Russian Foreign Policy

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA: FROM TSARS TO PUTIN
1
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by
Prof. Dr. ŞABAN HALİS ÇALIŞ
Dr. VANESSA TINKER
Editors
Prof. Dr. ŞABAN HALİS ÇALIŞ
Dr. VANESSA TINKER
ERI Books: 29
ISBN 978-601-7805-36-4
This edition is published by Eurasian Research Institute Almali

Avdani, Mametova 48, 050004, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Phone: +7 (727) 279 97 94 Fax: +7 (727) 279 24 26

www.eurasian-research.org • e-mail: [email protected]
© Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University

Eurasian Research Institute (ERI), 2022 (print and electronic)
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this

book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or
introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or
by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording
or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Distributed by Eurasian Research Institute Almali Avdani,
Mametova 48, 050004, Almaty, Kazakhstan
Typeset by Delux Printed and bound in Kazakhstan, Almaty
1st Edition: December 2022, Almaty
The views expressed in the analyses are the authors’ own and do
not necessarily reflect the Institute’s editorial policy.
CONTENTS
Preface 6
Acknowledgement 7
1. The Foreign Policy of Russia:

From Tsars to Putin 9
Prof. Dr. Şaban Halis Çalış
2. Russians and Russia in World Politics:

Historical Background 27
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sezgin Kaya
3. Material and Ideational Foundations of Russian

Foreign Policy 65
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vakur Sümer
4. The Making of Russian Foreign Policy 103

Prof. Dr. İrfan Kaya Ülger
5. The Russian Federation’s Relations 135

with Great Powers
Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu
6. Russia in International Organizations 163

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Demet Şefika Mangır
Research Assist. Ediliia Abdykadyrova
7. Russia and Global Problems 199

Assist. Prof. Dr. Arif Behiç Özcan
Upagul Rakhmanova
8. Russia and Türkiye:

Continuity and Change in Relations 235
Dr. Harun Semercioğlu
Research Assist. Çağlar Söker
5
PREFACE
The Russian Federation is one of the great powers with the

largest territory, rich natural resources, and nuclear armed forces.
Undoubtedly, Russia is one of the most important players in world
politics including the most heated regions such as Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. It is also a member
of the most important regional and international organizations. As
one of the five permanent member states, it has veto power in the
Security Council of the United Nations. Therefore, any analysis
of world politics cannot be complete without making a reference
to Russia.
Many valuable publications exist on modern Russia
and its foreign policy, but most prefer to narrate it only from a
historical perspective or to discuss the current situation in Russia.
Unlike other books however, this book, provides fresh insight
by its contributors from different universities and experts on
international relations, who critically analyse modern Russian
foreign policy by considering all socio-politic, ideational, material,
and institutional reasons behind its continuity and change, while
bearing in mind its historical bonds and unique contexts. In
addition, this book includes a special chapter on Russia’s relations
with Türkiye in order to evaluate the background, structure, and
bases of developments taking place recently under the leaders of
both countries.
Therefore, this book, Russian Foreign Policy, stands out
as a concise, well-structured, engaging, insightful, as well as
accessible in terms of its writing style. It is our pleasure to publish
this book at our university. I believe that this book will emerge
as a reference work for both academics and students all over the
world who have an interest in Russian foreign policy – in the past
and present.
Prof. Dr. Muhittin Şimşek

Chairman of the Board of Trustees
Khoja Akhmet Yassawi
International Turkish-Kazakh University
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As with most academic books, this book began as a

well-intentioned and ambitious project. However, unforeseen
circumstances nearly brought this books journey to an end.
Fortunately, the book endured, after finding a new home. It is
with tremendous gratitude that we would like to thank Khoja
Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University and
the Eurasian Research Institute, the Board of Trustees, and their
esteemed governing members who decided to publish our book.
In particular, we would like to thank Prof. Dr. Muhittin
Şimşek, the President of the Board of Trustees, Khoja Akhmet
Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University. Without his
understanding and support, the publication of the book would
have been nearly impossible. We would also like to extend our
appreciation to former and current heads of the Eurasian Research
Institute, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vakur Sümer and Dr. Suat Beylur, and
deputy director Cengizhan Canaltay, who assisted us every step
of the way.
As the editors of this book, we would especially like to
thank all the contributors, with whom which this book would not
be possible. We not only appreciate their knowledge and expertise,
but also their unforgettable friendship that speaks many volumes.
Furthermore, we are genuinely grateful for their perseverance and
patience throughout this arduous journey.
Finally, we would like to thank our readers for choosing
our book. Our aim and hope is that it provides them with fresh
insight, a foundational understanding and a point of reference for
those interested in Russian foreign policy.

Dr. Vanessa Tinker
Editors
7
1.
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA:

FROM TSARS TO PUTIN
Introduction
To understand Russia’s recent war on Ukraine under the
leadership of Putin, this book argues that we need to know the
constituent elements of Russian national and state identities
emerging from the country’s historical, cultural, and social
background. Not only the war on Ukraine but also all Russian
policies concerning domestic, regional, and international affairs
are related with these constituent elements. For this reason,
it is essential to make reference to its ideational and material
foundations and appreciate the country’s grandeur in terms of its
size (the largest geographically in the world) and abundance in
natural resources. All these factors need to be examined critically
within a historical context starting from the very emergence of
Russians as a nation and Russia as state. In addition, the concept
of tsarism needs to be evaluated since it helps us to understand
the role of leadership in Russian foreign policy making– from
the time of tsars to present. Neo-Tsarism, as used in this book,
refers to the contemporary governing style of Russian autocratic
leaders, which is decorated with some democratic institutions.
Putin is without any exception. When examining the current
war in Ukraine for example, we argue that there are striking
resemblances between Putin’s style of policies and those of
imperial tsars.
Therefore, we argue in this book, that any attempt to
understand Russian foreign policy requires a deep knowledge
of Russian history, beginning with the establishment of the first
Russian principalities in the Middle Ages. For this reason, we
begin this book with a chapter on the emergence of Russians as
a distinct community, in order to locate modern Russian foreign
policy in a wider historical context, one that produced a great
empire that gradually expanded from Moscow to eventually
encompassing the Eurasian region. This expansion, however,
9
came at a great cost. Russian leaders, otherwise referred to as

tsars, from the onset, justified expansionism in the name of
security. However, with expansionism came greater insecurity,
causing each tsar to be more ruthless in foreign affairs in addition
to domestic politics.
With the rise of the modern nation state, some of them
adapted their rhetoric to contemporary discourses including
concepts such as nationalism, national unity, integrity, and the
interest of freeing Slavic people. Later, under communism, Russia
adopted the discourse of communist comrades and socialist ideas
influenced Russian politics. Nevertheless, we argue, the essence
of the ideas concerning the tsarist and imperialist understanding
to keep Russia as one of the great countries in the world has
remained the same. Recent discourses about Eurasianism that
supports Putin’s policies further illustrate the persistence of
imperialist understandings, developed to keep the idea of great
Russia alive. Foreign policy, in this regard, remains one of the
most powerful state apparatuses at the hand of Putin (Arbatova,
2019: 7-24).
As this book demonstrates, the essential characteristics
of Russian foreign policy, and the style of Putin, reflects a
combination of nostalgia for the Soviets and the Tsarist Imperial
Russia. Krystel von Kumberg further reiterates this idea, arguing,
[N]ot much has significantly altered Russia’s principle

internal drivers and overall strategic mindset. Generally,
symbols, narratives, and the ways in which the security
discourse is framed largely mirror past ideas of greatness.
While technological advancements in an increasingly
multipolar and globalized system have accelerated the pace
of international relations, Russia’s behaviour still somehow
mirrors its Tsarist roots. (Kumberg, 2022).
Vladimir Putin and The Rise of Neo-Tsarism

As previously discussed, while the occupation of Ukraine
is an important issue, but racism is another. They should not be
confused with each other. However, when we look at especially
recent declarations of Putin, he prefers confusing the issues with
each other in order to justify his Ukrainian policies. He looks
10
like a racist pundit as he is denying the borders, history, and even

national identity of Ukraine. He does not hesitate in associating
himself with ruthless tsars. Putin complains about historical
imperialist approaches based on divide and rule policies, but he
does not hesitate to employ the same policy towards Ukraine.
Approximately six months before the start of the Ukrainian
war, he wrote an article, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and
Ukrainians”, in order to explain his position towards Ukraine, he
declared that “to have a better understanding of the present and
look into the future, we need to turn to history” (Putin, 2021). He
went on to add, “We know and remember well that it was shaped
– for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia. Ukraine
was created intentionally by the Bolsheviks, and it was further
fortified by the cold war conditions”. From these statements,
Putin suggests that modern Ukraine is a product of the Soviet era.
Later, he makes direct references to the tsarist Russian policies
and reminds Russian people of their inherent responsibility to
fight for their sovereignty. He states,
In order to claim some kind of leadership … any country, any
people, any ethnic group should ensure their sovereignty.
Because there is no in-between, no intermediate state: either
a country is sovereign, or it is a colony, no matter what the
colonies are called… If a country or a group of countries
is not able to make sovereign decisions, then it is already
a colony to a certain extent. But a colony has no historical
prospects, no chance for survival in this tough geopolitical
struggle. There has always been such a struggle (I just want
to make it clear); it is not that we are looking at what is
happening around us and saying “Wow!” It has always
been like that, you see, and Russia has always remained
at the forefront of ongoing events… Yes, there were eras
in the history of our country when we had to retreat, but
only in order to mobilise and move forward, concentrate
and move forward. (Putin, 2021).
Putin has also not hesitated from declaring the dissolution
of the Soviet Union as the biggest mistake in recent Russian
history. The demise of the Soviets was, in his words, “the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century” simply because the
Soviet Union was in fact nothing more than a reincarnation of
Russia with “a different name”. We argue in this text that Russia’s
11
recent invasion of Ukraine is another exemplary example of the

use of historical tsarist-based ideas to justify invasion and part of a
larger effort to establish another great state like the Soviets but with
tsarist style and values. Increasingly since the 2014, following the
Euromaidan protests that ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych, Putin has not shied away from making his
imperialist foreign policy intentions known and their connection
to “Tsarist Russia” as evidenced in his public declarations (Blank,
2009: 1-43). A few months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for
example, Putin stated:
We visited the exhibition dedicated to the 350th birth

anniversary of Peter the Great. Almost nothing has changed.
It is a remarkable thing…Peter the Great waged the Great
Northern War for 21 years. On the face of it, he was at war
with Sweden taking something away from it… He was
not taking away anything, he was returning. This is how it
was. The areas around Lake Ladoga, where St Petersburg
was founded. When he founded the new capital, none of
the European countries recognised this territory as part of
Russia; everyone recognised it as part of Sweden. However,
from time immemorial, the Slavs lived there along with the
Finno-Ugric peoples, and this territory was under Russia’s
control. The same is true of the western direction, Narva
and his first campaigns. Why would he go there? He was
returning and reinforcing, that is what he was doing…/
Clearly, it fell to our lot to return and reinforce as well.
And if we operate on the premise that these basic values
constitute the basis of our existence, we will certainly
succeed in achieving our goals. (Putin, 2022).
Therefore, to understand Russian foreign policy, it is

important to pay attention to Russia’s leaders, and more explicitly
in the case of Putin, their unremitting and specific references
to Tsarist Russia’s imperialist past. However, as we have noted
earlier in this chapter, we cannot understand the role of leadership
without having a deeper knowledge of Russian history and society.
Therefore, we begin in Chapter two of this book with a look at the
rise of Russia to locate modern Russian foreign policy in a wider
historical context that led to the development of a great empire
with great tsars.
12
Russians and Russia: Society, State and Identity

In Chapter two of this book, Sezgin Kaya begins with an
analysis on the emergence of Russians as a nation and Russia as
a state within a long historical setting. Then, Kaya attempts to
understand the process of Russian modernization and its impact
on Russian national identity construction and imperial policy
making process. In this context, the author focuses on the position
of the Tsarist Russia in the European system of states. Following,
he proceeds to evaluate the cornerstones of modern Russian
history such as the Revolution of 1917, the emergence and break-
up of the Soviet Union, and the establishment of the new Russian
Federation.
In this chapter, we find out answers to basic questions
concerning Russia and the Russians. For instance, we learn when
and why Russian modernization began, and how this modernization
affected its foreign policy. As the chapter demonstrates, although
Kievan Rus is considered as the first Russian state in history, the
foundations of the modernization period is traced back to the
Grand Duchy of Moscow in the 14th century. Upon reading this
chapter, we understand that modernization in Russia consisted
of a contradictory and long enduring process. The main problem
with reforms was their top-down imposition by autocratic leaders.
They were often carried out by violence, but leaders did not
always succeed in what they wanted to establish. Nevertheless, in
the end, Russia was able to modernise to the point that it became
a part of the European system of states. As the chapter informs
us, the inclusion of Russia in the European system occurred in
the post-Westphalian period. Only then, was Russia considered
one of the five major powers in the nineteenth century to keep the
European system in balance. This created more opportunities for
Russia, and following the Napoleonic wars, it became the biggest
land power in Europe.
After the Crimean War, however, Russia lost its status,
and finally collapsed in 1917 when the Bolshevik Revolution
succeeded. As the author of the chapter argues, the process leading
to revolution in Russia started with the defeat of the Crimean
War. Despite of the modernisation of tsars, the defeat revealed
much about the backwardness of the country when compared to
the West. This sparked many more new reforms, but the long-
lasting and endless wars placed tremendous hardships on people.
13
At the beginning of the 20th century, it became more obvious

that Russia was in a deep crisis both politically and economically.
In response, the working class sought to obtain a better life, and
Russian intelligentsia supported them with revolutionary ideas
such as socialism and anarchism. In the end, the Bolsheviks
won this struggle of power under the leadership of Lenin and his
political ideas heavily influenced the Soviet Union, including its
foreign policy.
At the beginning of the revolution, the Soviet Union did
not have a comprehensive approach to foreign policy because of
its ideological assumptions concerning imperialism. Therefore,
the main mission of Soviet foreign policy was to encourage world
revolutions and to exploit the contradictions between the capitalist
bourgeois states. This revolutionary approach was changed
essentially when Stalin came to power, but he also preferred
using violence in domestic politics and resorting to war in foreign
affairs. After the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy softened,
and some steps were taken to reduce tensions in the world. The
policy of “peaceful coexistence” developed by Khrushchev was
important in this respect. However, this period did not last long.
When Leonid Brezhnev took the control of the Soviets, he returned
to Stalinist understanding not only in domestic politics, but also in
international affairs. His preferences escalated conflicts and led to
more wars as was the case in Afghanistan.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation (RF) was established. Initially, there were high hopes
that the RF would make a peaceful transition to democracy and the
market economy. However, it has increasingly become apparent,
particularly under the leadership of Putin, that the RF has never
forgone its imperialist worldview and ambitions of reclaiming
its title as one of the leading world powers. The recent invasion
of Ukraine further reinforces and illustrates Russia’s return of
tsarism in Russian foreign policy.
Material And Ideational Bases

History and current developments demonstrate that there
is a great deal of continuity in Russian foreign policy – one that
connects the past to the present. As this book demonstrates, this
connection is not accidental, but represents an intentional effort
14
on the part of Russian leadership, dating back to the rise of tsars.

In the chapter three of this book, Vakur Sümer seeks to cover and
comprehend the subject of foundations starting from the basic
geographical features of the RF, which has kept its territorial
position as one of the biggest countries (now the biggest) in the
world since the times of tsars. In the case of Russia, size really
matters. In this respect, it is important to draw attention to Russia’s
natural resources, consisting of a range of rich mines, gas and
oil to forests and rivers. Russia has a very diverse topography.
Due to the large size of Russia, there exists extensive variation
from the north to south in terms of climate and natural conditions.
Climate, in particular, is an important issue for Russia. As this
chapter points out, Russia is in need of making drastic changes
to its national policies regarding climate change and other global
environmental issues.
After touching upon the importance of geography, the
chapter goes on to analyse the current structure and composition
of demography in Russia. It is a critical area to examine in
order to understand the weakness and strengths of Russia’s
human resources. Despite the country’s huge natural resources,
it faces a range of demographic challenges such as an ageing
population, outdated education system and poor infrastructure to
ensure a greater quality of life. The Ukrainian war, for instance,
demonstrates the RF’s problem in recruiting extra soldiers,
even after declaring national mobilization. This issue is further
discussed in chapter three, when it looks at the defence structure
and security issues facing Russia, with a special reference to the
military sector of the country.
As chapter three highlights, the RF initially inherited
about 85% of the Soviet Union’s military system including
manpower, equipment, and defence enterprises. However, as
this chapter points out, the RF lacked economic resources, as
well as motivation, to maintain this tremendous and awkward
machinery. As a result, this led to a sharp decline of the army’s
combat readiness, as illustrated by the disastrous outcome of
the First Chechen War for Moscow. Under President Putin,
assisted by rising oil prices, Russia started to reform its military
in 2008-2009, reducing the size of the armed forces, increasing
budgetary support, and announcing a gradual transition to a
professional army. Although there remain unresolved problems
and shortcomings in the military, Russia is nevertheless a nuclear
15
superpower that must still be taken seriously in world politics.

In addition, Sümer also attempts, in chapter three, to
critically analyse ideational foundations of Russian foreign
policy with special references to beliefs and ideologies that
affect principles and policy-making process in foreign affairs.
The persistence of ethnic nationalism, for example, undermine
the very foundation of the RF as a country with a considerable
number of different ethnic people. Ideologically, Russian politics,
since the end of the Cold War, has remained divided between two
fractions – Atlantists and Eurasianists. The former initially gained
substantial popularity. However, in recent years, Eurasianists,
supported by intellectuals such as Alexandre Dugin, have been
gaining strength, particularly after Putin came to power in 2000,
with more pan-Slavish ideas. Russian nationalism that places
emphasis on pan-Slavism, still plays a role great in domestic and
foreign policy. In addition, the rise of Eurasianism has impacted
the preferences of Russia in global politics. In this respect, the
Munich Speech of Putin in 2007 signalled a new turn in Russian
foreign policy after he openly rejected attempts to create a unipolar
world order under the auspices of the United States. As Sümer
notes, this speech is now considered to be the starting point of the
widening gap between Russia and the West and former attempts
to move towards a pro-Western orientation.
Domestic Politics, Administrative Structure and

Decision-making Units
The Russian foreign policy decision making process
consists of many diverse units, actors and factors. In chapter
four, İrfan Kaya Ülger attempts to provide a complete picture
of this complex process. The complexity is mainly related to
the federal administrative structure of the RF that is comprised
of 21 republics, 9 territories, 46 regions, 2 cities of federal
significance, 1 autonomous region, 4 autonomous districts.
Although this structure has been subject to many changes in the
past, its complexity has remained unchanged in decision making
including foreign policy. In order to understand the mindset behind
the Russian state today, Ülger begins by analysing the founding
principles and norms in the Russian Constitution that was put
into practice in 1993 a well after the end of the Soviet Union.
Ülger first provides detailed knowledge about the main structures
16
of the RF and the composition of Russian government together

with essential institutions that play a role significant in the making
of foreign policy such as the Russian Intelligent Unit. He then
proceeds by analysing the political parties in order to understand
their power, ideologies and impact in the policy making process.
He also sheds light on the role of media and civil society in today’s
Russia. Perhaps more importantly, he underlines the importance
of the Russian Orthodox Church as a religious institution that
plays a key role in politics including foreign policy.
Chapter four enables readers to understand the state
machine of Russia today. First, it draws attention to the complexity
of the system, consisting of 85 federated units. Each unit is
represented by equal members in the Council of the Federation.
All federated units are represented by 2 representatives in the
Council. However, the level of autonomy and status of the units
differ from the others. The highest level of autonomy is granted to
the Republics. Second place is kept for the Autonomous Okrugs.
The types of federated units in Russia are as follows: Federated
republic, Oblast, Krai, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug,
and Federal City. The present complex system stems from the
Soviet heritage. Secondly, the president of Russia is the main actor
of this political system. The president is not only the guarantor of
the constitution, fundamental rights, and freedoms but also the
guarantor of the citizens. According to the Constitution, the main
task of the head of state is to ensure the harmonious functioning of
the constitutional bodies, and to determine the general orientations
of domestic and foreign politics. The president is also the supreme
commander of the Russian armed forces. According to Article
87 of the Constitution, it has the authority to declare martial law
and state of emergency on its own initiative. It is also within the
competence of the President to chair the meetings of the Security
Council, to appoint and dismiss the high command level of the
armed forces and to approve the military doctrine which is an
essential part of security and foreign policy.
Within this setting, other players of policy making such as
political parties, the Federal Parliament, the State Duma, have some
functions at least to make debates, but they are all subordinated
to the will of presidents. Although the Russian constitution allows
parties to be established and to participate in elections freely, but
they do not have so much power to affect national policies in
practice. Their power in the Duma has further been reduced since
17
the rise of Putin in politics. As for the other players of politics,

media and civil society in Russia have not yet developed to the
level of their counterparts in western societies. Concerning the
Orthodox Church of Russia, it represents the mouth piece of
pan-Slavish and nationalist politics as was the case in the time of
tsars. In short, as far as foreign policy is concerned, media, civil
society and the church in today’s Russia are simply employed to
provide public support or to make propaganda in favor of current
presidential policies. As this chapter highlights, their function and
impact in foreign policy making all function as part of the state
apparatus under the strict control of Putin.
Great Power Connections

Foreign policy, just as with any other policy, is not made in
a political vacuum. Rather policies develop between and among
states as a means of affecting each other’s preferences in world
politics. However, it is important for students of International
Relations to understand and make critical distinctions between
states and great powers. In chapter five of this book, Tarık Oğuzlu
begins his analysis on great powers by providing a definition of
great power. Oğuzlu suggests it is critical to conceptualize what
we mean by great power to understand Russia’s position in this
respect. The relations of Russia with other great powers, namely
USA, China, and European Union depends on the description
of the concept of great power. Although there is no clear-cut
definition of the concept, he argues that the concept is used
today to make reference to states whose military, economic and
political capabilities are strong enough to shape world politics.
Great powers are states that have capabilities to affect relations
with each other as well as the choices of other states in the world.
In Chapter five, Oğuzlu provides a comparative analysis of
Russia’s relations with the USA, China, and EU. Unlike the United
States, whose geopolitical interests spans across the entire globe,
he argues that Russia’s are confined to the larger Eurasian region.
Even though Russia is the only country capable of annihilating
the USA in a nuclear exchange, its overall military capacity is no
match to it. On the other side, although Russia’s nuclear power
is much more than China, if current trends continue, China will
soon overtake it. Economically, Russia is not a global power, let
alone a great one. In terms of soft power, including for instance
18
ideas and global brands, Russia is no match of the United States,

China or the EU.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has increasingly
become discontent with globalist trends in world politics and
alarmed by unilateral American actions. This became more obvious
after Putin came to power as president in 2000. Consequently,
Russia has progressively become insecure, and neoconservatives
in the USA have played a decisive role in this. For instance, the
US administrations supported the coloured revolutions in the post-
Soviet geography – in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, hoping
that successful implementation of liberal democratic practices
in those countries would bring power to pro-American regimes.
Likewise, the United States supported the nomination of some
post-Soviet countries in NATO. Notable in this context is the
American support to NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine.
The NATO summit held in 2008 decided that Georgia would join
NATO sometime in the future contingent of its transformation into
a democratic and capitalist state. From the Russian perspective,
such western policies aimed at nothing more than containing
Russian influence in its near abroad. Then, Russia took a limited
military operation against Georgia in the summer of the same year.
Russia annexed Crimea after the pro-Russian regime Ukraine was
ousted from power by demonstrations in early 2014. The idea of
Ukraine and Georgia joining the EU and NATO is perceived as
unacceptable by Russia and this policy has been strictly followed
by Putin in particular. Putin now justifies his offensive policies in
the current war in Ukraine in light of these developments.
On the other hand, as Oğuzlu evaluates, Russia and China
are both realist actors that believe in the primacy of hard power
capabilities and tend to define security from the perspectives of
territorial integrity, national sovereignty and social cohesion.
Both countries believe that the unipolar era between the early
1990s and the second half of the 2000s was a historical aberration
and a multipolar environment is required to maintain global peace
and stability. Similarly, Russian and Chinese leaders share the
view that both Russia and China are entitled to have a geopolitical
influence in their neighbourhoods as well as curbing the American
penetration into their regions. A common view shared by both
countries is that western claims to democracy and universal
human rights serve as a smokescreen to hide their underlying
imperialistic ambitions and when imposed on others has often led
19
to war. Accordingly, Russia and China openly support the idea

that non-involvement in states’ internal affairs and the recognition
of their national sovereignty. In addition, Russian and Chinese
societies are also inclined to legitimize strong state authority over
society. Both countries are ruled by strong charismatic leaders
and the scope of civil society participation in national politics is
strictly limited.
Concerning Russian relations with the European Union,
Oğuzlu argues that they are essentially shaped by Russian
ideological orientations which revolves around pro-Europeanism,
pan-Slavism, and Eurasianism. On the subject, he concludes in his
chapter that “Russia’s relationship with Europe contains both a
strong degree of historical legacy dating back to the modernization
efforts of Peter the Great and the institutional interactions between
Russia and the European Union”. However, Russian’s current war
in Ukraine seems to have destroyed the choice of pro-Europeanists
and empowered nationalist, pan-Slavist and Eurasianist circles
and preferences while a new Cold War emerged between the West
and the Russian Federation under the tacit support of China for
Putin.
Russia in International Organizations

Following the end of World War II, international
organisations mushroomed and were accelerated by the
establishment of United Nations and since then they have reached
tens of thousands in number. Not only have their numbers
increased geometrically, but they have begun playing vital roles
in world politics. The functions of international organisations also
multiplied to cover many areas of international relations. While
states are still the main actors, their power has been notably
circumscribed by these organisations, whether they are members
of them or not. To understand Russian foreign policy, it is important
to comprehend its approach to international organisations. In the
chapter six of this book, you will find a joint analysis of Demet
Şefika Mangır and Ediliia Abdykadyrova about the subject of
Russia and international organisations. Starting with Russia’s role
in UN including the Security Council, they analyse its position
in some important inter-governmental organisations such as the
Council of Europe, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
20
Mangır and Abdykadyrova’s analysis demonstrate that

the RF as great power perceives international organizations as
an instrument to put its foreign and security policies in practice.
For instance, Russia’s attitude towards the UN Security Council
is inextricably linked to its search for a new role after the end of
the Soviet empire. Russia perceives the UN Security Council as
the only arena in which it can express its power directly in world
politics. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council
not only gives Russia a unique status, but also the right of veto,
which ensures that it will have a say on all major political issues.
On the other hand, as we see in the case of Council of Europe
(CoE), Russia seeks to undermine the function and impact of the
organizations when it feels it cannot control it. Russia was very
critical about the decisions and power of the Council from the very
beginning of its membership. Not surprisingly, Putin withdrew
Russian membership when the CoE decided to expel it soon after
the start of the Ukrainian War. Before the war, Russia was one
of the first on the list of the countries to violate the values and
principles of the Council established by international agreements
concerning for example human rights.
After the end of the WWII, Russia has increasingly turned
away from participation in western established organisations and
sought to establish alternatives to them in which it has strong
control over such as COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Russia has
continued to establish similar regional organisations to keep its
leading role, control, and great power claim alive. After the Cold
War, for instance, Russia established the Euro-Asian Economic
Union (EAEU) to coordinate and integrate economic policies of
the old-soviet republics that remained outside of the EU. Through
this organisation, Russia aims to counter the Western world’s
hegemonic status while at the same time create a barrier to China’s
growing economic dominance in the region. Similarly, the Russian
membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is
not only based on security concerns in Asia, but at the micro level,
it considers friendship with China as strategically important for
diplomatic means without military conflict. At the macro level,
Russia views China as a key ally to prevent the global hegemony
of the USA over the region, while at the same time seeking to
balance China’s influence in Asia as a whole.
21
Russia and Global Problems

As far as recent developments are concerned, Russia’s
policies towards international organisations cannot be separated
from its history, national identity and experiences as a whole. No
doubt, the stronger Putin feels about the power of the RF, the more
he voices nationalist, xenophobic, and irredentist discourses. In
many cases, he also challenges international organisations, law,
and rules, and rejects any idea of being a part of global world
order. However, despite being the biggest country in the world,
any global crisis has the potential to affect it, let alone any other
country in the world. Therefore, it is necessary to look at Russia’s
position concerning global issues including climate changes,
environmental problems, global security, terrorism, nuclear
weapons and arms control, energy supply, socio-economic
fluctuations and technological developments to understand its
foreign policy as a whole.
In the chapter seven, Arif Behiç Özcan and Upagul
Rakhmanova analyse Russia’s position concerning critical global
issues. According to them, Russia’s foreign policy on global
social conflicts, for example, are shaped by a mixture of several
economic and political factors. Accordingly, as it is known
from different case studies, Russia does not always adhere to
the same foreign policy on ethnic and religious conflicts in the
world. Russia for example, responds differently to conflicts in
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, perceiving them in the context
of national security and regional dominance concerns, whereas
the conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, Russia
considers then from the perspective of a global power, seeking to
ensure its energy security, arms sale, economic impact, and global
political balances.
As for global environmental problems, Russia in recent
years has taken a stronger interest since they are aware of the fact
that it is the largest country in the world, playing a significant
role in increasing regional and global environmental problems.
Therefore, from the 1990s onwards, Russia has played a critical
role in international regulations about environmental protection,
despite Putin’s suspicions about the underlying intentions of the
western world. In the same line, the Russian government preferred
to engage in arms control talks with the USA prior to Putin’s
takeover of domestic politics. Russia’s approach to arms control
22
negotiations with the United States, has remained dependent on

its leaders, and are therefore changed frequently in accordance
with developments in world politics.
Russia’s Near Abroad and Neighbourhood Policies:

