They
required for membership and the numbers deemed
denote the high regard in which professionals are held
necessary to provide an adequate service. By controlling
and reflect the value of their contribution to society.
supply, professionals can maintain a high demand for
Barber argues that the knowledge and skills of professionals their services and so gain high rewards.
provide them with considerable power, and it is therefore 2. Professionalism involves an association that controls the
essential for the well-being of society that this power is conduct of its members ‘in respects which are defined
used for the benefit of all. He claims that professionals make as relevant to the collective interests of the profession’
important contributions to the functional well-being of society (Parry and Parry, 1976). In particular, professional
and, in addition, their services are highly regarded in terms of associations are concerned with promoting the view
society's values. Professionals are highly rewarded as a result. that professional conduct is above reproach and that
professionals are committed to public service. This
Criticisms of functionalism
serves to justify high occupational rewards. By claiming
Functionalist explanations of the role and rewards of
the right to discipline their own members, professional
professionals have been strongly criticised on the grounds
associations largely prevent public scrutiny of their
that they make the following assumptions, all of which are
affairs and so maintain the image which they project of
questionable:
themselves.
|. Professionals make important contributions to the well- 3. Professionalism involves a successful claim that only
being of society as a whole. members are qualified to provide particular services.
2. They serve all members of society rather than This claim is often reinforced by law. Thus in Britain,
particular groups. for example, a series of laws have guaranteed solicitors
3. They are concerned with service to the community a monopoly on particular services. These monopolies
rather than with self-interest. are jealously guarded: the Law Society has prosecuted
unqualified individuals for performing services which are
In recent years there has been increasing criticism of the
defined as a legal monopoly of the law profession.
view that professionals provide valuable services to society.
Teachers have been attacked for allowing children to In these ways, professions can control rival occupational
underachieve. Lawyers have been accused of mystifying the groups that might threaten their dominance of a section of
legal system to the point where the layperson finds it largely the market. Parry and Parry conclude that, by adopting the
unintelligible, and of sometimes helping the guilty to go free strategy of professionalism, certain occupational groups are
while the innocent are convicted. able to extract high rewards from the market.
Individual cases of professional misconduct or Viewing professionalism as a market strategy provides
incompetence have reduced public trust in the professions. an explanation for the differing rewards of various so-
For example, in 2000 the British GP Harold Shipman called professions. Some of the occupational groups that
was found guilty of murdering |5 of his patients through claim professional status lack many of the attributes of
administering lethal injections — official investigations professionalism. In terms of Parry and Parry’s definition,
suggest he may have murdered many more patients. Social they are professions in name only. They have little control
workers and other child protection workers were severely over their market situation and, as a result, receive lower
criticised in the inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié in rewards than occupational groups that are more fully
London in 2000 for failing to take effective action to protect professionalised.
her despite extensive evidence that her guardians were Parry and Parry illustrate this point by a comparison
physically abusing her. The reputation of nurses was dented of doctors and teachers. They claim that doctors receive
when Beverley Allitt was given |3 life sentences in 1993 for higher rewards than teachers because they are more fully
killing patients in her care in Lincolnshire. In the USA, the professionalised. This is largely due to the fact that doctors
accountants of the energy company Enron were found to were able to organise themselves into a professional group
have misrepresented the company’s profits and shredded before the state intervened in medicine and became a major
evidence relating to the company’s collapse. employer of medical practitioners.
Such examples suggest that the functionalist argument The British Medical Association was founded in 1832,
that the higher professions confer positive benefits on and the Medical Registration Act of 1858 granted doctors
society is at least questionable. a monopoly on the practice of medicine and gave them
important powers of self-government. Once established as
The Weberian perspective on professions -
a professional body, doctors had considerable control over
market strategy
their market situation.
From aWeberian point of view, the professions can be seen
Teachers, by contrast, failed to achieve professionalism
as occupational groups that have succeeded in controlling
before state intervention in education. Because the state
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
was largely responsible for initiating and paying for mass Some Marxists have argued that the professions have
education, it was able to establish greater control over been weakened, so they can no longer pursue their own
teachers. In particular, the state controlled both the supply interests. Harry Braverman (1974) claims that deskilling
of teachers and standards for entry into the occupation. has taken place in many white-collar jobs.As the skill
Because they lack the market control which professionalism content of the work has been reduced, so some white-
provides, teachers have turned to trade unionism to improve collar workers have lost the advantages they previously
their market situation. Parry and Parry conclude that the enjoyed over manual employees. They have become
differences in occupational reward between doctors and proletarianised.
teachers are attributable to the degree of professionalisation Although primarily concerned with routine white-
of the two groups. collar work, Braverman believes that some professional
jobs have also become deskilled. The people who do these
The Weberian perspective on professions -
jobs lose the power they once had, their work is closely
the professional project
regulated, and they are made aware of their subordination.
The Weberian approach to the professions is reflected
Examples include draughtsmen, technicians, engineers,
in the work of Keith Macdonald (1997) who discusses
accountants, nurses and teachers. Such groups find that
the professional project — the attempt to establish
their work becomes more and more routine as it is divided
an occupational group as an accepted profession — as a
into specialist tasks. Their pay levels are threatened as
complex and continuous process.
they become unable to control the supply of labour into
Occupational groups do not suddenly achieve professional
their profession: there is always a ‘reserve army’ of suitably
status at a particular point in their development — they
qualified workers ready to step into their jobs.
continually struggle to enhance their status as the profession
develops. According to Macdonald, the professional project The declining independence of the
aims to establish a ‘monopoly in the market for services professions
based on their expertise, and for status in the social order’. Braverman’s views are rather general, and certainly
This is particularly important for professions because what exaggerate the decline in the autonomy of the professions,
they sell is intangible, since it takes the form of‘services but other sociologists have suggested ways in which the
which cannot be seen in advance in the shop-window, as it position of professional groups in the class structure has
were, but which also require the customer to trust deteriorated. Terence Johnson (1972) has pointed to the
the practitioner with their lives, their health, their money, limits that can be placed on some professions by their clients
their property and even their immortal souls’. or employers. For example, in the accountancy profession
Achieving the appropriate status is vital to gaining the most practitioners are employed by companies and are
necessary trust. not independent advisers.Accountants are expected to be
Macdonald discusses how professions try to establish loyal first and foremost to their company, and not to their
their position. First, they need to develop a strategy of profession.
social closure; that is, they exclude others from practising It may be true that during the course of the last
their profession. Second, they have to establish their own century some groups of professionals increasingly became
jurisdiction, and define the area over which they have employees, rather than being employers or self-employed;
expertise to claim a right to practise. Third, they have to and it may also be true that some professional groups
train the members of their profession. Fourth, they have have had their independence and autonomy reduced.
to try to monopolise their professional expertise to However, it is an exaggeration to claim that they have been
make sure that others cannot make claims on their area of proletarianised. Higher professionals in particular continue
jurisdiction. Fifth, they need to attain respectability. to enjoy many advantages over manual workers, and, for that
Macdonald uses the example of accountancy to illustrate matter, routine non-manual workers. They also have much
these points. In the mid-19th century, clerical workers with more power than either group.
fairly basic book-keeping skills carried out accountancy
functions. Gradually, accountants have established Barbara and John Ehrenreich — the
professional organisations such as the Institute of Chartered professional-managerial class
Accountants and Certified Public Accountants, gained a Although many sociologists see professionals as a distinctive
legal monopoly of some types of work (such as auditing the part of the upper middle class, others have argued that they
accounts of local authorities), confined recruitment almost have much in common with managers. Barbara and John
exclusively to graduates, and succeeded in raising the social Ehrenreich (1979), arguing from a neo-Marxist point of view,
status and rewards of accountancy.Accountants are now claim that there is a distinctive professional-managerial
among the highest paid and most influential professionals in class, which consists of ‘salaried mental workers who do not
Britain. own the means of production and whose major function in
Professions as servants of the powerful the social division of labour may be described broadly as the
The Weberian claim that the professions are able to reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations’.
Members of this class include teachers, social workers,
act primarily in their own interests has been called into
question. It has been argued that the higher professionals psychologists, entertainers, writers of advertising copy, and
primarily serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful. middle-level administrators, managers and engineers.
Accountants and lawyers are employed in the service of Origins and functions
capital, architects build for the wealthy, and doctors and Unlike some other Marxists, the Ehrenreichs believe that
psychiatrists in private practice care for the physical and there are three main classes in capitalist society, rather than
mental needs of the rich. two (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat). They see the
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
third class, the professional-managerial class, as having the However, a different position is adopted by Ken Roberts
following functions that they carry out for the bourgeoisie: (2011). Roberts sees lower-level white-collar workers as
belonging to an intermediate class, between the working
|. The first function of the class is to organise the
class and the middle class. He also argues that professionals
process of production, for example by developing new
and managers are not as dissimilar as might first appear and
technology and new methods of management.
furthermore that there has been a degree of convergence
2. The second function is to exercise social control over
between them. He makes the following points in favour of
children and the working class. This is carried out by
this position:
professionals such as teachers and social workers.
3. The third function is to propagate ruling-class ideology. |. Managers partly owe their position to professional
This is carried out by groups such as entertainers, qualifications in management, so to some extent they
teachers and advertising copywriters. can be seen as another form of profession.
4. The final function is helping to develop the consumer 2. Professionals often take on management roles during
goods market, ensuring that the working class consume their careers, for example university academics who
new products produced by capitalism. become vice chancellors or are appointed to other
management positions. Similarly doctors and other
The overall role of the professional-managerial class,
medical professionals often take on management
then, is to reproduce the relationship of domination and
responsibilities in the health service.
subordination between the ruling and subject classes.
3. Membership of professional bodies is sometimes
interests used to distinguish professionals from managers, but
The Ehrenreichs believe that the professional-managerial Roberts believes their advantaged position owes more
class has quite different interests from the working class, to their higher levels of education, their higher incomes
even though both groups consist of wage labourers. This is and, often, their privileged backgrounds, than their
because the professional-managerial class is paid out of the membership of particular bodies.
surplus produced by the working class. 4. The distinction between professions and managerial
The professional-managerial class also has different roles is probably weakening as MBAs (Master of
interests from the ruling class. Both groups have an interest Business Administration degrees), and qualifications
in maintaining the capitalist system, but the professional- in areas such as marketing, personnel and other fields,
managerial class has an interest in maximising its own make managers more mobile between organisations
independence or autonomy; the ruling class, on the other and less dependent upon their position in a particular
hand, tries to restrict it as far as possible. company or institution.
Criticisms of the Ehrenreichs Like Giddens, therefore, Roberts tends to favour the view
The Ehrenreichs provide an interesting attempt to analyse that there is a single service or middle class, but unlike
the position of one part of the middle class within a neo- Giddens he excludes lower-level white-collar workers from
Marxist framework. However, they have been criticised by that class.
Marxists and non-Marxists alike. We will consider the implications of these various views
The American neo-Marxist Erik Olin Wright (1978) does for the analysis of the middle class as a whole after we have
not accept that there is a unified professional-managerial discussed the lower middle class in the next section.
class. He argues that capitalist societies remain polarised
between two main classes: the ruling class and the working
class. He does not deny that there are groups of workers
The lower middle class
who are intermediate between these two classes, but he
Routine white-collar workers include such groups as clerical
argues that they do not constitute a fully developed class.
workers, secretaries and shop assistants. The growth in their
Instead he sees them as occupying a number of strata that
numbers during the 20th century has led to a long-standing
are in ‘contradictory class locations’. Some of their interests
debate about their position in the class structure:
coincide with those of the working class, and some with
those of the ruling class, but they do not have a coherent set |. Some sociologists argue that they have become
of interests of their own and cannot therefore constitute a proletarianised; that is, they have effectively become
distinctive class. members of the working class.
2. Others claim that routine white-collar workers still
Weberian theories
belong to the middle class.
Weberian and neo-Weberian sociologists generally reject
3. A third viewpoint suggests that they form an intermediate
the approach to defining and distinguishing classes adopted
group between the middle and working classes.
by the Ehrenreichs. They deny that classes can be defined
in terms of their functions for capitalism, and instead stress
Proietarianisation
the importance of the market situation of those in particular
The theory of proletarianisation suggests that routine white-
occupations.
collar workers have become part of the proletariat and so
This has led to one Weberian sociologist, Anthony
can no longer be considered middle-class. This viewpoint
Giddens (1973), identifying a larger middle class than the
has most usually been associated with Marxist sociologists
professional-managerial class discussed by the Ehrenreichs.
who have questioned the assumption that the working class
From Giddens’s point of view, the middle class should also
is a rapidly declining section of the population in capitalist
include lower-level white-collar workers (for further details
societies. They see routine non-manual workers as little
see p. 57). different from manual workers: they neither own the means
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
of production nor do they perform important social control In terms of market situation, Lockwood admitted that the
functions for capitalists. wages of clerical workers had dropped, but he argued that
For example, the British Marxists Westergaard and they had considerable advantages over manual workers in
Resler (1976) estimated that in 1913-14 male clerks earned other respects. They had greater job security and were less
122 per cent of the average manual wage, but by 1971 this likely to be laid off or made redundant. They also worked
had fallen to 96 per cent. They argued that, at least with shorter hours, had more chance of being promoted to
respect to earnings, ‘male clerks and shop workers are now higher-status jobs and were more likely to be given fringe
firmly among the broad mass of ordinary labour; and indeed benefits such as membership of a pension scheme.
often well down towards the bottom of the pile’. Lockwood reached similar conclusions with regard to
work situation. He accepted that there had been some
Harry Braverman — the deskilling of changes — in particular that offices had grown in size — but
clerical work he denied that this had led to clerical workers becoming
The American Marxist Harry Braverman (1974) supports the
proletarian. Compared to manual workers, clerks still
proletarianisation thesis on the grounds that many routine
worked in relatively small units, they had closer contact with
non-manual jobs have become deskilled. According to
management, and clerical jobs tended to be more varied and
Braverman, clerical workers in 1870 shared many similarities with
less standardised than manual work.
manual craft workers: both had wide-ranging responsibilities and
Finally, in terms of status situation Lockwood was more
plenty of opportunity to use their initiative and develop their
willing to concede deterioration in the position of the
skills. As such, they were valued members of the workforce.
clerical workforce. He accepted that mass literacy, and the
As companies grew larger and their clerical workforce
recruitment of growing numbers of workers from manual
expanded, the work was reorganised so that each worker
backgrounds, and of women, had reduced the status of
specialised in particular tasks and clerical work became little
clerical work. However, he still believed their status was
more than a production line for mental work.
superior to that of manual workers.
Braverman also claims that most ‘service workers’ have
Lockwood’s work is now dated and it is debatable
been deskilled. He says:
how far his claims apply to contemporary clerical work.
the demand for the all-round grocery clerk, fruiterer Nevertheless, it was an important study, since it established
and vegetable dealer, dairyman, butcher, and so forth, many of the issues that were to occupy later sociologists
has long ago been replaced by a labour configuration in who studied clerical work.
the supermarkets which calls for truck unloaders, shelf
Evaluation
stockers, checkout clerks, meat wrappers, and meat
A variety of sociologists have attacked or defended the
cutters; of these only the last retain any semblance of
theory of proletarianisation:
skill, and none require any general knowledge of retail
trade. Braverman, 1974, p.371 1. A. Stewart, K. Prandy and R.M. Blackburn (1980), like
Lockwood, argued that proletarianisation had not
Computerisation has further reduced the skill required of
taken place, though for different reasons. They studied
checkout assistants, and the control of stock and the keeping
a sample of male white-collar workers in medium or
of accounts have also become largely automated.
large firms and found high rates of social mobility out of
According to Braverman, most routine white-collar work
clerical work. Only 19 per cent of their sample were still
requires little more than basic numeracy and literacy. With
doing clerical work by the time they reached 30, and
the advent of mass compulsory education, the vast majority
51 per cent had been promoted to higher-status jobs.
of the population now have the necessary skills to undertake
According to this study, clerical work cannot be seen
this type of work.As a result the bargaining position of these
as proletarian because it is often a stepping stone to a
workers is little better than that of manual workers.
career in management.
David Lockwood = a Weberian perspective 2. Rosemary Crompton and Richard Jones (1984)
According to many Marxists, then, the positions in the class criticised the work of Stewart et al., pointing out that
structure occupied by most routine non-manual workers it relied upon an all-male sample. Crompton and Jones
have been proletarianised. In an early study of clerks from found in their research that a big majority of clerical
a neo-Weberian point of view, however, David Lockwood workers were female, and very few (just | per cent)
(1958) denied that clerks had been proletarianised. Lockwood had reached management positions. Furthermore, they
did not follow Weber in identifying an upper class based on point out that Stewart et al. did not examine whether
the ownership of property; he did, though, use a Weberian clerical work had become deskilled — a major part of
approach to distinguish between different groups of employees. the proletarianisation thesis. Crompton and Jones found
He suggested that there were three aspects of class situation: that 91 per cent of their sample of clerical workers did
market situation, work situation and status situation. not exercise any control over how they worked: they
simply followed a set of routines without using their
1. By market situation he was referring to such factors as
initiative. As a result their work required very little
wages, job security and promotion prospects.
skill, and this deskilling appeared to be closely linked to
2. By work situation he meant social relationships at work
computerisation. Crompton and Jones concluded that
between employers and managers and more junior staff;
clerical workers, particularly female clerical workers,
this involved consideration of how closely work was
supervised. were a white-collar proletariat, with little chance of
promotion to genuinely middle-class jobs.
3. By status situation he meant the degree of prestige
enjoyed by particular groups of workers in society. 3. Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David Rose and Carolyn
Vogler (1988; see also Marshall, 1997) rejected Crompton
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
and Jones’s view that clerical work has been deskilled. Their john H. Goldthorpe = the service
conclusions are based on structured interviews carried and intermediate classes
out with a sample of 1,770 British men and women. Only Giddens follows Weber’s views quite closely, but other
4 per cent of the female clerical workers and none of the neo-Weberians do not agree that there is a single middle
male clerical workers said the skill requirements of their class. John Goldthorpe, in his early work (Goldthorpe,
job had declined. Marshall et al. therefore support the view 1980; Goldthorpe et al., 1987), defines class in terms of
of Goldthorpe and Lockwood that clerical workers are in market and work situation, but in his research does not
an intermediate class between the working and service follow Weber in distinguishing the propertied from the
classes. However, they did find that the vast majority propertyless. Goldthorpe does not therefore clearly
of female personal service workers (such as checkout distinguish an upper class, nor does he claim that there
assistants) claimed to have little control over their work or is a united middle class. He sees the highest class as the
autonomy at work. They therefore conclude that personal service class, and this includes large proprietors as well as
service workers are indeed part of the proletariat. administrators, managers and professionals. This class itself
4. Ken Roberts (2011) also argues that clerical workers is internally divided between those in upper and lower
are part of an intermediate class. He notes that the positions. However, he sees no significant division between
proportion of the population working in these sorts of managers and professionals within the service class.
jobs has declined as computer technology has reduced Goldthorpe’s class in the middle is not called the middle
the need for such workers. Many professionals and class, but the intermediate class. It includes clerical
managers, for example, do their own word processing; workers, personal service workers, small proprietors and
and new information technology means that record lower-grade technicians.To Goldthorpe, these workers have
keeping requires much less labour. Those workers poorer market and work situations than the service class. In
who remain in this type of work are still much more his scheme this class is also seen as being internally divided,
likely to be female, and most come from working-class but nevertheless at the most basic level he sees what is
backgrounds. Nevertheless, normally regarded as the middle class as being split in two.
There are still superior office jobs in banks and In his later work, Goldthorpe (1995) changed tack and
insurance companies. The difference is that the old argued that there was a primary division between different
prospects of partnership in ... firms, and of promotion sections of the middle class based on employment status.
to management from the basic entry grades for non- That is, the employed, employers and the self-employed
graduates in the superior office jobs, have all but are in different positions. Beyond that, there are secondary
disappeared completely. Roberts, 2011, p. 121 divisions based on different employee relationships, and
Roberts therefore concludes: it is these, rather than the nature of the work tasks that
The office occupations ... are intermediate par they do, that distinguish classes. What makes the service
excellence. There is no distinctive consciousness, lifestyle class distinctive is that it not only receives a salary but is
or politics ... They are never likely to align overwhelmingly also provided with increments, pension rights and career
and unambiguously with either the working class or the development opportunities.
middle class, or to develop a characteristic consciousness Goldthorpe’s views are controversial. In particular, many
and politics of their own. Roberts, 2011, p. 121 sociologists argue, in contradiction to both of Goldthorpe’s
Roberts therefore adopts a similar view to Goldthorpe approaches, that there is a significant division between
(1980; Goldthorpe et al., 1987) in seeing a split between professionals and managers in Goldthorpe’s service class
a middle class and an intermediate class, with office (for example, Savage et al., 1992).A further problem is that
workers being part of.the latter rather than the former Goldthorpe himself admits that, strictly speaking, large
(see below). employers should be seen as a separate category from the
service-class employees. However, in his social mobility
research (see pp. 8!—2), he incorporates employees into his
Middle class, or middle classes? category of the service class because the group is so small.
