BRIEFING

EPRS Ideas Paper

Towards a more resilient EU

The future of multilateralism and

strategic partnerships
SUMMARY
The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 has exacerbated global geopolitical trends, including the
struggle to uphold multilateralism in a climate of growing nationalism, protectionism and rising
great power competition. At the same time, it has demonstrated the need for multilateral
cooperation for the effective mitigation of cross-border threats, including health crises. Within this
environment, the European Union (EU), a multilateral entity in itself, has illustrated the relevance of
cooperation. Beyond its internal strengthening, the EU has set the defence and reform of
multilateralism as one of its key priorities under the current European Commission. This will require
a more coordinated and autonomous EU foreign policy, a smart approach towards the escalating
US–China rivalry, reinvigorated cooperation with major democracies, and mobilisation of the EU's
foreign policy tools, widely defined. As coronavirus leaves parts of the world more fragile and
vulnerable, it also precipitates the need for a reformed multilateral system 'fit for purpose' and able
to address the challenges of the future. Thinking through new practices to enrich multilateralism
will be important for the further development of international cooperation.

Introduction
The 75th anniversary of the United Nations (UN) finds multilateralism at a critical juncture. The
coronavirus pandemic has exposed the multilateral system's inability to live up to the expectations
projected on it in the current geopolitical environment. The observed shortcomings of the UN
Security Council (UNSC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in the face of the crisis have led
critics of internationalism to prematurely pronounce the failure of multilateralism and global
governance and to highlight that citizens look to national leaders in times of existential crises.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to consider this reading to be short-sighted. The evident
need to reform many of the existing multilateral structures and institutions is hardly a sign of their
failure, but rather of the necessity to strengthen them and to allow them to evolve in the context of
an admittedly transforming – if not transformed – international environment. The same holds true
for many of the alliances and partnerships that underpin the multilateral order. In many ways,
multilateralism could be said to be facing a 'Darwinian moment' in which adaptation becomes a
prerequisite of evolution: multilateralism needs to be fit for purpose, in order to survive.
Even before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, multilateralism and the rules-based order
had been challenged. Recent years have been marked by the waning commitment of major
countries to international agreements and institutions, an issue of major concern to the EU. In the
area of security, this, among other things, is jeopardising the survival of important nuclear arms-
control treaties, with potentially direct implications for Europe. The unilateral withdrawal of the
United States of America from the US Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark
agreement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and the announcement, in
February 2019, that both the US and Russia would suspend their obligations under the 1987

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Elena Lazarou
PE 652.071 – September 2020 EN
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, are cases in point. More recently, the US announced
its withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. The crisis of multilateralism extends beyond traditional
areas of security, with the US having also withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change,
the UN Human Rights Council and, in May 2020, having announced its imminent withdrawal from
the WHO amidst the greatest health crisis in a century. Other countries have indicated that they may
follow.
Beyond the change of policy of the world's major power, the crisis of multilateralism is embodied in
challenges faced by some of the most established international organisations, most notably the
World Trade Organization (WTO), as multilateral consensus becomes harder to reach. As the UN
Secretary General, António Guterres, has emphasised, the observed rise in nationalism and
protectionism is having detrimental effects on transnational trust and multilateralism. The UNSC's
delay in agreeing to impose a ceasefire in conflict areas amidst the pandemic has scarred the image
of the UN, without doubt the symbol of the post-Second World War multilateral order. In the words
of the High Representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP), at a time when the world
needs it more than ever before, we unfortunately do not have enough multilateral and cross-border
cooperation. The multilateral order may be imperfect, but it can be credited to a large extent with
the preservation of peace and prosperity and with the achievement of solutions to global trans-
border challenges.

Multilateralism and EU foreign policy: A simultaneous goal, tool and value.

