An examination of the case Tukaram v.

State of Maharashtra
through the perspectives of MacKinnon, Penner, and Melissaris.

Thesis
Analysis of the case Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra reveals how the legal machinery sustains
patriarchal constructs that shape perceptions of sexual violence, and in turn, perpetuate gendered
hierarchies and reduce women's real existence. A feminist jurisprudence by MacKinnon and
Meslissaris's views in relation to Penner would reveal that the law often fails to listen to the realities
of sexually assaulted women and is institutionally oriented to perpetuate male supremacy.

Facts

On 26th March, 1972, Gama lodged a complaint where he claimed that Mathura was forcefully taken
and, despite protesting of all the people concerned, Ganpat and Tukaram sexually assaulted Mathura,
who subsequently informed her family and friends about the incident. During a medical examination
by Dr. Shastrakar, no conclusive evidence of recent sexual activity or assault was found; however, her
hymen showed signs of prior rupture, indicating she may have had previous sexual experiences.
Additionally, the "two-finger test" revealed that her vagina could accommodate two fingers
comfortably. There was nothing to indicate matting and dishevelment with pubic hair which would
testify to recent cohabitation. Dr. Shastrakar estimated that age of Mathura must fall between 14 and
16. There was nothing to indicate semen found from the vaginal smears and samples of pubic hair of
Mathura sent to the laboratory for further examination.

According to the Supreme Court, sexual intercourse with a woman may amount to rape under Section
375 of the Indian Penal Code. The court has further elaborated five conditions under which the sexual
acts may be termed rape, such as where sexual intercourse is against the wish of the woman, done
without her consent, or even under the fear of causing harm or death to her. Further, the court
underlined that criminal trials demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime.
The court further commented that in case of any contradiction or inconsistency in the statement by the
victim, then also her credibility in stating that incident would be doubtful. The court further reminded
its importance of ascertaining the credibility of a witness before drawing any conclusions. 1

1
Pandey, A. (2024, May 3). Tukaram and Another v. State of Maharashtra (Mathura Rape Case).
iPleaders. https://blog.ipleaders.in/case-analysis-tukaram-and-another-v-state-of-maharashtra-mathura-rape-
case/

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Analyzing the Mathura Rape Case Through the Lens of Penner and
Melissaris

This case, applying the feminist legal perspectives of Penner and Melissaris, can be critically
deconstructed, and the conclusion would obviously reveal how sexism in the legal structure affects
outcomes, especially in sexual violence cases. The acquittal in the *Tukaram* case is so close to the
criticism many often level against legal systems, which operate from the "masculine" perspective and
fail to really take into account the situational realities of women being victims of coercion and trauma.

According to Penner and Melissaris, in the words of feminist legal theory, it critiques conventional
law, which is very objective while focusing on the visible dynamics of physical evidence it paid a
little heed to the subtle dynamics of power play on over women victims. Such arguments can be
applied when examining the case of *Tukaram*: court dismissed the testimony given by Mathura just
for she showed no resistance during it. Feminist theory argues that judgments in cases like *Tukaram*
often fail to consider the psychological and social pressures that may inhibit a victim's physical
resistance, particularly when the perpetrator holds a position of authority.

Penner and Melissaris explore how the law reinforces gendered stereotypes, especially in cases of
sexual violence. Feminist legal scholars argue that legal frameworks perpetuate the notion of an “ideal
victim,” suggesting that only "substantial physical resistance" can confirm non-consent. Meanwhile,
the psychological trauma and fear that many victims endure are often disregarded. It served to
influence the Court's decision making in Tukaram such that it based its conclusions on the consensual
intercourse, even though it was overlooking the greater context of intimidation and the probable
Mathura's reaction given the position she was in.

Further, a "masculine" notion of justice whereby adversarial arguments depend largely on evidence-
based reasoning often divorced from the subjective experiences of women shows its hold in cases
such as *Tukaram*. The strict application of the rule of law relying on objective evidence of visible
injuries or signs of struggle necessarily excludes many women whose circumstances cannot be
explained through such a framework. As seen in *Tukaram*, the same masculine approach applies to
the Court's verdict as it overlooked the fact that Mathura's passivity was a survival response rather
than a sign of consent.

This analysis reflects the feminist critique, which contends that legal systems lack neutrality and
objectivity, being instead shaped by social and cultural biases that privilege male viewpoints.
Feminist legal theory advocates for a change in how issues concerning sexual violence are interpreted.
The law should shift away from the strict definitions of consent and resistance. It calls for a
recognition of the intricate realities of power and coercion that can affect victims' responses. In the
Tukaram case, without adopting this perspective, the judgment overlooked the power dynamics at
play and ultimately failed to provide justice for Mathura.

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In conclusion, feminist legal theory highlights the patriarchal biases inherent in the judicial system
and considers female victims of sexual assault, as seen in Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, to be
marginalized. It challenges the way the Court, in order to justify a "masculine" viewpoint, requires the
prosecution to prove the lack of consent by establishing physical struggle or resistance to transform
the experience of the victim into an extremely narrow definition of communication. Penner and
Melissaris argue that feminist interventions need to be made within the legal system to counter the
above biases and should recognize and respect women's lives and autonomy. This is a case that points
towards the need for urgent reforming of the legal understanding regarding consent, considering the
problems in the experience of the victims in such cases wherein power imbalances exist.

