Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?

Kingsley Davis

Science, New Series, Vol. 158, No. 3802. (Nov. 10, 1967), pp. 730-739.

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mitted beween two states having the in the direct-interaction mode. Some References and Notes
1. D. H. Wilkinson, A I ? ~Rev.
. Nlrcl. Sci. 9, 1
same isotopic spin. In fact, the giant of the energy that is contained in the (1959).
resonance in a non-self-conjugate nu- giant-resonance state is shared with the 2. G. A. Fergu~on, J. Halpern, R. Nathans,
P. F. Yergen, Pltj's. Rev. 95, 776 (1954).
cleus should split into two parts-one more-complicated states of the com- 3. R. Montalbetti, L. Katz, J. Goldemberg, ibid.
with the isotopic spin of the ground pound nucleus (that is, with states hav- 91, 659 (1953).
4. R. J. Van de Graaff, In Proc. 1958 Accelera-
state (written T <), the other with one ing many excited nucleons). This shar- tor C o n f . Cantbridge, Mass. (High Voltage
unit more of isotopic spin (T ,). The ing, in turn, gives rise to the fine struc- Eng. Corp., Burlington, Mass. 1958), p. A-1.
5. P. P. S~ngh,R. E. Segel, L. Meyer-Schiitz-
part with T < can be fed by alpha ture that is observed within the giant- meister, S. S. Hanna, R. G. Allas, Nucl.
Phys. 65, 577 (1965).
capture, and thus the selection rules resonance envelope. The constant angu- 6. J. T. Caldwell. R. R. Harvey, R. L. Bram-
of isotopic spin permit observation of lar distributions that are observed blett, S. C. Fultz, P h j s . Letters 6 , 213
(1 9h?>
tlie giant resonance. However, as shown throughout the giant-resonance region 7. T : ~ i i c s o n ,A nn. Phys. 23, 390 (1963).
in Fig. 9, the yield from the Siso- support the single-state picture s f the 8. B. W. Allardyce, W. R . Graham, I. Hall,
1Vtrcl. Phys. 5 2 , 239 (1964).
(y,ao)Mg2Qeaction, the inverse of the giant resonance. 9. R. G. Allas, S. S. Hanna, L. Meyer-Schiitz-
meister, R. E. Segel, ibid. 58, 122 (1964).
Mg2G(a,y), is even less than for the The simple model appears to ac- 10. T. Maver-Kuckuk. in Recent Progress in Nzr-
isotopic-spin-forbidden Si28(y,ao)MgZ4 count for the main features of the data, clear Physics with Tandems, W. ~ e r i n g ,Ed.
(Max Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics,
reaction. This fact shows that it is not and at least qualitatively accounts for Heidelberg, 1966).
the selection rules of isotopic spin the variation in yield for proton cap- 11. G. A. F i ~ h e r ,P. Paul, F. Riess, Bull. Arne?..
Phys. Soc. 11, 903 (1966); N. W. Tanner,
that inhibit alpha capture through the ture through various giant resonances. G. C. Thomas, E. D. Earle, h'lrcl. Phys. 52,
giant resonance. Further information about the giant- 45 ,,.
119hA>
12. R. E. Segel, Z. Vager, L. Meyer-Schiitz.
resonance state is obtained from the meister, P. P. Singh, R. G. Allas, Nucl. PIzys.
A93. 31 (1967).
alpha-capture data and from the char- 13. L. Meyer-Schiitzmeister, R. E. Segel, R. C.
So~nmaryand Conclusions acteristic angular distributions of the Bearse, Bull. Anler. Phys. Soc. 12, 72 (1967).
14. G. Dearnaley. D. S. Gemmell. B. W. Hooton,
various gamma rays. However, there G. A. Joncs, Nucl. Phvs. 64. 177 (1965).
The data on radiative capture through remains the difficulty that the shell- 15. J. M. Blatt and V. F. Weisskopf, Theoretical
Nzrclrar Physics (Wiley, New York, 1952),
the giant resonance have led to a model model picture predicts a varying angu- pp. 641-43.
16. D . S. Gelnlnell and G. A. Jones, Nucl. Phys.
in which the capture is pictured as lar distribution-contradicting the ex- 33, 102 (1962).
proceeding through a single broad (and perimental result. Work in this field is 17. N. W. Tanner, personal communicarion.
18. G. E. Brown and M. Bolsterli, Phys. Rev.
therefore short-lived) state that can be being continued in the hope of re- Letters 3, 472 (1959).
called the giant-resonance state. This solving this difficulty and of extending 19. L. Meycr-Schiitzmeister, 2. Vager, R. E.
Segel, P. P. Singh, Bull. Airier. Phys. Soc. 10,
state is the one formed directly upon the model to provide a more complete 463, 1084 (1965); 11, 334 (1966).
20. L. A. Radicati, Phys. Rev. 87, 521 (1952).
capture of a proton, and hence most of picture of this important nuclear phe- 21. The work described in this article was per-
the capture radiation is emitted quickly nomenon. formed under the auspices of the AEC.

is no guarantee that what is being done

is adequate. On the face of it, one could
hardly expect such a fundamental re-
orientation to be quickly and success-
fully implemented. I therefore propose
to review the nature and (as I see them)
Population Policy: limitations of the present policies and
to suggest lines of possible improve-
ment.
Will Current Programs Succeed?
The Nature of Current Policies
Grounds for skepticism concerning the demographic
effectiveness of family planning are considered. With more than 30 nations now try-
ing or planning to reduce population
growth and with numerous private and
Kingsley Davis
international organizations helping, the
degree of unanimity as to the kind of
measures needed is impressive. The
consensus can be summed up in the
Throughout history the growth of meet it. Most observers are surprised phrase "family planning." President
population has been identified with by the swiftness with which concern Johnson declared in 1965 that the
prosperity and strength. If today an over the population problem has turned United States will "assist family plan-
increasing number of nations are seek- from intellectual analysis and debate to ning programs in nations which request
ing to curb rapid population growth by policy and action. Such action is a such help." The Prime Minister of India
reducing their birth rates, they must welcome relief from the long opposi-
be driven to do so by an urgent crisis. tion, o r timidity, which seemed to block The author is professor of sociology and di-
rector of International Population and Urban
My purpose here is not to discuss the forever any governmental attempt to Research, University of California, Berkeley. This
crisis itself but rather to assess the pres- restrain population growth, but relief article is abridged from a paper presented at the
annual meeting of the National Research Council,
ent and prospective measures used to that "at last something is being done" 14 March 1967.

730 SCIENCE, VOL. 158

said a year later, "We nus st press for- the passages quoted above). It is also not undertake to influence ~ n o s tof the
ward with family planning. Tnis is a shown by the characteristic style of determinants of human reproduction.
progralnnle of the highest in~portance." reasoning. Expositions of current policy Thus the programs should not be re-
The Republic o l Singapore created in usually start off by lamenting the speed ferred to as population control or plan-
1966 the Singapore Family Planning and the consequences of r u n a ~ ~ apopu-
y ning, because they do not attempt to
and Population Board "to initiate and lation growth. This growth, it is then ~nfluencethe factors responsible for the
undertake population control pro- stated, must be curbed-by pursuing a attributes of hunlan populations, taken
grammes" (I). vigorous family-planning program. That generally; nor should they be called
As is well known, "family planning" family planning can solve the problem fertility control, because they do not
is a e u p h e n ~ i s nfor
~ contraception. The o i population growth seems to be taken try to affect most of the determinants
family-planning approach to population as self-evident. of reproductive performance.
limitation, therefore, concentrates on For instance, the much-heraldcd The ambiguity does not stop here,
providing new and efficient contraccp- statement by 12 heads of state, issued however. When one speaks of control-
tives on a national basis through mass by Secretary-General LJ Thant on ling population size, any inquiring per-
programs under public health auspices. 10 December 1966 ja statement ini- son naturally asks, What is "control"?