For the EU, the promotion and protection of the multilateral rules-based order is a fundamental goal
of its external action. Multilateralism lies at the core of the EU's identity, and of its strategy to
promote its values and defend its interests. As an example of multilateral cooperation itself, in its
foreign policy the EU shall, according to its Treaty, 'promote multilateral solutions to common
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations' whenever possible
(Article 20(1) TEU). The first ever comprehensive European Security Strategy (ESS) – formulated in
2003 – placed advocacy of 'effective multilateralism' at the centre of the EU's strategic goals. The
2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) reiterates the EU's dedication to the promotion of 'a rules-based
global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core'. At the same
time, it emphasises that 'the format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to
case', citing policy areas ranging from cybersecurity (where states, international organisations,
industry, civil society and technical experts are actors to consider) and maritime policy (the UN, UN
specialised agencies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), strategic partners, and Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)), to humanitarian, development and climate policy (the UN,
G20, new donors, civil society and the private sector). Where multilateral processes already exist, the
EU envisions strengthening them, and at the same time expanding fledgling international regimes
in areas such as disarmament and international criminal law.
Importantly, the EUGS acknowledged the need to reform multilateral structures and to address their
weaknesses. It stressed that, despite internal divisions and structural problems, 'the EU remains the
most consistent and best-resourced supporter of a strong multilateral system in the world today'. In
a world which risks resembling a zero-sum game, a united EU defining and pursuing its strategic
interests can work towards a renewed approach to multilateralism as an alternative European model
of global cooperation. This is particularly relevant in a time when Sino-American competition is
challenging established practices of internationalism and global cooperation with a return to realist
great power politics. Moreover, current digital and technological trends suggest that in the future
power may not be distributed in cohesive state-based centres (poles), but rather across a variety of
multiform interconnected actors (nodes). The connectivity, interdependence and pluralistic nature
of the system will also fundamentally transform power relations. In that shifting context, envisioning
new practices to enrich multilateralism is paramount for the evolution of international cooperation.
On assuming her new role in 2019, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged to lead a
'geopolitical Commission', which would reinforce the EU as an international actor, pursuing its

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interests and the promotion of its values. Part of this pursuit is to work on shaping a better global
order through reinforcing multilateralism. In her political guidelines, the Commission President
highlighted the intention to 'uphold and update the rules based global order' using assertiveness
and a strategic approach in order to do so, with both trade and climate as areas for action where the
Union can use its normative power to uphold multilateral decisions though its own legislation.
Ahead of the global health crisis, the Council of the EU identified three strands of action to
strengthen the multilateral system: upholding international norms and agreements; extending
multilateralism to new global realities; and making multilateral organisations fit for purpose through
reform. The European Parliament (EP) has emphasised that the EU's action to support and promote
multilateralism should be consistent with its principles, values and interests.
The coronavirus pandemic has reinforced discussions about autonomy, sovereignty and self-
sufficiency across the world and in the EU. A strategic and autonomous EU would be able to leverage
the partnerships needed in the effort to combine autonomy with the upholding of multilateralism.
As the Parliament has stressed, 'the EU should switch from a responsive to an anticipatory approach
and the importance of teaming up with like-minded EU strategic partners, in particular NATO and
emerging countries in order to defend the global rule-based order that is founded on international
and humanitarian law and multilateral treaties'. Without disregarding its benefits, the EU should
acknowledge that, for multilateralism to survive, it must adapt and serve the complex international
environment we live in. In this vein it will aim to work with likeminded partners in the context of
cooperative autonomy; lead the creation of the multilateral formats of the future; and support the
UN and key multilateral organisations through the 'crisis of multilateralism'. The pandemic is a wake-
up call for multilateralism, and may provide the necessary impetus for the reinvigoration of
multilateral cooperation. However, some powers may claim any victory against the coronavirus for
their own, using it to further 'nationalise' discourse and debase collective efforts and demean
international institutions further. It is for Europe to defend multilateralism and international law.

The way forward

It follows from this introduction that the preservation and reform of multilateral structures and the
reinvigoration of smart and fruitful partnerships will be quintessential goals of the EU in the post-
coronavirus world. Several strategic strands of work which require the coordination of different EU
policies can contribute to their pursuit. The new Commission structure, which includes horizontal
coordination of the external aspects of the work of the various directorates-general, helps to
coordinate the EU's and EU Member States' wide ranging toolkit and resources in this pursuit.

Rising above the US-China rivalry

Most experts seem to agree that the inadequate multilateral response to the pandemic, particularly
that of the UNSC, the G20 and G7, and even the WHO, is a result of the current dynamics between
major powers, particularly the US and China. Already engulfed in a growing geopolitical and
ideological rivalry and a heated trade war, China and the US instrumentalised the health crisis to
create allegiances and to engage in power games that delayed and watered down initiatives for a
coordinated global response. As Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations argues, 'the
pandemic has shown that institutions alone are not enough, there needs to be will and trust'.
Coronavirus is a wake-up call to the fact that the US-China rivalry, unmitigated, could severely
hamper multilateralism. The challenge for the EU is to engage with both powers in a way that both
serves its own interests and values and enables efficient global governance. With bilateralism and
unilateralism on the rise, the EU must promote an alternative model to great power competition.

