The Contemporary World Module - Rox
The Contemporary World Module - Rox
Compiled by:
Reasons for the Growth of Long-Distance Trade from the 16th to 18th Centuries .................17
Microeconomics ....................................................................................................................28
Horizontal integration.............................................................................................................30
International regimes can have some or all of the following elements: ...................................42
History ...................................................................................................................................47
Future development...............................................................................................................50
Globalization – Conceptualization..........................................................................................85
Population Density...............................................................................................................120
Forms of Migration...............................................................................................................125
Social consequences...........................................................................................................134
History .................................................................................................................................137
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2. Example: Independent oil refineries coming under U.S oil company……………. 30
Figure 3. Example Meat industry buys all the functioning plants needed for running this
meat industry…………………………………………………………………………... 32
Figure 4. Conglomeration………………………………………………………………………… 34
Figure 6. Some countries are developing faster than others. Many Asian countries are
quickly developing while many African countries are slowly developing………... 52
Figure 15. Population Distribution The pattern of where people live in an area. Closely
LIST OF TABLES
Learning outcome:
• Differentiate the competing conceptions of globalization
• Identify the underlying philosophies of the varying definitions of globalization
• Agree on a working definition of globalization for the course
Defining Globalization
What is Globalization?
• An Economic phenomenon?
• A Social phenomenon?
• A Cultural phenomenon?
Al-Rhodan (2006) - It can be contained within a specific time frame, all people, and situations
Larson (2001) – the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving
closer
It is the movement towards the expansion of economic and social ties between countries
through the spread of corporate institutions and capitalist philosophy that leads to the shrinking
of the world economic terms.
1|Page
(Figure 1) It could involve these things.
Metaphors of Globalization
1. Solidity
a. The barriers that prevent or make difficult the movement of things
2. Liquidity
a. An increasing ease of movement of people, things, information, and places in the
contemporary world
2|Page
3. Flows
a. The movement of people, things places, and information brought by the growing
porosity of global limitations (Ritzer, 2015)
Globalization Theories
3|Page
4. Problems in the capitalist world market - all sorts of trade barriers. Winners and
losers in the market
5. Globality:
a. Nothing is any longer limited to local,
b. Local incidences affect entire world
c. Immobility to reverse it), associated with "second modernity".
d. First modernity - decline of power of nation and the nation border.
6. Globality & "second modernity" = denationalization.
a. Distinctive features of Globality:
• Everyday life and interaction across national borders are profoundly
affected.
• Self-perception of transnationality in mass media, consumption, and
tourism realms.
• Community, labor & capital are increasingly placeless.
• Growing awareness of global ecological dangers and of actions to be
taken to deal with them.
• Increasing perception of transcultural others in our lives.
• Global culture industries circulate at unprecedented levels.
• Increase in number & strength of transnational agreements, actors, and
institutions.
C. Zygamut Bauman - Human consequences of globalization
1. Globalization - "space war where the winner has more mobility and create meaning
for themselves.
2. Mobility is a differentiating factor in social stratification - important factor.
3. Loser" - confined to isolated territories denuded of meaning.
4. Territories become battle-field"
5. Winners live in time (span space quickly)
6. Losers live in space which ties them down.
7. It is important to distinguish who have at least some degree of mobility:
a. "Tourist” - on the move because they want to be
b. “Vagabonds” -move because they find their environment unbearable.
c. “Tourist” has burdens
• Impossible to slow down.
• Unending string of choice.
4|Page
• Each choice has a series of risk and danger
A. Cultural Differentialism/Differentiation
1. Emphasizes the fact that cultures are essentially different and are only superficially
affected by global flows.
2. Despite globalization, there are lasting differences in cultures and civilizations. The core
culture remains the same
3. Globalization occurs on the surface.
4. Cultures closed to globalization and influence of other culture
5. Billiard Ball Game - potential catastrophic collisions among world cultures
6. This paradigm attracts recent attention because:
a. Set 1
• Sept 11, 2001- terrorist attack
• Afghanistan and Iraq war (clash between western and Islamic culture and eternal
cultural differences within them)
b. Set 2
• Increasing multiculturism of both US (1 Hispanic) and Western Europe (1
Muslim) Samuel Huntington's clash of civilization and remake of World Order
(1996). Huntington. civilization = culture.
• Resurfacing ancient identities, adversaries, and enemies since the past 20 years.
• Emergence of fault lines among many civilizations - historic enmities among
these civilizations.
• Huntington differentiated several world civilizations to:
o Sinic (Chinese)
o Orthodox (Centered in Russia)
o Hindu
o Islam
o Western Europe
o North America (Aussie, NZ close align to US)
o Africa
• All the above differs greatly on the philosophical assumptions, value, social
relations, customs and outlook of life.
5|Page
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CIVILIZATIONS
1. 1,500 BC – AD 1,500:
a. civilization separated by time and space.
b. contact likely to be non–existent.
c. if have, likely to be limited and intense
2. 1,500 – WWII
a. sustained, overpowering and unidirectional impact of western civilization on all
other civilization.
• due to rise of cities, state bureaucracy and emergence of national
consciousness.
• Immediate cause: - technology, military, ocean navigation, weaponry
b. West excels in organized violence.
c. Huntington’s view: 1910 – one world, one civilization – western civilization.
3. Multi-civilizational system
a. end of the expansion of the west. Revolt against it.
b. WWI -1990: clash of ideas (capitalist vs communist)
c. Now: religion, culture and ultimately civilization.
d. Huntington foresee: “A slow decline in the west dominance”
e. (A decrease in population, military and economic growth)
f. due to revival of 2 important civilization
• Resurgence of Asian society.
• Resurgence of Islam
4. Resurgence of Asian society (Sinic)
a. Refers to growth of economic power which will surpass the west
b. Increasing power to East (Growth in Japan, China and India)
6|Page
c. Economic ascendency traceable to superior aspects of its culture especially in its
collectivism in contrast to individuality that dominates the west
5. Resurgence of Islam (controversial argument)
a. Sinic rooted in economy while Islamic growth is rooted in dramatic population
growth and mobilization of the population. (i.e: 8% Muslims in France)
b. Clash between the west (arrogance), Islam (intolerance) and Sinic (assertiveness)
c. West view itself “Universal vulture” (democracy) and desire to export to the rest of
the world, which Islam sees as Imperialism.
d. West wants to limit weapon proliferation while others want them especially
“Weapons of mass destructions”
e. West seeks to control and limit immigration (especially from Islamic civilization)
which leads to development of cleft societies within Europe and US.
6. Huntington’s criticism:
a. Controversial about Muslim and Islamic civilization. Example:
• Whenever Muslim and non-Muslim live in close proximity, there is a tendency
for Muslim to be more violent.
• Islam spread by sword, glorified military values, history of Islamic conquest.
7. Huntington’s concern:
a. Decline in the west especially US.
b. US threatened by multi-civilizational or multicultural character.
c. Demise of US, demise of western civilization.
d. US must do 2 things: (a) reaffirm identity as a western nation and (b) reaffirm and
reassert its role of western civilization around the globe.
A Hybridization
1. Emphasizes the integration of local and global cultures (Cvetkovich and Kellner,
1997).
2. Mixing of cultures as a result of globalization & production resulting in global & local,
new and unique cultures created which is neither local nor global culture.
3. Indicate heterogenization than homogenization (globalization of nothing)
4. Glocalization – concept that gets to the heart of culture hybrid. (think global, act
local) example: Use internet to provide service to local people.
5. Examples of hybridization: (heterogenization & glocalization)
7|Page
a. Argentineans watching Asian rap performers performed by a South
b. American band at London club owned by a Saudi Arabian.
c. Americans eating Chinese tacos, kosher pizza.
d. people of mixed race, combination of language and culture. (Creolization –
Hannerz,1987)
6. Glocalization elements:
a. This theory is exceptionally alert to differences within and between areas of
the world.
b. Individuals and local groups have great power to adapt, innovate and
maneuver within a globalized world. Local individuals & groups as important
and creative agents.
c. Social processes are relational and contingent. Globalization provokes a
variety of reactions – ranging from nationalist entrenchment to cosmopolitan
embrace – that feedback on and transform it, that produce glocalization.
d. Commodities and the media are seen not as coercive but rather as providing
material to be used in individual and group creation throughout the globalized
areas of the world.
B “Appadurai’s landscape”
1. Emphasis on global flows and disjuncture's among them.
2. Scapes operate independently of one another and conflicting with other scapes.
3. Ethnoscapes- involve mobile groups and individuals who play an important role-
involves actual movement and the fantasies about moving.
4. Technoscapes- information technology move fluidly around and across the globe.
5. Financescapes- process of movement of money, currency, stock exchange moving
at great speed.
6. Mediascapes:- electronic capabilities to produce and transmit information around the
globe and the images of the world that these media create an disseminate. Involved
here are bloggers, filmmakers and distributors, newspapers and magazines.
7. Ideoscapes:- like mediascapes are set of images – restricted to political images
produced by states in line with their ideology or counter ideologies
8. Important noting’s:
a. Global processes that are partly/independent of any given nation state.
b. Global flows occur not only through landscapes but also through disjuncture.
8|Page
c. Territories going to be affected by the 5 landscapes and their disjuncture due
to differences between culture
9. Focus on landscape in line with:
a. Globalization associated with heterogenization than homogenization.
b. Globalization associated with glocalization than globalization.
c. Globalization = imperialistic ambitions of nations, corporations to impose
themselves on various geographic areas
C Cultural Convergence
1. Stresses homogeneity introduced by globalization
2. Globalization leads to sameness throughout the world.
3. Cultures of the world grows increasingly similar to some degree
4. Global assimilation to the dominant group.
5. Those who operate on this perspective (Bali & Lechner, 2005) focus on:
a. Cultural imperialism
b. Westernization
c. Americanization
d. “McDonaldlization”
e. World culture
6. Global processes that are bringing the same or similar phenomena.
7. “McDonald-lization“- a process which the principles of “fast-food-restaurant” are
coming to dominate more and more sectors in US and the world.
1. Efficiency
a. best possible means to achieve whatever end is desired.
b. ensure customer and employee act in efficient manner.
c. consume more efficiently (ie: drive through)
2. Calculability
a. quantity (speed) opposed to quality (↓ quality of cooking)
b. various aspect of work is timed.
3. Predictability
a. emphasis on predictability
9|Page
b. employees (scripted speech) and customers (know what they want) expected to
respond with predictable behavior.
4. Control by means of technology
a. great technology control system, which will replace employees.
b. offer standard food which customer cannot alter.
5. Irrationality of rationality
a. both customer and employees suffer
b. example: efficiency of speed, replaced by inefficiency of long lines of queue.
2. Economic Theory
Focus on transnational practices; cut across boundaries, territorial boundaries are of declining
importance (capitalist)
10 | P a g e
Important elements of Transnational practices
11 | P a g e
1. Transnational corporation abuses, exploitation leads to signs of protectionism
of some countries
2. Green movement, sustainable environment, anti-globalism and human rights
movement ➠ seeds to socialist globalization.
D Empire (Post-modern Marxian perspective of globalization)
1. Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri (2000), Multitude (2004)
2. Associate modernity with imperialism, where one or more nation at center
that control or exploit especially economically.
3. A showcase of such dominance but no single nation at center and exist in the
realm of ideas(media) & omnipresent (like god)
4. Is not fully exists yet. Formation at the moment.
5. Governs the world with single logic of rule, no single power. Power is
dispersed throughout the society and globe.
6. Lacks geographical / territorial boundaries. Expand down to social world.
7. Seek to control entirety of life down to most basic level.
8. Source of power = juridical power (order, norms, ethical truths, common
notion what is right)
9. what is “right” – intervene in “humanitarian “problems, engage “just wars”
10. “enemy” – threat to ethical order of the world. (US invade Iraq)
11. Based on triple imperatives (requirements)
a. Incorporate all it can. Eliminate all differences, resistance & conflict.
b. empire differentiates and affirm differences – celebrate different
cultures, set aside juridically
c. embed differences into hierarchy and manage it ➠ real power
E Multitude (Opposing of empire force)
1. real productive force of Empire.
2. consume Empire’s culture-ideology
3. empire a parasitic on Multitude creativity and productivity.
4. potential to overthrow empire, counter – empire.
5. Globalization leads to deterritorialization where multitude is a force behind this
and a pre-requisite to global liberalization
6. Social revolution.
F Hardt & Negeri
12 | P a g e
1. “Problem” is imperialism and empire. Control multitude via “police power”.
Pros of globalization:
2. prevent us from falling back into particularism and isolation.
3. “barbarism” involving the body (less likely to submit to external control – create
new life)
4. Control over multitude which produce intellectual, communicative, work in which
are immaterial are important ➠ however are control by global communication
and ideology (media) – but can use back to counter.
3. Political Theory
A Liberal theory
1. Importance of free market, operate free from nation state/ political entities and in
the long run bring advantage to everyone
B Realist View (Sholte, 2005; Spegle, 1996)
1. Globalization outcome of power relations among nation states
2. Pursue own interest at global stage, use power to advantage. (US, sole super-
power – major user and abuser of power)
C International Relations – Justin Rosernberg (2005)
1. Transnational focus is misguided
2. Nation-state inter-relationship, focal concern with capitalism from Marxian
perspective.
D International Relations - James Rosenau (2003)
1. Distant proximities (what seems remote is close at hand)
2. Linked to concept “fragmentation” – world is both fragmenting and integrating at
the same time.
3. Various sources of fragmentation in the world today
E Development of new micro-electronic technologies
1. integrate those who have them, those who don’t get separated.
2. cell phone, internet & email shrink the world.
3. rendered territorial boundaries less important.
F The skill revolution
1. analytical skill to relate their own situation to global situations.
2. able to cross state borders easily and minimal political attachments.
3. those who don’t have, retreat into local concern.
13 | P a g e
G The organization EXPLOSION
1. Proliferation of voluntary organization – NGO
2. Serve to integrate individuals involve in them, fragmentation to those who are
not.
3. Politically ↑ NGO contribute to the declining of state and confidence to
accomplish various things.
H Bifurcation of structure
1. variety of organizations and states.
2. state centrism vs. multi-centrism (fragmentation between them is increasing)
I The mobility up heals
1. increasing vast movement of people (tourist, illegal immigrants, terrorist)
a. travel & tourism: integrative effect
b. terrorism: disintegrative and integrative
2. political entities threaten by movement they cannot control illegal
immigrants/terrorist
J The decentralization of government (political implications)
1. decline of state importance because of their inability to stem a variety of global
process (less loyalty from the people)
a. (ideas, jobs, money, drugs, terrorist)
2. migrants can come together create own local institutions such as church and
schools.
K Authority crises bought on by increasing subgroupism & decentalization
1. disintegration caused by erosion of its authority.
2. loyalty based on criteria, how well state perform.
a. cannot perform, fragmentize process, stale-mate
b. citizen focus on self-interest.
3. magnify by government disintegration – centered as profit making organization
(what used to be made by federal government – now at government agencies at
various level, organization and corporations)
a. can integrate by micro-electronic technology
4. inability to handle many traditional responsibilities ➠ government crises
L The globalization of national economies
1. State no longer control transnational economic flow
14 | P a g e
2. create greater centralization and integration among these transnational economic
entities (European Union, consortium of European aircraft manufacturer)
M Conclusion
1. Political challenge to the state is to find new ways of governing, perhaps at
reduced level, in a globalizing and increasingly fragmentizing world
15 | P a g e
Unit 2: THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBALIZATION
Learning outcome:
In broad terms, the history of globalization can be divided into three phases. In the first
phase, which lasted until the Middle Ages, extensive long-distance trade relations which
16 | P a g e
crossed cultural divides and vast empires existed on the contiguous landmass of Asia, Africa
and Europe. Trading Diasporas were the main agents of these economic contacts over long
distances. The transfer of goods – for example, spices from India to Europe – often involved the
successive participation of several groups of traders. Thus, there was no coherent trade
infrastructure. However, caravan trade within Asia was promoted in the 13th and 14th centuries
by the Pax Mongolica, i. e. temporary political integration into the enormous empire of Genghis
Khan (1162–1227) and his successors
In the second phase, European global trade began when Venice was dominating the
trade with the Levant in the aftermath of the War of Chioggia between Genoa and Venice
(1378–1381) and continued until around the mid-19th century.2 Until at least the 17th century,
trade was primarily conducted within Europe and via the connecting sea trade routes, i. e.
through trade with the Levant, Baltic trade and trade with Russia. European expansion from the
late 15th century contributed – initially due to European control of the supply of silver – to the
concentration of trade between Asia and Europe in a (European) trading organization and to the
integration of America into intercontinental trade. However, if one excludes precious metals
which were used as payment, intercontinental trade in this period consisted primarily of luxury
goods, and there are relatively few examples of price convergence. Until the late 17th century,
the volume of intercontinental trade remained relatively low compared with long-distance trade
within Europe. In the Asian commercial regions, Europeans were also just one group of traders
among many, and European global trade coexisted with that of a number of other empires,
including China and the Ottoman Empire.
The third phase, which led to the present-day global economy, can be said to have
begun with the rapid expansion of the European economy into the so-called Atlantic economy in
the middle decades of the 19th century. This period was characterized, firstly, by the rapidly
increasing importance of dietary staples and industrial raw materials in long-distance trade;
secondly, by considerable international price convergence, both in relation to goods and labor;
thirdly, by the intermittent free and large-scale transcontinental mobility of labor; and, fourthly,
by the emergence of international capital markets.
Reasons for the Growth of Long-Distance Trade from the 16th to 18th Centuries
From the 16th century at the latest, the volume of long-distance trade grew considerably
more quickly than the European population and European economic output. From the 16th to
17 | P a g e
the 18th century, the total annual tonnage of ships sailing around the Cape of Good Hope
increased relatively steadily at an average rate of 1.1% per annum. In these three centuries, the
population of Europe (excluding Russia) grew at an annual average rate of only 0.3%. Per
capita incomes in the western European economies rose by no more than 0.2% per annum on
average. From the second half of the 17th century, transatlantic trade developed considerably
more quickly than European trade with Asia. For example, the number of slaves transported
from Africa and sold in the Americas – who were of vital importance for the production of tropical
goods exported from the Americas to Europe – increased between 1525 and 1790 by an
average of 2.1% annually.
The period of European global trade before 1850 saw hardly any examples of price
convergence, which can be attributed to the absence of a transportation revolution in the Early
Modern period. It was only from the middle of the 19th century that European global trade
expanded into a global economy, primarily due to revolutionary inventions in transportation and
communications technology which drastically reduced the cost of transportation and
communication
While per capita national income in Europe grew very slowly before the second half of
the 19th century, the incomes of the elite, who bought a disproportionately large portion of
traded goods, increased considerably. This was due to the growth of the state as a source of
income for the elite, as well as to population growth, which made more intensive land cultivation
possible, thereby increasing ground rents. The rising incomes of the elite account for a
considerable portion of growth in trade between Europe and other continents before 1800. Early
globalization was therefore closely connected with the long-term increase in income inequality.
Additionally, in the late 17th and 18th centuries, tastes and preferences changed not
only among the elite but among the general European population, to the extent that it is possible
to speak of a Consumer and Industrious Revolution. In the late 17th century, regulations that
tied individual consumption to one’s estate largely disintegrated, while the consumption of luxury
goods became acceptable. This increased the utility of consumption: Fashionable clothing could
18 | P a g e
now be used to gain social status, and tastefully chosen domestic furniture and ornaments could
accentuate one’s individual identity. This brought about a shift in preferences not only towards
sophisticated (better: differentiated) goods and traded goods, but also away from leisure and
towards work, since the utility of goods acquired through work had grown.
Expansion of Supply
In some cases, the fact that the prices of goods traded between continents remained
stable in spite of increasing trade volumes suggested that there was scope to increase supply.