The nature of these programs is shown tiated by John D. Rockefeller 111, Who is to control whom? Precisely
by the following enthusiastic report Chairman of the Board of the Popula- what population size, or what rate of
from the Population Council (2): tion Council), devotes half its space to population growth, is to be achieved?
discussing the harmfulness of popula- Do the policies aim to produce a
No single year has seen so many forward tion growth and the other half to rec- growth rate that is nil, one that is very
steps in population control as 1965. Efl'ec-
tive national programs have at last ommending family planning (3). A slight, or one that is like that of the
emerged, international organizations have more succinct examplc of the typical industrial nations? Unless such ques-
decided to become engaged, a new con- reasoning is given in the Provisional rions are dealt with and clarified, it is
traceptive has proved its value in mass Scheme for a Nationwide Family Plan- ilnpossible to evaluate current popula-
application, . . . and surveys have con-
firmed a popular desire for family lirnita- ning Progranlnle in Ceylon (4): tion policies.
tion. . . The actual programs seem to be aim-
The population of Ceylon is fast increas- ing simply to achieve a redtiction in
An accounting of notable events must be- ing.. . .[The] figures reveal that a serious
gin with Korea and Taiwan . . . Taiwan's situation will be created within a few the birth rate. Success is therefore in-
program is not yet two years old, and years. In order to cope with it a Family terpreted as the accoinplishment of such
already it has inserted one IUD [in- Planning programme on a nationwide
trauterine device] for every 4-6 target a reduction, on the assumption that the
scale should be launched by the Govern- reduction will lessen population growth.
women (those who are not pregnant, lac- ment.
tating, already sterile, already using con- In those rare cases where a specific
traceptives effectively, or desirous of more The promised goal-to limit population demographic aim is stated, the goal is
children). Korea has done almost as
well . . . has put 2,200 full-time worlters growth so as to solve population prob- said to be a short-run decline within n
into the field, . . . has reached operational lems-is a large order. One would ex- given period. The Pakistan plan adopted
levels for a network of IUD quotas, supply pect it to be carefully analyzcd, but it in 1966 ( 5 , p. 889) aims to reduce the
lines, local manufacture of contraceptives, is left imprecise and taken for granted, birth rate f.rom 50 to 40 per thozsand
training of hundreds of M.D.'s and nurses, as is the way in which family planning by 1970; the Indian plan (6) aims lo
and mass propaganda. . .
will achieve it. reduce the rate from 40 to 25 "as soon
Mere one can see the implication When the terms popz~lntion control as possible"; and the Korean aim (7) is
that "population control" is being and pop~tlntion planning are used, as to cut population growth from 2.9 to
achieved through the dissemination of they frequently are, as synonyms for 1.2 percent by 1980. A significant
new contraceptives, and the fact that current family-planning programs, they feature of such stated aims is the rapid
the "target women" exclude those who are misleading. Technically, they would population growth they would permit.
want more children. One can also note mean deliberate influence over all attri- Under conditions of modern mortality,
the technological emphasis and the butes of a population, including its age- a crude birth rate of 25 to 30 per
medical orientation. sex structure, geographical distribution, thousand will represent such a multi-
What is wrong with such programs? racial composition, genetic quality, and plication of people as to make use of
The answer is, "Nothing at all, if they total size. No government attempts such the term population control ironic. A
work." Whether or not they work de- full control. By tacit understanding, rate of increase of 1.2 percent per year
pends on what they are expected to do current population policies are con- would allow South Korea's already
as well as on how they try to do it. cerned with only the growth and size dense population to double in less than
Let us discuss the goal first, then the of populations. These attributes, how- 60 years.
means. ever, result from the death rate and One can of course defend the pro-
migration as well as from the birth rate; grams by saying that the present goals
their control would require deliberate and measures are merely interim ones.
Goals influence over the factors giving rise to A start must be made somewhere. But
all three determinants. Actually, current we do not find this answer in the popu-
Curiously, it is hard to find in the policies labeled population control do lation-policy literature. Such a defense,
population-policy movement any ex- not deal with mortality and migration, if convincing, would require a presenta-
plicit discussion of long-range goals. but deal only with the birth input. This tion of the next steps, and these are not
By implication the policies seem to is w.hy another term, fertility control, is considered. One suspects that the entire
promise a great deal. This is shown by frequently used to describe current poli- question of goals is instinctively left
the use of expressions like population cies. But, as I show below, family plan- vague because thorough limitation of
control and pop~ilntionplanning (as in ning (and hence current policy) does population growth would run counter
10 NOVEMBER 1967
to national and group aspirations. A lead logically to zero population growth tremely high rate of multiplication.
consideration of hypothetical goals as the ultimate goal, because any Actually, the family-planning rnove-
throws further light on the matter. growth rate, if continued, will even- ment does not pursue even the limited
Industrialized nations as the model. tually use up the earth. Yet hardly goals it professes. It does not fully
Since current policies are confined to ever do arguments for population pol- empower couples to have only the num-
family planning, their maximum demo- icy consider such a goal, and current ber of offspring they want because it
graphic effect would be to give the policies do not dream of it. Why not? either condemns or disregards certain
underdeveloped countries the same level The answer is evidently that zero pop- tabooed but nevertheless effective
of reproductive performance that the ulation growth is unacceptable to most means to this goal. One of its tenets
industrial nations now have. The lat- nations and to most religious and ethnic is that "there shall be freedom of
ter, long oriented toward family plan- communities. To argue for this goal choice of method so that individuals
ning, provide a good yardstick for de- would be to alienate possible support can choose in accordance with the dic-
termining what the availability of con- for action programs. tates of their consciences" (II), but in
traceptives can do to population growth. Coal peculiarities inherent in family practice this amounts to limiting the
Indeed, they provide more than a yard- planning. Turning to the actual meas- individual's choice, because the "con-
stick; they are actually the model which ures taken, we see that the very use science" dictating the method is usual-
inspired the present population policies. of family planning as the means for im- ly not his but that of religious and
What does this goal mean in prac- plementing population policy poses se- governmental officials. Moreover, not
tice? Among the advanced nations there rious but unacknowledged limits on every individual may choose: even the
is considerable diversity in the level the intended reduction in fertility. The so-called recommended methods are
of fertility (8). At one extreme are family-planning movement, clearly de- ordinarily not offered to single women,
countries such as New Zealand, with voted to the improvement and dissem- or not all offered to women professing
an average gross reproduction rate ination of contraceptive devices, states a given religious faith.
(GRR) of 1.91 during the period again and again that its purpose is that Thus, despite its emphasis on tech-
1960-64; at the other extreme are of enabling couples to have the num- nology, current policy does not utilize
countries such as Hungary, with a rate ber of children they want. "The oppor- all available means of contraception,
of 0.91 during the same period. To a tunity to decide the number and spac- much less all birth-control measures.
considerable extent, however, such di- ing of children is a basic human right," The Indian government wasted valu-
vergencies are matters of timing. The say the 12 heads of state in the United able years in the early stages of ifs
birth rates of most industrial nations Nations declaration. The 1965 Turkish population-control program by experi-
have shown, since about 1940, a wave- Law Concerning Population Planning menting exclusively with the "rhythm"
like movement, with no secular trend. declares (10): method, long after this technique had
The average level of reproduction dur- been demonstrated to be one of the
Article 1. Population Planning means
ing this long period has been high that individuals can have as many chil- least effective. A greater limitation on
enough to give these countries, with dren as they wish, whenever they want to. means is the exclusive emphasis on
their low mortality, an extremely rapid This can be ensured through preventive contraception itself. Induced abortion,
population growth. If this level is main- measures taken against pregnancy, , . . for example, is one of the surest means
tained, their population will double in Logically, it does not make sense to of controlling reproduction, and one
just over 50 years-a rate higher than use family planning to provide national that has been proved capable of re-
that of world population growth at any population control or planning. The ducing birth rates rapidly. It seems
time prior to 1950, at which time the "planning" in family planning is that peculiarly suited to the threshold stage
growth in numbers of human beings of each separate couple. The only con- of a population-control program-the
was already considered fantastic. The trol they exercise is control over the stage when new conditions of life first
advanced nations are suffering acutely size of their family. Obviously, cou- make large families disadvantageous. It
froni the effects of rapid population ples do not plan the size of the nation's was the principal factor in the halving
growth in combination with the pro- population, any more than they plan the of the Japanese birth rate, a major fac-
duction of ever more goods per per- growth of the national income or the tor in the declines in birth rate of East-
son (9). A rising share of their sup- form of the highway network. There European satellite countries after legal-
posedly high per capita income, which is no reason to expect that the millions ization of abortions in the early 1950's,
itself draws increasingly upon the re- of decisions about family size made by and an important factor in the reduc-
sources of the underdeveloped coun- couples in their own interest will auto- tion of fertility in industrializing na-
tries (who fall farther behind in rela- matically control population for the tions from 1870 to the 1930's (12).
tive economic position), is spent simply benefit of society. On the contrary, Today, according to Studies in Fanz-
to meet the costs, and alleviate the nui- there are good reasons to think they ily Planning (13), "abortion is prob-
sances, of the unrelenting production of will not do so. At most, family plan- ably the foremost method of birth
more and more goods by more people. ning can reduce reproduction to the control throughout Latin America."