He accepts that this ‘means introducing some, though in all
As we have seen, there is no agreement among sociologists probability only a quite small, degree of error’.
about the position of the middle class, or classes, in the
Mike Savage, James Barlow, Peter
stratification system. They are divided about which non-
Dickens and Tony Fielding -
manual workers should be placed in the middle class, and
Property, Bureaucracy and Culture
disagree about whether the middle class is a united and
Savage, Barlow, Dickens and Fielding (1992) follow
homogeneous or divided and heterogeneous group.
Goldthorpe in claiming that the middle class is not a united
Anthony Giddens - the middle class group. However, they do not argue that this lack of unity
The simplest position is taken by Anthony Giddens (1973). is inevitable, nor that the divisions within the middle class
He argues that there is a single middle class, based on the always stay the same. For example, they believe that France
possession of‘recognised skills — including educational has tended to have a more united service class (of managers
qualifications’. Unlike the members of the working class, who and professionals) than Britain. Furthermore, they believe
can sell only their manual labour power, members of the that the nature of divisions in the British middle class may
middle class can also sell their mental labour power. Giddens have been changing in recent times.
distinguishes the middle class from the upper class because Savage et al. distinguish groups in the middle class
the middle class does not own ‘property in the means of according to the types of assets that they possess, rather
production’ and so has to work for others to earn a living. than in terms of a hierarchy according to their elevation in
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
the class structure.The importance of these different groups cases, the assets are specific to a single organisation
can change over time and is affected by the particular and cannot readily be transferred to another company
circumstances in which classes are formed. Thus, for if the employee tries to move jobs. On the other
example, in one set of circumstances, professionals might hand, employment in organisations does provide
form a more cohesive and influential class than managers; at opportunities for exploiting the labour of others.
another time in another place, the reverse might be true. 3. Cultural assets derive partly from educational
attainment and credentials. These sorts of cultural asset
Social classes are particularly important to professional workers.
Savage et al. see social classes as ‘social collectivities rooted However, they can also take the form of class taste. They
in particular types of exploitative relationships’. These
can be found in
social collectivities are ‘groups of people with shared levels
what Bourdieu calls the habitus, or set of internalized
of income and remuneration, lifestyles, cultures, political
dispositions which govern people’s behaviour. Cultural
orientations and so forth’.As collectivities they may engage
assets are stored physically in people’s bodies and minds:
in social action that will affect how societies develop. the body itself materializes class tastes. They can be
However, to do this they have to actively form themselves
reproduced through the passing on of cultural tastes to
into classes. Class formation does not automatically follow
offspring. Savage et al., 1992
from social divisions. Savage et al. therefore examine how
class formation has developed in the middle classes. Class taste can be important in gaining educational
They point out that there are many social collectivities with qualifications (see the discussion of concept of ‘cultural
a shared lifestyle. What makes class distinctive is that it is based capital’ in Chapter | 1). Women play a key role here because
around exploitative relationships in which some people become of their prevalence in the teaching profession and their
better off at the expense of others. These may take place importance in the provision of childcare. Cultural assets,
through wage labour (as in Marxist theory), but exploitation however, cannot be used to directly exploit the labour
can also be found outside the workplace. One example of others. For this to happen they have to be used to
is where a person’s contribution to an activity is neither accumulate property assets or to achieve positions that
recognised nor rewarded. They illustrate this with the case of a bring with them organisational assets.
male academic who relies on his wife to type his manuscript or Different sections of the middle class will tend to try
do the housework so that he can get on with writing. He gives to use their assets to gain other assets that will make their
her no share of the royalties and no acknowledgement as a co- position secure and enable them to exploit other workers
author. Savage et al. say,‘her labour has been “deleted””’. and pass down their advantages to their children. So, for
example, the cultured will try to use their cultural assets to
Classes and types of asset
obtain good jobs or start their own businesses. Managers
The three types of asset, that give the middle classes
who have worked their way up in a company may try to gain
their advantaged life chances are property assets,
educational qualifications so that they have the option of
organisational assets and cultural assets. Individuals
applying for jobs in other companies. Owners of successful
may have some combination of these three types of asset,
small businesses may pay for a private education for their
but distinctive middle classes can develop based on each
children in the hope that they will acquire cultural assets.
type. Different types of asset have different qualities and
provide different possibilities for exploitation. Middile-class formation in Britain
According to Savage et al., the different sections of the
|. The propertied middle class are those who have
middle class in Britain have all enjoyed different degrees of
property assets. This group consists of the ‘petty
success at different times.
bourgeoisie’, which includes the self-employed and small
In recent decades, for example, the emphasis on
employers. Their property assets are not as great as
controlling or reducing public expenditure by successive
those of the ‘dominant class’ made up of landowners,
governments, and the increased stress on market forces,
financiers and capitalists. Property assets are easily
has tended to weaken the position of public sector
passed down from generation to generation.
They can
professionals. There have also been important changes in
be stored in the form of various types of capital or in
industry. Companies have been moving away from mass
other possessions such as property. Property assets are
production in very large hierarchical firms, and instead
the most ‘robust in conveying exploitative potential’. As
Marxist theory claims, you can use capital to hire and
produce smaller batches of more specialised products in
exploit the labour of others by not giving them the full
less hierarchical and more flexible firms. This new system
value of their labour. of production is known as post-Fordism (see pp. 135-6).
2. Organisational assets stem from holding positions in
In the process, firms have come to rely more upon self-
large bureaucratic organisations. These assets are held
employed consultants of various types.
by managers. In the past a considerable number of
Savage et al. believe that middle-class professionals
people gained organisational assets by working their working in areas such as advertising and marketing are in
way up a bureaucratic hierarchy in a company without the ascendancy. They play an important role in ‘defining
necessarily having high educational qualifications.
and perpetuating consumer cultures associated with
Organisational assets are the most fragile type of asset. private commodity production’. Their cultural capital is
They cannot be stored and it may be very difficult to not legitimated so much by qualifications and employment
pass them down to the next generation. Certainly, by the state, as by their ability to make money by tapping
today, managers are unlikely to be able to ensure that into consumer tastes. Managers have become even less
their children also obtain jobs as managers. In some of a cohesive grouping than they once were. The internal
labour markets of companies have become less important
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
for promotion prospects. Managers have tried to cement trap of assuming that class divisions are static, and it rightly
their position by gaining greater cultural assets such as emphasises the active role of groups in developing their
educational qualifications. These make them less reliant on own class identities. lt concentrates, however, on the higher
single companies. reaches of the middle class — their theory does not explain
Savage et al. claim, on the basis of such arguments, that the position of routine white-collar workers.
there is a new division in the British middle classes between: Furthermore, it could be argued that their analysis of
a public sector, professional, increasingly female, contemporary divisions in the middle class is not entirely
convincing. Senior managers could be seen as forming an
middle class on the one hand, opposed to an
increasingly powerful and influential group in Britain, who
entrepreneurial, private sector, propertied middle
may have combined the acquisition of qualifications with
class on the other. This latter group might include the
gaining increased opportunities for movement between
self-employed, some managerial groupings and the
private sector professionals. companies. For example, those with MBA (Master of
Business Administration) qualifications, particularly from the
most prestigious business schools, may find it easier to gain,
Historically, we have argued, the professional
and move between, powerful and highly paid jobs.
middle class lorded over the rest: today managerial
In a later work, Savage and Butler (1995) admit that
and private sector professionals may be shifting
some senior managerial groups may have benefited from
from its sphere ofinfluence and may be joining the
recent changes. They say,‘itseems likely that the most senior
previously marginalized petite bourgeoisie in a more
managers of large organisations actually have enhanced
amorphous and increasingly influential private sector
powers. Such senior managers are also increasingly likely
middle class. Savage et al., 1992, p.218
to be significant property owners of their organisations,
through devices such as share options. They speculate that
The culture and lifestyles of the middle
such managers may have professional backgrounds and they
classes
are increasingly forming ‘a small cadre who can mobilize
Using data from 1988 survey research from the British
organization, property and cultural assets simultaneously’.
Market Research Bureau, Savage et al. claim to have detected
cultural differences between these new middle-class
groupings. However, they distinguish three lifestyle groups
rather than two. The public sector professionals — such as
those working in health and education and social workers,
who are described as ‘people with cultural assets, but not
much money’ — were found to have ‘an ascetic lifestyle
founded on health and exercise’. They drank less alcohol
than the middle class as a whole and were heavily involved in
sports such as hiking, skating and climbing.
On the other hand, the rather better paid ‘private sector
professionals and specialists’ had a postmodern lifestyle.
This involved an appreciation of both high art and pop
culture, and a combination of extravagance and concern for
health and fitness. Thus:
An MBA from a prestigious institution such as the London Business
appreciation ofhigh cultural forms of art such as School can be a passport to a lucrative management career
opera and classical music exists cheek by jowl with
The characterisation of the lifestyle of different groups
an interest in disco dancing or stock car racing ...a
seems to be based on rather simplified generalisations. For
binge in an expensive restaurant one day might be
example, there are plenty of teachers and doctors who drink
followed by a diet the next. Savage et al., 1992
large amounts of alcohol and who are interested in popular
This lifestyle was postmodern because it rejected culture. There are also plenty of private sector professionals
traditional cultural values in relation to the worthiness of who have a particular interest in health and fitness.
different types of art, and because it drew on consumer
Derek Wynne — Leisure, Lifestyle
culture and combined a wide variety of images and lifestyles
and the New Middie Class
(see pp. 88-90 for a discussion of postmodernism).
The Heath
A third group, consisting largely of managers and civil
Like Savage et al., Derek Wynne examined the changing
servants, is described as having an undistinctive lifestyle.
nature of the middle class in late 20th-century Britain
If Savage et al. are right, then the middle classes remain
(Wynne, 1998). Wynne also follows Savage et al. in paying
divided, but the nature of those divisions has changed
attention to cultural features of the middle class. However,
significantly over recent decades. These changes have been
Wynne diverges from Savage et al. in basing his arguments
influenced by the policies of the British state, and the middle
on a detailed case study of the middle class on one housing
classes have also exercised greater choice in deciding to
estate, and in placing greater emphasis on lifestyle choices
adopt different lifestyles.
than on objective class divisions.
Evaluation Wynne studied a housing estate called the Heath, which
The work of Savage et al. highlights some important divisions is located in the Cheshire countryside. He used a number
within the middle class. It provides a useful analysis of the of methods: a detailed questionnaire, which examined
basis of middle-class life chances. It does not fall into the aspects of residents’ social life; interviews; and participant
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
observation (Wynne lived in a house on the Heath).An Wynne detected other differences in lifestyle between
unusual feature of the Heath was the existence of a bar and the two groups. Better-qualified men tended to make more
sporting facilities that were paid for, run by and reserved contribution to housework than the less well qualified. The
for residents of the estate. The size and price of the houses drinkers enjoyed summer package holidays to hotels in the
on the Heath meant that they were largely bought by Mediterranean or North America. Watching horseracing
middle-class families. and football were among their hobbies and they liked to eat
out at steakhouse restaurants or to go on trips to musicals.
Culture and class The sporters, on the other hand, were more involved in
In developing his theory Wynne draws upon the work
voluntary organisations. They liked to take camping holidays
of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984).VWynne
or gite holidays in France. They were interested in avant-
follows Bourdieu in arguing that classes are not just based
garde theatre rather than popular musicals. While the
upon economic capital. Classes are also shaped by
drinkers furnished their homes with fitted carpets and heavy
the possession of cultural capital (such as educational
upholstery, the sporters preferred parquet or tiled flooring
qualifications), social capital (such as networks of friends
and favoured sofa-groupings over three-piece suites.
and contacts) and symbolic capital (which involves the
Wynne argues that the drinkers can be seen as:
recognition of particular cultures as legitimate and superior
to others). Classes actively struggle to create their own [a] petite bourgeoisie created from the ranks of the
cultures and get them accepted as superior to other class traditional working class whose advancement has
cultures (see pp. 73-4 for a discussion of Bourdieu). occurred without the development of what Bourdieu
Drawing on Bourdieu, Wynne argues that classes are terms cultural capital. Their position has developed
not fixed entities but are ‘in continual flux and change’.As primarily from the economic field and their leisure
different groups develop their own cultures and struggle pursuits can be understood as an amplified version
to get them accepted as legitimate symbolic capital, classes of those traditionally associated with the urban
continually develop and change. Wynne uses his case working class. Wynne, 1998, p. 133
study to show how what he calls the new middle class
They are particularly concerned with having enough money
developed on a single housing estate in Cheshire.
to be able to afford an affluent lifestyle.
The sporters, on the
The new middie class other hand, are more concerned ‘with what is perceived
To Wynne, the new middle class consists of just the sort of as the “correct” form of consumption than its amount’.
people who lived on the Heath. These people are employed Wynne says, This group, largely college-educated, could be
in professional and managerial jobs. It is a new class because said to be searching for the cultural requirements of middle
it is associated with the rapid expansion of work in the classness such as those associated with an appreciation of
service sector of the economy. Members have a high income (high) culture’
and are often socially and geographically mobile.
Conclusion
Most residents had moved to the Heath from outside
Wynne concludes that the new middle class is divided
the immediate area; a significant number had working-class
between two main groups according to differences in lifestyle
origins and had been upwardly mobile to join the middle
and particularly the sort of capital (economic or cultural) that
class. Some had achieved upward mobility through the
is most valued. This division reflects differences in education,
acquisition of educational qualifications, whereas others had
class background and occupation, but it is not entirely
achieved it through promotion at work. Generally, those
determined by these factors. He says that ‘leisure practices
in professional jobs had relied more on qualifications to
themselves become important locators of social identity’.
achieve their position, whereas those in managerial work
Wynne supports aspects of postmodernism (see pp. 88-90
had relied more on promotion by their employers. The
for a discussion of class and postmodernism). He argues that
managers tended to possess less educational capital (or
people can choose their lifestyles and therefore to some
qualifications) than the professionals. However, managers
extent their class position. Traditional class hierarchies based
were likely to have higher pay.
upon occupational status are undermined by the increasing
Wynne found that the differences between well-paid but
importance of lifestyle and the fragmentation of the middle
less well-qualified managers and less well-paid but well-
classes into different lifestyle groupings. Increasingly, it is
qualified professionals came to be reflected in different
consumption (such as the furniture people buy, the films they
lifestyles. For example, managers, particularly those of
watch or the leisure facilities they use) that produces class
working-class origin and with low educational qualifications,
distinctions, rather than economic divisions.
were more likely to use the bar on the estate (Wynne called
this group the drinkers). They tended to dominate the bar Evaluation
area, sitting or standing around the bar on a regular basis, Wynne produces an interesting empirical study of differences
sometimes making it hard for others to get served. between groups in the middle class. However, his conclusions
On the other hand, the professionals made much more could be seen as contradicting his research. He identifies
use of the sporting facilities such as tennis and squash clear differences in lifestyle, but his research suggests these
courts (Wynne termed this group the sporters). Many of the are not simply a matter of choice. Rather, the differences
regular tennis and squash players took their sport seriously seem to stem from systematic differences in paths to middle-
and organised matches against other teams. Getting into class occupations. In terms of the categories used by Savage
the squash or tennis team became an important source of et al. (see above) the drinkers owe their position largely
social status. These groups ensured there was a complicated to organisational assets (management jobs), whereas
booking system for the courts, which made it very difficult the sporters owe their position more to the possession of
for the casual player to gain access to these facilities. cultural assets (particularly educational qualifications).
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
The divisions on the Heath could be seen as stemming class would develop a distinctive lifestyle and a strong sense
more from objective class differences than from lifestyle of class consciousness. He called this type of manual worker
choices.Wynne’s conclusion seems to be based less the proletarian traditionalist.
upon the evidence of his own study and more upon a Lockwood did not believe that this group was
commitment to the view of postmodernists that people representative of the whole of the working class, but he
simply choose identities and lifestyles. did believe that the proletarian traditionalist was typical of
close-knit working-class communities such as those based
around dock work, coalmining and shipbuilding. When
The working class sociologists have discussed the extent to which the working
class might have changed, they have sometimes made
The market situation of manual comparisons with the proletarian traditionalist.
workers The proletarian traditionalist lives in communities
In most occupational classifications, the working class dominated by a single occupational group (such as coalminers,
is regarded as consisting of manual workers.As we saw fishermen, steelworkers or dockers). These communities are
previously, there are important differences in the life chances relatively isolated from the wider society. Consequently, they
of manual and non-manual workers. There are also important tend to produce a strong sense of belonging and solidarity.
differences in their market and work situations: The workers are very loyal to their workmates and ‘a strong
sense of shared occupational experiences makes for feelings of
1. Non-manual workers, on average, receive higher wages
fraternity and comradeship’.
than their manual counterparts.
Friendship with workmates extends into leisure activities.
2. Manual workers have relatively few opportunities for
Workmates are often neighbours and relatives as well.
promotion and their pay structure is unlikely to include
They spend much of their leisure time together in pubs
incremental increases.
and working men’s clubs. There is little geographical or
3. Compared to non-manual workers, manual workers
social mobility, so the sense of belonging to a community is
generally have a greater risk of redundancy and
reinforced. The strong social networks ‘emphasize mutual aid
unemployment.
in everyday life and the obligation to join in the gregarious
4. White-collar workers tend to get more fringe benefits.
pattern of leisure’.
Such benefits include company pension schemes, paid
The proletarian traditionalist is not an individualist.
sick leave, the use of company cars, and so on.
Lockwood describes ‘a public and present-oriented
conviviality’ which ‘eschews individual striving “to be
Structure, consciousness and action
different”’. Unlike the middle class, proletarian traditionalists
The above evidence suggests that manual workers form at
do not pursue individual achievement by trying to gain
least part of the working class in Britain. Marxist-influenced
promotion at work or success in running their own
sociologists would also include routine non-manual workers
businesses. Instead they identify strongly with the pursuit
in the working class.
of collective goals. This is often expressed through strong
However, many sociologists have argued that social class
loyalty to a trade union. This loyalty comes from an
involves more than a similar market situation and similar life
emotional attachment to the organisation rather than from
chances. Sharing a particular place in the social structure
a calculation of the benefits that union membership might
tends to lead to a shared consciousness or awareness
bring.
of class, which in turn leads to actions that reflect this
The proletarian traditionalist’s attitude to life tends to
consciousness. Ray Pahl (1989, discussed in Devine
be fatalistic. From this perspective there is little individuals
et al., 2005) labelled this the ‘SCA approach’ or ‘structure-
can do to alter their situation, and changes or improvements
consciousness-action approach’. It follows Marx’s belief that,
in their circumstances are largely due to luck or fate. In
at least in the long term, the working class would develop
view of this, life must be accepted as it comes. Since there
class consciousness and ultimately take revolutionary action.
is little chance of individual effort changing the future, long-
They would develop awareness of group identity, and some
term planning is discouraged in favour of present-time
appreciation of and commitment to common interests. They
orientation. There is a tendency to live from day to day,
would also develop some similarity of lifestyle and would
and planning is limited to the near future.As a result, there
usually share certain norms, values and attitudes distinct
is an emphasis on immediate gratification. There is little
from those of other classes.
pressure to sacrifice pleasures of the moment for future
Until recently, much of the research on the working
rewards; desires are to be gratified in the present rather
class was based upon the SCA approach. It tended to look
than at a later date. This attitude to life may be summarised
for evidence of shared identity, the development of class
by the following everyday phrases: ‘what will be will be’, ‘take
consciousness and collective action by the working class.
life as it comes’, ‘make the best of it’, ‘live for today because
Where these characteristics were lacking it sought to explain
tomorrow may never come’.
the reasons for their absence. The following sections examine
By comparison, middle-class subculture is characterised
the arguments and research based upon this approach.
by a purposive approach to life; humanity has control
David Lockwood - the proletarian over its destiny and, with ability, determination and ambition,
traditionalist can change and improve its situation.Associated with this
One of the most influential ways of looking at the working attitude is an emphasis on future-time orientation and
class using the SCA approach was developed by David deferred gratification. Long-term planning and deferring
Lockwood (1966). He identified and described the type of or putting off present pleasures for future rewards are
manual worker who exemplified the idea that the working regarded as worthwhile. Thus individuals are encouraged to
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
act like members of the middle class. Affluent manual Bearing Company and Laporte Chemicals. Nearly half the
workers were seen as developing a privatised home-based manual workers in the survey had come from outside the
lifestyle and as becoming more concerned with purchasing southeast area in search of stable, well-paid jobs.All were
consumer goods than with showing solidarity with their married and 57 per cent were home owners or buyers. They
workmates. were highly paid relative to other manual workers and their
Another variation on this theme suggests that home wages compared favourably with those of many white-
ownership, particularly among former council house collar workers. However, white-collar workers retained
tenants, has transformed the attitudes and values of some many of their market advantages such as fringe benefits and
sections of the working class. Such theories have generated promotion chances.
considerable discussion and research, which will now be If affluent manual workers were becoming middle-class
examined. they should be largely indistinguishable from white-collar
workers in these areas. However, the research did not find
Embourgeoisement
that this was the case.