Examples of this include pepper in the 16th century and tea in the 18th century. The secular
inflation of silver in the modern period also suggests that the mining of silver became
increasingly profitable in real terms over a long period of time. The expansion of the supply of
traded goods in regions outside Europe as a result of force, organizational innovations or
monetary requirements (particularly in China) made an important contribution to early
globalization.
In the second quarter of the 19th century, growth in the international exchange of goods
accelerated. The global economy grew in the 19th and 20th centuries by an average of nearly
4% per annum, which is roughly twice as high as growth in the national incomes of the
developed economies since the late 19th century (ca. 1.5–2.0%). However, this growth was by
no means even, and it changed in character over time. Four phases can be identified from the
mid-19th century onwards:
19 | P a g e
The Period of the Atlantic Economy, c.1850-1931
During this period, growth in the global economy was concentrated in Europe and in
sparsely populated settler colonies in temperate climate zones on other continents (particularly
the USA; but also Argentina, Canada, Australia, and to a lesser extent Russia). Trade was
primarily based on the exchange of industrial goods for dietary staples and industrial raw
materials.
Economic development in this period was strongly influenced by the acquisition of land
reserves overseas for the production of unprocessed materials for export. This required the
immigration into these territories of masses of settlers, and during this period leading up to the
global financial crisis approximately 50 million people migrated from Europe to other continents.
This equates to roughly four to five times the number of African slaves transported to the
Americas in the Early Modern period; no comparable integration of transcontinental labour
markets has occurred since this period. The new settlers also had to be provided with
infrastructure. Investment in development overseas was funded by the exportation of massive
amounts of capital from Europe. In Great Britain, which was the most important source of
international capital flows in this period, capital exports constituted approximately 4.5% of the
national income between the 1870s and 1913. The level of integration of international capital
markets in the decades prior to the First World War was not witnessed again until the 1990s.
Regions in Asia, the Americas and Africa which were not suitable for the settlement of
European migrants profited to a far lesser degree from growth in the global economy. The
income-weak economies which developed in these zones came to be referred to as the Third
World in the third quarter of the 20th century.
Deglobalization, 1931-1944
After the First World War, the global economy stagnated, and then experienced a
veritable collapse in the global economic crisis (1929–1932). Nominally, trade fell by 20%, but
when deflation is taken into account – and it hit traded goods harder than non-traded goods –
the decrease was considerably larger in real terms. International capital markets disintegrated
due to the widespread insolvency of sovereign debtors. This decline in globalization was
reflected in institutional terms in deviations from the international gold standard (beginning with
Great Britain in 1931), in the introduction of high protective customs tariffs, and in the advent of
20 | P a g e
government-controlled trade regulated by bilateral payment treaties (starting with Germany in
1934).
This period was characterized by rates of growth in the national income of individual
economies from about 1950 onward which are unparalleled in history. In this period, the degree
of global economic integration of the developed countries – in contrast to the Third World – grew
rapidly to reach approximately the same level as had existed directly before the First World War.
However, this reconstruction of the global economy was based solely on trade in goods.
In order to maintain the freedom of the individual state to act and to control growth within its own
economy, international economic ties were organized on the basis of highly-formalized regimes.
The currency regime (1944–1973) which emerged from the conference held by the Allies in
1944 in Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, USA) on the restoration of international economic
relations was undoubtedly the most important of these. In western Europe, this regime was
supplemented by the beginnings of European integration, which at first primarily promoted
connections in the economic sphere.
21 | P a g e
aimed at supplying small, isolated national economies since raw materials prices had collapsed
during the global economic crisis. In highly developed countries, many markets were
deregulated, such as labor markets, markets for transportation services and, in particular,
capital markets. These reforms occurred in the context of widespread acknowledgement that
the efforts of individual states to control their own economies in the 1970s had proved largely
ineffective.
The classic explanation of the first wave of globalization points out technological
innovations, particularly the building of steam-powered railways (the central tracks were laid in
the third quarter of the 19th century), the transition to steam-powered ships with steel hulls on
the high seas (from the 1850s), as well as the electrical telegraph (the long-distance lines were
laid from the 1850s). These innovations made transportation and information transfer both
cheaper and faster, thereby optimizing the international division of labor
Market integration in the 19th century has been analysed empirically by comparing grain
prices in as many cities as possible. These studies have demonstrated that the European grain
markets became noticeably interconnected from about 1820 and that the USA essentially only
joined this already well-integrated international grain market after the Civil War (1861–1865).12
This suggests that advances in productivity in cross-border transportation and communication
are attributable to the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution unfolded irregularly,
concentrating on a number of leading sectors (particularly textiles, but also steel processing)
and on a small number of regions in England and on mainland Europe. Consequently, the
leading industrial sectors were strongly export-oriented. The resulting strong increase in
international trade caused the services sector to expand. This growth led to economies of scale
and increased specialization, and, as a result, to incremental increases in productivity in this
sector, also providing incentives for technological innovations in the sector.
22 | P a g e
Institutional Explanations
Invariably, the liberalization of free trade and the emergence of the gold standard are
also mentioned as contributing to the first wave of globalization around 1850. But both of these
processes appear to have been of secondary importance.
Great Britain liberalized its foreign trade by repealing the Corn Laws (1846) and the
Navigation Acts (1849). In 1860, the free trade movement on the continent led to the so-called
Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between Great Britain and France, which was signed by Richard
Cobden (1804–1865) and Michel Chevalier (1806–1879) on behalf of their respective
governments. To avoid their exports being discriminated against, other European countries
sought to conclude free trade treaties, initially primarily with France. By 1875, a network of more
than 50 such treaties were in place, all similar in structure. The liberalization of transit traffic and
the introduction of the most-favored-nation clause – stipulating that trade advantages could not
be granted to one single trade partner alone, but had to be granted to all – resulted in a kind of
international system which survived the renewed raising of customs tariffs from the end of the
1870s. However, the direct effects on bilateral trade were selectively limited to a small number
of industrial goods which were nonetheless of considerable importance to the respective treaty
partners
By the early 20th century, the emigration of large numbers of Europeans to regions in
temperate climate zones outside Europe had brought about an international convergence of real
wages within the Atlantic economy. The shortage of workers in overseas regions became less
acute, while emigration and economic growth eased demographic pressure in Europe. Falling
transportation and communications costs had the effect that goods prices on either side of the
Atlantic gradually converged, which over time negated the forces which had driven expansion in
the Atlantic economy.
Additionally, price and wage convergence roused globalization’s losers into action. They
founded interest groups and campaigned within their national political systems for measures to
retard globalization in order to reduce or eliminate the negative consequences which
globalization implied for them. Outside Europe, this primarily involved workers demanding the
introduction of immigration limits in order to protect their high wages. Their efforts yielded
23 | P a g e
success to the extent that the USA and other destinations of European emigration introduced
increasingly severe immigration regulations in the first third of the 20th century. Together with
the declining difference in real wages, these measures meant that the flow of migrants across
the Atlantic largely dried up by the 1930s.
Prior to the crisis which has been developing since 2008, the global economic crisis of
1929 represented the biggest international crisis of the modern period, resulting in a period of
deglobalization. Of the number of international aspects to the crisis, we shall discuss the
following two:
Firstly, the extreme fall (75%) in the prices of agricultural raw materials (1925–1933) was
preceded by latent supply-side pressure in the aftermath of the First World War. Emigration
from Europe reached its climax in the final years before the war, and in the early 1920s the
resulting increase in the production of staples overseas entered the international markets.
Simultaneously, the demobilization of military personnel after the war resulted in a recovery in
agricultural production in Europe, and this production was protected by protective tariffs which
tended to be even higher than those which had been in existence prior to the war. From the
mid-1920s, the governments of the USA and Canada tried to stabilize agricultural prices by
buying agricultural produce and putting it into state storage. The attempts of, in particular, the
USSR and Australia to maintain profits by boosting production caused this policy to fail in 1929
and contributed to serious deflation, which in the USA resulted in the bankruptcy of numerous
regional banks which had been heavily involved in providing finance to agriculture. The German
banking crisis in the summer of 1932 was also connected with the deflation of the prices of raw
materials.
Secondly, faults in international currency policy and, in particular, the system of fixed
exchange rates which resulted from the gold standard played a large role in the deterioration of
the international economic crisis. Fixed exchange rates resulted in the almost unhindered
transfer to other economies of a deflationary trend occurring in one particular country (in this
case, the USA). The falling prices of domestic goods became more competitive on the global
markets, therefore reducing imports and increasing exports. The fear of losing gold prompted
the central banks of the trading partners in a system with fixed exchange rates to suppress
domestic demand by raising interest rates, which increased deflationary pressures. Deflation
24 | P a g e
ultimately has a negative effect on economic growth because it prompts consumers to defer
purchasing and reduces returns of investments (at the end of a production process, the profits
are less than has been anticipated at the start). Consequently, the most effective measure taken
against the financial crisis after 1929 was coming off the gold standard and the introduction of
an expansionary monetary policy. International comparisons show that the earlier individual
countries dismissed the gold standard, the quicker they recovered. The lessons of the global
economic crisis have had a profound effect on the monetary policies of central banks in the
crisis which has been on-going since 2008. Indeed, Ben Bernanke (*1953), who has been
president of the US Federal Reserve since 2006, has contributed to research into the topics
discussed here.
From the early 19th to the early 20th century, the prices of exported raw materials did
rise relative to imported manufactured goods in countries which Europeans did not migrate to in
large numbers. However, since these countries mostly exported customary colonial goods
(particularly sugar, coffee and tea), they experienced less growth stimulation as a result of
globalization than regions which concentrated on new trade goods such as dietary staples and
industrial raw materials. Additionally, the exports of these countries were prone to particularly
strong price fluctuations, perhaps because the demand for these goods was more income-
elastic. These strong fluctuations in the prices of exports relative to imports had a negative
effect on economic growth.
25 | P a g e
Unit 3: MARKET INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL INTERSTATE SYSTEM
Learning outcomes:
- Explain the role of international financial institutions in the creation of a global economy
- Narrate a short history of global market integration in twentieth century
- Identify the attributes of global corporations
- Explain the effects of globalization on governments
- Identify the institutions that govern international relations
- Differentiate internationalism from globalism
Market Integration
A Integration shows the relationship of the firm in a market. The extent of integration
influences the conduct of the firms and consequently their marketing efficiency.
B The behavior of a highly integrated market is different from that of a disintegrated
market.
C Markets differ in the extent of integration and therefore, there is a variation in their
degree of efficiency.
D Kohls and Uhl defined market integration as a process which refers to the expansion of
firms by consolidating additional marketing functions and activities under a single
management.
E Examples of market integration are the establishment of wholesaling facilities by food
retailers and the setting up of another plant by a milk processor.
F In each case, there is a concentration of decision making in the hands of a single
management.
1. Horizontal integration
2. Vertical integration
3. Conglomeration
26 | P a g e
What is global market integration?
A Global market integration means that price differences between countries are eliminated
as all markets become one.
B One way to the progress of globalization is to look at trends how prices converge or
become similar across countries.
▪ Prices of identical security, commodities or asset traded anywhere that are exchanged in
two or more markets must be the same regardless of location and currency.
▪ In an efficient market, there must be only one price for commodities regardless of where
they are traded. Identical goods must have identical prices.
▪ For EXAMPLE, an ounce of gold must have the same price expressed in terms of dollars
in London as it does in Tokyo.
▪ The law of one price is a variation of Purchasing Power Parity that relates to a single
commodity as opposed to a basket of goods.
▪ This theory postulates that the difference in prices for identical commodities in two
countries is due to the foreign exchange (FX) rate between the two countries
27 | P a g e
MARKET INTEGRATION:
Migration
Microeconomics
▪ “MICROECONOMICS OF GLOBALIZATION” refers also to the myriad ways in which
economic actors also may become inserted into the global economy indirectly, through
their relations with other economic agents within local, regional, and national markets.
▪ It is the study of the economic behavior of individuals, households and firms.
▪ Where macroeconomics looks at the big picture of the economy, microeconomics looks
at the individual behaviors that drive economic processes.
Examples of microeconomics
1. Demand
2. Supply
3. Prices
4. Elasticity
5. Opportunity Cost
6. Labor Economics
7. Competition
8. Competitive Advantage
9. Consumer Choice
10. Consumer Confidence
11. Business Confidence
12. Information Economics
13. Welfare Economics
14. Productivity
1. Microeconomics Demand
28 | P a g e
• How demand for goods is influenced by income, preferences, prices and other factors
such as expectations.
2. Microeconomics Supply
• How producers decide to enter markets, scale production and exit markets. Law of
Supply and Demand - Demand falls, Supply Rises Demand rises, Supply falls supply
3. Microeconomics Prices
• How individuals, households and firms react to prices and influence prices with their
supply and demand. For example, the observation that some customary prices appear to
be sticky in that consumers resist buying above a particular historically established price.
4. Microeconomics Elasticity
• Elasticity is how supply and demand react to change. For example, a household that
demands less of a good when the price increases due to the availability of substitutes.
5. Microeconomics Opportunity Cost
• The tradeoffs that individuals and firms make to manage constrained resources such as
time, money, capital and land. Example, you spend time and money going to a movie,
you cannot spend that time at home reading a book, and you can't spend the money on
something else. Time is precious
6. Microeconomics Labor Economics
• Modeling the supply and demand for labor. focus on human capital (referring to the skills
that workers possess, not necessarily their actual work). For example, looking at how
expectations for economic growth impact the labor participation rate. humans use to
produce goods and services
7. Microeconomics Competition
• Modeling competition in markets.
• Three (3) types of competition
1. Direct competitors
2. Indirect competitor
3. Phantom competitors
For example, the use of game theory to model a price war between competitors.
29 | P a g e
Three (3) Tips to Determine Your Competitive Advantage
1. Price
2. Product
3. Customer experience
For example, a sporting goods company with superior brand recognition and a positive
brand image that can charge premium prices and still enjoy high demand for its products.
1. Income
2. Prices of the goods
For example, the idea that consumers maximize their expected utility of purchases meaning
that they buy the things they expect to be most useful to them.
Horizontal integration
This occurs when a firm or agency gains control of other firms or agencies performing similar
marketing functions at the same level in the marketing sequence
In this type of integration, some marketing agencies combine to form a union with a view to
reducing their effective number and the extent of actual competition in the market.
30 | P a g e
Two (2) basic kinds of market integration Horizontal integration
▪ Occurs when a firm or agency gains control of other firms or agencies performing
similar marketing functions at the same level in the marketing sequence.
▪ This type of integration sometimes combines agencies to form a union with a view to
reduce their effective number and the extent of actual competition in the market.
▪ FIRM A
▪ FIRM D
▪ FIRM C
▪ FIRM B
In most markets, there is a large number of agencies which do not effectively compete with
each other. This is indicative of some element of horizontal integration. It leads to reduced cost
of marketing. In this reduced competition possible.
(Figure 2) Example: Independent oil refineries coming under U.S oil company.
31 | P a g e
a. Lower costs.
b. Higher efficiency.
c. Increased differentiation.
d. Increased market power.
e. Reduced competition.
f. Access to new markets.
g. Economics of scale.
h. Economics of scope.
i. International trade.
3. Disadvantages of the Horizontal integration
a. Destroyed value.
b. Legal repercussions.
c. Reduced flexibility.
Vertical integration
▪ This occurs when a firm performs more than one activity in the sequence of the
marketing process.
▪ It is a linking together of two or more functions in the marketing process within a single
firm or under a single ownership.
▪ This type of integration makes it possible to exercise control over both quality and
quantity of the product from the beginning of the production process until the product is
ready for the consumer.
▪ It reduces the number of middle men in the marketing channel.
▪ Wholesaling of feed
▪ Feed mill
▪ Transport agency
▪ Food grains trade
32 | P a g e
(Figure 3) Example Meat industry buys all the functioning plants needed for running this meat
industry.
A Forward integration: If a firm assumes another function of marketing which is closer to the
consumption function, it is a case of forward integration. Example: wholesaler assuming the
function of retailing
B Backward integration: This involves ownership or a combination of sources of supply.
Example: when a processing firm assumes the function of assembling/purchasing the
produce from the villages.
C Balanced vertical integration
The third type of vertical integration is a combination of the backward and the forward
vertical integration. Advantages of Vertical Integration
33 | P a g e
6. It ensures a high level of certainty when it comes to quality.
7. It provides more competitive advantages.
Conglomeration
A combination of agencies or activities not directly related to each other may, when it operates
under a unified management, be termed a conglomeration.
(Figure 4) conglomeration
Agri-business
Conglomerate
Sales and
Fruit
Food Grains repairs of Manufacture
Processing Retail-Chain Cloth mill
Trade electronics of vanaspati
Unit
good
34 | P a g e
Examples
Effects of Conglomeration
Degree of integration
▪ Ownership integration This occurs when all the decisions and assets of a firm are
completely assumed by another firm. Example: a processing firm which buys a
wholesale firm.
▪ Contract integration This involves an agreement between two firms on certain
decisions, while each firm retains its separate identity. Example: tie up of a dhal mill with
pulse traders for supply of pulse grains.
35 | P a g e
Measurement of market integration
The measurement or assessment of the extent of market integration is helpful in the formation
of appropriate policies for increasing the efficiency of marketing process. The measurement or
assessment of market integration may be attempted at two levels.
Price correlation
1. The degree of correlation between two prices is taken as an index of the extent to which
the two markets are integrated.
2. A higher degree of correlation coefficient indicates a greater degree of integration at
least in terms of the pricing of the product between market centers and vice versa.
3. The correlation in the price of commodity in any markets is unity under spatial price
integration.
36 | P a g e
1. Correlation method.
2. Ravallion procedure.
3. Co integration approach.
4. Parity bound models (PBM).
1. The modern world-system is now a global economy with a global political system (the
modern interstate system).
2. Refers to the relationship between different state union.
3. It also includes all the cultural aspects and interaction networks of the human population.
A hegemon is a core state that has a significantly greater amount of economic power
than any other state, and that takes on the political role of system leader.
37 | P a g e
c. Currently, the theory divides the world into the core, semi-periphery and periphery
countries
C The Development of World-Systems
a. World-systems are whole systems of interacting polities and settlements.
b. Systemness means that these polities and settlements are interacting with one
another in important ways – interactions are two-way, necessary, structured,
regularized and reproductive.
D Core nations
a. Core nations appear to be powerful, wealthy and highly independent of outside
control.
b. They are able to deal with bureaucracies effectively; they have powerful militaries
and can boast with strong economies.
c. Due to resources that are available to them (mainly intellectual), they are able to be
at the forefront of technological progress and have a significant influence on less
developed non-core nations.
E SEMI-PERIPHERAL NATIONS
a. These regions have a less developed economy and are not dominant in the
international trade.
b. In terms of their influence on the world economies, they end up midway between the
core and periphery countries.
c. However, they strive to get into a dominant position of the core nation, and it was
proved historically that it is possible to gain major influence in the world and become
a core country.
F Peripheral nations
a. These are the nations that are the least economically developed.
b. One of the main reasons for their peripheral status is the high percentage of
uneducated people who can mainly provide cheap unskilled labor to the core
nations.
c. There is a very high level of social inequality, together with a relatively weak
government which is unable to control country’s economic activity and the extensive
influence of the core nations.
38 | P a g e
Unit 4: CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Learning outcome:
What is Governance?
• Includes a variety of arrangements, including “hard law” treaties, “soft law” declarations,
private orders, and international governmental organizations, and
• Global policy coordination that takes place without any governance structures
39 | P a g e
Global Governance
In the present period of rapid and extensive global change, the constitutions of national
governments and their treaties have been undermined by the increasing demands and solidarity
of ethnic and other subgroups. Although the concept of global governance is relatively new,
many theories have been in place for some time.