The Case of Relations with Türkiye
On global issues, Putin’s Russia has different ideas, which
cannot be described by such concepts as friendship, dialogue
and understanding. This line of policy is also true for Russian
foreign policy regarding near abroad and neighbouring countries.
Not only with Putin, but throughout history, Russia has followed
an imperialist policy of “divide and rule”. Alongside of this,
Russia also adheres to the idea of “control and occupy” when
necessary. it has resorted to a range of means to reach its final
target concerning relations with neighbours, even if it ends in
occupation. This approach did not change after the Bolshevik
revolution, as we witnessed in the cases of Eastern Europe, and
even in Afghanistan. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Putin
has invaded Ukraine, and makes open threats, including nuclear
ones, to any country who attempts to stand in his way.
Initially, Putin assumed RF was powerful enough to
quickly takeover Ukraine. However, he not only miscalculated
the power of the RF but also that of Ukraine. Most likely, he
also underestimated the reaction of the global community, let
alone those of the western countries. It is difficult to say what the
long-term consequences of the war will be, but Putin’s Russia is
certainly losing ground as well as the image of a superpower. In
addition, the RF is increasingly becoming isolated by the global
community, forcing Putin to seek out alternative friendships and
alliances.
Therefore, Putin has sought to establish closer relations with
Türkiye as its neighbour, and keep a strong personal friendship
with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The friendship represents
one of convenience, as Erdoğan also needs Russia and Putin for
many reasons including economy, trade, finance, tourism and
energy. Their styles of leadership also create additional reasons
for coming together as “friends”. Also, the case of Türkiye is
indeed very instructive from many perspectives to understand
Russian foreign policy towards its neighbours. In the last chapter
23
(chapter eight) of this book, I discuss and analyse this case in detail
together with the help of Harun Semercioğlu and Çağlar Söker.
Considering the reality of a long history that shapes Russia’s
relations with Türkiye, this chapter seeks essentially to provide
the factors and actors that affect reasons behind the dynamics of
continuity and change in Russian foreign policy towards Türkiye.
As we note at the beginning of the analysis, Russia and
Türkiye share some common features, but their relationship
historically has not been a friendly one. Until very recently,
they did not approach each other as a friend or an ally, but as a
rival if not an enemy. Despite a few historical turning points that
created conditions for cooperation in the past, they have generally
fought each other since Russia’s emergence as a nation-state after
the sixteenth century. Both nations played the role of dominant
other in the construction of each other’s national identity. Even
today, Putin makes references to the Turks as the enemies of
Slavic peoples and reminds how the world how Russians saved
Ukrainians from the yoke of the Ottomans in the past, to justify
its occupation in Ukraine.
The main arguments of the final chapter of the book can
be summed up as follows: The first and most important reason
behind Russia’s attitude towards the Turks is related to their
historical encounters. First, they fought each other for many
centuries to take the control of the region once habited by the
Turks from Vladivostok to Moscow. Second, they have different
religious identities. Third, Russia as the head of communist block
and Türkiye as the member of NATO fell in different ideological
camps during the Cold War, and this state of international politics
imposed in a broad sense different foreign policies based on rivalry
and conflict. The Soviet Union regarded Türkiye as a puppet of
NATO. Certainly, the end of the Cold War helped in changing
Russia’s attitude towards Türkiye, and Ankara recognized the new
Russian Federation soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
However, until the beginning of 2000s, Russian foreign
policy towards Türkiye remained unchanged despite some positive
developments in their relations. According to the authors of the
chapter, since then Putin and Erdoğan have succeeded in coming
together to solve bilateral and regional problems through summit
diplomacy, and by focusing on issues that mutually benefit both
nations – domestically and internally. This rapprochement is also
24
related to the personal friendship and direct relations between

Putin and Erdoğan. In addition, common economic interests in
foreign trade, finance, tourism, energy, and investments must be
considered as factors that play roles in the development of closer
relations. Thirdly, it has grown as a result of the attitudes of the
Western world towards Erdogan’s Türkiye and Putin’s Russia.
Conclusion
In closing, this chapter has underlined some key points
about Russian foreign policy. First, Russia has historically been the
state of tsars since the Middle Ages with grandiose expectations
and expansionist policies. Second, Russia is the largest terrestrial
country in the world with huge natural resources. Three, Russia
is a great power with nuclear weapons. Four, Russian leaders,
and more aggressively since the rise of Vladimir Putin, have
sought to reassert and put into practice tsarist ideas and values
in contemporary Russia. However, as this book notes, there are
many actors and factors that play a role in the making of Russian
foreign policy, some more prominent than others. In the following
chapters, this book seeks to provide an in-depth analysis, one that
is multilateral, multi-layered and multifaceted, to consider all of
the material and ideational reasons and elements that play a role
in the making of foreign policy.
25
REFERENCES*
Arbatova, Nadezhda. (2019). “Three Faces of Russia’s Neo-

Eurasianism”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,
December 2019–January 2020, November 2019, Pages:
7-24, Vol. 61, No. 6, pp.7-24, https://www.iiss.org/
publications/survival/2019/survival-global-politics-and-
strategy-december-2019january-2020/616-02-arbatova,
accessed 08.11.2022.
Blank, Stephen J. (eds). (2009). Prospects for U.S.-Russian
Security Cooperation, Published by SSI, March 2009.
Kumberg, Krystel von. (2022). “Neo-Tsarist Foreign Policy: From
Tsardom to Stardom”, The Footnote, 19 September 2022,
https://the-footnote.org/2022/09/19/neo-tsarist-foreign-
policy-from-tsardom-to-stardom/, accessed 15.10.2022.
Putin, Vladimir. (2021). “On the Historical Unity of Russians
and Ukrainians”, 12 July 2021, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/66181, accessed 18.03.2022.
Putin, Vladimir. (2022). “Meeting with young entrepreneurs,
engineers and scientists”, 2022-06-09, Moscow, http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/68606,
accessed 15.08.2022.
Rosenberg, Steve. (2022). “What is Vladimir Putin thinking and
planning?”, BBC, 12 October 2022, https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-63231823, accessed 07.11.2022.
*
For further references and reading lists please check all the
references and lists taking place at the end of each chapter
of the book.
26
2.
RUSSIANS AND RUSSIA

IN WORLD POLITICS:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sezgin Kaya
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as
the largest and most powerful successor state. However, Russia
found itself in a completely changed strategic environment. For
nearly 45 years, the strategic balance with the US collapsed and
the Country faced deep economic and social crises. Another
important problem the country faced was the fragmentation of
decision-making mechanisms and thus leadership in its foreign
policy. This problem remained until the mid-1990s. Perhaps the
most important problem was Russia’s adaptation to the changing
international conditions and new environment going from a
bipolar to multipolar system. In addition to the United States,
Russia now had to deal with other global and regional actors such
as Western Europe, China and Japan (Arbatov, 1993: 6–8).
Under these new conditions, Russian foreign policy during
the 1990s had three main priorities. The first was to ensure
political stability in the former Soviet geography through the
prevention and resolve of armed conflicts. The second priority
was to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons in Europe,
South Asia, and the Far East, which could be used to spread to
the regions that were once part of the Soviet Union. And the third
priority was to preserve the globally inherited position from the
Soviet Union and to maintain certain functions vital to its prestige
and status to engage in world affairs (Arbatov, 1994: 13). Other
goals, such as the realization of democratic reforms or economic
revival, relations with the rest of the world, the maintenance of
great power status, and survival as an integrated and sovereign
state were dependent on these priorities.
Although Russia has managed to return to the international
system as an important actor, it has not been an easy or quick
process. Russia historically, and even today, has had to address
27
a range of security concerns, the three most important being

occupation, domestic unrest and loss of national reputation
respectively. These fears stem from Russia’s geography, history,
and former empire status, which have influenced the country’s
security policies. For this reason, Russia’s foreign policies have
remained preoccupied in preventing these dangers. The military
policies pursued by the country have also been largely shaped
within the framework of these dangers (Galeotti, 1995: 19).
For the remainder of this chapter, it will examine the
factors that have guided the foreign policy of Russia throughout
its history, showing continuity between the Russian Federation
(RF) and its predecessor. Section one begins by retracing the
emergence of the Russian nation and then the state, as both part of
Europe and yet set apart from it due to historical circumstances.
Then in section two it examines the rise of the Romanov
Dynasty and how during the Tsarist regime, Russia underwent
a contradictory modernization process that was imposed top-
down, often through violence, illustrating discrepancies between
the horizontal culture of the people and the vertical culture of
the state that have remained constant throughout Russian history.
Next in the third section, it explores how Tsarist Russia became
involved in the European state system, which led Russia to be
the most powerful actor, but later to its end after its defeat in the
Crimean War and the onset of the Revolution of 1917. Section
four analyses the overthrow of the Romanov Dynasty by the
Bolshevik’s in 1917 and the beginning of the Soviet rule in Russia
that would last till 1991. Finally, section five concludes with the
Break-up of the Soviets and the new RF, who would find itself in
a new era, yet never abandoning its claim of a great power just as
its predecessors.
The Emergence of Russian Nation

Different perspectives on the origins of the Russians and
the Russian state can roughly be divided into two arguments – the
Norman theory and the anti-Norman theory. The Norman theory,
which is widely accepted by the West, traces the roots of Russian
culture (e.g. religion, customs, political structure, law and art) to
the Normans, and claims they arrived in the Russian lands in the
9th century and reigned until the mid-11th century. Slavs, from
this perspective of history, are therefore given little credit of the
28
RUSSIANS AND RUSSIA IN WORLD POLITICS
formation of Russian culture and state.

The anti-Norman theory however argues the Norman
influence on Russian culture was minimal, instead suggesting the
history of the Eastern Slavs as much older (Riasanovsky, 1947:
109-110). Among the different interpretations of anti-Norman
theory that exist, the Eurasian perspective of Russian history
is the most widely supported and accepted. Although Russia is
located between Asia and Europe, the Eurasian history perspective
argues that it is fundamentally different and set apart from the two
regions. One significant feature of this historical understanding is
the rejection of the Western civilization, referred to as the Roman-
Germanic civilization (Mazurek, 2002: 108). The Russian nation
is considered a mix of Eastern Slavs who settled in forested
regions and nomadic Turonian tribes of the Eurasian Steppe.
This perspective maintains that the Russian name dates back to
the 4th century, 500 years before the Varangians (or Varyag) came.
Eurasians claim the Norman theory is widely accepted in the
West to diminish Russian history. Soviet history also adopted and
supported this argument, claiming that the largest cultural centers
at the beginning of Russian history was the Muslim world and
Byzantium, not the Normans (Ataöv, 1968c: 216; Purtaş, 2005:
10).
Additionally, indigenous-nationalist movements in Russia
support the Eurasian perspective, rejecting the idea of a radical
break from the past, preferring instead to bring history and
traditions to the forefront. As with other nations in the world, it
is assumed that the longer back a nation can trace its historical
origins, the more valid it will be (Öğün, 2000: 22-24). This often
leads to an attempt to reinterpret history, involving the invention
of a “golden age” that reinforces the sense of superiority (Ortaylı,
2004). The quest for the golden age is also important for renewing
and reforming a culture thought to be threatened by the “other”
(Jaffrelot, 1998: 69). For example, Russian historian Nikolay
Mikhailovich Karamzin portrayed pre-15th century Russia,
before the Mongol invasion, as a golden age that embraced
democracy, equality, prosperity and happiness unlike medieval
Europe (Thaden, 1954: 514). However, the accuracy of such
claims is highly controversial since many historians identify the
period between 1000 -1500 A.D. as dominated by people from the
Eurasian Steppe, especially Turks and Mongols (Sander, 2000a:
48). It was only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the Russian
29
Empire achieved its great power status. The Moscow State

formerly was a small principality that tried to spread to the south
and east in the 16th century (Holden, 1994: 23).
Another problem with the Eurasian interpretation is
Russia’s historiography that has been inspired by three different
sources of political inspiration, especially during the 19th and
20th centuries. The first glorified the state mechanism, the
second glorified the peasant commune and the third glorified the
Bolsheviks. These sources brought the concept of loyalty to the
state (gosudarstvennost), the whole people (narodnost), and the
communist party (partiinost) into prominence. In this context, in
the period of 1800-1850 Russia, the statist ideas were the main
source of inspiration, in 1850-1900 period the populist tendency
increased, and in the 20th century the history of the Party was
brought to the fore. In short, from the 1800s onwards, Russian
historiography discourse has either adopted a loyalty to the
state, the people or the party (Sounders, 1984). The fluctuations
in historiography discourse, although contradictory, reflect the
changing power centers. Following this discussion about the
origins of the Russian nation, this section turns its attention to the
emergence of the Russian state.
The Formation of the Russian State

Beginning with the foundation and rise of the Grand Duchy
of Moscow (Knyazhestvo Moskovskoye) in the 1500s, referred
to as the modernization period, three different Russian states
have been established on the same geographical area, with the
same political culture, each representing in many respects the
continuation of each other – Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and
the Russian Federation. Even though there are claims that Kiev
Russia was the first Russian state, it remains historically debated.
Towards the middle of the 9th century, Eastern Slavs
gathered around two cities, Kiev and Novgorod. Towards the
end of this century, the Russians around Kiev established the first
central state “Drevniy Russia”. In this period, under the rule of
Vladimir I (980-1015), Russians were introduced to Christianity
after he accepted Orthodox Christianity and the Cyrillic alphabet in
988, both of which have placed a decisive role in Russian identity.
After the official adoption of Christianity, the Russian Church
30
became affiliated as a metropolitan to the Byzantine Patriarchate.

The new religion was adopted as a means of bringing communities
together that were scattered in different parts of Russia. However,
the life of Kiev Russia did not last long, and the state collapsed
with the Mongol raids that followed the internal division process
that started in the mid-11th century. After the conquest that began
in 1237 and took place in 1240, the Mongols reigned in the region
which has represented present day Russia for approximately 240
years (Purtaş, 2005: 11; Ataöv, 1968c: 230–237).
During Kiev Russia, the Russians had close relations
with European nations, and even adopted some of its social and
political institutions. However, after the conquest of Kiev and the
subsequent Mongol rule, Russia was completely separated from
the West (Guins, 1963: 355). While Russia was preoccupied with
the Mongol invasions, the “new Europe” took shape in the West
with the Renaissance and Reform movements of which Russia
was left out of (Kohn, 1962: 4). At the same time, trans-ocean
discoveries began, followed by the scientific revolution (Szeftel,
1964b: 230–233).
The rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow coincided with
the beginning of the weakening period of the Mongol rule. In
the 14th century, Moscow won the struggle to become the Great
Principality of Tver, which was another Russian city-state. In
1328, Ivan I (1325-1340), known as Kalita, became the head
of Grand Duchy of Moscow. Since then, Moscow has sought to
unite Russian territory (Ataöv, 1969: 3). Moscow, which gathered
scattered Russian principalities under its rule, now represents
present day Russia (Kurat, 1999: 89). Over time, the Grand
Duchy of Moscow became a political centre for all of Russia
(d’Encausse, 2003: 51–52).
In 1480, Russia was completely freed of Mongol rule
under the leadership of Ivan III (1462-1505), otherwise known
as Ivan the Great. Until that time, most of the Russian territory
was dominated by the Golden Horde state, the capital of which
was Kazan. Grand Duchy of Moscow was also subject to this
state, which was the successor of Genghis Khan Empire (McNeil,
2007: 458). Beginning with Ivan III, the Grand Duchy of Moscow
used all of its power to bring the Slavic tribes under his rule and
Russian expansionism continued for another 250 years. Russia,
which was originally a small principality, became “a power that
31
turns into a giant by eating its neighbours” (Tilly, 1995: 261-266).

Ivan III declared himself to be the last of the Byzantine
emperors and adopted the Byzantine double-headed eagle as the
state coat of arms. After his son and accessor to the throne Vasily
III died (1533), Russia became a state and an important centre
of power. Under the rule of Ivan IV (1533-1547) or Ivan the
Terrible, he was the first among Russian rulers to use the title of
Tsar. Moreover, the Tsar had this title approved by the Orthodox
Church, making himself the Holy-Roman Germanic emperor
(Tilly, 1995: 260-268).
After Ivan IV, Russia entered an important but troublesome
period between 1598 to 1613, known as the “Time of Troubles”,
where the country was the scene of constant power fights. Without
a ruler to ascend to the throne, Russia’s national existence was
placed in danger. Poland and Sweden wanted to take advantage
of this situation to bring its Russian opponents to their knees. In
1609, the King of Poland Sigismund III declared war on Russia
and demanded the Russian crown. However, the idea of a Catholic
king ascending to the throne was too much for the Russian
people to bear, triggering them to fight back. In 1612 the Russian
nation was resurrected and defeated the Poles and the Swedes.
Following this struggle, the Zemski Sobor, an advisory assembly
of the land made up of representatives from the ecclesiastical and
monastic authorities, the boyar council, the landowning classes,
and the urban freemen, gathered on May 2, 1613 to elect Mikhail
Romanov (1613-1645) as the tsar of Russia. This initiated the
period of Romanov dynasty in Russia, which lasted until 1917
(d’Encausse, 2003: 71–73; Kurat, 1999: 213).
Modernization Movements and the Search for Identity

Following the end of the Mongol rule, Moscow began to
re-establish relations with the Western world. However, for two
reasons, it would not be possible for this country to reintegrate
into the West and therefore to modernize. The first of these was
the decision of the Florence Council in 1439, which forced the
Russians and the Greeks to adopt the Pope’s authority. After the
Byzantine Emperor made contact with the Papacy in Rome due to
the increasing Ottoman-Turkish danger, it was decided with the
consensus reached in Florence in 1439 to unite the two churches
32
under the superior authority of the Pope. The Russians however did
not accept this decision and dismissed Isidore, the Metropolitan of
Moscow, who approved it. In 1443, a council of Russian Bishops
condemned the union with the Rome and establish the Union
of Churches. Moreover, any contact with Rome was forbidden
and the Russian Church left the Istanbul Patriarchate. In a way,
the Russian Church became a national Church by breaking its
ties with Byzantium, which was its main church (Kohn, 1962:
5). The second obstacle to Westernization was the conquest of
Istanbul by the Turks in 1453, whereby Russians lost all ties with
Byzantium and their activities in the Balkans. As a result of these
developments, Russia’s relations were once again broken with the
West (Kurat, 1999: 102; d’Encausse, 2003: 52–53).
Despite Russia’s disconnection and separation, historically
it has sought to resemble Europe. The Russian rulers sought
to modernize their countries socially, economically and
technologically, especially under the influence of Western Europe
(Holden, 1994: 23). The first modernization movement in Russia
started in the period of Tsar Alexi I (1645-1676), who tried to
reform and reorganize the Russian legal system with a law enacted
in 1649 to coincide with developments in Europe.
Although all members of the Romanov dynasty were
involved in the modernization process in way or another until
1917, it is Peter the Great (1682–1725) who is best known for his
widespread reforms in an attempt to make Russia a great nation.
After the Tsar came to power, he set two important goals. The first
was to ensure the empire’s power, and the second was to open up
to Europe. Moreover, Peter was particularly determined to reform
the privileges of the noble classes, the army, and bureaucracy,
to end the complex relationship between the State and the ruler.
The Tsar, who placed the state above the ruler, saw himself as
the first of the state servants. On the other hand, past institutions
such as the Boyars Assembly and Zemski Sobor were abolished,
and a State Senate was established in their place. Through these
reforms, the state was in fact intended to resemble its European
counterparts.
Despite Peter’s efforts, “old” Moscow traditions continued
to persist in other parts of the country. The state people in Moscow
and St. Petersburg encountered was not the same for people in
other parts of Russia (d’Encausse, 2003: 104–117). This dual
33
structure remained one of the most important problems of the

Russian modernization process.
Another hindrance to modernization was the disconnection
between the elites and the people. Undoubtedly, Peter’s reforms
influenced the elite of the country and altered their behaviour
and mentality to some extent. However, the church remained an
obstacle, of which he considered a conservative, ignorant and
outdated structure. When attempting to weaken the power hold of
the Church, he faced resistance. For Peter, the Church symbolized
ancient Russia, which the people had tried to eradicate. For this
reason, he implemented a revolutionary reform in 1721 abolishing
the Patriarchate and replacing it with a ministry of religious
affairs, Sen Sinod. In the past, the Tsar and the Patriarchate were
seen as authorities of equal weight, but with this reform, the ruler
became the single authority (d’Encausse, 2003: 119–120).
In Russia, modernization efforts were continued after Peter
I by Catherine II (1762–1796) otherwise known as Catherine the
Great, who pursued reforms while also reshaping foreign policy
to capture the West. Influenced by the Enlightenment, Catherine
aimed to rule Russia with a constitutional system and develop
a new society. During her lifetime, Russia made significant
progress in terms of modernization efforts, even if inadequate. A
new class called the intelligentsia emerged and concepts such as
private property and liberalism gained acceptance in the minds of
Russian elites. However, reforms during this period were imposed,
representing an exceptional example of intellectual despotism.
Throughout Russian history, the modernization process
has experienced periods of interruption, such as under the reign
of Nicholas I (1825–1855). He ruled as a despot and came to
symbolize militancy and oppression. Throughout his reign, he
obsessively fought dissent and revolutionary thought inside
and outside of his regime. He is remembered as reactionary and
resistant to Western ideas, instead preferring to promote traditional
Russian values and culture which implied the suppression of
non-Russian nationalities and non-Orthodox Christian regions.
Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality were considered as the
cornerstone for the stability of Russian history and the crown.
Domestic political turmoil in the country and the 1848 riots in
Europe also thwarted modernization in Russia (d’Encausse, 2003:
126- 144).
34
Reform processes regained speed under the reign of

Alexander II (1855-1881). After the defeat in the Crimean War,
the Tsar saw that the power of a state could only be achieved by
internal development. The Tsar, who initiated a series of reforms,
abolished the serfdom in 1861 by land reform. This was followed
by other reforms, particularly in the area of law. The reforms
initiated primarily aimed at alleviating Russia’s backwardness vis-
à-vis Western countries. Reform however was done selectively,
as autocracy was preserved and protected under Nicholas II
(1894-1917) believing it was the principal responsibility of the
sovereign to maintain the system (d’Encausse, 2003: 151-184).
As illustrated, modernization in Russia has consisted of a
contradictory process, whereby reforms have been imposed top-
down by autocratic leaders, often carried out through violence
(Holden, 1994: 28). The main problem with reform efforts was
the failure of leaders to reach and receive support from the public.
As Koyré (1994: 126) points out, “In Russia, the government was
more enlightened than the people, the society and the nation”. All
kinds of ‘civilizing’ activity and forward-looking moves came
from government. Therefore, modernization was perceived by
the people in Russia as the external influence of the West carried
out by elites, encouraging them to reject their ancestral traditions.
As a result, discrepancies between the horizontal culture of the
people and the vertical or high culture of the state has remained
constant in Russian life (d’Encausse, 2003: 81–83, 95).
The European System of States and Russia

Although Russia progressed differently than the Western
World, it remained part of the European states system during
the Tsarist regime when Russia gained the great power status.
Following the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, ending
the Thirty Years War, the Westphalian system was established
serving as a new system of international relations. It represented
the end of dynastic wars, causing traditional ties in international
relations to lose their effectiveness. Interstate relations were now
explained by the concept of balance of power in both theory and
practice (Sander, 2000a). Conflicts and cooperation between
states would now be based on common interests and rational
choices based on calculations, rather than on religious or dynastic
ties (Hartmann, 2006: 245–246). With these treaties, raison d’état
35
doctrine became the guiding principle of European diplomacy,

rather than moral rules (Kissinger, 1998: 50-51).
This system, born in Europe and then spread all over the
globe, was initially based on a limited number of great powers,
with Russia being one of them. It wasn’t until the 17th century
that other Eastern European states began to play an important
role in the great wars in Europe. Since the Treaties of Westphalia,
Russia, along with the Ottoman Empire, intensively participated
in European wars. For example, Russia entered its first important
alliance in Europe in 1680. By 1682, Russia began to cooperate
with the Austrian, Polish, Venetian and German states against
the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottoman’s defeat at the Battle
of Vienna 1683, Russia joined the anti-Ottoman “Holy League”
formed between Polish-German states and Venice (Kurat, 1999:
237).
Under the leadership of Peter I (1682-1725) otherwise known
as Peter the Great, Russia’s mobility in Europe and participation
in the international system as an active player increased. As an
empire and great power, Peter’s primary goal was to reach the
warm seas. Peter’s victory against Poland and Sweden in the
Great Northern War (1700–1721), subsequent settlement in the
Baltic region, and Poltava and the Nyastad opened up the pathway
to Europe. When Peter died in 1725, Russia had already become
one of the most powerful states in Europe (Kurat, 1999; Sander,
2000a). By the end of the 1730s, Russia was a state that regularly
participated in most of the wars in Europe. With its enlarged and
modernized army, Russia was now “a valuable ally and a terrible
enemy” for the European states. This was in line with Peter’s
project, which sought to increase the role of his empire in Western
European diplomacy and conflicts (Tilly, 1995: 275).
Following Peter I, nearly all of his successors involved
Russia in European wars. Russia for example was involved in the
Seven Years War (1756–1763), the last major conflict to involve
all the great powers of Europe before the French Revolution
(Armaoğlu, 1999: 26). Russia, with its allies France, Saxony and
Sweden, and Austria, fought against Prussia, Hanover and Great
Britain. The Russians defeated the Prussian army in 1760, and for
a short time occupied Berlin. The war eventually was brought to
an end with the Treaty of Paris in 1763 (McNeil, 2007: 549).
36
Like her predecessor, Catherine II prioritized Russia’s

foreign policy, focusing mainly on Poland and the Ottoman
Empire, while aggressively pursuing imperialist policies.
Catherine faced the Ottoman Empire twice in the 1768-74 and
1787-92 wars and was involved in the partitioning of Poland three
times (1772, 1793, 1795) (d’Encausse, 2003: 132-133). After the
Revolutionary or Napoleonic Wars, Russia along with Britain
emerged as the most powerful European powers. Following the
revolution, France’s aggressive foreign policy in Europe and
subsequent wars, caused Russia to take part in coalitions against it.
Russia sent its famous commander General Suvorov to Northern
Italy and then to Austria to fight against the French. In addition,
a group of Russian soldiers, alongside of the British, struggled
against the French in the Netherlands. For a short while, in the
early 1800s, Russia and France came closer and agreed to fight
against the British (Kurat, 1999: 295–296).
However, after Napoleon declared himself emperor in 1804
and attempted to become the hegemon of Europe, Russia went
back to supporting anti-French coalitions of states. As Napoleon
moved East, he defeated the Russian troops who were among the
coalition forces in the Austerlitz war in 1805 and the Friedland war
in 1807. With the Tilsit peace in 1807, the relations between the
two countries were restored and they agreed to share domination
over Europe with the French in Western Europe and the Russians
in Eastern Europe. Moreover, these two countries acted together
against England. Following his defeat at Trafalgar in 1805,
Napoleon decided to implement a policy called “Continental
System” against Britain. Russia, which was initially reluctant to
participate, subsequently joined the system, but tried to disrupt it.
Therefore, the agreement between Tilsit and the two countries did
not last long.
Following these developments, Napoleon in 1812 started
a Russian Campaign, a move that fatefully would bring his reign
to an end. In the face of Napoleon, who invaded Moscow, the
Tsar did not surrender and managed to defend itself against the
French in the Smolensk and Borodino battles of 1813, which is of
great historical importance in Russian history. The intense winter
conditions, as well as the lack of replenishment of the French
army, led Napoleon to withdraw his army unable to declare a
decisive defeat, also called “Grande Armée”.
37
In the period following these developments, Russians

managed to completely remove Napoleon from their lands. In the
Battle of the Nations near Leipzig in 1813, Napoleon was once
again defeated by the coalition forces led by the Russians. In
1814, the Allied forces (Russia, Austria and Prussia) crossed the
French border and entered Paris and defeated Napoleon March 31
at the Battle of Paris, leading to his dethronement and exile to the
island of Elba (Hobsbawm, 1998a: 100; Kurat, 1999: 301–309;
Armaoğlu, 1999: 71–73).
Following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars,
emperors, kings, princes, ministers and representatives came
together between 1814-1815 at the Congress of Vienna to negotiate
territorial issues and the Great Powers went further by seeking to
create a new political system in Europe, a ‘System of Peace’ that
would last until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Russia
emerged as the most powerful state in continental Europe, both
in terms of its military power and territory. Meanwhile, Russia
had become a general source of fear for Europe (Kohn, 1962: 7).
However, as this next section discusses, the process that initially
made Russia the most powerful actor in the system came to an end
with the Crimean War
The Fall of Tsarist Russia in World Politics

Following the post-Napoleonic era, the Holy Alliance
was created upon the initiation of Russian Tsar Alexander I
(1777 – 1825) and included the emperor of Austria and the king
of Prussia with the aim of preserving social order and restoring
European boundaries after the fall of Napoleon empire. In reality,
the alliance of conservative rulers achieved nothing but rather
it served as a vague attempt to base international relations on
Christian principles (Sander, 2000a: 160–161; Armaoğlu, 1999:
100–104).
Additionally, the Concert of Europe emerged from the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 and included the Quadruple Alliance
of powers – Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who
sought to protect the absolutist regimes in Europe and suppress
the ongoing revolutions in Europe. Later in 1818 France would
join making it the Quintuple Alliance transforming the structure
and establishing a system that brought moderate and plausible
38
solutions and incorporated them into a network of mutual agreements

(Schroeder, 2000: 159-160). The logic behind the order was based
on the prevention any single power, such as Napoleon did between
1793–1815, to forcibly impose their will on the rest of Europe. The
system aimed to preserve peace by concerted diplomatic action
to deal with issues of mutual concern and maintain a balance of
power to prevent any state from controlling the international
system. For example, minor territorial changes had to be approved
by the majority of the other states that were party to the treaty
(Kennedy, 1996: 163). In reality, the system was characterized by
two hegemons of power – England in Western Europe and Russia
in Eastern Europe. However, both allowed small powers to form
areas of influence, therefore making their power hold less apparent
(Schroeder, 2000: 161).
Despite its initial success of the system established after
1815, it did not prevent the formation of a series of military
alliances over time. The Russian Tsar Nicholas I became known
as a militant autocrat, who opposed ideologically rising liberalism
and democracy, further reinforcing the fear of Russia in Western
Europe. In addition, the ambitious policies pursued by the Tsar and
the Pan-Slavic tendency in this country were perceived as a threat
by the West. Panslavism advocated the unity of Slavic peoples under
the leadership of Russia which meant its influence could spread all
over Europe (Hammen, 1952: 27–31). Although Russia was one
of the most important actors in the European state system in 19th
century, it was also the biggest obstacle to European revolutions.
During this period, Russia became a thoroughly militarized and
bureaucratized autocracy (Skocpol, 2004: 165).
In many respects, Russia was at the forefront of the
developments that resulted in the collapse of the Concert of Europe.
Although the principles of the Holy Alliance supported monarchies
against separatist movements, Russia backed anti-Ottoman
rebellions since nearly all of the states set to be established in the
Balkans were Orthodox and about half of them were Slavic. Russia
considered itself the protector of the Christian orthodox Balkan
peoples and hoped with the rise of the new states, they would
come under its influence (Halecki, 1952: 19). Its long-term goal
was to capture Constantinople, to control the Bosphorous, and the
Dardanelles straits which would offer Russia direct access to the
Mediterranean. Russia sought to expand its influence in the Black
Sea region and the Caucasus.
39
With the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the

19th and 20th century, the Eastern Question increasingly became
a concern and point of contention amongst European powers, as
each feared the other might try to take advantage of the political
chaos to expand its own influence. He sought to persuade the
European powers to divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire
amongst themselves. However, he faced resistance, and the
diverging interests came to a head in 1853 with the outbreak of the
Crimean War where an anti-Russian alliance was formed by the
British and French who chose to continue supporting the Ottoman
Empire to keep Russia out of Europe and maintain the current
balance of power by thwarting Russian expansion (Sander, 2000a:
273–275).
After the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, it revealed
the weaknesses of the Russian autocracy to modernize the
country, despite later attempts of Tsar Alexander II to introduce
land and legal reforms in 1861 (Hobsbawm, 1998b: 181) It also
demonstrated the inadequacy of Russian development, providing
a suitable environment for the regime’s opponents within the
country that later would lead to the Revolution in 1917 (d’Encausse
2003: 191). Although the regime survived for another 60 years, it
was no longer the absolute power of Europe and the tsarist legend
ended (Palmer, 1999: 244–245).
Taking advantage of Russia’s apparent weakness, Austria
invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 which brought Russia and
the Balkan Slavs closer to each other. The Balkan crisis of 1908-
1909 emerged from Germany’s attempt to make this fait accompli,
which was already realized by Austria-Hungary, approved by
Russia. In 1912, the Balkan coalition of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece
and Montenegro took action against the Ottomans, the Russians
maximized their diplomatic activities in the Balkans. At the outset
of World War I, Russia declared that its main goal was to liberate
all Slavs (Lavrin, 1962: 18–19; Kennedy, 1996: 295).
The main reason for Russia’s entry into the war was due to
its imperial aims. Although initially Russia seemed to act for the
purpose of protecting Serbia, it had two other alternative aims –to
conquer Constantinople and the Straits, and to regain control of
Poland, including the lands left in Prussia and Austria in 1815
(Halecki, 1952: 19). From the beginning of the war, Russia fought
in this region, known as the eastern front of Eastern Europe.
40
However, Russia was no match against Germany in this struggle.

