03 QuantifyingUncertainty
03 QuantifyingUncertainty
Roberto Sebastiani
DISI, Università di Trento, Italy – [email protected]
http://disi.unitn.it/rseba/DIDATTICA/fai_2020/
Copyright notice: Most examples and images displayed in the slides of this course are taken from
[Russell & Norwig, “Artificial Intelligence, a Modern Approach”, 3rd ed., Pearson],
including explicitly figures from the above-mentioned book, and their copyright is detained by the authors.
A few other material (text, figures, examples) is authored by (in alphabetical order):
Pieter Abbeel, Bonnie J. Dorr, Anca Dragan, Dan Klein, Nikita Kitaev, Tom Lenaerts, Michela Milano, Dana Nau, Maria
Simi, who detain its copyright. These slides cannot can be displayed in public without the permission of the author.
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Outline
2 Basics on Probability
2 / 44
Outline
2 Basics on Probability
3 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty
Agents often make decisions based on incomplete information
partial observability
nondeterministic actions
Partial solution (see previous chapters): maintain belief states
represent the set of all possible world states the agent might be in
generating a contingency plan handling every possible eventuality
Several drawbacks:
must consider every possible explanation for the observation
(even very-unlikely ones) =⇒ impossibly complex belief-states
contingent plans handling every eventuality grow arbitrarily large
sometimes there is no plan that is guaranteed to achieve the goal
Agent’s knowledge cannot guarantee a successful outcome ...
... but can provide some degree of belief (likelihood) on it
A rational decision depends on both the relative importance of
(sub)goals and the likelihood that they will be achieved
Probability theory offers a clean way to quantify likelihood
4 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example
Automated taxi to Airport
Goal: deliver a passenger to the airport on time
Action At : leave for airport t minutes before flight
How can we be sure that A90 will succeed?
Too many sources of uncertainty:
partial observability (ex: road state, other drivers’ plans, etc.)
uncertainty in action outcome (ex: flat tire, etc.)
noisy sensors (ex: unreliable traffic reports)
complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
=⇒ With purely-logical approach it is difficult to anticipate everything
that can go wrong
risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time” or
leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
“A25 will get me there on time if there’s no accident on the bridge ,
and it doesn’t rain and my tires remain intact , and...”
Over-cautious choices are not rational solutions either
ex: A1440 causes staying overnight at the airport
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Acting Under Uncertainty: Example
Automated taxi to Airport
Goal: deliver a passenger to the airport on time
Action At : leave for airport t minutes before flight
How can we be sure that A90 will succeed?
Too many sources of uncertainty:
partial observability (ex: road state, other drivers’ plans, etc.)
uncertainty in action outcome (ex: flat tire, etc.)
noisy sensors (ex: unreliable traffic reports)
complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
=⇒ With purely-logical approach it is difficult to anticipate everything
that can go wrong
risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time” or
leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
“A25 will get me there on time if there’s no accident on the bridge ,
and it doesn’t rain and my tires remain intact , and...”
Over-cautious choices are not rational solutions either
ex: A1440 causes staying overnight at the airport
5 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example
Automated taxi to Airport
Goal: deliver a passenger to the airport on time
Action At : leave for airport t minutes before flight
How can we be sure that A90 will succeed?
Too many sources of uncertainty:
partial observability (ex: road state, other drivers’ plans, etc.)
uncertainty in action outcome (ex: flat tire, etc.)
noisy sensors (ex: unreliable traffic reports)
complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
=⇒ With purely-logical approach it is difficult to anticipate everything
that can go wrong
risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time” or
leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
“A25 will get me there on time if there’s no accident on the bridge ,
and it doesn’t rain and my tires remain intact , and...”
Over-cautious choices are not rational solutions either
ex: A1440 causes staying overnight at the airport
5 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example
Automated taxi to Airport
Goal: deliver a passenger to the airport on time
Action At : leave for airport t minutes before flight
How can we be sure that A90 will succeed?