Writing in the 19th century, Marx predicted that the
intermediate stratum would be depressed into the Instrumental orientation to work
proletariat. During the 1950s and early 1960s a number of The affluent workers defined their work in instrumental
sociologists suggested that just the opposite was happening. terms, as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
They claimed that a process of embourgeoisement was Work was simply a means of earning money to raise living
occurring whereby increasing numbers of manual workers standards. Largely because of this instrumental orientation
were entering the middle stratum and becoming middle- they derived little satisfaction from work. They had few close
class. From the 1950s onwards it was suggested that a friends at work and rarely participated in the social clubs
growing group of affluent manual workers were joining provided by their firms. Most affluent workers felt that there
the middle class.As a consequence, a middle class that was was little chance for promotion. They were concerned with
growing rapidly increasingly dominated the stratification making a ‘good living’ from their firms rather than a ‘good
system. career’ within their company.
Like the traditional worker, affluent workers saw
Economic determinism
improvements in terms of wages and working conditions as
The theory used to explain this presumed development
resulting from collective action in trade unions rather than
was a version of economic determinism. It was
individual achievement. However, they lacked a strong sense
argued that the demands of modern technology and an
of class solidarity and union loyalty. The affluent workers
advanced industrial economy determined the shape of the
joined with their workmates as self-interested individuals
stratification system. For instance, the American sociologist
to improve their wages and working conditions. Thus the
Clark Kerr (Kerr et al., 1962) claimed that advanced
solidaristic collectivism of the traditional worker had
industrialism requires an increasingly highly educated, trained
largely been replaced by the instrumental collectivism of
and skilled workforce that, in turn, leads to higher-paid and
the affluent worker.
higher-status occupations among manual workers.
By contrast, white-collar workers did not define work in
The supporters of embourgeoisement argued that
purely instrumental terms. They expected and experienced
middle-range incomes led to middle-class lifestyles. The
a higher level of job satisfaction. They made friends at
process of embourgeoisement was seen to be accelerated
work, became involved in social clubs and actively sought
by the demands of modern industry for a mobile labour
promotion.
force. This tended to break up traditional close-knit
Goldthorpe et al. concluded that, in the area of work,
working-class communities found in the older industrial
there were significant differences between affluent manual
areas. The geographically mobile, affluent workers moved
workers and white-collar workers.
to newer, suburban areas where they were largely
indistinguishable from their white-collar neighbours. Friendship, lifestyle and norms
Goldthorpe et al. found little support for the view
j. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer
that affluent manual workers were adopting middle-
and J. Platt - The Affluent Worker in the
class lifestyles. Affluent workers drew their friends and
Ciass Structure
companions from predominantly working-class kin and
In a famous study entitled The Affluent Worker in the Class
neighbours, while the white-collar workers mixed more with
Structure, conducted in the 1960s, Goldthorpe, Lockwood,
friends made at work and with people who were neither kin
Bechhofer and Platt (1968a, 1968b, 1969) presented the nor neighbours. Furthermore, the affluent workers showed
results of research designed to test the embourgeoisement no desire to seek middle-class status.
hypothesis. They tried to find as favourable a setting However, in one respect there was a convergence
as possible for the confirmation of the hypothesis. If between the lifestyles of the affluent worker and the
embourgeoisement were not taking place in a context that lower middle class. Both tended to lead a privatised and
offered every opportunity, then it would probably not be home-centred existence. The affluent workers’ social
occurring in less favourable contexts.
relationships were centred on, and largely restricted to, the
Goldthorpe et al. chose Luton, then a prosperous area home. There was no evidence of the communal sociability of
in southeast England with expanding industries.A sample of the traditional working class.
229 manual workers was selected, plus a comparative group
of 54 white-collar workers drawn from various grades of Images of society
clerical work. The study was conducted from 1963 to 1964 In terms of their general outlook on life, affluent workers
and examined workers from Vauxhall Motors, Skefko Ball differed in important respects from traditional workers.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Many had migrated to Luton in order to improve their living et al., she did not find that they had moved to Luton in search
standards and thus had a purposive rather than a fatalistic of higher living standards. With high levels of unemployment
attitude. However, as we noted previously, the means they in the 1980s, many had gone to Luton in search of greater
adopted to realise their goals — instrumental collectivism — job security and more affordable housing.
were not typical of the middle class as a whole. In addition,
Orientation to work
their goals were distinct from those of the middle class in Devine found that those in her sample were interested in
that they focused simply on material benefits rather than on using work as a means of improving their living standards,
a concern with advancement in the prestige hierarchy.
but, faced with threats of redundancy, they were more
This emphasis on materialism was reflected in the concerned with attaining greater security. They expected no
affluent workers’ images of society. Few saw society in more than ‘small, cumulative gains’ in their living standards.
terms of either the power model, based on the idea of
Their consumer dspirations were more limited than those
‘us and them’, characteristic of the traditional worker, or of their 1960s counterparts, though they were still rather
the prestige model, which was typical of the middle class.
greater than those supposed to be possessed by the
The largest group (56 per cent) saw money as the basis of
‘traditional’ working class.
class divisions. In terms of this money model, or pecuniary
The 1980s sample continued to belong to and support
model, they saw a large central class made up of the
trade unions. Furthermore, they saw unions as a ‘collective
majority of the working population.
means of securing working-class interests’. Money was not
Although differing from traditional workers, the affluent
their only concern, and other issues, including concern
workers’ outlook on life and their image of society did not
about working conditions and the distribution of power at
appear to be developing in a middle-class direction.
work, led to feelings of solidarity with fellow workers. They
Political attitudes were interested in securing humane and fair treatment for
Finally, Goldthorpe et al. found little support for the view that their colleagues and themselves in their working lives. Many
affluence leads manual workers to vote for the Conservative of them were critical of unions, but these criticisms were
Party. In the 1959 election, 80 per cent of the affluent worker directed at union tactics and not at the principle of having
sample voted Labour, a higher proportion than for the unions to defend working-class interests.
manual working class as a whole. However, support for the Overall, Devine follows Goldthorpe et al. in describing
Labour Party, like support for trade unions, was often of an the workers’ orientation to work as instrumental collectivism,
instrumental kind rather than based on strong loyalty. but she found more evidence of collectivism in the 1980s than
had appeared to be present in the 1960s. The concern with
The ‘new working class’
money and living standards did not prevent them from feeling
Goldthorpe et al. tested the embourgeoisement hypothesis
a sense of solidarity with fellow workers.
under conditions favourable to its confirmation, but found it
was not confirmed. Instead they found that affluent manual Friendship, lifestyle and norms
workers differed from both the proletarian traditionalist Like Goldthorpe et al., Devine did not find that Vauxhall
and the middle class. They therefore suggested that manual workers were befriending members of the middle
affluent workers were the vanguard of an emerging new class. In some respects they had traditional working-
working class.While the new working class was not class friendship patterns: men had friends from work and
being assimilated into the middle class, there were two many wives retained close contacts with relatives. Men
points of normative convergence between the classes: still enjoyed leisure outside the home with other men,
privatisation and instrumental collectivism. particularly playing sports or going to the pub. Traditional
These characteristics had developed as traditional gender roles were also in evidence; although many wives had
working-class norms adapted to a new situation. Lockwood paid employment they still had primary responsibility for
(1966) believed that the privatised instrumentalist revealed domestic chores. This reduced their freedom to engage in
by the affluent worker study would gradually replace the leisure outside the home.
proletarian traditionalist as the predominant group in the Nevertheless, Devine did find important differences
working class. between her sample and the supposed characteristics of
traditional workers. She says that they ‘were not engaged
Fiona Devine = Affluent Workers Revisited
in extensive sociability in pubs, clubs or whatever’, and
Fiona Devine (1992) directly tested Lockwood's claim that
they did not have a communal existence based on their
the privatised instrumentalist would become the typical
member of the working class. neighbourhoods. Their lifestyles ‘did not totally revolve
Between July 1986 and July 1987 she conducted in-depth around the immediate family in the home’ but at particular
interviews with a sample of 62 people from Luton. The stages in the life cycle the home was very important.
sample consisted of 30 male manual workers employed on Families with young children had restricted opportunities for
the shop floor at the Vauxhall car plant, their wives, and two leisure in the community. Men were often working overtime
further wives of Vauxhall workers whose husbands refused to to help provide materially for the family, and women had
participate. By returning to Luton, Devine was able to make most of the responsibility for childcare. In short, their
direct comparisons between her own findings in the 1980s lifestyle was neither as communal as that of the proletarian
and those of Goldthorpe et al. in the 1960s. traditionalist, nor as home-centred and privatised as that of
Goldthorpe et al.’s affluent workers.
Geographical mobility
Like the earlier study, Devine’s found high levels of Images of society
geographical mobility. Some 30 per cent of the sample had The images of society held by Devine’s sample were
grown up away from Luton. However, unlike Goldthorpe found to be very similar to those in the earlier study. They
had a ‘pecuniary model of the class structure’. Most saw characteristics somehow peculiar to the recent years of
themselves as belonging to a‘mass working/middle class’ economic recession’.
in between the very rich and the very poor.This did not, Marshall et al. claim that historical studies show that
though, prevent them from sharing certain values with the there were artisans who put primary emphasis on their
traditional working class. Many felt resentment at those home life, and who had an instrumental attitude to work,
who had inherited money and a sense of injustice at the well back into the 19th century. Furthermore, their data
existence of extreme class inequalities. One said:‘l disagree on contemporary workers suggested that these workers
with a silver spoon. People should work for their money, not retained some commitment to their work and did not
inherit it’ They wanted some redistribution of wealth away follow completely privatised lifestyles. For example,
from the very rich and, with it, the creation of a somewhat 73 per cent of the sample thought that their work was at
more egalitarian society. least as important as any non-work activity, and over half
numbered one or more workmates among their friends.
Political attitudes
Marshall et al. concluded that there was no evidence
Devine did find evidence of declining support for the
of a significant shift towards instrumentalism and
Labour Party. Only 24 of the 62 in the sample had voted
privatism.
Labour in the 1979 or 1983 elections. On the surface this
would seem to support the view that affluent workers Mike Savage = working-class identities
were increasingly voting for individualistic and instrumental reconsidered
reasons. In an article in 2005, Mike Savage re-examined some of
However, Devine did not find that disillusioned Labour the filed data produced in the affluent worker studies
Party supporters had abandoned their belief in the values of the 1960s. He did so in order to critically examine
traditionally associated with voting Labour. Instead, they the conclusions drawn by Goldthorpe et al. and to
had withdrawn their allegiance, perhaps only temporarily, reinterpret aspects of their data. Savage does not dismiss
because of the party’s political failings in areas such as the conclusions of Goldthorpe et al. Indeed he says, ‘My
economic policy and industrial relations.A number of the argument here largely reiterates the conclusions drawn by
disillusioned voters felt fatalistic about politics. While they researchers of the time, who emphasized the fragmented
still felt that theoretically the Labour Party represented and contradictory nature of class identities’ (Savage,
working-class interests, they doubted its ability to deliver 2005). However, Savage believes that the interpretation of
economic prosperity or low unemployment. Some supported the findings in the affluent workers study was shaped by
the Conservatives because they promised to sell off council the preconceptions about class and class consciousness
houses, but they had little commitment to the party. which were characteristic of sociology of the time.
Savage interprets some of the data from the study rather
Conclusion
differently from Goldthorpe et al.
Devine’s findings were rather different from those of
Goldthorpe et al. claimed that few of their respondents
Goldthorpe et al. some three decades earlier. She did
saw society in terms of a power model, but Savage found
not find that her sample had become the increasingly
considerable evidence that a high proportion of respondents
instrumental privatised workers predicted. She says:
did believe there was a fundamental class divide between
The interviewees were not singularly instrumental in the rich and the rest. They may not have explicitly said that
their motives for mobility or in their orientations to the rich had most of the power, but according to Savage
work. Nor did they lead exclusively privatized styles the respondents did believe there was a close connection
of life. Their aspirations and social perspectives were between money, the exercise of power, marriage and
not entirely individualistic. Lastly, the interviewees inheritance’.
were critical of the trades unions and the Labour Savage also argues that many respondents had stronger
Party, but not for the reasons identified by the Luton class identification than was realised by the researchers.
team [i.e. Goldthorpe et al.]. Devine, 1994, p.9 Goldthorpe et al. saw class largely in terms of the
occupation you had and its position in the class structure.
Devine rejects the idea of a ‘new’ working class and denies
Most respondents did not see class in this way but
that the affluent workers have been persuaded to accept
understood it as involving a combination of criteria including
capitalist society uncritically. They have aspirations as
money, status and power. Most of the respondents (78 per
consumers and their living standards have risen, but they
cent) were willing to identify themselves as being working-
would still like to see a more egalitarian society. They have
class or lower-class, but they also tended just to think
lost faith in the ability of unions and the Labour Party to
about themselves as ‘ordinary’. They distanced themselves
deliver this objective, but they have not fundamentally
somewhat from sociological views of class, emphasising that
changed their values.
they were ‘normal individuals’, but they contrasted this with
Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David people from the upper class who were not considered to be
Rose and Carolyn Vogler = continuities in ‘normal’ in the same way. In particular they saw themselves
the working class as normal because they had to earn their own living whereas
There is considerable support for Devine’s findings in the upper class did not.
a study of the British stratification system carried out On this basis Savage argues that ‘Luton affluent workers
by Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David Rose and might not have been so distinct from other groups within
Carolyn Vogler (1988). Based on a national sample of |,770 the working class which were researched at the same time
adults, the study found that ‘sectionalism, instrumentalism, and where there is evidence that respondents recognized
and privatism among the British working class are not power divisions.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
A number of studies of class, such as those conducted by discursive symbolism, which centred partly on the
Charlesworth (2000) and Skeggs (1997) (see pp. 74-7), have division of minds/bodies, mental/manual, and clean/dirty
claimed that people distance themselves from a working- work’, leading to a continued sense of distinctiveness
class identity. They ‘dis-identify’ from class. Savage believes from the middle class.
that such conclusions are misleading. His analysis suggests . Ivor Crewe (1983) argued on the basis of research on
that there is considerable continuity in working-class voting behaviour that the working class was becoming
identities. Despite all the changes in the working class, the divided into a new and an old working class by sectoral
emphasis on being ordinary in contrast to the upper class cleavages. Sectoral cleavages were specific factors, to do
remains. Savage concludes, in contrast to Goldthorpe et al., with residence, work, housing and union membership,
that ‘working-class identities are not linked to particular which caused divisions in the working class.
work experiences’ and the search for subtle differences in Crewe believed that there was a new working class
the class identities of different sections of the working class whose members possessed one or more of the following
may have missed the extent to which the working class characteristics:
shares at least a basic class identity.
>» They live in the south.
Divisions in the working class >» They are union members.
Marxism and the homogeneous working » They work in private industry.
class » They own their own homes.
Marx and Engels (1848) predicted that members of the
They could be distinguished from the diminishing
working class would become increasingly homogeneous,
numbers of old working class who lived in the north,
or alike. The American Marxist Harry Braverman (1974)
belonged to unions, worked directly or indirectly for the
agreed with Marx. He claimed that the pursuit of profit had
government, and lived in council houses. Crewe found
led to more and more automation in factories. This in turn
that the old working class were still very likely to vote
had reduced the need for skilled workers and had led to an
Labour, but the new working class was increasingly
increasingly undifferentiated and unskilled working class.
deserting the Labour Party, the traditional party of the
Sociologists have debated whether the working class has
working class.
become more homogeneous:
. Gordon Marshall, Howard Newby, David Rose and
|. Ralph Dahrendorf (1959) argued that technology had Carolyn Vogler (1988) used data from their study of the
led to an increasingly divided working class. Ever more British stratification system to evaluate the claim that
complex machinery required more skilled workers to the working class was divided. In general terms, they
design, build and maintain it. This led to divisions in the supported the view that the working class was divided
working class between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled into strata according to the level of skill involved in
manual workers. their work, but they denied that the types of sectoral
2. Roger Penn (1983) agreed with Dahrendorf that the divisions identified by Crewe were significant. Like
working class was divided, but argued that it was Penn, they argued that skill divisions were nothing new.
nothing new. From a study of cotton and engineering Unlike Crewe, they found little evidence that sectoral
workers in Rochdale from 1856 to 1964 he found that cleavages made much difference to voting intentions.
there had always been divisions between workers with Only housing tenure was found to be of any importance.
different levels of skill. Even those working in the same Council house tenants were more likely to vote Labour,
industry were often represented by different unions but the vast majority of council house tenants were
which reflected levels of skill. The unions defended the working-class anyway.
interests of their members, sometimes at the expense . Warwick and Littlejohn (1992) studied four communities
of other groups within the working class. in a mining area of West Yorkshire, surveying a total of
3. In a study based on participant observation and 324 households in 1986 and 1987. Although they found
unstructured interviews with 32 workers in London some differences in the voting behaviour of council
in the building industry, Darren Thiel (2007) found tenants and owner-occupiers, they did not follow Crewe
plenty of evidence of divisions within this working- in claiming that housing tenure itself was the cause of
class group. The men he studied differentiated strongly increased divisions within the working class. Instead,
between different types ofjobs in the building trade. they argued that housing tenure reflected a polarisation
They tended to look down on the less skilled and dirtier between the relatively economically secure who have
jobs (labouring and painting for example), while jobs regular employment, and the rest. For the less well-off
such as carpentry, bricklaying and plastering were members of the working class, insecure employment,
seen as relatively high-status. There were significant low income, poor health, and residence in council
ethnic divisions as well. Sometimes these overlapped housing tended to go together. Rising unemployment
with differences between trades. For example, most of in the economic recessions, combined with the
the carpenters were of Indian origin and most of the sale of council houses to the better-off, had led toa
labourers were first- and second-generation Irish. ‘cleavage between citizens who still have clear means
However, there was also quite a strong sense of unity of participating in democracy, and those who are being
among the building workers in the respect they had pushed into what some call an “‘underclass”’.
for manual labour and its association with a masculine As we shall see, the idea of an underclass is extremely
identity. Furthermore, like Penn (1983), Thiel thinks controversial and has been extensively debated (see
that divisions between trades are nothing new, but this pp. 68-71).
does not prevent these workers having a ‘class-based
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
of social superiority were a considerable source of society, with a majority of all social classes believing that the
grievance. Devine, 1994 existing distribution was unfair; and, although lower classes
were more likely to believe this, the percentage difference
The affluent workers of the 1980s were more pessimistic between them and higher classes was not particularly great.
about the prospects for changing society, but they had not Although people felt that society was unjust, and would
lost the desire for change, nor their sense of class inequality.
have liked to see reforms that would make society fairer,
To Devine, they retained a considerable amount of class they did not believe that such reforms were likely. Marshall
consciousness. et al. do not believe that class consciousness is automatically
Inconsistencies in class consciousness produced by the existence of class divisions. Despite the
There is a tendency in many studies of class consciousness potential for class consciousness, the British population has
to assume that workers hold a clear, consistent and not been mobilised in support of a programme that would
coherent image of society, and to mould data into neat, tackle the sources of their sense of injustice. In this respect,
tidy categories. However, many individual workers do not Rose and Marshall point the finger at the Labour Party for
hold clear and consistent views on society, as was found in having failed to tap the reservoir of potential support for
a study of the ideology of 951 unskilled manual workers in change.
Peterborough, conducted in 1970/71 by R.M. Blackburn and More recent qualitative studies of the working class
Michael Mann (1975). They found that both right- and left- suggest that class is still seen as important by many
wing views coexisted in the workers’ ideology. Blackburn members of the working class, even if their attitudes fall
and Mann concluded that the workers did not possess well short of well-developed class consciousness. In his
consistent images of society. study of building workers (see p. 66), Darren Thiel (2007)
In fact, Blackburn and Mann suggest that there is every found that the workers still thought of themselves as
reason to expect that this should be the case. The workers’ working-class, and partly this was because ‘Physical
experience of subordination and exploitation in the masculinity was a fundamental source of capital and
workplace tends to produce a power model of society and status. The building workers tended to think more in
radical attitudes that demand a change in the status quo. terms of status differences between trades than in simple
However, the workers are also exposed to the ideology class terms, but they believed there was a significant
of the dominant class broadcast by the mass media and difference between themselves and non-manual workers.
transmitted by the educational system and various other Their friendships and local networks also tended to be
institutions. This ideology is conservative: it supports the within the working class.
existing social arrangements and states that the relationship Even stronger class identities were found in a study of
between capital and labour is right, natural and inevitable. redundant steelworkers in Wales conducted by Robert
As a result, workers ‘remain confused by the clash between MacKenzie, Mark Stuart, Chris Forde, lan Greenwood,
conservatism and proletarianism, but touched by both’. Jean Gardiner and Robert Perrett (2006). They found little
evidence of individualism replacing a collective outlook
Beliefs and actions
among the 125 ex-steelworkers they interviewed, even
On the basis of questionnaire research with a national
though they no longer worked in the steelworks. Many
sample of British adults, David Marshall, Howard Newby,
of them tried to maintain their friendship networks with
David Rose and Carolyn Vogler (1988) reached somewhat
former colleagues; they were concerned for their welfare
similar conclusions to Blackburn and Mann. They claimed
post-redundancy and they remained strongly supportive
that class consciousness often did not produce a coherent
of the principle of trade unionism. Mackenzie et al. say,
view of the world. Respondents quite frequently gave
‘the commitment to the principles of collective solidarity
inconsistent answers. For example, some respondents
remained’.
wanted both to leave the economy to market forces and for
There was also a strong sense of having different
the government to intervene more in the economy. Some
interests from those of higher classes. The workers saw
wanted higher taxes but were unwilling to pay higher taxes
their collective plight as the result of a combination of global
themselves.
structural forces that had affected their industry, and the
The continuing relevance of class failure of higher classes in local and national government,
Nevertheless, Marshall et al. emphasise the continuing management and banks to do anything to protect it. The
relevance and importance of class for the British population. former workers in one company, ASWV, felt particularly
Rose and Marshall summarise some of their findings as angry at the loss of their pension rights when the company
follows: collapsed.