Although they initially managed to advance into the territory
of East Prussia, Russian troops later had to retreat. The defeat
of Russia at Tannenberg against the Germans would be its first
major defeat in this war. Russia did not make any gains, and its
situation only worsened in 1915–16 period. With the onset of
the Revolution of 1917, Russia was forced to pull out of the war
(McNeil, 2007: 695; Kurat, 1999: 413).
With the rise of Germany, Russia sought to join the
alliances that emerged in Europe, perceiving Germany and the
Central powers as a threat. The Russians, who turned to Western
European states, joined the Anglo-French block, so that after 1907
there were two forces left in the European diplomatic game –the
tripartite alliance and the German-Austrian alliance.
By joining this alliance, Russia inevitably became involved
in WWI. Upon losing the war, Russia downgraded to a second-
rate power (Kennedy, 1996: 294). For this reason, Russian Tsar
Nicholas II turned to the West again to establish activities in the
Balkans, restarting the Slav-Germanic struggle in the region. This
issue was one of the most important tensions in the pre-World War
I period (Sander, 2000a: 239; Armaoğlu, 1999: xxii).
The Revolution of 1917 and the Birth of Soviet Russia

Despite internal and external problems, the despotic and
autocratic Russian Tsarism survived until the World War I.
However, the Revolution of 1917 brought the end of Tsarist Russia.
From the beginning of the 20th century, the country was already in
a political and economic crisis. The Russian intelligentsia turned
to socialist views concerning labour movements, the oppressive
political environment, and the conviction that the public paid too
much for the sake of progress. In addition, the intelligentsia was
no longer content with the opposition it carried out in confined
spaces, and therefore sought to teach its ideas to the working class
(d’Encausse, 2003: 190).
By March 8, 1917 (or according to the Julian Calendar
February), the opponents of the regime increased in numbers and
strength with crowds of demonstrators joining striking industrial
workers who took to the streets to protest sparking the revolution
41
that forced the Tsar to abdicate from the throne ending centuries
of Romanov rule. Meanwhile the Duma formed a provisional
government to maintain the war the country was in and develop
a new constitutional order. However, unrest continued with a
second coup d’état in November (or October according to the
Julian Calendar) of the same year, overthrowing the provisional
government, followed by the Bolshevik wing of the Social
Democratic Party coming to power in Russia (McNeil, 2007:
696). Following this development, the Tsarist regime officially
ended and Russia entered a new period in which it would move
away completely from the West. Despite the Western ideas and
modernist structure on which the revolution was built, the new
regime and state shifted to an ideologically and politically anti-
Western stance.
Vladimir Lenin’s views were decisive in determining
the foreign policy as the head of the new state. Both Lenin
and Leon Trotsky, another important figure of the revolution,
believed in the redundancy of foreign policy. No diplomacy or
foreign policy would be needed if the state disappeared as the
ideology predicted. The early Bolsheviks developed theories of
war associated with class conflict and imperialism. However, they
had little understanding on how to conduct foreign policy among
sovereign states. For many of the first communist leaders, they
believed a world revolution would take place immediately. Never
would they have imagined they would live side-by-side with
capitalist countries for so many years. Rather they assumed that
if the revolution was delayed, only then would it be necessary
to confront the capitalist countries. Therefore, the main task of
Soviet foreign policy was not to maintain inter-state relations, but
to encourage world revolution (Kissinger, 1998: 224; Macmillan,
2003: 79).
Despite the Soviet’s approach to foreign policy, its ideology
had little impact on it. Rather other variables such as capacity,
perceived opportunities, personalities of leaders, internal groups
and their interests, as well as excessive desires resulting from
institutional and functional pressures influenced Soviet foreign
policy. In many respects, the Soviet foreign policy was very
similar to traditional Russian policy followed during the Tsardom,
especially in matters of national security, borders and power
(Gönlübol, 1968: 172).
42
The two most apparent similarities between the two

regimes were in foreign policy and relations with the Western
powers. Both perceived the West as a clear threat. However, the
reactions of Soviet Russia to the West often differed depending
on the circumstances of the state. For example, in the early years
of the revolution, the Bolsheviks abandoned their nationalist
mobilization during the civil war and accepted becoming smaller
in terms of old imperial lands. The necessity of consolidating
a revolution resulted from the defeat of World War I which led
Russian leaders to pursue defensive, reactive and almost non-
disseminating policies during the 1917-1921 period (Skocpol,
2004: 403).
Undoubtedly, one of the most important reasons for
consolidating the revolution was the civil war that broke out in
the country immediately after World War I. The Bolsheviks had
withdrawn Russia from the ongoing war, but a bloody struggle
had begun within the country from 1918 to 1920. During the civil
war, some Western forces militarily intervened in the country and
occupied some parts of it. While the Bolsheviks were conducting
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, many regions within the empire
declared their independence initiated by Ukraine, Estonia, Finland,
Moldova, and Latvia. After signing the agreement, Lithuania
and Trans-Caucasus countries also declared their independence.
In 1918, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan also declared their
independence.
The Brest-Litovsk Agreement of 1917 was the first serious
diplomacy test of the new Soviet state between the Central Power
and Ukraine to end hostilities between each other during WWI.
Although the Soviet government initiated the peace treaty, they
attempted to stall the proceedings. German responded with
demands, requesting independence for the Polish and Baltic
territories formerly belonging to the Russian Empire and Ukraine.
When the Soviet’s again attempted to stall, Germany responded
with an attack and the Bolsheviks had no choice but to make
concessions to avoid a total defeat. Lenin aimed to preserve the
very new and uncertain future of the revolutionary process in
this way (Macmillan, 2003: 68). The agreement confirmed that
the Soviet Union would exit WWI, breaking ties with the Allied
Powers, and give up Ukrainian, Polish and the Baltic territories
and Finland, given it was too weak to survive the continuation
43
of war. Despite Germany’s strong position at the beginning of

1918, after the Soviet Union pulled out of the war, a few events
changed the course of history in the Allies favour: Britain and
France strongly attacked Germany after the “Michael Offensive”
in March 1918, the German navy went on strike, and the USA
joined the Allies in the war in April 2017. Germany was therefore
forced to surrender on 11 November 1918 officially ending WWI.
When Lenin passed away in 1924, two different approaches
emerged within the Party – the “permanent revolution” supported
by Trotsky and “socialism in one country” supported by Joseph
Stalin. Due to the backwardness of Russia, a dominantly agrarian
economy with minimal industry, both Trotsky and Stalin agreed
that it had been necessary to establish an alliance between the
proletariat and the peasantry to overthrow the bourgeoisie which
is however unorthodox according to Marxist theory. The two
nevertheless diverged in their ideas on how to bring about the
socialist revolution. Trotsky was less optimistic than Stalin
about the Soviet’s abilities to bring about the socialist revolution
on its own. Instead, he sought to export and support communist
revolutions in advanced capitalist economies to bring technologies
to Russia and avoid capitalist hostilities. Stalin however, believed
Soviet Russia had enough resources and technology at its disposal
to defend itself and develop a socialist model along the lines of the
bourgeoisie, however always maintaining the communist vision.
It was assumed that once power and resources were consolidated,
and security obtained, Soviet Russia would provide a socialist
model that would revolt against the capitalist world and naturally
attract other oppressed classes in other countries to follow suit and
overthrow their capitalist classes. The theory put forth by Stalin
in the end was accepted, determining the general framework of
the foreign policy that Soviet Russia would follow in the period
between WWI and WWII.
Under Stalin’s rule, Russians gave up the idea of world
revolution. Undoubtedly, the most important reason was that the
Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, was located in the European
state system which placed it geographically at risk of conflict.
Instead, the Soviet leaders focused on carrying out rapid industrial
development in the economy and military. The relative weakness
of the country and the lack of material conditions supporting its
ideological aims, made the Soviet Union pursue more moderate
44
policies in its relations with the West. Especially between 1925-

1930, Soviet foreign policy made a significant contribution to
the peace and was asked to join the League of Nations in 1934
as a permanent member on the council. Soviet decision-makers
benefited from all the subtleties of its foreign policy, which they
initially had believed to be unnecessary.
In the process leading up to World War II however, the
Soviet Union appeared to be a “non-fighting ally.” Stalin’s
greatest fear was the possibility that all capitalist countries would
act jointly against the Soviets. When the danger of Hitler became
clear, Stalin initially sought a policy of rapprochement with
Germany to appease its ideological rival, signing in 1939 a non-
aggression pact. With Stalin’s “master work” diplomacy, he made
significant gains long before entering the war. Thanks to his secret
alliance with the Germans, half of Poland was seized, three Baltic
states were invaded, and then he pursued Finland however failing
to capture the country. Finland, in response, applied to the League
of Nations declaring the Soviet Union as an aggressive state and
demanded it be removed from membership of the organization,
which it later was.
Meanwhile, Stalin in 1940 took Bessarabia and Bukovina
from Romania, succeeding to take back nearly all his country’s
territories that had been lost at the end of World War I (McNeil,
2007: 706; Kissinger, 1998: 326). Then, Stalin signed a pact with
Japan, like the one made with Germany. The Soviets sought to
eliminate the danger of a two-sided war. The main purpose of
this agreement, signed in Moscow on 13 April 1941, was to keep
the war out of Soviet territory for the Russians (Kissinger, 1998:
335).
Despite Stalin’s attempts to stay out of war through strict
diplomatic negotiations, neutrality in the Allied – Axis conflict,
and secret protocols, tensions grew in German-Russian relations.
One of the first triggers was the Triple Pact signed between
Germany, Japan and Italy on 27 September 1940, increasing
Stalin’s fears and suspicions that eventually Soviet Russia would
become a target. Another important factor was Hitler’s invasion
of France. Hitler, like Napoleon, believed that there were two
major obstacles for expansion. The first was England in the west,
and the second was Russia in the east. After dealing with France,
Hitler became alarmed by Stalin’s expansion in the Baltics. For
45
this reason, Germany attacked Russia without even declaring war

and began an operation known as Barbarossa (Kissinger, 1998:
327; Ataöv, 1985: 91).
After being attacked June 22, 1941, Russia joined the
major Allied powers – Britain, France, and the USA against the
major Axis powers – Germany, Japan and Italy. Between 1942-
1944, World War II continued mainly on the Russian front. The
Germans, who reached Stalingrad in 1942 with a massive attack,
were able to move up to the Volga River. However, towards the
end of 1942 and in 1943 Russians managed to repel the Germans
and forced the occupation forces to withdraw from Russia. By
the end of the summer of 1944, Russian troops now crossed the
country’s pre-war borders and moved towards Berlin, the decisive
battle that brought an end to the war (McNeil, 2007: 708, 711).
Despite having the highest level of casualties and damage
from the war, Russia nevertheless occupied nearly all of Eastern
Europe. These developments brought an end to the good relations
established with the West during the war. Poland, occupied by
both Germany and the Soviet Union during the War, officially
became part of the Soviet Union in 1948. The Soviets clearly
indicated that it would oppose any intervention of the West in any
region they saw within their domain of influence (Sander, 2000b:
186). Therefore, former allies – Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania,
and victims – Poland and Czechoslovakia of the Axis were placed
under the Soviet Union’s control. The Soviets managed to expand
Russian power over Continental Europe to the west (Tilly, 1995:
309).
When the war ended, Stalin managed to shift the borders
of his country with the territories he occupied up to 600 miles
west of Elbe. The weakness of Western Europe and the planned
withdrawal of American forces further widened the gap in front
of the Soviet armies (Kissinger, 1998: 396). Stalin was given
the opportunity to socialize almost all of Eastern Europe. The
“sharing of Germany” that emerged towards the end of the war
showed that the Soviet Union’s intention to expand in Europe
was not over. At the Yalta Conference, the European Advisory
Commission adopted a protocol to divide Germany by the USA,
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union military forces. It was also
agreed to divide Berlin into occupation zones, with the USA,
Britain and France controlling the Western sections and the Soviet
46
Union the Eastern sector. At the Potsdam Conference, held later,

basic political solutions to the problems in Europe were provided.
At this conference the Allies adopted four basic principles
regarding Germany. It was decided that Germany should pay
war compensation, be disarmed and completely de-militarized
and ultimately managed as an economic unit with a democratic
constitution (Reynolds, 1973: 133).
Shortly after however, the relations between Western Allies
and the Soviet Union deteriorated over Berlin due to competing
occupation policies. When the USA and Britain decided to
unify their zones, tensions between the East and West increased.
Later, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Quadratic Control
mechanism after learning about the Western Allies secret plans
to create a new German state made up of their three occupation
zones. Then in June 1948, without informing the Soviet Union,
the Western Allies introduced the new Deutschmark to try to free
the city from Soviet Union’s economic control and bring about
economic recovery. The Soviet Union retaliated by introduction
its own counter currency the Ostmark, and then blocked access
to all major rail, road and water access to Western Berlin. In
response Allies countered the blockade by delivering supplies to
Western Berlin by airlift. Eventually, the Soviet Union agreed
to end their blockade, however the Berlin Crisis between 1948
– 1949 solidified the divisions between the West and East. These
divisions were further reinforced after the Western occupation
zones united to form the Federative Republic in Germany and
the Soviet Union transformed the Eastern sector into the German
Democratic Republic (Kennedy, 1996: 443–445; Kissinger, 1998:
519). There was now no longer the possibility of finding any
common ground between the Soviet Union and the West.
The new world order created after the Yalta Conference,
shifted the balance of power of international relations outside of
Europe for the first time in history, from a multi-polar to bi-polar
system. The next part of the study assesses the historical process
that led to the Cold War.
The Cold War Period

The Cold War lasted until 1991 between two rival ideologies
with different views on the future culminating into a bipolar world
47
order – The USA and Soviet Union. The main distinctive feature
of the Cold War was its zero-sum logic based on a “win or lose”
principle. However, unlike other wars, the Cold War represented
a time of peace, since the struggle remained “cold” but never
became a “hot” conflict (Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997: 2).
The Soviet Union, especially in the 1950s, pursued an
idiocentric policy towards the West, believing that the strategic
balance was in its favour with the developments in the Suez Crisis
in 1956 and the deployment of the Sputnik into space, both of
which increased the Soviet Union’s prestige (Sander, 2000a: 280).
The West, under the leadership of the USA, followed a policy that
antagonized the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill for example
drew the divide between the West and the East to everyone’s
attention, using the term “iron curtain” in his speech on March
5, 1946, to characterize the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union
(Kissinger, 1998: 411).
The iron curtain discourse marginalized the communist
bloc and the subsequent containment strategy formed the basis
of the West’s Cold War policy. As the Soviet Union kept to itself
under the iron hold of Stalin, few in the West had any experience
with the communist state and therefore had little understanding
what motivated it. George Kennan, known as the architect of the
containment policy, provided the US government with first hand
insight he had obtained while serving as Chargé d’ Affaires in
Moscow, warning the US Government about the aggressive nature
of the Soviet Union. He described the Soviet Union’s foreign
policy as a mixture of the zealousness of communist ideology and
old-fashioned Tsarist expansionism.
Later in an article published in Foreign Affairs under the
pseudonym Mr. X in July 1947, Kennan outlined his containment
strategy which became the premises of US President Harry S.
Truman’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. In the article
he warned, “The main element of any United States policy toward
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm
and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” The
Truman Doctrine, declared March 12, 1947, represented the first
application of the containment policy with the aim of countering
the Soviet Union’s geopolitical expansion (Ataöv, 1968a: 206).
The Document stated that the US Government will provide
political, economic, and military aid to any democratic nation
48
facing any external or internal threats from an authoritarian power,

although it was mainly directed towards Greece and Türkiye.
Later in 1947 a more elaborate and extensive economic
recovery plan was initiated by US Secretary of State George C.
Marshall named after him The Marshall Plan, otherwise referred
to as the European Recovery Program (ERP). The aim was to
provide substantial aid to help rebuild European economies that
were severely damaged during the war and remove trade barriers to
enhance commerce between the countries and the USA. Included
in this initiative was economic aid to restore Germany, an idea
well received by France and Britain but adamantly rejected by the
Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviet Union placed pressure on
its Eastern European allies to reject any Marshall Plan Assistance,
convincing them that it was a ploy by the USA to intervene in
the domestic affairs of other countries and impose its economic
imperialism. The Marshall Plan was nevertheless passed in 1948,
and over $15 billion in economic aid was given to restore the
economies of Western European countries as well as prevent the
spread of communism. The Marshall Plan also served as a catalyst
to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
1949, to provide collective security between the USA, Canada
and several Western European countries against the Soviet Union
(Kissinger, 1998: 441). Together the Marshall Plan and NATO were
viewed by the USA as vital in preventing communist expansion
across the continent.
In retaliation to the Marshall Plan, perceived by the Soviet
Union as a US ploy to impose its economic imperialism, it created
COMECON (Mutual Economic Assistance Council) January 25,
1949 with the aim of economic cooperation and unification of
the communist bloc countries in Eastern Europe (Ataöv, 1968b:
276–81). Following the establishment of NATO and the adoption
of Western Germany into the organization on October 23, 1954,
the Soviet Union issued a memorandum declaring NATO as
“weapon of the aggressive Anglo-American Bloc” and contrary
to the Yalta and Potsdam conferences aims to establish peace and
international security (Ataöv, 1968b: 300–301). For this reason,
the Soviet Union took immediate action, establishing the Warsaw
Pact (WP) May 14, 1955, formed together with the eight Eastern
Bloc member countries.
Contrary to Soviet expectations, the communist movements
in the Western countries weakened in the post-1948 period.
49
Revolutionary Marxism did not occur in the countries where the

proletariat population was high, but rather succeeded in countries
where the majority were villagers. Furthermore, communist
countries were not willing to cooperate with Russia, contrary to
what Marxist internationalism predicted. The new revolutions
did not create a brotherhood between the communists, but rather
conflicts emerged such as in Yugoslavia, when Stalin failed in 1948
to control the Country. Another unexpected development was the
withdraw of colonial powers from their colonies rather than by
revolution as formerly predicted (McNeil, 2007: 725–728).
After Stalin’s death, Soviet foreign policy softened to
reduce East-West hostility, especially between the two blocs.
Soviet statesman Nikita Khrushchev, for example, in 1956
declared the principle of “peaceful coexistence” as the foundation
of Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin period. Peaceful
coexistence however did not mean the reconciliation of socialism
and bourgeois ideologies, but rather it was to point out that despite
the ideological and political disagreements between states they
did not necessarily have to end in a war. The West nevertheless
remained sceptical of this policy change and saw it as a tactical
maneuver.
The policy change however was not tactical but out of
practical necessity given that both systems contained nuclear
weapons (Gönlübol, 1968: 171). Although the atmosphere of
mistrust did not completely disappear, the USA was aware of the
dangers of nuclear war and understood that cautious steps were
needed which came to represent the détente period. Following the
Cuban Crisis in 1963, Khrushchev sought reconciliation with the
US to develop a unity of understanding between the two global
powers that could protect the world from a thermonuclear war.
Khrushchev also thought long-term stability with the USA would
both strengthen his position and his country’s external interests.
Another expectation of Khrushchev was to establish a Soviet-
American diarchy through the détente policy in the international
community (Aspaturian, 1969: 604–607).
Unfortunately for Khrushchev he was never able to realize
his goals since he was expelled from power in the Soviet Union
in 1964 and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev who brought forth a
period referred to as “stable Stalinism” (Purtaş, 2005: 30). Initially
Brezhnev pursued the détente policy of the Khrushchev period,
50
contributing to the Helsinki Conference as the highest point of this

policy. This approach however was short-lived after the Prague
Spring. In response to the Prague Spring, the Brezhnev doctrine
was introduced August 3, 1968 calling upon the Soviet Union to
militarily intervene in countries were socialism was under threat
(Cooper, 1999: 26).
Three weeks later, the Doctrine was put to the test when
Soviet armed forces invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia August
20 disposing Dubček and replacing him with hardliner communist
leaders who haltered the reforms (Sander, 2000a: 403). For the
ensuing decades, Soviet-bloc members were severely restricted
by the Doctrine, and its principles were so broad that it justified
and legitimized Soviet intervention in non-Warsaw Pact countries
such as in the case of Afghanistan in 1979. Although the premises
for intervention was for the ideological preservation of socialism,
it reflected Russia’s traditional understanding of “great power”
and determination to maintain its sphere of influence (Aspaturian,
1969: 595).
The End of the Soviet Union

These developments also brought the end of the détente
period, accelerating the US and its allies’ hostilities towards the
Soviet Union and its communist allies (Doyle and Ikenberry,
1997: 1). The Doctrine remained in effect until 1985, when
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. With Gorbachev, sweeping
transformations were made in Soviet political life. First,
glasnost, the liberalization in politics, and then perestroika – the
restructuring programs in 1987. Although in the early years of
Gorbachev’s rule he followed similar policies to his processors,
he began to make changes following the 27th Congress of the
Communist Party held in February-March 1986 (Kramer, 1989–
90: 28-30).
Gorbachev’s democratic reforms and the new
understanding of foreign policy weakened the legitimacy of the
party administration and the very idea of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, it paved the way for the emergence of opposition
movements organized within the country according to both
liberal-democratic and nationalist principles, even though he
himself did not wish to do so. Starting in 1989, at least four
51
different political movements within the Soviet Union began to

make themselves felt. The first was reformist communists. The
international aim of this movement, led by Gorbachev, was to
integrate with Western economic and political systems. The
second group consisted of liberal democrats led by Boris Yeltsin.
They shared Gorbachev’s vision of the international role of the
Soviets but demanded the country’s rapid transition to a market
economy and democratization. The third group consisted of
orthodox communists, and according to them the Soviet Union
should remain a Marxist-Leninist state. The fourth group of
nationalist separatists in other Soviet republics, particularly in
the Baltic states, explicitly rejected the Soviet identity (Chafetz,
1996–97: 670).
The reforms initiated by Gorbachev also extended in the
Soviet Union’s foreign policy. In this context, a new era began
with the West no longer defined as the absolute enemy. According
to Gorbachev, ideological differences should not be transferred to
inter-state relations, and foreign policy should not be subordinated
to them. Rather Gorbachev emphasized that there should be more
openness, more clarity, less tactical maneuvers and talk-and-play
in international relations. The most important aspect of this new
approach was the way in which the Soviet Union saw itself as a
part of Europe. According to Gorbachev, Europe was a cultural and
historical whole, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, where
the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment
was united (Gorbaçov, 1988: 166, 210).
Gorbachev’s reform process in domestic and foreign policy,
even if he did not foresee this, brought an end to the Cold War that
had been going on for more than 40 years between the two blocs.
As a result of the political, economic and social transformation
of glasnost and perestroika policies within the country, the
characteristics of the Soviet system, such as Party monopoly,
closedness and national unity were eroded. Several foreign
political steps also led to the end of the Cold War. For example,
Gorbachev terminated Soviet aid provided to the strict communist
administrations of Eastern Europe since the 1950s. This also
paved the way for reform initiatives in the region. On October
28, the Soviet Union declared that the member states were free
to leave the alliance if they wished. This development served in
many regards as the declaration of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact
52
(Cooper, 1999: 36).

In parallel with Gorbachev’s reforms, significant internal
political developments took place in Eastern European countries
between 1989 – 1991. These developments affected the
disintegration process of the Soviet Union. The anti-communist
movements which started in Poland, then spread to other Central
and Eastern European countries. The pro-Soviet governments in
these countries fell and the governments changed hands. These
changes primarily took place peacefully through elections as in the
case of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, in some
cases they resulted in bloodshed as in Romania and Bulgaria. The
inaction attitude of the Soviet Union against these developments
was encouraging for the republics of the Soviet Union (Purtaş,
2005: 47).
The eventual collapse of the Soviets came December
8, 1991 when the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
agreed that the Soviet Union as a political and legal entity no
longer existed. A few days later, Gorbachev resigned as the last
president of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet
Union had very tragic consequences for the Russians. Firstly,
there was a significant decline in the borders of the country in the
post-disintegration period. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the
land it owned was almost the same size as the one it reached at
the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Not only did Russia lose land but
also its international position, becoming a state the international
community tolerated with pity. Russia lost its central position in
foreign policy, effectively becoming a peripheral country in terms
of economic and financial relations (Trenin, 2001: 286).
Foreign and Security Policies in the New Russian

Federation
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new RF
faced social, political and economic crises and a completely
changed geopolitical environment and international system.
Seeking to find a new role and identity in this changed
geopolitical environment, Russia turned to its historical past to
find answers. This helps explain why the Russians began to reuse
imperial symbols in their flag, street or city names soon after their
independence in 1991 (d’Encausse, 2003: 17).
53
Although Russia found itself in a new era, there has

been historical continuity between the RF and its predecessor.
Although it did not directly assume responsibility for Soviet
policies, the Russians inherited its international status, obligations
under international treaties, position in the UN Security Council,
diplomatic institutions, nuclear capacity, and a majority of its
conventional arms were transferred to Russia. What did change
was its size and superpower status (Light, 1996: 36–37). However,
the new Russia, like its predecessor, did not abandon the claim of
a great power. Despite the changing international environment,
Russia remains an important country, especially in terms of
international security. Russia has become a decisive actor not only
in the former Soviet region but also in Europe and Asia.
Russian foreign policy also faces many of the same concerns
as its predecessor such as the fear of occupation, internal unrest,
and loss of national dignity, all of which stem from Russia’s
geography, history and the formation of an empire. Throughout
its history, these and similar fears have profoundly influenced
both foreign and security policies of Russia. Therefore, the
country’s primary role in foreign policy has always been defined
as preventing such dangers. The military policies pursued by the
country are also shaped within the framework of these dangers
(Galeotti, 1995: 19). The measures Russia has taken to avoid
these threats have remained relatively consistent for centuries. For
example, during the Tsarist and Soviet period, both sought to ward
off external threats and maintain internal stability by surrounding
itself with buffer states and harmonious allies.
However, unlike the past, Russia returned to the international
system as a single actor, proving extremely challenging when
seeking to overcome security concerns while also attempting
to take a new direction in its foreign policy. Since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign and security policies have
undergone transformations reflected in the following three
doctrines: Kozyrev, Primakov and Putin.
The Kozyrev military doctrine was adopted in the first
term of President Yeltsin in 1993. The new democratic leader
of Russia sought to integrate into the West/US-centered systems
on the one hand, while trying to protect its security and national
interests on the other. The Doctrine prioritized the creation of
a security zone around its borders of Russia and establishing a
54
line of good neighbours with the “near abroad” or in Russian

“blizhneye zarubyezhe” used to refer to those states neighbouring
the RF which previously formed part of the Soviet Union. In
geopolitical terms, it covers the area of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and also the Baltic states. The Doctrine
has been nicknamed the “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine” since it
takes a defensive stance, declaring the post- Soviet region an area
of exclusive Russian interest and suggests that if threatened, it
has the right to defend it. Russia perceived itself as the political
and military guarantor for stability in this region. Realizing that it
could no longer be a global actor in the new era, Russia turned to
Eurasia with the hopes regaining and consolidating its superiority
as well as influence in the region (Peter and Rubinstein, 1997:
100; Light, 1996: 54; Dağı, 2002b: 192).
The détente period, defined as an intermediate period in
the Cold War, started after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and
steps were taken to reduce the hostility between the Eastern and
Western blocs. Comprehensive disarmament talks were also held
between the parties during this period, whose main motivation
was to avoid the possible consequences of a nuclear war. As a
result of these negotiations, it was possible to make agreements
in areas such as preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
limiting and reducing strategic weapons. This period was closed
however, with the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.
Another distinctive aspect of the new military doctrine was
that it saw the violation of the rights of the Russian minority in
the former Soviet republics as a major cause of conflict. For this
reason, the Russian diaspora became one of the main issues of
Russia’s foreign and security policy. Russia later would use this
issue as an instrument of intervention against former member
countries of the Soviet Union such as Estonia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, who have a dense Russian population.
Upon the arrival of the new foreign minister Yevgeny
Primakov in 1996, Russian Foreign Policy made a stark change.
In 1997, the Primakov doctrine was adopted, replacing the
Kozyrev Doctrine, dramatically transforming the strategic
direction of the country’s foreign policy. His idea was based on
the assumption that Russian national interests and security would
best be served best in a “multi-polar world” (Klepatskii, 2003:
11). The Document underlines four priorities: strengthening
55
Russia’s territorial integrity, promoting peaceful integration

between CIS states, stabilizing regional conflicts in the CIS and
the former Yugoslavia, and preventing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The first two priorities made it clear
that Russia would turn its attention to the CIS, rather than the far
West (Peter and Rubinstein, 1997: 102).
The Primakov doctrine was also an attempt to balance,
not replace, American hegemony (Trenin 2003: 34), signalling a
return to ‘realism’ in Russia (İşyar, 2004: 24). Russia’s diplomatic
and military significance in the international arena had rapidly
lost value, just like the ruble. He therefore advocated the creation
of a Moscow-Delhi-Beijing axis, a flexible geopolitical formation
referred to as the “big triangle,” with the aim of balancing
America’s geopolitical position, the influence of NATO, and the
multipolar world demand. Russia’s new geopolitical approach
also sought to reconstruct regional power balances which
stabilized relations with the former Soviet republics. To secure
the absolute sovereignty and to re-establish the international
status as a “great power,” the Doctrine emphasized the need for
Russia to re-nuclearize and to use its unique position as a basic
energy exporter (Fedorov, 2006: 4). This idea was reiterated in
2000 after Vladimir Putin became the ruling party.
Immediately after Putin became president in 2000, he
introduced three new doctrines concerning security, military
and foreign policy (Öztürk, 2001: 19). Although the doctrines
were similar to their predecessors in terms of their definitions of
internal and external threats and foreign policy priorities, they
embodied some differences reflecting Putin’s original political
understanding. The most distinguishing feature of the relevant
doctrines was that they were more realistic and practical (İşyar,
2004: 70). They also reflected Russia’s reaction to the events in in
the Balkans and NATO’s intervention. Russia openly declared its
intention to resume the development of nuclear weapons to offset
these and possible future threats. In the event of a possible attack
with conventional, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction
targeting itself and/or its allies, the doctrines made it clear that
Russia would not hesitate to respond with its nuclear weapons.
The principle of “no first use”, in effect since the Brezhnev era,
was now abandoned. In the revision of 2000, Russia was now
clearly building its military policies on nuclear deterrence (Dağı,
56
2002a: 190). Using its nuclear trump card, Russia both maintained
its ‘great power’ claim and tried to deter potential threats to itself
(Freedman, 1999: 30).
Conclusions
There are different views in the literature regarding the
origins of the Russians and the Russian state that consist of two
categories –the Norman theory and anti-Norman views. The
Norman theory, which is widely accepted by the West, traces the
roots of Russian culture to the Normans, and claims they arrived
in the Russian lands in the 9th century and reigned until the mid-
11th century. Slavs, from this perspective of history, are therefore
given little credit of the formation of Russian culture and state.
The anti-Norman theory however instead suggested the history
of the Eastern Slavs as much older. The most prominent anti-
Norman consider Russians a mix of Eastern Slavs who settled
in forested regions and nomadic Turonian tribes of the Eurasian
Steppe. Leaving aside the theoretical discussions, the foundation
of modern Russia began with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which
succeeded in gathering other Russian city-states around itself
during the 15th century and which lasted for almost 240 years on
Russian soil.
Russian modernization was executed by tremendous
reforms imposed top-down by autocratic leaders, often with
violence. Neither the reforms nor the leaders did receive a
voluntary support from the public. In Russia, as it happened to
many other modernization movements that took place in non-
western societies, modernization was carried out by a small circle
of ruling elite for the state against the will and traditional values
of the society. These elites acted as a civilizing force and forced
the people to follow what they imposed from above without any
critics. Therefore, the people in Russia perceived modernization
as an external project and initially rejected it.
The Tsarist Russia has been one of the major powers of
Europe since its establishment. Russia began to spread its influence
over Europe, which was initially limited to Eastern Europe, but
gradually became one of the great powers of the European system
of states that emerged in the post-Westphalia period. Russia,
which lost its status and its influence in Europe after the Crimean
57
War, was destroyed by the Bolsheviks after 1917 Revolution.