Along with the globalization of economies, other changes became apparent, such as the
surge of global social movements, the shrinking of political distances by microelectronic
technologies, and the mushrooming of global interdependencies fostered by currency crisis,
AIDS, and terrorism, all of which touch upon the subject of global governance. These
centralizing and decentralizing dynamics have undermined the constitutions and treaties of
national governments. Governments still operate as sovereign powers in a number of ways, but
some of their authority has been relocated toward sub-national collectivities.
In the global context, global governance means “governance in the global arena,”
referring to all the governance that occurs throughout the global order. Therefore, global
governance implicitly indicates the global shift from statism to integration as well as the
fragmentation of actors in the international arena. There is a possibility of a global
transformation from the primacy of “government” to that of “governance.”
According to the Commission on Global Governance, which was established under the
UN in 1995, global governance can be defined as “the sum of the many ways individuals and
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.” It is “a continuing process through
which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be
taken.”
In another study, Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss define global governance as
“efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond
the capacities of states to address individually.” In other words, the term global governance
reflects the current situation in which declining state power provides non-state actors with the
capacity and opportunity to assert their interests.
In sum, global governance is a term adopted to account for the foregoing changes in the
increasingly globalizing international arena in the post-Cold War era, underscoring the search
for the co-existence of a wide variety of international actors without privileging any one specific
actor, such as states.
40 | P a g e
Forms of Global Governance
Perhaps the greatest change, however, has been the growth of multilayered governance
and the diffusion of political authority, with the role of the nation-state transformed by the
development of regional trade blocs like the European Union, NAFTA, and ASEAN; the growing
role of international bodies like the World Trade Organization, UN and NATO; the burgeoning
network of transnational NGOs; and new norms and regulations of international and multilateral
governance on issues ranging from trade to human rights and environmental protection. (Global
Governance & Cosmopolitan Citizens, Pippa Norris).
• Sovereignty implies that only a state can regulate within its own jurisdictional space
• Enforcement of regulations relies on the judicial and police powers of states, since
global equivalents are lacking
• But the “principal-agent” problem greatly complicates such regulation—which can lead
to “regulation from below”
“Governance” is not the same as “government.” It assumes more than just the institutions of
the latter, a wider range of actors, and broader forms of regulation.
41 | P a g e
International regimes can have some or all of the following elements:
• A formative convention or treaty that stipulates problems, principles and practices (e.g.,
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change)
• Various related or subsidiary organs and agencies (e.g., IPCC, GEF, SBSTA, etc.)
• Other associated operations, agencies at various levels (e.g., carbon emissions trading
schemes and markets)
In practice, many international regimes are strongly influenced by the United States, the
EU and Japan
• For example, the head of the World Bank is always an American; the head of the IMF is
always a European
• International regulations governing commercial aircraft and flight are largely drawn from
U.S. regulations
• The World Health Organization depends on the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention to investigate disease outbreaks
• The IAEA generally responds most strongly to U.S. concerns in the event of proliferation
issues and concerns
42 | P a g e
Privatization of governance is a relatively new “commodity frontier,” but raises
numerous questions:
• Who decides what to privatize, and to with whom contracts should be signed?
• What kinds of regulations and laws must private entities obey, and who monitors and
enforces such limitations?
The emerging field of global governance has produced a number of breakthroughs, as well as
failures, aimed at managing global problems through the voluntary and ad hoc cooperation of a
diverse range of international actors.
1. Top-down governance,
43 | P a g e
2. Bottom-up governance,
3. Market governance,
4. Network governance,
5. Side-by-side governance
6. Complex web governance.
1. Top-down Governance
• A top-down approach to governance presents a clear divide between top-level policy
formulation and the subsequent implementation of these preset goals by
administrators and service providers.
• The process of enacting policy is viewed as an implementation chain where links
must be forged between various agencies.
2. Bottom-up governance
• The bottom-up implementation approach initiates with the target groups and service
deliverers, because they find that the target groups are the actual implementors of
policy.
• The top-down implementation approach is a clear-cut system of command and
control—from the government to the project, which concerns the people.
3. Market Governance
• Market governance mechanisms (MGMs) are formal, or informal rules, that have
been consciously designed to change the behavior of various economic actors.
• This includes actors such as individuals, businesses, organizations and governments
- who in turn encourage sustainable development.
4. Network Governance
• Network governance is "interfirm coordination” that is characterized by organic or
informal social system, in contrast to bureaucratic structures within firms and formal
contractual relationships between them.
5. Complex Web Governance
• Web governance is the process of maintaining and managing an online presence in
an organized way.
• The idea is to set certain standards for your website and hold yourself to them.
• That can include both your own organization’s standards and external regulations or
compliance standards, such as WCAG 2.1 web accessibility standards.
44 | P a g e
• The ultimate goal is to provide the best user experience possible for your website
visitors by ensuring quality, consistency, accessibility, searchability, and more.
45 | P a g e
Unit 5: GLOBAL DIVIDES: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH
Learning outcome:
The North is mostly correlated with the Western world and the First World, plus much of
the Second World, while the South largely corresponds with the Third World and Eastern world.
The two groups are often defined in terms of their differing levels of wealth, economic
development, income inequality, democracy, and political and economic freedom, as defined by
freedom indices. Nations in the North tend to be wealthier, less unequal and considered more
democratic and to be developed countries who export technologically advanced manufactured
products; Southern states are generally poorer developing countries with younger, more fragile
democracies heavily dependent on primary sector exports and frequently share a history of past
colonialism by Northern states. Nevertheless, the divide between the North and the South is
often challenged and said to be increasingly incompatible with reality.
In economic terms, as of the early 21st century, the North—with one quarter of the world
population—controls four-fifths of the income earned anywhere in the world. 90% of the
manufacturing industries are owned by and located in the North. Inversely, the South—with
three quarters of the world population—has access to one-fifth of the world income. As nations
become economically developed, they may become part of definitions the "North", regardless of
46 | P a g e
geographical location; similarly, any nations that do not qualify for "developed" status are in
effect deemed to be part of the "South"
History
The idea of categorizing countries by their economic and developmental status began
during the Cold War with the classifications of East and West. The Soviet Union and China
represented the East, and the United States and their allies represented the West. The term
'Third World' came into parlance in the second half of the twentieth century. It originated in a
1952 article by Alfred Sauvy entitled "Trois Mondes, Une Planète." Early definitions of the Third
World emphasized its exclusion from the East-West conflict of the Cold War as well as the ex-
colonial status and poverty of the nations it comprised. Efforts to mobilize the Third World as an
autonomous political entity were undertaken.
The 1955 Bandung Conference was an early meeting of Third World states in which an
alternative to alignment with either the Eastern or Western Blocs was promoted. Following this,
the first Non-Aligned Summit was organized in 1961.
Also, in 1973, the oil embargo initiated by Arab OPEC countries as a result of the Yom
Kippur War caused an increase in world oil prices, with prices continuing to rise throughout the
decade. This contributed to a worldwide recession which resulted in industrialized nations
increasing economically protectionist policies and contributing less aid to the less developed
countries of the South. The slack was taken up by Western banks, which provided substantial
loans to Third World countries. However, many of these countries were not able to pay back
their debt, which led the IMF to Extended further loans to them on the condition that they
undertake certain liberalizing reforms This policy, which came to be known as structural
adjustment, and was institutionalized by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Western
governments, represented a break from the Keynesian approach to foreign aid which had been
the norm from the end of the Second World War.
47 | P a g e
After 1987, reports on the negative social impacts that structural adjustment policies
had had on affected developing nations led IFIs to supplement structural adjustment policies
with targeted anti-poverty projects.[9] Following the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the
Soviet Union, some Second World countries joined the First World, and others joined the Third
World. A new and simpler classification was needed. Use of the terms "North" and "South"
became more widespread.
Defining development
Being categorized as part of the "North" implies development as opposed to belonging to
the "South", which implies a lack thereof. According to N. Oluwafemi Mimiko, the South lacks
the right technology, it is politically unstable, its economies are divided, and its foreign exchange
earnings depend on primary product exports to the North, along with the fluctuation of prices.
The low level of control it exercises over imports and exports condemns the South to conform to
the 'imperialist' system. The South's lack of development and the high level of development of
the North deepen the inequality between them and leave the South a source of raw material for
the developed countries. The north becomes synonymous with economic development and
industrialization while the South represents the previously colonized countries which are in need
of help in the form of international aid agendas. In order to understand how this divide occurs, a
definition of "development" itself is needed. Northern countries are using most of the earth
resources and most of them are high entropic fossil fuels. Reducing emission rates of toxic
substances is central to debate on sustainable development but this can negatively affect
economic growth.
Other factors that are included in the conceptualization of what a developed country is
include life expectancy and the levels of education, poverty and employment in that country.
48 | P a g e
Furthermore, in Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State Strategies and
Globalization, Jean Grugel states that the three factors that direct the economic development of
states within the Global south is "élite behavior within and between nation states, integration
and cooperation within 'geographic' areas, and the resulting position of states and regions within
the global world market and related political economic hierarchy."
Uneven immigration patterns lead to inequality: in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries immigration was very common into areas previously less populated (North America,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Australia, New Zealand) from already technologically advanced areas
(Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal). This facilitated an uneven diffusion of
technological practices since only areas with high immigration levels benefited. Immigration
patterns in the twenty-first century continue to feed this uneven distribution of technological
innovation. People are eager to leave countries in the South to improve the quality of their lives
by sharing in the perceived prosperity of the North. "South and Central Americans want to live
and work in North America. Africans and Southwest Asians want to live and work in Europe.
Southeast Asians want to live and work in North America and Europe".
49 | P a g e
New Economic Geography explains development disparities in terms of the physical
organization of industry, arguing that firms tend to cluster in order benefit from economies of
scale and increase productivity which leads ultimately to an increase in wages. The North has
more firm clustering than the South, making its industries more competitive. It is argued that
only when wages in the North reach a certain height, will it become more profitable for firms to
operate in the South, allowing clustering to begin.
Challenges
The accuracy of the North–South divide has been challenged on a number of grounds.
Firstly, differences in the political, economic and demographic make-up of countries tend to
complicate the idea of a monolithic South. Globalization has also challenged the notion of two
distinct economic spheres. Following the liberalization of post-Mao China initiated in 1978,
growing regional cooperation between the national economies of Asia has led to the growing
decentralization of the North as the main economic power. The economic status of the South
has also been fractured. As of 2015, all but roughly the bottom 60 nations of the Global South
were thought to be gaining on the North in terms of income, diversification, and participation in
the world market. Globalization has largely displaced the North–South divide as the theoretical
underpinning of the development efforts of international institutions such as the IMF, World
Bank, WTO, and various United Nations affiliated agencies, though these groups differ in their
perceptions of the relationship between globalization and inequality. Yet some remain critical of
the accuracy of globalization as a model of the world economy, emphasizing the enduring
centrality of nation-states in world politics and the prominence of regional trade relations.
Future development
Some economists have argued that international free trade and unhindered capital flows
across countries could lead to a contraction in the North–South divide. In this case more equal
trade and flow of capital would allow the possibility for developing countries to further develop
economically.
As some countries in the South experience rapid development, there is evidence that
those states are developing high levels of South–South aid. Brazil, in particular, has been noted
for its high levels of aid ($1 billion annually—ahead of many traditional donors) and the ability to
50 | P a g e
use its own experiences to provide high levels of expertise and knowledge transfer. This has
been described as a "global model in waiting".
The United Nations has also established its role in diminishing the divide between North
and South through the Millennium Development Goals, all of which were to be achieved by
2015. These goals seek to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve global universal
education and healthcare, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child
mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensure
environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development.
Economy was based on cotton production which depended on slave labor. Southern economy
was weak and vulnerable because it depended entirely on cotton but was still very profitable.
The period of cotton growing was called King Cotton.
North
Economy was based on industries and major businesses, commerce and finance.
North had many manufacturing factories that dealt with textiles, lumber, clothing, machinery,
leather, and wooden goods. The biggest business of the north was in railroad construction.
Transportation was easier because of railroads.
North-South Divide:
North
South
51 | P a g e
- 5% of the population has enough food and shelter
- It serves as a source for raw materials for the north
North-South Gap:
Term used to describe the economic gap between the rich northern countries of the world and
the south poorer countries of the world. NORTH SOUTH
DEFINITION:
During Cold War – Primary Global Division Was Between East and West, and Predicated Upon
Security and Power Balance.
After Cold War – Many See Primary Global Division as Being Between North and South, and
Predicated Upon Economic Inequality.
- Standard of living
- Distribution of income around the world
- Economic competition worldwide
Issue no. 1: Standard of living: Factors lead to low of standard of living Lack of trade and aid
Single crop farming Abundance of debt Neo- Colonialism
52 | P a g e
Issue no.2: Distribution of income around the world:
- Liberalization of market occurs, most South countries lost to the competition from the
North.
- Encourage migration of people from South to North for having a more good income.
(Figure 6) Some countries are developing faster than others. Many Asian countries are quickly
developing while many African countries are slowly developing.
53 | P a g e
MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN NORTH AND SOUTH:
Some of the major differences in North and South countries are as follows:
NORTH
▪ Less population
▪ High Wealth
▪ High Standard of living
▪ High Industrial development
▪ Industry
SOUTH
▪ Large population
▪ Low Wealth
▪ Low Standard of living
▪ Low Industrial development
▪ Agriculture
Classifying Countries:
Most Developed Countries (MDCs): - the richest of the industrialized and democratic nations
of the world.
Less Developed Countries (LDCs): - countries with little industrial development, little wealth,
and high population growth.
Least Developed Countries (LLDCs): - very low per capital income, low literacy rates, and
very little in the way of manufacturing industries.
Comparison: The comparison between North and South is not of only one aspect. It can be
seen through different angels that is:
54 | P a g e
(Table 1) Comparison of north and south
North South
Reasons: There are 3 main reasons why our world is so unequal today:
1. Colonialism
2. Trade
3. Debt
55 | P a g e
Colonialism:
▪ Today’s North-South gap traces its roots to the colonization of the Southern world
regions by Europe over the past several centuries. This colonization occurred at different
times in different parts of the world, as did decolonization.
▪ Control by one power over a defendant area or people.
Trade:
▪ What you are spending to bring goods into your country is a greater sum that what you
are making by selling products in the global economy.
▪ You are losing money.
▪ Southern countries suffered from this.
Debt:
▪ Their products were losing money in the global economy, so they needed to increase
production.
▪ The only way they could do this was to borrow money from the rich northern countries.
▪ This put them in debt.
▪ The North-South Divide (or Rich-Poor Divide) is the socio-economic and political division
that exists between the wealthy developed countries, known collectively as “the North,”
and the poorer developing countries (least developed countries), or “the South.”
Although most nations comprising the “North” are in fact located in the Northern
Hemisphere, the divide is not primarily defined by geography.
▪ As nations become economically developed, they may become part of the “North,”
regardless of geographical location, while any other nations which do not qualify for
“developed” status are in effect deemed to be part of the “South.”
▪ “The North” mostly covers the West and the First World, with much of the Second World.
Development gap:
The North-South divide has more recently been named the development gap. This places
greater emphasis on closing the evident gap between rich (more economically developed)
countries and poor (less economically developed countries) countries.
Globalization:
56 | P a g e
▪ In Terms of Economic Development, There Exists an Enormous Gap Between Northern
and Southern Countries, Which Has Been Increased
▪ The process by which regional economies, societies, and cultures have become
integrated through a global network of political ideas through communication,
transportation, and trade.
▪ Capitalist
▪ Communist
▪ Developing
Why is the gap between the economic north and south widening?
▪ The richest 1% of the world’s population now receives as much income as the poorest
57%.
▪ Lack of trade.
▪ Lack of aid.
▪ Abundance of debt.
▪ Failure of international organizations (e.g. IMF, World Bank, WTO).
▪ Neo-colonialism.
▪ Adverse climatic conditions.
▪ The difficulty of transforming the established.
▪ The United Nations has developed a program dedicated to narrowing the divide through
its Millennium Development Goals. This includes improving education and health care,
promoting gender equality, and ensuring environmental sustainability.
57 | P a g e
Unit 6: ASIAN REGIONALISM
Learning outcome:
Globalism thus implies the growth of a world market, increasingly penetrating and
dominating the "national" economies, which in the process are bound to lose some of their
"nationness". This means dominance of the world market over structures of local production, as
well as the increasing prevalence of Western-type consumerism. From this, there may emerge a
political will to halt or to reverse the process of globalization, in order to safeguard some degree
of territorial control and cultural diversity. One way of achieving such a change could be through
the New Regionalism.
The two processes of globalization and regionalization are articulated within the same
larger process of global structural transformation, the outcome of which depends on a dialectical
rather than linear development. It can therefore not be readily extrapolated or easily foreseen.
But rather it expresses the relative strength of contending social forces involved in the two
processes. They deeply affect the stability of the Westphalian state system; and therefore, they
at the same time contribute to both disorder and, possibly, a future world order.
58 | P a g e
unification of the world, the concept of globalization is often used in a rather loose and
ideological sense.
However, there are also many definitions of the new regionalism, and, just as is the case
with globalization, some are enthusiastic, some more alarmist. For the critics, the regionalist
trend constitutes a threat to the multilateral system. For the enthusiasts, on the other hand, the
new regionalism could form the basis for an improved multilateral system. The basic problem
with globalization is its selectiveness. Exclusion is inherent in the process, and the benefits are
evenly balanced by misery, conflict and violence. The negative effects are incompatible with the
survival of civil society, and thus in the longer run a threat to all humanity.
What do I mean by the new regionalism? The new regionalism differs from the "old"
regionalism in a number of ways, and I want to emphasize the following five contrasts:
1. Whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking
shape in a multipolar world order. The new regionalism and multipolarity are, in fact, two
sides of the same coin. The decline of US hegemony and the breakdown of the
Communist subsystem created a room-for-manoeuvre, in which the new regionalism
could develop. It would never have been compatible with the Cold War system, since the
"quasi-regions" of that system tended to reproduce bipolarity within themselves. This old
pattern of hegemonic regionalism was of course most evident in Europe before 1989,
but at the height of the Cold War discernible in all world regions. There are still remnants
of it here in East Asia.
2. Whereas the old regionalism was created "from above" (often through superpower
intervention), the new is a more spontaneous process from within the regions, where the
constituent states now experience the need for cooperation in order to tackle new global
challenges. Regionalism is thus one way of coping with global transformation, since
most states lack the capacity and the means to manage such a task on the "national"
level.
3. Whereas the old regionalism was inward oriented and protectionist in economic terms,
the new is often described as "open", and thus compatible with an interdependent world
economy. However, the idea of a certain degree of preferential treatment of countries
within the region is implied in the idea of open regionalism. How this somewhat
59 | P a g e
contradictory balance between the principle of multilateralism and the more
particularistic regionalist concerns shall be maintained remains somewhat unclear. I
would myself rather stress the ambiguity between "opened" and "closed" regionalism.
4. Whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to its objectives (some
organizations being security oriented, others economically oriented), the new is a more
comprehensive, multidimensional process. This process includes not only trade and
economic development, but also environment, social policy and security, just to mention
some imperatives pushing countries and communities towards cooperation within new
types of regionalist frameworks.
5. Whereas the old regionalism was concerned only with relations between nation states,
the new forms part of a global structural transformation in which non-state actors (many
different types of institutions, organizations and movements) are also active and
operating at several levels of the global system.
In sum, the new regionalism includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects, and
goes far beyond free trade. Rather, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence and
regional identity seems to be of primary importance. The new regionalism is linked to
globalization and can therefore not be understood merely from the point of view of the single
region. Rather it should be defined as a world order concept, since any particular process of
regionalization in any part of the world has systemic repercussions on other regions, thus
shaping the way in which the new world order is being organized. The new global power
structure will thus be defined by the world regions, but regions of different types.