Too many sources of uncertainty:
partial observability (ex: road state, other drivers’ plans, etc.)
uncertainty in action outcome (ex: flat tire, etc.)
noisy sensors (ex: unreliable traffic reports)
complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
=⇒ With purely-logical approach it is difficult to anticipate everything
that can go wrong
risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time” or
leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
“A25 will get me there on time if there’s no accident on the bridge ,
and it doesn’t rain and my tires remain intact , and...”
Over-cautious choices are not rational solutions either
ex: A1440 causes staying overnight at the airport
5 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example
Automated taxi to Airport
Goal: deliver a passenger to the airport on time
Action At : leave for airport t minutes before flight
How can we be sure that A90 will succeed?
Too many sources of uncertainty:
partial observability (ex: road state, other drivers’ plans, etc.)
uncertainty in action outcome (ex: flat tire, etc.)
noisy sensors (ex: unreliable traffic reports)
complexity of modelling and predicting traffic
=⇒ With purely-logical approach it is difficult to anticipate everything
that can go wrong
risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time” or
leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making:
“A25 will get me there on time if there’s no accident on the bridge ,
and it doesn’t rain and my tires remain intact , and...”
Over-cautious choices are not rational solutions either
ex: A1440 causes staying overnight at the airport
5 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example (2)
A medical diagnosis
Given the symptoms (toothache) infer the cause (cavity)
How to encode this relation in logic?
diagnostic rules:
Toothache → Cavity (wrong)
Toothache → (Cavity ∨ GumProblem ∨ Abscess ∨ ...)
(too many possible causes, some very unlikely)
causal rules:
Cavity → Toothache (wrong)
(Cavity ∧ ...) → Toothache (many possible (con)causes)
Problems in specifying the correct logical rules:
Complexity: too many possible antecedents or consequents
Theoretical ignorance: no complete theory for the domain
Practical ignorance: no complete knowledge of the patient
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Acting Under Uncertainty: Example (2)
A medical diagnosis
Given the symptoms (toothache) infer the cause (cavity)
How to encode this relation in logic?
diagnostic rules:
Toothache → Cavity (wrong)
Toothache → (Cavity ∨ GumProblem ∨ Abscess ∨ ...)
(too many possible causes, some very unlikely)
causal rules:
Cavity → Toothache (wrong)
(Cavity ∧ ...) → Toothache (many possible (con)causes)
Problems in specifying the correct logical rules:
Complexity: too many possible antecedents or consequents
Theoretical ignorance: no complete theory for the domain
Practical ignorance: no complete knowledge of the patient
6 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example (2)
A medical diagnosis
Given the symptoms (toothache) infer the cause (cavity)
How to encode this relation in logic?
diagnostic rules:
Toothache → Cavity (wrong)
Toothache → (Cavity ∨ GumProblem ∨ Abscess ∨ ...)
(too many possible causes, some very unlikely)
causal rules:
Cavity → Toothache (wrong)
(Cavity ∧ ...) → Toothache (many possible (con)causes)
Problems in specifying the correct logical rules:
Complexity: too many possible antecedents or consequents
Theoretical ignorance: no complete theory for the domain
Practical ignorance: no complete knowledge of the patient
6 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example (2)
A medical diagnosis
Given the symptoms (toothache) infer the cause (cavity)
How to encode this relation in logic?
diagnostic rules:
Toothache → Cavity (wrong)
Toothache → (Cavity ∨ GumProblem ∨ Abscess ∨ ...)
(too many possible causes, some very unlikely)
causal rules:
Cavity → Toothache (wrong)
(Cavity ∧ ...) → Toothache (many possible (con)causes)
Problems in specifying the correct logical rules:
Complexity: too many possible antecedents or consequents
Theoretical ignorance: no complete theory for the domain
Practical ignorance: no complete knowledge of the patient
6 / 44
Acting Under Uncertainty: Example (2)
A medical diagnosis
Given the symptoms (toothache) infer the cause (cavity)
How to encode this relation in logic?
diagnostic rules:
Toothache → Cavity (wrong)
Toothache → (Cavity ∨ GumProblem ∨ Abscess ∨ ...)