The China conundrum

By several forecasts, China will be the world's largest economy by 2035. Its 'Made in China 2025'
industrial policy and the Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to expand China's investment in the
regional integration of its wider neighbourhood, are trademarks of the country's ambition to secure

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its economic primacy and geopolitical influence. In spite of the effects of the pandemic on China's
economy, its global leadership ambitions remain present for the foreseeable future.
The ability to calibrate a relationship with China that ensures the EU's strategic interests, economic
benefits for both sides and collaboration in the face of global challenges, will define the EU's global
role to a great extent. The HR/VP has stated that the EU has an 'enduring interest' in working with
China on global issues, such as health and climate, acknowledging its importance. While the
Commission's 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook designated China a systemic rival and an
economic competitor, it does not advocate disengagement and also refers to it as a cooperation
partner. Concerns regarding security and differences as regards values and norms such as human
rights, the application of international law, the respect of good governance and sustainable
economic development, complicate the relationship further. Recent events, such as China's actions
in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have brought this to the fore. In addition, the regulation of the
relationship with China, in a way that ensures commitments on market access, industrial subsidies
and regulatory issues, becomes increasingly necessary. The conclusion of a comprehensive
agreement on investment would be an important step towards this end. An update of the
Strategic Approach, with a greater emphasis on values, and its full endorsement by all members of
the Council would add coherence and solidity to the EU's negotiations with the Asian powerhouse.
Striking a balance between cooperating with China and safeguarding EU strategic sovereignty (see
below) is a prerequisite to ensure that the EU can play a constructive and proactive role in promoting
effective multilateralism by positioning itself smartly in the context of US-China rivalry. It is also
essential to avoid allowing China to create divisions within the EU-27, for example in the context of
the 17+1. The implementation of rules regarding critical investment screening across the EU
would also contribute to this goal. Finally, a partnership with China should not allow the latter's
technological dominance (e.g. in 5G, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing) to obstruct
the EU's digital sovereignty and/or to jeopardise the EU's commitment to privacy.

A renewed transatlantic relationship

The US remains the EU's key strategic partner in spite of observed differences and policy divergence
under the Trump administration. The transatlantic relationship is based on common history and
values and on mutually beneficial objectives. The EU and the US have enjoyed the fruits of
multilateralism and the rules based order since the end of the Second World War, which has served
their 'joint interests, stability and prosperity'. As China's influence grows, it will inevitably seek to
shape the world according to its interests, values and political beliefs. In spite of recently observed
US isolationism, a renewed and reinforced transatlantic relationship is essential for both the US
and EU, to uphold democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the basis of global governance.
However, there is a need to promote renewed trust in the transatlantic relationship. While actions
and statements by President Trump have led to perceptions of divergence between the
transatlantic partners, including in areas such as multilateralism and human rights, relations at the
legislative level remain robust, with a strong alignment in values and interests on new and
traditional issues. Raising public awareness of the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) could
restore confidence in the durability of the transatlantic bond and ensure continuity of cooperation.
Beyond the headlines, in the past year, the EU and US have agreed to expand joint efforts in fighting
terrorism and other areas of justice and home affairs (JHA), such as drones, cybersecurity, and hybrid
threats. On internet governance, an emerging area for multilateral cooperation, both commit to the
principles of openness, freedom and interoperability, as well as a human rights framework for
cybersecurity and a multi-stakeholder model, in spite of controversies over the EU's approach to
data protection and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). As China's
rise brings with it a diametrically opposed authoritarian model of internet governance, the EU and
US should aim to work together to strengthen their approach. The public health crisis has
accelerated the realisation of the need to reduce dependence on China in both the EU and the US.
In June 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo agreed to launch a high-level EU-US dialogue on

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China. EU-US solidarity is a prerequisite to ensuring Chinese compliance with its obligations under
international law, the case of Hong Kong being the most recent example. Together, the EU and US
have also enforced sanctions on Russia as part of a coordinated response to its actions against
Ukraine. A common position on the crisis in Belarus may also be in the making, potentially
reinforcing a transatlantic approach to Russia and its neighbourhood. As experience has shown, a
united transatlantic front against violations of international law can leverage real results in
international security crises and further areas can be explored (for example, Venezuela).