A rough distinction can be made between three structurally different types of regions: core
regions, peripheral regions and, between them, intermediate regions. How do they differ from
each other?
• The core regions are politically stable and economically dynamic. They organize for the
sake of being better able to control the rest of the world, the world outside their own
region.
• The intermediate regions are closely linked to the core regions. They will be incorporated
as soon as they conform to the criterion of "core-ness", that is, economic development
and political stability.
60 | P a g e
• The peripheral regions, in contrast, are politically turbulent and economically stagnant.
Consequently, they must organize in order to arrest a process of marginalization. Their
regional arrangements are at the same time fragile and ineffective. Their overall situation
makes "security regionalism" and "developmental regionalism" more important than the
creation of free trade regimes. They are necessarily more introverted.
• The core regions are those regions which are politically capable, no matter whether such
capability is expressed in the form of a political organization or not. So far only one of the
three core regions, namely Europe, aspires to build such an organization. The other two,
that is North America and East Asia, are both economically strong, but so far, they lack a
regional political order.
Structurally close to core are the intermediate regions, all in preparation for being
incorporated in the core, the speed depending on their good, "core-like", behavior. They
are:
• Central Europe, obediently waiting first in line for membership in the European Union,
• Latin America and the Caribbean, in the process of becoming "North Americanized",
• China, South-East Asia and the "European Pacific", or Oceania (Australia, New
Zealand), all now being drawn by Japanese capital into the East Asia economic space.
• the post-Soviet area, the major parts of it now in the process of being reintegrated in the
form of Commonwealth of Independent States (perhaps laying the ground for a future
core region),
• the Balkans, where the countries have lost whatever little tradition of cooperation they
once might have been involved in,
• the Middle East, a region defined from outside and with a most unsettled regional
structure,
• South Asia, with a very low level of "regionness", because of the "cold war" (sometimes
getting hot) between the two major powers, India and Pakistan, and finally, Africa, where
in many countries the political structures called "states" are falling apart.
Levels of Regionness
Thus, the peripheral regions are "peripheral" because they are stagnant, turbulent and war
prone. The only way for these regions to become less peripheral is to become more
61 | P a g e
regionalized, i.e. to increase their levels of "regionness". Otherwise, their only power resource
would rest in their capacity to create problems for the core regions ("chaos power"), and thereby
inviting some sort of external engagement. What shall we then understand by "regionness"? It
means that a region can be a region more or less. There are five degrees of "regionness":
1. Region as a geographical unit, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and
marked by ecological characteristics: "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals", "Africa
south of the Sahara" or "the Indian subcontinent". This first level can be referred to as a
"proto-region", or a "pre-regional zone", since there is no organized society. In order to
further regionalize, this particular territory must, necessarily, be inhabited by human
beings, maintaining some kind of relationship. This brings us to the social dimension.
2. Region as social system implies trans-local relations between human groups. These
relations constitute a security complex, in which the constituent units, as far as their own
security is concerned, are dependent on each other, as well as the overall stability of the
regional system. Thus, the social relations may very well be hostile. The region, just like
the international system of which it forms a part, can therefore be described as anarchic.
The classic case of such a regional order is 19th century Europe. At this low level of
organization, a balance of power or some kind of "concert", is the sole security
guarantee. This is a rather primitive security mechanism. We could therefore talk of a
"primitive" region.
3. Region as organized cooperation in any of the cultural, economic, political or military
fields. In this case, region is defined by the list of countries which are the formal
members of the regional organization in question. In the absence of some kind of
organized cooperation, the concept of regionalism does not make much sense. This
more organized region could be called the "formal" region. It should be possible to relate
the "formal region" (defined by organizational membership) to the "real region" (which
has to be defined in terms of potentialities and through less precise criteria) in order to
assess the relevance and future potential of a particular regional organization.
4. Region as civil society takes shape when the organizational framework facilitates and
promotes social communication and convergence of values throughout the region. Of
course, the pre-existence of a shared cultural tradition in a particular region is of crucial
importance here, but culture is not only a given but continuously created and recreated.
However, the defining element here is the multidimensional and voluntary quality of
regional cooperation and the societal characteristics indicating an emerging "regional
anarchic society", that is something more than anarchy, but less than society.
62 | P a g e
5. Region as acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure
of decision-making. Crucial areas for regional intervention are conflict resolution
(between and particularly within former "states") and creation of welfare (in terms of
social security and regional balance). This process is similar to state formation and
nation building, and the ultimate outcome could be a "region-state", which in terms of
scope can be compared to the classical empires, but in terms of political order
constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national, political units
into a supranational security community, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all.
• Culture takes a long time to change. Of importance here is rather the inherently shared
culture which usually is transnational, since national borders in many cases are artificial
divisions of a larger cultural area.
• A transformation of the security regime (from security complex towards security
community) is perhaps the most crucial factor.
• Changes in political regimes today typically mean democratization.
• Changes in economic policies nowadays normally go in the direction of economic
openness.
63 | P a g e
The dynamics of regionalization thus constitute the interaction between these
dimensions and can, furthermore, be found at different levels of world society:
• On the global level, the changing structure of the world system provides room-for-
manoeuvre for the regional actors, at the same time as the process of regionalization in
itself constitutes a structural change towards multipolarity.
• On the level of interregional relations, the behavior of one region affects the behavior of
others. European regionalism is, for instance, the trigger of global regionalization, at
least in two different ways: one positive (in promoting regionalism by providing a model)
the other negative (in provoking regionalism by constituting a protectionist threat).
• The regions themselves constitute arenas for sometimes competing, sometimes
converging "national interests". If the overall trend within a particular geographical area
is convergence of interests, we can speak of an emerging regional actor.
• The actual process of regionalization is triggered by events on the sub-national level as
well. One example is the "black hole" syndrome or the disintegration of nation states due
to ethno-national mobilization. A less violent form of national disintegration is the
emergence of economic micro-regions as the geopolitical environment creates a more
direct access to the macro economy for dynamic sub-national regions.
Although the region is slowly becoming an actor in its own terms, the nation states
typically still conceive it as an arena where so-called "national interests" could be promoted, and
these interests are, of course, differently conceived by different social groups in society.
Whereas certain groups may find it rewarding to move into the supranational space, others cling
to the national space where they have their vested interests to protect. Regionalization thus
creates its own counterforces.
Regionalization does not come about unless the states in a particular region want it. It
may come about through a more or less spontaneous or unintended convergence in terms of
political regime, economic policy or security, but often one can identify a triggering political
event which sets the process in motion. Naturally, this political event is related to the main
players in the region, the policy makers, in contradistinction to policy takers, the smaller players.
In order to understand the regionalization in various areas of the world, it is thus wise to observe
the behavior of the policy makers.
64 | P a g e
We can divide the policy makers into two categories, those whose influence goes
beyond a particular region, the world powers, and those whose influence is confined to a
particular region, the regional powers.
• World powers may not be able to achieve hegemony on the world level, which, since the
range of their influence is undefined and varying, means that there will be a certain
competition among them.
• The regional powers may be hegemonic in their own regions (which implies a general
acceptance or at least tolerance of their leadership throughout the region) or simply
dominant (which means that they are looked upon with suspicion and fear among the
minor players).
• those who are supportive of the regionalization process (sometimes the smaller players
are the main proponents), the "supporters",
• those who try to find their own path or, rather, several paths (since they would be
welcome into more than one regional organization), "the multi-trackers",
• and those who are left in the cold (since they are seen as liabilities rather than assets),
"the isolated".
In some cases, regionalism grows from extended bilateral relations, for instance in the
Americas, where both Nafta and Mercosur resulted from a situation where third parties (Canada
and Uruguay) became anxious not to be left in the cold. The regional powers (in these cases the
USA and Brazil) usually prefer bilateralism to regionalism. This is also the case in South Asia,
where the small players softly imposed regionalism on the regional power. India was always
more in favor of bilateralism. The same behavior seems to be repeated by China in East Asia.
The final issue I want to discuss here concerns the consequences of regionalization in
terms of security and development. What are, first, the security problems to which
regionalization may provide a solution? They can be summarized in the metaphor of "black
holes", or what in UN terminology is referred to as "failed states". National disintegration seems
to reinforce the process of regionalization via threats to regional security, provoking some kind
65 | P a g e
of reaction on the regional level. It may even form part of the process of regionalization, since
the enlargement of political space provides opportunities for different sub-national and micro-
regional forces, previously locked into state structures, to reassert themselves.
The collapse of political authority at one level of society tends to open up a previously
latent power struggle at lower levels, and in a complex multi-ethnic polity the process of
disintegration may go on almost indefinitely. However, sooner or later there must be some
reorganization of social power and political authority on a higher level of societal organization,
most probably the region.
This is likely to be preceded by some form of external intervention with the purpose of
reversing the disintegration process. Again, the region may play a role, but there are also other,
and so far, more important, actors. A distinction can be made between five different modes of
external intervention: unilateral, bilateral, pluri-lateral, regional and multilateral.
• The unilateral can either be carried out by a concerned neighbor trying to avoid a wave
of refugees or by a regional/superpower having strategic interests in the region.
• In the bilateral case there is some kind of (more or less voluntary) agreement between
the intervener and the country in which the intervention is made.
• The pluri-lateral variety can be an ad hoc group of countries or some more permanent
form of alliance.
• The regional intervention is carried out by a regional organization and thus has a
territorial orientation.
• The multilateral, finally, normally means an UN-led or at least UN-sanctioned operation.
These distinctions are not very clear-cut, and in real world situations several actors at
different levels may be involved, the number increasing with the complexity of the conflict itself.
However, it is my belief that future external interventions will be a combination of regional and
multilateral operations, but with an increasingly important role for the former. The record of
regional intervention in domestic conflicts and regional conflict resolution is a recent one and
therefore the empirical basis for making an assessment is weak. However, in almost all world
regions there have been attempts at conflict resolution with a more or less significant element of
regional intervention, often in combination with multilateralism (UN involvement). Perhaps the
future world order can be characterized as regional multilateralism?
Secondly, the new regionalism may provide solutions to development problems, which in
fact can be seen as a form of conflict prevention, since many of the internal conflicts are rooted
66 | P a g e
in development problems of different kinds. Under the old regionalism, free trade arrangements
reproduced center-periphery tensions within the regions, which made regional organizations
either disintegrate or fall into slumber. Let me propose the following seven arguments in favor of
a more comprehensive development regionalism:
67 | P a g e
During the Cold War a common argument (the "common security" approach) against
nuclear armament was that the destructive capacity of the military establishments was
excessive and therefore irrational, and that whatever reduction of the level of armament that
could be negotiated might be used for civil (development) purposes. Some regions, such as
East Asia and Europe (and within these regions Japan and West Germany in particular) were
seen as "free riders" of the security order since they could devote more resources to investment
and economic growth.
In the post-Cold War order these regions have been encouraged to take a larger
responsibility for their own security. At the same time the removal of the Cold War "overlay"
permitted latent conflicts to re-emerge, giving rise to costly (conventional) armaments races.
The security situations differ from region to region, with vacuum problems in East Asia and
Europe, eruptions of older conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East, breakdowns of political
order leading to "tribal ism" in Africa and the Balkans. The only region experiencing relative
peace is Latin America, which now may be said to have a comparative advantage in peace and
political stability. The peace in East Asia seems less stable, but in view of the high degree of
economic independence, the states have a high stake in regional security. Here the circle is
closed: regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace
dividend facilitates further development cooperation. This positive circle can also be turned into
a vicious circle, where conflict and underdevelopment feed on each other. Security and
development form one integrated complex, at the same time as they constitute two fundamental
imperatives for regional cooperation and increasing regionness. The levels of regionness
between regions in the process of being formed will continue to be uneven. Only the future will
decide where these levels will be, and where the balance between regionalization and
globalization will be struck. However, political will and political action will certainly play their part
in breaking the vicious circle of regional conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment.
68 | P a g e
Asia-Pacific area show a low degree of regionness. East Asia lacks any kind of formal
regionalist framework. South-East Asia earlier contained two regional formations: the now more
or less post-Communist Indo-China and the previously anti-Communist ASEAN grouping. The
political rationales for these formations have thus completely changed, much like in Europe, and
there are new possible alignments. The "European Pacific" (Australia and New Zealand) may
turn Euro-Asian, but they may also be seen as regional great powers in a fourth "region" of
Pacific micro states: the, South Pacific. In the sections below we first describe the historical
heterogeneity of the Pacific region, secondly experiences of regional conflict and conflict
resolution, and thirdly integrative forces that nevertheless exist.
East Asia is the most dynamic of the world regions, containing a hegemonic contender
(Japan), an enormous "domestic" market (China), three NICs (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong) and a socialist autarky (North Korea), in the midst of major changes which may
fundamentally alter the pattern of cooperation within the region. A reunification of Korea, a
democratization of China and a more independent Japanese role would release an enormous
potential. These changes are admittedly not imminent, but on the other hand quite feasible. At
present the East Asian region is a region largely in the geographical, economic and perhaps
69 | P a g e
cultural (Confucian-Buddhist) sense of the concept, while a regional security order is missing.
Previous experiences of "regionalism" have been rather imperialistic. The degree of
"regionness" is thus low in spite of the fact that unplanned economic integration is now taking
place due to the dominance of the yen. Regional integration thus takes place without much
formal institutionalization (Palmer 1991, p. 5). The end of the Cold War opened up new
possibilities for inter-subregional contacts, widening the potential regional cooperation. The
Confucian model provides a dominant pattern of social and political organization, which now
frequently is hailed as a cultural alternative to Westernization (Herald Tribune, 13 July 1992).
Many countries are facing internal basic policy options which will have a crucial impact on
further regionalization and future regional configurations.
Perhaps the most complex issue in the region is the future role of Japan. Will it remain
number two in Pax Americana or take a more independent global or regional role? The latter,
and perhaps more likely option, would imply the accumulation of military strength and a break
with the introverted Japanese world view. It also implies reversing the process of "de-
Asianization" begun in the 19th century. The former course presupposes that the US itself does
not turn to isolationism, which would create great confusion as far as Japan is concerned
(Tamamoto 1990). References to "global partnership" cannot hide the fact that the old security
order is defunct, due to the disappearance of the main threat, against which the order was built,
and the emergence of new threats which may necessitate new approaches. There is, as yet, no
national consensus in Japan regarding her proper role in the world. The erosion of the
hegemonic position of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) implies that different options will be
more politically articulated and possibly that future lines of action will be based on a changing
pattern of political alliances. The pressure on Japan from outside also increases, due to the
regionalist and protectionist trend in the world economy.
Japan, not a great practitioner of but increasingly dependent on free trade, has so far
been rather negative or at least neutral to the idea of regionalism. It would, if regionalization
were to be the main trend, appear as a regional power in more than one sense, which is bound
to create suspicions throughout the region. Some countries have the Greater East Asian Co-
prosperity Sphere in vivid memory, and even today the Japanese attitude towards Asia is not
free from arrogance. As in the case of Germany in the EC/EU, a comprehensive regional
framework would help protect Japan against itself, an Asianized Japan rather than a Japanized
Asia. Japan has, however, a rather weak identity as an Asian power, and the prospect of "re-
Asianization" does not seem to be very popular. At the moment, Japan has "a regional policy for
70 | P a g e
Asia but not a policy of regionalism" (FEER, 18 June 1992). The latter would necessitate that
Japan acted more like a powerful nation state, less like an international trading firm (Pyle 1993).
Much will of course depend on the future behavior of China in the region. China will
continue the long road towards a more open economy in spite of the temporary isolation which
followed in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident. China's self-reliance-oriented economy
built in the Cold War context is in need of transformation, which (as in the case of Viet Nam)
implies a change in the domestic balance of power away from Beijing and towards the south,
where foreign investments flow. Guangdong Province is forging links with Hong Kong, Fujian
with Taiwan, Japan invests primarily in the Shanghai area, and South Korea in Shandong
Province. China as a centralized empire is probably doomed, but its eventual dissolution could
hopefully be less turbulent than the dissolution of the Soviet empire proved to be.
71 | P a g e
Stable peace in the larger region would change the basic parameters for the way
ASEAN operates at present. As the superpowers pull out, old rivalries are emerging, at the
same time as the objective preconditions for a cooperation encompassing the whole region in
the longer run are improving. This trend will be reinforced by great power ambitions in the larger
Asia-Pacific area, where South-East Asia is sandwiched between East Asian (China, Japan)
and South Asian (India) regional powers. There is a strong feeling of encirclement and external
penetration in the South-East Asian region, coexisting with a tradition of reliance on external
security support. Somehow this contradiction must be overcome.
The Cambodian conflict has been of major concern for the ASEAN countries, and has
been compared to a "Bosnia" in the region (FEER, 27 May 1993). The history goes much further
back, actually to the Viet Nam war. The ultra-leftist Khmer Rouge regime pursued an extreme
autarkic line which included the physical elimination of urban ("cosmopolitan") elements. The
first intervention was of the unilateral (unneighborly) kind. The Vietnamese intervention led to a
sharp polarization both at the regional and the global level. In 1991, when the Soviet veto had
disappeared from international decision-making, an agreement in the Security Council
(permanent five) on the "framework for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict"
was reached and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created.
This, the largest UN operation so far, was the beginning of the peace process and included a
democratic election. The non-participation of the Khmer Rouge in the elections fueled the fears
that the guerrillas planned a division of the country. However, their political strength was much
less than generally expected. They had become "rebels without a cause" (Theyer 1995). The
turnout of the voters, on the other hand, was much larger than expected and was a triumph for
the UN. The operation gave an opportunity for Japan to participate in a large international
operation, probably indicating a more far-going security interest in the region. For Cambodia
several question marks remain, above all the question of how the Khmer Rouge may rejoin the
national community and on what conditions. Only when this problem has found a solution, is it
possible to talk about real conflict resolution. So far this is rather a case of multilateral conflict
management with a strong regional component. Cambodia has strongly declared its intention to
become a member of ASEAN, and this co-optation (which can be compared to the inclusion of
Greece, Spain and Portugal in the EEC) is also seen by the regional organization as a
stabilizing measure. Whether this implies the survival of democracy (particularly of the kind
imposed by the UN) remains to be seen (Öjendal 1996b).
72 | P a g e
Towards Regional Cohesion?
East Asia and South-East Asia are, due to economic linkages, becoming hard to
separate from each other, and will be even more converging in the future, as countries such as
Malaysia and Thailand (apart from Singapore, which is already known as an NIC) are more or
less successfully trying to apply the NIC strategy. Thus, the Asian core of the Pacific rim, east
and south-east, will probably follow its own economic course.
South-East Asia, like Europe, has been divided in two economic and political blocs:
ASEAN (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei) which has
existed since 1967, and the "Indochinese" area (Viet Nam, Kampuchea and Laos). The latter
subregion has been under Communist rule, with Viet Nam exercising sub regional hegemony.
This role is now played down at the same time as market-oriented economic policies (doimoi)
are implemented. Viet Nam, and behind it the Soviet Union, was earlier seen as a threat by the
ASEAN countries. This threat was a crucial factor behind the relative cohesiveness of the
organization in the Cold War era. The source of common cause and identity was thus partly an
external threat, and there were few incentives for economic cooperation. Only recently (January
1993) a free trade agreement, AFTA, within the 330-million-people ASEAN region was agreed
to be realized within a fifteen-year period. The planned tariff slopes of the different countries
differ according to starting point and speed, which complicates the competitive situation in the
intraregional trade of the constituent countries. The more protectionist countries will probably
use AFTA to dump into more open economies. Many therefore doubt that this free trade zone
will be realized. ASEAN countries are direct competitors in many areas and it will take a long
time for them to develop into complementary economies. From the very beginning ASEAN was
a political, rather than economic, organization (Yamakage 1990), and now the political
preconditions have changed.
In fact there are strong inter-state, as well as intra-state, tensions in the two subregions.