Over 90 per cent of our respondents could place Overall, their working-class identity remained strong
themselves in one of the conventionally defined class and they continued to see society as divided between a
categories; 73 per cent viewed class as an inevitable disadvantaged working class and powerful classes, which
feature of British society; and 52 per cent recognised showed little or no concern for the interests of the
working class.
the existence of class conflicts over important social
issues in Britain. Rose and Marshall, 1988 p. 23
Furthermore, half of the sample believed there was a The lower strata
dominant class that possessed economic and political power,
and a lower class that had no economic and political power. Although some sociologists see the working class as the
There was a surprisingly widespread sense of injustice lowest stratum in capitalist societies, others argue that there
about the distribution of income and wealth in British is a group beneath it. The most disadvantaged sections of
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
capitalist society have been described in many ways. Kirk economic definition of class which characterises his work
Mann says: on other classes. Furthermore, many of his views are so
critical of the lower strata they seem to represent little
Terms such as ‘the underclass’, ‘marginalised groups/
more than personal prejudice.
stratum’, ‘excluded groups’, ‘reserve army oflabour’,
One reason perhaps why Marx was so critical of
‘housing classes’, ‘the pauper class’, ‘the residuum’,
the lumpenproletariat was that he did not see them as
‘relative stagnant population’ and, more obviously,
having the potential to develop class consciousness. Mann
the poor, have all been used to describe a section of
questions this view, suggesting, for example, that urban riots
society which is seen to exist within and yet at the
and the existence of claimants’ unions (organisations for
base of the working class. Mann, 1992, p. 2
those drawing benefits) show that this group is no more
Of these terms, underclass is the one that has had the conservative than the working class.
widest currency in recent years. Those sociologists who Unlike Marx, most contemporary sociologists have used
have identified a group of people at the bottom of the the term underclass rather than lumpenproletariat
stratification system have seen them as having various to describe the groups at the bottom of the stratification
distinguishing characteristics. These have included being poor, system.
unemployed or dependent on benefits. In some cases they
have been defined as a group whose behaviour contravenes
Charles Murray —- the underclass in
the norms and values of society. Thus some sociologists have
America and Britain
The underclass in America
emphasised the economic distinctiveness of the lower strata,
Although not the first writer in recent times to use the
while others have concentrated on their supposed cultural
term underclass, theAmerican neoliberal sociologist Charles
or behavioural differences from the rest of the population.
Murray has probably done more than anyone else to
In the latter case, the lower strata have been seen as
popularise its usage.
constituting a social problem that poses a threat to society.
In Losing Ground, published in 1984, Murray argued that
They can also, however, be seen as a sociological problem
the USA had a growing underclass which posed a serious
for theories of stratification. Some theories of stratification
threat to American society. He argued that government
have been based upon occupations, leaving the unemployed
policies were encouraging increasing numbers of Americans
as a group who are difficult to categorise. In this chapter
to become dependent on benefits. During the 1960s,
we will focus on the implications of the existence of lower
welfare reforms led to an increase in the numbers of
strata for theories of stratification. Later chapters will discuss
never-married black single parents, and to many black
the relationship between the underclass and poverty (see
youths losing interest in getting a job. Increases in the
pp. 265-9), and the underclass and ethnicity (see pp. 222-4).
level of benefits and changes in the rules governing them
Marx’s view of the lower strata discouraged self-sufficiency.
The lumpenproiletariat Murray argued that the growing size of the underclass
In recent years, sociologists, journalists and politicians have was a threat to the social and economic well-being of the
all paid considerable attention to the ‘problem’ of the lower country because its members were responsible for a rising
strata, but this interest is nothing new. In the 19th century crime rate and the benefits paid to them were costly to
Karl Marx was among those who expressed views on these taxpayers.
groups. He used a number of different terms to describe
The underciass in Britain
those at the bottom of the stratification system of capitalist
Murray visited Britain in 1989 and wrote an article for
societies.
the Sunday Times. In it he argued that Britain too has a
He used the word lumpenproletariat to describe the
developing underclass, although unlike America it is neither
lowest group of all. The picture he paints of them is less than
firmly established nor is it mainly composed of ethnic
flattering. They are variously seen as:
minorities. Murray defines the underclass in terms of
This scum of the depraved elements of all behaviour. He says ‘the “underclass” does not refer to a
classes ... decayed roués, vagabonds, discharged degree of poverty, but to a type of poverty’. He knew these
soldiers, discharged jailbirds, escaped galley slaves, types of poor people in his youth:
swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets,
They were defined by their behaviour. Their homes
tricksters, gamblers, brothel keepers, tinkers, beggars,
were littered and unkempt. The men in the family
the dangerous class, the social scum, that passively
were unable to hold a job for more than a few weeks
rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers ofthe
at a time. Drunkenness was common. The children
old society. Marx and Engels, 1950, p. 267
grew up ill-schooled and ill-behaved and contributed
It is unclear from Marx’s writing whether he regarded this a disproportionate share to the local juvenile
group as a class or not.Although, at times, he did refer to these delinquents. Murray, 1989, p. 20
people as a class, at other times he dismissed the idea that they
Describing himself as ‘a visitor from a plague area come to
can form a class because he saw them as having little potential
see if the disease is spreading’, he found signs that Britain
for developing class consciousness or taking collective action.
too is being infected. These signs consist of figures showing
Kirk Mann (1992) argues that Marx uses a wide range
rising rates of illegitimacy, a rising crime rate and an alleged
of criteria to distinguish the lower strata from the rest unwillingness among many of Britain’s youth to take jobs.
of the working class. He says,‘Marx links economic, social
In certain neighbourhoods, traditional values such as beliefs
and psychological issues to the pathology of individuals in honesty, family life and hard work have been seriously
and social groups. Marx does not stick to using the purely undermined.As a consequence, increasing numbers of
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
children are being raised in a situation where they are likely The nature of the underclass
to take on the underclass values of their parents. Giddens argues that women and minority ethnic groups are
particularly likely to be found in the underclass. Employers
Evaluation of Murray recruit women to underclass jobs partly because of ‘social
Murray’s views on the underclass add little to theories of prejudice’, but also because they are likely to interrupt their
stratification. By insisting on using a cultural definition of careers as a result of marriage and childbirth. Minority ethnic
the underclass he neglects any economic divisions that groups are also the victims of discrimination and prejudice. In
contribute to the creation of such a class. In many ways his the UK,African Caribbeans and Asians are more likely than
work is better seen as a theory of poverty than as a theory other groups to be in the underclass. Giddens argues that the
of stratification. We will therefore evaluate his work in more
underclass is likely to be more radical than the working class
detail in Chapter 4 on poverty and social exclusion (see because their experience of deprivation makes them more
pp. 266-8), where we will show that in America much of the
sympathetic to radical social change.
evidence suggests that the benefits system does not have
the effects he claims. Evaluation of Giddens
The evidence Murray uses to make the case for an Critics have questioned Giddens’s theory of the underclass.
underclass in Britain is flimsy and sometimes contradictory. Kirk Mann criticises Giddens’s theory of the dual labour
He blames the underclass for its predicament, explaining the market. He argues that there is no clear dividing line
situation in terms of its own aberrant behaviour.To quote between a primary and a secondary labour market. For
Kirk Mann, he sees the British underclass as ‘criminally example, some jobs are well paid but with little job security;
violent bastards who refuse to work’. others are poorly paid but relatively secure. It is unclear
Most sociologists view the so-called underclass rather from the dual labour market theory whether such jobs
more sympathetically. Unlike behavioural and cultural should be seen as primary or secondary jobs. Mann also
accounts of the underclass, structural accounts tend to see criticises the theory for failing to explain why some groups
the lowest strata in society as the victims of inequality. They of workers (such as women and minority ethnic groups)
therefore tend to make more explicit connections between tend to end up in the secondary labour market. The theory
the underclass and the stratification system of society as a lacks an explanation of sexism and racism.
whole.
Duncan Gallie = a heterogeneous
Anthony Giddens - the underclass underclass
and the dual labour market Duncan Gallie (1988, 1994) is critical of the views of
The middie class, working ciass and both Murray and Giddens. He accepts that there is a
underclass disadvantaged group at the bottom of the stratification
Unlike Murray, Giddens (1973) does not define an system, but he denies that its members are culturally distinct
underclass in terms of behaviour. Instead he sees it in terms (as Murray suggests) or that they form a class (as Giddens
of its economic situation and he also integrates his theory of argues).
the underclass into a theory of stratification. Gallie (1994) used research data from a study of six
As mentioned earlier in the chapter (see p. 57), Giddens local labour markets in England and Scotland. He found
sees the middle class as those who possess educational that both the employed and the unemployed had had an
or technical qualifications.This gives them an advantage average of six jobs during their working life. On average the
in the labour market over the working class, who have unemployed had held on to each of their jobs for almost as
only their manual labour power to sell. Members of the long as the employed (74 months as opposed to 76 months).
underclass also have to rely upon selling their manual Furthermore, the unemployed were more committed to
labour power, but, compared to the working class, they are working than the employed: 77 per cent of the unemployed
at a disadvantage when trying to do so.As a result, they said they would want to work even if they had enough
tend to secure employment in the least desirable and most money to retire in comfort, compared to 66 per cent of the
insecure jobs. employed and self-employed.
The dual labour market
Gallie therefore dismisses Murray’s claim that the
unemployed have a culture that makes them unwilling to
Giddens argues that contemporary capitalist societies have
work. However, he also dismisses Giddens’s claim that the
a dual labour market. Jobs in the primary labour market
underclass form a social class, arguing that they are too
have ‘high and stable or progressive levels of economic
heterogeneous (or varied) to be considered a class. There
returns, security of employment and some chance of career
are differences between males and females, between those
mobility’. Jobs in the secondary labour market have ‘a low
who are unemployed and those who are in low-paid work,
rate of economic return, poor job security, and low chances
of career advancement’. and between the long-term and short-term unemployed.
Employers need to plan ahead, and to be able to do so
There are ‘huge flows’ of people into and out of the ranks
of the unemployed every month, making the underclass too
they need a reliable and committed group of workers in key
unstable to develop any class consciousness.
positions. High and secure rewards are necessary to ensure
the loyalty of these workers. This inevitably raises labour Galllie argues that most of the so-called underclass can
costs. In order to reduce overall costs, workers who are in simply be seen as the most disadvantaged section of the
less important positions and who are more easily replaced working class. They tend to display traditional working-class
political beliefs, with more of the unemployed than unskilled
are paid much lower wages and are offered less job security.
It is these secondary sector workers who come to make up manual workers saying they supported Labour.
the underclass. However, Gallie does tentatively suggest that the long-
term unemployed could be seen as an underclass because
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
‘Their deprivations are distinctive from those generated example,Alan Buckingham (1999, cited in Roberts, 201 1)
directly by the employment relationship and they have the argued that the existence of the long-term unemployed in
type of stability over time that is assumed by underclass itself showed that an underclass existed. Using data from the
theory. He still insists that this group has close connections National Child Development Study, he showed that 5.4 per
with the working class, though, and cannot be seen as cent of the sample in the study were long-term unemployed
completely distinct. and therefore formed an underclass.
Some writers adopt a similar position to Gallie (see the On the other hand, more demanding criteria were used
discussion of the work of Ken Roberts, below), but others by Tania Burchardt (2000, cited in Roberts, 2011). Burchardt
do believe that a distinct underclass can be identified at the only regarded individuals as members of an underclass if
bottom of the class structure. they were unemployed, they did not vote and were not
members of a political organisation, they lacked emotional
W.G. Runciman = the underclass as
support, and their household received less than 50 per cent
claimants
of mean income. She used data from the British Household
The underclass and the class structure
Panel Survey and found that only 0.3 per cent of the
Runciman (1990) devised a seven-class model of the British
population were excluded by all these criteria, suggesting
class structure based upon differences in control, ownership
that an underclass did not in reality exist.
and marketability. This model was examined earlier in this
chapter (see pp. 35-6). Runciman identifies an underclass Class formation
at the bottom of his class structure. He explicitly rejects However, Roberts argues that two different criteria are
Giddens’s view that it should be defined as ‘a category of more appropriate for determining whether an underclass
workers systematically disadvantaged in the labour market’. (or indeed any other class) exists:
Runciman mentions Gallie’s work in suggesting that a
|. First, a class only exists if a group has a distinctive
different definition of the underclass is needed. He defines
economic position which is sustained over a considerable
the underclass as ‘those members of British society whose
period. In this case, a lack of paid employment and
roles place them more or less permanently at the economic
consequently a low income is the distinctive economic
level where benefits are paid by the state to those unable
position. Roberts argues that there is plenty of
to participate in the labour market at all’. Many are from
evidence that the long-term unemployed exist and
minority ethnic backgrounds, and many are women,
that unemployment tends to be passed down from
particularly single mothers, but it is their reliance upon state
one generation to the next in a significant number of
benefits that places them in the underclass, not their gender
families.
or ethnicity.
2. The second criterion is that‘a class might then acquire
Criticisms of Runciman distinctive social, cultural and political characteristics’
Runciman appears to offer a straightforward and plausible (Roberts, 2011). Roberts does not see this criterion as
definition of the underclass. However, Hartley Dean and being fulfilled. There is, he says, ample evidence that most
Peter Taylor-Gooby (1992) have attacked his views. They of the long-term unemployed would like paid work, and
point out that Runciman stresses the importance of‘career’ it is hard to detect distinctive political views among
in class analysis: that is, the future prospects and past groups that could be seen as part of an underclass. He
history of individuals in the class system must be examined says that, ‘At present, full class formation looks unlikely,
before allocating them to a class. Yet Runciman fails to take first because the disadvantaged, the underclass or the
this into account when considering the underclass. For excluded have no label, no name, with which members
example, figures suggest that on average lone parents stay are likely to identify, and there is no mainstream ideology,
as lone parents for a mere 35 months. Similarly, most of that takes their side’ (Roberts, 201 1).
the long-term unemployed have had jobs in the past. They
Roberts concludes that it is too early to reject the
are unstable members of the working class rather than
possibility that this group might one day form a self-aware
members of a stable underclass, and therefore the so-called
class, but he does not think such a class has been formed
underclass is simply too unstable and impermanent to be
as yet. Nevertheless, he accepts that there is a group of
seen as a class.
marginal and ‘semi-connected’ people at the bottom of
Dean and Taylor-Gooby also attack Runciman for
the stratification system who have been badly affected by
basing his definition of the underclass on quite different
changes such as deindustrialisation, globalisation and the
criteria from those used in his definitions of other classes.
trend towards less secure work.
Members of the underclass are not defined in terms of their
relationship to the market but in ‘purely institutional terms’.
They exist in a relationship with the state, not the economic Class identity and culture
system.
The previous sections of this chapter owe a great deal to
Ken Roberts — the usefulness of the the influence of Marxist and Weberian perspectives on the
concept of the underclass study of stratification.As discussed earlier (see pp. 61-2),
Research on the underclass much of it stems from what David Lockwood has called the
A more nuanced position is taken by Ken Roberts (2011).
structure-consciousness-action model (Lockwood,
Drawing on a range of research, he argues that whether an 1988, discussed in Savage et al., 2001).According to this
underclass is identified largely depends upon the criteria model (the SCA model), ‘class structure is seen as leading to
used to distinguish an underclass. The lower the bar is set,
class action through giving rise to a particular type of class
the more likely it is that an underclass will be found. For consciousness’ (Savage et al., 2001).
2 SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Much of the work discussing class identity emphasises lower classes favour ‘the heavy, the fat and the coarse’.
cultural differences, particularly differences in lifestyle, Expensive or rare meat and fresh fruit and vegetables
between groups in the stratification system. By far the are popular with higher classes. Teachers, who have
biggest influence on these studies is the work of Pierre plenty of cultural capital but less economic capital,
Bourdieu (1984), which will now be examined. favour exotic or original cooking (such as Italian or
Chinese food) which can be purchased at low cost.
Pierre Bourdieu = class and culture
Following on from differences in consumption, a
Unlike Marxist and Weberian sociologists, Pierre Bourdieu
fourth type of cultural capital is that which is embodied.
attaches as much importance to the cultural aspects of class
People’s bodies can themselves come to reflect and
as he does to the economic aspects. In his most influential
represent differences in taste. Diet affects body shape,
work on class, Distinction (1984, first published in French, 1979) ’
and the way in which you present your body can suggest
Bourdieu systematically analyses the differences in culture and
that you are ‘vulgar’ or‘distinguished’, lower-class or
lifestyle between classes in France. However, Bourdieu does
higher-class. Such things as your haircut, make-up,
not see culture and lifestyle simply as products of economic
and whether you have a beard or moustache can all
differences. Culture and lifestyle can themselves shape chances
function as social markers indicating your position in
of upward social mobility and becoming better off. Bourdieu
class hierarchies. Even your posture and gestures can be
argues that there are four main sources of capital in society.
indicative of belonging to a particular class.
Types of capital Cultural capital cannot be passed on from generation
to generation in quite as straightforward a way as
1. Economic capital consists of material goods — wealth in
economic capital. Nevertheless, through socialisation
such forms as shares, land or property, and income from
and the acquisition of the class habitus (see below)
employment and other sources. Wealth can be passed
children from families rich in cultural capital do tend to
on quite easily through gifts or inheritance from parents
acquire considerable cultural capital for themselves.
to children.
3. The third type of capital is social capital. Social capital
2. Cultural capital can take a number of forms. First, it
consists of social connections — who you know and who you
includes educational qualifications. Second, it includes
are friendly with; who you can call on for help or favours.
a knowledge and understanding of creative and artistic
4. The fourth type of capital is symbolic capital. Symbolic
aspects of culture, such as music, drama, art and cinema.
capital is similar to the concept of status and refers
In this artistic sense of culture, Bourdieu distinguishes
to ‘a reputation for competence and an image of
different levels of cultural capital:
respectability and honourability’.
(a) The highest level is what he calls legitimate culture.
This is the culture of the dominant classes in society.
Capital, class, lifestyle and the habitus
It involves an appreciation of works of art in fields
These different forms of capital relate to one another. For
such as music and painting, which are considered to
example, it may be difficult to accumulate economic capital
be the height of good taste. For example, Bourdieu
without the possession of some cultural, social or symbolic
puts the paintings of Brueghel and Goya in this
capital. Without educational qualifications, the appropriate
category. Legitimate culture tends to be appreciated
taste to enable you to mix in the right circles or to impress
by those with the highest educational qualifications.
at an interview, the ‘right’ social contacts, or a reputation
(b) Middlebrow culture includes ‘the minor work of the
for competence, it might be difficult or impossible to get a
major arts’. They are generally accepted as having
well-paid job.
artistic merit, but are seen as less serious or worthy
To a certain extent, one type of capital can be used to
than legitimate culture. They are popular among
accumulate a different type of capital. The wealthy who lack
the middle classes. Bourdieu gives the example of
cultural capital can spend extra money on education to help
Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue.
increase their children’s cultural capital. Similarly those with
(c) Popular taste is the lowest form of culture. In music,
cultural capital can use it to make social contacts or to acquire
for example, it includes songs ‘totally devoid of
educational qualifications that might help them make money.
artistic ambition or pretension’. He cites Petula
Classes can be distinguished according to both the
Clark as an example and suggests that some
type and the amount of capital they possess and their past
classical music, such as Strauss’s ‘Blue Danube’, has
history. Groups who have been upwardly mobile through
become so ‘devalued by popularisation’
that it too
education may lack the knowledge of ‘good’ taste to fit in
has become part of popular taste.
with those who have been established in higher classes for
Bourdieu does not argue that there is anything
more than one generation. Groups high in cultural capital
intrinsically superior about higher levels of culture. He
but low in economic capital (such as teachers) tend to
sees this cultural hierarchy as socially constructed. It
have rather different lifestyles from those with plenty of
is used by classes to distinguish themselves from one
economic capital but little cultural capital (such as successful
another and by higher classes to establish and maintain
small business people). It is out of such differences that each
their dominant position.
class, or class faction, develops its own habitus.