Only after World War II did Russia become once again one of the
most powerful actors of the bipolar international system, with the
status of “superpower”. The Iron Curtain elevated it to the most
dangerous power of the European continent during the Cold War.
Opponents of the Tsarist regime took to the streets to
protest sparking the revolution on 8 March in1917 forcing the
Tsar to abdicate from the throne ending centuries of Romanov
rule. Despite efforts of the Duma to form a provisional
government while the Country remained in the war, and develop
a new constitutional order, unrest continued and a second coup
d’état in November of the same year overthrew the provisional
government. In its replacement, the Bolshevik wing of the Social
Democratic Party came to power in Russia, officially ending the
Tsarist Regime and entering Russia into a new period away from
the West. Despite the Western ideas and modernist structure on
which the revolution was built, the new regime and state shifted
to an ideologically and politically anti-Western stance.
Gorbachev’s reform process in domestic and foreign policy
brought an end to the Cold War. As a result, the characteristics of
the Soviet system, such as Party monopoly, closedness and national
unity were eroded. Foreign policies including the termination
of Soviet aid and the provision of member states to leave the
Warsaw Pact also led to the end of the Cold War. Additionally,
internal political developments in Eastern Europe between 1989-
1991 affected the disintegration process of the Soviets such as the
anti-communist movements which started in Poland, then spread
to other Central and Eastern European countries. The eventual
collapse of the Soviet Union came in December 1991 when the
Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed that the Soviet
Union no longer existed. Its successor, the new RF found itself in
a new era. Still, there has been historical continuity between the
Russian Federation and its predecessor, inheriting its international
status, obligations under international treaties, position in the UN
Security Council, diplomatic institutions, nuclear capacity, and a
majority of its conventional arms were transferred to Russia.
58
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63
3.
MATERIAL AND IDEATIONAL

FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN
FOREIGN POLICY
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vakur Sümer
Introduction
The Russian Federation (RF) is the largest country in
the world. The territory of Russia covers an area of about 17.1
million square kilometres, nearly 1/10 of the total land mass of
the world. The total length of the borders is almost 60 thousand
km – 14.5 km land, and 44.5 km sea (maritime borders). The great
length from north to south provides a big variation in climatic and
natural conditions. Similarly, the topography of Russia is very
diverse. The administrative structure of the Russian Federation
is comprised of 21 republics, 9 territories, 46 regions, 2 cities of
federal significance, 1 autonomous region, 4 autonomous districts.
The population of Russia as of 1 January 2019 equals
146.7 million. Most of the population lives in three regions: The
Central Federal District with 26.83% of the population, Volga
Federal District with 20%, and the Northwestern Federal District
with 11.21%. According to statistics, 189 ethnic groups live in
Russia, of which Russians have the majority with 80.9% in the
2010 census, followed by Tatars and Ukrainians with 3.9% and
1.4% respectively.
Russia features a diverse cultural and religious heritage,
thanks to the multinational structure of the country. For centuries
Russia was influenced by the cultures of other nations, which
made it more versatile, as well as rich. There also exists four main
religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia transitioned
from a command to a market economy after reforms were
introduced in early 1990s. As of 2017, the Russian Federation
has a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1,577,524 million,
which makes it the 11th largest economy in the world. In terms
of purchasing power parity (PPP) however, its GDP amounts to
$3,783,139 million, placing it 7th place among all other countries.
65
Additionally, Russia has one of the world’s largest and

powerful armed forces. According to Global Firepower’s 2019
world military strength rankings, Russia is ranked 2nd out of
137 countries. Of the 69.640 million available manpower cited,
46.659 million are considered fit-for-service. The total military
personnel are estimated at 3.586 million, including 1.014 million
active personnel and 2.572 million reserve personnel. Russia is
one of the few countries which holds nuclear weapons, along with
a strong navy and state-of-the-art conventional weaponry.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian
foreign policy has undergone many transformations over the last
30 years and faced many new challenges related to the changing
international political environment. However, as this chapter will
demonstrate, many ideas and values embedded in contemporary
Russian foreign policy are deeply rooted in Russian history and
culture. The aim of this chapter is to explore the material and
ideational foundations of Russian foreign policy. In the proceeding
sections, this chapter examines the geography, demography,
culture, religion, economy, military, and ideas.
Geography
The Russian Federation (RF) has a unique geographical
and geopolitical position. It occupies 30% of the territory in the
eastern part of Europe and about 70% in the northern part of
Asia. In the north, the extreme continental point of the country is
Chelyuskin Cape, located on the Taimyr Peninsula. The southern
boundary of the continent is located on the crest of the main
Caucasian ridge, the site that borders Dagestan and Azerbaijan. In
the west, the frontier point is the Sand Spit, located in the waters
of the Baltic Sea, close to Kaliningrad. In the east, the extreme
point related to the mainland is Dezhneva Cape in Chukotka. The
furthest point relating to the islands is located on the Rotmanova
Island. This island is in the Bering Sea, near the border with the
United States (Black, et al, 2015). Given the enormity of the
Russian territory, the country has ten-time zones determined
by the meridians. In areas with a high population density, these
boundaries are determined by the administrative subjects of the
federation.
As previously stated, the total length of the borders is
66
MATERIAL AND IDEATIONAL FOUNDATIONS
almost 60 thousand km – 14.5 of them are land borders and 44.5

km of Russian territory is coved by the sea (maritime borders).
The water border (the end of territorial waters) is located 22.7 km
from the coast. The marine economic zone (exclusive economic
zone) of Russia is in the seawaters stretching 370 km off the coast.
The sea borders of the country pass through the waters of three
oceans. In the north, the RF’s sea borders are located in the Arctic
Ocean. From the north, the country is surrounded by the Arctic
Ocean, and from the east, by the Pacific. From the west, Russia
has access to the Azov, Black, and Baltic seas of the Atlantic
Ocean. There are five seas in the north: the Barents, Kara, Laptev,
East Siberian, and Chukchi. The territory located from the north
coast of the country to the North Pole is the Russian sector of the
Arctic. Within this space, all the islands, apart from a few islands
of the Svalbard archipelago, belong to Russia. In the eastern part
of Russia, it borders the Pacific Ocean and the smaller seas of the
Pacific basin, located very close to Japan and the United States.
Russia is separated from the territories of Japan by the Strait of
Laperuz, located in the Sea of Japan between Sakhalin Island and
Hokkaido Island. In the west, the maritime boundary is in the
waters of the Baltic Sea. Through these expanses of water, Russia
is associated with several European countries: Sweden, Poland,
Germany and the Baltic states. The southwestern sea border
of Russia includes the Azov, Caspian, and Black Sea. These
water borders separate Russia from Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria,
Türkiye, and Romania. Through the Black Sea, Russia has access
to the Mediterranean Sea (Blinnikov, 2011).
Along with extended sea borders, Russia has extensive land
borders that separate it from 14 countries, extending 1,605 km.
990 km of these border falls on the Baltic countries, and 615 km
on Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia has land borders with China,
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Norway and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Semenov 2015, 19).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the border with
Poland decreased. Currently, only the Kaliningrad region is
associated with this European country. Changes have occurred on
the border with China, decreasing by half. Borders with Norway
and Finland are designated by international agreements, and with
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries they
67
are condition. Currently, there are no special treaties defining

these boundaries. Russian troops monitor the security of the
borders of many countries of the former Soviet Union. Currently,
several countries have territorial disputes with Russia, and many
have complained of Russia’s advancements on their borders e.g.,
Japan, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Japan for example, argues
four Kuril Islands (Kunashir, Shikotan, Khaboshan, and Iturup)
are part of its territory, while Estonia has claimed the Pechora
region, the Pytalovsky district of Latvia and the lands of Karelia
in Finland are part of its territory. In addition, as a result of the
Crimea annexation by Russia, Moscow gained convenient access
to the sea and well-equipped ports in the west. Since 2014, Crimea
has remained a disputed territory between Russia and Ukraine,
with both sides officially recognizing it as part of their countries.
Additionally, Russia also has 7 large lakes as shown in Table
1. In the European part, each lake has an area of more than 1,000
km2, and in the Asian part, the largest lake in Asia – Lake Baikal
located, has an area of 32,000 km2. Russia has numerous strong
and long rivers. The main volume of the water flows from the
biggest rivers of Volga, Don, Amur, Lena, Yenisei, Ob, Northern
Dvina, Pechora, which are formed within the country and only
about 5% comes from the territories of neighbouring states.
Table 3.1:
Medium-Year Reserves of Water in the Largest Lakes and Water
Reservoirs
Lakes Cubic km Reservoirs Cubic km
Ladoga 911 Tsimlyanskoe 23.7

Onega 292 Rybinskoe 26.3
Sayano-
Hanka 18.3 31.3
Shushenskoye
Baikal 23,000 Kuibyshevskoe 58.0
Krasnoyarskoe 73.3
Volgogradskoe 31.5
Bratskoye 170
Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, (Rosstat 2017).
68
Russia is situated in 4 climatic zones, providing the country

with enormous variation in climatic and natural conditions – the
arctic, subarctic, temperate (temperate continental, continental,
sharply continental, monsoonal) and subtropical. The physical
geography of Russia as illustrated in Table 2 consists of: the arctic
semi-deserts and deserts, tundra and forest-tundra, taiga, mixed
and deciduous forests, forest-steppes and steppes, hard-leaved
evergreen forests and shrubs, and high-altitude zones.
Table 3.2:
Land Area of Russia (1000 Km)
2001 2006 2014 2015 2016

Total land 1,709.8 1,709.8 1,709.8 1,712.5 1,712.5
Agricultural land 221.1 220.7 220.2 220.2 222.1
Forest land 871.5 870.6 871.8 871.8 870.7
Surface waters
12.8 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2
(including swamps)
Other lands 398.2 393.4 392.8 392.9 392.9

As a percentage of the total area
Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, (Rosstat 2017).
The topography of Russia is very diverse, which is also due

to its vast territory and peculiarities of the tectonic structure. Most
of the country is occupied by the East European, West Siberian,
Central Siberian Plateau plains. The mountains are located
mainly along the southern and eastern borders of the country. The
Caucasus Mountains are located between the Caspian and Black
Seas, along the southern border stretched ridges of the Altai,
Sayan Mountains, and the Stanovoi Range. Along the east coast
are the ridges of Chersky, Verkhoyansk, and Sikhote-Alin.
The geographical position of the country causes significant
severity in some cases as with permafrost, which spreads over
64% of the country’s territory causing difficulties in the country’s
connectivity and economic development. Russia is placed in
the most severe northeastern part of Eurasia. The rural locality
of Oymyakon for example has the coldest recorded records in
the Northern Hemisphere. 65% of Russian territory lies north of
69
60° N. and only 5% of the country is south of 50° N. About 140

million people are concentrated in the northern territory, making
Russia the only country in the world that has a population in such
high latitudes.
These northern specifics of Russia leave their mark on the
living conditions of people and the development of the economy.
It requires the creation of technology and equipment to remove
snow from the roads and additional fuel reserves for the operation
of equipment at low temperatures. All of this involves not only
the organization of special industries, but also enormous material
resources such as energy and huge monetary investments.
The climate of Russia also causes restrictions in the
development of agriculture. The country is in the zone of risky
farming. There is not enough heat for the development of crops in
the north and moisture for them in the south, so crop failures and
crop shortages are common in domestic agriculture. This required
the creation of significant state grain reserves. Severe conditions
limit the ability to grow high-yielding forage crops. Instead
of sufficiently heat-loving soybeans and corn in Russia, it is
necessary to grow mainly oats, which do not produce high yields.
These factors, together with the cost of stalling cattle, affect the
cost of livestock production. Therefore, state subsidies are vital
for sustaining the farming population as well as sustaining food-
security of the country.
Russia possesses huge reserves of natural resources,
constituting about 20% of world reserves. This predetermines the
raw material orientation of the Russian economy. The country
needs to use significant portions of its energy resources for its own
purposes. To maintain the same standard of living as in Western
Europe, Russia needs to spend 2 to 3 times more energy than most
of the European countries. In order to survive one winter without
freezing, each resident of Russia, depending on his/her region
of residence, requires from 1 to 5 tons of fuel per year. For all
residents of the country, it will be at least 500 million tons ($40
billion at current world fuel prices).
Demography, Nationalities and Minorities

Historically, the Soviet Union did not have an issue with
its demographic status, and the population continuously rose until
70
the end of the 1980s. The population of Russia reached its peak
in 1992 with 148.6 million people (World Bank, 2019). Since
1993, the number of the population has continuously fallen. To
understand this dramatic population decline, it is important to
examine the last two decades, where we can observe two shock
periods – the first in the early 1990s, and the second at the end of
the 1990s. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was
an increase in economic and political uncertainty which sharply
affected the decisions of families to have children.
The demographic situation of the Country has been
influenced by several factors which have affected the population
growth. One of the most important aspects is the balance between
birth and death rates. The birth rate in Russia, during the 1986-
1994 period, drastically fell from 17.2 people per thousand people
in 1986 to 9.4 people in 1994; while death rates increased from
10.4 people per thousand people in 1986 to 15.7 people in 1994
(World Bank, 2019). Another important factor is the total fertility
rate. According to the United Nations, countries needs to have at
least a 2.1 fertility rate per woman during their lifetime to have
sustainable population growth. During the Soviet Union era, the
fertility rate did not fall under this threshold until its collapse. In
the late 1980s, the total fertility rate was above 2 until 1986, with
a fertility rate of 2.15. Then it decreased to 1.4 in 1994, losing
almost one-third of its growth level. This falling trend continued
until 1999, dropping to 1.15, one of the lowest levels in the world
at that time. During this period the life expectancy also decreased
from 69.3 years in 1986, to 64.4 years in 1994 (World Bank,
2019).
Despite these negative trends, population figures started to
recover and stabilize between 1994-1998. However, the economic
conditions between 1998-9, negatively affected the population
growth in Russia. 1998 was recorded as one of the lowest figures
in different aspects of the economy, effecting the population
dynamics in Russia. For instance, birth rates were at their record
low with 8.3 people per thousand followed by the death rates
at 13.5 people per thousand. The total fertility rate fell to 1.15
in 1999, one of the lowest levels in Russia’s registered history
(World Bank, 2019). The age dependency ratio, which started
at 50.8% in 1994 and dropped to 46.8% in 1998, also continued
to fall until 2010 dropping to 38.8%. According to experts, any
ratio below 50% is considered alarming for the labor market and
71
economy since it increases the weight of the workforce on the

shoulders of the younger generation. The increase in the number
of people above 65 years old and the fall in the number of new
birth rates have caused a reduction in the age dependency ratio
(World Bank, 2019).
The second demographic shock was associated with
the economic crisis in Russia due to the Russian Ruble crisis
and fall in the price of oil in 1998. In 1998 oil prices were at
a record low level where the price of the oil per barrel dropped
to $17.3 (Macrotrends, 2019). The fluctuation in oil prices had
a significant macro-level effect on the Russian economy since
oil a major source of income. This helps explain the decrease in
birth rates in Russia as a correlation has been found between the
economic conditions of a country and the decision of families to
have a child.
To further illustrate this correlation, the demographic
growth rates sharply increased from 2005-2010 after oil prices
hiked up from 2004 - 2008, reaching a historical record of $162.6
in June 2008 and has since then continued to gradually grow.
This trend has been supported and even reached a surplus by the
decrease in the number of death rates and with the support from
permanent immigration to Russia (Rosstat, 2016).
In addition to the recovering economy, the Russian
government attempts to improve the conditions of migration and
birth rates have had a positive effect over population numbers in
the country. 2007 was a turning point for the population statistics
when immigration and work permit regulations were eased and
simplified for the Post-Soviet Union countries’ citizens which
allowed more migrants to arrive including permanent migrants
who settled in Russia. The Government also introduced a family
program initiative offering financial aid for families to encourage
them to have children. The Program was successful in reaching
its goals in a short period of time, enabling the total fertility rate to
rise from 1.3 in 2006 to 1.75 in 2014, covering most of the losses
that occurred in the 1990s (Kashina and Yukina, 2009).
The main aim of the family program was to encourage
families to have more than one child by providing additional
financial assistance. Surveys found that families were hesitant to
have additional children due to economic reasons (Arkhangelsky
et al., 2015). One survey for example shared 50% of the
72
participants showed a desire to have a second child, but only 15%

of them had one. To help families fulfill their desire of having a
second child and providing a solution to its demographic problem
naturally, the Russian government initiated the family support
package program (Arkhangelsky et al., 2015).
One of the key features of the program was the maternity
capital assistance. Families for example, in 2007 received
financial assistance in the amount of 250,000 rubles which was
equivalent to around $9,800. However, families only received
these funds when their child reached the age of 3 (Kashina and
Yukina, 2009). The program has since then been modified and
developed, contributing to the financial situation of families by
allowing them to benefit from certain tax reductions. As of 2014,
the amount of maternity capital has also risen to 429,000 rubles
equivalent of $12,300 (Pension Fund, 2014).
In terms of the geographical distribution the most populous
areas include big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and
regions like Krasnodar Krai, Tyumen Oblast, Dagestan and
Chechnya. Migrants tend to gravitate towards the bigger cities
like Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the bigger regions, most of
the population includes ethnic minorities, especially Muslims,
who have significantly contributed to the growth rate of the
population. For instance, in Chechnya and Dagestan, Muslims
make up 14.93% and 6.2% of the population respectively, with
larger growth rates than in the other regions.
The demographic dynamics of Russia can in part be
explained by the role of ethnic groups (Rosstat, 2010; Rosstat,
2018). Although ethnic Russians make up the majority of the
population, their numbers have declined for the past three decades.
In the 1989 census, it indicated that the share of Russians was
81.5% which fell in 2002 to 80.6% however slightly making
some gains in 2010 reaching 80.9%. Moreover, the Slavic group
is also decreasing, declining by 2.3% between 1989-2010 which
includes Tatars, Ukrainians, and Russians. On the other hand,
smaller minority groups such as Bashkirs, Chechens, Armenians
and Avars have increased 0.23%, 0.43%, 0.5% and 0.29%
respectively (Rosstat, 2010; Rosstat, 2018).
73
Chart 3.1:
Russian Federation’s Ethnic Structure after the Soviet Union
(mid-1990s)
Source: Eurasian Geopolitics website: https://eurasiangeopolitics.com
For the foreseeable future, Russia’s policies aiming to boost

the growth of population needs to be practical and not politicized
to reach their full potential. Future forecasts of the Russian
demographic statistics indicate the population in the country will
continue to decrease unless there is a significant increase in the
number of natural growth rates and the immigration flows into
the country. To give the growth process of the population another
push, as was done during the 2007-2014 period, government
initiatives, regarding the demographic situation in the country,
needs to be revitalized under the current circumstances and aim
to solve the problems of the stagnation that started to occur after
2014.
Economy and Natural Resources

The Russian Federation was proclaimed as an independent
country on December 25, 1991. During the 5th Congress of
the People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist
Republic (RSFSR) held October 28, 1991, Boris Yeltsin, who had
been elected as the first President of the Russian Federation on
June 12, 1991, proclaimed a program of fundamental economic
reforms aimed at transition from a planned economy to a market
74
economy starting on January 1, 1992. The transition began on

January 2, 1992 with the liberalization of prices followed by
the liberalization of foreign trade and massive privatization of
state-owned enterprises. Liberalized trade conditions, low tariffs,
and price differentials on tradable goods between domestic and
foreign markets quickly increased the amount of exports of many
important primary commodities and allowed cheap imported
consumer goods to rush into to the domestic market changing
the prices. Rapid growth of the exports of primary commodities
such as crude oil, natural gas and metals ensured a large inflow of
foreign currencies essentially important for balancing the current
account. On the other hand, a wide range of manufacturing
industries that previously existed under the planned economy
instantly turned out to be uncompetitive and collapsed under the
pressure of the market conditions.
Privatization was another important economic reform
in Russia that began in 1992. All enterprises, except for large
enterprises of special strategic importance e.g. natural resource
deposits, pipelines, roads and other infrastructural facilities of
common use, were subject to transfer from state ownership to
different forms of private ownership. As of 1990, the total price
of stock on privatized enterprises exceeded $1.0 trillion. From
1993 to 2003 over 145,000 state enterprises were sold to private
ownership for a total sum of $9.7 billion (Dzutseva and Khalyava,
2017).
One of the most important and urgent reforms for economic
transition, was the monetary reform carried out from July 26 to
December 31, 1993. The reform aimed to stop the circulation of
bank notes issued by the State Bank of the Soviet Union and those
of the Bank of Russia within 1961–1992 and replace them with
new bank notes in 1993. It was important to carry out the reform
as soon as possible since many post-Soviet countries had already
begun to issue their own currencies and old bank notes could have
flooded the Russian economy causing high inflation rates.
The radical structural economic transition reforms of the
first half of 1990s brought dramatic changes to the economy
of Russia establishing the basics for market conditions that
served as a base for subsequent transformations. However, these
economic reforms were implemented improperly under extreme
conditions and within short periods of time. 40% of the GDP
75
declined between 1991 and 1996 and a massive contraction of

many industries caused an unprecedented crisis with severe
socio-economic consequences (EBRD, 1997). The share of the
population living under the poverty line rose from less than 5% in
1989 to over 33.5% in 1992 (Rosstat, 2018).
At the same time, the privatization reform of 1992 was non-
transparent and many enterprises were sold to private ownership
at prices much lower that their market value. As a result, huge
amounts of wealth were accumulated in the hands of a few
billionaires that became owners of large privatized enterprises.
Consequently, privatization and the devastating deterioration of
the welfare system led to a tremendous income stratification of the
households. Although there were certain signs of recovery after
1992-1993, the number of households living below the poverty
line reached 11% by 1995 (Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998).
The liberalization of trade in 1992 benefited the Russian
economy, as it ensured the inflow of foreign currency and
contributed to the establishment of the fundamentals of the
market economy. For instance, in 1992 Russian exports more
than quadrupled, reaching a record high of $286 billion. Despite
this positive trend, poor trade regulations, shortages of many
consumer products and similar crisis in neighbouring post-Soviet
countries, caused illegal trade activities to increase, contributing
to the shadow economy. The situation was highly aggravated by
hyperinflation, which never fell below 100% per annum between
1991 and 1995, and in 1992 hit the record high of 2,500% per
annum (World Bank, 1998).
Although the rates of inflation gradually decreased after
1992, this did not improve the investment climate. Therefore,
fighting inflation was the priority task of the Central Bank and
one of the main objectives of the Government of Russia. Strong
measures aimed at reducing the inflation such as excessive
monetary cuts and fixing the ruble exchange rate above its
market value. This however led to detrimental side effects such
as the decline in competitiveness of domestic products, non-
cash exchange of goods and services, widespread delays of wage
payments and social benefits.
By 1997, the Russian economy became highly dependent
on financial borrowing on foreign capital markets. Weak
institutions and the devastated real-estate sector of the economy
76
was not capable of attracting capital investments at interest rates

comparable to developed markets. At the same time, the period
before 1998 was largely a failure in terms of investments, and
during the 1993-97 period, Russia had a Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) inflow of only 0.38% percent of the GDP (World Bank,
1998).
Moreover, oil prices continued their decline between 1997-
1998, reducing the essentially important foreign currency inflows
into the economy. The government responded by increasing the
interest rates so that by the second quarter of 1998, the sovereign
rates on short-term government bonds went as high as 49.2%. The
interest rates kept increasing to the point where the government
was no longer capable of paying its liabilities. Then on August 17,
1998, the Central Bank of Russia announced a technical default on
government bonds, which marked the beginning of the economic
crisis in Russia. Soon after, a switch to a floating exchange rate
of the ruble was announced, fixing it within a corridor of 6-9.5
rubles per US dollar. However, by the end of 1998 the exchange
rate broke the established corridor going beyond 15 rubles per US
dollar.
The economic crisis of 1998 that hit Russia was a serious
challenge that revealed the main weaknesses and failures of the
macroeconomic policy that had been implemented since 1992.
The liberalization measures taken by the Russian government
before 1998, vague achievements in the structural reforms, and
excessive exposure to external factors together led to a sharp crisis.
As a result, the GDP of Russia in1998 was - 5.3%. The effects of
the crisis fortunately did not last long, and in 1999, the economy
started to recover showing a GDP growth rate of 6.4% by the end
of the year. The crisis of 1998 in Russia made the government
reconsider its economic policy, conduct certain structural reforms
and establish necessary conditions for economic growth in
subsequent years.
The year 2000 marked a new period in the economic
development of the Russian Federation, when the most painful
and necessary economic transitions were finished, and new global
economic trends were instead put into place to start shaping the
economic evolution of the country. The year 2000 also marked the
end of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, and the beginning of the
presidency of Vladimir Putin, who took the office May 7, 2000.
77
The period from 2000-2010 was characterized by a

booming economic growth in Russia, during which the GDP of the
country grew by 85%. The period of rapid economic growth was
only temporarily interrupted during the crisis of 2008-2009. The
driving force of the economic growth was the increasing oil prices
and gas that became the main export commodity of Russia. Several
important trends characterized the economic trajectory of Russia.
Firstly, the Russian economy gradually became highly dependent
on exports of primary commodities such as crude oil, natural gas
and metals. Secondly, exports of large amounts of oil and its rising
price ensured rapid growth of the average oil productivity and
income of households in the economy, turning Russia into a high
middle-income economy. From 2000 to 2008 for example, the
income from the annual export of primary commodities was more
than 20 times greater than the yearly income from manufactured
exports (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010). Thirdly, Putin, during his
first presidential term, implemented various reforms increasing
the retirement funds, reducing the share of government in the
economy and decreasing the overregulation in the private sector
that helped to bring forward the economy after the crisis (Cooper,
2009).
However, many of these reforms were reversed in several
years’ time. From 2004 to 2006, the government restored its control
over previously privatized companies in some important sectors
of industry and finance. As a result, the share of the government
in the oil sector alone, increased from 16.0% in 2003 to 33.5%
in 2005 (OECD, 2006). This measure to diversify exports was
ineffective and predetermined the vulnerability of the Russian
economy to external shocks that occurred in 2008-2009 as well
as in 2014.
The paradigm that dominates the economic evolution of
Russia since 2009-2010 is the Eurasian integration. On November
28th, the heads of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Dmitry
Medvedev, Alexander Lukashenko and Nursultan Nazarbayev
met to create in the territory of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
as a single customs area starting from January 1, 2010. On July
1, 2011, the customs control between the three countries was
eliminated and they started to function as a single customs zone.
After tedious trilateral cooperation on the harmonization of the
economic policies, starting from January 1, 2015, the Customs
78
Union was converted into the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia

became the fourth country to join the union January 2, 2015 and
later August 12, of the same year Kyrgyzstan became one of the
members of the EEU. On May 29 of 2015, EEU member states
signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Vietnam that came
into force in July of the same year. As of today, negotiations on
FTA are with Iran, Cuba, Serbia, Egypt, Thailand and several
other states are underway.
Currently, Russia has the largest natural gas reserves of
around 47.8 trillion cubic meters or nearly 23.7 % of the world’s
natural gas reserves (IES, 2018-a). Russia also has the 8th largest
oil reserves of about 80 billion barrels, which is roughly 5% of the
world’s total oil reserves (IES, 2018-b). Apart from that, Russia
accounts for the 4th largest coal reserves of about 70 billion tons
(knoema.com). Russia also ranks in the top position of many other
essentially important metals, non-metal minerals, timber etc.
Abundant natural resources play an important role in the Russian
economy. From the early 1990s onwards, the export of natural
gas, oil and other minerals have become the main drivers of the
Russian economy. In 2017, the share of the extractive sector in
the total export of Russian goods reached 62.4%, oil and the gas
sector provided 36% of the revenue growth of the budget system
and over 70% of the federal budget (Stolypin Growth Economy
Institute). High dependence on oil and gas exports, however,
continue to make the Russian economy highly sensitive to the
volatility of prices of these primary commodities.
Military Power, Defence and the Sector of Security