Supporting the UN reform agenda

In September 2020, world leaders will meet (virtually) for a special UN session on 'The Future We
Want, the UN We Need: Reaffirming our Collective Commitment to Multilateralism,' and endorse a
political declaration which reaffirms the imperative of international cooperation and, among other
things, commits UN members to realising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), abiding by
international law and human rights norms, and to making the UN more 'agile, effective, and
accountable', ensuring its sustainable financing. They will also agree to cooperate on improving
pandemic preparedness and global resilience.
At the same time, the UN's key development and peace-keeping goals are being challenged. Official
development assistance (ODA) is decreasing globally and emerging donors, with competing
interests, are on the increase. While the global community is committed to the 2030 Agenda, it is
lagging on most SDG targets, and financing remains a challenge. Meanwhile, the pandemic has
exacerbated the urgency for effective development aid, as it has caused extreme poverty, food
insecurity and humanitarian needs to rise. Financing the SDGs will be more challenging in the
aftermath of the pandemic, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts negative global
growth in 2020, while the humanitarian cost of the pandemic grows. International reactions during
the coronavirus outbreak have demonstrated both the temptation to focus on national measures
and an increased sense of international solidarity – not least because the weakest links could
undermine the global efforts in fighting the pandemic. Reform of the UN and the improvement of
plans to achieve the SDGs are essential to confront nationalist rhetoric. A global reshuffle in
international development cooperation will require adaptation of priorities and modalities and
increased monitoring, auditing and accountability, including by parliaments and auditing bodies.
As the largest collective financial contributor to the UN system, collectively providing nearly half of
the global ODA, the EU and its members should be a leading voice in the debate about ODA
governance and standards. The global coronavirus response (of which €12.28 billion is pledged to
address the economic and social consequences of the pandemic in the most fragile countries), has
shown that the EU is in a unique position to coordinate international initiatives to address the
pandemic, promoting renewed multilateralism targeted to citizens' immediate needs.
Peace-keeping is also at a critical moment, as conflict environments become more complex and the
demands for peace-keeping grow. The pandemic will aggravate the root causes of conflict, while
the related economic recession will have a negative effect on peacekeeping financing. The
proposed reform of UN peace-keeping will include parameters such as 'the relevance and
pertinence of mandates, the political environment and will of key parties, operations' comparative
advantage vis-à-vis regional, UN and other partners, and the configuration of support'.
The EU will continue to fully support the UN reform agenda proposed by the UN Secretary General,
which includes a reform of the UN development system and a restructuring of the peace and
security pillar, both corresponding to stated EU priorities. The proposed reform also includes a
managerial reform. The three pillars of the UN reform run in parallel with the EU-UN eight strategic
partnerships for peace operations and crisis management for 2019 to 2021. However, as has been
highlighted by the EP, the promotion and protection of human rights – an EU priority – is not
pursued by a tailored reform process. In light of the US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights
Council, working with like-minded partners to ensure continuity in the relevance of human rights in
the work of the UN should be an EU priority for multilateralism.

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Perhaps the biggest bet for the survival and renewal of the UN, however, will be overcoming the
paralysis of the UNSC, which the current geopolitical situation has fuelled. Constructive
engagement with the US and China would allow the EU to steer a diplomatic path towards
overcoming this stalemate.

From strategic partnerships to strategic partnering

Since the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU has made efforts to engage with potential
strategic partners or allies bilaterally, with the long-term objective of spill-over from these bilateral
partnerships to the multilateral level. It has – at times simultaneously – engaged in the inter-regional
approach, connecting with other regional organisations with the same end goal. In a world of
transforming power politics and of emerging issues, such as climate and digital connectivity, both
the strategic partnership and interregional approach need to be modernised, as acknowledged by
the Commission's relaunching of several partnership dialogues and by the modernisation of free
trade agreements (FTAs), among other things. A more pragmatic yet still principled approach to
the world suggests that issue-specific partnering will also be necessary with non-likeminded yet
relevant countries. At the same time, the inter-regional approach should run in parallel to tailored
engagement with members of a given region, to avoid 'one size fits all' generalisations that have not
worked in the past. If anything, Covid-19 has highlighted divergences within regions.
Strategic partnering should strike a balance between serving the EU's interest and promoting its
values. In light of the observed bipolarisation of the strategic environment, the EU's partnerships
need to expand and diversify even more: coalition building and alliances are needed for the EU
to strengthen its foreign policy footprint and its agenda setting power in multilateral institutions. In
the face of US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), for example, the EU needs
to solidify alliances with countries which share its views on the UN's role in the protection of
human rights. At the same time, it needs to adopt 'smart' and pragmatic strategies vis-à-vis rivals.
Relations with its largest normative rivals are complex: while the EU views China as a systemic rival,
'an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting
alternative models of governance', China is a key investor in several EU Member States and a partner
in fighting climate change and, most recently, in facing coronavirus. Russia, on which the EU has
enforced sanctions, is a critical energy provider and a neighbour, and thus significantly
interdependent with the EU. The EU should, therefore, continue to fine-tune strategies for relations
with these two geopolitical poles, while – as the pandemic has illustrated – aiming to reduce
dependence.
Cooperating with like-minded partners
The post-Second World War multilateral order has been based on liberal values, many of which are
being challenged today by what Anne Applebaum calls 'the seductive lure of authoritarianism'. As
stated by the EU HR/VP, 'given everything that's happening in the world and the rise in authoritarian
powers, it is important to have strong cooperation with like-minded democracies'. Indeed, the EU's
support for multilateralism and international law is mostly shared by other 'continental
democracies', which face similar challenges. Closer engagement with these likeminded partners,
which adhere to several of the EU's values, should continue to be explored in the context of
cooperative autonomy and in the understanding that only a substantial 'alliance for
multilateralism' will be fit to counter alternative paradigms and serve democracies' mutual
interests. Working with major democracies in traditional and new, bilateral and multilateral
formats should be a priority in EU efforts to reinvigorate values based international cooperation.
Fruitful and efficient cooperation among democracies has, moreover, been shown to enhance the
'soft' or 'normative' power of attraction related to democracy. This enhanced cooperation can take
the form of comprehensive trade agreements; the exploration of exercises and possibilities for
cooperation in defence research and industry and military projects, including through NATO global
partnerships (using the EU position in NATO); in crisis management, framework participation