A third type of cultural capital relates to lifestyles and
The habitus is ‘a structured and structuring structure’
the consumption associated with different lifestyles. Even
consisting of a ‘system of schemes generating classifiable
in areas as mundane as eating and dressing, different
practices and works’ and ‘a system of schemes of perception
classes distinguish themselves from one another through
and appreciation (taste)’ (Bourdieu, 1984). In other words,
their differences in taste. Higher classes tend to prefer
the habitus consists of the subjective ways in which different
food which is ‘light’, ‘delicate’ and ‘refined’, whereas
classes understand and perceive the world, and the sorts
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
of tastes and preferences that they have.A habitus tends to research in Britain (Bennett et al., 2009) found little
produce specific lifestyles. For example, it will influence the evidence to support Bourdieu’s view that there was
sorts of leisure pursuits that different classes follow, who a dominant legitimate culture, although it did find
they mix with, what sort of television programmes they continuing significant differences in class culture in
watch, which newspapers (if any) they read, how highly they some respects (see pp. 736-9).
value education, what food they eat, and so on. 4. Bourdieu does not provide a convincing discussion of
Each habitus develops out of a ‘position in the structure the working class. Jenkins says, ‘the superficiality of his
of the conditions of existence’ — in other words out of treatment of the working class is matched only by its
economic position. The habitus of the working class, for condescension’. He questions the idea that the working
example, reflects their lack of money and their everyday class are entirely uninterested in questions of taste
struggle to make ends meet. Bourdieu claims that the when buying things for their homes. He asks:‘Does
working class are not particularly concerned about the Bourdieu really believe that it is alien to working-class
aesthetic merits of household objects. It doesn’t matter to women to furnish and decorate their homes on the
them if things around the house look nice so long as they basis of aesthetic choices?’ (Jenkins, 1992). However, as
are affordable and do the job they were bought for. On we shall see, some sociologists disagree with Jenkins’s
the other hand, the habitus of higher classes reflects their view and see Bourdieu’s interpretation of working-class
economic security and the greater range of choices open life as perceptive.
to them. They are far more concerned that what they buy
Whatever the weaknesses of Bourdieu’s work, a number of
for their home looks good and is in the ‘best’ possible taste.
contemporary sociologists have found it useful for developing
The habitus therefore has a structure and it structures the
their own theories and conducting their own studies of class,
everyday life of individuals.
culture and identity. Some of these will now be examined.
A habitus is not fixed and unchanging.As the economic
position of different groups changes, so will their habitus. Simon Charlesworth - A
Groups struggle to get their culture accepted as legitimate, Phenomenology of Working Class
and this too may lead to changes, as some tastes gain in Experience
legitimacy while others lose ground.As Richard Jenkins If Bourdieu has been accused of neglecting working-class
(1992) puts it in discussing Bourdieu’s work, ‘struggles about culture by some sociologists, the same is certainly not true
the meaning of things are an aspect of class struggle’. of the work of Simon Charlesworth. Charlesworth’s (2000)
Success in the cultural field can bring economic success study was based upon interviewing people from Rotherham,
and so change the habitus. However, Bourdieu does not a town in Yorkshire suffering from the decline of traditional
portray the class system as being very fluid. It is reproduced industries and high levels of unemployment.
to a considerable degree. Dominant groups can to a large Charlesworth draws upon a number of theoretical
extent use their control over culture and what is considered approaches in his study, including phenomenology, but the
good taste to maintain their position, pass it on to their biggest influence on his work is probably Bourdieu. He
children, and devalue cultures that do not stem from their makes particular use of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus,
habitus.As Jenkins puts it, ‘the process of social reproduction which he describes as a ‘distinct way of being’ and ‘the
is largely secured through a process of symbolic violence, socially constituted principle of perception and appreciation
a process of cultural reproduction’. Those from culturally of the social world we acquire in a particular context’
disadvantaged classes are, by and large, kept in their place by (Charlesworth, 2000).
cultural means. Unlike Jenkins, Charlesworth sees Bourdieu's portrayal
of working-class life as insightful rather than superficial or
Criticisms of Bourdieu
condescending. He discussed Bourdieu’s work with some
Despite being extremely influential, Bourdieu’s work has
of those he interviewed and he found that ‘people were
come in for some criticism. Richard Jenkins makes four main
fascinated by the ideas and knew precisely what Bourdieu
criticisms of Bourdieu’s work on class:
was expressing’. His study attempts to build upon Bourdieu’s
1. Bourdieu’s view is rather deterministic. Although he work by providing a rich description of working-class life in
tries to introduce an element of fluidity and change Rotherham.
into his theory, the concept of the habitus implies a
Life in Rotherham
high degree of reproduction of class cultures from
Rotherham has traditionally relied upon mining and steel
generation to generation. Classes seem to have a
production for employment. However, the nearby pits
particular culture imposed on them by their position.
The importance of individual choice and creativity is
and the steelworks have both closed down, leaving what
underplayed.
Charlesworth describes as ‘devastation’.At one point
2. Bourdieu neglects the importance of social institutions
Rotherham had ‘the largest areas of industrial dereliction
in shaping class structures. For example, he does not
in Europe’. It suffered badly during the recessions of the
discuss how the development of the welfare state
1980s, losing 8,000 jobs (out of a total of 82,000) in 1981
may have influenced class culture, particularly among
alone. It has not benefited as much as other areas from
professionals employed by the state. economic revival, with rates of unemployment, poverty and
3. Bourdieu assumes that his study of France can be
long-term illness all being much higher than the national
generalised to class cultures in other countries. Jenkins average. Charlesworth paints a bleak picture of the town:
suggests that different countries may have rather ‘The place, even according to many who live here, is ugly
different class cultures and queries how far Bourdieu’s
and depressing. Areas of greenery tend to be covered
in rubbish. Many shops have closed and relocated to the
theory is applicable to the USA and Britain. Recent
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
nearby Meadowhall shopping mall. The houses are often in Taste is based upon necessity rather than upon the much
poor condition. greater choices open to the middle class and affluent. For
However, it is not just the physical aspects of the town example, shell suits are a popular form of dress, although
that are depressing. Charlesworth argues that the ugliness they are mocked by middle-class taste. However, from the
of the place ‘manifests itself not just in the architectural point of view of the working class in Rotherham, they are a
structures that pattern the space, but in the manner and cheap, comfortable and practical type of clothing. They are
bearing, the comportment and style of behaviour of the especially popular with the unemployed, who spend much of
people in the town’. There are many examples of this. their time at home.
Charlesworth says: In a culture based on necessity, there is little time for
the niceties of middle-class taste and culture. Those who try
the majority seem to smoke, too many are
to adopt aspects of middle-class lifestyle may be mocked.
overweight, ill, and often lame too young; and too
The working-class habitus emphasises everyday, physical
many are clad in dirty, often cheap, clothes. Young
experience and devalues art, literature and other aspects of
children play, till late, on the streets, and many
culture appreciated more by the middle class.
teenagers seem hell-bent on destroying or damaging
Nevertheless, people are all too aware that others
anything that is public. Charlesworth, 2000, p. 55
have more possibilities and choices than them.As one
interviewee put it, “The best we can ’ope fo’ is a video anda
Nights out
shag, if wi lucky” But to Charlesworth this attitude does not
Friday and Saturday nights in Rotherham town centre are
stem from ignorance. It is a product of the circumstances
a key feature of the social life of many of the residents.
of working-class life in Rotherham. There is little point in
However, even this is not exactly uplifting. People go out
hoping for more than a video and a shag if you are going
drinking in the pubs and clubs largely to be seen and to pick
to be constantly disappointed. Furthermore, Charlesworth
up, or to be picked up by, others. There is little in the way of
argues that a central reason for the disappointment is the
meaningful conversation. Having a good body, looking healthy
education system.
and dressing well enough to appear to have some money
are the criteria by which people are valued. Charlesworth Education and speech
describes: It is largely in the education system that the working class
learn to devalue themselves and restrict their ambitions. The
open-plan theme pubs and clubs, where the space is
most important reason why the working class do not thrive
designed and used to be observed in. They are what
in the education system is because their way of talking and
people colloquially term ‘meat’ or ‘cattle’ markets.
their use of language are devalued by the education system.
And, indeed, some ofthe men are steroid-ridden,
According to Charlesworth, working-class speech stems
swollen in a world where muscles matter. Men and
from ‘the urgencies of a world whose solicitations demand
women stand up all night and walk around in large
constant readiness which impinges upon consciousness’.
circles, parading themselves, and surveying the value
Working-class people have to justify themselves to their
of what else is on this market, whilst also assessing
bosses or to state agencies such as the DSS. The constant
what bodies compete with their own. Charlesworth,
struggles of life leave little time or space for contemplation.
2000, p. 57
This lack of space for contemplation leads to an immediacy
Charlesworth claims that ‘what is said is unimportant, for in working-class speech. People get straight to the point —
this is an arena in which the truth of our society is clear: it they avoid euphemism; they know they will not be able to
is what you are that matters. Existence is bought with the get away with pretension.
value of the flesh’
Speech circles around the practical touchstones
The working-class habitus of working-class life: work and shifts; so many
Charlesworth believes that the working class in towns such exchanges that go on between working men begin
as Rotherham develop a distinctive habitus because of the with ‘What shift thy on?’, or else ‘’m fucked this
conditions under which they live. Most of the residents week, it’s Zombie shift’; or in the absence of work,
of Rotherham are working-class. Their lifestyle, habits, disgust at the bad treatment by the Department of
attitudes, values and physical appearance all stem from the Social Security. Charlesworth, 2000, p. 215
limitations they experience as members of the working class.
In their speech, the working class reflect the fact that
Charlesworth says, ‘the phenomenon of class, inequality,
what they say ‘is not valued, so what they say has no
deprivation and powerlessness must be understood through
consequence’. They can say almost anything without it
their effect on the manner in which people come to exist
having much effect or cost. This is reflected in deliberate
in the world’ and through the ‘states and sensibilities that
coarseness and derogatory comments to one another.
are social in the sense that they are prior to a particular
The closest friends or partners will greet each other with
individual’s feeling and govern the range of feelings available’.
expressions like ‘Nah then shag’, ‘Nah then shithead’,‘Ahr
The class habitus produces ‘powerful affinities and aversions
[Our] shit-fo’-brains’, ‘Nah then ugly’,‘Nah then yer slapper’.
to persons, things and spaces’ — and this tends to reproduce
These forms of familiarity reflect the ways that other classes
classes, encouraging them to stick to things which are
devalue the working class. It establishes a common bond
familiar and appealing to them. between people who can dispense with any pretence of
Members of the working class lack the money to develop
their own value.Anyone who is aloof or posh (for example,
the symbolic and cultural capital which would allow them
teachers, politicians and officials from the DSS) is deeply
to be accepted in middle-class circles. Life involves a daily
distrusted.
struggle to maintain their dignity and make ends meet.
Not surprisingly, these ways of speaking are not valued in were enrolled on caring courses in a further education
the education system.According to Charlesworth: college in a town in northwest England. Overall, she
studied the women for II years, following their careers
the education system enshrines the culture of the after they had left further education. Skeggs describes her
dominant class as the national culture; it elevates
research as ethnography that was ‘politically motivated to
one form oflinguistic habitus to the status of provide a space for the articulations and experiences of the
legitimate, as the form ofspeech befitting those who
marginalized’.
are appropriate for senior and professional positions.
Charlesworth, 2000, p. 220 Working-class women
Skeggs argues that being a working-class woman in late
Success in the education system requires the use of more 20th-century Britain posed considerable problems. While
measured and euphemistic ways of speaking. Working-class
there were somé positive identities for working-class
speech is likely to be criticised by teachers and lead to a
men (for example, those associated with trade unionists
lack of educational success. Working-class speech patterns
campaigning for their rights), it was more difficult for
become ‘hopelessly stigmatised’, confirming the working
working-class women to establish a positive identity.
class in their low status and largely confining them to jobs
According to Skeggs, ‘the label working-class when applied
that require few qualifications. Knowing the way in which
to women has been used to signify all that is dirty, dangerous
they are stigmatised by higher classes, the working class
and without value’.
react by ‘frequenting places that operate as protected
Unlike middle-class women, working-class women tend
enclaves which they can retreat to and avoid, with the help
to be portrayed as lacking in respectability and as having
of drink and friends, the direct effects upon the body, of
a dangerous and unrestrained sexuality. Furthermore,
valuelessness’.
working-class women tend to lack all the types of capital
Evaluation identified by Bourdieu. They are likely to have little wealth
Charlesworth’s study provides interesting insights into and be poorly paid, so they lack economic capital. They
the origin and nature of the habitus of the working class lack the cultural capital to succeed in academic subjects
in Rotherham. Some sociologists have welcomed his work in the education system. They lack social capital in the
enthusiastically.Tim Ednesor (2000) praises Charlesworth form of relationships with those in positions of power,
for conducting a detailed empirical study of the culture and they lack symbolic capital because people in higher
of the working class, a group which Ednesor believes is classes does not regard the cultural and social capital they
increasingly neglected in sociological research.To Ednesor, do have as legitimate. Lacking in capital, and facing negative
Charlesworth’s work challenges the views of those who perceptions of working-class women, they try to make the
believe the working class is disappearing. Furthermore, best possible use of the capital they do have. They try to
Ednesor comments that, ‘the most impressive part of this challenge their working-class identity.
marvellous book is that it shows how this culture is deeply
Working-class disidentification
enmeshed in, and emerges out of, conditions of struggle and
It is not that the women want to be middle-class. They tend
necessity’.
to see the middle class as pretentious and snobbish or
However, there are some weaknesses in Charlesworth’s
‘hoity-toity’. But they do not want to be seen as working-
work. He paints a rather bleak picture of working-class
class either. The women see the working class as ‘poor,
culture. It may be that Rotherham has suffered more from
deprived, depriving, dangerous and degraded. They are
economic depression than most towns and cities, so the
well aware of the jokes about “Sharons and Kevins”, about
culture he describes may be untypically depressed and
“tackiness”, about “white high-heeled shoes”’ (Skeggs, 1997).
depressing. He fails to find much creativity or resistance
The women wish to avoid these connotations and so seek
in working-class culture and does not acknowledge that
‘(dis)identification’ with the working class in particular
some people from the working class are successful in the
and class in general. For example, one woman says:‘Ijust
educational system and experience upward social mobility.
don’t think class is a very useful term. | think | am probably
Charlesworth tends to portray the whole of Rotherham’s
classless. You know I’m not really one nor the other’
working class as equally downtrodden and displays little
Another woman says:
sensitivity for differences within the working class.
| think it’s just daft trying to fit people into
Beverley Skeggs = Formations of
Class and Gender pigeonholes. They say because you live on a council
The study estate you must be working class ... But loads of
Like Charlesworth, Beverley Skeggs (1997) conducted people own their own houses and just because they
a study of working-class British people using many of are on council estates it doesn’t make any difference.
Skeggs, 1997, p. 77
the concepts devised by Bourdieu. However, rather than
examining the whole of the working class in a particular This desire to disidentify with and escape from
town, Skeggs conducted an in-depth study of a group of perceptions of themselves as working-class is particularly
women. Skeggs focuses on how gender and class interact in evident in two main areas:
creating a habitus. Although Skeggs follows Charlesworth in
seeing the working class as being somewhat trapped in their |. First, by doing caring courses the women tried to
establish that they were respectable and responsible.
habitus, she paints a less bleak picture of working-class life.
Skeggs used participant observation, interviews and They lacked the capital necessary to get into higher
secondary sources to study a group of 83 women who education or well-paid jobs, and the academic side
of the caring courses had little appeal. However, the
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
practical side of the courses was appealing to them opportunities were available for them...
and related to their experiences of caring within but also operated through a multitude of
families. The responsibility of looking after others capital transformations and trading. Skeggs,
(for example, in care homes) ‘offered a means to 1997, p. 161
feel good, even morally superior’ and this was ‘a
Their attempts to distance themselves from a working-class
powerful incentive when set against the prospect of
unemployment’.
identity demonstrated that class was important in their
lives.
The courses themselves emphasised the importance
of respectability, for example through teaching good Evaluation
hygiene and discussing the effects of inadequate or Skeggs’s research was an in-depth study using a relatively
irresponsible parenting. The women were able to small sample. This is both its main strength and its main
come to think of themselves as caring and therefore weakness. It is a strength because it enabled Skeggs to
respectable people, although the courses were ‘framed develop a thorough understanding of the lives of the
by class relations that placed working-class women women she studied and to see processes of change over
in a relationship of continually proving themselves the || years she followed them. It enabled Skeggs to
as adequate to the standards of others. This means identify differences between the women and to avoid
that their production of subjectivity is always open to making sweeping generalisations. For example, Skeggs
scrutiny by others.’ discusses one woman who goes against the views of the
2. A second area in which they tried to distance other women by seeing nothing wrong in sleeping around
themselves from being seen as working-class was their with many different men.
sexuality. Here again they felt scrutinised by others However, because Skeggs uses a small and untypical
and were concerned about being seen as tarty. Lacking sample, it is hard to know how far her findings can be
in other forms of capital, they were aware that as generalised to other working-class women. Because all the
young women they had a potential value in the women were doing a caring course at a particular college,
‘marriage market’. However, if they dressed or acted they may have been more concerned about appearing
in such a way as to be seen as ‘tarts’ or ‘sluts’ then respectable than other working-class women.
they would be devalued. The women distinguished The next study to be considered in this section examines
‘between being looked at in ‘“‘admiration” and looked class in less depth, but uses a somewhat larger and more
at as “sexual object’’’ . The former was acceptable, diverse sample.
whereas the latter was not. Part of their cultural
capital consisted of knowing how to look good Mike Savage, Gaynor Bagnall and
without looking tarty. Considerable time, money Brian Longhurst: class identities in
and effort were expended in getting this right. They northwest England
developed rules such as 466 ““‘you can’t wear jeans and The study
high heels” and “‘you can’t wear white stiletto shoes Between 1997 and 1999, Mike Savage, Gaynor Bagnall
and mini-skirts”’’. and Brian Longhurst (2001) conducted research based
Skeggs comments that ‘all of the women wanted to on |78 in-depth interviews on class identities in the
be seen as desirable. To be valued was a validation of Manchester area. The interviews were conducted in
themselves.’ However, they were usually more bothered four areas:
about knowing that they could get a man rather than
1. Cheadle: a lower middle-class suburb of Manchester
actually getting one. Ultimately, they did want to
where the interviewees were a mixture of working-class
marry and settle down. They saw marriage as offering
and lower middle-class.
them respectability. There were fears about being
2. Wilmslow: a very affluent suburb where the sample
‘left on the shelf’ because it would show “a lack
consisted almost exclusively of highly paid managers
of desirability’. Weddings were of great symbolic
and professionals.
importance as ‘the validation of legitimation’.
3. Ramsbottom: an ‘old industrial mill village’ where a
Apparently marriage offered the women secure
mixture of working-class people and managers and
symbolic capital as respectable women who
professionals lived, many on new estates.
distanced themselves from the connotations of
4. Chorlton: a suburb near the centre of Manchester
being working-class.
where most of the residents were young and middle-
Although these women tried to distance themselves class, with jobs in the public sector or in the media and
from class associations and refused to see themselves as arts.A few long-established working-class residents were
working-class, Skeggs believes that class was fundamental also interviewed.
to them. The place of the women in the class structure
Attitudes to class and identity
shaped the opportunities open to them. It also permeated
Savage et al. avoided using the term class early in the
their lives and particularly the ways in which they tried
interviews. Nevertheless, about one-third of respondents
to make the most of such capital as they had. Skeggs
referred to class before the interviewer had used the term.
says: Often the question ‘What type of people live around here?’
Class was completely central to the lives of the would elicit a response about the class of residents.As
women. It was not only structural, in the sense that Table 1.8 shows, however, a large majority of people were
the division of labour organized what economic ambivalent about having a class identity.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Table 1.8 Class identities (showing number of respondents and percentage of them in each place)
;
)
30(70%) | 819%) 3 (7%) 30 (70% 10 (23%)
frs@im [46
)
rramsborom [naan |sie [new [reese seam; [225% )
rea
)
613m [ain
)
chorion [18G55
TOTAL
rise)
62 (35%)
| 127 (71%) 29 (16%) 38 (21%) 81 (46%) 59 (33%)
Source: M. Savage, G. Bagnall and B. Longhurst (2001) ‘Ordinary, ambivalent and defensive: Class identities in the Northwest of England’,
Sociology, vol. 35, no. 4.