Such facts indicate that the industrial extent that unwanted births exceed Yet this method is rejected in nearly
nations provide neither a suitable demo- wanted births. In industrial countries all national and international popula-
graphic model for the nonindustrial the balance is often negative-that is, tion-control programs. American for-
peoples to follow nor the leadership people have fewer children as a rule eign aid is used to help stop abor-
to plan and organize effective popula- than they would like to have. In un- tion (14). The United Nations excludes
tion-control policies for them. derdeveloped countries the reverse is abortion from family planning, and in
Zero population gvowth as a goal. normally true, but the elimination of fact justifies the latter by presenting it
Most discussions of the population crisis unwanted births would still leave an ex- as a means of combating abortion ( 1 5 ) .
SCIEYCE. VOL. I58
Studies of abortion are being made in as a whole, the movement gives con- woman, from the standpoint of family
Latin America under the presumed trol only to couples, and does this only planners, is the one who wants "as
auspices of population-control groups, if they use "respectable" contraceptives. many as come," o r "as many as God
not with the intention of legalizing it sends." Her attitude is construed as
and thus making it safe, cheap, avail- due to ignorance and "cultural values,"
able, and hence more effective for pop- The Neglect of Motivation and the policy deemed necessary to
ulation control, but with the avowed change it is "education." N o compul-
purpose of reducing it ( 1 6 ) . By sanctifying the doctrine that each sion can be used, because the move-
Although few would prefer abortion woman should have the number of ment is committed to free choice, but
to efficient contraception (other things children she wants, and by assuming movie strips, posters, comic books,
being equal), the fact is that both per- that if she has only that number this public lectures, interviews, and dis-
mit a woman to control the size of her will automatically curb population cussions are in order. These supply
family. The main drawbacks to abor- growth to the necessary degree, the information and supposedly change val-
tion arise from its illegality. When per- leaders of current policies escape the ues by discounting superstitions and
formed, as a legal procedure, by a necessity of asking why women desire showing that unrestrained procreation
skilled physician, it is safer than child- so many children and how this desire is harmful to both mother and children.
birth. It does not compete with con- can be influenced (18, p. 41; 1 9 ) . In- The effort is considered successful when
traception but serves as a backstop stead, they claim that satisfactory mo- the woman decides she wants only a
when the Iatter fails or when contra- tivation is shown by the popular de- certain number of children and uses an
ceptive devices or information are not sire (shown by opinion surveys in all effective contraceptive.
available. As contraception becomes countries) to have the means of family In viewing negative attitudes toward
customary, the incidence of abortion limitation, and that therefore the prob- birth control as due to ignorance.
recedes even without its being banned. lem is one of inventing and distrib- apathy, and outworn tradition, and
If, therefore, abortions enable women uting the best possible contraceptive "mass-communication" as the solution
to have only the number of children devices. Overlooked is the fact that a to the motivation problem (22), family
they want, and if family planners do desire for availability of contraceptives planners tend to ignore the power and
not advocate-in fact decry-legaliza- is compatible with high fertility. complexity of social life. If it were
tion of abortion, they are to that ex- Given the best of means, there re- admitted that the creation and care of
tent denying the central tenet of their main the questions of how many chil- new human beings is socially moti-
own movement. The irony of anti- dren couples want and of whether this vated, like other forms of behavior, by
abortionism in family-planning circles is the requisite number from the stand- being a part of the system of rewards
is seen particularly in hair-splitting point of population size. That it is not and punishments that is built into hu-
arguments over whether or not some is indicated by continued rapid popu- man relationships, and thus is bound up
contraceptive agent (for example, the lation growth in industrial countries, with the individual's economic and per-
I U D ) is in reality an abortifacient. A and by the very surveys showing that sonal interests, it would be apparent
Mexican leader in family planning people want contraception-for these that the social structure and economy
writes (17): show, too, that people also want nu- must be changed before a deliberate
merous children. reduction in the birth rate can be
One of the chief objectives of our pro-
gram in h4exico is to prevent abortions. The family planners do not ignore achieved. As it is, reliance on family
If we could be sure that the mode of motivation. They are forever talking planning allows people to feel that
action [of the IUD] was not interference about "attitudes" and "needs." But they "something is being done about the
with nidation, we could easily use the pose the issue in terms of the "ac- population problem" without the need
method in Mexico. ceptance" of birth c ~ n t r o ldevices. At Por painful social changes.
The questions of sterilization and un- the most naive level, they assume that Designation of population control as
natural forms of sexual intercourse lack of acceptance is a function of the a medical or public health task leads to
usually meet with similar silent treat- contraceptive device itself. This reduces a similar evasion. This categorization
ment or disapproval, although nobody the motive problem to a technological assures popular support because it puts
doubts the effectiveness of these meas- question. The task of population con- population policy in the hands of re-
ures in avoiding conception. Steriliza- trol then becomes silnply the invention spected medical personnel, but, by the
tion has proved popular in Puerto Rico of a device that ~iiillbe acceptable (20). same token, it gives responsibility for
and has had some vogue in India The plastic I U D is acclaimed because, leadership to people who think in terms
(where the new health minister hopes once in place, it does not depend on of clinics and patients, of pills and
to make it compulsory for those with a repeated acceptance by the woman, and IUD's. and who bring to the handling
certain number of children), but in thus it "solves" the problenl of motiva- of economic and social phenomena a
both these areas it has been for the tion (21). self-confident naivetk. The study of
most part ignored or condemned by But suppose a woman does not want social organization is a technical field;
the family-planning movement. to use any contraceptive until after she an action program based on intuition
On the side of goals, then, we see has had four children. This is the type is no more apt to succeed in the control
that a family-planning orientation limits of question that is seldom raised in of human beings than it is in the area
the aims of current population policy. the family-planning literature. In that of bacterial or viral control. Moreover,
Despite reference to "population con- literature, wanting a specific number of to alter a social system, by deliberate
trol" and "fertility control," which pre- children is taken as complete motiva- policy, so as to regulate births in accord
sumably mean determination of demo- tion, for it implies a wish to control with the demands of the collective wel-
graphic results by and for the nation the size of one's family. The problem fare would require political power, and
 this is not likely to inhere in public The Evidence of Ineffectiveness tions were used, the recent trend was
health officials, nurses, midwives, and found to be upward in 27 underdevel-
social workers. T o entrust population If this characterization is accurate, oped countries, downward in six, and
policy to them is "to take action," but we can conclude that current programs unchanged in one (24). Some of the
not dangerous "effective action." will not enable a government to con- rises have been substantial, and most
Similarly, the Janus-faced position on trol population size. In countries where have occurred where the birth rate was
birth-control technology represents an couples have numerous offspring that already extremely high. For instance,
escape from the necessity, and onus, of they do not want, such programs may the gross reproduction rate rose in
grappling with the social and economic possibly accelerate a birth-rate decline Jamaica from 1.8 per thousand in 1947
determinants of reproductive behavior. that would occur anyway, but the con- to 2.7 in 1960; among the natives of
On the one side, the rejection o r avoid- ditions that cause births to be wanted Fiji, from 2.0 in 1951 to 2.4 in 1964;
ance of religiously tabooed but other- or unwanted are beyond the control of and in Albania, from 3.0 in the period
wise effective means of birth prevention family planning, hence beyond the con- 1950-54 to 3.4 in 1960.