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agreements (such as those with the USA, South Korea); high-level dialogues on development and
human rights building on existing dialogue formats 1; through bilateral ties and global networks
among 'global cities'; by continuing to strengthen bilateral ties between parliaments.
Most major democracies agree that a reform of multilateral institutions is needed, but not at the
expense of democracy, as illustrated by proposals such as for an alliance of ten large democracies,
developing the idea of creating a D10 or G9 that would advance the liberal international order. US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has hinted that this may be the time for a new alliance of
democracies. An expanded G7 of democracies could focus on tangible issues such as the
development of 5G technology or a joint approach to the recovery from the pandemic, while
safeguarding democratic values. This approach to multilateralism is consistent with the EU's
objection to a proposal by President Trump earlier in the year for Russia to re-join an expanded G7
as the EU 'considers that the G7 format is a vital multilateral framework among countries guided by
shared values, interests and commitments'. The Alliance for Multilateralism is also emerging as a
forum bringing together like-minded partners that support effective multilateral cooperation and a
targeted approach to the reform of multilateralism with the UN at its centre.
The upgrading of strategic partnerships and the modernisation of strategic dialogue
agreements can support collaboration bilaterally and in multilateral fora in areas ranging from
human rights, to multilateral export controls and non-proliferation regimes, to health. In this vein, it
is notable that in the wake of the coronavirus crisis, the EU held high-level virtual meetings with
Japan, the Republic of Korea and India, expanding cooperation in values-based fields such as
artificial intelligence, the digital sphere and climate change. It goes without saying that some form
of strategic partnership with the United Kingdom is of utmost importance. A swift conclusion of
trade negotiations and a robust agreement to cooperate on foreign and security policy issues could
enable the EU and the UK to work together for the promotion of shared values, including in the
digital area, climate change, international security (for example, the preservation of the JCPOA) and
human rights, in the wake of the global pandemic.
A new approach to regions
The 'great power' game between China, the US and Russia takes place in parallel and in varied ways
in several loci. In Africa, through investment and aid; in the Arctic, through competition for control
of waterways and energy sources; and closer to home in the Western Balkans and the Eastern
Neighbourhood, through disinformation and electoral interference, investment financing, 5G
competition and military procurement. These regions could see one or other system of power taking
precedence, jeopardising EU interests and undermining its values. As coronavirus has aggravated
the vulnerabilities of less developed regions of the world, it has fuelled US-China competition for
influence, for example in Africa and Latin America through 'Covid diplomacy' (e.g. provision of masks
and loans for vaccine access). Thus, a focus on regions is a necessary move for EU strategy and
foresight. As a global player committed to rules-based multilateralism, the EU should continue to
work on partnerships with regions, helping them build resilience to the impact of a bipolarisation of
international relations and to strengthen their support for a rules based multilateral order. The
Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy and the new Comprehensive Strategy for Africa, which focus
on concrete areas of major global trends, are initiatives of 'strategic partnering' with whole
regions, while cooperating with regional organisations like the African Union and ASEAN.