Relatively few respondents thought Britain was becoming themselves as working-class thought they were ordinary
a classless society. This was demonstrated in a number of because the vast majority of ordinary people worked for a
things they said. Some talked about ‘the haves and have nots’, living. Some of those who identified themselves as middle-
others referred to the existence of an ‘establishment’, but class saw themselves as ordinary because they were the
few were willing to assign themselves, without qualification, class in the middle. Middle-class identifiers often distanced
to a class. Savage et al. comment:‘People have little difficulty themselves from any idea that they might be ‘snobbish’.
in talking about class “out there”, but do not like to think
Conclusions
about class closer to home with respect to their own
Despite the existence of a minority who retain clear class
identity. Savage et al. suggest that people tend to see class
identities, Savage et al. generally support Skeggs’s claim
as ‘“out there”, as part of the social fabric, whereas people
that it is common to disidentify with class. While using
themselves are “individuals”, who by definition cannot be
some of Bourdieu’s concepts (for example, the concept
parts of classes’.
of cultural capital), they disagree with his view that people
People were unwilling to see themselves as simply a
are constantly concerned to ‘display and construct cultural
product of their class background. They saw themselves as
distinction of one type or another’. Instead, most of the
having more control over their lives than the idea of class
sample tried to show that they were no different from
might imply. Most people were therefore defensive about
others, that they were ordinary. But that did not mean
stating a class identity and, in line with Beverley Skeggs’s
that they avoided thinking in class terms altogether. Most
arguments (see above), tended to ‘disidentify’ with class.
recognised that classes existed, even if they did not want to
However, Savage et al. did find some people who
see themselves as belonging to one. Furthermore, in seeing
identified clearly with a class. In Wilmslow, some of the older
themselves as ordinary, they were acknowledging that there
male professionals with high levels of cultural capital were
were others who were not ordinary, who were in a different
happy to see themselves as middle-class. Furthermore, there
class from themselves. Class had by no means disappeared
was a minority of people who had ‘a degree of inverted class
from their understanding of the social world and their own
pride in coming from working-class backgrounds’. Savage et
identity. Instead, Savage et al. argue, ‘We see then in people’s
al. go on to comment that‘“Working classness” is not an
accounts of class, a highly charged but complex ambivalence
entirely stigmatized identity that people tend to distance
in which classes and individuals are held to be different yet
themselves from. This underestimates the continued moral
so inherently related’ (For a review of the affluent worker
force of working-class identities, at least for men.
studies by Savage see pp. 65-6.)
For the most part, though, it was those from working-
class backgrounds who were most likely to feel threatened Geoff Payne and Clare Grew — class
by the idea of class and deny that they belonged to a class. ambivalence
Those with more cultural capital, such as young university- The research by Savage et al. has been criticised by Geoff
educated respondents in Chorlton, were more willing to Payne and Clare Grew (2005). Payne and Grew conducted
think about how class categories might apply to them. Most their own research in two English rural areas which were
still ended up denying that they could be put in clear-cut not in the northwest. Like Savage et al., Payne and Grew
class categories, but they were willing to think about how used face-to-face in-depth interviews; their sample consisted
class affected their lives. They demonstrated a degree of of 39 people.
‘reflexivity’ by discussing how their own experiences related Payne and Grew question the findings of Savage et al.
to class. that a high proportion of the population are ambivalent
Savage et al. therefore argue that three main groups can about class. They argue that the findings of their study
be distinguished: were a product of the way the research was conducted
|. A ‘defensive ambivalent majority’.
and the way the data were interpreted. Savage et al. asked
2. Asmall group of upper middle-class and working-class
respondents, ‘Do you think Britain is becoming classless?’,
people who have strong class identities.
immediately before asking them, ‘What social class do
3. A group of‘reflexive class identifiers’. you think you belong to?’ Payne and Grew suggest that
respondents were likely to see the second question as an
Even those who were willing to express some class identity extension of the first. The complexity of the issues involved
tended to be at pains to stress that they were just ordinary in the first question may have led to answers which
people, like everybody else. Some of those who saw appeared ambivalent.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Furthermore, Savage et al. counted any answers clothing rather than the quality of the material itself; and
which revealed any uncertainty whatsoever as showing leisure industries are increasingly based around experiences
ambivalence. For example, those who said,‘l suppose | am such as holidays, travel and adventure activities rather than
middle-class’ were classified as ambivalent. Payne and Grew physical products. Thus culture is more and more important
suggest that such replies might reflect ‘general ambivalence’ for making a profit.
about changes in class as much as ambivalence about class Culture has been commodified and this has made
position, because respondents were still reflecting on the ‘culture central to exploitation and surplus value
previous question about classlessness. production’ (Skeggs, 2005) (for similar views see the
In their own research, Payne and Grew found only work of David Harvey in chapter 15). Culture is now a
four people who completely rejected both the idea that vital part of advertising. For example, the fashion group
society still had classes and the idea that they belonged to Benetton’s advertising made extensive use of‘racial
a class.All the other respondents talked in class terms, but signifiers to generate a “multi-cultural” appeal’ (Skeggs,
he ways in which they discussed class were complex and 2005). In this process, the cultures of different classes are
varied. valued differently, with working-class culture being seen
A total of 14 criteria were used to talk about class, as particularly lacking in value. Although always devalued,
including: ‘money, income and financial inequalities’, ‘housing’, working-class culture is now seen as even more morally
‘aristocracy/upper-class people’,‘educational qualifications’, worthless than in the past, and is identified with ‘waste’
‘inter-personal attitudes expressing class superiority/ and seen as ‘lacking in taste, as un-modern, backward, as
inferiority’, ‘aspirations, getting on and personal achievement ’ escapist, as dangerous, unruly and without shame’ (Skeggs,
and ‘lifestyle’. ‘Job types’ and ‘capitalism/the class system’ 2005). Even the bodies of the working class are seen
were mentioned, but very infrequently. negatively as representing such characteristics.
The meaning of class for the interviewees was not Skeggs uses several examples to illustrate this process:
only complex, but often it did not conform to sociologists’
>» Skeggs discusses a survey conducted in the Daily Mirror in
definitions of class. The apparent ambivalence in their
1997 in which readers were invited to classify themselves
responses reflected this complexity and the differences
through filling in a questionnaire containing 20 questions.
between their own understandings of class and those of
Only three were about economic issues, with the rest
sociologists. Payne and Grew say:
about culture. Readers were asked to tick statements
interviewees normally express their views about they strongly agreed with, including:‘l have sex too much’,
class in a somewhat confused way, because they ‘I go to Tuscany for my holidays’,‘l never read books’ and
are being asked to handle a generally multi- ‘Il take bottles, papers and cans to be recycled’. According
faceted concept at short notice ... The rejection to Skeggs, the scoring system inferred that working-class
of a simple label, therefore, is not necessarily a practices (such as having too much sex, owning big dogs,
rejection of class self-identification. Payne and not reading, and going on cheap holidays in the sun) were
Grew, 2005, p. 903 less morally good than middle-class practices (such as
recycling, going to Tuscany, exercising sexual restraint and
Conclusion taking physical exercise).
If Payne and Grew are to be believed, then levels of self- » Skeggs discusses work by Tasker (1998) which examines
identification with different classes may be higher than film portrayals of working-class women.According to
Savage et al. believe. The methodological complexities Tasker (and Skeggs), films such as Pretty Woman, Working
of studying class leave considerable room for different Girl, and Up Close and Personal are concerned with
interpretations of interview data. Despite the differences how morally worthless working-class women can be
between them, the studies of Charlesworth, Skeggs, Savage transformed by changing their appearance and the way
et al. and Payne and Grew all found that class continues to they speak to pass as middle-class. In these examples,
exert a strong influence on people's lives. The first three class differences are embodied — they are part of the
studies also show that Bourdieu’s approach can be used to physical characteristics of the women concerned.
understand both cultural differences between classes and >» Another example which links working-class
class inequality. tastelessness and moral inferiority is the way ownership
of satellite dishes is portrayed. Skeggs quotes research
Beverley Skeggs ~ the re-branding by Brunsdon (1997) that equates the tastelessness of
of class satellite dishes with a working-class identity.
Popular culture and the denigration of the
> Finally, Skeggs refers to research by Haylett (2001) that
working class examined Tony Blair’s choice of a run-down council estate
In more recent work, rather than conducting detailed in south London in 1997 to make an announcement
empirical research into working-class culture, Beverley about social inclusion. Skeggs says that Haylett:
Skeggs (2005) looked at how working-class culture is shows how this announcement used the white
presented in popular culture. She also broadens the working-class poor as symbols of a generalised
debate about class and culture to consider the changing role ‘backwardness’ and specifically a culturally
of culture in shaping class divisions in general. burdensome whiteness. The white working class
Skeggs argues that culture is increasingly important in become represented as the blockage not just
capitalist societies. Capitalist businesses do not just sell to social inclusion, but to the development of a
physical commodities (such as cars, washing machines and modern nation that can play on the global stage.
food); they increasingly sell ‘signs’ and ‘experiences’. For Skeggs, 2005, p. 56
example, it might be the designer label that sells an item of
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Working-class culture as a resource words, they have a relatively low degree of closure. In
Skeggs does not believe that working-class culture is particular, it is argued that status in pre-industrial societies
always denigrated in popular culture. In some cases it is is largely ascribed, whereas in industrial societies it is
seen as a ‘resource’ for the middle class who are attracted increasingly achieved. As a result, ascribed characteristics
to its image of being authentic, tough or primitive. These such as class of origin, sex, race and kinship relationships
characteristics can sometimes be used to sell commodities. have less influence on an individual’s social status. Status
However, the middle class are sometimes laughed at in is seen to be achieved on the basis of merit: talent, ability,
popular culture for their naivety about a working class they ambition and hard work are steadily replacing ascribed
do not understand, and for their pretentiousness in trying characteristics as the criteria for determining a person’s
to be working-class. This was reflected in the television position in the class system.
comedy The Royle Family, which ridiculed middle-class The importance of social mobility
pretentiousness, and in the Pulp song ‘Common People’ in
Sociologists are interested in social mobility for two main
which the person who wants ‘to live like common people’
reasons:
is despised and told, ‘You'll never watch your life slide out
of view, and dance and drink and screw ’cos there’s nothing 1. Ken Roberts (2011) believes that social mobility is
else to do’ (quoted in Skeggs, 2005). important because ‘We are all interested in whether we
However, portrayals in popular culture that give some live in a fair society, commonly understood to mean a
value to working-class culture and ridicule middle classes “meritocratic’”’ society where individuals’ achievements
who have a romantic attachment to working-class culture depend on their own talents and efforts rather than
are very much in the minority, and working-class culture is their social origins.” Studies of social mobility reveal
usually devalued. Behaviour which is seen as pathological the extent to which there is opportunity for talent and
in the working class (such as too much sex) is glamorised effort to be rewarded.
in the middle class. In the television comedy Sex and the 2. Roberts also argues that social mobility should be
City the sexual desires of the lead characters were treated studied because it can help to show ‘whether the classes
sympathetically because the characters had ‘enough volume into which we divide the population are demographic
of other forms of cultural capital to offset connotations of entities’. Classes that have a relatively stable
pathology and denigration’ (Skeggs, 2005). membership — where most of the children born into the
class stay in that class — are more likely than unstable
Culture and class conflict
classes to develop their own distinctive cultures. Where
Skeggs concludes that just as cultural factors have become
there are high rates of mobility into and out of the
increasingly important in differentiating between classes, so
class, the members of that class may have little sense of
culture is also increasingly important in class conflict. She
shared interests and will be unlikely to develop a strong
says, Class struggle becomes not just about the entitlement
and distinctive class culture.
to the labour of others but the entitlement to their culture,
feelings, affect and dispositions’ As the economy is increasingly It is not just sociologists who see social mobility as
dominated by the exchange of cultural signs, classes who important. The Coalition government in the UK published
lack the ‘right’ culture will see their economic opportunities a report in 2011 entitled Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers:
restricted. Struggles over the moral worth of different cultures A Strategy for Social Mobility. |n the foreword, the deputy
therefore become struggles over economic capital as well. prime minister, Nick Clegg, of the Liberal Democrats, argued
that ‘A fair society is an open society.A society in which
Conclusion
everyone is free to flourish and rise. Where birth is never
Skeggs’s views reflect the increasing acceptance in the
destiny’ (Cabinet Office, 201 1).
sociology of class stratification that both economic and
Thus the study of social mobility plays a vital part both
cultural factors are crucial in understanding class. For
in understanding the class structure of any society and in
example, Rosemary Crompton and John Scott (2005) stress
determining how meritocratic a society is.
that ‘Culture and economy are intertwined’ and argue
that the study of both aspects of class is crucial to a full Types of social mobility
understanding of class divisions. They support a ‘pluralistic Sociologists have identified two main types of social mobility:
stance in relation to research on class and stratification’, in
|. The first, intragenerational mobility, refers to social
which research inspired by Bourdieu and more conventional
mobility within a single generation. It is measured by
types of research on economic inequality or class
comparing the occupational status of an individual at
consciousness are all valued.
two or more points in time. Thus if a person begins their
working life as an unskilled manual worker and 10 years
Social mobility later is employed as an accountant, they are socially
mobile in terms of intragenerational mobility.
Ascription and achievement 2. The second type, intergenerational mobility, refers to
This section examines the nature of social mobility in social mobility between generations. It is measured
by comparing the occupational status of sons or
capitalist society. It is generally agreed that the rate of
social mobility — the amount of movement from one daughters with that of their fathers (or less frequently
stratum to another — is significantly higher in industrial with that of their mothers). Thus if the daughter of
an unskilled manual worker becomes an accountant,
societies than in pre-industrial societies. Industrial societies
are therefore sometimes described as open. In other she Is socially mobile in terms of intergenerational
mobility.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
can be criticised for ignoring the existence of small elites, Goldthorpe and Payne therefore concluded that the non-
or,in Marxist terms, a ruling class. Goldthorpe’s class | is a inclusion of women in earlier studies of social mobility was
relatively large grouping, containing |0—-15 per cent of the not important, since it made little difference to the overall
male working population. Studies that concentrate on small results, at least in terms of determining the openness of the
elite groups within class | reveal a much higher degree of stratification system.
closure. Alternative views
The process by which members of wealthy and powerful Michelle Stanworth (1984) is highly critical of Goldthorpe
groups are drawn from the children of those who already for insisting on categorising women in social mobility studies
belong to such groups is known as elite self-recruitment.
according to the class of their husband. She prefers an
The Oxford study, while showing a relatively high rate of
approach based upon individuals being allocated to a class
mobility into class |, does not indicate the degree of elite
according to their own job.
self-recruitment.To take just one example: according to the
Some research seems to support Stanworth’s view, in
Cabinet Office (2011), 54 per cent of the chief executive
that it shows important differences in the social mobility of
officers of the hundred largest companies in Britain had
men and women.Anthony Heath (1981) used data from the
been to private schools, compared to 7 per cent in the
1972 and 1975 General Household Surveys to examine the
population as a whole.A wider range of studies, discussed
intergenerational mobility of women. He compared women’s
in Chapter 9 (see pp. 591-2), show high levels of elite self-
social class with their father’s class (though not their
recruitment. Though class | as a whole appears fairly open,
mother’s) and reached the following conclusions:
elite groups within that class are relatively closed.
A second major problem with the Oxford Mobility Study 1. Women of class | and 2 origins were much more likely
is the fact that it ignores women. Goldthorpe believes that to be downwardly mobile than men of the same class
the unit of stratification in industrial societies is the family. origin. This was largely because of the preponderance of
The class position of the family is given according to the females in class 3 (routine non-manual jobs).
occupation of the main breadwinner, which is usually a man. 2. Women from higher social classes were less likely to
Other sociologists hotly dispute this view. (For details of the follow in their father’s footsteps than men from the
debate on gender and stratification see pp. 87-8.) same classes.
3. On the other hand, women of class 5, 6 or 7 origins were
Gender and mobility
far more likely to be upwardly mobile to class 3 than
J.-H. Goldthorpe and C. Payne’s views on
their male counterparts, although Heath points out
gender and social mobility
that whether this movement can be considered ‘upward
With specific reference to gender and social mobility,
mobility’ is a moot point. As indicated earlier, some
Goldthorpe and Payne (1986) examined data from the 1983
sociologists do not believe that routine non-manual
British Election Survey to determine what difference it makes
workers have any significant advantages over most
to the results of studies of social mobility if three different
manual workers (see pp. 55-7).
approaches are adopted to including women in the data:
Heath argues that the disadvantages suffered by the
|. In the first approach, women are included but their
daughters of fathers in the higher classes are greater than
class is determined by their husband’s occupation.
the advantages experienced by the daughters of fathers from
Goldthorpe and Payne found this made little
lower classes. If Heath is to be believed, then the British
difference to either the absolute or relative rates of
stratification system is less open than studies based on
intergenerational social mobility found in studies using
males would suggest.
an all-male sample.
Reviewing later data on social mobility, Ken Roberts
2. In the second approach, the occupation of the partner
(2011) concurs that women from middle-class backgrounds
in full-time employment with the highest class position
have been more likely to be downwardly mobile than men
is used to determine the class of both partners. Single
from similar backgrounds, but women from working-class
women are included on the basis of their own job. This
backgrounds have experienced more upward mobility than
approach also made little difference to relative mobility
their male counterparts. However, he argues that male
rates, although Goldthorpe and Payne conceded that
and female patterns of mobility are likely to be converging,
it does at least allow information on women who are
because the distribution of men and women in different
unattached or who are heads of households to be
included.
occupational classes is becoming more similar in the
21st century than it was in the 20th.
3. In the third approach, individuals are allocated to
classes on the basis of their own jobs. This showed that
Pamela Abbott, Claire Wallace and Melissa Tyler (2005)
absolute mobility rates for women and men were very
argue that the openness of the stratification system for men
different. This was largely due to the fact that women
is a result of the lack of openness for women. They say:
are distributed differently from men in the occupational Women’s preparedness to ‘have a job’ rather
structure (see pp. 37-40). However, once again this than following a career is certainly important in
method of including women in the data made little explaining male mobility; few ‘dual income’ families
difference to the intergenerational, relative mobility actually have two partners following careers — more
rates of different classes. In other words, the social often the man has a career and the woman fits her
mobility chances of women compared to other women work into the demands of that career. Abbott et al.,
from different classes were as unequal as the chances of 2005, p. 70
men compared to other men from different classes.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
The NCDS study of mobility in the NCDS study, compared to 57 per cent in the earlier
A further study of social mobility in Britain was carried Oxford study. However, the chances of those from working-
out by Mike Savage and Muriel Egerton (1997). Savage and class origins reaching the service class had significantly
Egerton used data from the National Child Development increased (from 16 per cent to 26 per cent). Nevertheless,
Survey, astudy of a national sample of children born in 1958. those of service-class origin were still much more likely to
Savage and Egerton’s study (the NCDS study) is based upon end up with service-class jobs. In the NCDS study service-
the class people had reached in 1991 when aged 33. Unlike class sons were still more than twice as likely to end up with
the Oxford Mobility Study, it included data on the social service-class jobs as working-class sons were (61 per cent as
mobility of women.Women’s social mobility was measured opposed to 26 per cent).
in relation to their father’s occupation, not that of the chief
The origins of class members
earner in their household during their childhood.
Tables 1.10 and 1.12 show changes in class inflows, that is, the
Ken Roberts (2001) adapted data from Savage and
background from which members of a class come. They give
Egerton’s study and the Oxford Mobility Study to make
an indication of the extent to which different classes share
direct comparisons between the cohorts in the two studies
a common class origin. Table |.10 shows that in the Oxford
in order to indicate changes in social mobility in the
study the service class came from diverse origins, with fairly
20th century. The comparisons use a simplified three-class
equal proportions coming from service-, intermediate- and
model of service, intermediate and working classes.
working-class backgrounds. The working class, however,
Table |.9 shows the destinations of those in the Oxford
continued to be recruited very largely from the working class
Mobility Study, while Table |.10 shows their origins. Table 1.1 |
(7| per cent coming from working-class backgrounds). By the
shows the destinations of those in Savage and Egerton’s study,
time of the NCDS study, 40 per cent of the service class were
and Table |.|2 their origins. Table 1.13 compares the destinations
of working-class origin, but the working class remained largely
of men and women in the Savage and Egerton study.
composed of those of working-class origin (72 per cent).