(too many possible causes, some very unlikely)
causal rules:
Cavity → Toothache (wrong)
(Cavity ∧ ...) → Toothache (many possible (con)causes)
Problems in specifying the correct logical rules:
Complexity: too many possible antecedents or consequents
Theoretical ignorance: no complete theory for the domain
Practical ignorance: no complete knowledge of the patient
6 / 44
Summarizing Uncertainty
Probability allows to summarize the uncertainty on effects of
laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc.
ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc.
Probability can be derived from
statistical data (ex: 80% of toothache patients so far had cavities)
some knowledge (ex: 80% of toothache patients has cavities)
their combination thereof
Probability statements are made with respect to a state of
knowledge (aka evidence), not with respect to the real world
e.g., “The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she
has a toothache, is 0.8”:
P(HasCavity (patient) | hasToothAche(patient)) = 0.8
Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence:
“The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she has a
toothache and a history of gum disease, is 0.4”:
P(HasCavity (patient)
| hasToothAche(patient) ∧ HistoryOfGum(patient)) = 0.4
7 / 44
Summarizing Uncertainty
Probability allows to summarize the uncertainty on effects of
laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc.
ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc.
Probability can be derived from
statistical data (ex: 80% of toothache patients so far had cavities)
some knowledge (ex: 80% of toothache patients has cavities)
their combination thereof
Probability statements are made with respect to a state of
knowledge (aka evidence), not with respect to the real world
e.g., “The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she
has a toothache, is 0.8”:
P(HasCavity (patient) | hasToothAche(patient)) = 0.8
Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence:
“The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she has a
toothache and a history of gum disease, is 0.4”:
P(HasCavity (patient)
| hasToothAche(patient) ∧ HistoryOfGum(patient)) = 0.4
7 / 44
Summarizing Uncertainty
Probability allows to summarize the uncertainty on effects of
laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc.
ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc.
Probability can be derived from
statistical data (ex: 80% of toothache patients so far had cavities)
some knowledge (ex: 80% of toothache patients has cavities)
their combination thereof
Probability statements are made with respect to a state of
knowledge (aka evidence), not with respect to the real world
e.g., “The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she
has a toothache, is 0.8”:
P(HasCavity (patient) | hasToothAche(patient)) = 0.8
Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence:
“The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she has a
toothache and a history of gum disease, is 0.4”:
P(HasCavity (patient)
| hasToothAche(patient) ∧ HistoryOfGum(patient)) = 0.4
7 / 44
Summarizing Uncertainty
Probability allows to summarize the uncertainty on effects of
laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc.
ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc.
Probability can be derived from
statistical data (ex: 80% of toothache patients so far had cavities)
some knowledge (ex: 80% of toothache patients has cavities)
their combination thereof
Probability statements are made with respect to a state of
knowledge (aka evidence), not with respect to the real world
e.g., “The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she
has a toothache, is 0.8”:
P(HasCavity (patient) | hasToothAche(patient)) = 0.8
Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence:
“The probability that the patient has a cavity, given that she has a
toothache and a history of gum disease, is 0.4”:
P(HasCavity (patient)
| hasToothAche(patient) ∧ HistoryOfGum(patient)) = 0.4
7 / 44
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Ex: Suppose I believe:
P(A25 gets me there on time |...) = 0.04
P(A90 gets me there on time |...) = 0.70
P(A120 gets me there on time |...) = 0.95
P(A1440 gets me there on time |...) = 0.9999
Which action to choose?
=⇒ Depends on tradeoffs among preferences:
missing flight vs. costs (airport cuisine, sleep overnight in airport)
When there are conflicting goals the agent may express
preferences among them by means of a utility function.
