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    S009630032100268X

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    ng.h.p.vy14082006.thptpvt
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    4 views1 page

    S009630032100268X

    Uploaded by

    ng.h.p.vy14082006.thptpvt

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as TXT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    Zhao Song, Hao Guo, Danyang Jia, Matjaž Perc, Xuelong Li, Zhen Wang,

    Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks,


    Applied Mathematics and Computation,
    Volume 403,
    2021,
    126178,
    ISSN 0096-3003,
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2021.126178.
    (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009630032100268X)
    Abstract: Interventions from third parties, such as governmental agencies or
    organizations, play an important role in mitigating conflicts in modern human
    societies. The goal thereby is to pacify disputants, although this is subject to
    failure on account of self-interest from all involved. To study how relationships
    between disputants and third parties evolve, we propose an interdependent network
    model, where one layer is occupied by disputants and the other layer is occupied by
    third parties. Disputants play a prisoner’s dilemma game, where defection is the
    dominant strategy, whereas third parties play a snowdrift game, where cooperation
    and defection coexist more commonly. Moreover, third parties have the ability to
    mediate a conflict on the other layer by enforcing a snowdrift game onto
    disputants, for which they can receive a fee. We show that third party
    interventions improve the evolution of cooperation between disputants, and also,
    that the improvement of cooperation in turn promotes interventions. Nonetheless,
    non-intervention does not go extinct, which enables defectors to survive, thus
    creating a feedback loop between the two networks layers. The evolutionary dynamics
    is characterized by fascinating spatial pattern formation, which we explore by
    means of Monte Carlo simulations and via replicator equations.
    Keywords: Interdependent network; Intervention; Third party; Evolutionary game
    theory; Cooperation; Evolutionary dynamics

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