A stronger EU foreign policy with a strategic vision

A robust, efficient and united EU foreign policy guided by a strategic approach to the external
environment, is a fundamental prerequisite for a targeted pursuit of multilateralism and for the
construction of strategic partnerships, based on a strategic vision and concrete aims and goals. The
pursuit of multilateralism itself can only be a declared goal of EU foreign policy if it is formulated in
the context of a strategic vision corresponding to the EU's values and interests. In addition, a
strategic vision for EU foreign policy would facilitate the EU 'speaking with one voice' on

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international crises and to avoid 'polyphony' in international fora. As past and recent crises have
shown, this is not always the case. Looking to the future, a review of the Global Strategy, taking
developments since 2016 into account, including the impact of coronavirus, Brexit and of the Trump
Presidency, can provide elements of this strategic vision. The strategic compass process will refine
the EU's collective perception of foreign and security policy priorities, which can guide partnerships.
Elements of a more effective EU foreign policy are already on the table and, in light of the
competitive post-coronavirus international environment, should be pursued further. More efficient
decision-making could be achieved through the proposed move to qualified majority in areas of
EU common foreign security policy (CFSP), namely sanctions, human rights, and common security
and defence policy (CSDP) civilian missions, and better and more strategic preparation of European
Council meetings, for which existing yet under-used provisions in the Lisbon Treaty can serve as the
basis. Enhanced oversight of EU foreign policy, through a stronger role for parliaments as pledged
by the Commission President, could further build trust and accountability in EU foreign policy.
Parliaments are best placed to scrutinise external action on the basis of strategic commitments and
to compare deliverables to objectives. Ensuring that EP own initiative reports in this area are given
serious consideration by the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) through
a feedback mechanism and enhancing links between parliamentary and executive diplomacy are
also steps in that direction. Greater European Parliament involvement in strategic partnerships
could be pursued in this way, as well as with coordination between executive and parliamentary
diplomacy, through the relevant EP committees and delegations. Finally, enhanced impact
assessment and evaluation of external policy strategies and actions should be pursued,
particularly of those financed by dedicated instruments (for example, migration and development).

Building EU strategic autonomy

The coronavirus crisis has strengthened the argument for EU strategic autonomy and resilience, as
illustrated by the proposed EU budget for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). For the
EU, strategic autonomy is synonymous with a greater capacity to defend a principled commitment
to multilateralism, rather than the aspiration to act unilaterally. Thus efforts to bolster the EU's
strategic autonomy should be seen as prerequisites to sustaining multilateralism by making it fit for
the present and future. The EU continues to work on several domains of strategic autonomy:
Technological autonomy: By capitalising on its various strengths (highly educated
population, strong research institutions and single market) and by boosting its industrial
competitiveness (through innovation, access to finance, structural reforms) the EU should
work to avoid lagging behind in areas such as 5G technology, AI start-ups, data-driven
applications and quantum computing.
Digital sovereignty: The EU is a key actor in shaping and enforcing legislation in the
digital environment; it should actively promote European values and principles in areas
such as data protection, cybersecurity and ethically designed AI.
A stronger euro: The euro is the world's second most used currency, but lags far behind
the dollar as a reserve currency. The 2018 proposals to strengthen the euro would increase
the EU's independence in financial transaction and its resilience to secondary sanctions.
Energy independence: The EU is a net energy importer for over 70 % of its oil and gas
needs; whereby energy suppliers gain influence over EU Member States. Developing new
gas fields; energy supply coordination; renewables and strengthening relations with
reliable energy suppliers, are some of the ways to face this challenge.
EU Defence Union: In the face of a growing militarisation of the international
environment, the EU should continue to pursue industrial and operational autonomy in
defence by implementing ongoing initiatives (permanent structured cooperation
(PESCO), military mobility, European Defence Fund), strengthening the EU pillar of NATO,
and its own capacity for situational awareness.

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Trade: Based on the principle of open strategic autonomy, the EU, the world's largest
trader of manufactured goods, should avoid weaponising trade, but rather use its trade
power to promote multilateral goals such as climate, labour standards, sustainable
development and human rights. Drawing lessons from the pandemic, the EU should also
set up mechanisms that protect it from unfair trade practices, and ensure fair participation
in global trade.