Utilities are combined with probabilities in the general theory of
rational decisions, aka decision theory:
Decision theory = Probability theory + Utility theory
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): an agent is rational if and only
if it chooses the action that yields the maximum expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.
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Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Ex: Suppose I believe:
P(A25 gets me there on time |...) = 0.04
P(A90 gets me there on time |...) = 0.70
P(A120 gets me there on time |...) = 0.95
P(A1440 gets me there on time |...) = 0.9999
Which action to choose?
=⇒ Depends on tradeoffs among preferences:
missing flight vs. costs (airport cuisine, sleep overnight in airport)
When there are conflicting goals the agent may express
preferences among them by means of a utility function.
Utilities are combined with probabilities in the general theory of
rational decisions, aka decision theory:
Decision theory = Probability theory + Utility theory
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): an agent is rational if and only
if it chooses the action that yields the maximum expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.
8 / 44
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Ex: Suppose I believe:
P(A25 gets me there on time |...) = 0.04
P(A90 gets me there on time |...) = 0.70
P(A120 gets me there on time |...) = 0.95
P(A1440 gets me there on time |...) = 0.9999
Which action to choose?
=⇒ Depends on tradeoffs among preferences:
missing flight vs. costs (airport cuisine, sleep overnight in airport)
When there are conflicting goals the agent may express
preferences among them by means of a utility function.
Utilities are combined with probabilities in the general theory of
rational decisions, aka decision theory:
Decision theory = Probability theory + Utility theory
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): an agent is rational if and only
if it chooses the action that yields the maximum expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.
8 / 44
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Ex: Suppose I believe:
P(A25 gets me there on time |...) = 0.04
P(A90 gets me there on time |...) = 0.70
P(A120 gets me there on time |...) = 0.95
P(A1440 gets me there on time |...) = 0.9999
Which action to choose?
=⇒ Depends on tradeoffs among preferences:
missing flight vs. costs (airport cuisine, sleep overnight in airport)
When there are conflicting goals the agent may express
preferences among them by means of a utility function.
Utilities are combined with probabilities in the general theory of
rational decisions, aka decision theory:
Decision theory = Probability theory + Utility theory
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): an agent is rational if and only
if it chooses the action that yields the maximum expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.
8 / 44
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Ex: Suppose I believe:
P(A25 gets me there on time |...) = 0.04
P(A90 gets me there on time |...) = 0.70
P(A120 gets me there on time |...) = 0.95
P(A1440 gets me there on time |...) = 0.9999
Which action to choose?
=⇒ Depends on tradeoffs among preferences:
missing flight vs. costs (airport cuisine, sleep overnight in airport)
When there are conflicting goals the agent may express
preferences among them by means of a utility function.
Utilities are combined with probabilities in the general theory of
rational decisions, aka decision theory:
Decision theory = Probability theory + Utility theory
Maximum Expected Utility (MEU): an agent is rational if and only
if it chooses the action that yields the maximum expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.
8 / 44
Outline
2 Basics on Probability
9 / 44
Probabilities Basics: an AI-sh Introduction
10 / 44
Probabilities Basics: an AI-sh Introduction
10 / 44
Probabilities Basics: an AI-sh Introduction
10 / 44
Probabilities Basics: an AI-sh Introduction
10 / 44
Random Variables
11 / 44
Random Variables
11 / 44
Random Variables
11 / 44
Propositions and Probabilities
12 / 44
Propositions and Probabilities
12 / 44
Propositions and Probabilities
12 / 44
Propositions and Probabilities
12 / 44
Probability Distributions
16 / 44
Conditional Probabilities [cont.]
def P(a∧b)
Conditional probability: P(a|b) = P(b) , s.t. P(b) > 0
P(Total=11∧die1 =5)
ex: P(Total = 11|die1 = 5) = = 1/6·1/6
P(die1 =5) 1/6 = 1/6
observing b restricts the possible worlds to those where b is true
Production rule: P(a ∧ b) = P(a|b) · P(b) = P(b|a) · P(a)
Production rule for whole distributions: P(X , Y ) = P(X |Y ) · P(Y )
ex: P(Weather , Cavity ) = P(Weather |Cavity )P(Cavity ), that is:
P(sunny , cavity ) = P(sunny |cavity )P(cavity )
...