Examination of the Mathura rape case through the lens of MacKinnon’s

perspective.

The legal theory developed in respect of the role by the state in perpetuating male authority by
Catharine MacKinnon, about how the legal structure further reinforces gender inequalities by
operating against the lived lives of women, has been most fruitful in critically analyzing case by case.
A fitting case in point is Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, where this interpretation by the judiciary
doesn't seem to be out of deep-seated biases where survivor voices are sidelined to the extent of
constructing notions of consent in a deeply masculine framework.

In Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, the judicial examination and evidence reveal a visible
unwillingness to accept Mathura's experience as rape. Emphasizing the absence of physical injuries
and the fact that she did not raise an alarm as indicators of consent illustrates what MacKinnon refers
to as the state's alignment with male authority. It can be seen, therefore that the Court read Mathura's
silenc and perceived submissiveness as an implied consent, thereby conveniently bypassing reality of
coercion.2 This is a good argument that supports MacKinon's critique of liberal legal frameworks,
even while claiming to be objective, continue to prop up a male-perspective by defining "consent" in
narrow ways and ignoring the significant impact that fear and coercion have.

This case can be seen to reflect the critique of MacKinnon that state "sees and treats women the way
men see and treat women." 3The judgment of the Supreme Court goes in favor of a view of consent
that is utterly insensitive to the socioeconomic realities & power imbalances that women like Mathra
face, thus reinforcing male sexual privilege. By dismissing her lack of physical resistance and
emphasizing Mathura's purported sexual history and "habit" of intercourse, the judgment perpetuated
patriarchal narratives surrounding female sexuality. This aligns closely with MacKinnon’s claim that
the legal system legitimizes male dominance while undermining women's autonomy.

The language the court employs and its dependence on the two-finger test reflect the objectification of
women within the legal system. When it mentions Mathura stating she "was habituated to sexual
intercourse," the Sessions Court is employing stereotypes with regard to female chastity and
character, only claiming that virginal women can be considered reliable victims. This view is not very
different from MacKinnon's criticism of how the law frequently, more or less coincidentally favors
2
2011 (14) SCC 250
3
MacKinnon, C. A. (1983). Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence. Signs, 8(4), 635–658. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173687

3
male interests by recasting women's lives within tropes of property and purity. Such practices and
determinations reinforce the assumption that a woman's past history of sexual activity undermines her
credibility or makes an attack against her less egregious, thereby perpetuating the ideals of patriarchy
that curtail women's sexual rights and liberties.

MacKinnon mounts a criticism against the state complicity in perpetuating male dominance through
selective intervention in sexual violence. She further argues that criminal justice systems treat sexual
violence cases as isolated incidents rather than dealing with the imbalances of power which create
such events. In Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, the very fact that courts emphasize such points as
absence of overt physical injuries, and such a perception as Mathura consenting, obliterates how
authority figures-be it policeman or any such other-and abuse their respective powers by taking
advantage of such girls. What would MacKinnon opine from here is this judicial meekness with such
abusers is what makes it the liberal state's coercive and authoritative role within the hegemonic
domain by degrading such experiences from women's victimhood as violence.

In a way, as MacKinnon has so eloquently said, this is more than an error of judgment on the part of
the Supreme Court. Rather, it appears a calculated legal strategy whose intent is to further assure
men's supremacy: de-legitimize what is for women a reality in and through rape. The judgment
continues to establish that masculine authority overweighs the fetters of law; thus, one could say the
system is male in the sense of a feminist. It is well possible as the court draws an analogy between
non-injury and consent; thus the court makes it appear to be so as if in case she feels that her rights
have been violated the violation could be only at the hands of strict dictation of masculine criteria set
by the male aggression-inspired power dynamics, which, again, happen to be masculine 4.

CONCLUSION

Examining Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra through a feminist legal theory lens is an

indicator of the major weakness that the judiciary exhibits in dealing with sexual violence.
This judgment shows how male power overshadows the power of women, resulting in
patriarchal bias. The fact that the Supreme Court bases its judgment on tangible evidence and
the fact that no overt resistance can be shown is a result of the limited, masculine perspective
in which the nuances of victim responses to trauma and coercion are overlooked. This
approach dismisses the believability of a victim while promoting dangerous myths linked to
"ideal victims." Such individuals are expected to act in a physically violent way in order for
people to believe their testimonies. The case shows systemic flaws and fails to fully dispense
4
MacKinnon, C. A. (1983). Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence. Signs, 8(4), 635–658. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173687

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with the power differential as it is at the centre of sexual abuse. The case speaks to a deeper
urgency of change with law enforcement institutions regarding female autonomy and
representation. There is scope in establishing a more just system of law by noting down the
inadequacy of traditional definitions of consent and resistance therefore showing the realities
that sexual assault victims undergo.