Reforming multilateralism with a vision

New issues demand new multilateral arrangements. As a rules based entity, the EU should lead in
the process of setting rules through multinational consensus in areas such as biodiversity and AI.
These new issues make clear that solutions will need to be developed in collaboration with
scientists, who should be part of multilateral arrangements. The cyber-realm has also grown in
importance during the pandemic, as the world has 'gone virtual'.2 Moving forward, the EU should
continue to engage in cyber diplomacy to promote a rules based 'cyber order'.
New circumstances also require a rethinking of existing multilateral arrangements. The pandemic
could result in a decrease in global trade for 2020 of somewhere between 10 % and 16 %. As former
Commissioner Phil Hogan has stated, the EU trade policy review (including an initiative on WTO
reform), launched in June 2020, should 'help us show leadership in shaping a strong global trade
and investment environment, with a fit-for-purpose international rulebook underpinning it'. 'Open
strategic autonomy', enshrined in the Commission's communication on the recovery from
coronavirus, should guide the EU's stance, 'shaping the new system of global economic governance
and developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations, while protecting ourselves from unfair and
abusive practices'. The EU's approach to the WTO will continue to be guided by the green agenda,
which is also increasingly incorporated in FTAs. Coronavirus has also highlighted the links between
the governance of trade and the mitigation of health crisis. The EU has launched a new initiative
on trade and health, aiming to ensure the sustainability and resilience of global value chains for
medical products and devices.
On economic recovery, G7 and G20 coordination are vital to ensure that unilateral short-sighted
plans do not override the win-win prospects of multilateral solutions. On climate, it is paramount
that the climate crisis be addressed with the same vigour as the pandemic and in spite of it. The
COP26 climate conference in Glasgow should finalise the rulebook for the Paris Agreement and
address global ambition, taking account of the coronavirus situation and the national recovery
packages. To function as a true champion of multilateralism and to lead by example, the EU should
continue to uphold multilateral decisions with own laws, for example, the commitment to uphold
the Paris Agreement through the European Green Deal (EGD), WTO rules in EU trade policy and, not
least, conditionality of external financing on respect for international law.
Defence will also be struck by the pandemic as post-coronavirus economic recovery could lead to
cuts in security and defence spending; transatlantic tensions could rise as European NATO allies
would not meet their commitment to allocate 2 % of GDP to defence expenditure by 2024. An EU
commitment to the NATO 2030 agenda which puts forward a more values based and political
approach to the alliance could help mitigate such tensions.
The health, climate and cyber crises have made clear that multilateralism is no longer only about
states. The private sector, non-governmental organisations, local governments and civil society
have been crucial in forging tangible solutions to global problems. A multi-stakeholder approach
to multilateralism is increasingly becoming a necessity and norm. The EU can lead by example by
including all levels of stakeholders in its own upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe.
Moreover, accountable and transparent global governance should feature a greater participation
of parliamentary bodies. The International Parliamentary Union affirms the multilateral system is
under intense public scrutiny due to the rise of new media. Directly elected parliamentarians can,
function as a crucial link between citizens and the multilateral system. Multilateral assemblies, such

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as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO parliamentary
assemblies, as well as the parliamentary tracks of the G20, should be empowered to function as a
key component of multilateral decision-making.
Looking ahead to the global order of the post-pandemic world, complexity and unpredictability will
continue to be the norm. Much will depend on joining up resources to analyse the impact of global
trends. Strategic foresight capacity will help actors navigate the future through better global
policies. Knowledge will increasingly become a critical element of power and collaborative
preparedness is likely to reap the highest benefits. In a world of anticipatory governance,
anticipatory global governance is the key to the survival and evolution of multilateralism.

MAIN REFERENCES
Debié F. (coordinator), Towards a more resilient Europe post-coronavirus: An initial mapping of structural
risks facing the EU, EPRS, European Parliament, 2020.
Dworkin A. and Leonard M., Can Europe save the world order?, ECFR, 2018.
Gaub F., Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe, ESPAS, April 2019.
Lazarou E., The future of multilateralism: Crisis or opportunity?, EPRS, European Parliament, 2017.
Patrick S., When the system fails, Foreign Affairs, 2020.

ENDNOTES
1
The EU already holds human rights dialogues with Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia and South Africa.
2
For the first time ever, during the Covid-19 crisis, the EU imposed cyber-sanctions as retaliation for cyber-espionage.

DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as
background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole
responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official
position of the Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.
© European Union, 2020.
[email protected] (contact)
www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet)
www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet)
http://epthinktank.eu (blog)

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 The future of multilateralism and strategic partnerships