P(snow, ¬cavity ) = P(snow|¬cavity )P(¬cavity )
a 4 × 2 set of equations, not matrix multiplication!
Chain rule is derived by successive application of product rule:
P(X1 , ..., Xn )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−1 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn−1 |X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= ...
Qn
= i=1 P(Xi |X1 , ..., Xi−1 )
16 / 44
Conditional Probabilities [cont.]
def P(a∧b)
Conditional probability: P(a|b) = P(b) , s.t. P(b) > 0
P(Total=11∧die1 =5)
ex: P(Total = 11|die1 = 5) = = 1/6·1/6
P(die1 =5) 1/6 = 1/6
observing b restricts the possible worlds to those where b is true
Production rule: P(a ∧ b) = P(a|b) · P(b) = P(b|a) · P(a)
Production rule for whole distributions: P(X , Y ) = P(X |Y ) · P(Y )
ex: P(Weather , Cavity ) = P(Weather |Cavity )P(Cavity ), that is:
P(sunny , cavity ) = P(sunny |cavity )P(cavity )
...
P(snow, ¬cavity ) = P(snow|¬cavity )P(¬cavity )
a 4 × 2 set of equations, not matrix multiplication!
Chain rule is derived by successive application of product rule:
P(X1 , ..., Xn )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−1 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn−1 |X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= ...
Qn
= i=1 P(Xi |X1 , ..., Xi−1 )
16 / 44
Conditional Probabilities [cont.]
def P(a∧b)
Conditional probability: P(a|b) = P(b) , s.t. P(b) > 0
P(Total=11∧die1 =5)
ex: P(Total = 11|die1 = 5) = = 1/6·1/6
P(die1 =5) 1/6 = 1/6
observing b restricts the possible worlds to those where b is true
Production rule: P(a ∧ b) = P(a|b) · P(b) = P(b|a) · P(a)
Production rule for whole distributions: P(X , Y ) = P(X |Y ) · P(Y )
ex: P(Weather , Cavity ) = P(Weather |Cavity )P(Cavity ), that is:
P(sunny , cavity ) = P(sunny |cavity )P(cavity )
...
P(snow, ¬cavity ) = P(snow|¬cavity )P(¬cavity )
a 4 × 2 set of equations, not matrix multiplication!
Chain rule is derived by successive application of product rule:
P(X1 , ..., Xn )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−1 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= P(X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn−1 |X1 , ..., Xn−2 )P(Xn |X1 , ..., Xn−1 )
= ...