enables the family-planning movement trol of any nation which relies on The general rise in fertility in back-
to avoid official condemnation. On the family planning alone as its population ward regions is evidently not due to
other side, an intense preoccupation policy. failure of population-control efforts,
with contraceptive technology (apart This conclusion is confirmed by because most of the countries either
from the tabooed means) also helps the demographic facts. As 1 have noted have no such effort or have programs
family planners to avoid censure. By above, the widespread use of family too new to show much effect. Instead,
implying that the only need is the in- planning in industrial countries has not the rise is due, ironically, to the very
vention and distribution of effective given their governments control over circumstance that brought on the popu-
contraceptive devices, they allay fears, the birth rate. In backward countries lation crisis in the first place-to im-
on the part of religious and govern- today, taken as a whole, birth rates are proved health and lowered mortality.
mental officials, that fundamental rising, not falling; in those with popu- Better health increases the probability
changes in social organization are con- lation policies, there is no indication that a woman will conceive and retain
templated. Changes basic enough to that the government is controlling the the fetus to term; lowered mortality
affect motivation for having children rate of reproduction. The main "suc- raises the proportion of babies who
would be changes in the structure of cesses" cited in the well-publicized poli- survive to the age of reproduction and
the family, in the position of women, cy literature are cases where a large reduces the probability of widowhood
and in the sexual mores. Far from pro- number of contraceptives have been during that age (25). The significance
posing such radicalism, spokesmen for distributed or where the program has of the general rise in fertility, in the
family planning frequently state their been accompanied by some declinc in context of this discussion, is that it is
purpose as "protection" of the family- the birth rate. Popular enthusiasm for giving would-be population planners a
that is, closer observance of family family planning is found mainly in the harder task than many of them realize.
norms. In addition, by concentrating on cities, or in advanced countries such as Some of the upward pressure on birth
new and scierttijic contraceptives, the Japan and Taiwan, where the people rates is independent of what couples
movement escapes taboos attached to would adopt contraception in any case, do about family planning, for it arises
old ones (the Pope will hardly authorize program or no program. It is difficult from the fact that, with lowered mor-
the condom, but may sanction the pill) to prove that present population poli- tality, there are simply more couples.
and allows family planning to be re- cies have even speeded up a lowering
garded as a lbranch of medicine: over- of the birth rate (the least that could
population becomes a disease, to be have been expected), nluch less that Underdeveloped Countries
treated by a pill or a coil. they have provided national "fertility with Population Policies
We thus see that the inadequacy of control."
current population policies with respect Let us next briefly review the facts In discussions of population policy
to motivation is inherent in their over- concerning the level and trend of popu- there is often confusion as to which
whelmingly family-planning character. lation in underdeveloped nations gen- cases are relevant. Japan, for instance,
Since family planning is by definition erally, in order to understand the mag- has been widely praised for the effec-
private planning, it eschews any societal nitude of the task of genuine control. tiveness of its measures, but it is a very
control over motivation. It merely fur- advanced industrial nation and, besides,
nishes the means, and, among possible its government policy had little or
means, only the most respectable. Its Rising Birth Rates nothing to do with the decline in the
leaders, in avoiding social complexities in Underdeveloped Countries birth rate, except unintentionally. It
and seeking official favor, are obviously therefore offers no test of population
activated not solely by expediency but I n ten Latin-American countries, be- policy under peasant-agrarian condi-
also by their own sentiments as mem- tween 1940 and 1959 (23), the average tions. Another case of questionable
bers of society and by their background birth rates (age-standardized), as esti- relevance is that of Taiwan, because
as persons attracted to the family- mated by our research office at the Uni- Taiwan is sufficiently developed to be
planning movement. Unacquainted for versity of California, rose as follows: placed in the urban-industrial class of
the most part with technical economics, 1940-44, 43.4 annual births per 1000 nations. However, since Taiwan is
sociology, and demography, they tend population; 1945-49, 44.6; 1950-54, offered as the main showpiece by the
honestly and instinctively to believe 46.4; 1955-59, 47.7. sponsors of current policies in under-
that something they vaguely call popu- In another study made in our office, developed areas, and since the data are
lation control can be achieved by mak- in which estimating methods derived excellent, it merits examination.
ing better contraceptives available. from the theory of quasi-stable popula- Taiwan is acclaimed as a showpiece
SCIENCE, VOL. 158
Table 1. Decline in Taiwan's fertility rate, proportions only in 1964, when sorne
1951 through 1966. 46,000 IUD's were inserted (in 1965
Registered the number was 99,253, and in 1966,
births per Change 111,242) (29; 30, p. 45)-could have
Year in rate
1000 women (percent):l:
aged 15-49 caused the increase observable after
1963 in the rate of decline. Between
1951 and 1963 the average drop in the
birth rate per 1000 women (see Table
1) was 1.73 percent per year; in the
period 1964-66 it was 4.35 percent.
But one hesitates to assign all of the
acceleration in decline since 1963 to
the family-planning campaign. The
rapid economic development has been
precisely of a type likely to accelerate
a drop in reproduction. The rise in
manufacturing has been much greater
0 7 - 18 I
than the rise in either agriculture or
- The percentages were calculated on unrounded
construction. The agricultural labor Fig. 1. Births per 1000 women aged 15
figures. So~irce of data through 1965, Taiwan through 49 in Japan and Taiwan.
Demographic Fact Book (1964, 1965); for 1966, force has thus been squeezed, and mi-
Monthly Bulletin of Population Registration Sta-
tcltics of Taiwan (1966, 1967). gration to the cities has skyrocketed
(31). Since housing has not kept pace,
urban families have had to restrict re- many were using other methods of birth
because it has responded favorably to production in order to take advantage control (30, pp. 18, 31).
a highly organized program for dis- of career opportunities and avoid do- The important question, however, is
tributing up-to-date contraceptives and mestic inconvenience. Such conditions not whether the present campaign is
has also had a rapidly dropping birth have historically tended to accelerate somewhat hastening the downward trend
rate. Some observers have carelessly a decline in birth rate. The most rapid in the birth rate but whether, even if
attributed the decline in the birth rate decline came late in the United States it is, it will provide population control
-from 50.0 in 1951 to 32.7 in 1965- (1921-33) and in Japan (1947-55). for the nation. Actually, the cam-
to the family-planning campaign (26), A plot of the Japanese and Taiwanese paign is not designed to provide such
but the campaign began only in 1963 birth rates (Fig. 1 ) shows marked simi- control and shows no sign of doing so.
and could have affected only the end larity of the two curves, despite a dif- It takes for granted existing reproduc-
of the trend. Rather, the decline repre- ference in level. All told, one should tive goals. Its aim is "to integrate,
sents a response to modernization simi- not attribute all of the post-1963 accel- through education and information, the
lar to that made by all countries that eration in the decline of Taiwan's birth idea of family limitation within the ex-
have become industrialized (27). By rate to the family-planning campaign. isting attitudes, values, and goals of the
1950 over half of Taiwan's population The main evidence that some of this people" [30, p. 8 (italics mine)]. Its
was urban, and by 1964 nearly two- acceleration is due to the campaign target is married women who do not
thirds were urban, with 29 percent comes from the fact that Taichung, the want any more children; it ignores girls
of the population living in cities of city in which the family-planning effort not yet married, and women married
100,000 or more. The pace of economic was first concentrated, showed subse- and wanting more children.
development has been extremely rapid. quently a much faster drop in fertility With such an approach, what is
Between 1951 and 1963, per capita in- than other cities (30, p. 69; 3 2 ) . But the maximurn impact possible? It is the
come increased by 4.05 percent per the campaign has not reached through- difference between the number of chil-
year. Yet the island is closely packed, out the island. By the end of 1966, dren women have been having and
having 870 persons per square mile only 260,745 women had been fitted the number they want to have. A study
(a population density higher than that with an IUD under auspices of the in 1957 found a median figure of 3.75
of Belgium). The combination of fast campaign, whereas the women of repro- for the number of children wanted by
economic growth and rapid population ductive age on the island numbered women aged 15 to 29 in Taipei, Tai-
increase in limited space has put parents 2.86 million. Most of the reduction in wan's largest city; the corresponding
of large families at a relative disad- fertility has therefore been a matter of figure for women from a satellite town
vantage and has created a brisk demand individual initiative. T o some extent the was 3.93; for women from a fishing
for abortions and contraceptives. Thus campaign may be simply substituting village, 4.90; and for women from a
the favorable response to the current sponsored (and cheaper) services for farming village, 5.03. Over 60 percent
campaign to encourage use of the IUD those that would otherwise come of the women in Taipei and over 9 0
is not a good example of what birth- through private and commercial chan- percent of those in the farming vil-
control technology can do for a gen- nels. An island-wide survey in 1964 lage wanted 4 or more children (33).