Russia possesses one of the world’s largest and powerful
armed forces. According to Global Firepower ranked Russia 2nd
out of 137 countries in world military strength (2019). Of 69.640
million available manpower, 46.659 million are considered fit-for-
service. The total military personnel are estimated at 3.586 million,
including 1.014 million active personnel and 2.572 million reserve
personnel (Global Firepower, 2019). The President of Russia is
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Military service is
mandatory for all male Russian citizens between 18 and 27 (with
a few exceptions), and the draft is implemented two times a year
– in the spring and autumn (Russian Federation, 2019; Isaeva,
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2016). Although the Russian army has a mixed conscript-contract

recruiting system, conscription remains the main mechanism for
staffing the army. As announced by Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu in March 2019, since 2012, the number of contract
soldiers in the Russian armed forces has more than doubled and
reached 394,000 people (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019). The term of
military service which used to be two years was reduced to 18
months in 2007 and to 12 months in 2008 (Barany, 2008).
The Russian Armed Forces were formed after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. In 1992, President Yeltsin signed edicts
establishing the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
and placed all former Soviet military units stationed on the
territory of Russia under its control (Schmemann, 1992). It is
estimated that Russia inherited about 85% of the Soviet Union’s
overall military strength, including manpower, equipment, and
defense enterprises, but it lacked economic resources, as well
as motivation, to maintain this military machine. As a result, in
1990s, the Russian army did not receive sufficient financial and
technical support, and the situation was aggravated by draft
dodging, desertions, poor morale, incompetence, corruption, and
resistance of the officer corps to reform attempts. This led to a
sharp decline of the army’s combat readiness, as illustrated by
the disastrous outcome of the First Chechen War for Moscow.
Under President Putin, assisted by rising oil prices, Russia started
to reform its military, reducing the size of the armed forces,
increasing budgetary support and announcing a gradual transition
to a professional army, but this initial effort was largely a failure
(Hays, 2008) The major structural reorganization of the Russian
Armed Forces began in 2008-2009, accelerated by Russia’s
military operational shortcomings revealed during the August
2008 Russo-Georgian War, and included the reform of the army’s
structure and chain of command, the reduction of its strength to
one million, and weapons modernization (Nichol, 2011). Russia
was able to demonstrate the full range of its renewed military
power capabilities during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria (Baev,
2015; Lavrov, 2018).
Currently, Russia possesses 21,932 combat tanks, 50,049
armored fighting vehicles, 6,083 self-propelled artilleries, 4,465
towed artilleries, and 3,860 rocket projectors, as well as 4,078
military aircraft, 1,485 military helicopters, and 352 naval vessels
(Global Firepower, 2019). In terms of structure, the Russian
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Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense are divided into

three branches – the Ground (Land) Forces, the Aerospace Forces,
and the Navy. In addition, there are two separate arms of service –
the Airborne Troops and the Strategic Missile Troops (Ministry of
Defence, 2019a). There are also other military entities, such as the
National Guard directly subordinated to the President of Russia
and the Border Service under the Federal Security Service.
The Ground Forces consist of the Motorized Rifle
Troops, Tank Troops, Missile Troops and Artillery, Air Defence
Troops, reconnaissance formations, Engineer Troops, Troops
of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence, and Signal
Communications Troops. The Motorized Rifle Troops are the most
numerous components of the Ground Forces formed by motorized
rifle brigades with high operational autonomy, versatility and
firepower. The Tank Troops are the main strike force of the
Ground Forces, which are mainly used to support the Motorized
Rifle Troops and are composed of tank brigades and battalions.
The Missile and Artillery Troops provide fire support during
combined-arms operations and consist of missile, rocket and
artillery brigades, including high-power mixed artillery battalions,
rocket artillery regiments, separate reconnaissance battalions, and
artillery of military bases. The Air Defence Troops are intended to
cover troops and facilities from enemy air attacks and equipped
with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft gun-
and-missile systems and portable anti-aircraft missile systems,
supported by radio-technical units. The reconnaissance formations
provide the military command with information about the enemy,
terrain and weather conditions, while the Engineer Troops render
engineering support to combat actions, such as the construction
of fortifications, installation of minefields and water purification.
The Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence are
tasked with protecting military units from radioactive, chemical
and biological contamination, and the Signal Communications
Troops are responsible for the deployment and technical support
of communications and automated control systems (Ministry of
Defence, 2019b).
The Aerospace Forces consist of the Air Force, Air and
Missile Defence Forces, and Space Forces. The Aerospace Forces
are tasked with preventing aggression in the aerospace, protecting
command and control posts, cities, industrial and economic areas,
important facilities, infrastructure, and the armed forces from air
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attacks, providing air support and destroying enemy troops and

objects using both conventional and nuclear ordnance, as well as
carrying out spacecraft launches and controlling satellite systems.
The Air Force’s aviation is divided into the long-range, front-
line, military transport and army aviation, which in turn can be
composed of the bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport
and special aircraft units (Ministry of Defence, 2019c).
The Navy consists of the Surface Forces, Submarine
Forces, Naval Aviation, and Coastal Troops. The Surface
Forces perform various combat missions, such as searching
and destroying enemy submarines, striking enemy surface
forces, landing amphibious assault forces, suppressing coastal
fire, mine laying and mine clearing, and protecting transport
and landing ships. The Submarine Forces that include strategic
missile nuclear-powered submarines, general purpose nuclear-
powered submarines and diesel-electric submarines are tasked
with striking important enemy ground facilities, searching and
destroying enemy submarines, aircraft carriers and other surface
ships, landing units, convoys, and transport vessels. The Naval
Aviation, divided into the deck-based and land-based aviation
consisting of aircraft and helicopters of various purposes, is
designed for conducting aerial reconnaissance, covering ships
from enemy air strikes and destroying enemy forces at sea. The
Coastal Troops, consisting of the Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops
and the Marine Infantry, are responsible for defending the naval
forces, land troops, population and facilities from enemy surface
ships, as well as air and amphibious assaults. The Marine Infantry
is also designed to conduct amphibious landings for capturing the
enemy’s naval bases, ports, islands, and other coastal facilities.
Geographically, the Navy is divided into the Northern Fleet, the
Pacific Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, and the Caspian
Flotilla (Ministry of Defence, 2019d).
The Airborne Troops are the elite and one of the most
important combat elements of the Russian Armed Forces. They
serve as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special
operations or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war.
For example, they played a crucial role in the 2014 annexation
of the Crimea. The Airborne Troops consist of two parachute
divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades,
along with a signals brigade and a reconnaissance brigade.
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30,000 servicemen and sergeants, or 70% of the Airborne Troops’

personnel, serve under contract (Kofman, 2019).
The Strategic Missile Troops control Russia’s land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles and consist of three missile
armies and 12 missile formations (Ministry of Defence, 2019e).
At present, Russia modernizes its strategic and non-strategic
nuclear forces replacing Soviet-era weapons with upgraded
systems. As of 2019, Russia is estimated to have a total inventory
of around 6,490 nuclear warheads, including a military stockpile
of 4,490 nuclear warheads assigned for use by long-range strategic
launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. Of these, 1,600
strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy
bomber bases, 1,070 strategic warheads are in storage along with
about 1,820 non-strategic warheads, while about 2,000 retired
warheads are awaiting dismantlement (Kristensen and Korda,
2019). Russia justifies its increased reliance on and modernization
of nuclear weapons and its plans for the deployment of a global
anti-ballistic missile system by the unilateral withdrawal of the
United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and
Washington’s recently announced unilateral withdrawal from the
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
The range of new weapon systems presumably developed
by Russia, as presented by President Putin, includes a new heavy
(200 tons) intercontinental ballistic missile called Sarmat with
multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads that can attack
targets both via the North and South poles and an air-launched
cruise missile powered by a small nuclear propulsion unit, with
President Putin claiming that both systems are invincible against
all existing and prospective missile and air defence systems. Other
weapons mentioned by Putin include a dual-capable unmanned,
nuclear-powered submersible vehicle that can operate at extreme
ocean depths and has an intercontinental range, a high-precision,
hypersonic air-launched missile system called Kinzhal (Dagger), a
strategic missile system with a gliding wing unit called Avangard
(Avant-garde), as well as laser weapon systems (President of
Russia, 2018).
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Ideas and ideologies in the Tsarist and the Soviet

Periods
As the names of the periods suggest, Russian foreign policy
was made in accordance with the types of regimes and ideologies:
Tsarism during the reign of tsars, and Marxism/Socialism between
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the end of the Soviet Union
in 1991.
1. Tsarism as the foreign policy of tsars: Russia began its
expansionism policy under the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (or Ivan the
Terrible). Constant raids from Kazan and Astrakhan Khanate
however caused him significant foreign policy obstacles. After
solving this problem, it was possible to take over control of
Siberia. Ivan the Terrible was also interested in access to the sea,
and therefore sought approval in the Baltics. Thus, foreign policy
was divided into southern, western and eastern directions. After
Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates fell; the Nogai Horde, wandering
east of the Volga, recognized its dependence on Russia. Also, most
of Bashkiria and Chuvashia on voluntary terms were attached to
Russia in 1577. Then, in 1584, parts of Siberia were conquered.
At the same time, the policy in the Northern direction for the
breakthrough to the Baltic ultimately did not bring success.
After the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584, Russia’s
medieval Rurik Dynasty fell and caused political turmoil for 15
years. It wasn’t until 1613 that expansionism resumed, when
the Romanov dynasty took over the power. Russia continued to
expand over the next three centuries till the imperialist dynasty
was toppled by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
In the earlier years of the Romanov dynasty, it became
apparent that the country technically lagged far behind European
powers and needed to modernize. Peter I, (or Peter the Great),
the grandson of the first Romanov Tsar Mikhail I, launched large-
scale transformations that increased the country’s capabilities
and strengthened Russia’s foreign policy. First, he attempted to
improve Russia’s access to the southern seas and make Russia
a maritime power. To succeed with this goal, his first military
efforts were directed at the Ottoman Turks. At the end of the 17th
century Ottoman Turks waged war on many European countries.
To take advantage of the Ottomans’ weakened position, Russia
launched the Azov campaigns in 1695 and 1696 and succeeded to
capture the Fortress of Azov, although only temporarily. Russia’s
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occupation of Azov in 1696 was symbolic, as it was the first time

it had access to a year-round usable port. Access to the Baltic Sea
became one of the key directions of his foreign policy. Following
Peter, the Great’s victory in the European fronts, he decided to
explore Asia. Russia sought to establish closer ties with Central
Asia. However, efforts were put on hold for another 150 years,
after his expedition against Khiva was destroyed by the Khan’s
troops.
Catherine II (or Catherine the Great), empress to Russia
for over 30 years (1762-1796), focused on establishing friendly
relations with other states. By establishing contacts with leading
international powers, she tried to elevate the position of Russia
in the international arena. Despite attempts to peacefully resolve
conflicts, for example, the partition of Poland, she was always
ready to use war to achieve her goals. Returning the partition of
Poland under Catherine II, the Russian foreign policy gradually
began to manifest a factor in the protection of the Orthodox
population, which it used to expand its territories. The formal
reason for interfering in the internal affairs of Poland was to equate
the rights of the Orthodox with Catholics. The same applied to
Georgia, which sought the protection of the Orthodox population
from Türkiye and Persia, after the country signed an agreement
under which the kingdom became a protectorate of Russia. The
most striking manifestation of the protection of the Orthodox
would be the period of Alexander II and his military in the Balkans
to expand its influence and again increase the territory.
In general, Catherine’s foreign policy was imperial in
nature and was characterized by expansionism, neglect by the
interests of other nations, and to a certain extent was aggressive.
The foreign policy results of Catherine’s 34 years reign were
significant territorial acquisitions and the final consolidation of
the status of Russia as a great power.
The foreign policy of Russia as a great power did not
undergo any fundamental changes until the end of the reign of the
Romanovs. The Russian Empire gained power after the victory
against Napoleon (1812) and became the main continental power
in Europe. However, after the Crimean War (1853-56), it gradually
weakened. Despite Russia’s need to modernize, its lack of reforms
resulted in a decisive defeat from Japan. The humiliating defeat
later served as a reason of the Russian Revolution 1905-1907.
85
In the end, Russia was dragged into WWI, which devastated

and destroyed its resources and ended the 300 years of the
Romanovs Dynasty rule. Russia became the main engine of the
Soviet Union (1917-91). The Soviet Union’s “superpower” status
following WWII (1939-45), up until late 1980s, contributed to the
continuation of Russia’s self-image of “great power”. However,
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic
plight of Russia left a widespread legacy of self-perception of
weakness across the population, which was only overcome in
2000s.
2. The Soviet Union and Marxism/Socialism: The Soviet
Union (1917-91) embraced Marxism, a form of socialism, as its
main ideology. As the victors of the 1917 Revolution, Bolsheviks
rejected all forms of nationalism and instead embraced a
progressive, revolutionary discourse. According to the founding
father Vladimir Lenin, the corrupted capitalist-imperialist
western world was entering a phase of collapse and was destined
to be replaced by socialist governments around the globe. For
this reason, Soviets supported revolutionary and anti-colonial
struggles in other parts of the world.
However, by 1922 it became apparent that the Soviet
Union had failed to trigger a world revolution. Therefore, Soviet
diplomacy had to change and compromise its revolutionary aspects
and instead it sought diplomatic recognition and acceptance from
foreign powers as equal to the world’s great powers. Additionally,
it wanted to create opportunities to develop economically by
expanding and continuing channels for international trade.
Once power was again conciliated, particularly during
Joseph Stalin’s time, the Soviet administration turned into a
so-called “slavophile”. Following the World War II, Stalin
used communist solidarity instrumentally to build an Eastern
bloc. Therefore, starting from Stalin, Soviet statesmen used
the communist ideology as a rather loose guideline for their
pragmatically oriented foreign policy.
Post-Soviet Foreign Policy

After 1991, the Russian Federation’s foreign policy entered
an era of flux, where several strands of thought resurfaced to
find a viable replacement for Marxism. Since the collapse of the
86
Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has undergone a number of

transformations and several stages of formation. At the same time,
it has faced new challenges related to the changing international
political environment. Russian foreign policy can be divided
into three phases: 1991-1996, 1996-2007, and 2007-2014. The
post-2014 period remains uncertain, as it is unclear whether it
represents the continuation of the third stage, or a fourth new
stage.
Before discussing the recent developments in Russian
foreign policy, it is important to examine three strands of thought
that existed in the post-1991 era: Westernizers (Atlanticists),
Slavophiles (Nationalists), and Eurasianists (Geopolitical) and
how they continue to influence Russian thinking about the Russian
identity and the orientation of the state (Nugraha 2018).
1. Westernizers (Atlanticists): In the early 1840s and 1850s,
two intellectual movements emerged in Russian thinking about
the Russian identity and orientation of state. They were called the
Westernizers and Slavophiles. Westernizers argued that Russia
needed to follow the steps of the “Western civilization” and adopt
the Western socio-political system, civil society and culture as
models for its development. The reforms undertaken by Peter the
Great served as an example. Pioneers of westernizers included
the poet Konstantin Batyushkov, and writer and journalist Ivan
Panayev. Moscow and St. Petersburg were the main centers where
westernizers gathered (Sputnik, 2010).
For Westernizers, establishing a bourgeois-based democratic
system by peaceful means was possible. They rejected feudalism
and serfdom in the economy, political life and culture, and called
for Western-style socio-economic reforms. They focused on the
commonalities between Russia and rest of Europe, rather than on
disagreements. Russia’s socio-economic backwardness could be
overcome by imitating the progress-embracing European system,
rather than through unique elements of Russia’s national culture.
Westernizers were basically influenced by theorists like Johann
von Schiller, Georg Hegel and Friedrich Schelling, Ludwig von
Feuerbach, Auguste Comte and Henri de Saint Simon (Sputnik,
2010).
Westernizers later became one of the political approaches
in the post-Cold War Russian foreign policy. The Kozyrev
doctrine, adopted in the first term of Yeltsin era, defined Russia’s
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identity as the new liberal democracy and market economy

along with the Western architecture. The Doctrine, named after
Yeltsin’s Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Kozyrev, was presented
as the re-joining to the West and proclaimed Russia’s support in
the transition to democracy and market economy (Smith, 1999,
482, cited in Nugraha, 2018). It proclaimed the idea of a strategic
union of the Russian Federation and the United States, implying
a gradual integration of Russia into the economic structures and
Western values in exchange for assistance in the implementation
of liberal reforms. Russia however failed to create a meaningful
partnership with the USA and China which was a major setback
to the westernizers.
Nevertheless, the Westernizer input is still evident in
Russian foreign policy as Russia continues to try to build strategic
partnership with the European Union in order to overcome
the marginalization it faced in 2000s onwards and to secure
uninterrupted oil and gas exports. It also hoped that a more
independent European security re-structuring can undermine the
US supremacy in European affairs. However, the Crimea crisis
seemed to have caused a further fragmentation of Russia from
the EU, which contributed to raise of doubts about the Russian
identity as a western country.
2. Slavophiles (Nationalists and Pan-Slavists): The
Slavophile movement which started in the 1840s, sought to
restore the role of Russia’s Orthodox Church as the “Third Rome”
(Nugraha 2018). Slavophiles criticized the Westernization efforts,
arguing that Russia’s destiny was not a European one. Instead,
they called for a unique Russian way. Slavophile thinking was
largely supported by educated people and landowners. However,
the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimea war in 1854-56
highlighted the reality that it was not as strong as they thought.
This led to the emergence of the Pan-Slavic movement. Pan-
Slavic thinking called for the unity of Slavic people despite their
religious, linguistic and geopolitical differences under Russia
leadership (Nugraha, 2018).
The influence of Slavophile and the Pan-Slavism movement
became more visible at the beginning of the 20th Century when
the Russian Tsar devoted more attention to Asia. His interest
in the Far East was demonstrated in “The conquest of Siberia,
the construction of Trans-Siberia railway from Moscow to
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Vladivostok, and the sending millions of peasants” (Nugraha,

2018, 99). The underlying aim of Pan-Slavists thinking, was to
gather all people in Eurasia region that fell within the borders of
the Empire and reinforce specific values of Eurasia.
3. Eurasianism: Eurasianist ideas resurfaced in the Soviet
Union in late 1980s within Parniat, an organization that formerly
encompassed most of the Russian nationalist movement (Laurelle,
2008). Eurasianists opposed Gorbachev’s New Thinking. They
argued that the Russia-Western interdependence concept of
Gorbachev weakened the country and made Russia dependent on
other countries, especially Western ones. The term “Eurasianism”
was rediscovered (often called as Neo-Eurasianism) during
the final years of perestroika, particularly around the figure of
Alexander Dugin. Dugin supported Eurasianism as a member
of the Den’s editorial board: “Dugin argued that throughout the
history two types of states or empires have existed and opposed
each other; the continental that associated with Roman Empire,
German and Russia empires and the maritime that associated
with Carthage and British Empire that nowadays evolved as
the so called atlanticist. The continental empires according to
Dugin described as a benevolent force that uniting vast lands and
multicultural people in non-exploitative basis, and promoting
virtue, tolerant and harmony as has been claimed by Russian
empire in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile the atlanticist is
portrayed as greedy, exploitative and self-interested driven by
mercantilist/capitalism and materialistic culture” (Nugraha, 2018,
101). According to Dugin, to balance the supremacy (unipolarity)
of US, Russia should create a Eurasian alliance as a grouping of
the continental power against the sea power represented by US
and its allies.
At the beginning of 1996, the former head of the Foreign
Intelligence Service, Yevgeny Primakov, replaced Kozyrev as head
of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Primakov’s appointment was
seen as the symbolic refusal of the Russian authorities from the
course of rapprochement with the West (Lukin, 2018). For many,
this was a Neo-Eurasianist turn of Russian foreign policy. The new
foreign minister announced the main focus of his activities with the
“near abroad” or rather those from the former Soviet Union. Since
1998 under Primakov and under his successor Ivanov, Russia has
withdrawn from the path of concessions to the West. The policy of
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the Primakov-Ivanov period was that of “selective partnership.”

This concept, focused on the preference of cooperation with the
United States and the EU, but not in all areas and retained the right
of Moscow to choose when to be aligned or distant from them.
This represented the first stage in Russian foreign policy.
Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he has
demonstrated an affinity to Neo-Eurasianism. The Russian
foreign policy concept of 2000 declared Russia’s concern with the
rising unipolarity of international affairs under the United States’
superiority. However, when reading Russia’s foreign policy,
it exemplifies a compromise between westernist (Atlanticist),
nationalist and Eurasianist, abstracting from them their pragmatic
elements.
In the 1990s and 2000s Russia faced an unstable economic
situation and state weakness, causing foreign partners to doubt
the Country’s ability to pay off huge external debt. Creditors,
primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF), doubted
that Russia would be able to pay its debts on time. From 2000
to 2006, the solution to the debt problem was the main focus
of Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, thanks to high energy
prices, Russia managed to pay off its debts before the deadlines,
which significantly increased the level of trust of the Country in
the world. Besides, the huge revenues from oil and gas greatly
expanded the capabilities of the Kremlin for a more active foreign
policy. The activities of Russia have dramatically increased, not
only in the development of cooperation with countries of the West
and near abroad, but also with the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
The highest priority of Russia’s concept of foreign policy,
however, was to ensure strict compliance with the rights of
Russians and the Russian-speaking population in the near abroad
and the preservation of unity and territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation. These priorities were clearly manifested in the second
Chechen war and the conflict with Georgia in 2008. Russia
sought to attain these objectives by first agreeing to accept the
norms of international law, the purposes and principles of the UN
Charter, and to treat other countries as equals and partners in the
global world order (The concept of foreign policy, 2013). Second,
Russia aimed to form good neighbor relations around its borders,
by helping to eliminate existing and or prevent the emergence of
90
potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent

to the Russian Federation (The concept of foreign policy, 2013).
Third, Russia wanted to promote a positive perception of itself
in world, by popularizing the Russian language and the culture
of its people in foreign countries (The concept of foreign policy,
2014). Forth, Russian foreign policy prioritized strengthening
relations with the CIS countries and the Baltic States, as well as
the European Union, the US, China, Japan and other states (The
concept of foreign policy, 2013). The doctrine has helped the
Russian Federation to reorient to pragmatism and independence
in world affairs (Khmylev, 2010).
Following the United States decision to unilaterally act in
Iraq, disappointed Russian political elite began to make significant
changes in its foreign policy. In June 2006, Vladimir Putin spoke in
Moscow to the diplomatic corps stating, “Russia as a major power
should be more actively involved in shaping the agenda and be
responsible for global development” (Putin, 2006). It was the first
time when the president of Russia declared global ambitions of
the country. The next step was Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech in
February 2007, in which he rejected attempts to create a unipolar
world under the auspices of the United States (Putin, 2007).
Today, this speech has come to symbolize Russia’s break
from the West, the departure from the second stage of Russian
Foreign Policy, and the embarkment on a new third stage (Ioffe,
2018). Statements by the President of Russia led to the creation of
a new concept of the country’s foreign policy and it was approved
in 2008 (Kremlin.ru, 2008). One of the most important principles
that emerged in the new concept of Russian Foreign policy is non-
interference in internal affairs of other nations. The Kremlin is
tough on upholding this principle, and this position has attracted
many non-Western leaders, significantly strengthening the image
of Moscow in the non-Western world. However, the actions of
Moscow aiming to protect the Russian-speaking population
contradicts with this. At the end of 2013, Vladimir Putin announced
Russia’s turn to the Pacific Ocean, which can also be called a turn
to the East (Putin, 2013). Therefore, the Kremlin has adjusted
its priorities in the Asia-Pacific. Later, unfolding events in the
Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea led to the complete
rupture of Russia and the West, and the complete reorientation of
Moscow to the East. It remains to be seen whether the Kremlin
will focus more on creating favourable external conditions for
91
the development of Russia or to challenge as well as change the

world order.
Conclusions
The Russian Federation is the largest country in the world
in terms of territory. The territory of Russia covers an area of
about 17.1 million square kilometres. Russia is located on the
mainland of Eurasia and occupies around 1/3 of its territory.
The territory of the country is situated in the northern and north-
eastern regions of the mainland and has a unique geographical
and geopolitical position. It occupies the eastern part of Europe
and the northern part of Asia and about 30% of the territory of
the RF is located in Europe and about 70% in Asia. Along with
extended sea borders, Russia has extensive land borders. The land
borders separate Russia from 14 countries, extending 1,605 km.
990 km of these border falls on the Baltic countries, and 615 km
on Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia has land borders with China,
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Norway and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The population of Russia in 2022 equals to 146 million.
Looking at the last two decades, we can observe two shock
periods where the number of the population has dramatically
reduced. Substantial reforms may be needed in order to maintain
a population increase in the country. Most of the population is
living in three regions: The Central Federal District takes the
lead with 26.83%, Volga Federal District follows with 20%,
and finally North-western Federal District follows with 11.21%.
According to the statistics although 189 ethnic groups live in
Russia, the ethnic kin group Russians has the majority with 80.9%
in the 2010 census followed by Tatars and Ukrainians with 3.9%
and 1.4% respectively. Looking at the last two decades, we can
observe two shock periods where the number of the population
has dramatically reduced. The first period is the early 1990s and
the second period is the end of the 1990s for different reasons.
The Russian Federation now has a market economy with a
total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) size of $1,577,524 million
as of 2017, which makes it the 11th largest economy in the world.
According the latest estimates, Russia has the largest natural gas
92
reserves of around 47.8 trillion cubic meters or nearly 23.7 % of

the worlds natural gas reserves (IES, 2018-a). Russia also has the
8th largest oil reserves of about 80 billion barrels, which is roughly
5% of the world’s total oil reserves (IES, 2018-b). Apart from
that, Russia accounts for the 4th largest coal reserves of about 70
billion tons (knoema.com). Russia also ranks in top positions
in terms of many other essentially important metals, non-
metal minerals, timber etc. Abundant natural resources play an
essentially important role in the economy of Russia and through
the period from early 1990s and especially after 2000 exports of
natural gas, oil and other minerals became the main drivers of
the economy of Russia. Thus, in 2017, the share of the extractive
sector in total exports of good of Russia reached 62.4%, oil and
gas sector provided 36% of the revenue growth of the budget
system and over 70% of the federal budget. High dependence on
oil and gas exports makes the Russian economy highly sensitive
to the volatility of prices of these primary commodities.
Russia possesses one of the world’s largest and powerful
armed forces. According to Global Firepower’s 2019 world
military strength rankings, Russia is ranked 2nd out of 137
countries. Of 69.640 million available manpower, 46.659 million
are considered fit-for-service. The total military personnel
are estimated at 3.586 million, including 1.014 million active
personnel and 2.572 million reserve personnel. In terms of
their structure, the Russian Armed Forces under the Ministry of
Defence are divided into three branches – the Ground (Land)
Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and the Navy. In addition, there
are two separate arms of service – the Airborne Troops and the
Strategic Missile Troops (Ministry of Defence, 2019a). There are
also other military entities, such as the National Guard directly
subordinated to the President of Russia and the Border Service
under the Federal Security Service.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian
Federation’s foreign policy was in search for a viable replacement
for Marxism. In this context, several strands of thought resurfaced
in the post-Soviet era: Westernizers (Atlanticists), Slavophiles
(Nationalists), and Eurasianists (Geopolitical). Westernizers
argue for the need for Russia to realign itself with the West, where
it rightfully belongs, while Slavophile’s reject this claim stating
that Russia’s destiny is not a European one. Slavophiles seek
93
to restore the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and to unit

Slavic people despite their religious, linguistic and geopolitical
differences under Russia leadership. Finally, the Eurasianists
promote the idea of uniting vast lands and multicultural people
in non-exploitative basis, and promoting virtue, tolerant and
harmony as formerly claimed by Russian empire in the nineteenth
century. Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he has
demonstrated an affinity to Neo-Eurasianism. The Russian
foreign policy concept of 2000 declared Russia’s concern with
the rising unipolarity of international affairs under the United
States’ superiority. However, Russia’s foreign policy exemplifies
a compromise between westernist (Atlanticist), nationalist and
Eurasianist, abstracting from them their pragmatic elements.
94
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101
4.
THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN

POLICY
Prof. Dr. İrfan Kaya Ülger
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation (RF) adopted a new constitution on December 12,
1993, being the first in its history to adopt a multiparty political
system that includes universal values. To adapt to the new post-
Cold War environment and international political system, RF’s
Constitution includes divisions of power (see Chapter 1, Articles
1-16) and provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms (see
Chapter 2, Articles 17-64) comparable to Western Democracies.
The Constitution includes 9 chapters based on five basic
principles: the integrity of the state, the unity of the state power,
the sharing of power between the RF and the federal units, the
equality of the peoples living within the borders of the country
and the understanding of an egalitarian state (Tellal and Keskin,
2003:405-406). Those living within the borders of the country
have the right to self-determination in terms of internal self-
determination and federated units are also granted a high level of
autonomy.
The 1993 Russian Constitution elaborates on the type of
government model Russia adopts, declaring it as “a Democratic
federal law-bound State with a Republican form of government
(Chapter 1, Article 1),” comprised of federal units – republics,
krays, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast,
and an autonomous okrug. The Constitution is defined as the
supreme law of the land that will be applied directly to all units of
the RF. It goes on the state that laws and other bindings regulations
in federated units shall not be contrary to the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Constitution pledges the RF will respect
and incorporate universally recognized norms of international
laws, international treaties and agreement into its legal system. It
goes on to mention the rights and freedom of citizens in Russia
are guaranteed by the state within the framework of the general
principles of international law. The Constitution defines Russia
103
as a secular and social state that grants equal rights to all of its
citizens, irrespective of their ideological and religious differences,
and maintains that the Russia state does not have an ideology but
rather supports political diversity and the multi-party system
(Chapter 2).
Equally important, the Constitution elaborates on how
power will be distributed. Russia, as this chapter will discuss
in greater detail, represents a blend between a presidential and
parliamentary system inspired by France’s semi-presidential
system model. The model is based on a two-headed executive
principle – the President of the state and the Prime Minister of
the government. Like most democratic systems, the Russian
Constitution recognizes three branches of power – the executive,
legislative, and judicial. All three branches of power are defined
as independent and separate from each other (Chapter 1, Article
10). In terms of state power, the Constitution states “the Russian
Federation shall be exercised by the President of the RF, the Federal
Assembly (the Council of Federation and the State Duma), the
government of the RF, and the Court of the Russian Federation”
according to the authority granted to each (Article 11).
Apart from the provision of rights and division of powers,
the Constitution specifies the foreign policy actors and decision-
making process in detail. Within the framework of the Constitution
and federal laws, the President is the leading foreign policy actor
in Russia. The President sets the basic rules in this field, manages
foreign policy, represents Russia on international platforms, and
is the commander of the armed forces and the President of the
Security Council of the RF. The Federal Assembly, within the
jurisdiction of their power, is the second major foreign policy
actor who forms the legal framework of foreign policy decisions
and fulfil international obligations. The Ministries and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are mainly responsible for the implementation
of the overall strategy on Russian foreign policy. It is the duty
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate information among
the foreign policy actors and to make a uniform foreign policy
proposal. Intelligence organizations such as Federal Security
Services (FSB) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which
assist the President, are invisible actors of the process.
In addition, the Security Council of the RF and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Federal Agency
104
THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
are critical actors. The Security Council determines the basic

principles of foreign policy, makes threat assessments along
with the recommendations to the President about the policy to be
followed and coordinates all these activities while the CIS Federal
Agency is obliged to form a uniform foreign policy on cooperation
with former Soviet countries. Some Federated Republics, such as
Tatarstan, have the right to establish direct economic relations
with foreign countries, provided that they remain within the
borders of the Russian Constitution.
Other critical actors that influence foreign policy, although
not specified in the Constitution, include the Russian Orthodox
Church, the Presidency of the Russian Armed Forces and
institutions that have public institution status such as Gazprom,
Rosneft, Rosatom, and Rostec. Non-governmental organizations
that support the foreign policy design and implementation process
are composed of various foundations and think tanks. These
include Russia’s World, the Comrades Foundation, the Gorchakov
Foundation, and the Moscow Fund for International Cooperation.
As demonstrated from this brief overview of the 1993
Russian constitution, there exists a range of critical actors
involved in both Russian domestic and foreign policy, although
the distinction between the two has increasing blurred in recent
years as international issues have become intertwined with
domestic ones. For the aim and purpose of this chapter, the focus
will remain on the making of Russian foreign policy, examining
each of the actors’ roles and the internal political environment that
influence the formation of foreign policy in the RF. As this chapter
discusses, Russia’s domestic political order has a significant
impact on foreign policy actors and the decision-making process.
However, as this chapter exhibits, it is the President and his close
circles that mainly determine foreign policy in the RF, especially
those of the former Soviet Union. This chapter is divided into
the following five sections: the structure of the RF, the Russian
Government, political parties in Russia, the Russian Orthodox
Church, and Civil Society and media. Each section provides
insight on the critical role actors play in shaping and influencing
Russian Foreign Policy.
105
The Structure of the Russian Federation