Qn
= i=1 P(Xi |X1 , ..., Xi−1 )
16 / 44
Logic vs. Probability
Logic Probability
a P(a) = 1
¬a P(a) = 0
a→b P(b|a) = 1
(a, a → b) P(a) = 1, P(b|a) = 1
b P(b) = 1
(a → b, b → c) P(b|a) = 1, P(c|b) = 1
a→c P(c|a) = 1
2 Basics on Probability
18 / 44
Probabilistic Inference via Enumeration
Basic Ideas
Start with the joint distribution P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity )
For any proposition ϕ, sum the atomic events where ϕ is true:
P(ϕ) = Σω : ω|=ϕ P(ω)
19 / 44
Probabilistic Inference via Enumeration
Basic Ideas
Start with the joint distribution P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity )
For any proposition ϕ, sum the atomic events where ϕ is true:
P(ϕ) = Σω : ω|=ϕ P(ω)
19 / 44
Probabilistic Inference via Enumeration: Example
20 / 44
Probabilistic Inference via Enumeration: Example
20 / 44
Marginalization
21 / 44
Marginalization
21 / 44
Marginalization
21 / 44
Marginalization: Example
23 / 44
Conditional Probability via Enumeration: Example
23 / 44
Conditional Probability via Enumeration: Example
23 / 44
Normalization
24 / 44
Normalization
24 / 44
Normalization
24 / 44
Normalization: Example
def
α = 1/P(toothache) can be viewed as a normalization constant
Idea: compute whole distribution on query variable by:
fixing evidence variables and summingP over hidden variables
normalize the final distribution, so that ... = 1
Ex:
P(Cavity |toothache) = αP(Cavity ∧ toothache)
= α[P(Cavity , toothache, catch) + P(Cavity , toothache, ¬catch)]
= α[h0.108, 0.016i + h0.012, 0.064i]
= αh0.12, 0.08i = (normalization) = h0.6, 0.4i [α = 5]
P(Cavity |¬toothache) = ... = αh0.08, 0.72i = h0.1, 0.9i[α = 1.25]
2 Basics on Probability
26 / 44
Independence
Variables X and Y are independent iff P(X , Y ) = P(X )P(Y )
(or equivalently, iff P(X |Y ) = P(X ) or P(Y |X ) = P(Y ))
ex: P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity , Weather ) =
P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity )P(Weather )
=⇒ e.g. P(toothache, catch, cavity , cloudy ) =
P(toothache, catch, cavity )P(cloudy )
typically based on domain knowledge
May drastically reduce the number of entries and computation
=⇒ ex: 32-element table decomposed into one 8-element and one
4-element table
Unfortunately, absolute independence is quite rare
28 / 44
Conditional Independence
28 / 44
Conditional Independence [cont.]
30 / 44
Exercise
30 / 44
Exercise
30 / 44
Outline
2 Basics on Probability
31 / 44
Bayes’ Rule
Bayes’ Rule/Theorem/Law
P(a ∧ b) P(b|a)P(a)
Bayes’ rule: P(a|b) = =
P(b) P(b)
P(X |Y )P(Y )
In distribution form P(Y |X ) = = αP(X |Y )P(Y )
P(X )
def
α = 1/P(X ): normalization constant to make P(Y |X ) entries sum
to 1 (different α0 s for different values of X )
A version conditionalized on some background evidence e:
P(X |Y , e)P(Y |e)
P(Y |X , e) =
P(X |e)
32 / 44
Bayes’ Rule
Bayes’ Rule/Theorem/Law
P(a ∧ b) P(b|a)P(a)
Bayes’ rule: P(a|b) = =
P(b) P(b)
P(X |Y )P(Y )
In distribution form P(Y |X ) = = αP(X |Y )P(Y )
P(X )
def
α = 1/P(X ): normalization constant to make P(Y |X ) entries sum
to 1 (different α0 s for different values of X )
A version conditionalized on some background evidence e:
P(X |Y , e)P(Y |e)
P(Y |X , e) =
P(X |e)
32 / 44
Bayes’ Rule
Bayes’ Rule/Theorem/Law
P(a ∧ b) P(b|a)P(a)
Bayes’ rule: P(a|b) = =
P(b) P(b)
P(X |Y )P(Y )
In distribution form P(Y |X ) = = αP(X |Y )P(Y )
P(X )
def
α = 1/P(X ): normalization constant to make P(Y |X ) entries sum
to 1 (different α0 s for different values of X )
A version conditionalized on some background evidence e:
P(X |Y , e)P(Y |e)
P(Y |X , e) =
P(X |e)
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Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
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Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: The Simple Case
Used to assess diagnostic probability from causal probability:
P(effect|cause)P(cause)
P(cause|effect) =
P(effect)
P(cause|effect) goes from effect to cause (diagnostic direction)
P(effect|cause) goes from cause to effect (causal direction)
Example
An expert doctor is likely to have causal knowledge ...