The latter can be exemplified by ethnic tensions (Malaysia, the Philippines) and the former by
old territorial disputes (Indonesia vs. Malaysia), as well as contrasting views on regional security
(Singapore vs. Indonesia and Malaysia). As in Europe, the dismantling of the Cold War system
will change the pattern of conflict rather than eliminate the conflicts. We can therefore expect
more relaxation between the two subregions, but more conflicts within them. Possibly the
ASEAN framework is now strong enough to deal with them. The recent ASEAN meeting in
Manila, for instance, addressed the tension over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea,
which triggered a wider ASEAN interest to discuss a future security arrangement "in the post-
73 | P a g e
Cambodia era" (The Nation, Bangkok, 23 July 1992). Ad hoc consultations may no longer be
sufficient (Leifer 1992).
The national economies are outward oriented, and the political systems are formally
democratic or semi-democratic but in practice more or less authoritarian. The Confucian model
has a strong impact on this region as well, so authoritarianism in fact constitutes the
homogenizing political factor. The ASEAN countries are in various phases on an NIC-type
development path. Problems in the international market usually reinforce domestic
authoritarianism due to the strong two-way causal relationship between economic growth and
political stability. Economic growth and redistribution are a pre-condition for ethnic peace,
political stability a precondition for the economic confidence expressed by international capital
towards the region.
Australia and New Zealand, although geographically distant from Europe, have
European, and particularly British, origins. Under the impact of successive immigrations, the
European heritage is becoming less distinctive. Economically, they are becoming part of Asia
and dependent on Japan. Australia's exports to Britain have fallen from 32% (in 1950) to a mere
3% today. Sixty per cent of exports now go to Asia. The leaders are, consequently, promoting a
republican Australia less attached to Britain and more involved in Asia, but this involvement
obviously has its limits. The term "open regionalism" is often used for regional trade
arrangements that do not hurt third parties. The ASEAN countries are still not convinced about
the good will of the two European Asians, and as an editorial in The New Straits Times puts it
"first it must prove that it is proud to be part of Asia" (quoted from EPW, 24 April 1993). Australia
is publicly criticizing the regionalist project of creating an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC),
which is a proposition from the South-East Asian region, while backing the much looser Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Politically they are thus still not quite part of the region,
and there has also been a discussion on Australia joining NAFTA (Bangkok Post, 12 Sept.
74 | P a g e
1992). The Australian attitude to Europe is becoming increasingly negative. Similarly, New
Zealand is one of the major victims of European agricultural protectionism.
In 1990 the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir (in frustration over drawn-out GATT
negotiations) urged Japan to act as a leader of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG),
which would create an East Asian and South-East Asian superbloc with a Sino-Japanese core.
EAEG (it has since been modestly renamed the East Asia Economic Caucus - EAEC) would be
a sort of response to the European and North American "fortresses". The EAEC proposal is
slowly gaining support among other ASEAN countries, whereas the East Asian countries,
particularly Japan and South Korea, have taken a more sceptical attitude. So have the USA and
the World Bank. According to a World Bank report (Sustaining Rapid Development) East Asia
can strengthen regional integration through trade liberalization and promotion of foreign direct
investment within the framework of the multilateral trading system. "A trading block would more
likely foster an inward orientation, impairing the world wide search for market opportunities that
has served East Asia so well".
A more comprehensive alternative is thus the 15-member-strong forum for Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was set up in 1989 with regional and interregional trade
expansion as its main goal. Similar to the "Atlantic project" in Europe, it is a trans-regional
network providing a bridge for the USA in the area, and therefore supported by US-oriented
regimes and opposed by spokesmen for a genuinely Asian regionalism. From the US point of
view APEC, like NAFTA in the Americas, is a continuation of its strategy of bilateralism. Again,
we meet the two distinct understandings of regionalism:
So far, the first conception predominates in Asia-Pacific. The idea of any kind of more
introverted regionalism is thus very controversial in a region extremely dependent on
unhindered world trade, and the debate is carried out merely in terms of an "insurance policy"
(FEER, 25 July 1991).
75 | P a g e
GLOBAL OR REGIONAL: WHAT CAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DO?
To consider the relative advantages of regional versus global organizations one must
begin with clarity about why it is that particular international organizations are created. Some
organizations are essentially single purpose, others have multiple purposes. Among the
purposes, or functions, for which international organizations are designed are
These purposes are of course carried out by a wide range of international organizations,
including international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as well as intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). In this paper, however, it will be enough of a task to address just the
potential of IGOs.
I begin the discussion with the example of the European Union, or rather the set of
organizations that formed predecessors of the contemporary EU and of the various
organizations that currently constitute the EU system. It can serve to illustrate all of the above-
mentioned purposes. It is especially worth noting that the origins of the EU lie in a history of
warfare. As a regional organization, it arose after centuries of violent conflict among neighboring
states. Indeed, as with individuals, most conflicts among states occur between states which are
close together. By virtue of their closeness they have what has been termed both the
opportunity to fight and the willingness, or reasons, to fight.1 They have the opportunity because
it is relatively easy even for a militarily weak state to mobilize its armed forces on its borders and
to use those forces against a contiguous or other nearby state. It may not have the "global
reach" of an imperial power or superpower, but can exert force against its neighbors. Similarly,
states within the same region have issues about which they can readily come into conflict. The
most obvious concern territorial borders, often including irredentist claims and cross-national
76 | P a g e
ethnic conflicts. Pairs of such states frequently carry on what have been termed long-term
rivalries.
Certainly, Europe was cursed by regional conflict and long-term rivalries. Three times in
75 years it had been the site of massive wars, of which the last two left the protagonists
exhausted and, especially in 1945, their economies devastated. Given that experience, the
leaders of the major West European states determined to build a new kind of international order
to prevent war among themselves. Thus, the predecessor institutions of the European Union
were devoted first of all to promoting peace among their members. The statesmen who
designed and put into place these institutions - Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, Alcide de
Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer - worked especially to that end, vowing that war among their states,
though once common, would be made unthinkable by linking their economies so tightly that no
rational leader could possibly see any gain accruing from war with any other member state.
They began with the European Coal and Steel Community, then EURATOM for the nuclear
industry, and then combining these into the European Community and ultimately the EU.
But peace among its members was only one of the security functions of the nascent EU.
It was also intended to provide a measure of external security relative to the world's two great
superpowers. While allying solidly with the West against the Communist threat on the continent
of Europe, the Western European states did not wish to live under excessive United States
domination. Militarily weak as individual countries, they hoped to pool their economic and
demographic resources sufficiently to have some degree of flexibility and independence in their
foreign policies.
Thirdly, they hoped to restore their war-shattered economies. They were acutely aware
of the strains which the great depression and trade disputes had put on their economies during
the inter-war period, contributing to the outbreak of World War II. Moreover, they understood
that their national economies were now too small, individually, to benefit properly from
economies of scale. Thus, economic integration was intended to promote greater prosperity
than previously achieved, both for its own sake and as a contribution to securing the peace.
And finally, the new European institutions were to enhance and solidify political and
social rights, especially those associated with democratic governance. Germany and Italy had
become aggressors once their democratic regimes were overthrown, and other states'
democratic institutions, such as those of France, were gravely endangered. So, the new
77 | P a g e
European order was to preserve and defend democracy, again both for its own sake and from a
conviction that stable democratic states would be less likely to fight one another.
The IGOs of Europe have multiplied and strengthened over the past 50 years,
broadening both their scope and their membership to extend far beyond the original six
members of the Coal and Steel Community. Their evolution has perhaps been least impressive
in the area of external security, since Europe still has neither a common military force nor a
common foreign policy. Nonetheless, even here there has been some coordination, with the
formation of at least a French-German brigade, some movement toward common military
command, and (rather muddled) efforts to produce a common policy in the Balkans. They have
done much better in securing a lasting and stable peace among their members, and in
promoting economic growth and interdependence. That interdependence has in turn impelled
substantial cooperation and institutional formation to deal with health and environmental
protection. The preservation of human rights has become a major function, embodied for
example in the Council of Europe and the European Court of Justice, where states can be
brought to the bar for human rights violations. Adoption of a democratic form of government has
in fact become a prerequisite to joining and remaining within the EU; the hope of achieving EU
membership has proved a powerful force to encourage democratization and human rights in
Eastern Europe.
The first UN that of security against violence, is perhaps the most obvious, at least to
those of us in the developed world. It is epitomized by the Security Council, alone among UN
organs authorized to use military force against Member States and able to require all Member
States to cooperate, as for example in the enforcement of economic sanctions against an
78 | P a g e
aggressor. Since virtually all states of the world are members of the UN, the function of external
security is now essentially moot, but that of providing peace among members of the
organization certainly is not. The function of collective security against a state deemed an
aggressor has been exercised most recently and powerfully against Iraq. Yet with the end of the
Cold War and the breakdown of many states which previously seemed stable, in recent years
most Security Council-authorized operations have taken place in the context of civil wars largely
internal to states. Such a development was not anticipated by the organization's founders. In
this new role the UN, and its Member States, are still searching for the most appropriate means
and principles of action.
The UN of security against violence, however, is not limited to the Security Council. As
examples, consider the Secretary-General and the International Court of Justice. The Secretary-
General has the capability of mediating or offering his good offices to resolve conflicts, as Javier
Pérez de Cuéllar did effectively in the late stages of the Iran-Iraq war. And the International
Court, while often usually lacking compulsory jurisdiction, has successfully adjudicated several
dangerous disputes, including the Chad-Libya border conflict that had previously produced
repeated bloody clashes. When states wish to use the ICJ for such purposes, it is there.
The second UN, that of economic security, is embodied, for example, in the Bretton
Woods institutions of the World Bank, the IMF, and GATT (now the World Trade Organization),
and also the UN Development Programs. Some of these institutions were initially devoted
primarily to rebuilding economies devastated by World War II, but quickly turned to problems of
development in the poor countries as well. They have been concerned to promote and stabilize
economic interdependence, and to reduce poverty and stimulate economic development. They
have taken on a special role in stabilizing economies in Eastern Europe, and in promoting
market reforms both there and in many developing countries as they moved away from statist
organizing principles. As such, these global institutions have underpinned economic
interdependence and have become major instruments for the spread of free markets. Many
other UN-related organizations have made other contributions to economic development and
the alleviation of poverty. The World Health Organization and UNICEF, for example, deserve
the credit for the global eradication of smallpox. UN agencies also have taken on important roles
in worldwide environmental protection.
79 | P a g e
The alleviation of poverty is itself directed to some of the basic human rights embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its subsequent Conventions. Other basic
human rights - political, social and cultural - have been furthered by other UN institutions. These
include the Human Rights Commission, and the very demanding and effective work of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees. With the economically oriented institutions, they have often
played major parts in the rebuilding of societies shattered by civil war or wars of liberation. An
agency frequently overlooked is the Electoral Assistance Unit of the UN Secretariat. It has
supervised, monitored and otherwise assisted the holding of free elections in more than 60
countries, aiding transitions following the collapse of authoritarian regimes and civil wars.
Examples include Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Mozambique and
Namibia. In this way, the UN has become an instrument of democratization - an unthinkable
development prior to the end of the Cold War.
As with the EU, the activities of the "three UNs" have been undertaken for their own
sake; for example, the alleviation of poverty is a goal in itself. But, also like the vision of the
founders of the EU, these various purposes also have synergisms. Not only is peace sought
directly by those organs of the UN overtly devoted to security from violence, but, in his Agenda
for Peace and Agenda for Development3 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared his
belief that development and human rights were essential for stable peace. More generally, it is
more than plausible that, conversely, peace facilitates and encourages economic development
and the securing of human rights. In effect, a set of virtuous circles operates, with each of these
causal arrows reinforcing the others. Nor is this vision limited to Boutros Boutros-Ghali and
some of his contemporaries. It was clearly evident in the thought of many of the founders of the
UN, in the United Kingdom and the United States, when they devised its institutions in 1945. For
all their "realist" concerns with power politics and the institutions of collective security, these
founders also found room for the liberal institutionalist vision of the broader underpinnings of a
peaceful order that would in many instances make direct resort to the collective security
operations unnecessary and virtually irrelevant.
Why IGOs?
Before proceeding further with some thoughts on the relative capability and suitability of
regional or global institutions, it is worth pausing to be clearer about why IGOs come to exist at
all. To do so one can usefully begin with the economists' concept of collective goods, or public
goods. Collective goods are those goods, or benefits, that no individual person or state can
80 | P a g e
acquire for itself. They are goods which, to be achieved at all or at least to an optimal degree,
must be provided by collective action. They must be provided cooperatively, with some
provision for minimizing "free-riding" by those who would like to enjoy the benefits without
paying for them. Within states, the provision of collective goods is, writ large, the primary
purpose of government. Public health can reliably be secured only by regulation or other
collective action (as for compulsory vaccination, or the provision of safe water). Environmental
protection also often requires collective action and regulation, since the effects of pollution may
extend far beyond its source and, in the absence of public policy, polluters may lack sufficient
incentive to change their practices. In the absence of regulation, subsidy or effective taxation,
the temptation for everyone to try to free-ride is likely to lead to widespread violation of
restraints. Public order and defense against attack similarly require collective action, and the
assessment and collection of taxes to ensure that everyone pays what is deemed a fair share of
the cost.
The problem is not fundamentally different at the international level. Control of infectious
disease across borders, regulation of civil aviation safety standards and global control of
environmental pollutants, each in its way, are collective goods and furthered the existence of
IGOs. Even security against violence is in effect a collective good, particularly in a regime that
privileges the independence of many weak but sovereign states. Some means for providing the
instruments of collective security, and paying for them, are required. In the absence of an all-
powerful hegemon, willing as well as able to provide the collective goods by itself, individual
states cannot unaided do the job at a satisfactory level. What, precisely, can IGOs do? They
can carry on at least six kinds of action, as can many other types of institutions. A few are
limited to just one function; most take on many or even all six. I begin at the coercive end of the
spectrum, and end with the "soft" power of shaping identities:
1. Most obviously, they can enforce the community norms, if necessary, coercing the norm-
breakers. In some circumstances the coercion is overt and violent, as when the Security
Council authorizes military action or the application of economic sanctions. Furthermore,
the Security Council is empowered to carry out the action, to collect "taxes"
(peacekeeping assessments) from Member States, and to require all Member States to
observe the regime of economic sanctions it may apply. But any taxation or rule
enforcement, when the instruments of state coercion are in the background rather than
the foreground, remains a form of coercion.
81 | P a g e
2. IGOs may mediate between conflicting parties, or otherwise serve as facilitating rather
than coercive agents for conflict resolution. Here too, but more rarely, IGOs are used as
instruments of arbitration and adjudication, sometimes taking on certain coercive powers
of enforcement.
3. IGOs, like all institutions, serve as channels for conveying information about member's
actions, needs, preferences and perceptions. No collective action of much import is
possible without a substantial institutional network for conveying such information, and
reducing uncertainty.
4. Institutions frequently expand their members' views of their material self-interest by
making it more inclusive and longer term. For example, institutions devoted to increasing
economic interdependence make one state's economic prosperity largely dependent on
that of the other states which serve as its markets or its sources of important goods and
services. My self-interest depends on serving yours also, and in the long term not just
the short.
5. IGOs help shape norms which influence the behavior of states and individuals. Among
these norms, that of sovereignty is most obvious, given the organizing principle of state
membership in IGOs. The UN has greatly enhanced the norm of sovereignty by granting
membership to states deemed to be in control of their territory regardless of how small or
weak that state may be. The norm of the right of a state to be recognized as a sovereign
entity was promoted powerfully during the era of the demise of colonialism, and the UN
was a major actor in that process. More recently, the right of a sovereign state to
continue in existence formed the basis for much rationale supporting the resistance to
Iraq's attempted seizure of Kuwait. Recently, the Bretton Woods institutions have widely
promoted norms of free markets in states making the transition from controlled
economies.
6. Finally, IGOs can generate the narratives of mutual identification across states and
cultures. Principles of a global interest and global citizenship are part of the UN's
message, presented powerfully in visual images as well as words. Regional
organizations do some of the same, as with the EU's promotion of European citizenship
and the creation of a European passport. Overall, global organizations as well as
regional ones may be judged to have a decent record in many of these others, though
not nearly as good as many of us might hope.
82 | P a g e
The Regional Basis for Action
When addressing the case for regional action, it helps to begin with an understanding of
the term region. What is a region? In practice it is a very loosely defined term, often used in an
ad hoc fashion. It is typically defined with some geographical reference, often to a continent or
part of a continent. But such geographic references may be very imprecise, and laden with
economic, cultural or political distinctions. Whereas a decade or so ago people readily spoke of
Eastern Europe or Western Europe as distinct entities, it is now much more common to refer
implicitly or explicitly to the cultural and other unities of a single Europe. Some people, to
identify (still quite imperfectly) the area of industrial states refer to the North Atlantic area, or to a
Europe from Vladivostok to Ireland. Mexico is physically located on the continent generally
referred to as North America, but when Mexicans speak of norteamericanos they do not mean
themselves. Is Taiwan a part of East Asia, or not? It depends on the circumstances and
purposes of those who use the term. Physical, political, economic and cultural definitions of
regions rarely delineate the same boundaries.
Furthermore, all regions are hardly equal in their potential for institutional formation and
success. Not only do they vary in their homogeneity by the above criteria, they vary immensely
in the resources they can bring to bear on the problems of their member states. The potential of
African institutions is sharply limited by the small size and general poverty of that continent's
states. Economic development in Africa requires vast external resources; the peacekeeping
potential of the OAU is limited by the military forces available to its members. By most
assessments, the European model of regional organization has been the most successful.
Europe is the locus of an extremely dense network of IGOs.
Latin America is the region with the second most dense network of institutions. Others,
such as Africa, all of Asia, or parts of Asia, are less rich with institutions and probably more
diverse. Asia overall exhibits much diversity, whether along dimensions of development, political
system or even culture. It is arguably nearly as diverse as the globe itself. Allegations about an
"Asian way" of governing, or of development, obscure many differences and exaggerate the
likelihood of substantial agreement on regional IGOs' policies.
83 | P a g e
Unit 7: GLOBAL MEDIA CULTURES
Learning outcome:
The electronic media & communication sector, which ranges from telecommunication networks
& the Internet, through to radio, television & film, is itself among the most active in the current
drive for the globalization of production, markets & trade.
The process has been facilitated by a world-wide trend toward deregulation and privatization of
the mass media.
Globalization – the growing integration of economies & societies around the world – has been
one of the most hotly-debated topics in international economics over the past few years.
❖ The social consequences of the globalization of the sector itself are comparable to those
of many other sectors, & include the restructuring of employment relations & conditions,
& international competition for footloose capital based on cheaper labor.
❖ The media & communication industries are a leading sector in facilitating overall
globalization.
❖ For instance, the social consequences of facilitating the emergence of globalize financial
transactions (e-commerce) & manufacturing industries open markets for “lifestyle”
products (Valentine Day, Mothers Day, etc.), popular culture (k-pop culture), which
includes fast food (KFC, McDonald, etc.) and cosmetics (SK-II, ), are a result of the
growth of these sectors (softening up cultures for consumerism).
84 | P a g e
Globalization – Conceptualization
A The term globalization is linked to a variety of different perspectives and ideas about what
globalization is and how it affects people and communities around the world.
1. Encyclopedia Britannica says that globalization is the "process by which the experience
of everyday life ... is becoming standardized around the world."
D vital functions - respects democracy, human rights & economic, social & cultural needs.
E Free flow of information also causes Media Imperialism (confusing the whole world
concerning real fact)
F “Global Village” concept by McLuhan (1964) & Meyrowitz (1985) – existent ICT has dense
space & time enable societies around the globe living in borderless world.
G United Nations itself has encouraged member countries to invest in digital technology as a
way to achieve its millennium development goals (MDG).