uinely backward country. In fact, when showed that over 150,000 women were In a sample of wives aged 25 to 29
the program was started, one reason for already using the traditional Ota ring in Taichung, a city of over 300,000,
expecting receptivity was that the island (a metallic intrauterine device popular Freedman and his co-workers found
was already on its way to moderniza- in Japan); almost as many had been the average number of children wanted
tion and family planning (28). sterilized; about 40,000 were using was 4; only 9 percent wanted less than
At most, the recent family-planning foam tablets; some 50,000 admitted to 3, 20 percent wanted 5 or more (34).
campaign-which reached significant having had at least one abortion; and If, therefore, Taiwanese women used
10 NOVEMBER 1967
contraceptives tnat were 100-percent and economic changes. Although the ning center in Tunisia, more than 600
effective and had the number o f chil- government is advocating vasectomies o f 900 women accepting contraceptives
dren they desire, they would have about and providing IUD's and pills, it re- had four living children already ( 4 4 ) .
4.5 each. The goal of the family-plan- fuses to legalize abortions, despite the In Bangalore, a city o f nearly a million
ning effort would be achieved. In the rapid rise in the rate of illegal abortions at the time (1952), the number of o f f -
past the Taiwanese woman who married and despite the fact that, in a recent spring desired by married women was
and lived through the reproductive pe- survey, 72 percent of the people who 3.7 on the average; by married men,
riod had, on the average, approximately stated an opinion favored legalization. 4.1 ( 4 3 ) . In the metropolitan area o f
6.5 children; thus a figure of 4.5 would Also, the program is presented in the San Salvador (350,000 inhabitants) a
represent a substantial decline in fer- context o f maternal and child health; 1964 survey ( 4 5 ) showed the number
tility. Since mortality would continue it thus emphasizes motherhood and the desired by women o f reproductive age
to decline, the population growth rate family rather than alternative roles for to be 3.9, and in seven other capital
would decline somewhat less than in- women. Much is made o f the fact that cities of Latin America the number
dividual reproduction would. With 4.5 opinion surveys show an overwhelming ranged from 2.7 to 4.2. I f women in
births per woman and a life expectancy majority o f Koreans (89 percent in the cities of underdeveloped countries
o f 70 years, the rate of natural increase 1965) favoring contraception (38, used birth-control measures with 100-
would be close to 3 percent per year p. 2 7 ) , but this means only that percent efficiency,they still would have
(35). Koreans are like other people in wish- enough babies to expand city popula-
In the future, Taiwanese views con- ing to have the means to get what they tions senselessly, quite apart from the
cerning reproduction will doubtless want. Unfortunately, they want sizable added contribution o f rural-urban mi-
change, in response to social change families: "The records indicate that the gration. In many of the cities the dif-
and economic modernization. But how program appeals mainly to women in ference between actual and ideal num-
far will they change? A good indication the 30-39 year age bracket who have ber o f children is not great; for instance,
is the number of children desired by four or more children, including at least in the seven Latin-American capitals
couples in an already modernized coun- .
two sons . ." (38, p. 2 5 ) . mentioned above, the ideal was 3.4
try long oriented toward family plan- In areas less developed than Korea whereas the actual births per women
ning. In the United States in 1966, an the degree o f acceptance o f contracep- in the age range 35 to 39 was 3.7 (46).
average o f 3.4 children was considered tion tends to be disappointing, especially Bombay City has had birth-control
ideal by white women aged 21 or over among the rural majority. Faced with clinics for many years, yet its birth
( 3 6 ) . This average number o f births this discouragement, the leaders o f cur- rate (standardized for age, sex, and
would give Taiwan, with only a slight rent policy, instead of reexamining their marital distribution) is still 34 per 1000
decrease in mortality, a long-run rate assumptions, tend to redouble their inhabitants and is tending to rise rather
o f natural increase o f 1.7 per effort to find a contraceptive that will than fall. Although this rate is about
year and a doubling o f population in appeal to the most illiterate peasant, 13 percent lower than that for India
41 years. forgetting that he wants a good-sized generally, it has been about that much
Detailed data confirm the interpreta- family. In the rural Punjab, for ex- lower since at least 1951 ( 4 7 ) .
tion that Taiwanese women are in the ample, "a disturbing feature . .. is that
process o f shifting from a "peasant- the females start to seek advice and
agrarian" to an "industrial" level o f adopt family planning techniques at the Is Family Planning the "First
reproduction. They are, in typical fash- f a g end o f their reproductive period" Step" in Population Control?
ion, cutting o f f higher-order births at ( 3 9 ) . Among 5196 women coming to
age 30 and beyond ( 3 7 ) .Among young rural Punjabi family-planning centers, T o acknowledge that family planning
wives, fertility has risen, not fallen. In 38 percent were over 35 years old, 67 does not achieve population control is
sum, the widely acclaimed family-plan- percent over 30. These women had not to impugn its value for other pur-
ning program in Taiwan may, at most, married early, nearly a third o f them poses. Freeing womeB from the need
have somewhat speeded the later phase before the age of 15 (40); some 14 to have more children than they want
o f fertility decline which would have percent had eight or more living chil- is o f great benefit to them and their
occurred anyway because o f moderniza- dren when they reached the clinic, 51 children and to society at large. My
tion. percent six or more. argument is therefore directed not
Moving down the scale of modern- A survey in Tunisia showed that 68 against family-planning programs as
ization. to countries most in need o f percent o f the married couples were such but against the assumption that
population control, one finds the family- willing to use birth-control measures, they are an effective means o f control-
planning approach even more inade- but the average number of children ling population growth.
quate. In South Korea, second only to they considered ideal was 4.3 ( 4 1 ) . But what difference does it make?
Taiwan in the frequency with which it The corresponding averages for a vil- W h y not go along for awhile with
is cited as a model of current policy, a lage in eastern Java, a village near New family planning as an initial approach
recent birth-rate decline of unknown Delhi, and a village in Mysore were 4.3, to the problem of population control?
extent is assumed by leaders to be due 4.0, and 4.2, respectively (42, 4 3 ) . In The answer is that any policy on which
overwhelmingly to the government's the cities o f these regions women are millions o f dollars are being spent
family-planning program. However, it more ready to accept birth control and should be designed to achieve the goal
is just as plausible to say that the net they want fewer children than village it purports to achieve. I f it is only a
effect o f government involven~ent in women do, but the number they con- first step, it should be so labeled, and
population control has been, so far, to sider desirable is still wholly unsatis- its connection with the next step (and
clelay rather than hasten a decline in factory from the standpoint of popula- the nature of that next step) should be
reproduction made inevitable by social tion control. In an urban family-plan- carefully examined. In the present case,
SCIENCE, VOL. 158
since no "next step" seems ever to be increase. (ii) Support and encourage- It follows that population-control
mentioned, the question arises, Is re- ment of research on population policy policy can de-emphasize the family in
liance on family planning in fact a basis other than family planning is negligible. two ways: (i) by keeping present con-
for dangerous postponement of effective It is precisely this blocking of alterna- trols over illegitimate childbirth yet
steps? T o continue to offer a remedy tive thinking and experimentation that making the most of factors that lead
as a cure long after it has been shown makes the emphasis on family planning people to postpone or avoid marriage,
merely to ameliorate the disease is a major obstacle to population control. and (ii) by instituting conditions that
either quackery or wishful thinking, The need is not to abandon family- motivate those who do marry to keep
and it thrives most where the need is planning programs but to put equal or their families small.
greatest. Today the desire to solve the greater resources into other approaches.