P(symptoms|disease) (i.e., P(effect|cause))
... and needs producing diagnostic knowledge
P(disease|symptoms) (i.e., P(cause|effect))
Ex: let m be meningitis, s be stiff neck
P(m) = 1/50000, P(s) = 0.01 (prior knowledge, from statistics)
“meningitis causes to the patient a stiff neck in 70% of cases”:
P(s|m) = 0.7 (doctor’s experience)
P(s|m)P(m) 0.7 · 1/50000
=⇒ P(m|s) = = = 0.0014
P(s) 0.01
33 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: Combining Evidence
A naive Bayes model is a probability model that assumes the
effects are conditionally independent, given the cause
Q
=⇒ P(Cause, Effect1 , ..., Effectn ) = P(Cause) i P(Effecti |Cause)
total number of parameters is linear in n
ex: P(Cavity , Toothache, Catch) =
P(Cavity )P(Toothache|Cavity )P(Catch|Cavity )
Q: How can we compute P(Cause|Effect1 , ..., Effectk )?
ex P(Cavity |toothache ∧ catch)?
35 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: Combining Evidence [cont.]
35 / 44
Using Bayes’ Rule: Combining Evidence [cont.]
35 / 44
Outline
2 Basics on Probability
36 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World
A probability model of the Wumpus World
Consider again the Wumpus World (restricted to pit detection)
Evidence: no pit in (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), breezy in (1,2), (2,1)
Q. Given the evidence, what is the probability of having a pit in
(1,3), (2,2) or (3,1)?
Two groups of variables:
Pij = true iff [i, j] contains a pit
(“causes”)
Bij = true iff [i, j] is breezy
(“effects”, consider only
B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Joint Distribution:
P(P1,1 , ..., P4,4 , B1,1 , B1,2 , B2,1 )
Known facts (evidence):
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1 ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
37 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
38 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
38 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
38 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Inference by enumeration
General form of query: P
P(Y|E = e) = αP(Y, E = e) = α h P(Y, E = e, H = h)
Y: query vars; E,e: evidence vars/values; H,h: hidden vars/values
Our case: P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ), s.t. the evidence is
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1
Sum over hidden variables:
∗ ∗
P1,3 |p , b ) =
P(P
α unknown P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ , unknown)
unknown are all Pij ’s s.t.
(i, j) 6∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3)}
=⇒ 216−4 = 4096 terms of the sum!
Grows exponentially in the number of hidden variables H!
=⇒ Inefficient
39 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Inference by enumeration
General form of query: P
P(Y|E = e) = αP(Y, E = e) = α h P(Y, E = e, H = h)
Y: query vars; E,e: evidence vars/values; H,h: hidden vars/values
Our case: P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ), s.t. the evidence is
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1
Sum over hidden variables:
∗ ∗
P1,3 |p , b ) =
P(P
α unknown P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ , unknown)
unknown are all Pij ’s s.t.
(i, j) 6∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3)}
=⇒ 216−4 = 4096 terms of the sum! ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
Inference by enumeration
General form of query: P
P(Y|E = e) = αP(Y, E = e) = α h P(Y, E = e, H = h)
Y: query vars; E,e: evidence vars/values; H,h: hidden vars/values
Our case: P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ), s.t. the evidence is
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1
Sum over hidden variables:
∗ ∗
P1,3 |p , b ) =
P(P
α unknown P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ , unknown)
unknown are all Pij ’s s.t.
(i, j) 6∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3)}
=⇒ 216−4 = 4096 terms of the sum! ( c S. Russell & P. Norwig, AIMA)
Inference by enumeration
General form of query: P
P(Y|E = e) = αP(Y, E = e) = α h P(Y, E = e, H = h)
Y: query vars; E,e: evidence vars/values; H,h: hidden vars/values
Our case: P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ), s.t. the evidence is
def
b∗ = ¬b1,1 ∧ b1,2 ∧ b2,1
def
p∗ = ¬p1,1 ∧ ¬p1,2 ∧ ¬p2,1
Sum over hidden variables:
∗ ∗
P1,3 |p , b ) =
P(P
α unknown P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ , unknown)
unknown are all Pij ’s s.t.