85 | P a g e
H The uneven development of ICT (digital divide) indicates that the benefits of new technology
will be felt by the only few innovative adopters at the expense of a larger group of laggards.
SOCIAL CHANGE
❖ Transformation of traditional society into a modern society.
❖ Universal Education
❖ Gender Equality
❖ Child Health
❖ Maternal Health
❖ Combat HIV/AIDS
❖ Environmental Sustainability
❖ Global Partnership
86 | P a g e
3 Questions
2. If social media is so important, why should not governments simply cut it in times of
crisis?
CURRENT ISSUES
87 | P a g e
(Figure 9) Television Landscape
88 | P a g e
Internet Usage
❖ as “social” technology
❖ as a capital-enhancing activity.
❖ as recreational outlets
❖ “Social change” – what the Internet can offer that mass media could not?
About 57% of Internet user are between the ages of 20 and 24 years. About 71% said that
their main online activities are keeping in touch with friends and family, instant messaging, and
reading local news.
“Globalization" Characteristic:
• People around the globe are more connected to each other than ever before.
Information & money flow more quickly than ever.
• Goods & services produced in one part of the world are increasingly available in all parts
of the world. International travel is more frequent.
89 | P a g e
• International communication is commonplace.
B Globalization has various aspects which affect the world in several different ways such as:
4. Political - Political globalization is the creation of a world government which regulates the
relationships among nations and guarantees the rights arising from social and economic
globalization.
90 | P a g e
7. Ecological- the advent of global environmental challenges that can not be solved without
international cooperation, such as climate change, cross-boundary water and air
pollution, over-fishing of the ocean, and the spread of invasive species.
9. Transportation - Fewer and fewer American cars on American roads each year.
4. Spread of local consumer products (e.g. food) to other countries (often adapted to their
culture)
5. World-wide fads and pop culture such as Pokemon, Idol series, YouTube, Black Mental,
Hip-Hop, and etc.
6. World-wide sporting events such as FIFA World Cup and the English Premier League
(EPL), Olympics Games & etc.
2. Capital movements
3. Movement of people
91 | P a g e
Debate
Debate abounds over whether globalization is good or bad for the self, the family, the
nation, and the world. Some pessimists see increased interdependence as a terribly destructive
trend, while optimists see a more diverse, better life for all. Some people argue that the world is
no more globalize than it was in the waning days of the British Empire, but some see an
information revolution that is unparalleled in history and widespread in its implications.
1. Social Change:
a. Changing of attitudes and norms
b. Adoption of innovation
c. Urbanization
d. Better income
2. Communication & Change:
a. Top-down Strategy
b. Mass Media As ‘Magic Multiplier’
3. Rethinking of the Dominant Paradigm”
a. stressing popular participation, self-reliance, and the empowerment of people
involved in social change.
b. requires a communication model that describes the process of dialogue, horizontal
information sharing, mutual understanding, agreement, and collective action.
c. requires a model of social change based on community dialogue and collective
action that specifies social as well as individual outcomes.
92 | P a g e
Issues:
Communication as Dialogue:
• Dialogue cannot occur between those who deny other men the right to speak their word
and those whose right to speak has been denied them.
• Dialogue cannot be carried in a climate of hopelessness.
• Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be
no true education (change).
• The emergence of the Internet and its extensive global networks has given traditional,
interpersonal face-to-face horizontal communication a sizable boost.
• The masses who find it difficult to make themselves heard can now depend on the
Internet as a method of expressing their views and initiating change.
First: We are concerned with who has power in those industries whose explicit purpose is to
communicate ideas and produce images.
First, retreat from public broadcasting and regulation to freer market-based system (changes in
way Public Service broadcasters behave).
93 | P a g e
• Privatisation of the Communications Infrastructure.
• Technology convergence of different media and technologies and the ability for
information to transcend distance
• Most striking trend is the growing market power of a small number of firms
• Bagdikian argue that between 1983 and 1994 number of global media companies fell
from 50 to 20
• Links between these firms Disney union with ABC, Time Warner CNN
• Reuters(UK)
• Bloomberg (USA)
Global 500 $
1999
(Japan)
(USA)
94 | P a g e
3 SBC Communications 42 49' 489
(USA)
(Germany)
(USA)
Communications
(USA)
(UK)
(Italy)
(France)
(USA)
• With media deregulation we see the rise of imported programmes. In the German private
television sector US imports account for 32% to 52% programming
• This is important because the images and sounds we consume important in making us
who we are and shaping our conception of the good life
95 | P a g e
Although links between ownership, control and nationality are complex
• In 1993 Africa 16 (267 Europe) daily newspapers, 173 (982 North America) Radios and
39 (406 NA) TVs per thousand
• Half the world has never made a phone call and 24 OECD countries with 15% world
population account for 71% of lines
• Although based upon the truth that middle class individuals do enjoy the ability to offer
the world the opportunity to broadcast their opinions. It conceals domination and Liberal
quasi-censorship.
Highlight the main points of Baudrillard’s and Fine’s theories of consumption. Briefly
seek to relate their conclusions to contemporary processes of globalisation.
• In the contemporary era “functionalist discourse serves as an alibi for the function of
invidious distinction”
• Accumulate objects as symbol of our social progress but they also remind us of our
frustrations (some tensions in arguments about differentiation and consumption)
• For Fine Baudrillard work is fundamentally flawed and represents a mirror image of
conventional economics relative neglect of sociology of consumption
96 | P a g e
• Fine uncomfortable with simply reducing consumption to social meaning and neglect of
production
• Also, Fine demands that we do is understand how commodities are historically specific
and constructed.
• Fine systems of provisions approach seek to once again place production at the centre
and combine an analysis of material and the social.
• As a centre piece of analyse is leading firms themselves and how they seek to construct
‘meaning’
• System of provisioning approach (Horizontal and vertical linkages) demands study of the
wider social, culture and political milieu
That which can happily co-exist for capital can have terrible impact on individuals. Co-
existence in contemporary society of mass obesity and anorexia/bulimia. US 31% men, 24%
(40%) women overweight. $40 billion cost of tackling obesity, $20 diet industry. Although
arguably other cultural milieu promotes a ‘healthier’ body shape? 64% women and 23% of men
who have never been overweight have been on diets. Ideas of consumption satisfying utility and
consumer sovereignty are actually fairly meaningless. Personally, I am all for state regulation.
No thin models, bans on junk food etc. Personally, my favourite example of a System of
Provision is chairs. 70% of the population in core capitalist states suffer from lower back pain,
accounting for 13% of sickness absences in the UK. 85% of lower back pain in the UK is
classified as being ‘non-specific back pain’ meaning that it ‘results from postural and mechanical
stresses on spinal and paraspinal structures (Speed, 2004: 1120). Most chairs are frankly
useless, see the following by Ralph Lauren
97 | P a g e
• Control of Workplace
• State regulation
How does this all relate to globalisation? If the act of consumption is simultaneously an
economic and social one than how things produced and are sold critical is critical to the
construction of culture. So economic changes cannot but be culture changes. Not simply in the
image industries but in all industries. Perhaps culture cannot simply be reduced to material
culture but material culture is a key competent. Foolish to simply dismiss arguments formation
of global culture (although they have limitations)
Summary
• Globalization is much like fire. Fire itself is neither good nor bad (kecil jadi kawan, besar
jadi lawan).
• ICT as alternatives enhance national development, national unity, .
• While some people think of globalization as primarily a synonym for global business, it is
much more than that.
• As Friedman says: "[Globalization] can be incredibly empowering and incredibly
coercive. It can democratize opportunity and democratize panic. It makes the whales
bigger and the minnows stronger. It leaves you behind faster and faster, and it catches
up to you faster and faster. While it is homogenizing cultures, it is also enabling people
to share their unique individuality farther and wider."
98 | P a g e
Unit 8: THE GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGION
Learning outcome:
Consideration of the relation between religion and globalization involves two basic
possibilities. There are, on the one hand, religious responses to globalization and religious
interpretations of globalization. These are, as it were, part of doing religion in a globalizing
context. On the other hand, there are those analyses of globalization that seek to understand
the role of religion in globalization and the effects of globalization on religion. They focus on
observing religion in a global society. By far the largest portion of the literature that relates
religion and globalization is of the former sort, and therefore it is well to begin there.
99 | P a g e
to the manifestation of evil in our world. In many respects globalization in this segment of the
literature is a successor term for what used to be censured as the capitalist system or cognate
terms. Accordingly, globalization results in violence and the unjust oppression of the majority of
people around the world. It threatens local and indigenous cultures, imposing a particularly
heavy burden on women. It is the chief cause of global and local environmental degradation,
again to the principal detriment of the mass of marginalized humanity. Such theologically
inspired positions are not restricted to the representatives of a particular religious tradition.
Thus, for example, Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, and those speaking from indigenous
traditions all arrive at similar critical assessments of globalization. And far from being a
characteristically religious perspective, such arguments are quite common in the overall
literature, whether recognizably religious or not. What they imply, among other consequences,
is that religion and religious sensibilities are at root outside of and contrary to globalization, that
globalization and religion are fundamentally incommensurate. Another segment of both the
religiously inspired and the secular literature, while often sharing many of the negative
judgments, nonetheless sees a much closer relation between the two. As noted, these
observers almost invariably share the broader meanings of globalization, especially the
dialogical and from below perspectives.
100 | P a g e
Religion and Religions in Globalization
Globalization perspectives seeking to include religion have taken several directions of
which the following are likely the most significant. Certain approaches analyze religion as a
global or transnational institution, whose diverse manifestations operate to a large extent
independently of economic and political structures and that bind diverse regions of the world
together in ways comparable to global trade, international relations, mass media, sport,
communications media, or tourism. A second but related focus of observation is the role that
religious systems play as powerful cultural resources for asserting identity and seeking inclusion
in global society, especially among less powerful and marginalized populations. It is in this
context that religio-political movements, including so-called fundamentalisms, receive the most
focused attention. A third strategy goes even further, attempting to show how the formation,
reformation, and spread of religions have been an integral dimension of globalization as such.
From this angle, what we today conceive as the most typical forms of religion and even the
typical understandings that we have of religion are themselves outcomes and reflections of the
historical process of globalization. Although these three directions are by no means mutually
exclusive, for the sake of presentation they can be treated separately. Each implies a somewhat
different theoretical emphasis, and each also tends to focus on different empirical
manifestations of religion in our world.
101 | P a g e
far reaches of Southeast Asia. It informed without doubt the largest world system before the
arrival of the modern era.
Yet perhaps most important in this regard is that, as the European powers expanded
their influence around the globe between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, thus setting the
conditions for contemporary truly worldwide globalization, Christian religion and Christian
institutions were throughout that entire period key contributors to the process. The churches
accompanied European colonizers in Africa, the Americas, and Australasia; Christian missions,
whether independently or in conjunction with secular authorities, sought conversions in all
corners of the globe. In consequence, today the vast majority of globally extended religious
institutions are in fact Christian organizations and movements. A wide variety of these include,
for instance, the Roman Catholic Church (along with many of its religious orders), several
Protestant and Eastern Orthodox churches, the World Council of Churches, Seventh-day
Adventists, the worldwide Pentecostal movement, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Christian missions
still crisscross the world: American missionaries are to be found in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia; African and Latin American Christians conduct missions in Europe and the United States;
Australians serve in India; South Koreans are a major presence in southern Africa; and
everyone is trying to spread the word in the countries of the former Communist bloc.
Although Christian establishments thus dominate numerically, they are far from being
alone among transnational religious institutions. Muslim movements and organizations such as
the Ṣūfī and neo-Ṣūfī ṭarīqah, or brotherhoods (for example, Naqshbandīyah, Murīdīya,
Qādirīyah), reform movements like the Pakistani Tablighi Jamaat and the Turkish Milli Görüş,
and unity foundations like the World Muslim Congress or the World Muslim League are broadly
established in different regions. They are far from negligible in importance. Buddhist
organizations such as the Foguangshan or the Sōka Gakkai have a worldwide presence as do
Hindu movements like the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the
Sai Baba movement. Parallel examples could be mentioned for other both major and minor
religions ranging from Judaism, Sikhism, and Bahā'ī to Mormonism, Scientology, and the
Brahmā Kumaris.
The specific literature on any of these is fairly substantial. Yet with some exceptions,
notably Christian manifestations like the Roman Catholic Church and Pentecostalism,
globalization perspectives have not concentrated on these perhaps most obvious of global
religious forms as a characteristic dimension of the globalization process. Instead, a growing
literature has been focusing on religion in the context of global migration. The more or less
102 | P a g e
permanent displacement of large numbers of people from diverse regions and cultural
backgrounds to many other parts of the world, but notably from non-Western to Western
countries, has like few other phenomena brought home to an increasing range of observers just
how much humanity is now living in a single world where identity and difference have to be
renegotiated and reconstructed. Dialogical theories of globalization and those that stress
globalization from below have been particularly apt to analyze the consequences of global
migration, but the issue is not missing from many that understand globalization primarily in
economic or political terms. Like global capitalism or international relations, this question is not
susceptible to easy understanding on the basis of theories that take a more limited territory,
above all a nation-state or a region like Europe, as their primary unit of analysis. In the context
of the various other structures that make the world a smaller place, global migrants in recent
times maintain far stronger and more lasting and consequential links with their countries of
origin. Globalization approaches allow a better understanding of why they have migrated, what
they do once they migrate, and the dynamics of their integration or lack thereof into their new
regions.
Given that religious institutions, religiously informed worldviews, and religious practice
are so often instrumental in these processes, the growing number of efforts to understand
religion's role among global migrants is not surprising. Such contributions have focused on the
concrete religious institutions of the migrants in their new homes, the immigration and
integration policies and attitudes of the host countries, the transnational links and flows that the
migrants maintain, and the influence of these diasporic communities on the global religions that
are usually involved. Not infrequently in such analyses, the sorts of transnational religious
organizations and movements just mentioned are salient topics, since the migrant communities
are often instrumental in bringing about, developing, and maintaining their global character.
Thus, for instance, we have consideration of Senegalese murīd presence in the United States,
Taiwanese Foguangshan establishments in Canada, Turkish Süleymanli communities in
Germany, Tablighi Jamaat mosques in Great Britain, Japanese Buddhist temples in Brazil, as
well as African or Latin American Pentecostal churches in North America and Europe. As this
illustrative list demonstrates, the bulk of this literature reflects the fact that it is people in
Western countries that carry out most of such globalization analyses. This imbalance needs yet
to be corrected. Nonetheless, the examples do demonstrate one of the important ways that
globalization perspectives are being applied to religion, and conversely how the analysis of
religion is coming to inform theories of globalization themselves. Moreover, the consideration of
the role of transnational religious institutions in the context of global migration already implicates
103 | P a g e
the second way that religion has been understood as a significant contributor to globalization
processes, and that is as a cultural, but especially political resource.
The role of religion in providing, broadly speaking, cultural resources in a global context
is not limited to the situation of migrants, however. Globalization, irrespective of which meaning
one favors, implies a kind of compression of space in which the upheaval and uprooting
characteristic of the migratory experience are the lot of a great many of the world's people,
whether they leave their homes or not. Parallel circumstances in Africa and Latin America can
serve to make this similarity clear. Both these continents have large regions and large
populations that are effectively excluded from the main globalized power structures, yet their
lives are nonetheless profoundly affected by them. Religion and religious institutions are
important resources for responding to the situation. In Latin America, for instance, one reason
104 | P a g e
for the rapid rise of Pentecostal Christian churches along with significant growth among Afro-
Brazilian religions like Candomblé and certain Roman Catholic movements is that these
institutional religious forms provide people with ways of understanding themselves and coping in
a world where their situation is changing and often precarious. They afford people narratives
with attendant life practices by which they can give themselves a meaningful and dignified place
in this world. Religion lends them a measure of power. Even more clearly, in sub-Saharan Africa
above all Christian and Islamic organizations, centers, networks, and movements offer large
numbers of people at least some access to an institution that actually functions reasonably to
their benefit. Although they are localized institutions and largely in the control of local people, a
far from insignificant part of the appeal of these religious establishments is that they have links
to and represent access to the wider globalized world. This has always been one of the
attractions of both Christianity and Islam; they have in effect been global religions for many
centuries. In today's world they continue to fill that role. The degree to which religions contribute
to the globalized circumstance as well as their character as globalized institutions becomes
evident in these cases.
As noted earlier, the one phenomenon that has attracted the most attention to the global
significance of religions is the proliferation of effective religio-political movements in almost all
regions of the world. From the rise of Hindu nationalism in India and the heavy political
involvement of certain Buddhist organizations in Japan to the many highly politicized Islamicist
movements in countries as diverse as Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria, politicized religion has been
a constant feature of the global world since at least the 1960s and in many respects well back
into the nineteenth century. Although the literature often analyzes them under the somewhat
tendentious label of fundamentalisms, two of their most basic features illustrate quite clearly
how relevant they are for theories of globalization and how they manifest the global nature of so
much contemporary religion.
The first is simply that they have arisen in so many different countries, and almost
always on the basis of the traditions and institutions of one of the globally recognized religions
such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, or Buddhism. Religions that are very
different from one another provide the resources for remarkably similar political movements.
The fact that one of the broadly homologous modern states is invariably implicated by such
movements is one reason for this similarity, but so is the explicitly global view that they typically
represent. Whether one takes the Islamic revolution in Iran, the religious Zionists of Israel, the
Christian Right in the United States, liberation theological movements in Latin America, Sōka
105 | P a g e
Gakkai in Japan, the Hindu nationalism of the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh in India, or a host
of other examples, most of these movements have justified themselves explicitly in global terms,
in addition to local or national ones. Even the Islamicist Taliban in Afghanistan, a movement
with hardly any global consciousness when it formed in the early 1990s, very much saw itself in
global terms by the time the American-led invasion ousted its government in 2001. What these
religio-political movements therefore also demonstrate once again is how localized religion does
not have to be globally extended, let alone positive toward the process of globalization, for it to
be globally relevant and therefore for globalization theories to be useful in understanding them.
A further theoretical approach to the role of religion and religions in globalization goes
beyond the idea that religious worldviews and institutions have participated in the process. It
focuses on the degree to which both modern institutional forms and modern understandings of
religion are themselves manifestations of globalization. With the centuries-long development of
what is today a globally extended society, religion came to inform what is today a globally
extended religious system consisting primarily of a series of mutually identified and broadly
recognized religions. These religions, in virtually every region of the globe, include Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, but a variable list of other religions receives almost as broad
legitimacy. Among these are Judaism, Sikhism, Daoism, and Jainism, followed again by another
set of less consistently or more regionally accepted ones such as Bahāʾī, Shintō, Candomblé,
African Traditional Religions (ATR), Scientology, and so forth. The idea that religion manifests
itself through a series of distinct religions may seem self-evident to many people, including a
great many of their adherents. Yet that notion is historically of quite recent provenance. In
Europe, where this understanding first gained purchase, it dates back at the earliest to the
seventeenth century. Elsewhere, such as in most regions of Asia, one must wait until at least
the nineteenth century. Its development and spread is entirely coterminous with the period most
theories identify as the prime centuries of globalization.
For this approach to religion and globalization, the construction of the religious system is
not only recent. It is also quite selective; not every possible religion, not everything possibly
religious counts. Symptomatic of both aspects are ongoing and recent debates among scholars
of religion concerning the meaning of the concept and its supposed Eurocentrism. One
perspective in these controversies has it that religion is at best an abstract term, useful for
106 | P a g e
certain kinds of analysis but not something real that is actually out there in the world. A prime
argument in support of this position is how the ideas of religion as a separate domain of life and
of the distinct religions are so demonstrably products of relatively recent history and so clearly
attendant upon and implicated in the concomitant spread of Christian and European influence
around the world. Another is that religions is empirically too narrow, as what is meant by them
does not cover nearly everything in our world that is manifestly religious using slightly different
notions of religion. Cogent as such arguments are, however, they point exactly to what the
theory under review states: a peculiar way of understanding religion and institutionally
embodying religion has developed in conjunction with and as an expression of the process of
globalization. It is accepted and contested right around the world. Similar to global capitalism
and the global system of sovereign states, the idea and its putting into practice exclude as well
as include. It also involves power and imposition, as do all human institutions. And just as
antiglobalization movements are themselves important manifestations of that which they
seemingly oppose, so too is contestation—whether academic, theological, or broadly political—
with reference to religion and the religions symptomatic of the social and cultural reality that it
contests.