population problem is so intense that
we are all ready to embrace any "action Postponement o f Marriage
program" that promises relief. But post- New Directions in Population Policy
ponement of effective measures allows Since the female reproductive span
the situation to worsen. In thinking about other approaches, is short and generally more fecund in
Unfortunately, the issue is confused one can start with known facts. I n the its first than in its second half, post-
by a matter of semantics. "Family plnn- past, all surviving societies had institu- ponement of marriage to ages beyond
nirzg" and "fertility control" suggest tional incentives for marriage, procrea- 20 tends biologically to reduce births.
that reproduction is being regulated ac- tion, and child care which were power- Sociologically, it gives women time to
cording to some rational plan. And so ful enough to keep the birth rate equal get a better education, acquire interests
it is, but only from the standpoint of to or in excess of a high death rate. unrelated to the family, and develop a
the individual couple, not from that Despite the drop in death rates during cautious attitude toward pregnancy
of the community. What is rational in the last century and a half, the incen- ( 5 0 ) . Individuals who have not married
the light of a couple's situation may be tives tended to remain intact because by the time they are in their late
totally irrational from the standpoint the social structure (especially in re- twenties often do not marry at all. For
of society's welfare. gard to the family) changed little. At these reasons, for the world as a whole,
The need for societal regulation of most, particularly in industrial societies, the average age at marriage for women
individual behavior is readily recognized children became less productive and is negatively associated with the birth
in other spheres-those of explosives, more expensive (48). In present-day rate: a rising age at marriage is a fre-
dangerous drugs, public property, natu- agrarian societies, where the drop in quent cause of declining fertility during
ral resources. But in the sphere of re- death rate has been more recent, pre- the middle phase of the demographic
production, complete individual initia- cipitate, and independent of social transition; and, in the late phase, the
tive is generally favored even by those change ( 4 9 ) , motivation for having "baby boom" is usually associated with
liberal intellectuals who, in other children has changed little. Here, even a return to younger marriages.
spheres, most favor economic and social more than in industrialized nations, the Any suggestion that age at marriage
planning. Social reformers who would family has kept on producing abundant be raised as a part of population policy
not hesitate to force all owners of rental offspring, even though only a fraction is usually met with the argument that
property to rent to anyone who can of these children are now needed. "even if a law were passed, it would not
pay, or to force all workers in an in- If excessive population growth is to be obeyed." Interestingly, this objection
dustry to join a union, balk at any be prevented, the obvious requirement implies that the only way to control
suggestion that couples be permitted to is somehow to impose restraints on the the age at marriage is by direct legisla-
have only a certain number of offspring. family. However, became family tion, but other factors govern the actual
Invariably they interpret societal control roles are reinforced by society's system age. Roman Catholic countries generally
of reproduction as meaning direct of rewards, punishments, sentiments, follow canon law in stipulating 12
police supervision of individual be- and norms, any proposal to demote the years as the minimum legal age at
havior. Put the word compulsory in family is viewed as a threat by con- which girls may marry, but the actual
front of any term describing a means servatives and liberals alike, and cer- average age at marriage in these coun-
of limiting births-cor~zpulsory steriliza- tainly by people with enough social tries (at least in Europe) is characteris-
tion, cotnpulsory abortion, cotnpulsory responsibility to work for population tically more like 25 to 28 years. The
contmception-and you guarantee vio- control. One is charged with trying to actual age is determined, not by law,
lent opposition. Fortunately, such direct "abolish" the family, but what is re- but by social and economic conditions.
controls need not be invoked, but con- quired is selective restructuring of the In agrarian societies, postponement of
servatives and radicals alike overlook family in relation to the rest of society. marriage (when postponement occurs)
this in their blind opposition to the idea The lines of such restructuring are is apparently caused by difficulties in
of collective determination of a society's suggested by two existing limitations on meeting the economic prerequisites for
birth rate. fertility. (i) Nearly all societies succeed matrimony, as stipulated by custom
That the exclusive emphasis on in drastically discouraging reproduction and opinion. In industrial societies it
family planning in current population among unmarried women. (ii) Ad- is caused by housing shortages, unem-
policies is not a "first step" but an vanced societies unintentionally reduce ployment, the requirement for overseas
escape from the real issues is suggested reproduction among married women military service, high costs of education,
by two facts. (i) No country has taken when conditions worsen in such a way and inadequacy of consumer services.
the "next step." The industrialized as to penalize childbearing more se- Since almost no research has been de-
countries have had family planning for verely than it was penalized before. In voted to the subject, it is difficult to
half a century without acquiring control both cases the causes are motivational assess the relative weight of the factors
over either the birth rate or population and ecanomic rather than technological. that govern the age at marriage.
10 NOVEMBER 1967
E~~couraging
Limitation of equal educational and occupational op- though not so revolutionary as a Brave
Births within Marriage portunities, and if social life were New World or a Communist Utopia,
organized around the place of work nevertheless tend to offend most people
As a means of encouraging the limi- rather than around the home o r neigh- reared in existing societies. As a conse-
tation of reproduction within marriage, borhood, many women would develop quence, the goal of so-called population
as well as postponement of marriage, interests that would compete with control is implicit and vague; the
a greater rewarding of nonfamilial than family interests. Approximately this method is only family planning. This
of familial roles would probably help. policy is now followed in several Com- method, far from de-emphasizing the
A simple way of accomplishing this munist countries, and even the less family, is familistic. One of its stated
would be to allow economic advantages developed of these currently have ex- goals is that of helping sterile couples
to accrue to the single as opposed to tremely low birth rates (54). to have children. It stresses parental
the married individual, and to the small That inclusion of women in the labor aspirations and responsibilities. It goes
as opposed to the large family. For in- force has a negative effect on reproduc- along with most aspects of conventional
stance, the government could pay peo- tion is indicated by regional compari- morality, such as condemnation of abor-
ple to permit themselves to be sterilized sons (18, p. 1195; 5 5 ) . But in most tion, disapproval of premarital inter-
(51); all costs of abortion could be countries the wife's employment is sub- course, respect for religious teachings
paid by the government; a substantial ordinate, economically and emotionally, and cultural taboos, and obeisance to
fee could be charged for a marriage to her family role, and is readily sacri- medical and clerical authority. It de-
license; a "child-tax" (52) could be ficed for the latter. No society has re- flects hostility by refusing to recommend
levied; and there could be a require- structured both the occupational system any change other than the one it stands
ment that illegitimate pregnancies be and the domestic establishment to the for: availability of contraceptives.
aborted. Less sensationally, governments point of permanently modifying the old The things that make family plan-
could simply reverse some existing poli- division of labor by sex. ning acceptable are the very things that
cies that encourage childbearing. They In any deliberate effort to control the make it ineffective for population con-
could, for example, cease taxing single birth rate along these lines, a govern- trol. By stressing the right of parents to
persons more than married ones; stop ment has two powerful instruments- have the number of children they want,
giving parents special tax exemptions; its command over economic planning it evades the basic question of popula-
abandon income-tax policy that dis- and its authority (real or potential) tion policy, which is how to give socie-
criminates against couples when the over education. The first determir~es(as ties the number of children they need.
wife works; reduce paid maternity far as policy can) the economic condi- By offering only the means for couples
leaves; reduce family allowances (53) ; tions and circuinstances affecting the to control fertility, it neglects the means
stop awarding public housing on the lives of all citizens; the second provides for societies to do so.
basis of family size; stop granting fel- the knowledge and attitudes necessary Because of the predominantly pro-
lowships and other educational aids to implement the plans. The economic family character of existing societies,
(including special allowances for wives system largely determines who shall individual interest ordinarily leads to
and children) to married students; cease work, what can be bought, what rearing the production of enough offspring to
outlawing abortions and sterilizations; children will cost, how much individuals constitute rapid population growth un-
and relax rules that allow use of harm- can spend. The schools define family der conditions of low mortality. Child-
les5 contraceptives only with medical roles and develop vocational and recre- less or single-child homes are consid-
permission. Some of these policy re- ational interests; they could, if it were ered indicative of personal failure,
versals would be beneficial in other than desired, redefine the sex roles, develop whereas having three to five living
demographic respects and some would interests that transcend the home, and children give5 a family a sense of con-
be harmful unless special precautions transmit realistic (as opposed to moral- tinuity and substantiality ( 5 6 ) .