Potential initiatives
Project Likely lead actor What should be done?
• New strategy on Russia
A 'smart' and pragmatic
EEAS/ • EU–China Strategic Outlook: update and unanimously
1 approach to strategic
Commission endorse
and systemic rivals
• Critical Investment Screening
• Build on common priorities with the USA, such as joint
A renewed and efforts in fighting terrorism and other areas of JHA.
balanced All EU • Promote shared interests through the TLD.
2
transatlantic institutions • High Level dialogue on China.
relationship • Support the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue
Enhancement Act in US Congress.
Negotiate solutions to EEAS/Commission, • Hold talks at different levels with the USA to resolve a
3 resolve trade tensions Council, Member number of trade tensions, including tariffs, and re-
with the USA States, Parliament establish a balanced transatlantic trade relationship.
EU-China EEAS/Commission,
• Advance and conclude EU-China negotiations on the
4 comprehensive Council, Member
bilateral investment agreement.
investment agreement States, Parliament
• Reinforce the EU-UN Strategic Partnership on Crisis
Management.
EEAS/Commission,
• Establish an EU-UN collaborative platform on Women,
5 EU-UN cooperation Council, Member
Peace and Security.
States
• Work with likeminded stakeholders to strengthen the
Human Rights Council.
• Support the proposed UN reform in development,
Support UN Reform EEAS/Commission, peacekeeping and administration/finance of UN.
6
Agenda Member States • Consider aiming for an EU seat in the UNSC.
• EU global coronavirus response.
• Engage with likeminded partners to promote
Cooperate with
All EU institutions multilateral solutions.
7 Continental
Member States • Enlarge the Alliance for Multilateralism.
Democracies
• Examine the potential for a D10/expanded G7.
• Expand and update existing strategic partnerships to
Modernise Strategic
EEAS/Commission, reflect new priorities, new risks and updated interests
8 Partnerships and
European Council of parties.
Strategic Dialogues
• Involve the legislative branch more.
• Conclude negotiations on the future trade
Commission,
EU-UK Strategic relationship between EU and UK, ensuring a level
9 Council, Member
Partnership playing field. Forge a strong strategic partnership with
States, Parliament
the UK.
• Implement the Comprehensive Strategy for Africa.
Strategic Partnership
10 Commission/EEAS • Determine joint priorities at the EU-African Union
with Africa
Summit.
EU Asia Connectivity • Implement the Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy
11 All EU institutions
Strategy with support from the next MFF.
European Council • Focus on strategic vision of EU foreign policy.
Review the EU Global
12 EEAS • Outline a strategy for partner engagement and a
Strategy
Member States concrete approach to the future of multilateralism.
EEAS, Member • Agree collectively on prioritisation of EU foreign and
13 Strategic Compass
States security policy goals and joint threat assessment.
• Increase coordination of external dimension of DGs.
• Move to QMV in certain areas of CFSP.
A modernised EU EEAS/Commission
14 • More effective and flexible financing (Neighbourhood,
foreign policy Member States
Development and International Cooperation
Instrument (NDICI).

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EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

• Move towards European Defence Union

• Reinforce Intelligence Capabilities
All EU institutions
• Strengthen the euro
Build Strategic Member States
15 • Digital Sovereignty
Autonomy European Defence
• Reduce energy dependencies
Agency
• Empower EU R&D
• Open strategic autonomy in trade
• Enhanced oversight of CFSP
• Ensure that INIs are given considerable consideration
by the Commission/EEAS through structured
A stronger role for the European
feedback mechanism
parliaments in foreign Parliament and
16 • More access to classified information
affairs, multilateralism national
• More coordination between executive and
and diplomacy. parliaments
parliamentary diplomacy
• Strengthen parliamentary tracks of multilateral
organisations (e.g. G7, G20, NATO, OSCE)
• Work diplomatically to unblock WTO's Appellate Body
(AB).
• Implement alternative solutions for free and fair trade
such as the interim appeal systems.
Lead the reform of the
17 Commission • Introduce countermeasures when third countries
WTO
block the WTO dispute settlement process.
• Complete the EU Trade Policy Review
• Advance and conclude plurilateral negotiations on a
digital trade agreement.
• Work towards a Paris agreement on biodiversity.
Build the multilateral • Propose a High Level Panel on AI at UN level (based
Commission
18 governance of the on the model of the European Strategy on Artificial
Member States
Future. Intelligence) following the UN Secretary-General's
Strategy on New Technologies.
Commission,
International initiative • Spearhead an international initiative to facilitate trade
Parliament,
19 on trade in healthcare in healthcare products (pharmaceuticals and medical
Council, Member
products goods) with a group of WTO partners
States
• Uphold the Paris Agreement through the European
Uphold multilateral Green Deal.
Commission
20 agreements with own • Uphold WTO rules in EU trade policy.
EU Member States
laws • External financing conditional on respect for
international law and UN Charter principles.
Lead the coordination • Work within the G7 and G20 on a coordinated
EEAS
21 of recovery from approach to financial recovery.
Commission
Covid-19 • Build on the Coronavirus Global Response Model.

All • Investigate the WHO's handling of Covid-19.

Reform, strengthen and
Member States • Secure the future financing of WHO.
22 revitalise multilateral
partner countries • Work towards NATO 2030.
institutions.
civil society • Safeguard and strengthen the NPT.
• Strengthen the coordination of EU Member States
EU Member States/EU across the UN system, building on work underway
Member States
23 Coordination in and on best practices in these areas.
Commission
Multilateral Fora • Jointly support candidates for senior positions in
multilateral organisations.
• Build further on ESPAS
• Integrate interinstitutional foresight reports into the
Strategic Foresight
24 All EU institutions work of the EEAS on multilateralism and strategic
Capacity
partnership.
• Share global trends insights with Strategic Partners.

12