Federal states are typically established by unification or
separation. For example, while the United States was established
by the unification of the states, Canada was the result of
separation. The federal system in Russia however is complex,
made up two types of states: the federal sate and the member state.
The constitution gives the federal state power over the member
states. While member states have independence in their internal
affairs, they have no defence, security and foreign policy powers
of their own, and are prohibited from leaving the federal states.
The present complex system stems from the Soviet heritage and
is based on the project of allocating the republics to ethnic groups
under their own names. (Ağır, 2015:42-48; Dejevsky, 2009:238-
342).
The Russia Federation comprises of federal subjects made
up – republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an
autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs. In Chapter three,
Articles 65-79, the Russian Constitution officially names and
explains the legal status of the all the subjects, states and territories
of Russian Federation. Until recently, there was 83 administrative
units consisting of 22 republics, 46 oblasts, 9 krais, 1 autonomous
oblast, and 4 autonomous okrugs, and 2 cities of federal
importance. More recently however, this number increased to 85
with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014,
although most states still refer to them as part of Ukraine. On the
other hand, after the Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine on
February 24, 2022, 4 more Ukrainian territories were annexed.
Russia occupied the Ukrainian territory of Zaporidja, Kherson,
Donetsk and Luhansk regions in September 2022. Uncertainty
remains about the final status of these regions. The situation of the
mentioned regions will become clear when a ceasefire or peace
agreement is signed.
The Russian Constitution considers federal subjects as
equal subjects of the Russian Federation. Each federal subject has
their own leader, legislative body and constitutional court backed
by their individual constitution and legislation. Two delegates
represent each federal subject in the Federal Assembly but vary
according to the degree of autonomy permitted to each of them.
The highest level of autonomy is given to the republics,
which consist of regions with non-Russian ethnic groups, although
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many republics have a Russian majority. A republic originally

received its name after the indigenous ethnic group common
in the area. However, with internal migration, the indigenous
ethnic group may no longer be the majority in the population
of the republic. Republics maintain the right to establish their
own official language and enjoy extensive powers. Despite the
executive’s powers granted to executives, the federal government
will quell any contradictory laws that support any secessionist
ideas and movements. Although the Federal government represent
the republics in international relations, some are allowed to
establish economic and commercial relations directly with foreign
countries. Ranked from highest to lowest in terms of population,
the 22 republics in the Russian Federation include: Bashkortostan,
Tatarstan, Dagestan, Republic of Udmurt, Chuvashia, Chechnya,
Komi, Buryatia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Kabardian Balkar
Republic, Mordovia, Mari El, Karelia, North Ossetia (Alania),
Khakass, Ingushetia, Republic of Adygea, Karachay Circassian
Republic, Tuva, Kalmykia and the Altai Republic.
The oblast is the highest administrative unit in the
Russian Federation. The name oblast refers to the largest city
in the region and is formed where there is a Russian majority.
Managers of this category are appointed at the federal level and
the legislature is determined by federated elections. The city is
also the administrative center of the oblast. Of the 85 federal
subjects, there are 46 oblasts in Russian Federation, some of the
more influential include Astrakhan, Chelyabinsk, Khaliningrad,
Kurgan, Leningrad and Moscow.
Kray, represents another federal unit of the Russian
Federation, which differs significantly from the oblasts. The
number of Krays are 9, including Altai, Kamchatka, Stavropol,
and Zabaykalsky (formerly known Chita). There is also one
autonomous oblast in Russia, which is called the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast in Birobidzhan region.
Autonomous Okrug, represent an additional federal
subject, where ethnic groups are dominant in the population –
Chukotka, Khanty-Mansi, Nenetsiya, and Yamaliya. Autonomous
Okrugs have less autonomy than Republics and more autonomy
than Oblasts. Finally, Moscow, the capital city of the Russian
Federation, St. Petersburg, and the city of Sevastopol after the
annexation of Crimea in 2014, have a special status as cities of
federal importance.
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Yevgeny Primakov, who was prime minister in the 1990s,

initiated a study for uniformization and simplification of federated
units in Russia, but this study was not concluded. Vladimir Putin,
who assumed the new presidency in 2000, also carried out efforts to
uniformize the asymmetric federated units. In 2005, Perm oblast
and Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug were merged and the new
unit was named Perm Krai. Evenkiya and Taymyriya autonomous
oblasts were also connected to the administrative boundaries of
Krasnoyarsk Krai. In the same year, the Kamchatka Oblast and
the Koryak Autonomous Okrug (Korkakiya) merged and became
the Kamchatka Krai. In 2008, Ust Orda Buryat Autonomous
Okrug was connected to Irkutsk Oblast. Chita Oblast and Agin
Buryat Autonomous Okrug were also united as Zabaykalsky Krai.
As a result of his efforts, Russia was divided into 7 regions. The
rulers of the so-called super-regions are appointed by the Russian
President. Region administrators are held responsible for national
security as well as the economic, social and political strengthening
of their territories. The 7 regions originally created were Central,
South, Northwest, Far East, Siberia, Ural, and the Volga. Later,
the Caucasus was added as a new region, now making the total
number of regions 8.
Although the 85 administrative units have many legal
rights, Moscow remains the main decision-maker in the
political system. The political and economic autonomies of
administrative units are limited compared to Western countries.
Federalism, according to the Western understanding, refers to a
form of governance where sovereignty is shared, between the
federal and federated governments. However, the practices of
federalism in Russia differ significantly, and the implementations
of federalism remains within the framework of a unitary state.
This is in part due to Russia’s unique historical developments
and no former experience with federalism. Existing practices are
more experimental and are open to the intervention of the central
government when it is necessary. The relations between the centre
and the federated units did not change the position of the centre’s
prescriptive structure.
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The Russian Government: The President and the Prime

Minister
The Russian President is the main actor of the political
system. The President is not only the guarantor of constitution, but
also of fundamental rights, and freedoms of citizens. As outlined
in Chapter 4, Articles 80-93 in the 1993 Constitution, the main task
of the President, as head of the state, is to ensure the harmonious
functioning of the constitutional bodies and determine the general
orientation of domestic and foreign policies. However, as this
section highlights, the rights and powers granted to the President
by the 1993 Constitution go far beyond classical presidential
powers given in most Western states. Typically, a president acts
as a symbolic authority to create a balance between institutions,
directs executive and legislative bodies and takes basic decisions.
However, Article 80 grants the Russian Presidency with “Super
Presidency” powers.
Initially the presidential term was set for four years with
the possibility of re-election for one additional term. However,
in 2008 an amendment to the constitution was made that
extended the presidential term to six years that went into effect
in the 2012 elections. To qualify for the presidency, Article 81
of the Constitution states candidates must be over 35 years of
age and have permanently resided in the Russian Federation
for a minimum 10 years. Members of the State Duma have the
right to nominate candidates for the head of state as do political
parties. However political parties can only nominate candidates
after collecting over 2 million signatures from federated units.
This rule also applies to those who wish to participate in an
independent candidate in elections. According to Article 77 of
the Constitution, to be elected as President, it is necessary to
obtain more than fifty percent of the votes in the first round. If
no candidate can reach this rate in the first round, a second round
of voting is held between the two candidates who received the
highest number of votes. The president is then elected based on
the highest number of votes received.
The President can be dismissed only by the Federation
Council based on the opinion of the Federal Court of Russia
on the crime of treason and subsequently upon approval by the
Constitutional Court. One-third of the members of the State
Duma must propose this request and the dismissal must be taken
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by a two-thirds majority in both the Federation Council and the

State Duma.
The President is responsible for a broad range of activities.
One of the main activities include appointing and dismissing the
Prime Minister. The President exercises his/her authority only
with the approval of the State Duma. However, as Article 109 of
the Constitution states, the President has permission to terminate
the State Duma if it rejects the President’s nominee for Prime
Minister three times, making the checks of Presidential power
dubious. Furthermore, Article 83 of the Constitution entitles the
President to appoint and dismiss federal cabinet members and
deputy prime ministers. The President also has the right to reject
the resignations of Prime Minister or cabinet members who would
like to leave the office according to the legal provisions, and to ask
them to reconsider staying at their current posts. To date this right
has not been applied, but legally such an option exists, illustrating
the extensive powers the President has.
Additionally, the President is obliged to determine the
basic preferences of the country’s domestic and foreign policy
in accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution. Therefore, the
main orientation in the implementation of policies are determined
by the President rather than the cabinet members and the Prime
Minister, and the President directs political decisions through
statements and speeches on various platforms. The statements of
the president, which can be assessed under the annual address,
reveal his/her main political preferences. Similarly, the president
can raise a national or international issue through budget talks.
The president also has the right to propose laws to the legislative
body and to send draft legislation as well either through the
government or through its own bureaucracy. Thus, the president
indirectly affects the legislative process.
All federal laws must be approved by the President before
they become enforced. The President has the right to veto a
federal law. If a law is vetoed by the President, it is readmitted to
two-thirds majority of the State Duma and must be ratified within
7 days. The president also has the right to issue prevailing and
binding decrees throughout the country, provided it is not contrary
to the Constitution and the federal laws in force.
The president’s powers in defence, security, and foreign
policy are also broad. It is the constitutional duty of the President
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to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity

of the Russian state. The President is entitled to appoint and
dismiss the high-level command as head of the armed forces. He/
she is also the director of the Security Council of the Russian
Federation and chairs the sessions, regulates military doctrine and
activities. He/she has the right to declare martial law either in
whole or in part in the country in case of an attack or threat against
Russia. In such a case, the president must inform the legislative
body. The President has the authority to also declare a state of
emergency, provided he/she notifies the legislature when it is
deemed necessary. He/she has the authority to appoint and recall
diplomatic representatives to foreign countries and international
organizations in consultation with the relevant committees and
commissions of the legislative body. And the President has the
right to conduct international negotiations and become a party to
the agreements binding on Russia (Henderson, 2011:124).
One more point worth mentioning, is the President’s
work with bureaucrats in the fields of defence, security, and
foreign policy. The unit consisting of bureaucrats, also called
the Presidential Block, does not have a legal basis. Thus, the
President, through his/her contacts with the elite, can direct
political developments and cabinet members. Apart from the
official staff, the Block may include former KGB personnel or
police chiefs. The Government is obliged to coordinate with
the Presidential Block in carrying out its ordinary duties. This
relationship between the Presidential Bloc and the government
represents a derivative or reflection of the practices of the Soviet
Union.
Although the Government has the constitutional right to
bring any issue to the judiciary against the President’s decisions,
in practice it complies with the attitude of the Presidency.
When the powers of the President are examined as a whole, the
diversity of duties and obligations given by the 1993 Constitution
and its weight on the political system are remarkable. Indeed,
some Western experts considered the Russian political system
as a dictatorial presidency. In the Russian political system, the
personality characteristics of the president and attitude towards
exercising powers directly affect the implementation of the
system. The strong powers of the President, which did not attract
much attention during the reign of Yeltsin, have attracted attention
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during Putin and Medvedev periods. To illustrate one example, as

previously as noted, the constitution only allowed a president to
serve for two terms. However, after having served from 2000 to
2008 as President, Putin had to stand down and Dmitry Medvedev
was elected as President. Putin alternatively assumed the prime
minister post. Although Medvedev was legally in power during
his presidency, the political practices were shaped by Putin’s
preferences while he served as prime minister (Henderson,
2011:106). Then the Constitution in 2008 was amended extending
the presidency from 4 to 6 years enabling Putin to be elected a
third term as president March 4, 2012 with an official count of 64
% of the vote.
Putin’s first months in office were marked by attempts to
quash or marginalize the protest movement and those entities
that did not lend their support. Under the newly enacted laws, the
organizers and participants of unauthorized demonstrations were
subject to dramatically increased fines, and nongovernmental
organizations that received funding from outside Russia were
forced to declare themselves as “foreign agents.” Lastly, Russians
went to the polls on March 18, 2018 which non coincidentally
served as the fourth anniversary of Russia’s forcible annexation
of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea, an event that
marked a spike in Putin’s domestic popularity. In line with public
expectations, Putin outperformed his rivals and was elected
President of Russia till 2024.
Parliament has no authority to appoint or dismiss cabinet
members. In Russia, the President decides the resignation of the
government, and chairs the cabinet meetings when it is deemed
necessary. However, the appointment and dismissal of the
chairman of the Central Bank depends on the approval of the State
Duma. The head of state also has the authority to propose laws
and to veto them. The laws adopted by the State Duma must be
signed and published by the President in order to enter into force.
The State Duma cannot be terminated in cases of martial
and emergency situations and 6 months before the end of the term
of office. The State Duma can vote of no confidence against the
government. This requires a majority vote of the full number of
members. After the vote of no confidence, the President has the
right to declare the resignation of the government if he/she wishes
or to rejects this decision.
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If the vote of no confidence arises for the second time in

three months, the President will either declare the government
resignation or use the power to terminate the State Duma. The
president has the authority to issue decrees and orders. Legislation
in this category should not contradict the constitution and federal
law. The limits of the decree authority are extremely narrow. In
Russia, the federal budget, taxes and fees, financial obligations,
customs, and monetary issues with the acquisition or loss of
citizenship, administrative structure, fundamental rights and
freedoms, rules of election are regulated by the basic legislation.
The President does not have the authority to issue a decree on a
matter regulated by law.
The President has the right to propose candidates for the
president of the Constitutional Court and the President of the
Supreme Court along with the membership for the High Arbitration
Court and for the Attorney General’s Office. Appointment to these
positions is carried out after the approval of the Federal Council.
In contrast, it has the authority to appoint judges serving in federal
courts.
As for the dismissal of the president, there has to be a
crime related to treason or similar sanctions against the president
action and the State Duma’s approval by a two-thirds majority.
If the Council of the Federation approves the decision by a two-
thirds majority, the President is removed from office and becomes
subject to the legal proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
The presidential system in Russia today is largely based
on Putin’s popularity. Putin is the coordinator who eliminates the
differences of opinion within the Russian state and directs them to
a single option. The rights and powers granted to the President by
the Constitution and various laws have facilitated Putin’s struggle
with the oligarchs and the success in this field has led to an
increase in public support. Putin was trying to realize a project that
was accepted by the vast majority of the Russian people. In other
words, he wanted Russia to be a strong international political actor
as it was during the USSR. Putin has put into practice the idea of
alliance and cooperation with China to reinforce Russia’s power
in global competition. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
has served as an important tool in this regard.
Russia’s relations over the former Soviet countries through
the CIS, the attitude towards NATO enlargement in Ukraine and
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Georgia have led to the strengthening of Russia in global politics,

while the main impact has emerged within the country. Putin’s
foreign policy preferences and his policies in Ukraine have
strengthened his political support within the country and led the
society to turn towards nationalist national goals.
The Prime Minister

Although the prime minister is the head of the government,
and thus the head of the executive body, he/she and the cabinet in
practice are obliged to put into practice the policies the President
decides. The Prime Minister negotiates with the President in
advance to avoid vetoing the cabinet members. Cabinet members
cannot be appointed from among the representatives of parliament
e.g. the State Duma and the Federation Council. The President
may dismiss the Prime Minister or one of the cabinet members
at any time. The Prime Minister’s main task is to organize
government activities in accordance with the Constitution, federal
laws and Presidential decrees. In this context, preparing the budget
and fulfilling state policy obligations in the fields of economy,
culture, finance, education, science and social security is the main
task of the cabinet. It is also the duty of the cabinet to take the
necessary measures to carry out the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms,
protection of property rights and public order are within the scope
of government’s mandate. The Government is also obliged to
fulfill the duties assigned to it by the Presidential decrees.
The Government may be dismissed by the President if
political non-compliance arises. It may also be overthrown by a
simple majority vote of the total number of members in the State
Duma. The President has the right not to accept the resignation
of the government, which received a vote of no confidence in the
State Duma. If the president does not want the resignation of the
government, which has received a vote of no confidence, then the
second round of the voting takes place in the State Duma. If a no
vote of confidence is reached in the second vote, the President will
either ask for the government’s resignation or dissolve the State
Duma. The same method is used during the confidence vote. If the
cabinet prepared by the Prime Minister appointed by the President
cannot receive a vote of confidence from the State Duma within
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7 days, the President has the authority to appoint a new prime

minister or to terminate the State Duma. The State Duma has no
authority to dismiss the ministers. In the Russian administration
system, which has its own peculiar features, the government is
not the primarily a decision-making body, but an organization that
implements the decisions. Without the President’s approval, it is
not possible for the government to implement any policy. Because
of the President’s broad power, the government is careful to work
in harmony with the President rather than in conflict. The authority
of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and members of the
Cabinet and to dissolve the State Duma limits the mobility of the
Cabinet.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bureaucracy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is
the federal executive body that outlines government policies and
implements foreign policy decisions. All activities of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are supervised by the President. Former Soviet
Republics, now members of CIS, are the most important units in
the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russia defines
CIS countries as its “backyard” in the “Near Abroad Doctrine”
following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Aron, 2013).
The main task of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is to ensure coordination in Russia’s foreign policy. The Ministry
shapes data from federated units, legislative councils, and non-
governmental organizations within the framework of policies
adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
The priority of Russian foreign policy is to protect Russia’s
national interests. The basic principles guiding Russian foreign
policy includes the maintenance of the country’s sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity. Within this framework, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates from a strategic perspective
to be a global power again.
On the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, it
states that Russia is trying to establish a contemporary international
political order that is fair, stable and democratic and in compliance
with international law. These statements however coincide with
reality, as revealed in the events of 2008 in Georgia and 2014
in Ukraine. The President and his team, who guide the foreign
115
policy, have not hesitated to act contrary to these principles when

it was deemed necessary.
During the Soviet Union, the main decision-makers in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries were the Soviet
elite from the Communist Party: The Secretary-General, Politburo,
Council of Ministers, Central Committee, and the Secretariat.
This group, also called Nomenklatura, controlled the entire Soviet
system. Youth organizations called Komsomol, leaders of regional
party organizations and high-level bureaucrats were also included
in this group. Society was excluded from participation in debates
due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system. The public
instead accepted the official discourse to get rid of the oppression.
Consequently, totalitarianism and the cult of leadership
abolished society’s belief in the system. When Gorbachev came
to power in the mid-1980s, his efforts to restructure the system
opened the door to the political participation of the masses.
Today however, it is apparent that the strong bureaucratic
structure of the former Soviet Union has carried over into Russia’s
current political system. Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the bureaucracy quickly adapted to the capitalist system.
Unlike the past, where the bureaucracy derived its power from the
adherence to the official ideology of the Communist Party, now it
is through Putin’s leadership and membership in the United Russia
Party, making the bureaucracy untouchable within the system.
Russian Parliament: Federal Council and the State

Duma
In the December 1993 referendum, the Constitution
amended the Russian Parliament, termed the Federal Assembly
which is the legislative branch of the government. The
Constitution gives explicit details about the Federal Assembly and
its function in Chapter 5, Articles 94-109. The Federal Assembly
has two branches: The Federation Council (upper house) and the
State Duma (lower house). The Federation Council includes two
representatives from each subject of the Russian Federation –
one from the legislative and one from the executive body of state
authority, who have the duty to approve draft laws. Unlike the
State Duma, the members do not have links to political parties.
The Federation Council approves draft laws after first having
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been discussed in the State Duma. The Federation Council has

no right to make changes to these drafts, but rather has two
options: to approve or reject the bill. If the Federation Council
does not approve the proposals from the State Duma within 14
days, the proposed law is renegotiated with the participation of
an equal number of representatives from both chambers and a
text of conciliation is drawn up based on these negotiations. The
jurisdiction for the Federal Council includes several areas such
as the approval of the President’s decrees of the introduction of
martial law and the state of emergency, the approval of changes
in borders between subjects of the Russian Federation, the
impeachment of the President, deciding on whether to use the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside of its territory,
and the right to propose candidates for the high court judges and
prosecutors to name a few (Article 102).
The State Duma was established in 1993 after the
dissolution of the Congress of People’s Representatives of the
Russian Parliament during the constitutional crisis. Members
of the State Duma, the main body of the Russian legislative
process, are elected through federal elections. The State Duma
has 450 members and the term of office of deputies is 5 years.
To be elected as a deputy, the candidate must be at least 21 years
of age. According to the new regulation introduced by the 2004
election law, the election to the State Duma membership is based
on political party lists. Before this change, half of the State Duma
members could independently apply for candidacy based on the
narrow zone selection system. The candidate who received the
highest number of votes in the narrow zone system was elected
as a member of the State Duma. To send representatives to the
State Duma, political parties must pass the 5% election threshold
throughout the country. Due to the election threshold, it is not
possible to represent small parties in the State Duma. The OSCE
has criticized the new regulations, arguing that Russian elections
are not held under equal and fair conditions (Busyigana, 2018:
57-64).
The jurisdiction of the State Duma, as stated in the
Constitution, includes the vote of trust of the President’s selection
of Prime Minister; the appointment or removal of the President
of the Central Bank, the Chairman and half of the auditors of
the Accounting Chamber, and Commissioner for human rights;
proclamation of amnesty; and discussing charges of treason
117
against the President for his impeachment (Article 103). Federal

laws shall be adopted by the State Duma, approved by the
Federation Council and signed by the President. The State Duma
may overcome the Federation Council veto by re-adopting the law
by two-thirds of the votes. The President’s veto can be overcome
only if the law is re-adopted by both the Federation Council and
the State Duma by a 2/3 majority vote of the total number of
members of both chambers.
Political Parties in Russia

Until 2000, there was no law on political parties in Russia,
and political party activities were conducted according to various
laws remaining from the Soviet period. The emergence and
development of the concept of a political party has shown a different
development from other countries. In the early 1990’s, various
social and civil activities such as trade unions, retiree associations
and women’s associations were expressed as “parties”. These
unions and associations had the right to participate in the elections.
258 social organizations and 15 unions participated in the 17 June
1995 elections under the name of parties. To participate in the
elections, category organizations had to register with the Central
Election Commission and identify themselves as “socio-political
organizations”.
The most radical changes in political parties were made
in 2000 under Putin’s rule. The definition and responsibilities of
the political party were determined with a law passed in 2001.
According to the new law, only political parties can participate in
the elections. The participation of professional organizations in
elections was prevented within the frame of the respective law. To
have the status of a party, political organizations now need to have
at least 10,000 members and be organized in more than half of
the country. The law also prohibits the establishment of political
parties at the regional level and stipulates that political activities
should be conducted at the federal level. It is also forbidden to
establish a political party based on gender, language and ethnicity
(e.g. Christian Democratic Party).
Due to the weakness of political parties, independent
distinguished candidates came to the forefront in the regional
parliamentary elections held in 2002. In these elections, the ratio
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of political party candidates in total was 14.3% and only 9.6%

of them were elected. The party lists were used in 4 regions and
the others were based on the majority system. The number of
political parties decreased to 44 at the end of 2003. Since 2004,
the proportional representation system has been used for the
elections of the regional parliaments.
The structure of political parties in Russia is based on
the authority of the party leader. The party candidates who are
going to participate in local elections have been determined by
the leadership of the party. Due to the political power of the party
leader, the strengthening of the opposition within the party is
prevented. Consequently, today’s leading Russian political party
leaders have maintained their positions since 1990s.
The political parties are forbidden from forming an election
alliance based on the amendments that entered into force in 2005.
Only registered political parties can participate in the elections.
The national election threshold is 7% for representation in the
State Duma.
Based on the ideological classification in Russia, political
parties are divided into two categories – the left and right. The
parties in the center consist of a mix of two different ideologies.
When considering the economic policies of Russian political
parties, it is possible to classify them as left or right and whether
they are pro-Western, or Eurasian based on foreign policy
preferences.
Table 4.1:
Ideological Trends of Russian Political Parties
Left Wing Left of the Right of the Ultrana-

Centre Range Centre Range tionalist
Communist Party Russian Women Choice of Russia LDPR
Agriculture Party Diversity Party Civil Union

Union of Democratic Party
Yabloko
Bolsheviks of Russia
Russian Social Republican Russian Union
Democratic Party Party Party
United Russia Right-Wing Union
Source: Chenoy, Anaradha M & Kumar, Rajan, Re-emerging Russia Structures,
Institutions and Processes, Palgrave Publication, New York 2017, p.128.
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The only party in Russia that remains on the left of the

ideological range and maintains its existence is the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). On the far-right side of
the ideological spectrum, is the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
(LDPR). These two parties have been represented in the State
Duma in all elections from 1993 to present. In the last election,
held in 2021, political party United Russia won 326 seats, securing
a supermajority that allows it to change the constitution without
the support of other parties. The other three main opposition
parties – CPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia, won the remaining
seats, taking 58, 24, and 29 respectively. At the other hand, the
New People’s Party won 16 deputies and independent candidates
won 2 deputies. (Duma, 2022). The other parties with a similar
ideological structure were not as successful. For the remainder of
this section, it will briefly retrace the historical origins and discuss
the ideological differences of the six most powerful political
parties.
The United Russia Party (BRP) is also known as Putin’s
party. It was founded as a result of the merger of the Union Party
and the Fatherland Russian Party. One of the founders of the party
is the former Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov. Today, the United
Russia Party is known as the champion of ethnic nationalism and
patriotism. The United Russia Party argues that Russia is a major
political force in history and that it should be the same today.
This idea is expressed in the Russian language with the word
Derzhavnost. The party advocates hard competition against NATO
in foreign policy and defends the ideas of limiting the powers of
regional administrations. The practices of the Yeltsin government
against corruption, privatization and oligarchs were criticized by
the founders of this party in the 1990s. The establishment of the
party was possible as a result of a series of alliances. In 1999
Luzhkov formed an alliance with Yevgeny Primakov called the
All Russia Party. Later, the Agricultural Party and the Women of
Russia joined to this alliance. The Alliance received 23% of the
vote in the 1999 elections. In 2003, the alliance was reorganized
with the convergence of all these political parties and became the
United Russia Party. The party derives its strength from the strong
leadership of Putin starting from 2000. It won the majority of the
seats in 2003 during the State Duma elections. In all subsequent
elections, the United Russia Party has dominated the State Duma.
While Yeltsin used violence to control the Parliament, Putin has
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used legal regulations, decrees and the United Russia Party.

BRP is generally known as the party of the regime with its
support by the majority of the voters, preventing the possibility
of representation of the central parties in the parliament. BRP
supports state capitalism, nationalism and national sovereignty,
while advocating limitations of the federated units’ powers
and local administrations, preferring instead to strengthen the
center rule. As for foreign policy, BRP supports Eurasianism,
close relations with China, diaspora, protection of the rights and
interests of the Russians are among the priorities of the party.
The ideological successor to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party
(CPRF), has been the strongest opposition party in the State Duma
since 1993. The history of the Party dates back to 1898, during the
Tsarist period (CPRF Website, 2019). In Russia, after the coup
attempt in September 1991, the party’s activities were suspended
and then the party reorganized in 1993, and it was registered with
the Ministry of Justice. The main founding text of the Party is
based on Marxist Leninist ideology. The party’s organizational
structure consists of the Central Committee and the Secretary-
General. It has 570,000 members and is organized in 81 regions
of the country. In the 2016 the State Duma elections, the party
won 42 seats. The official publication of the party is the Pravda
newspaper. The party argues that economic activities should be
in public ownership. The propaganda activities carried out by the
Party under the name of “Renewed Socialism in the 21st Century”
differs from the Soviet period. The most noticeable difference is
that CPRF is more nationalistic and patriotic (Kudryatsev, 2017).
The political practice of the CPRF has been somewhat
contradictory. On one hand, it has consistently offered a negative
view of the introduction of the free market in Russia and of
cooperation with the West. On the other, the CPRF leadership
has gradually been integrated into the post-Soviet political
elite, and the party also has created stable contacts with many
businesses, advancing their interests at the federal and local level.
Among its core supporters are those who suffered politically
and economically as a result of the changing economic order.
Particularly prominent among its supporters are elderly voters,
which has prompted some observers to question whether the
party’s success in elections will gradually diminish over the
121
long term. In 2018, the selection of Pavel Grudinin as the CPRF

candidate in the presidential election, and of Vadim Kumin as
the party’s candidate in the Moscow mayoral election, indicate
distinct attempts to update the party’s flagging political image.
Both candidates had made their careers in business and were
outsiders as far as the party’s traditional ideologically oriented
cadres were concerned. To attract younger voters, the party
supports various Komsomols (youth organizations).
Following the appearance of the United Russia Party, the
political support of the party has remained limited due to changing
internal and external political developments. While in 1999 it won
a landslide victory in the State Duma election with more than
24% of the votes and 113 seats, in 2003 it managed to win less
than 13% of the votes and only 61 seats. In the last parliamentary
election in 2016, political support of CPRF was 12% and won 42
seats in the State Duma (Kudryatsev, 2017)
The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDRP) has an
extremely right leaning, claiming that Slavic nations are selected
nations (Chenoy, 2001). This party originated in the Pamyat
(Memory) movement founded by Dmitry Vasiliev during the
Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Although the Pamyat movement
was ideologically xenophobic and anti-Semitic, it was accepted
by the rulers as a patriotic association. During the communist
era Pamyat worked for the restoration of churches and national
monuments in Moscow, and Vasiliev generally supported the
Communist Party and praised Lenin, Stalin, and the KGB for
defending national traditions.
After 1989 however, the Pamyat movement increasingly
supported the Russian Orthodox Church and began to advocate
monarchism. Later attempts were made to revive Russian
nationalism. The organization over time was transformed into
the LDRP political party by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Despite the
party’s name, it is anything but liberal, supporting authoritarian,
racist and Islamophobic attitudes and supported the annexation
of the Crimea. The supporters of the party are generally low
educated and unemployed people living in rural areas or towns.
The Party in the 1991 elections received 8% of the vote. Then
in 1993 the Party received 70 seats the State Duma elections, the
party’s highest achievement. Voter support, which was 12% in the
2011 elections, increased to 16.5% in the 2016 elections. LDRP
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is currently the third most powerful party in the State Duma. This
party supports the Putin administration on all important issues.
Some political analysts claim that LDRP strongly opposes other
political parties but is now an ally of the United Russia Party.
The fourth largest party represented in the State Duma is the
Only Russian Party. The party, which positions itself as a social
democrat, defends fundamental rights and freedoms and supports
the market economy, however with strict controls. It supported
Putin in the 2018 presidential elections.
The final remaining two parties represented in the State
Duma are the Motherland Party (Rodina) and the Civic Platform
Movement. The Motherland Party was founded in 2003 by Aleksey
Zhuraliyov and supports the state’s strength in the economy and
the strengthening of Russia’s power in the contemporary world.
The Civic Platform Movement was established in 2012 and was
founded by Mikhail Prokhorov, one of Russia’s most famous
and richest representatives of the industry and business world
in the political system. Both parties supported Putin in the 2018
Presidential elections.
Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Federation state is a secular state. Article 14 of
the Russian Constitution states, “No religion may be established
as a state or obligatory one” and that “[r]eligious associations
shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the
law”. The constitution provides citizens the freedom of belief and
of religious worship. Although the Constitution and laws state
that the Russian Federation is neutral to all religions, in practice
the Russian Orthodox Church is under the protection of the state
and is “first among equals”.
Today, the Russian Orthodox Church, along with Istanbul,
Alexandria, Antioch, is ranked as one of the most important
Orthodox churches in the world. The Russian Orthodox Church
claims authority over the Orthodox Churches in the former Soviet
countries. However, some of the Orthodox churches do not accept
the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, the
Estonian and Moldavian Churches do not adhere to the Russian
Orthodox Church and maintain an autonomous status. A similar
development has been observed in the Ukrainian and Belarusian
123
churches. The Russian Orthodox Church’s influence, however,

goes well beyond the geography of the former Soviet Union. For
example, Orthodox churches in China and Japan are generally
subject to the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox Churches in
the USA are divided into two groups. Some of them accept the
Russian Orthodox Church as the highest authority, and the other
accepts the Fener Greek Patriarchate. The activities of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the USA go back to 1867, when Alaska was
sold by the Tsarist administration (Dualı, 2014: 63-94).
Presently, Orthodoxy is the most common religious belief
in Russia. Despite not paying attention to performing religious
rituals, about two-thirds of Russians define themselves as Orthodox
and religious. In the Russian Federation, which currently has a
population of 143 million, the rate of Orthodox is 74% while the
rate of Muslims is 6.5%. Religious groups with a ratio of less
than 5% of the population in the country are Buddhist, Protestant,
Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
Hindu.
The largest Orthodox population in the world lives in
Russia. According to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Pope in
Rome is considered the highest authority of the Catholic world
and the Orthodox Church in Moscow is the supreme authority of
the Orthodox world. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church
does not accept the claims of the universality (ecumenic) of the
Fener Greek Patriarchate and considers it a distortion of reality.
Since the mid-1980s, when Perestroika and Glasnost policies
came to the forefront, Russian society has undergone significant
changes in religious matters.
Since the mid-1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church
became the undeclared official religion of the state. The Russia
Orthodox Church now has become an integral part of the Russian
identity. It is not uncommon to see hanging icons in official public
institutions, broadcasting Orthodox prayers on state television,
recruiting a large number of clergymen from members of the
military and police organizations, and building churches for
soldiers on duty at the border, demonstrating that Orthodoxy is
the official state religion.
In the post-Soviet era, the Church has increasingly become
an important political actor in domestic and foreign politics.
Despite the constitutional principle of secularism and the
124
provision that the state should maintain an equal distance to all

members of religion and belief, the Orthodox faith in Russia is
supported and encouraged by the state. The Church is supported
not only by the Putin Administration, but also by the opposition
Liberal Democratic Party and even by the Communist Party
with its increased engagement in political activities. Gennady
Zyuganov, Secretary General of the Russian Communist Party,
has repeatedly stated that they support the strengthening of
Orthodoxy in the Russian geography. The church, alongside of
the Government, has sought to establish a Russian influence both
within and outside of the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The Russian Orthodox Church considers the protection of
the rights of Russian descents in the former Soviet Republics one
of its primary duties. The church and the state act collectively in
matters such as protecting the rights and interests of the Russians
outside Russia and ensuring that the Orthodox peoples are attached
to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow (Somuncuoğlu,
2004: 93-107). The church considers the influence of other
foreign denominations on Russians living abroad as a direct threat
to its influence. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church
claims to represent the Orthodox religion in Belarus and Ukraine
and opposes the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church
and the National Orthodox Church of Ukraine operating in the
country. Additionally, the Church tries to influence the Russian
minority in the Moldavian and Baltic countries through sectarian
connections. The Moldovan Orthodox is affiliated to Moscow.
However, the influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church in
Moldova is expanding. In Estonia, the majority of the population
is Lutheran. There are 50,000 Estonian Orthodox and 100,000
Russian Orthodox in the country.
Civil Society and Media