Positive and unitary interpretations come in a number of variants. There are still a few
that see globalization as inevitably moving the world toward a future of ever greater material
prosperity, political democracy, and technological progress shared equitably among all peoples.
Far more numerous are those that share ideals such as equality and inclusion of all people in
the benefits of global society, perhaps under the rubric of universal human rights; but they
consider that at the very least human society has a long way to go before these are realizable,
and that certain features of globalization actually stand in the way of their realization. Several
107 | P a g e
perspectives grounded in institutionalized religion fall under this heading, for instance, the
already discussed Global Ethic Project led by Hans Küng, or the Justice, Peace and Integrity of
Creation program of the World Council of Churches. Typically, these and other examples
consider such values as equality among peoples, religions, classes, and genders to be
completely unquestionable. With equal self-evidence they exhibit strong ecological sensibility
and valorize the natural environment. Into this category also belong those social-scientific
approaches that stress the global preponderance of idealized models, especially models of
progressive economy, the nation-state, education, legal structures, mass media, art, and
culture.
Unitary but negative visions share most of these characteristics but reject the idea that
any of these developments can have a positive outcome. Sometimes these take world-rejecting
communitarian directions, advocating retreat from the globalized world. Ironically perhaps, it is
not uncommon for these visions to espouse precisely the sort of egalitarian values typical of the
positive versions but insist that this is only possible in a separated—and usually quite small-
scale—society. Some subdivisions of environmental and back-to-nature movements exemplify
this possibility. In many respects they are mirror images of globalized society, and in that
respect reflections of it. By contrast, there are those rejections of a unitary globalization that
insist on the unique validity of a particular culture or society. Some so-called fundamentalist
visions fall in this category, but it must be stressed how comparatively rare they are. The Afghan
Pashtun Taliban, in contrast to most Islamicist perspectives, may have been one of the few.
Pluralist visions of the world are variations on the unitary ones, putting greater stress on,
respectively, the difference or the irreconcilability of diverse worldviews. The clash of
civilizations model made famous by Samuel Huntington is representative of a negative version,
dependent as it is on the idea—not to say ideal—that quasi-essential civilizations with particular
characteristics actually exist logically prior to the globalized context in which mutually identifying
them might make sense. Pluralist positive perspectives, by contrast, are even more mere
variations on the unitary variety: the value of pluralist and egalitarian inclusion here is simply
more strongly emphasized.
108 | P a g e
world visions may in the end be one of the most powerful symptoms of the social reality which
the idea of globalization seeks to name.
109 | P a g e
Unit 9: THE GLOBAL CITY
Learning outcome:
A global city or world city are a concept which postulates that globalization can be
broken down in terms of strategic geographic locales that see global processes being created,
facilitated and enacted. The most complex of these entities is the "global city", whereby the
linkages binding a city have a direct and tangible effect on global affairs through more than just
socio-economic means, with influence in terms of culture, or politics. The terminology of "global
city", as opposed to megacity, is thought to have been first coined by Saskia Sassen in
reference to London, New York and Tokyo in her 1991 work The Global City.
General characteristics
It has been argued that global cities are those sharing the following characteristics:
• International, first-name familiarity; whereby a city is recognised without the need for a
political subdivision. For example. although there are numerous cities and other political
entities with the name Paris or variations on it, one would say "Paris", not "Paris,
France".
• Active influence and participation in international events and world affairs; for example,
New York City is home to the United Nations headquarters complex and consequently
contains a vast majority of the permanent missions to the UN.
• A fairly large population (the centre of a metropolitan area with a population of at least
one million, typically several million).
• A major international airport (for example, London Heathrow Airport) that serves as an
established hub for several international airlines.
110 | P a g e
• An advanced transportation system that includes several freeways and/or a large mass
transit network offering multiple modes of transportation ( rapid transit, light rail, regional
rail, ferry, or bus).
• In the West, several international cultures and communities (such as a Chinatown, a
Little Italy, or other immigrant communities). In other parts of the world, cities which
attract large foreign businesses and related expatriate communities; for example,
Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Moscow.
• International financial institutions, law firms, corporate headquarters (especially
conglomerates), and stock exchanges (for example the London Stock Exchange, the
New York Stock Exchange or the Tokyo Stock Exchange) that have influence over the
world economy.
• An advanced communications infrastructure on which modern trans-national
corporations rely, such as fiberoptics, Wi-Fi networks, cellular phone services, and other
high-speed lines of communications.
• World-renowned cultural institutions, such as museums and universities.
• A lively cultural scene, including film festivals (for example the Toronto International Film
Festival), premieres, a thriving music or theatre scene (for example, West End theatre
and Broadway); an orchestra, an opera company, art galleries, and street performers.
• Several powerful and influential media outlets with an international reach, such as the
BBC, Associated Press, Reuters, The New York Times, The Times, or Agence France-
Presse.
• A strong sporting community, including major sports facilities, home teams in major
league sports, and the ability and historical experience to host international sporting
events such as the Olympic Games, Football World Cup, or Grand Slam tennis events.
To some, London, New York City, Paris, and Tokyo have been traditionally considered
the 'big four' world cities – not coincidentally, they also serve as symbols of global capitalism.
However, many people have their own personal lists, and any two lists are likely to differ based
on cultural background, values, and experience.
In certain countries, the rise of suburbia and the ongoing migration of manufacturing jobs
to these countries has led to significant urban decay. Therefore, to boost urban regeneration,
tourism, and revenue, the goal of building a "world-class" city has recently become an
obsession with the governments of some mid-size cities and their constituents.
111 | P a g e
The phenomenon of world-city building has also been observed in Buenos Aires,
Santiago, Frankfurt, Montréal, Sydney, Mexico City and Toronto: each of these cities has
emerged as large and influential.
Note that this roster generally denotes cities in which there are offices of certain
multinational companies providing financial and consulting services rather than other cultural,
political, and economic centres. There is a schematic map of GaWC cities at their website.
112 | P a g e
Evidence of world city formation
Strong evidence
• 3 points: Athens, Auckland, Dublin, Helsinki, Luxembourg, Lyon, Mumbai, New Delhi,
Philadelphia, Rio de Janeiro, Tel Aviv, Vienna
Some evidence
• 2 points: Abu Dhabi, Almaty, Birmingham (UK), Bogotá, Bratislava, Brisbane, Bucharest,
Cairo, Cleveland, Cologne, Detroit, Dubai, Ho Chi Minh City, Kiev, Lima, Lisbon,
Manchester, Montevideo, Oslo, Riyadh, Rotterdam, Seattle, Strasbourg, Stuttgart, The
Hague, Vancouver
Minimal evidence
Global Cities
Well-rounded global cities
World Cities
113 | P a g e
2. Social: Manila, Nairobi, Ottawa.
Other criteria
The GaWC list is based on specific criteria and, thus, may not include other cities of
global significance or elsewhere on the spectrum. For example, cities with the following:
114 | P a g e
5. Based on quality of life or city development
6. Based on costs of living
a. Based on personal wealth; e.g., number of billionaires
7. Significant transport infrastructure:
a. Airports with significant passenger traffic or cargo movements
b. Extensive and popular mass transit systems
c. Prominent rail usage
d. Road vehicle usage
e. Major seaports
8. Significant technological capabilities/infrastructure:
a. Prominent skylines/skyscrapers
9. Significant institutions:
a. Educational institutions; e.g., universities, international student attendance
b. Research facilities
c. Health facilities; e.g. hospitals, medical laboratories
10. Sites of pilgrimage for world religions
11. Hosting headquarters for international organizations
12. Cities containing UNESCO World Heritage Sites of historical and cultural significance
a. High endowments of cultural facilities:
b. Notable museums and galleries
c. Notable opera
d. Notable orchestras
e. Notable film centers and film festivals
f. Notable theatre centers
g. Sites of major international sports events; e.g., Olympic Games sites
13. Tourism throughput:
a. Visitors
b. Economy
c. Events
14. Site or subject in Arts and Media
a. TV,Film,Video-Games,Music
b. Literature,Magazines,Articles,Documentary
c. Historic Reference,Showcase
115 | P a g e
Unit 10: GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHY
Learning outcome:
Explain the significance of changes in world population with reference to population pyramids,
distribution, density, and demographic transition models
In 1820 there were about one billion humans living on earth. In 2016 there were 7.33
billion. Today we are close to 7.5 billion. According to recent estimates, today's population is
about to 6.9% of the total number of people ever born.This chart shows the evolution of global
116 | P a g e
population by regions. With the option 'Relative' you can see the changing shares of population
across regions.
This map shows where people live around the world. It plots population per square kilometre.
117 | P a g e
• In order to study how the world population changes over time, it is useful to consider the
rate of change rather than focusing only on the total population level.
• This chart shows annual population growth rates, superimposed over total world
population for the period 1750-2010, plus UN projections up to 2100.
In 1962 annual population growth rates peaked, and since then, they have been going
down.
• According to these UN projections, growth rates are likely going to continue decreasing
through the century.
• This means that while the world population quadrupled in the 20th century, it will not
double in the 21st century.
Human population is not currently growing exponentially.
The number of children in the world will soon stop increasing and this will lead to new economic
opportunities
Why is it usually the poorer countries who have so many kids and hence high population
growth?
118 | P a g e
• Low status of women – husbands can have their way = kids
• Lack of contraception and education about contraception
• Religious opposition to contraception
• Lack of pension plans for old people (kids become the pension plan)
Birth Rate (Fertility): The percentage of babies being born in a country relative to its population
(annual) (Total live births / Total population) x1000 = Birth Rate
Death Rate (Mortality): The percentage of people who die relative to the country’s population
(annual) (Total deaths / Total population) x1000 = Death Rate
Why are people moving all over the place? These are called Push-Pull Factors. Can you think of
any?
SO, there are two things that affect population: Fertility/Mortality rates, and Migration Rates.
Population Growth rate = Rate of natural increase + net migration rate Doubling Time: The
amount of time it takes for a country’s population to double -Generally known as the Rule of 70:
70 / Population Growth Rate = doubling time.
The Demographic Transition Model! • This model predicts that, as a country develops, high birth
rates and high death rates will fall. • This model also predicts that countries will pass through
periods of industrialization and urbanization on the way to reduced birth and death rates. • We
will examine each individual stage in the demographic transition model now. Please hold your
applause.
Stage One Stage one is characterized by high birth rates and high fluctuating death rates
resulting in small population growth. Plagues, diseases and poor nutrition keep mortality high.
Stage Two • Stage two is characterized by improved health care, sanitation and increased food
supplies leading to a rapid fall in death rates. Birth rates are still high, so there is a rapid
increase in population numbers.
119 | P a g e
Stage Three • Stage three is characterized by a decreased growth rate of a population. Birth
rates begin to fall. Industrialization, urbanization and improved living standards lead to less
desire for large families.
Stage Four • Stage four is characterized by the completion of the transition to a low growth rate
with low birth and death rates. The birth rate may fluctuate in special circumstances, such as in
the post-war “baby-boom.”
Stage Five • Stage five is characterized by a lower birth than death rate. This is happening in
some European countries and in Japan. It is not known if this trend will extend to other regions.
Population Density
(Figure 14) Population Density
Population Density
• The number of people that live in a certain area, for example, per square km. India’s
population density is high at 281 people per square km while Canada’s is quite low at
2.8 people per square km.
• Bangladesh pop dens = 1000 +.
• Downtown Vancouver pop density = 20000 +
120 | P a g e
(Figure 15) Population Distribution The pattern of where people live in an area. Closely related
to population density.
• Early expanding
• Expanding
• Stable
• Contracting
121 | P a g e
(Figure 17) Type of population pyramids
Early Expanding
• Wide base (lots of young children) and a very narrow top (few old people). •Very high
birth rate and death rate (short life expectancy).
• Reasons could include poor health care, lack of family planning, need for children as
workers.
• Corresponds to stage 1 – 2 of DTM
Expanding
• Slightly narrower base than early expanding and a little wider in the middle and older
ages.
• Birth rate still high but decreasing slightly and death rate decreasing.
• Reasons for the change from early expanding could include better medical care,
improved diet and better hygiene.
• Roughly corresponds with stage three of the demographic transition model.
Stable:
122 | P a g e
• Birth rate falls while death rate also falls and they are in balance
• Reasons could include better health care, improved family planning, better economic
conditions.
• Roughly corresponds with stage 4 of the demographic transition model
Contracting:
• Bottom part of pyramid narrower than the middle and continually getting narrower.
• Birth rate continues to fall while the death rate continues to decrease.
• Reasons could include more women working, high cost of child rearing, small families
encouraged by the state.
• Examples: Germany/ Japan.
• Roughly corresponds with stage 5 of the demographic transition model.
123 | P a g e
Unit 11: GLOBAL MIGRATION
Learning outcome:
- Analyze the political, economic, cultural and social factors underlying the global
movements of people
- Display first-hand knowledge of the experiences of OFWs
- Write a research paper proposal with proper citation
- Critique research proposals of classmates
MIGRATION
Migration – the temporary or permanent movement of people from one place to another
The United Nations defines migration as the movement of a person or persons from one place
to another, involving a permanent move of home for over 1 year
124 | P a g e
Forms of Migration
- Forced migration includes refugees, asylum seekers and people forced to move
due to external factors
- Family members - people sharing family ties joining people who have already
entered an immigration country
- Return migrants - people who return to their countries of origin after a period in
another country
1. Legal migrants
2. Illegal migrants
3. Irregular migrants
4. Refugees
5. Labor migration
Legal Migrants - migrants that legally enter into the country, have a valid immigrant visa and
proper documentation
Illegal migrant – a person who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal
status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe a country’s
admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country
Irregular migration - The people who enter or remain in a country of which they are not a
citizen in breach of national laws. The IMO estimates that irregular immigrants account for one-
third to one-half of new entrants into developed countries, marking an increase of 20 per cent
over the past ten years
Labor migration - An international migrant worker is defined by the 1990 United Nations (UN)
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.
125 | P a g e
Types of Labor Migration
• Temporary labor migrants (also known as guest workers or overseas contract
workers): People who migrate for a limited period of time in order to take up
employment and send money home.
• Highly skilled and business migrants: People with qualifications as managers,
executives, professionals, technicians or similar, who move within the internal labour
markets of trans- national corporations and international organizations, or who seek
employment through international labour markets for scarce skills. Many countries
welcome such migrants and have special 'skilled and business migration' programs
to encourage them to come.
Labor: - A voluntary form of migration. E.g. skilled international migration to global cities like
London or Dubai.
Rural –Urban: - Both forced and voluntary migration predominantly in developing nations. But
also, in developed nations with drought in Australia.
Voluntary: - Historically occurred as territorial expansion (colonizers). Now occurs for economic
(employment)/social (to join family or communities)/better climate.
Involuntary: - All forms of push factors resulting in refugees. Asylum Seeker: A person who
has a right to work and live in a country for a short time. Refugee: A person who has left their
home in a country where they feel unsafe because of persecution or war, and has applied to
stay in another country where they feel safe. If they are allowed to stay, they become a refugee.
Internal: - Simply refers to rural urban migration/ push and pull factors at work within a nation.
Internal Migration
This is migration within a country. explain what the following types of internal migration are.
• Rural to Urban
• Urban to Rural
• Inter-urban
126 | P a g e
• Intra-urban
• Transmigration
Types of Migration
There are two key migration term that you need to learn
Push factors
127 | P a g e
• High population pressure
• Economic hardship
• Poor quality of life
• Persecution
• Forced out – ethnic cleansing
• No jobs
• Starvation and disasters
• Marriage
• Harsh environment
Pull factors
People migrate for many different reasons. These reasons can be classified as either economic,
social, political or environmental:
128 | P a g e
• Communications and Transport- growing ease of learning about and moving to a
destination
• But the major reason, by general consensus, is ECONOMIC
• Push from subsistence agriculture to higher wages
• Potential reverse migration toward rural areas as result of high unemployment brought
about by lack of employment
Migrant Characteristics
Female migration of two types: ‘associational’ migration following ‘primary’ male migrant and
‘unattached females’
Education- clear association between migration and educational attainment: more education >
greater propensity to migrate
• The impact of labor migration varies from country to country. Economic migration can
have different effects resulting from the volume, composition, and characteristics of the
migratory flows as well as the context in which the flows take place.
• For countries of origin, in addition to the possibility of providing some relief from
unemployment and absorbing an increase in the labor force, it can provide a form of
developmental support, especially through remittances, transfer of know-how, and
creation of business and trade networks
• For receiving countries facing labor shortages, immigration can alleviate labor scarcity,
facilitate occupational mobility, and add to the human capital stock of the receiving
countries
Planned Migration
Causes
129 | P a g e
• plans to develop undeveloped areas
Effects
Political Problems
• The migration has only had a small impact because it moves far fewer people that the
population increase.
• The administration is inefficient
• The cost to the government is high
• The programs rely on aid from abroad e.g. from the World Bank
Socio-Economic Problem
• Conflict between the traditional farmers and newcomers who were given money and
land
• Productivity is low, leaving some farmers still needing support after a year.
• Some native tribes have lost land and been forced to moved other areas.
Living conditions in refugee camps are at best subsistence and nothing more. They can become
permanent features.
Migration Difficulties
• physical barriers
• immigration policies
• Lack of capital
• Travel costs
• Illiteracy
• Military service
• Language
• Family pressures
130 | P a g e
Migration is Global
• ! In 2005, 191 million people were counted as living outside the country of their birth
• ! The number of migrants worldwide has doubled since World War II
• ! If they lived in the same place, international migrants would form the 5th most populous
country in the world
Trends in Migration
1. During colonial period (British period) millions of Indians laborer were sent to countries
such as Mauritius, Caribbean islands, Fiji and South Africa by British from Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar to work as plantation workers
2. In the 20th century semi-skilled Indians migrated to the neighboring countries such as
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and African countries as artisans,
traders and factory workers
3. In recent times, professionals like doctors, engineers, software engineers, management
consultants, financial experts, media persons, migrated to countries such management
consultants, financial experts, media persons, migrated to countries such as USA,
Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Germany, etc. These professionals are highly
educated, the highest paid
• Life-time migrant: OR (place of birth) if the place of birth is different from the place of
enumeration. (30% of total population).
• Migrant by place of last residence OR (Place of residence): if the place of last residence
is different from the place of enumeration. (31% of total pop.)
131 | P a g e
1. Maharashtra, Delhi, Gujarat and Haryana have largest numbers of net in-migrants.
(These states attract migrants from other states).
2. Largest numbers of out-migrants are from states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
3. Among the urban agglomeration (UA), Greater Mumbai received the higher number of
in-migrants.
4. Intra-state in-migrants are largest in Greater Mumbai.
STREAMS OF MIGRATION
132 | P a g e
Four streams are identified under the internal migration:
1. Intra-state migrants are larger than inter-state migrants, i.e. people prefer to migrate
within the state.
2. Intra-state migration is dominated by female migrants whereas inter-state migration is
dominated by male migrants.
3. Female migrates due to the reasons of marriage whereas male migrates due to the
economic reasons (iv) Females prefer short distance rural to rural migration whereas
male migrate to long distance rural to urban regions
CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION
Economic consequences: -
1. Positive consequences:
(a) The remittance (payments) sent by migrants to their homes help in the growth of
economy of the region. This money is mainly used by the family for repayment of debts,
medical treatment, marriages, children’s education, purchasing agricultural inputs,
construction of houses, etc.