The extent of upward mobility
Female mobility
In the period between the two studies the class structure
Table |.13 provides evidence of recent trends in female
continued to change, with the contraction of the working
mobility compared to male mobility. In line with the
class and the expansion of higher classes. This provided
studies discussed above, the NCDS study found significant
opportunities for intergenerational upward mobility from
differences in the mobility of men and women. It found that
the working class. Despite this, it can be seen from Tables |.9
women were much more likely than men to move into the
and |.1 1 that the chances of escaping from the working class
intermediate class from other classes. For example, 19 per
had not greatly increased.A total of 55 per cent of sons
cent of males but 39 per cent of females with working-class
from working-class backgrounds remained working-class
Table 1.9 Class outflows of males in the Oxford Mobility Table |.1 1 Class outflows of males in the Savage and
Study Egerton study
18
Table 1.10 Class inflows of males in the Oxford Mobility Table |.12 Class inflows of males in the Savage and
Study Egerton study
Sources (Tables !.9—1.13): K. Roberts (2001) Class in Modern Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 197.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
fathers ended up in the intermediate class. However, females the working class loses potential leaders who could organise
with a service-class origin were less likely than men with and represent the class.
this origin to follow fathers into the service class. Only 45
International comparisons of social
per cent of daughters stayed in the service class, compared
mobility
to 6! per cent of sons. Savage and Egerton (1997) also found
Upward and downward occupational
some evidence that daughters from all origins who ended up
mobility
in the service class were more likely than men to end up in
As previous sections have shown, there are many technical
lower professional jobs (such as teaching and nursing) rather
difficulties in carrying out studies of social mobility,
than higher professional and managerial jobs.
and these have made it difficult to make international
Conclusion comparisons of social mobility rates. Occupational
Discussing these findings, Roberts (2001) argues that ‘very classification schemes used to distinguish classes have
wide inequalities of life chances that operate in the middle varied from society to society and comparable sets of data
class's favour’ continue to exist. However, there is some have not always been available. However, in recent years
evidence of greater openness in the class system. Furthermore, international comparisons of social mobility rates have
the middle classes have rather diverse origins.As the middle become possible. One reason for this is that a number of
classes grow, however, Roberts believes that they will recruit countries have adopted similar occupational classification
increasing proportions of their membership from the middle schemes based upon or similar to those of Goldthorpe’s
class, which will tend to favour the development class scheme which has influenced the classification scheme
of a ‘distinctive lifestyle, consciousness and politics’. adopted for British government statistics (called the
Although the working class continues to recruit most NS-SEC — see pp. 36-7).
of its members from the working class, Roberts believes it An international comparison of mobility rates was
may become more disorganised. With more opportunities published in 2004 by R. Breen (discussed in Scott, 2005),
for upward mobility, those who fail to be upwardly mobile which produced figures on the proportions of the
may blame their position on their own inadequacies. population who were upwardly and downwardly mobile.
Furthermore, the most talented people of working-class The results are shown in Tables |.14 and 1.15.
origin may tend to be upwardly mobile, with the result that
Upward
mobility
Downward
mobility
Source: R. Breen (ed.) (2004) Social Mobility in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 48.
Upward
mobility
Downward
mobility
Source: R. Breen (ed.) (2004) Social Mobility in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 66.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Table |.14 shows that fairly high proportions of men occupation as a measure of social mobility allowed simple
achieved upward social mobility in all the societies studied, comparisons to be made between countries and between
while downward mobility rates were substantially lower. This cohorts (groups of people born at different times). Income
suggests that all the societies experienced some contraction levels are a direct measure of inequality, unlike occupation,
of working-class jobs and some expansion of middle-class since earnings can vary considerably within occupations as
jobs. The highest rates of upward mobility across the three well as between them, but they are less directly linked with
decades were in Germany, Sweden and Britain, and the definitions of social class based upon occupations.
lowest rates in Ireland, Poland and France. However, the Blanden et al. divided the population into quartiles:
overall fluidity — the total amount of male mobility both that is, they distinguished between the lowest 25 per cent
upwards and downwards — was lowest in France, Ireland and of income earners, the next 25 per cent earning below
Poland and highest in Britain, Sweden and Hungary. median income, the next 25 per cent earning above median
Among women, upward mobility rates had increased income, and the top 25 per cent of earners. British data
quite significantly in most countries and in some countries were based upon the National Child Development Survey
had overtaken men’s rates. However, in several countries (of a cohort born in 1958) and the British Cohort Study (of
women had higher rates of downward mobility than men by a cohort born in 1970). Data were also collected on seven
the 1990s. In Britain in the 1990s there was a mixed picture, other countries: the USA, Canada and five other European
with women having higher rates of upward and downward countries (see Table |.18).
social mobility than men. Tables |.16 and |.17 show the results for the two
This comparative study also examined how far cohorts based upon earnings when aged 33 or 30. They show
class origin influenced educational success and how far that for sons born in 1958, 31 per cent born into the bottom
occupation was determined by educational qualifications. quartile of income earners were still in the bottom quartile
In the most meritocratic countries class should have little when they were 33,and I|7 per cent had reached the top
effect on educational success, while occupational status quartile. However, for sons born in 1970 only || per cent
should be strongly influenced by qualifications. Sweden was had reached the top quartile and 38 per cent were still in
found to be the most meritocratic of the countries, and the bottom quartile. Thus there was less upward mobility for
Britain was the least meritocratic. Indeed, in Britain there the cohort born more recently, contradicting conventional
was no evidence of any decline in the influence of class mobility studies which suggest that upward social mobility
background on educational qualifications achieved. has been increasing. Blanden et al. (2005) therefore argue
that‘intergenerational mobility has fallen over time in Britain;
income and social mobility
equality of opportunity declined for those born in 1970
In a novel approach to studying social mobility,Jo Blanden,
compared with those born in 1958’. Furthermore this change
Paul Greg and Stephen Machin (2005) conducted research
was not found to be characteristic of other countries. They
on intergenerational mobility based upon income differences
looked at similar data on the USA and found that upward
rather than occupational grouping. Using income rather than
mobility had increased over time.
So e
eee
23}
ee
2nd
Top
ee
Sources (Tables 1.16 and !.17): J. Blanden, P. Greg and S. Machin (2005) Intergenerational Mobility in Europe and North America, Centre for
Economic Performance, London, p. 8 (data drawn from the British Cohort Study).
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Britain British Cohort Study 1970 2000 (age 30) Parental income 271
1980 and 1986
(average)
USA Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1954-70 | Age 30 Parental income .289
when son aged 10
and 16
Sweden Register data 1962 1996 and 1999 __| Father's earnings
(average) 1975
Finland Quinquennial census panel 1958-60 1995 and 2000 ‘| Father’s earnings
(average) 1975
Source: J. Blanden, P. Greg and S. Machin (2005) Intergenerational Mobility in Europe and North America, Centre for Economic Performance,
London, p. 8.
Comparing mobility rates across all eight countries, Blanden et al. also examined more recent data from the
Blanden et al. found that Britain had one of the lowest British Household Panel Survey on a cohort of boys born in the
levels of social mobility. They examined the strength of the late 1970s, to discover recent trends in the relationship between
relationship between father’s (or in some countries parents’) income and educational attainment. For this group, who reached
earnings and children’s earnings for the most recent cohort the age of 16 in the mid-1990s, there was a weakening in the
for which they had data. Table |.18 shows the results. The relationship between family income and staying on in education
higher the correlation, the closer the relationship between after 16.An increasing proportion of |6-year-olds from all
the earnings of fathers (or parents) and sons, and hence backgrounds were staying on in post-compulsory schooling.
the lower the rate of mobility. The table shows that Britain However, there was a marked strengthening in the relationship
(.271) and the USA (.289) had much higher rates than any between parental income and whether or not the children got a
other countries.All other countries had very similar rates degree. The research found that:
to one another, with correlations between .139 (Norway)
Young people from the poorest income groups have
and .171 (West Germany). These results reinforce Breen’s
increased their graduation rate by just 3 percentage
findings that Britain has comparatively little social mobility
points between 1981! and the late 1990s, compared
compared with most other countries.
with a rise in graduation rates of 26 percentage
In addition to examining the amount of mobility, Blanden
points for those with the richest 20 per cent of
et al. also examined the reasons behind the decline in
parents. Blanden et al., 2005, p. 11
mobility, by looking at educational qualifications. They
measured the level of educational qualification by calculating More recently this research has been updated to examine
how many years it would take the individual to get to their mobility among cohorts born around 1985 and 1999 (Sutton
highest level of qualification after compulsory schooling Trust, 2007). Since these groups have not had time to reach
had ended. They found that educational qualifications were adulthood in the case of the latter group, or an age at which
becoming more strongly linked to level of income over they are likely to have achieved their main career position
time. However, the link between parental income and in the case of the former, the research concentrates on
educational qualifications was also becoming stronger. The measuring educational outcomes which have been shown
sons of affluent parents were taking much more advantage to have a relationship with future earnings. These outcomes
of increased opportunities in education than the sons of include gaining a degree before the age of 23, and high
poorer parents, cementing their place among future high cognitive test scores in the early years of education. The data
earners and leaving little opportunity for those from poorer for the Sutton Trust study were taken from the Millennium
backgrounds to get into the top quartile of earners.A rising Cohort Study and the British Household Panel Survey.
proportion of children stayed on in education after the age Overall this research found that for children born
of 16 from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, but staying- between 1970 and 2000, the influence of background on
on rates rose faster among the more affluent groups than performance had remained fairly constant. However, there
among the less affluent. was a small increase in the disparity between the chances
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
of those from richer backgrounds gaining a degree and Alternatively, gender groupings might be seen to cut
the chances of those from poorer backgrounds gaining a across social class,and perhaps even be more important
degree. In the 1990s, || per cent of degrees were obtained than class. This view implies that a working-class woman
by those from the poorest fifth of households, and 40 per would have more in common with a middle-class woman
cent by those from the most affluent fifth, but in 2002 only than with a working-class man.
10 per cent of graduates were from poorer backgrounds, There are numerous variations on these points of view.
while 44 per cent were from richer backgrounds. In terms In the following sections we demonstrate different ways in
of cognitive test scores, inequality between those from which sociologists have struggled to resolve the problem of
richer backgrounds and those from poorer backgrounds was the relationship between class and gender.
similar for children born in 1970 and those born in 2000/1.
(See Chapter 10 for more details on this and other studies
The household as the unit of class
of changes in educational opportunity and achievement.)
analysis
The first and simplest way to deal with the relationship
Evaluation and conclusion between gender and class is to more or less ignore it. In
Blanden et al.’s study does have some limitations. It only official statistics in Great Britain a person’s class is determined
examined the social mobility and educational achievement by the occupation of the ‘head’ of their household.
of boys, and it moved away from using conventional class Before the 1981 census, males were always considered
categories in favour of considering income groups. The to be the heads of households in which women also lived.
international comparisons were made on the basis of data Thus all the women in such a household were deemed to
collected in slightly different ways at slightly different times have the same class as the male ‘head’. In the 1981 census
(see Table |.18). However, the research is based upon the possibility of having a female ‘head’ of the household was
sizeable samples, and measures of income inequality may first accepted, but in practice the class of the household was
be more reliable than complex occupational schemes used still very likely to be determined by the occupation of the
to determine people's class origin. The updated research husband. Single women and those in all-female households
on educational attainment produced by the Sutton Trust make up the vast majority of women whose class is
does not measure social mobility as such, merely some measured in terms of their own occupation.
educational outcomes that may be related to later mobility,
john Goldthorpe = class, families and the
but it provides some indication that social mobility might
head of household
not increase in the future.
John Goldthorpe has followed this approach in his various
The research presents convincing evidence that, at
studies of class and social mobility. Goldthorpe (1983)
least for men in Britain, there is now greater inequality of
defends this position. He believes that the family is the unit
Opportunity than there was a few decades ago. Parental
of stratification, and the life chances of a family are largely
income is having an increasing influence on children’s income
determined by the occupation of the head of household. He
and chances of obtaining higher educational qualifications.
does, however, accept that where both the male and female
This finding is in marked contrast to the views of those
partners in a family are working, it should not always be the
sociologists who believe that class inequality is declining in
male who is taken as the head of household. The head should
importance, or may even be disappearing. Such views will be
be defined as ‘the family member who has the greatest
examined below (see pp. 88-93).
commitment to, and continuity in, the labour market’.
In theory this position might pose problems for existing
Gender and social class methods of measuring class. If it were found that many wives
had a greater involvement in, and commitment to, the labour
The issue of social mobility illustrates how gender was market than their husbands, then the class position of many
neglected in many early studies. When men were the main families might have been mistakenly defined in the past.
breadwinners in most families and comparatively few married Furthermore, if there were many families in which it was
women worked in paid employment, women seemed of little unclear whether the husband or the wife had the greater
importance in theories of class to the predominantly male involvement in the labour market, and their jobs placed
sociologists carrying out research. However, as women have them in different classes, it would be difficult to determine in
increasingly combined paid work with domestic tasks and which class to place many families. According to Goldthorpe,
have become as numerous as men in the labour force, it has these problems do not arise for the following reasons:
become impossible to construct theories of stratification !. First, by using data from the Oxford Mobility Study (for
without considering the position of women.
further details of this study see pp. 81-2), Goldthorpe
The inclusion of women poses a number of theoretical claims that the vast majority of working wives withdraw
problems for theories of stratification because women are from work once or more during their working life. Thus
more likely to work part-time than men, some women are it is their husbands who have a greater commitment to
housewives, and male and female partners may have jobs in paid work and therefore it is on the basis of the husband’s
different classes. work that the class of the family should be calculated.
On the one hand, women might be seen as a part of 2. Second, Goldthorpe denies that there are a large
the class structure without in any way forming a distinctive number of cross-class families in which the wife has a
group within it. In other words, individual men and women higher social class than the husband. He argues that
are first and foremost members of a class rather than many families only appear to be cross-class families
members of the gender groups ‘male’ and ‘female’. This because the class of the wife has been determined in an
suggests that a working-class woman has more in common inappropriate manner. Most female non-manual workers
with a working-class man than with a middle-class woman.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
have routine or unskilled white-collar jobs. Goldthorpe Research from the USA suggests that men have always
claims that these women have a much less favourable seen their own occupation as the main marker of their class.
market situation than their male counterparts in Women, however, used to see their husband’s occupation
lower-level non-manual jobs. The female workers tend as more important than their own in identifying their class.
to receive lower pay and fewer fringe benefits and enjoy But this has started to change, with women increasingly
less job security. In these circumstances it makes little taking account of both their husband’s and their own job
sense to place such families in the middle class: the in determining their class identity. This suggests that using
woman’s job does not provide the family with middle- the family as the unit of stratification is becoming less
class life chances, and the husband’s job is still the best appropriate over time.
measure of the family’s class. (For details of studies that examine aspects of gender
and class identity, see pp. 76-7.)
Ken Roberts — alternative approaches to
the unit of stratification
Ken Roberts (2011) points out a number of problems with
The death of class?
Goldthorpe’s approach:
There have long been claims that class is becoming
|. People living in the same household may not have the less significant, that class analysis is no longer useful for
same standard of living. As feminists have pointed out, sociologists, or even that social class is dying. According to
marriages may be unequal and one partner may have David Lee and Bryan Turner (1996), as early as the end of
access to more resources than the other. the 19th century the German Eduard Benstein argued that
2. Women now make up nearly half the workforce. improvements in the conditions of the masses were making
Furthermore, career breaks after having children have class-based politics outdated. More recently, postmodern
shortened and become less significant in terms of theorists have argued strongly that class is losing its
career progression. significance or even dying.
3. Partly as a result, ‘there are more households where
Jan Pakulski and Malicoim
deciding which member’s labour market attachment is
Waters - postmodernism and
dominant is far from straightforward’ (Roberts, 2011).
the death of class
4. Family life has become much more complex, with the
Class and other social divisions
age at first marriage having risen, and divorce becoming
In their book The Death of Class (1996) the Australian
more common, so women may spend less time living
sociologists Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters claim that, ‘like
with a male partner. Men also tend to die younger than
beads and Ché Guevara berets, class is passé, especially among
women, and often widows cannot claim their partner’s
advocates of the postmodernist avant-garde and practitioners
full occupational pension. Roberts says, ‘Given these
of the new gender-, eco- and ethnocentred politics’. In other
trends, one would expect more and more women to
words, they believe that it is unfashionable to consider class
regard their own life-chances as depending more upon
important.While they admit that fashion alone should not
their own education rather than who they first marry,
dictate how sociologists see the world, they go on to say
or with whom they are currently cohabiting,
that ‘arguments about the salience of class can no longer be
In these circumstances, it would seem to make more sense dismissed as symptoms of ideological bias, intellectual weakness
to classify people as individuals rather than as members of or moral corruption’. This is because, they claim, there is
households. However, there are two major problems with growing empirical evidence that class is losing its significance.
this approach as well: According to Pakulski and Waters, classes only exist
if there is a ‘minimum level of clustering or groupness’,
|. Cohabiting or married individuals in the same
and such clusterings or groupness is no longer evident.
occupation will be seen as having the same class
People no longer feel they belong to class groupings, and
position as each other regardless of their spouse’s or
members of supposed classes include a wide variety of very
partner’s occupation. Yet they may have very different
different people. Pakulski and Waters do not claim that
life chances if one is married to an unskilled manual
social inequality is disappearing, but they do argue that there
worker and the other is married to a professional.
are new ‘cleavages that are emerging in post-class society’
Such cross-class families create problems for using the
which overshadow class differences. If people do not act
individual as the unit of stratification.
as members of classes and do not see class-based issues
2. Numerous studies continue to suggest that ‘the
as of special significance, then sociologists should not give
husband’s occupation is still, even today, a better
predictor of the wife’s politics and class identity than
special importance to class.To Pakulski and Waters, class can
her own job’ (Roberts, 2011).
be seen as just one, not very important, division in society,
along with ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.
Roberts concludes that there are strong arguments on both
Types of society
sides of the debate as to whether families or individuals
should be seen as the unit of stratification, and the best Pakulski and Waters argue that the stratification systems of
approach to adopt partly depends upon what you are capitalist societies have gone through three phases.
studying. He goes on to argue that the most appropriate In economic-class society, which existed in the
approach also depends upon changes in society and 19th century, society was divided into property owners and
subjective views of class. How people see their class position workers. The property-owning class controlled the state,
will have an important influence upon such things as political and culture was divided into ‘dominant and subordinate
affiliation and attitudes. ideologies and into high and low cultures’.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Organised-class society existed during roughly rights and global values that identify and empower
the first 75 years of the 20th century. The state became struggles around such diverse focuses as postcolonial
the dominant force in society and it was ‘typically ruled racism, sexual preferences, gender discrimination,
by a single unified bloc, a political-bureaucratic elite, that environmental degradation, citizen participation,
exercises power over subordinated masses’.The state elite religious commitments and ethnic self-determination.
exercised a strong control over the economy and may have These issues have little to do with class. In the
followed policies of redistribution or state ownership of contemporary period of history, the class paradigm
some industries. With this type of government in office the is intellectually and morally bankrupt. Pakulski and
mass of the population tried to influence the state through Waters, 1996
political parties rather than through conflicts within industry.
To Pakulski and Waters, class politics is dead and issues to
In the last quarter of the 20th century capitalist societies
do with ethnicity, gender, religion and cultural differences
developed into status-conventional societies. In this
and preferences are far more important. People have
phase stratification became based on cultural rather than
become more interested in saving the environment than
economic differences. Pakulski and Waters say,‘the strata
fighting for class interests, and a much wider variety of
are lifestyle- and/or value-based status configurations.
issues has become politically important.
They can form around differentiated patterns of value
consumption, identity, belief, symbolic meaning, taste, opinion Reasons for the death of class
or consumption. People can choose their lifestyles and Pakulski and Waters offer a number of explanations for
values and are therefore not restricted in the groups they the death of class. Class divisions in earlier years of the
can join by their background or job. Because people’s tastes 20th century were first undermined by the growth of
and identities can change rapidly, the stratification system increasingly interventionist states. The most interventionist
‘appears as a shifting mosaic’. There are many different states of all were fascist (for example, Nazi Germany) or
groupings within society based on these cultural differences communist (for example, the USSR). In other societies the
and status depends on the values of these groupings. development of welfare states and consensus between
Economic inequalities become much less important governments, business and unions reduced the direct impact
in shaping status differences. ‘Symbolic values’, the value of class relationships.
of different images, become the crucial factor shaping More recently there has been a shift towards ‘market-
stratification, and the conventions that establish these values meritocratic’ relationships, where the state intervenes less
form the basis of hierarchies in status-conventiona! societies. in the economy and society. Alongside this, the division
For example, the décor of your house becomes more of labour has become more complex, and educational
important than the value of your house. Similarly, low-paid but qualifications and professional skills have become
desirable jobs in the media might give you more status than more important than class background in shaping job
less well-paid but unfashionable jobs in manufacturing industry. opportunities.
Pakulski and Waters distinguish four key features of the Property has increasingly moved from private hands to
change in the stratification system in status-conventional being owned by organisations. Individuals or families own
societies: fewer large businesses. Property ownership has also become
more dispersed, making property ‘a decreasing source of
I. Culturalism. Stratification is based on lifestyles,
power’. Many people own their own homes and have some
aesthetics and information flows. ‘Material and power
savings. Pakulski and Waters argue that in capitalist societies
phenomena are reducible to these symbolically
wealth became progressively more equally distributed during
manifested lifestyle and value phenomena.
the 20th century.
2. Fragmentation. In this new type of society people have
Pakulski and Waters accept that there is some evidence
many different statuses based on their membership of
that in recent years class inequalities have started to
different groups and different patterns of consumption.
grow in countries such as the USA, Australia and the UK.