Russian society has undergone significant changes since
1991. The first remarkable trend after the Soviet Union was the
quick adaptation of former communist rulers and bureaucratic
elite to the political changes, many of which became businessmen.
The Soviet society model and Soviet people have also rapidly
changed.
Previously, Soviet society was heterogeneous in history,
125
religion, and culture. Economic disparities were not readily

apparent, as the state had a means of production and redistributed
income. The lack of astronomical differences between wages, the
provision of free education and health care by the state, and finally
the restriction of private property prevented major problems in
society. The exception however was privileged groups such as
members of the Communist Party and prominent bureaucrats.
In the mid-1980s, all of this changed when Gorbachev
introduced perestroika to change the Soviet Union, although it
would eventually hasten its collapse. During this time however,
senior bureaucrats and party members became interested in
trade and business. This interest was further spurred under the
first president of the Russian Federation Yeltsin, whose first
generation of enterprising elites demonstrated their support for
him and the reforms, by minimizing their ties with the Communist
Party in the early 1990’s. During privatization and restructuring
activities under the new system, elites in Moscow and the regions
economically benefited.
The emerging entrepreneur class is composed of oligarchs
at the local level and the Communist Party’s bureaucracy. In
particular, the direct contact of local managers with foreign
capital has led to the emergence of new power groups prior to
the strengthening of the authority of the central administration.
Initially in the 1990s, Yeltsin attempted to control the new class
that emerged, but he largely failed. Table 2 shows the economic
strength of the oligarchs in Russia in the early 1990s.
Speculations about the new entrepreneurial class and the
wealth of local elites influenced Russian society in two ways.
First, the entrepreneurial class effected the foreign capital inflows
and the expansion of Russia. Secondly, people opposed the
empowerment of oligarchs on the grounds that it was unfair. Those
who were adversely affected by political economic developments
strongly supported the Putin administration in the 2000s.
Since 2000, some of the oligarchs in Russia have escaped
from the country. Legal arrangements have been made to control
the activities of the remaining oligarchs inside the country. In
particular, the oligarchs’ support for political parties and their
dominance over the media were limited during the Putin period.
Putin’s fight with the oligarchs led to an increase in popular
support for him.
126
Apart from the changes in civil society, there has been

no significant progress on media freedom since the 1990s.
Although the media is categorized as semi-independent, the
Russian government largely controls it, directing society through
newspapers, television, news agencies, and internet media. The
media plays an important role in shaping Russian foreign policy
as it did during the Soviet period. The Russian administration uses
the media to make propaganda inside and outside of the country
to expand its influence on society.
Television is the most popular information tool for Russian
citizens, followed by internet, radio, and newspapers. The Russian
government directs society through state controlled media and
private media organizations, some of which belong to oligarch
businessmen. Putin tries to create domination over oligarchs by
using media tools.
The media serves as an important instrument of foreign
policy. President Putin pursues a strategy that shapes foreign
policy through state controlled and non-state instruments. After
Putin’s re-election as president in 2012, the pressure on the media
increased. The President often manipulates domestic and foreign
policy decisions through the media. The use of media in foreign
policy is done in three ways: to provide public support for the
implemented foreign and security policy, to put forward official
foreign policy preferences, and to influence foreigners through
propaganda. As a result, the media is the key to the formation and
direction of Russian foreign policy. Putin conveys the message of
the Kremlin to the public by means of state controlled media and
private sector media channels.
The President’s media strategy is primarily designed by his
advisors. Putin’s messages related to culture, society, business,
political parties and target countries are communicated through
the media. The strategy is based on an approach that puts Putin
in the center. The Putin administration uses the media to gain
influence over the public and businesses to reinforce his existing
power, and to deliver messages to target countries.
The most popular television channels in the Russian
Federation are Rossiya 1, Channel 1, NTV, Russia Today, Ren
TV, and TV Centre. The leading internet media is Mail.Ru (ru
+ com), Rambler and Yandex. The radios in the same category
are Yevropa Plyus, Avtoradio, Rosskoye Radio, Retro FM and
127
Radio Shanson, Ekho Moskvy, Rario Marak and Vesti FM are the
media organs that include news and analysis in their programs.
Komsomolskaya Pravda, Metro Daily, and Metro Weekly are also
among the strongest in the media in the printed media category.
The total circulation of these three newspapers is around 6 million.
State controlled Rossiskaya Newspaper, published as a tabloid, is
the most popular publication (Snegovaya, 2015).
The Freedom House report argues that media freedom in
Russia has become worse since 2000. The main reason is the
increased propaganda in the statecontrolled media. In Russia,
state television stations serve as the main source of information
for 90% of the population. In particular, radical changes were
made after the increase in anti-government demonstrations in
2011 and after Putin was re-elected in 2012. The most important
change that prevents freedom of the media is the law, also known
as the foreign agent law. This law increases the state pressure on
independent reporters. Another turning point took place in 2014
when the Russian forces invaded the eastern regions of Ukraine,
and the attack was largely camouflaged by the Russian media
(Freedom House, 2018).
After 2014, publicly owned media and others faced
intense pressure. The media strategy of the Putin administration
in the new era is based on three pillars. The first of these is the
application of censorship to the news. As a result of the continuity
of this practice, the media began to apply censorship on their own
and did not include any news and comments that the government
would not consider appropriate. The second method is to control
the media with official propaganda. Mass media has become
bulletins that reflect the official view of the government. The
third method is the use of legal and economic instruments such
as accusations of media organs as foreign agents, the dismissal of
editors and even the acquisition of the media. The media organs
purchased in this way and who subsequently changed their
publication policy include Ria Novosti, Gazete.ru, Kommersant,
Londra.ru, EkhoMoskvy, Nevasimiya, and Yandex. Independent
media outlets that ignored warnings, legal and economic pressures
have been closed down by federal or local authorities such as:
Kasparov.ru, Ej.ru, Navalyn’s Live Journal, Grani.ru.
The pressures of the administration on the media have been
similar for non-governmental organizations. Following the foreign
128
agent law enacted in 2012, the Ministry of Justice accused some

non-governmental organizations of espionage. Consequently,
some NGOs have been oppressed and forced to limit their
activities, others have terminated themselves, or some were closed
by the administration. As this section has demonstrated, freedom
of the press and the activities of non-governmental organizations
are severely restricted in comparison with Western democracies.
Conclusions
The Russian Federation comprises of federal subjects
made up – republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal importance,
an autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs. In Chapter
three, Articles 65-79, the Russian Constitution officially names
and explains the legal status of the all the subjects, states and
territories of Russian Federation. Until recently, there was 83
administrative units consisting of 22 republics, 46 oblasts, 9 krais,
1 autonomous oblast, and 4 autonomous okrugs, and 2 cities of
federal importance. More recently however, this number increased
to 85 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol in
2014, although most states still refer to them as part of Ukraine.
The 1993 Russian Constitution defines the Russian
government as “a Democratic federal law-bound State with a
Republican form of government” (Article 1). It recognizes three
branches of power – the executive, legislative, and judicial. All
three branches of power are defined as independent and separate
from each other. In terms of state power, the Constitution states
“the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the President of
the RF, the Federal Assembly (the Council of Federation and
the State Duma), the government of the RF, and the Court of the
Russian Federation” according to the authority granted to each
(Article 11).
The main actors of the Russian federation foreign policy are
the President, Federal Assembly, Security Council and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. The President of the Russian Federation, in
conformity with his constitutional powers, shall provide guidance
of the country’s foreign policy and as the Head of State shall
represent the Russian Federation in international relations. The
Federation Council and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly
of the Russian Federation, within the framework of their
129
constitutional powers, shall pursue legislative work to support the

foreign policy course of the Russian Federation and fulfilment of
its international obligations. The Security Council of the Russian
Federation shall execute the decisions of the President of the
Russian Federation in the area of international security and control
over their implementation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation shall provide direct implementation of the
foreign policy course approved by the President of the Russian
Federation.
The United Russia Party is the most powerful political
party in Russia. The other political parties represented in the
State Duma are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
Liberal Democrat Party, Only Russia Party, Motherland Party and
Civic Platform Movement. The role of the political parties in the
formation of foreign policy decisions is extremely limited. As a
mass party, the United Russia Party dominates the State Duma. In
most cases, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, can
abandon the ideological perspective and support the practices of
the Putin administration on the basis of patriotism. On the other
hand, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Liberal Democrat
Party is also an ally of the government. An important problem
with political representation has been the election threshold.
Since the 7% election threshold is applied at the country level,
many political parties remain outside the State Duma.
The Russian Orthodox Church is a widely recognized
religious institution in the Russian Federation. The relationship
between the Russian State and the Russian Orthodox Church
is a complicated one, which demonstrates a breadth of activity,
collaboration, and cooperation. The Church sees itself as the
religious leader of the Russian Federation and claims authority over
the Orthodox Churches in the former Soviet countries. However,
some of the Orthodox churches do not accept the authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the Russian government
supports the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church inside and
outside the country and encourages cooperation in forming its
foreign policy decisions.
The role of media and civil society in shaping foreign
policy decisions has been limited in recent years. Following the
events of Ukraine in 2014, criticizing the official policy of the
government in mass media and civil society activities has been
130
limited by the foreign agent law enacted in 2012. Mass media

state or privately owned has faced censorship, causing them to
avoid any news or comments that the government would not
consider appropriate. Media has also been controlled through
official propaganda, now including bulletins that reflect the
official view of the government. The government has also used
legal and economic instruments such as accusations of media
organs as foreign agents, the dismissal of editors and even the
acquisition of the media as a means of silencing any criticism
of the government. Non-governmental organizations have faced
similar pressure accused of espionage, forced to either limit their
activities or be shutdown.
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5.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S

RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS
Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu
Introduction
From Russia’s inception, it has sought the status and
recognition as a great power. Therefore, Russia’s relations with
other great powers are of significant value (Krickovic and Weber,
2018). The aim of this chapter is to discuss Russia’s relations
with the other great powers of international politics – the United
States, China, European Union. The first section analyzes the
conceptualization of great power. Then in section two, it begins
with a discussion about Russia’s status in international politics.
From a conceptual perspective, it deliberates on whether and
why Russia should be considered a great power considering the
Country’s decline in material and non-material power capabilities
since the end of the Cold War era. Then in section three, it
analyzes Russia’s relations with the United States. Considering
the geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War era, one wonders how and in
which ways the changing dynamics of Russian-American relations
during the post-Cold War era have affected Russia’s great power
position. How have the dynamics of bilateral relations radically
changed following Putin’s coming to power in late 1990s? The
fourth section highlights the key dynamics of Russia’s relations
with China and tries to answer why these two countries have
in recent years come closer. It considers whether the evolving
cooperation between Russia and China as an alliance relationship
is designed mainly to prevent the United States from playing a
hegemonic role in the Eurasian region. Finally, in the fifth section,
it examines Russia’s relations with the European Union, with a
focus on the alternative schools of thought shaping Russia’s
approach to relations with European countries. What are the key
features of Russia’s approach towards the European Union? And
how have they evolved under the leadership of President Putin?
The Concept of Great Power

Of all the theoretical approaches in international relations,
it is the structural realist approach that sees the distribution of
135
power capabilities among states as vital to the ordering of the

international system at a given time (Mearsheimer, 2001). The
structural realist approach holds that states are the key actors of
international politics. However, it maintains that states of great
powers matter the most. The ordering principle of international
relations assumes anarchy. States internal behaviors are presumed
to function in a similar manner and to not play a decisive role in
their international behaviors. States are only classified by their
material power capabilities (Waltz, 1979). Dynamics of relations
among great powers have shaped the course of international
developments and the material and ideational foundations of the
international order over the course of history (Brands, 2018).
Although many scholars place the United States in its own
category due to its well-invested geopolitical interests in every part
of the planet, and ability to protect them against all other actors
through the use of coercive and non-coercive instruments, this
chapter holds that Russia, China and the European Union should
also be considered in the same category. Like the United States,
they all differ from other actors in international politics in terms
of the scope of their geopolitical interests, as well as capabilities
to lead, either in all, or some dimensions of power. This chapter
maintains they are the only great powers in today’s international
system.
Despite the United States lead on Russia, China and the
European Union in terms of its material and non-material power
capabilities, each of them, are the only powers on earth that have
the ability to play hegemonic roles in their neighborhood as well
as the capacity to protect themselves against a range of external
attacks. Although many other countries outperform Russia in
terms of economic and ideological power capabilities, it remains
the only country on earth with the military power capacity to
compete with the United States on nearly equal terms. If military
power capability were to be the only criterion to differentiate
countries, the United States and Russia would form a league of
their own. Russia’s non-conventional nuclear power capability can
only be compared to the United States. Even with its deteriorating
economic capacity over the last decade, Russia still possesses the
ability to deploy troops to distant places in a short amount of time.
Russia’s military involvement in Georgia, eastern Ukraine, Syria
and Venezuela attest to Russia’s non-dwindling military power
capacity (Sutyagin and Bronk, 2017).
The question of how many great powers exist in international
politics depends on the type of polarity within the system at any
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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS
given point in time. In unipolar systems, there is only one great

power whose material capability is unmatched by others. The time
period between 1991 and 2008 is defined by many observers of
international politics as a unipolar era in which the United States
acted as the only global and hegemonic power within the system
(Monteiro, 2014). Whereas the Cold War era represented a bipolar
system consisting of two hegemonic powers – the Soviet and the
United States. All other state powers arranged themselves within
the system according to their relations with either of the two great
powers. The international systems during the interwar years and
the time period between the end of Napoleonic wars in 1815 till
the end of the World War I in 1918 is considered an example of
a multipolar system, where power was distributed among four
great powers – Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, with wealth
and military capabilities distributed relatively evenly and had
the capacity to block political arrangements that threatened their
major interests.
The Russian Federation’s Great Power Status

Unlike the United States, which pursues geopolitical
interests across the entire globe, Russia’s geopolitical interests are
mainly confined to the larger Eurasian region (Suslov, 2018). Even
though Russia is the only country with the capability to annihilate
the United States in a nuclear exchange, its overall military
capability is no match of the United States. The United States for
example, spends around 800 billion US dollars on its military,
while Russia spends approximately one tenth of this amount. To
illustrate one more example, the United States has twelve aircraft
carriers, while Russia has only one. Nevertheless, Russia has the
ability to defend itself against any potential American military
attack and strike the American homeland with intercontinental
ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads.
In terms of its economic power capability, Russia is far
below many other powers with a GDP of approximately 2 billion
US dollars. For example, the United States and European Union
command a GDP of around 19 trillion US dollars each, whereas
the Chinese GDP is around 13 trillion US dollars. Yet, Russia is
among the top three producers of oil and gas on earth and Russian
authorities do not shy away from using others’ dependency on
Russian oil and gas resources as leverage in its foreign relations
(Rumer, 2007).
Additionally, Russia’s ideological/normative/soft power
137
capability is no match of the United States, China or the European

Union. Neither Russia’s political ideology nor its global brands
have succeeded in gaining worldwide attraction (Kanet, 2018).
Despite Russia’s inadequacies, Russia still considers itself
a great power and seeks to recognized as one. To understand why
and how, it important to understand different aspects of Russia’s
conceptualization of great power. First, Russia understands
great power in terms of tangible power capabilities, in particular,
military capacity, natural resources and geographical location of
which it is endowed with.
Second, Russia assumes a great power should be one of
the permanent members on the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) since it represents the most important decision-making
body in international politics to deal with issues concerning
international peace and security. Russia, as a permanent veto
holder on the Security Council, also maintains that no international
military operation should be undertaken without the approval of
the UNSC.
Third, Russia views a great power as having the capacity
to influence and determine the decisions of other states in
international relations. This has particularly been the case since
President Putin came to power in the late 1990s, where Russia has
strongly opposed the legitimacy of the liberal international order
and the global hegemony of the United States. However, it has not
been the intention of Russia to influence other states by pursuing a
revolutionary strategy to overthrow the liberal order and propose
an alternative world order. Rather Russia’s success to influence
other states has emanated from its ability to use its disruptive
power capacity to restrict attempts of western powers to shape
international politics in their own image. Through this strategy,
Russia seeks to prevent other actors from damaging its national
interests in different parts of the world. This in part explains
why Russia does not offer proactive solutions to global problems.
Instead, as many Russian foreign policy analysts observe, Russia
seems to benefit from frozen conflicts.
Fourth, Russian leaders are aware that the most powerful
actors in international politics in the years to come will be the
United States and China. The possibility of peace and war across
the globe will be strongly determined by the interplay of relations
between Washington and Beijing. However, Russia is determined
to not let either of them shape the course of developments in the
larger Eurasian region. For this reason, Russia follows a foreign
policy strategy which simultaneously aims at contributing to
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the erosion of the transatlantic trust between the two shores

of the Atlantic Ocean and improving relations with China to
counterbalance the United States.
Russia and the United States

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new geopolitical environment
emerged in which the triumphant western powers found it difficult
to accept the new Russian Federation as a great power. Common
amongst all successive American administrations from the early
1990s until now, is the perception that Russia is a regional power
lacking the power capacity to be deemed as a great power on par
with the United States (Roberts, 2013). As this section explores,
the bilateral American-Russian relationship over the last thirty
years can be characterized as an ongoing Russian desire to be
treated as a global power on the one hand and incessant American
reluctance to do so on the other.
Although Russia pursued a pro-western foreign policy
orientation during the 1990s, setting in motion a liberal democratic
transformation process at home, and cultivating functional
cooperative relations with NATO and the European Union abroad,
western powers refrained from treating Russia as a great power
and providing it a legitimate place in the existing institutions
of the liberal international order (Rumer and Stent 2009). This
drastically contrasted with the western powers’ treatment of
the former communist countries in central and Eastern Europe.
As the former communist states in central and Eastern Europe
liberated themselves from the Soviet Union, they showed a strong
determination to join the western international community. The
western powers responded positively and many of these countries
in the 1990s joined as members of NATO and the European Union.
Likewise, as newly independent states emerged in Caucasia
and Central Asia, western powers lent their support by offering
to incorporate them into the western institutions at the risk of
antagonizing Russia.
From the onset, it was not easy for the Russian Federation to
recognize the newly independent states in the larger Eurasia region
as its peers. Even though Russia was not in a strong position to
resist western penetration into the post-Soviet geography during
the 1990s, Russian opposition to western primacy in its former
territories saw a radical increase following the coming to power
of President Putin in late 1990s (Wishnick, 2009).
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To understand why Russia did not immediately react to

NATO’s expansion in the 1990s, it is important to understand
Russian leaders’ initial assumptions following the end of the
Cold War. Russian leaders mistakenly assumed with the end
of the Soviet Union, there would be no need for NATO to exist
as a collective defense alliance. Russian leaders hoped for the
formation of a pan-European security organization that would
replace NATO as the prime venue to discuss European security.
Under this new arrangement, Russia expected western powers
would recognize Russia as a great power and redefine the security
structure in Europe in close cooperation with Russia (Layton,
2014).
When it became apparent that NATO was there to stay,
Russia was then given the impression by western powers that
NATO would not enlarge towards Russian territories in return
for Russian acquiescence to German unification and ascension
to NATO (German, 2017). Despite Russian expectations, NATO
did expand closer to the Russian border. Initially, to ease tensions
between Russia and NATO members, Russia signed the NATO-
Russia Founding Act in 1997 whereby Russia was allowed to join
NATO meetings in Brussels, without having the right to vote on
final decisions. Additionally, Russia was admitted to the G-7 group
in 1998 as a consolation prize for not opposing NATO’s decision
to admit Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic to membership in
1999.
After the Kosovo crisis in 1999 however, relations between
Russia and NATO entered a crisis period. Russia vociferously
opposed the US-led NATO operations in the territories of the
former Yugoslavia. When NATO undertook military attacks
against Serbia in 1999 to coerce the Serbian leadership to
withdraw its troops from Kosovo, Russia strongly reacted. From
Russia’s perspective, any NATO-led involvement in the internal
affairs of other countries without the approval of the United
Nations Security Council is illegitimate and illegal (Karabeshkin
and Spechler 2007).
In terms of Russian-American relations, they dramatically
declined during George W. Bush’s two term presidency between
2000-2008, when Russia became increasingly discontent and
alarmed with American foreign policy. During this period the
so-called neoconservative school of thought shaped American
foreign policy thinking decisively, whereby the United States
adopted a global primacy strategy that promoted American
values across the globe through unilateral instruments. No longer
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believing in the legitimacy of multilateral platforms, the Bush

administration forced its allies to toe the line and place maximum
pressure on potential rivals to digest American hegemony as fait
accompli (Pan and Turner, 2016). To demonstrate its discomfort
with American foreign policy, Russia strongly opposed the US-
led war in Iraq in 2003. Together with France, Germany and
China within UN Security council, Russia voted against any US-
led multilateral military operation in Iraq.
The Bush administration also supported the peaceful
revolutions that swept across the post-Soviet geography in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan collectively known as the
“color revolutions”, hoping that successful implementation of
liberal democratic practices in those countries would bring to
power pro-American regimes. The US also supported Georgia
and Ukraine’s nomination to join NATO. However, it was decided
at the NATO summit in 2008 that Georgia could only join if it
succeeded in transforming into a democratic and capitalist state.
From the Russian perspective, western policies, particularly
American policies, aimed to contain the penetration of Russian
influence in its near abroad. At the Munich Security Conference
in 2007, President Putin delivered a historic speech in which he
harshly criticized the American efforts to promote American values
across the globe and strengthen its primacy through the adoption
of unilateral policies. Putin made it clear that the dissolution of
the Soviet Union was a historical mistake and his mission was to
rejuvenate Russia as a formidable great power. To Russian elites,
it is assumed that all great powers are entitled to have their own
sphere of influence, and Ukraine and Georgia were in Russia’s
(Radin and Reach, 2017). In response to the perceived threat of
western policies, Russia undertook a limited military operation
against Georgia in the summer of 2008 in the immediate aftermath
of the NATO summit in Bucharest. Not long after, Russia annexed
Crimea after the pro-Russian regime Ukraine was ousted from
power by people demonstrations in early 2014. Russia refused to
accept the idea of Ukraine and Georgia joining the EU and NATO,
before having the chance to develop a cooperative relationship
with western powers supported by international agreements.
In 2014 Russia was disposed from G-8 following its
annexation of Crime. The Russian use of force against sovereign
states of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated the primacy Russian
leaders’ give to military power in foreign policy (Sherr, 2017).
The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign
states and the annexation of Crimea into Russian territories were
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in clear violation of the founding principles of the Westphalian

international order. Former American Secretary of States John
Kerry went so far as to accuse Russia of employing the tools
of nineteenth century geopolitics in the emerging twenty first
century (Epstein, 2014).
Once the Bush presidency was replaced by Barak Obama’s
presidency in early 2009, the new American administration
decided to set in motion a reset in its relations with Russia.
Despite the many disagreements between the two powers, the
driving logic behind the reset initiative was that the United States
and Russia also shared many common strategic interests, such
as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
defeating Al-Qaeda and its affiliates across the globe, bringing
stability to Afghanistan and Iraq, dealing with transnational
terrorism and organized crime and finding a lasting solution to
the crises stemming from the attempts of regimes in North Korea
and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons (Mattox, 2011). For about
four years, the reset initiative appears to have eased the tension
in bilateral relations coinciding with Medvedev’s presidency in
Moscow between 2008-2012.
Relations however would once again take a negative turn
after Vladimir Putin returned to presidency in 2012. Following the
eruption of protests in Russia in 2011 upon Putin’s announcement
to run again for presidency, a degree of skepticism rose in
Putin’s administration with respect to the intentions of American
governments vis-à-vis Russia. From Putin’s perspective the
anti-Putin street demonstrations revealed nothing more than the
US intentions to get involved in Russian domestic politics by
supporting non-state actors. The illiberal authoritarian turn in
Russian domestic politics following the reinstitution of Putin’s
presidency also demonstrated the widening value gap between
the United States and Russia creating a thorn in bilateral relations
(Oliker, 2017).
Russia’s relations with the United States continued to
deteriorate following the Crimean crisis. In cooperation with
European allies, the United States orchestrated an economic and
political embargo against Russia. Relations however dropped
to a new low following Russia’s military involvement in the
Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Assad regime in late
2015. Putin has demonstrated his willingness prop up the Assad
regime through the employment of all policy instruments at his
disposal to regain influence in the region with Russia’s expanded
military capabilities, reclaim its status as a great power, and to
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play a greater role in the Middle East (Allison, 2013). Aside

from Russia’s military efforts, Russia received China’s backing
at the Security Council to block any multilateral or US-led
military operations against Assad. Russia has also sought to create
alternative platforms to find diplomatic solutions to the Syrian
civil war and It is within this context that Russia, Türkiye and Iran
have met numerous times and developed the Astana and Sochi
processes to find a compromised solution to the Syrian civil war.
After Donald Trump won the presidential elections in late
2016, bilateral relations went from bad to worse. Despite Trump’s
intentions to improve relations with Russia on a transactional
and pragmatic logic, who has also been sympathetic with Putin’s
strongman rule in Russia, there is now a bipartisan consensus
in the US Congress that Russia deserves to be punished for its
illiberal authoritarian turn and overt political interference with
the American presidential elections (Rumer, Sokolsky and Weiss,
2017). The Trump administration went further by categorizing
and identifying in the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018
National Defense Strategy documents Russia and China as the
most important global rivals to be reckoned with (The White
House, 2017). And despite Trump’s extremely critical stance
on NATO and European allies, the US contribution to NATO’s
deterrence and reassurance capabilities have meaningfully
increased over the last few years (Sperling and Webber, 2019).
Furthermore, a sizable number of American troops have now
been deployed to Poland and American efforts to fortify NATO’s
military presence in central and Eastern Europe has shot up.
Russia and China