were taken. The aim would be to reduce istic) knowledge concerning marriage, Given the existing desire to have
the number, not the quality, of the next sexual behavior, and population prob- moderate-sized rather then small fami-
generation. lems. When the problem is viewed in lies, the only countries in which fertility
A closely related method of de- this light, it is clear that the ministries has been reduced to match reduction in
emphasizing the family would be modi- of economics and education, not the mortality are advanced ones temporarily
fication of the comple~nentarityof the ministry of health, should be the source experiencing worsened economic con-
roles of inen and women. Men are now of population policy. ditions. In Sweden, for instance, the
able to participate in the wider world net reproduction rate (NRR) has been
pet enjoy the satisfaction of having below replacement for 34 years (1930-
several children because the housework The Dilemma of Population Policy 63), if the period is taken as a whole,
and childcare fall mainly on their but this is because of the economic
wives. Women are impelled to seek this It should now be apparent why, de- depression. The average replacement
role by their idealized view of marriage spite strong anxiety over runaway popu- rate was below unity (NRR = 0.81)
and motherhood and by either the lation growth, the actual programs pur- for the period 1930-42, but from 1942
scarcity of alternative roles or the dif- porting to control it are limited to through 1963 it was above unity
ficulty of combining them with family family planning and are therefore in- (NRR = 1.08). Hardships that seem
roles. To change this situation women effective. (i) The goal of zero, or even particularly conducive to deliberate
could be required to work outside the slight, population growth is one that lowering of the birth rate are (in man-
home, or compelled by circumstances nations and groups find difficult to aged economies) scarcity of housing
to d o so. If, at the same time, women accept. (ii) The measures that would be and other consumer goods despite full
were paid as well as men and given required to implement such a goal, employment, and required high partici-
SCIENCE, VOL. 158
pation of women in the labor force, or 8. As used by English-speaking demographer,, 31. During tlie period 1950-60 thc ratio of
the word fertllit!' designates actual reproduc- growth of the city to growth of tile noncity
(in freer economies) a great deal of tive performance, not a theoretical capacity. population was 5:3; during tlie period 1960-
9. K. Davis, R o f a r i a ~ z 94, 10 (1959); Hecrltlz 64 the ratio was 5:2; these ratios are based
and economic insecurity, Editc. Moizogrci~ilzs 9, 2 (1960); L. Day and on data of Shaohsing Chen, J . Sociol. Trri-
When conditions are good, any nation A. Day, T o o Mrrny A~nericarzs (Houghton wan 1, 74 (1963) and data in the United
"ifflin, Boston, 1964); R. A. Piddington, Nations Deinogvrrplzic Yeerrbooks.
tends to have a growing iinzits o f Maizkiizd (Wright, Bristol, England, 32. R. Freedman, Population Index 31, 434
It follows that, in countries where 1956). (1965). Taichung's rate of decline in 1963-64
10. Oficicrl Grrzette (15 Apr. 1965): quoted in was roughly double the average in four other
contraception is used, a realistic pro- Studies i n Fainilv Planizina ( I , P. 7 ) . cities, whereas just prior to the campaign its
posal for a government policy of lower- 11. J . W. Gartlner, Secretary of ~ e ~ l t Ed~ica-
h , rate of decline had been much less than
tion, and Welfare, "Memorantlum to Heads theirs.
ing the birth rate reads like a catalogue of Operating Agencies" (Jan. 1966), repro- 33. S. H . Chen, J. Soc. Sci. Taipei 13, 72 (1963).
of horrors: cOnsL1n'ers through duced in Heariizgs on S. 1676 (51, p. 783. 34. R. Freedman et crl., Population Studies 16,
12. C. Tietze, Denrogvrrphy 1, 119 (1964); J. 227 (1963); ibirl., p. 232.
taxation and inflation; make housing Chrorzic Disecises 18, 1161 (1964); M. Mura- 35. In 1964 the life expectancy a t birth was
matsu, Milbarzk Menz. Fnnd Qi~iivt. 38, 153 already 66 years in Taiwan, as compared to
very scarce by limiting construction; (1960); K. Davis, Poprrlcrtion Index 29, 345 70 for the Unitetl States.
force wives and mothers to work out- (1963); R. Armijo and T . hfonreal, J . Sex 36. J. Blake, Eugenics Qrravt. 14, 68 (1967).
Re$. 1964, 143 (1964); Proceetlings Worltl 37. Women accepting IUD's in the family-
side the home to the inadequacy Population Conference, Belgrade, 1965; Pro- planning program are typically 30 to 34 years
of male wages, yet provide few child- ceedings International Planned Parenthood old and have already had four children.
Federation. [Studies in Fainily Plcrnizing N o . 19 (1967),
care facilities; encourage migration to 13. Studies iiz Frrrnily Planning, NO. 4 (19641, P 51.
the city by paying low wages in the p. 3. 38. Y. K. Cha, in Farnily Planniizg and Popnla-
14. D. Bell (then administrator for Agency for tion Pvogrrrms, B. Berelson e t crl., Eds. (Univ.
country and providing few rural jobs; International Development), in Heavings o n of Chicago Pres,, Chicago, 1966).
S. 1676 ( 5 ) , p. 862. 39. H. S. Ayalvi and S. S. Johl, J . Fanzil!~ W e l -
increase congestion in cities by starving 15, A.tjnn poplrlatjon Conference (United Na- fare 12, 60 1965).
the transit system; increase personal tions, New York, 1964), p. 30. 40. Sixty percent of the women had borne their
16. R. Armi.io and T. Monreal, in Conzponents o f first child bel'ore age 19. Early marriage is
insecurity by encouraging conditions Pop~rlation Cliarzge i n Latirz Anzericrr (Mil- 5trongly supported by public opinion. Of
that produce unemployment and by b:*nk Fond, New York, 19651, P. 272; E. couples polled in the Punjab, 48 percent said
Rice-Wray, Aiiler. J . Plrblic Iierrlth 54, 313 that girls slzo~rlrl marry before age 16, and
haphazard political arrests. N o govern- (1964). 94 percent ,aid they should marry before age
merit will institute such hardships sim- 17. E. Rice-Wray; in "Intra-Uterine Contracep- 20 (H. S. Ayalvi ,and S. S. Johl, ibid., p. 57).
tive Dcvices, Excevptrr M e d . Iizteriz. Congr. A st~idy of 2380 couples in GO villages oQ
ply for the purpose of controlling popu- s e v . N O . 54 (1962), p. 135. Uttar Pradesh fount1 that the women had
lation growth. clearly, therefore, the 18. J. Blake, in Pirblic Health rrrzd Popzrlrrtiort con,ummated their marriage at an average
Change, M. C. Sheps and J. C. Ritlley, Ed,. age of 14.0 year, [J. R.. Rele, ~ o p n l r i t i ~ i z
task of contemporary population policy (Univ. of Pitt,burgli Pre,s, Pittsburgh, 1965). Stirdies 15, 268 (1962)l.
is to develop attractive for 19. 3. Blake and K. Davis, A ~ n e r . Beitirviorol 41. J. Morsa. in Faririly Planninrc cr!?d Poorilrrtioi!
Scientist, 5, 24 (1963). ~rogrcrirls;B. ~ e r c f s o ne t 01.; Etls. ( ~ n i v o, f
family interests, so as to avoid having 20. See "Panel discussion on comparative ac- Chicago Prei,, Chicago, 1966).
ceptability of different methods of contra- 42. Fi. Gille and R. J. Pardolio, ibid., p. 515;
to turn to hardship as a corrective. ception," in Re~earclz in Farnily Pliinning, S. N. Agarwala, Med. Dig. Boinbaj~ 4, 653
The specific measures required for de- C. V. Ki,er, Ed. (Princeton Univ. Pre,s, (1961).
Princeton, 1962), pp. 373-86. 43. Mysore Popr~latiolz Strrdj~ (United Nation,,
veloping such substitutes are not easy 21. "From the ooint of view of the woman con- New Yorli, 1951), p. 140.
to determine in the absence of research cerned, t h e whole problem of continuing 44. A. Daly, in Farrrily Plcrnizing ancl Popzrlcrtion
motivation disappear,, . .". [D. Kirk, in Programs, 8 ,Bereison et al., Etls. (Univ. or
on the question. Popnlation D ~ ~ n a m i c s M, . Muramats~i and Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966).