There is a ‘virtually infinite overlap of associations and
However, they argue that the changes are small, the trends
identifications that are shifting and unstable’.
inconsistent and any overall effect unimportant. In any case,
3. Autonomisation. Individuals become more autonomous
‘short-term fluctuations are probably influenced more by
or independent in their values and behaviour. People
the changing cash value of assets than by the redistribution
choose how to act and what to believe and you can no
of ownership’. For example, changes in house prices and
longer predict these things from their class background
share values affect the overall distribution of wealth as much
or other characteristics.
as houses and shares changing hands.
4. Resignification. People can change their preferences
With wider distribution of wealth, more people are able
and identifications, leading to great fluidity and
to consume products well in excess of what they need for
unpredictability in the status system of society. People
physical survival.As a result, there is much more opportunity
constantly change what they see as especially significant.
for individuals to demonstrate taste and to choose products
In arguing for this change in the nature of stratification, that match their identities. Similarly they can judge others
Pakulski and Waters are highly critical of those theorists in terms of what they consume. Thus the ecologically
who, as they see it, cling to outdated notions about the aware might judge those who have more money but who
centrality of class. They say that sociology is still failing: consume ecologically damaging products to be inferior. Thus,
consumption
to recognise that oppression, exploitation, and
conflict are being socially constructed around is becoming the standard by which individuals judge
transcendent conceptions of individual human others and themselves. Consumer goods become
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
signs of association and lifestyle. They are consumed identification’. Indeed, as earlier parts of this chapter
for the images they convey, rather than because of have indicated, in Britain at least, people continue
utility or aesthetics, much less out of necessity. Few to believe that classes exist and see themselves as
consumers would seriously believe, for example, belonging to particular classes (see p. 68).
that they can make a difference to the environment, 2. By claiming that consumption patterns and differences
much less to a clean domestic environment, by using in lifestyle have become more significant than class
‘green’ household cleaning materials, but they can, differences, Pakulski and Waters neglect the obvious
by consuming them, indicate a commitment to point that class differences influence the types of
environmentalist values. Pakulski and Waters, 1996 lifestyle that different groups can afford. It seems
strange that they appear to think that the underclass
Globalisation of the world economy has meant that class
chooses a poverty-stricken lifestyle rather than that
inequalities within individual countries have become less
they adopt such a lifestyle due to lack of money.
important (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of globalisation).
The ‘culture of poverty’ theory, which Pakulski and
Since exploitation now stretches beyond nations, there is
Waters mention approvingly, has come in for sustained
much less common ground for class conflict developing
and highly damaging criticism (see pp. 261-2). Of course,
within particular societies. Partly as a consequence of this,
people with similar levels of income can make different
voting and party allegiance become less based on class
decisions about their lifestyles and consumption patterns,
and there is a ‘decline in the use of class imagery and
but those with few resources are inevitably excluded
consciousness in politics’. For example, Pakulski and Waters
from the many choices that are only available to those
quote studies of voting in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden
with sufficient income or wealth.As John Westergaard
and the USA which suggest that there has been a decline in
(1996a) puts it, ‘consumer power, after all, is money
the strength of the relationship between manual workers
power: quite simply, the rich and the comfortably off have
voting for left-wing parties and non-manual workers voting
much more of it than ordinary wage-earners, let alone
for right-wing parties. In its place, ‘new politics’ based on
the poor who are out of wage work’.
non-class issues has grown in significance. They say:
3. Pakulski and Waters have been criticised for making
class simply does not fit the wars and conflicts of the unsubstantiated generalisations. For example, Bradley
Middle East, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the (1997) points out that Pakulski and Waters claim
Bosnian conflict, or the religious and ethnic conflicts that patriarchy is dying because new technology is
of the Indian subcontinent. National, religious, freeing women from housework and the demands of
regional, ethnic, gender, racial and sexual preference childbearing. No real evidence is used to back up this
identities are much more important. Pakulski and claim, which contradicts a sizeable amount of feminist
Waters, 1996 research. Furthermore, Bradley asks, ‘what is one to
make of wildly overstated generalizations like this: “‘the
Although these various identities and non-class sources of
family is more or less entirely losing its function of social
conflict have always existed, they used to be overshadowed
and cultural reproduction’’?’
by class issues. Now, they overshadow class issues. Pakulski
Bradley accuses much of The Death of Class of being ‘a
and Waters thus conclude that ‘the intellectual armoury of
rehashing of the usual postmodern truisms about change,
class theory is about as useful for the contemporary social
invoking consumerism, fragmentation and destabilization
scene as a cavalry brigade in a tank battle’.
with insufficient empirical backing’.To other critics, this
Even apparently new classes, such as the ‘underclass’,
lack of empirical backing — the lack of adequate evidence —
cannot be seen in conventional class terms. According
is also true of Pakulski and Waters’s claims about class.
to Pakulski and Waters, ‘membership of the underclass is
Gordon Marshall (1997) argues that their work
a function not of its members’ exploitation but of their
‘misrepresents the evidence in order to substantiate
incapacity to consume.An earlier generation of social
their arguments’. Pakulski and Waters quote work by
scientists wrote of poverty as a culture. Perhaps it is time to
Peter Saunders which argues that the consumption of
do so once again.
housing might lead to a division between home owners
Criticisms of Pakulski and Waters and those in rented housing, without acknowledging
Although Pakulski and Waters identify some important Saunders’s own admission that class remains the key
changes in capitalist societies, not surprisingly their claim factor shaping voting patterns in Britain.
that class is dying has attracted strong criticism. Pakulski and Waters also claim that height
differences between the classes are being reduced and
1. Some writers have criticised Pakulski and Waters for
ignore evidence that middle-class people in Britain
using inconsistent and confused definitions of class.
are still, on average, about five centimetres taller than
Harriet Bradley (1997) points out that at some points
working-class people. Marshall concludes that ‘these
they use primarily economic definitions of class but at
illustrations confirm that the postmodernist critique of
others they ‘measure the existence of class in terms of
class analysis has largely detached itself from empirical
its presence or absence in political discourse’. However,
reality’.
whether politicians talk in class terms is not crucial to
whether class in economic terms exists. Bradley argues Ulrich Beck - Risk Society - ‘beyond
that ‘such definitional sleight of hand serves to write status and class’
class altogether out of the script, where a more balanced Risk society
assessment might suggest that class is legitimately seen It is not only postmodernists who have suggested that
as one of many aspects of social inequality and political classes may be dying out. Ulrich Beck also argues that
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
contemporary societies are undergoing transformation, but those working at or living near to a nuclear power plant.
not into postmodern societies. Instead, he sees society as Radioactivity knows no geographical limits and can spread
changing to a risk society (Beck, 1992). across national borders.
According to Beck, there have been three main stages The rich may make some effort to avoid or minimise
in the development of societies: premodernity, simple risks. For example, they can buy food that has less chance
modernity, and reflexive or late modernity. In of being affected by pollutants — hence the popularity of
simple modernity, religion and tradition were replaced by organic food. They might choose to buy second homes
‘technological rationalisation’ and a sense of certainty that or go on holiday in areas where environmental risks are
came from a belief in the ability of science and technology low. However, they cannot avoid risks altogether. Like
to solve problems. However, in the period of reflexive radioactivity, air and water pollution cannot be entirely
modernity, a risk society becomes established. In simple avoided.Acid rain caused by industrial pollution in one
modernity, most conflicts concerned the distribution of country might affect another country. Some risks, such as
wealth.A shortage of wealth was a widespread problem: the greenhouse effect and global warming and the depletion
most people suffered from ‘genuine material need’. People’s of the ozone layer, are global in nature. Nobody can avoid
chances in life were significantly undermined by a lack of them.As Beck puts it, the only way to avoid all risks would
money. The risks associated with poverty, lack of job security be by ‘not eating, not drinking and not breathing’.
and inequality was at the forefront of people’s concerns. In the latest phase of modernity the predominant
The inequalities produced by the class structure in concern becomes how to control the risks. People are no
simple modernity were analysed by writers such as Karl longer exclusively concerned ‘with making nature useful,
Marx and Max Weber. Since there was insufficient wealth or with releasing mankind from traditional constraints, but
to go around, the most important conflicts in society also and essentially with problems resulting from techno-
concerned the distribution of wealth. These sorts of issues economic development itself’ (Beck, 1992). The biggest
remain paramount in the ‘third world’, where poverty and concerns of late modernity are problems created by modern
material scarcity are still major problems. science and technology. For these reasons Beck defines the
However, in Western Europe and other affluent societies, latest period of modernity as reflexive modernity. In
technological developments have led to a greatly increased reflexive modernity people are concerned to reflect upon
productive capacity and a reduction in material need. It modernity itself and the problems it creates.
has become possible to produce enough to meet people’s
Individualisation and the decline of class
essential material needs.As Beck puts it, ‘the struggle for
In the risk societies of reflexive modernity, the social
one’s “daily bread” has lost its urgency’.
groupings that were so significant in simple modern
In countries such as Germany, material scarcity ceased
societies begin to lose their importance. In particular, class
to be the main problem from the early 1970s. However,
and status groups lose social significance.
this did not mean the end of all problems and conflicts.
Beck does not deny that inequalities between rich
Instead, a new series of problems began to confront such
and poor remain. Furthermore, he accepts that the
societies. The societies changed from wealth-distributing
basic features of capitalism do not change. He says, ‘the
societies to risk-distributing societies. The central
fundamental conditions of wage labour have remained the
problem in society changed from creating and distributing
same’. However, according to Beck, ‘ties to a social class
wealth to managing the risks that were created by science
recede mysteriously into the background for the actions of
and technology. In particular, science and technology came
people. Status-based social milieus and lifestyles typical of a
to be seen as creating problems rather than simply solving
class culture lose their lustre’
them. There was a growing awareness of the hazardous side-
Despite the continuance of inequality, people no longer
effects and destructive potential of science and technology.
feel a sense of class identity or base their lifestyle around
The problems of risk society class membership. The main reason for this is that risks are
Beck uses a number of examples to illustrate the problems no longer related to class membership. In simple modernity,
of risk society: the working class were much more insecure than higher
classes. In reflexive modernity, risks created by science
|. Thanks to developments in agriculture, shortage of food
and technology affects all classes. People cannot protect
is no longer a problem in the rich countries. However, a
themselves against them by having a high income.
plentiful supply of processed food has led to unhealthy
Even economic insecurity ceases to be based on class
diets, obesity and consequent health problems.
differences. Beck argues that in Germany unemployment has
2. Atomic energy has helped to produce abundant energy affected all classes. Between 1974 and 1983 about a third of
supplies, but nuclear waste and the possibility of nuclear Germans, from every class, experienced at least one period
accidents create serious health risks for people.
of unemployment. In this situation people do not experience
3. Toxins in the environment, particularly in the air,
risk as a class-based problem: it has the potential to affect
water and foodstuffs, produce ‘systematic and often
everybody. Beck therefore believes that social inequality has
irreversible harm’.The toxins are often invisible and
been individualised. People experience and worry about risk
people are not immediately aware of the risks they
as individuals rather than as members of a particular class.
create.
A number of factors work together to encourage
Many of these risks are not confined to particular social individualisation and to undermine class cultures and
groups. They may be as likely to afflict the wealthy as identities. Education becomes increasingly important in
the poor, and are beyond the control of individuals. For determining opportunities. There is increased experience
example, the risks of atomic accidents do not just affect of social mobility and competition between people for jobs.
SOCIOLOGY THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES
Employment becomes less stable. People change jobs more postmodernists such as Pakulski and Waters, Beck has a
often and fewer have a job for life. In all these respects, tendency to make unsubstantiated generalisations.
individuals have to make their own way through life rather
John H. Westergaard - the
than experiencing life in terms of class membership. They hardening of class inequality
experience it as individuals involved in planning and shaping John Westergaard (1995, 1996a, 1996b) takes a very different
their own destiny. approach from that of Pakulski and Waters and Beck. He
Classes are increasingly divided between those with argues that, far from dying, class differences became stronger
different levels of educational qualifications.As people in the late 20th century, particularly in Britain. While the
become geographically mobile, moving from job to job,
claims of postmodernists, Beck’s work and politicians’
residential areas are no longer based around particular
rhetoric might suggest that class is less important, the
classes. Beck says, ‘People from a great variety of social
objective reality is that class divisions are becoming more
backgrounds are mixed together and social relations in
important, not less.
the neighbourhood are much more loosely organized.’ In
Westergaard broadly follows Weberian and Marxist
these circumstances, people can no longer rely on relating
approaches to class, saying that ‘class structure is first of
to others in terms of class culture.‘The newly formed
alla matter of people’s circumstances in life as set by their
social relationships and social networks now have to be
unequal places in the economic order’. He goes on to state
individually chosen; social ties, too, are becoming reflexive, so
unequivocally, ‘in that sense, class structure has recently
that they have to be established, maintained, and constantly
hardened in Britain’. He tries to substantiate this claim with
renewed by individuals.
a range of empirical evidence.
In politics, too, the importance of class declines. Political
conflicts increasingly take the form of ‘temporary coalitions’ Evidence of the hardening of class structure
between individuals concerned about a particular problem, Westergaard (1996a, 1996b) quotes a variety of statistics
such as an ecological threat. Risks that affect all classes from British government sources to back up his claim:
become an important focus of political concern.
|. Between 1980 and 1990 the earnings of the highest-
People continue to experience discrimination resulting
paid 10 per cent of white-collar workers rose by
from ‘ascribed characteristics’. Conflicts in terms of such
approximately 40 per cent in real terms, while the
characteristics as ‘race, skin colour, gender, ethnicity, age,
poorest-paid 10 per cent of blue-collar workers saw
homosexuality, physical disabilities’ rise to prominence as the
virtually no rise in their real incomes.
importance of class declines.
2. The share of total household income going to the
Beck does not argue that class solidarity disappears
poorest 20 per cent of households fell from 10 per cent
completely, or immediately. There is a gradual process
in the late 1970s to 7 per cent by the late 1980s, while
whereby class loses its social significance. The end result
the share of the richest 20 per cent grew from 37 per cent
will be a situation where ‘Class society will pale into
to 44 per cent.
insignificance beside an individualized society of employees.’
3. Private ownership of property has become more
Evaluation of Beck’s Risk Society concentrated. Thus the share of marketable wealth
Beck’s work on risk society has been widely influential, but owned by the richest 5 per cent of the British
it has also been subject to criticism.A key criticism is that population rose from 36 per cent at the start of the
Beck greatly exaggerates the shift from a society in which 1980s to 38 per cent at the end of that decade.
risks stemmed from scarcity to a society in which risks
Westergaard argues that the power of the highest social
affect all classes however well off they might be.
classes, and of big business, has also been growing. He says:
Alan Scott (2000) argues that even in pre-industrial times
the rich could not isolate themselves from all risks. Problems the power of private business has grown, ofcourse,
such as harvest failure could affect the food supply of the as free market policies intended. To take just one
rich. Infectious diseases, which were responsible for many instance, business representation in the governance
deaths, and natural disasters, knew no class boundaries. of public education and health has been consistently
Scott also argues that in contemporary societies money can stepped up; and, more generally, business-style
give far more protection from risks than Beck acknowledges. prescriptions for ‘cost-efficiency’ have spread widely
Scott says,‘Those who can, do move away from areas of in the conduct of public-sector affairs. Westergaard,
high pollution, environmental degradation and danger’ They 1996a
cannot isolate themselves from total catastrophe (such as
nuclear war). The denationalisation of public enterprises (such as British
Steel and British Airways) has concentrated more power
Beck recognises that inequality continues to exist, but he
in the hands of private businesses. Changes in the City of
does not acknowledge the extent to which this still affects
London have increased the power of finance capitalists,
life chances.As discussed earlier (see p.51), class differences
continue to affect life expectancy and child mortality. while the influence of trade unions has declined. According
to Westergaard,‘a small network of top people from top
Beck can also be criticised for simply asserting that class
no longer has a significant effect on identity, or influences corporations and institutions’, including ‘insurance companies
differences in lifestyle. There is much empirical research and pension funds’, wields enormous power, which ‘comes
that suggests class identities still exist (see, for example, from the mass of corporate assets whose strategic
Marshall et al., p.65) and that class still influences lifestyle deployment they lead’. The top class comprises less than
| per cent of the total population but, from this viewpoint,
(see, for example, Devine, pp. 64-5, or Skeggs, pp. 76-7). Like
its power steadily increased from 1979 to the late 1990s.
Chapter 1 Stratification, class and inequality
Reasons for the hardening of class inequality faded?’ If the inequalities between classes are greater, why
The main reasons for these changes, according to does there appear to be less class consciousness? He argues
Westergaard, are economic and political. Economic that, in Britain at least, the Labour Party may be largely
growth has become more varied, and North American responsible.As the party which traditionally represents the
and Western European economies have faced growing interests of the disadvantaged, it is important in expressing
competition from Asia. Transnational corporations have and mobilising class consciousness in the working class.
developed faster than nationally based companies. However, factors such as internal party disputes and the
British government policies changed from 1979 onwards widespread strikes in the late 1970s, under a Labour
in response to these developments. What Westergaard calls government, led to disillusionment with the party. In order
the ‘class compromise’ of the 1940s involved redistributive to regain support, it abandoned many of its traditional
taxation and a commitment to the welfare state and state policies, which were in favour of redistribution to the less
ownership of some industries. Conservative governments well-off. This left no major party to articulate the interests of
strengthened the importance of market relationships in the a class-conscious working class.
economy and reduced the progressive elements in taxation. Nevertheless, Westergaard maintains that there is the
There were increased inequalities in earnings as the market potential for the revival of class consciousness and left-
value of unskilled labour declined and the market value of wing policies. Reviewing opinion poll evidence, he says,
some types of skilled labour increased. The government ‘Many people, then, appear to want to see “fairer shares”.
accepted, even encouraged, the growth of these inequalities And although many are sceptical about the means to that
as necessary in a competitive market economy. end, popular conceptions are nevertheless quite out of line
with fashionable social theory and right-wing ideology. Like
Class and other divisions
Marshall et al. (see p. 68) and many other sociologists, he
Westergaard accepts the point made by postmodernists
thinks that class is far from dead — indeed in some respects
such as Pakulski and Waters that there are important
it is not only alive but kicking the disadvantaged in society
divisions other than class. However, he does not accept that
harder than for many decades.
these divisions have superseded class.As suggested above,
divisions along consumption lines reflect differences in
income to a considerable extent.
Summary and conclusions
Westergaard accepts that gender divisions are an
Westergaard’s data are now a little dated, but the
important aspect of inequality. However, class and gender
evidence of this chapter on more recent trends and
divisions ‘twine together, to reinforce the effects of class
research tends to support his views. Inequalities of
rather than go against them’. For example, most women with
income and wealth have not declined significantly in
white-collar jobs are married to men with white-collar jobs,
recent years (see p. 65) and the data do not suggest
and working-class women are largely married to working-
Britain has become a meritocratic society. Research
class men. Many families therefore enjoy the material benefits
on social mobility between different levels of income
of two white-collar salaries, whereas few households have
shows that opportunities for upward mobility have
the income from one blue-collar wage boosted by a partner’s
been declining, that Britain is less meritocratic than
higher professional or managerial salary.Vvomen suffer the
most similar societies, and that class increasingly
same sorts of class disadvantages as men. The main difference
affects access to higher education (see pp. 699-701).
is that, typically, they are worse off than men.
The boundaries between classes may have become
Similarly, ethnic divisions are an important source
increasingly blurred, but that does not prevent —
of disadvantage, but again they tend to reinforce rather
people from recognising the existence of inequality
than contradict class divisions. Westergaard argues that
and injustice in society (see pp. 67-8). Undoubtedly
‘racial division — on this score much like gender division —
there have been important changes in class structure,
comes to expression in good part as low placement of its
class culture and class consciousness, but objectively
victims precisely in the economic order of production and
class inequality continues to exercise considerable
distribution: that is in the structure of class’.
influence over people's lives. Subjectively, many people
Nor does Westergaard see a sharp division between an
may resist seeing themselves as part of a class, but
underclass and the rest of the class structure. Those who
cultural differences between classes are an integral
are usually seen as part of the underclass tend to be those
and essential part of everyday experience (see Skeggs,
from working-class backgrounds who have retired or cannot
1997, 2005, discussed on pp. 76-7, Charlesworth, 2000,
find work. The unemployed or retired middle class tend
discussed on pp. 74—6, and Wynne, 1998, discussed
to have savings or pensions which mean they are not as
on pp. 59-61). Indeed, ethnographic studies of class
disadvantaged as those held to be in the underclass.
perhaps bring home more eloquently than statistics
Class ‘in itself’ and class ‘for itself” on social mobility that claims of the death of class are
Westergaard comments, in concluding his argument, that ‘we much exaggerated.
are still left with a puzzle: when class division “in itself” has
sharpened, why does class division “for itself” seem to have