(i, j) 6∈ {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3)}
=⇒ 216−4 = 4096 terms of the sum!
Grows exponentially in the number of hidden variables H!
=⇒ Inefficient
39 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Using conditional independence
Basic insight: Given the fringe squares (see below), b∗ is
conditionally independent of the other hidden squares
def
Unknown = Fringe ∪ Other
def
=⇒ P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Unknown) = P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe, Others) =
P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe)
Next: manipulate the query into a form
where this equation can be used
40 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Using conditional independence
Basic insight: Given the fringe squares (see below), b∗ is
conditionally independent of the other hidden squares
def
Unknown = Fringe ∪ Other
def
=⇒ P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Unknown) = P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe, Others) =
P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe)
Next: manipulate the query into a form
where this equation can be used
40 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Using conditional independence
Basic insight: Given the fringe squares (see below), b∗ is
conditionally independent of the other hidden squares
def
Unknown = Fringe ∪ Other
def
=⇒ P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Unknown) = P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe, Others) =
P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , Fringe)
Next: manipulate the query into a form
where this equation can be used
40 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
P(p∗ , b∗ ) = P(p∗ , b∗ ) is scalar; use as a normalization constant
41 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Sum over the unknowns
41 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Use the product rule
41 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Separate unknown into fringe and other
41 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
b∗ is conditionally independent of other given fringe
41 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Move P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe) outward
We have obtained:
P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
42 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
We have obtained:
P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
42 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
We have obtained:
P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
42 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
We have obtained:
P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
42 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
We have obtained:
P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
42 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Start by rewriting as two separate equations:
P( p1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P( p1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
∗
of them, P(b |...) is 1 if the breezes occur, 0 otherwise:
P For each ∗ ∗
P(b |p , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04+1·0.16+1·0.16+0 = 0.36
Pfringe ∗ ∗
fringe P(b |p , ¬p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04 + 1 · 0.16 + 0 + 0 = 0.2
=⇒ P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
= α0 h0.2, 0.8ih0.36, 0.2i = α0 h0.072, 0.16i
= (normalization, s.t. α0 ≈ 4.31) ≈ h0.31, 0.69i
43 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Start by rewriting as two separate equations:
P( p1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P( p1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
∗
of them, P(b |...) is 1 if the breezes occur, 0 otherwise:
P For each ∗ ∗
P(b |p , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04+1·0.16+1·0.16+0 = 0.36
Pfringe ∗ ∗
fringe P(b |p , ¬p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04 + 1 · 0.16 + 0 + 0 = 0.2
=⇒ P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
= α0 h0.2, 0.8ih0.36, 0.2i = α0 h0.072, 0.16i
= (normalization, s.t. α0 ≈ 4.31) ≈ h0.31, 0.69i
43 / 44
An Example: The Wumpus World [cont.]
Start by rewriting as two separate equations:
P( p1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P( p1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
∗
of them, P(b |...) is 1 if the breezes occur, 0 otherwise:
P For each ∗ ∗
P(b |p , p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04+1·0.16+1·0.16+0 = 0.36
Pfringe ∗ ∗
fringe P(b |p , ¬p1,3 , fringe)P(fringe) = 1·0.04 + 1 · 0.16 + 0 + 0 = 0.2
=⇒ P(P1,3 |p∗ , b∗ ) = α0 P(P1,3 ) fringe P(b∗ |p∗ , P1,3 , fringe)P(fringe)
P
= α0 h0.2, 0.8ih0.36, 0.2i = α0 h0.072, 0.16i
= (normalization, s.t. α0 ≈ 4.31) ≈ h0.31, 0.69i
43 / 44
Exercise
44 / 44