In short, the world's population prob- P. A. Harper, Eds. (Johns Hopkins Press, 45. C. J. Gomez, paper presented at the World
Baltimore, 1965)l. Population Conference, Belgratle, 1965.
lem cannot be solved by pretense and 22. "For influencing family size norms, certainly 46. C. Miro, in Frrnzily Planizing rrnd Populrrtion
the examples and statement, of public figures Progi.ams, B. Bere1,on et rrl., Eds. (Univ. of
wishful thinking. ~h~ identi- . .
arc of great significance . . also . . use of Chicago Pres,, Chicago, 1965).
.
fication of fa mil^ planning with
L
DOVL~-A
mass-communication methods which help to
legitimize the small-family style, to provoke
47. Dernogrirphic Tmiizing cmd Research Centye
(India) Newsletter 20, 4 (Aug. 1966).
lation control is an ostrich-like approach conversation, and to e,tabli,h a vocabulary 48. K. Davis, Poplrlcrtion Index 29, 345 (1963).
in that it permits people to hide from lor di,cussion of family planning." [M. W. For economic and socio!ogical theory of
Freymann, in Popzrlatioiz Dyntinzics, M. Mura- motivation for having children, see J. Blake
themselves the enormity and uncon- matsu and P. A. Harper, Eds. (Johns Hop- [Univ. of California (Berlieley)l, in prepara-
ventionality of the task. There is no kins Pres,, Baltimore, 1965)l. tion.
23. 0. A. Collver, Birth Rates in Latirz Arnericii 49. K. Davis, Amer. Econoi?zic R e v . 46, 305
reason to abandon family-planning pro- (International Population and Urban Re- (1956); Sci. Aitzer. 209, 68 (1963).
grams; contraception is a valuable search, Berkeley, Calif., 1965), pp. 27-28; 50. J. Blake, W o r l d Pop~rlation Conference [Bel-
the ten countries were Colombia, Costa Rica, grade, 19651 (United Nations, New Yorlc,
technological instrument. But such pro- El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 1967), vol. 2, PC. 132-36.
grams must be supplemented with equal Mexico, Panami, Peru, ancl Venezuela. 51. S. E'nke, R e v . Economics Stcrti.stics 42, 175
24. J. R. Rele, Fertilitq' Ancrly~is tlzrou,?lz Exteiz- (1960); --_, Econ. Develop. Crrlt. Change
or greater investments in research and sion o f Stnhle Pop~rlntion Concepts. (Inter- 8, 339 (1960), - , ibid. PO, 427 (1962);
national population ancl Ijrban Research, A. 0 . Krueger and L. A. Sjaastad, ibid., p.
experimentation to determine the re- Berkeley, Calif., 1967). 423.
quired socioeconomic measures. 25. J. C. Kiclley, M. C. Sheps, J. W. Lingner, 52. T. J . Samuel, 9. Family W e l f a r e India 13,
J . A. Menken, Milhunk M e m . Fund Quart. 12 (1966).
References and Notes 45, 77 (1967); E. Arriaga, unpublished 53. Sixty-two countries, including 27 in Europe,
paper. give cash payments to people for having chil-
1. Studies in Familq' Planning, N o . 16 (1967). 26. "South Korea and Taiwan appear successfully dren [U.S. Social Security Administration,
2. Ibid., N o . 9 (1966), p. 1. to have checked population growth by the Social Secrrrity Programs Tl1rounhout the
3. The statement is given in Studies i n Family use of intrauterine contraceptive devices" W o r l d , 1967 (Government Printing Office,
Planning ( I , p. I ) , ancl in Poprrlcrtion Bull. [U. Borell, Hearinns o n S . 1676 (3,p. 5561. Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. xxvii-xxviii].
23, 6 (1967). 27. K. Davis, Pop~ilation Index 29, 345 (1963). 54. Average gross reproduction rates in the early
4. The statemcnt is quoted in Studies iri Far~rilv 28. K. Freedman, ibid. 31, 421 (1965). 1960's were as follows: Hungary, 0.91; Bul-
Planning ( I , p. 2): 29. Before 1964 the Family Planning Association garia, 1.09; Romania, 1.15; Yugoslavia, 1.32.
5. Hearings o n S . 1676, U . S . Sencrte, Subcorn- had given advice to fewer than 60,000 wives 55. 0. A. Collver and E. Langlois, Econ. De-
mittee o n Foreian Aid Exnenditures. 89th in 10 years and a Pre-Pregnancy Health Pro- velop. Crrlt. Change 10, 367 (1962); J . Weeks,
Concress, ~ e c o n i Session, April 7 , 8 , 11 gram had reached some 10,000, and, in the [Univ. of California (Berkeley)], unpublished
(1966), pt. 4. current campaign, 3650 IUD's were inserted paper.
6. B. L. Raina, in Fcrmily Plannin,? and Popu- in 1965, in a total population of 2% million 56. Roman Catholic textbooks condemn the
lation Provrams. B. Berelson. R. K. Ander- women ol' reproductive age. See Strrdies i n "small" family (one with fewer than four
son, 0. IIalkavy, G. M a e r , W. P. Mauldin, Family Planning, N o . 19 (1967), p. 4, and children) as being abnormal [J. Blake, Popu-
S. G. Segal, Edu. (Univ. of Chicago Press, R. Freedman et al., Population Studies 16, lation Studies 20, 27 (1966)l.
Chicago, 1966). 231 (1963). 57. Judith Blake's critical readings and discus-
7. D . Kirk, A n n . A m e r . Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 30. R. W. Gillespie, Fainily Plcrnning o n Taiwan sions have greatly helped in the preparation
369, 53 (1967). (Population Council, Taichung, 1965). of this article.

10 NOVEMBER 1967 739

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Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?
Kingsley Davis
Science, New Series, Vol. 158, No. 3802. (Nov. 10, 1967), pp. 730-739.
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References and Notes

12
The Demographic Significance of Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe
Christopher Tietze
Demography, Vol. 1, No. 1. (1964), pp. 119-125.
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12
Effect of Induced Abortion on the Reduction of Births in Japan
Minoru Muramatsu
The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Apr., 1960), pp. 153-166.
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25
The Effects of Changing Mortality on Natality: Some Estimates from a Simulation Model
Jeanne Clare Ridley; Mindel C. Sheps; Joan W. Lingner; Jane A. Menken
The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1. (Jan., 1967), pp. 77-97.
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28
The Transition From High to Low Fertility: Challenge to Demographers
Ronald Freedman
Population Index, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1965), pp. 417-430.
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29
Fertility Trends in Taiwan: Tradition and Change
R. Freedman; J. Y. Peng; Y. Takeshita; T. H. Sun
Population Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1963), pp. 219-236.
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Supplementary Note: The Accelerating Fertility Decline in Taiwan
Ronald Freedman
Population Index, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Oct., 1965), pp. 430-435.
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34
Fertility Trends in Taiwan: Tradition and Change
R. Freedman; J. Y. Peng; Y. Takeshita; T. H. Sun
Population Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1963), pp. 219-236.
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34
Fertility Trends in Taiwan: Tradition and Change
R. Freedman; J. Y. Peng; Y. Takeshita; T. H. Sun
Population Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Mar., 1963), pp. 219-236.
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40
Some Aspects of Family and Fertility in India
J. R. Rele
Population Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Mar., 1962), pp. 267-278.
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51
The Economics of Government Payments to Limit Population
Stephen Enke
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 8, No. 4, Part 1. (Jul., 1960), pp. 339-348.
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Some Misconceptions of Krueger and Sjaastad regarding the Vasectomy-Bonus Plan to
Reduce Births in Overpopulated and Poor Countries
Stephen Enke
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Jul., 1962), pp. 427-431.
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51
Some Limitations of Enke's Economics of Population
Anne O. Krueger; Larry A. Sjaastad
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Jul., 1962), pp. 423-426.
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The Female Labor Force in Metropolitan Areas: An International Comparison
Andrew Collver; Eleanor Langlois
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 10, No. 4. (Jul., 1962), pp. 367-385.
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The Americanization of Catholic Reproductive Ideals
Judith Blake
Population Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Jul., 1966), pp. 27-43.
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