(b) Similarly, remittances from the international Indian migrants are one of the major
sources of foreign exchange in India.
(c) States such as Punjab, Kerala and Tamil Nadu receive very large amount of money from
their international migrants. iv. Migration of people from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, to the rural
areas of Punjab, Haryana, has resulted in the success of green revolution.
2. Negative consequences:
(a) Unregulated migration to the metropolitan cities of India has caused overcrowding.
(b) Development of slums in industrially developed states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat,
and Delhi are the result of unregulated migration.
(c) The under-development gets even worse due to out migration of skilled people
Economic consequences
133 | P a g e
• Brain drains
• Green revolution in Punjab
• overcrowding
• Slums and squatters
Demographic consequences
1. Positive consequences:
a. Migration leads to the redistribution of the population within a country.
b. It results in balanced distribution of people according to resources.
c. Rural-urban migration is one of the important factors contributing to the
population growth of cities.
2. Negative consequences:
a. It results in imbalances in sex composition due to selective male or female
migration. Large cities have unfavorable sex ratio as compared to rural areas due
to high male immigration.
b. Rural areas face shortage of skilled people because most of skilled and
semiskilled people migrate to urban areas.
Social consequences
1. Positive consequences:
a. Migrants act as agents of social change. The new ideas related to new
technologies, family planning, girl’s education, etc. get spread from urban to rural
areas through them.
b. Migration also leads to intermixing of people from diverse cultures and results in
the evolution of composite culture.
c. The mind set of people changes. They start thinking broadly and the narrow
views changes.
2. Negative consequences:
a. It also causes anonymity, which creates social vacuum and sense of dejection
among individuals.
b. Continued feeling of dejection may motivate people to fall in the trap of antisocial
activities like crime and drug abuse.
134 | P a g e
c. Migration affects the women more. In the rural areas, male selective out
migration leaving their wives behind puts extra physical as well mental pressure
on the women which increases their vulnerability.
Environmental consequences
135 | P a g e
Unit 12: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Learning outcome:
What is Sustainability?
What is Development?
• Development is the accumulation of human capital and its effective investment in the
progress of an economy.
• Development entails improvement in the quality as well as quantity of life.
Sustainable Development-
Definition
"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present, without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. “‘Our common future’
1987
Sustainable Development
136 | P a g e
(Figure 19) The Harmonious Integration
Economy Society
Environmental
Differences?
History
History 1800 - The Industrial Revolution
• Since the Industrial Revolution, the government’s aim was about produce as much as
possible
• There were no concerns or knowledge about over pollution and its consequences
137 | P a g e
• Non-governmental Organization (NGO)
• Devoted to the study of the “world problematique”
• Multidisciplinary and long-term perspective - Brought the ecological limits to economic
and demographic growth to the door of world opinion
• Published the Limits to Growth
• For the first-time issues of an ecological nature were added to the roster of international
concerns
• Declaration of principles and action plan to fight pollution
• First Definition of Sustainable Development "Development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
History 1992 - United Nations Conference on Environment and Development “Earth Summit”
138 | P a g e
• Systematic scrutiny of patterns of production - Alternative sources of energy to replace
the use of fossil fuels which are linked to global climate change
• New reliance on public transportation
• The growing scarcity of water - Agreement on the Climate Change Convention - Agenda
21
• Kyoto Protocol
• No binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions - Limits of emissions for developed
countries
• Entered into force in 2005 - 192 States signed the protocol
139 | P a g e
• Air pollution kills around 3 million people mostly in poor countries
• Animal and Plant species are under threat of extinction
• Between 100 and 1000 species become extinct each year
Obstacles
The United Nations has taken sustainable development very seriously and it has established
specialist units to deal with the issue and to identify opportunities and activities to support this
development theory
The challenge now is to mainstream sustainable development thinking and to find sensible and
simple solutions to our challenges
140 | P a g e
(Figure 20) The beauty about sustainable development is that it really is very simple and people
have been practicing it for centuries Where are we now?
People
Environment Economy
141 | P a g e
Socio-Cultural • Promoting resource access and upholding property rights • Promoting
environmental awareness, inculcating environment ethics and supporting environment
management action
142 | P a g e
Unit 13: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
Learning outcome:
Access to quality, nutritious food is fundamental to human existence. Secure access to food can
produce wide ranging positive impacts, including:
NIFA’S IMPACT
NIFA supports global efforts to strengthen agricultural production and end hunger by:
• Helping countries to improve their agricultural markets and increase food production
• Funding research to heighten disease resistance in beans and increase crop production
• Joining with USDA and other federal agencies on global initiatives intended to break the
cycle of hunger and poverty
• Developing and testing new food products designed to improve the nutritional value of
the food aid that is delivered overseas
143 | P a g e
• Strengthening developing countries’ extension systems
• Helping developing countries improve their agricultural economies
Food Security: having viable access to sufficient quantities of nutritious and affordable food
Nearly a billion people across the world experience the effects of food insecurity. According to
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), food security means having,
at all times, both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet dietary needs
for a productive and healthy life. Put more simply, families are able to afford and obtain
enough nutritious food. A family is food secure when its members do not live in hunger or fear
of hunger. Both in the United States and in developing nations, food insecurity is often linked to
poverty. Shifts in the global economy, including rises in global food and oil prices, can affect
food security throughout the world, with especially severe effects in low-income countries.
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines three main aspects of food security. The first is
food availability, having a sufficient supply of food available on a consistent basis. This food
can be either locally produced or imported from other places. In some cases, communities may
be unable to produce their own food locally because of inappropriate agricultural technologies or
practices; lack of natural resources or productive land; climate constraints; emergency situations
like natural disasters; or health constraints, such as HIV/AIDS, that prevent people from
engaging in labor. Communities may be unable to import food from other places because of
issues like lack of foreign exchange, political unrest, or lack of transportation.
The second aspect of food security is food access, having sufficient resources to obtain
appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Even when a sufficient supply of food exists to feed
everyone, food may not always be accessible to everyone. People need to have sufficient
incomes and resources in order to obtain food. There are a number of factors that can affect a
person's economic access to food, including lack of job opportunities that can provide sufficient
income, or lack of training or business knowledge for success with income generating activities.
The final aspect of food security is known as food utilization, or consuming a nutritious
diet. This means that people make appropriate use of food, based on knowledge of basic
nutrition and care, and have access to water and sanitation for preparing food and maintaining
proper hygiene. Nutrition education can be an important part of improving food utilization-
making sure people are aware of the variety of foods their bodies need to maintain good health.
In many parts of the world experiencing food insecurity, people may consume sufficient
144 | P a g e
quantities of starchy staple foods like potatoes, rice, maize, and cassava, but insufficient
quantities of protein, oils, dairy, fruits and vegetables that make up a balanced diet. Changing
this may not only require nutrition education, but also increasing food availability through
improved agricultural practices and resources.
Disease prevention and management, including proper sanitation and hygiene practices, are
also important for proper food utilization. Undernourished human bodies are more susceptible to
illnesses like diarrheal disease and pneumonia. But with proper nutrition, sanitation, and
hygiene, many diseases-especially those caused by food and waterborne contaminants-are less
likely to occur.
Food security is an issue both globally and at home in the United States. According to recent
data from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), approximately 14.7% of U.S.
households experience low or very low food security. This equates to nearly 50 million people in
the United States, including about 17 million children. In response to food insecurity, the U.S.
government offers food assistance to low income families through the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP). This allows provides families with electronic benefits they can use
like a debit card to purchase breads, cereals, fruits, vegetables, meat, and dairy products from
approved stores. The federal government also funds school breakfast and lunch programs.
Some community-based organizations, such as food banks, help address families' immediate
food needs, while others work to address the root causes of food insecurity, improve local
access to nutritious food, and provide community-based nutrition education.
Looking at food security globally, the number of people experiencing food insecurity in the
United States and other developed nations makes up only about two percent of the global total.
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that 925 million people in
the world are undernourished. The largest percentage of undernourished people live in Asia and
the Pacific Islands, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa. Fortunately, there is enough food in the
world today for everyone to have the nourishment they need for a healthy and productive life. A
key factor in addressing the world's food security challenges is improving the availability,
access, and utilization of food across global communities.
Peace Corps Volunteers work with communities in many different capacities to address food
security challenges. The support communities in developing irrigation systems to increase
agricultural yields, in developing sustainable new food sources through practices like fish
farming, and in helping communities improve the processing and marketing of their food
145 | P a g e
products. They also provide assistance with school garden projects, agricultural micro-
enterprises, and nutrition education initiatives. Explore the stories on Paul D. Coverdell World
Wise Schools Program’s Global Issues page to learn more about how Peace Corps Volunteers'
work in education, agriculture, income generation, health and nutrition is helping communities
increase their food security.
Food access: Refers to the affordability and allocation of food, as well as the preferences of
individuals and households.
Food availability: Relates to the supply of food through production, distribution, and exchange.
Global Water Crisis - Water table reserves are falling in many countries (including Northern
China, the US, and India) due to widespread over-pumping and irrigation.
Climate Change - Rising global temperatures are beginning to have a ripple effect on crop
yields, forest resources, water supplies and altering the balance of nature.
Land Degradation - Intensive farming leads to a vicious cycle of exhaustion of soil fertility and
decline of agricultural yields.
Greedy Land Deals - Corporations and Governments buying rights to millions of acres of
agricultural land in developing countries to secure their own long-term food supplies.
Far from focusing on the needs of the poor in developing countries, GM crop development is
driven by the commercial interests of US and European companies. The major GM crops
146 | P a g e
currently grown - soya, oilseed rape, cotton and maize - are designed to support the food and
textile industries of the developed world. There is currently little GM research and development
by private companies on staple food crops vital to developing countries.
"Terminator" seeds are modified to produce sterile seeds. This prevents farmers from saving
seeds to plant the following season. 1.4 billion people, mainly poor farmers in developing
countries, depend on saved seed. Farmers are then forced to buy new seeds every year from
the biotech companies. Despite universal condemnation from farmers' movements all over the
world, the technology is still being developed today.
Food security is not just a poverty issue; it is a much larger issue that involves the whole food
system and affects every one of us in some way. Issues such as whether households get
enough food, how it is distributed within the household and whether that food fulfills the nutrition
needs of all members of the household show that food security is clearly linked to health.
Global Food Security must exist to meet the challenge of providing the world's growing
population with a sustainable, secure supply of good quality food.
147 | P a g e
Major Challenges in Consumption
• Increasing population- sheer number of people demanding food is increasing
• Growing prosperity-more meat items in the domestic menu which needs more food
grains
• Changing food habits-urbanization needs more processed food which consumes more
food
• Wastages-over eating, throwing away of food cooked more than the needs and food
getting expired in the domestic fridges/chain stores
• Poor commitment of the ruling elite to ensure this fundamental right through proper
legislation
• Not providing good governance whereby people have freedom to get food grains without
any hassle
• Not improving overall law and order and security situation in the country for peaceful
movement of the food grains and its convenient availability
• Not making special arrangements for the provision of food grains in conflict/disaster
prone areas
148 | P a g e
• Increase production through vertical expansion-increase the total factors productivity by
greater awareness and use of good agricultural practices, availability of quality inputs at
affordable prices
• Reduce production and post production losses and wastages by encouraging judicious
use of chemicals and improved processing facilities
• Establish food god owns at convenient places to respond to the needs of vulnerable
groups as and when needed
• Establish adequate system to forecast shortages and timely import of food grains
• Improve financial access of the people to food through employment creation, skill
development and job clearance information networks
• Provide income support to the extremely poor by creating social safety nets
• Improve physical access of the people to food by facilitating free movement of food
grains throughout the country
• Improve general health care by allocating more resources to promotive and preventive
healthcare which is more cost effective and helpful in the developing countries than the
curative
• Population planning for arresting its rapid growth with particular attention to mother and
child healthcare
• Pay special attention to water borne diseases which are widespread but can be
controlled with dedicated efforts
• Food fortification to make it healthy and absorption friendly
• Each country to have sufficient buffer stocks available for emergency in different parts to
ensure their easy availability in emergency situation
• Code of conduct at UNO level not to impose restrictions on the exports of food by the
food exporting countries in times of crises which aggravate the situation more than the
actual crises
• Timely information about the global trends in stocks and production and early warning in
case of looming food shortages must be available
149 | P a g e
• In time import of food grains whenever a country or a region’s stocks appear to fall below
the danger threshold
150 | P a g e
Unit 14: GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
Learning outcome:
Within the educational system, the concept of global citizenship education (GCED) is beginning
to supersede or overarch movements such as multicultural education, peace education, human
rights education, Education for Sustainable Development, and international education.
Additionally, GCED rapidly incorporates references to the aforementioned movements. The
concept of global citizenship has been linked with awards offered for helping humanity.
Teachers are being given the responsibility of being social change agents. Audrey Osler,
director of the Centre for Citizenship and Human Rights Education, the University of Leeds,
affirms that "Education for living together in an interdependent world is not an optional extra, but
an essential foundation".
With GCED gaining attention, scholars are investigating the field and developing
perspectives. The following are a few of the more common perspectives:
• Critical and transformative perspective. Citizenship is defined by being a member with rights
and responsibilities. Therefore, GCED must encourage active involvement. GCED can be
taught from a critical and transformative perspective, whereby students are thinking, feeling,
and doing. In this approach, GCED requires students to be politically critical and personally
transformative. Teachers provide social issues in a neutral and grade-appropriate way for
students to understand, grapple with, and do something about.[9]
• World mindedness. Graham Pike and David Selby view GCED as having two strands. World
mindedness, the first strand, refers to understanding the world as one unified system and a
responsibility to view the interests of individual nations with the overall needs of the planet in
mind. The second strand, Child-centeredness, is a pedagogical approach that encourages
students to explore and discover on their own and addresses each learner as an individual
with inimitable beliefs, experiences, and talents.
151 | P a g e
• Holistic Understanding. The Holistic Understanding perspective was founded by Merry
Merryfield, focusing on understanding the self in relation to a global community. This
perspective follows a curriculum that attends to human values and beliefs, global systems,
issues, history, cross-cultural understandings, and the development of analytical and
evaluative skills.
Philosophy
Global citizenship, in some contexts, may refer to a brand of ethics or political philosophy in
which it is proposed that the core social, political, economic, and environmental realities of the
world today should be addressed at all levels—by individuals, civil society organizations,
communities, and nation states—through a global lens. It refers to a broad, culturally and
environmentally inclusive worldview that accepts the fundamental interconnectedness of all
things.
Political, geographic borders become irrelevant and solutions to today's challenges are seen to
be beyond the narrow vision of national interests. Proponents of this philosophy often point to
Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412 B.C.) as an example, given his reported declaration that "I am a
citizen of the world (κοσμοπολίτης, cosmopolites)" in response to a question about his place of
origin. A Tamil term, Yadhum oore yaavarum kelir, has the meaning of "the world is one family".
The statement is not just about peace and harmony among the societies in the world, but also
about a truth that somehow the whole world has to live together like a family.
Psychological studies
Global pollsters and psychologists have studied individual differences in the sense of global
citizenship. Beginning in 2005, the World Values Survey (WVS), administered across almost
100 countries, included the statement, "I see myself as a world citizen". In the WVS Wave 6,
conducted from 2010 to 2014, across the globe 29.5% "strongly agreed" and another 41%
"agreed" with this statement. However, there were wide national variations, as 71% of citizens
of Qatar, 21% of U.S. citizens, 16% of Chinese, and just 11% of Palestinians "strongly agreed."
Interpreting these differences is difficult, however, as survey methods varied for different
countries, and the connotations of "world citizen" differ in different languages and cultures.
For smaller studies, several multi-item scales have been developed, including Sam McFarland
and colleagues' Identification with All Humanity scale (e.g., "How much do you identify with (that
152 | P a g e
is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) . . . all humans everywhere?”), Anna
Malsch and Alan Omoto's Psychological Sense of Global Community (e.g., "I feel a sense of
connection to people all over the world, even if I don’t know them personally"), Gerhard Reese
and colleagues' Global Social Identity scale (e.g. "I feel strongly connected to the world
community as a whole"),[16] and Stephen Reysen and Katzarska-Miller's global citizenship
identification scale (e.g., "I strongly identify with global citizens"). These measures are strongly
related to one another, but they are not fully identical.
Studies of the psychological roots of global citizenship have found that persons high in global
citizenship are also high on the personality traits of openness to experience and agreeableness
from the Big Five personality traits and high in empathy and caring. Oppositely, the authoritarian
personality, the social dominance orientation, and psychopathy are all associated with less
global human identification. Some of these traits are influenced by heredity as well as by early
experiences, which, in turn, likely influence individuals' receptiveness to global human
identification.
Research has found that those who are high in global human identification are less prejudiced
toward many groups, care more about international human rights, worldwide inequality, global
poverty and human suffering. They attend more actively to global concerns, value the lives of all
human beings more equally, and give more in time and money to international humanitarian
causes. They tend to be more politically liberal on both domestic and international issues. They
want their countries to do more to alleviate global suffering.
153 | P a g e
Human rights
The lack of a universally recognized world body can put the initiative upon global citizens
themselves to create rights and obligations. Rights and obligations as they arose at the
formation of nation-states (e.g. the right to vote and obligation to serve in time of war) are being
expanded. Thus, new concepts that accord certain "human rights" which arose in the 20th
century are increasingly being universalized across nations and governments. This is the result
of many factors, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in
1948, the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust and growing sentiments towards
legitimizing marginalized peoples (e.g., pre-industrialized peoples found in the jungles of Brazil
and Borneo). Couple this with growing awareness of our impact on the environment, and there
is the rising feeling that citizen rights may extend to include the right to dignity and self-
determination. If national citizenship does not foster these new rights, then global citizenship
may seem more accessible.
Global citizenship advocates may confer specific rights and obligations of human beings
trapped in conflicts, those incarcerated as part of ethnic cleansing, and pre-industrialized tribes
newly discovered by scientists living in the depths of dense jungle
UN General Assembly
Article 1 states that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood."
Article 2 states that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no
distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”
Article states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country."
As evidence in today's modern world, events such as the Trial of Saddam Hussein have proven
what British jurist A. V. Dicey said in 1885, when he popularized the phrase "rule of law" in
1885.[38] Dicey emphasized three aspects of the rule of law:
154 | P a g e
1. No one can be punished or made to suffer except for a breach of law proved in an
ordinary court.
2. No one is above the law and everyone is equal before the law regardless of social,
economic, or political status.
3. The rule of law includes the results of judicial decisions determining the rights of private
persons.
US Declaration of Independence
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;
"Global citizenship in the United States" was a term used by former U.S. President Barack
Obama in 2008 in a speech in Berlin
World citizen
In general, a world citizen is a person who places global citizenship above any nationalistic or
local identities and relationships. An early expression of this value is found in Diogenes of
Sinope (c. 412 B.C.; mentioned above), a Cynic philosopher in Ancient Greece. Of Diogenes it
is said: "Asked where he came from, he answered: 'I am a citizen of the world (kosmopolitês)'".
This was a ground-breaking concept because the broadest basis of social identity in Greece at
that time was either the individual city-state or the Greeks (Hellenes) as a group. The Tamil poet
Kaniyan Poongundran wrote in Purananuru, "To us all towns are one, all men our kin." In later
years, political philosopher Thomas Paine would declare, "my country is the world, and my
religion is to do good." Today, the increase in worldwide globalization has led to the formation of
a "world citizen" social movement under a proposed world government. In a non-political
definition, it has been suggested that a world citizen may provide value to society by using
knowledge acquired across cultural contexts. Many people also consider themselves world
citizens, as they feel at home wherever they may go.
155 | P a g e