Relations between the Soviet Union and China during
the Cold War era ebbed and flowed depending on different time
periods (Lo, 2008). For example, bilateral relations during the late
1940s and throughout much of the 1950s were cordial. This is in
part because of the US, who as the leader of the liberal-democratic
camp, defined Russia and China as enemies and did its best to
contain both. Despite a certain degree of rivalry between Moscow
and Beijing for the leadership of the communist world globally,
Russian and Chinese leadership saw a great benefit in cooperating
across the board.
Following the American strategic overtures towards China
in the early 1970s, the bonds between the Soviet Union and
China weakened. In line with realpolitik strategic thinking, the
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American decision makers during the Nixon presidency wanted

to drive a wedge between these two communist behemoths. While
the famous ping-pong diplomacy of the Nixon presidency under
the stewardship of the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
paved the way for a strategic rapprochement between the United
States and China, relations between the Soviet Union and China
deteriorated. The prime goal of the United States in helping
facilitate China’s opening to international world was to weaken
the so-called Soviet-Chinese axis.
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new understanding
in bilateral Russian-Chinese relations. Since the early 1990s till
now, the degree and scope of cooperation between Russia and
China has significantly grown (Charap, Drennan and Noël, 2017).
Unlike the Cold War era, these two great powers have begun
defining their relationship increasingly from a strategic point of
view. Their common strategic goal has been to limit the influence
of the United States in the greater Eurasian region.
Despite increasing cooperation, relations with China did
not occupy the center stage in Russian foreign policy during the
1990s. There are two reasons main reasons. First, post-communist
Russia under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin adopted a pro-western
foreign policy orientation during the 1990s. Russia undertook
many liberal reforms at home, while yearning for the recognition
of its western identity by western powers. Simultaneously,
western powers supported Russia’s incorporation into the western
international community. The 1990s also saw that Russia was a
great power in relative decline being in no position to challenge
the enlargement of the western international community towards
the post-Soviet geography in central and Eastern Europe. Despite
Russia’s opposition to the enlargement of NATO and the European
Union’s efforts to expand towards its borders, Russia’s declining
material power capacity and the willingness of Russian leadership
to become a legitimate member of the western world restricted
Russia’s response.
Second, China was at the early stages of its economic
development process during the 1990s and was in no position
to appear as a reliable trade partner and a source of financial
investment for the Russian economy. One should also underline
the liberal engagement policy the United States pursued towards
China the first fifteen years of the post-Cold War era, made it
possible for China to adopt a reactive and low-key foreign policy
orientation, one it did not want to jeopardize with western actors
in general and the United States in particular. In other words, both
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Russia and China valued their relations with western actors more
than their relations with one another and none of them were in a
possible to appear as a reliable strategic partner for the other (Lo,
2010).
However, the more western actors, particularly the United
States, tried to contain the rise of China in East and South East
Asia, and Russia in the wider Black Sea and the Middle Eastern
regions, the closer Moscow and Beijing have become. Russia’s
efforts to improve its relations with China have skyrocketed over
the last decade as western actors have put Russia under economic
sanctions with the view of punishing Russia for its assertive and
aggressive foreign policy stance.
Putin’s coming to power in late 1990s boosted the
determination of the Russian elites to help rejuvenate Russia as
a great power with growing economic and military capabilities,
as well as widening its sphere of influence. Increasing oil and gas
revenues and Putin’s success in strengthening the state capacity
have proved instrumental in the revival of Russian power over
the last two decades. In parallel to the increases in its material
power capability, Russia has simultaneously adopted an assertive
foreign and security policy line aiming at delegitimizing the core
tenets of the liberal international order. Russia’s war with Georgia
in the summer of 2008, its annexation of Crimea in 2014, its
support to pro-Russian separatists of Eastern Ukraine, its military
involvement in Syria in late 2015 on the side of the incumbent
of Assad regime, and its ongoing efforts to meddle in the internal
affairs of some liberal western countries through hybrid tactics of
political warfare, have put Russia on a collision course with the
western world.
Therefore, Russia’s recent strategic rapprochement with
China can only be understood by considering the dramatic negative
turn in Russia’s relations with the western world in general and
the United States in particular. Russia’s relations with the United
States reached their nadir following the alleged claims that Russia
interfered in the latest 2016 presidential elections in the United
States by overtly working for the success of one candidate, Donald
Trump, at the expense of the other, Hillary Clinton. Despite all the
intentions of President Donald Trump to help improve relations
with Putin’s Russia, both the Congress, and most of the American
public alike, have now adopted a negative perspective towards
Russia.
Irrespective of Trump’s transactional approach towards
European allies and extremely critical stance on the value of NATO,
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American contribution to NATO’s deterrence and reassurance

capabilities has dramatically increased over the last five years.
Some even argue that the dramatic deterioration of NATO-Russia
relations has indirectly contributed to the perpetuation of NATO
as a collective defense organization in the emerging twenty-first
century.
Another point worth underlining is Russia’s strategic
rapprochement with China has also been driven by the worsening
of relations between China and the United States over the last
decade (Gabuev, 2015). To understand why relations between
China and the United States has deteriorated in recent years,
structuralist realist offers some answers. Structural realist
scholars suggest war will likely occur between the established
global power – the US, and the rising power – China, because
the established power does not want to lose its hegemony and
privileges within the system emanating from its unrivalled power
status (Allison, 2017). Through this logic, if the United States
does not want to lose its global hegemony in the years to come,
it is in its strategic interest to contain China and prevent its rise
now. Structural realists also predict that as the power capability
of a state increases, it begins redefining its national interests from
a much broader perspective than before and all states pursue
power maximization strategies to secure their survival within
the anarchic international order. The reason why American-
Chinese relations have recently entered a downward spiral can be
attributed to the rapid rise in China’s material power capabilities
relative to those of the United States which has instilled a fear in
American decision makers.
This systemic cause is also compounded by the political
aspirations of the Chinese communist party that has been in power
since 1949. The current Chinese president Xi Jinping defines the
Chinese dream as the rejuvenation China as the most powerful
country in East Asia to end the country’s century of humiliation
at the hands of western powers (Callahan, 2017). China’s leaders
also wish to overtake the current global hegemon, the United
States, in all critical power categories by 2035. China has now
adopted a more nationalistic and assertive foreign policy line,
leaving behind the decades old ‘hide your capabilities and bide
your time’ dictum which the United States has begun interpreting
as the most important challenge levelled against its national
security and global primacy.
Today, the Trump administration has been pursuing a
protectionist trade war against China while increasingly trying
146
to contain its rise through the adoption of Free and Open Indo-
Pacific strategy and boosting military capabilities of its traditional
allies in the region. The decades-old liberal engagement strategy
has already given way to realist containment strategy. President
Obama’s strategy of containing the rise of China through pivoting
to East Asia has been given a new boost by President Trump’s
efforts to fortify American military presence in the region as well
as contemplate alternative development strategies to rival China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (Johnston, 2019).
Russia and China are both realpolitik security actors
that believe in the primacy of hard power capabilities and tend
to define security from the perspectives of territorial integrity,
national sovereignty and societal cohesion (Wilson, 2018). Both
countries believe that the unipolar era between the early 1990s
and the second half of the 2000s was a historical aberration and
a multipolar environment is required to maintain global peace
and stability. Similarly, Russian and Chinese leaders share the
view that both Russia and China are entitled to have geopolitical
influence in their neighborhoods as well as curbing the American
penetration into their regions. A common view shared by both
countries is that western claims of universal human rights and
morality are wrong, and simply serve to disguise imperialistic
ambitions to impose one’s values onto another. Both countries
content that nations have different conceptualizations of morality,
human rights and political legitimacy due to their peculiar
historical experiences, geographical locations, state-society
traditions and human capital. Looking from this standpoint
Russia and China are the most ardent supporters of the idea that
non-involvement in states’ internal affairs and the recognition of
their national sovereignty should remain as the most sacrosanct
value of international relations. Therefore, western attempts to
promote democracy abroad are not legitimate and the principle
of responsibility to protect masks ulterior imperialistic ambitions.
Likewise, there is not a universally recognized standard to define
humanitarian interventions and nation-building initiatives in war-
torn countries (Grant, 2012).
Russian and Chinese societies are inclined to legitimize
strong state authority over society. Post-modern values of
consumerism, hedonism and extreme individualism in liberal
democratic western societies are considered vices to be avoided.
Both countries are ruled by strong charismatic leaders and the
scope of civil society participation in national politics is strictly
limited. Martial values are strong within Russian and Chinese
societies and the value of individuals emanate from their
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contribution to the well-being of their societies and security of

their states.
Even though the scope of the cooperation between Russia
and China has recently widened to incorporate as many different
realms as possible, it would be wrong to characterize the current
relationship as one of an alliance (Gabuev, 2015). Rather it
serves as a growing strategic partnership of convenience, not a
NATO-like collective defense alliance. The burgeoning friendship
between Presidents Putin and Jinping has been demonstrated by
their frequent visits to each other, more than thirty times since Xi
Jinping became president in 2013. China is Russia’s number one
trading partner and the volume of bilateral trade is a little more
than 100 billion US dollars. Yet, Russia is not among China’s top
trade partners. Russia mainly sells to China oil and gas whereas
China exports to Russia predominantly manufactured merchandise
goods. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and Chinese-
led BRI have merged with each other as parts of the Greater
Eurasian Economic Partnership. Both countries are the two most
powerful members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
the so-called BRICS community. Their military cooperation is
also noteworthy. Russia is the number one arms exporter to China
and Chinese military modernization has been made possible,
among others, by Russian technology transfers. Both countries
organize joint military exercises in different locations across the
globe. Their diplomatic cooperation within the United Nations
and other international settings is also remarkable.
However, it is still the case that both countries define
their relations with the United States more vital to their security
and economic interests than their own bilateral relations. Many
analysts share the view that neither Russia nor China would accord
the other the big brother role in an emerging alliance relationship
(Kaczmarski, Katz, and Tiilikainen, 2018). Indeed, both countries
take great pains to avoid giving signaling that their goal is to
establish a NATO-like military alliance.
Russia and the European Union

Russia’s relationship with Europe consists of a strong
historical legacy dating back to the modernization efforts of
the Tsar Peter the Great and institutional interactions since the
end of the Cold War era. Historically speaking three alternative
narratives have shaped Russia’s relations with Europe, namely a
pro-Europeanism, pan-Slavism and Eurasianism (Sakwa, 2011).
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The pro-Europeanist school of thought holds that Russia is

first and foremost a European country and the Russian civilization
can be rightly placed within the larger European civilization
(Kaempf, 2010). Once the Byzantine Empire ended at the hands
of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, Russia became the
most important representative of the Orthodox Christian world. It
has also been Russia’s conviction that the Orthodox Patriarch in
Moscow holds the highest religious authority within the Orthodox
community. The Russian Church strongly opposes attempts
of other patriarchates, most notably the Greek Patriarchate in
Istanbul, on claims for the ecumenical title. During the reign
of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian tsars claimed to act as the
legitimate protectors of the Orthodox community living within
the borders of the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, the pro-Europeanist narrative holds that
Russia’s modernization and transformation into a developed
country was contingent on Russia adopting European norms
and practices. Many go back to the centuries-old modernization
process in Russia to the reign of Peter the Great mainly because
he had sent a bunch of Russians to European countries to study
European practices and set in motion a detailed transformation
process within the Empire to mirror European norms and
practices. Pro-Europeans also cite Russia’s contribution to
European cultural and artistic civilization among the proofs of
Russia’s European identity.
From the perspective of pro-Europeans, Russia should
develop good relations with European countries and try to join
all leading European regional organizations as a full member. The
Russian economy is strongly tied to European economies and the
volume of bilateral trade between the two is unrivalled in Russia’s
overall trade relations. Europe is also the number one source of all
foreign direct investment in the Russian economy.
In terms of security interests, pro-European perspectives
argue that Russia’s geography would be better served and protected
from European nations by being considered as a European country
(Hill, 2019). Russian territory to the west of Urals is plain and
difficult to defend against powerful armies of European nations.
Napoleon, for example, almost succeeded in conquering Russia
in the 19th century and a similar situation occurred almost one
hundred years later when Hitler invaded Russia from the west
during the WWII.
This security logic manifests itself strongly in Russian
attempts to establish buffer zones between the Russian mainland
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and powerful nations of western Europe, most notably France and

Germany (Roberts, 2017). For example, Poland served as a buffer
zone between Germany and Russia in the past. Even Russian and
German authorities signed some agreements to divide Poland into
Russian and German spheres of influence. When the Second World
War ended, Russian troops invaded many Central and Eastern
European countries and helped install pro-Soviet communist
regimes. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact was established in the year
of 1955 when the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to
join NATO in the same year. All such security practices fit in well
with geopolitical desires to protect the Russian mainland against
potential territorial attacks coming from the west (Graham, 2010).
The wartime alliance among Russia, the United States and
Great Britain against Hitler’s Germany also attests to Russian
efforts join forces with maritime powers whenever a continental
European nation put claims to hegemony across the continent.
This demonstrates that the balance of power logic shapes Russian
security culture profoundly (Kotkin, 2016). Despite ideological
and cultural differences between Russia and western European
nations, as well as the United States, they all succeeded in forming
a powerful anti-German alliance during WWII.
The second historical narrative that has shaped Russia’s
approach to Europe is pan-Slavism. Russia is presumed to be the
natural leader of the Slavic origin-nations. The insurmountable
differences between Russia’s orthodox and Slavic culture and
Catholic and protestant Europeans suggests that Russia should not
pursue a pro-European orientation at home and abroad. There is a
distinctive The Russian identity is set apart from western European
nations and the best Russia can do is pursue power politics with
European nations. Russia is a civilization-state of its own. Pan-
Slavism also suggests that Russia is first and foremost a Slavic
country rather than a multicultural entity in which all ethnic and
linguistic communities living in Russia possess equal claims to.
The third historical narrative that has decisively shaped
Russia’s approach towards Europe is Eurasianism (Morozova,
2009). According to this school of thought Russia is both a
European and Asian nation. The Russian identity is defined
alongside Eurasianism as a multicultural identity. All non-Slavic
subjects of the Russian state can shape the destiny of Russia should
they prove their allegiance to Russian national interests. Looking
from this perspective, Russia is defined as a quasi-imperial state.
Russia is the traditional and natural leader of the greater Eurasian
region As the center of gravity in international politics has shifted
150
away from the transatlantic area to the Indo-Pacific region, Russia

would do well to define itself as Eurasian rather than a European
or an Asian state, instead focusing its geopolitical attention on
the developments taking place in the greater Eurasian region. As
geopolitical rivalries over connectivity issues increase, Russia’s
Eurasian identity would accrue greater advantages.
For Russia to feel secure and safe, Russian leadership seeks
to create fissures within the transatlantic community by wooing
European nations away from the United States as well as dealing
with EU members on a bilateral basis rather than treating the
EU itself as a single international actor (Wohlforth and Zubok,
2017). This strategy is the outcome of the Cold War era legacy
that still lives in today’s Russia. The United States previously
defined the Soviet Union as the existential enemy in geopolitical
and ideological terms and adopted the so-called containment
strategy during the Cold War years. NATO was established
to help bring into existence a powerful defensive alliance in
Europe under American leadership and all successive American
administrations supported western European allies in their efforts
to strengthen their integration in economic and other realms. For
the United States to deal with the Soviet menace, strong security
bonds between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean would prove
to be decisive. Preservation of the transatlantic alliance under
American leadership and the adoption of the containment strategy
constituted the cornerstones of American security policy towards
the Soviet Union.
Given this historical experience, Russian leadership has
prioritized driving wedges between Americans and their western
European allies. During the Cold War era, Russian rulers tried to
convince and persuade their European counterparts that Russia and
European nations were neighbors sharing the same geopolitical
landscape, and that it was in their strategic and security interest to
work together. Furthermore, they pointed out that in the case of
a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union, Europe would be the first theatre to be wiped off the map.
Put another way, the Soviet leadership warned NATO’s
European allies against the dangers of entrapment in a potential
American-Russian face-off and that they had toed the American
line blindly. Looking from this perspective, the Soviet leadership
supported Germany’s efforts to reach out to the Soviet Union
through economic engagement in the early 1970s. Russia
capitalized on anti-American feelings in leading European allies
such as France and Germany in its efforts to help create cracks
151
within the transatlantic alliance. The signing of the Helsinki

accords and the founding of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe in 1975 testify to the success of Russian
efforts in this regard. The Soviet leadership also tapped into
the strong German opposition to the instalment of American
intermediate range nuclear ballistic missiles in the territories of
European allies.
This thinking manifested itself in the immediate aftermath
of the post-Cold War era as Russia proposed to help bring into
existence new security structures in Europe that would leave no
European nation outside. Even before the Cold War era ended in
1991, the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed the
common European House initiative (Layton, 2014). Likewise,
from the Russian perspective, the end of the Cold War era
between the two rival power blocks justified the dissolution of the
NATO alliance. Russian leadership has incessantly argued that a
new pan-European security organization should replace NATO if
Russia and European countries want to live in a stable and secure
Europe. If this was not possible, Russia should be admitted to
NATO as a member.
As part of its efforts to woo European allies away from
the United States, post-Cold war era Russian leadership has
consistently sided with key European allies such as France and
Germany whenever these countries had strong geopolitical
and foreign policy disagreements with the United States. Two
examples stand out in this regard. First, Russia cooperated with
France and Germany inside the United Nations Security Council
to help scupper the American plans to organize a military operation
against Iraq in 2003 on the pretext that Saddam’s regime developed
nuclear weapons capability and actively supported transnational
terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Russian cooperation with France and
Germany was undoubtedly made possible by the neoconservative
foreign policy mentality of the Bush presidency which not only
prioritized unilateralism over multilateralism but also saw NATO
as a platform that would confer legitimacy on American military
engagements across the globe.
The second example concerns Russian support to European
initiatives to help find a solution to the Iranian nuclear dispute
through diplomatic mechanisms. Neither Russia nor key European
allies sees Iran as an existential enemy. Nor do they believe Iran
has the capability of developing nuclear weapons. They also
all agree that lasting peace and stability in the greater Middle
Eastern region requires Iran’s incorporation into the international
152
community as a responsible stakeholder. It is within this context

that Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and China
joined Obama to sign off on the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan
with Iran in the summer of 2015. For this reason, Russia and other
signatories, have shown a strong opposition to the withdrawal of
the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement in May 2018
under the watch of Donald Trump’s administration.
Russia also feels sympathetic with any European calls for
a multipolar world order in which Europe and the United States
might part ways (Lukin, 2016). Even though Russia would not
feel comfortable with the idea that European nations would unite
under a pan-European entity, such as EU, and constitute one of the
poles in a multipolar world order, Russian leadership had in the
past felt content with any European initiative that would hollow
out NATO from within. French desires to help transform Europe
into a third block during the Cold War and endow the European
Union with strategic autonomy during the post-Cold War have all
stroke sympathetic chords with Russians.
Another aspect of Russian approach towards Europe,
particularly in the realms of geopolitics and security, is that Russia
has long preferred to engage with European nations on a bilateral
basis rather than treating the EU as a credible international actor
that could speak with one voice. Russian leadership pays a great
deal of importance to improve bilateral relations with European
nations for the main reason that Russia’s bargaining power vis-
à-vis each European nation would be much higher than Russia
facing the European Union as a block. There is no way for
Russia to dictate its terms on the European Union because the
power disparity between the two is immense. As is well known,
Russia mainly exports gas and oil to European nations. Many
countries bordering Russia in central and Eastern Europe are
highly dependent on gas and oil imports from Russia. Russia
wants to make sure that European dependence on Russian energy
resources continue (Monaghan, 2007). Rather than negotiating
with the European Union the economic terms of any energy
trade, Russia prefers to engage with European nations bilaterally
because this way it would be in a more advantageous position to
dictate its terms. Russian oil and gas companies offer different
deals to different EU members. The well-known example in this
regard is the Nord Stream II gas pipeline project between Russia
and Germany. Noteworthy in this context is that Germany wants
to finalize this project despite all opposition coming from other
members of the European Union, in particular those bordering
153
Russia in Eastern Europe, as well as the United States (Dyson,

2016).
Another example of Russian attempts to court EU nations
bilaterally, is Putin’s latest intensified efforts to help bring into
power pro-Russian political parties across Europe. Reminiscent
of its support to communist and socialist parties in Europe during
the Cold War era, today’s Russia is trying to increase its influence
in Europe by cultivating cooperative relations with populist
parties of the right and left that are anti-globalist, anti-American,
anti-immigrant and anti-integration and help them come to power
across the continent (Robinson et al., 2018). A common theme
that Russian leadership and many of these populist parties share
is the claim that nation-states should continue to be the ultimate
political communities in international relations and universalistic
political designs should be discarded.
Looking from this perspective, Putin’s Russia would like
to see that the European Union evolve into a Europe of United
States, rather than the United States of Europe. Russian efforts
to get involved in internal politics of many European nations and
employ hybrid tactics have recently increased. Inviting former
German Prime Minster Gerhard Schroder to serve in the board
of Gazprom, the leading Russian gas company, lending financial
support to the political campaigns of pro-Russian populist parties,
hosting prominent leaders of European populist movements in
Russia are among the tactics that Russian leadership has employed
so far.
Conclusions
The structural realist theoretical approach in international
relations disciple holds that states are the key actors of international
politics and of such states great powers are the ones that matter in
the course of global politics. Dynamics of relations among great
powers will shape the course of international developments as
well as the material and ideational foundations of world order.
The Russian Federation, together with the United States and
China are the only great powers of today’s international political
environment. Even though the United States is far ahead of
Russia and China in terms of its material and non-material power
capabilities, these are the only powers on earth that have the ability
to impose their priorities on the countries in their neighborhood
as well as the capacity to protect themselves against all kind of
external attacks.
154
Although there are many other countries outperforming

Russia in terms of economic and ideological power capabilities,
Russia seems to be the only country on earth having the military
power capacity to compete with the United States. If military
power capability were to be the only criterion to differentiate
countries, the United States and Russia would form the league
of their own. Russia likewise defines itself as a great power
and wants to be recognized as one. Russia defends its title as a
great power based on several criteria. First, Russia understands
great power in terms of tangible power capabilities, particularly
military capacity, natural resources and geographical location of
which it is endowed with. Second, Russia assumes a great power
should be one of the permanent members on the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) since it represents the most important
decision-making body in international politics to deal with
issues concerning international peace and security. Third, Russia
views a great power as having the capacity to influence and
determine the decisions of other states in international relations.
Fourth, Russian leaders are aware that the most powerful actors
in international politics in the years to come will be the United
States and China. Russia however is determined to not let either
of them shape the course of developments in the larger Eurasian
region. For this reason, Russia follows a foreign policy strategy
which simultaneously aims at contributing to the erosion of the
transatlantic trust between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean
and improving relations with China to counterbalance the United
States.
Even though Russia itself pursued a pre-western foreign
policy orientation during the 1990s by setting into motion a
liberal democratic transformation process at home and cultivating
functional cooperative relations with NATO and the European
Union abroad, it vociferously opposed the US-led NATO operations
in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Russian discomfort
with unilateral American policies increased tremendously during
George W. Bush’s two term presidency between 2000 and
2008. During this period the so-called neoconservative school
of thought shaped American foreign policy thinking decisively
according to which the United States adopted a global primacy
strategy and promotion of American values across the globe
through unilateral instruments. It is worth underlying that once
the Bush presidency was replaced by Obama’s presidency in early
2009, the new American administration decided to set in motion
a reset in its relations with Russia. For about four years, the reset
in American-Russian relations appears to have eased the tension
155
in bilateral relations. This time period between 2008 and 2012

coincided with Medvedev’s presidency in Moscow. Yet, relations
have begun deteriorating once again when Vladimir Putin returned
to presidency in 2012. Russia’s relations with the United States
have deteriorated dramatically following the Crimean crisis. In
cooperation with European allies, the United States orchestrated
an economic and political embargo against Russia. Relations have
taken a more negative turn following Russia’s military involvement
in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Assad regime in
late 2015. With Donald Trump winning the presidential elections
in late 2016, bilateral relations have turned extremely negative.
Despite Trump’s intentions to improve relations with Russia
on a transactional and pragmatic logic as well as his sympathy
with Putin’s strongman rule in Russia, there is now a bipartisan
consensus in US Congress that Russia deserves to be punished for
its illiberal authoritarian turn and overt political interference with
the presidential elections.
Although the scope of cooperation between Russia and
China has recently widened to incorporate as many different
realms, it would be wrong to characterize the current relationship
as one of an alliance. Their relationship is a growing strategic
partnership of convenience rather than a NATO-like collective
defense alliance. Presidents Putin and Jinping’s burgeoning
relationship has been demonstrated from their thirty visits to
each other since Xi Jinping became president in 2013. China is
Russia’s number one trading partner and the volume of bilateral
trade is a little more than one 100 billion US dollars. Yet, Russia is
not among China’s top trade partners. Russia mainly sells oil and
gas to China whereas China exports to manufactured merchandise
goods to Russia. Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and
Chinese-led BRI have merged with each other as part of a Greater
Eurasian Economic Partnership. Both countries are the two most
powerful members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and
the so-called BRICS community. Their military cooperation is
also noteworthy. Russia is the number one arms exporter to China
and Chinese military modernization has been made possible,
among others, by Russian technology transfers. Both countries
organize joint military exercises in different locations across the
globe. Their diplomatic cooperation within the United Nations
and other international settings is also remarkable. However, it
is still the case that both countries define their relations with the
United States more vital to their security and economic interests
than their own bilateral relations.
156
Russia’s relationship with Europe contains both a strong

degree of historical legacy dating back to the modernization efforts
of Peter the Great and the institutional interactions between Russia
and the European Union. Historically speaking there are three
alternative narratives on Russia’s relations with Europe, namely
pro-Europeanism, pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. However, the
current war in Ukraine of Russia seems to have destroyed the
choice of pro-Europeanism and empowered nationalist, pan-
Slavist and Eurasianist circles and preferences while a new Cold
War emerged between the West and the Russian Federation under
the tacit support of China for Putin.
157
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162
6.
RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Demet Şefika Mangır
Research Asist. Ediliia Abdykadyrova
Introduction
Modern Russia participates in almost all open
intergovernmental global organisations, and some regional.
The main focus of this chapter is Russian foreign policy and
cooperation with international organisations. This chapter is
separated into eight sections: the first section analyses the Russian
approach to international organization, taking into consideration
its Soviet legacy;the secondfocuses on the UN and its Security
Council; the third examines Russia’s cooperation with the
Council of Europe, one of the oldest institutions of Europe; the
fourth discusses relations between Russia and Eurasian Economic
Union, where Russia is considered as a driving-force and critical
in strengthening the integration processes in the post-Soviet
space; the fifth examines the cooperation within the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, where Russia along with China are
considered as the primary leaders; the sixth turns to the Asia-Pacific
region, lookingat the APEC Forum, and Russia’s specific interest;
the seventh evaluates the Organization of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperationconcerning the position of the Russian Federation;
and the eighth addresses the topic of the Commonwealth of
Independent States and their integrated associations in the post-
Soviet space. Post-Soviet Space is the unofficial term for the area
formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and covered by the 15
new independent states, which emerged after the collapse of the
Soviet Union (Nikitin, 2008: 10).
The Russian Approach to International Organizations

The post-Soviet change of Russian foreign policy during the
1990’s was marked by the acknowledgment of national weakness
caused by the breakdown of socialism and the dissolution of
one powerful state into fifteen new ones. Initially, Russia was
163
preoccupied with the task of internal stabilization and financial

survival and was therefore hesitant to play a leading role in the
region. However, in the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Moscow began to position itself as a regional leader, resurrecting
a new Russian globalism under Vladimir Putin in new historic
conditions of the “end of the post-Soviet space” (Nikitin, 2008:
9).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, two major debates
arose about Russian foreign policy. The first question was whether
Russia’s national interests would be better off by establishing
closer relations and integration into the Euro-Atlantic world led
by the United States of America (USA), or looking for friends
and partners to ensure and even limit the USA power throughout
the world. The second was the extent to which Russia should
contribute to the reintegration of the Eurasian space and whether
it should also actively block the expansion of the political and
economic influence of other major powers in this part of the
world in order to secure Russian interests (Gvosdev and Marsh,
2013: 88).
The administration of Boris Yeltsin, the first president
of the Russian Federation, decidedly chose to concentrate its
foreign policy efforts on quick integration into the Euro-Atlantic
structure, to join the ranks of the West, even if meant undermining
Russia’s real interests. In a world that seemed increasingly
unipolar, if not in terms of American centrism, then in terms of
an increasingly centered West or Northern Hemisphere, Russia’s
integration into the West and the Euro-Atlantic community of
states seemed to be the only viable option at that time. Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 went on to elaborate that “the
developed countries of the West are natural allies of Russia”
(Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013: 88) and that Russia’s foreign policy
will be primarily aimed at these countries, especially the USA,
France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. The “second
echelon” of Russian foreign policy interests included other areas
of the world such as the Eurasian space, the Far East, South Asia,
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (Gvosdev and Marsh,
2013: 88).
Although the “West-skepticism” was already expressed
in Russia, Russia’s policy throughout most of the 1990’s was
aimed at developing special relations, strategic partnerships with
164
RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
the USA, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

European Union (EU), as well as joining the G7, World Trade
Organization (WTO) and Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). The openness in the late 1980’s and
early 1990’s of a significant part of the Russian political elite
and society as a whole to the democratic values of a pluralistic
society, and at the same time toward the development of a market
economy, played as significant role in the choice to align Russia
with the West (Zagorski, 2010: 27-28).
Shortly after Russian attempts to integrate with the West,
opposition rose. When Yevgeny Primakov, the leading critic
of this integration, was appointed new foreign minister, the
vision of national interests changed. By choosing him, Yeltsin
committed himself to a new perception of external threats and
foreign policy objectives. Instead of proposing modernization
and westernization as Russia’s key national interests, Primakov
pointed out the danger of the concentration of world power
associated with the unipolar status of the USA. As a realist, he
proposed the concept of ‘great power balancing’ with the goal of
gradually turning the existing unipolar world into a multipolar
one. This vision required integration of the former Soviet region
under Russian leadership and seeking assistance from other
powerful states, such as China and India, in order to balance the
American hegemony (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265). However, a lot
of Primakov’s initiatives and suggestions remained unfulfilled.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russian
diplomacy focused on expanding (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013).
Vladimir Putin, who came to power as a new president, drew
attention to the world’s instabilities, such as terrorism, as well
as some new economic opportunities. Putin saw the need to
engage the West in ambitious joint projects. At the same time, he
visualized Russia as a great power and sought the recognition of
the West. Putin redefined national interest as that of ‘pragmatic
cooperation’ of a great power. Instead of balancing the power
of the USA, the key goal was now declared as an economic
modernization for the sake of preserving the status of a great
power (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265).
Since then, the politics of Russia have changed from
attempts to reengage with the West, to that of assertiveness. The
Kremlin has been very active in developing relations with Europe
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and the USA, especially after the 9/11. For example, in Europe,
Russia has sought a stronger role in defining a security framework
and a greater share in economic projects. In Eurasia, it has initiated
ambitious ideas of regional integration under the umbrella of the
Eurasian Union by inviting several former Soviet states to join.
In Asia, it has sought to pool its resources with China in order to
challenge the West-centered world. Russia also has contributed
to the development of alternative international organizations
such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS,
with the idea of using and taking advantage of new international
opportunities outside the West (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265).
Russia’s desire to build SCO structures or BRICS project can
be seen as an expression of Russia’s desire to build a strategic
network between new actors of international relations which
have the potential to grow and, thus, to balance the USA power
in the international system. In addition, the Russian government
is concerned about remaining a key player in the international
system in the near future and therefore tries to establish links
with countries whose power and influence is growing (Leichtova,
2016: 91).
The importance of Russia’s integration into the world
community is reflected in the words of the Preamble of the
Russian Constitution: “We, the multinational people of the
Russian Federation…are conscious of ourselves as part of the
world community” (constitution.ru). It is the only constitution
that explicitly states the people’s will is to integrate into the
world community. The Russian Federation’s participation in
the activities of more than 300 international organizations
demonstrates this point, which can be divided into three groups:
• Bodies and specialized organizations (institutions) of the
United Nations (UN) system;
• Economic, trade, financial and investment, scientific,
technical, cultural and educational, law enforcement,
environmental and other international organizations;
• International clubs, unions and communities, etc. (Jadan,
2016: 89).
This however was not always the case. The former Soviet
Union’s stance towards international organizations such as the
League of Nations and the International Labor Organization
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(ILO) was defensive. When tensions peaked with the League, the
Soviet Union was excluded and temporarily withdrew from the
ILO. The Soviet Union perceived international organizations as
an instrument of imperialistic foreign policy. This was particularly
apparent during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union blatantly
disregarded existing regional associations and blocked decisions
made by the UN Security Council and many of its specialized
agencies causing them to remain ineffective. The Soviet Union
did not attempt to create its own effective cooperation mechanism
within the framework of multilateral institutions and categorically
refused to borrow them from the West. Rather the nature of
associations created and headed by Russia were quasi-integrated.
Even those institutions the Soviet Union and Western states shared
equal footing, such as the UN, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) or the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), Russia took a defensive position. Its primary
objective was to maintain equal opportunity with the USA and its
allies (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union however, Russia’s stance towards international
organizations changed and it sought to rebuild relations. In
the 1990’s Russia had plenty of opportunities to join existing
organizations in the Western world, to participate in the creation
of regional organizations, to intensify cooperation with regional
associations of Europe and Asia, Pacific integration, and to
transform security institutions. From 1991 to 2001, it became a
member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council
of Europe, the G8 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), became the founder of the Council of the Baltic Sea States
and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
started an active dialogue with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), MERCOSUR, NATO and the EU, initiated
reform of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), led a number of integration projects in the post-Soviet
space and shared with China the status of the SCO architect.
The feverish catch-up of chances missed during the Cold War
years was essentially a set of tactical measures designed to solve
several problems simultaneously: integration into the community
of democratic states and overcoming European determinism in
foreign policy through the development of relations with Asian
(especially Pacific) states (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).
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By the twenty-first century Russia felt more confident

at a regional and global level to make choices that favor an
internationalist approach. The trend over the last decade has
been an integration breakthrough in the post-Soviet space; the
stake in this case is not on the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), but on the most compact Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC), within which the Customs Union is
already functioning and the Eurasian Economic Union has been
formed. Russia demonstrates a positive dynamic in the Pacific
direction as well. Since 2005, Russian-ASEAN summits have
been held, and later, starting in 2011, Russia has participated
in meetings of senior officials and foreign ministers of the East
Asian Community (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).
Russia views international organizations as instruments for
the use by great powers. It often seeks to undermine organizations
it feels it cannot control or at least influence (e.g. the EU) and
instead create alternative bodies that it can or at least play a
dominant role (e.g. the Eurasian Economic Union) to make post-
Soviet Russia great again as one of the members of global Concert
of Powers to settle world affairs, taking into account international
law, but not necessarily being bound by it and influence the course
of events in the international arena (Bond, 2015: 202).
The United Nations and Security Council Decisions

Multilateral diplomacy is understood by Moscow as an
interests-based Concert of Powers, whereas the EU comprehends
it as a means of greater value-based convergence of policies
of the involved countries. The Russian conceptualization is
characterized by three significant features. First it implies the
concept of ‘collective leadership of leading states’, which
objectively assumes a special responsibility for the state of world
affairs, and not the leadership ambitions of a single superpower.
Second, the very concept of multilateral diplomacy implies that
a coordinated multilateral policy must be agreed on between the
countries concerned, including Russia. Therefore, the results of
negotiations, in any forum where it was not part of the decision-
making process, and did not approve of the decision, will not be
considered legitimate by Russia. In the same way, Russia does
not view multilateral decisions taken by regional organizations
that it does not belong to, such as NATO or the EU, as legitimate.
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Third, multilateral diplomacy is thought to serve as the basis and

reflect the distribution of power in the emerging multipolar world
with the rising influence of China, India and Brazil. For this
reason, Moscow considers the UN as the only major international
organization institutionalizing and practicing the concept of
multilateralism. The UN remains a universal forum, given unique
legitimacy and remains the main element of modern multilateral
diplomacy (Zagorski, 2008: 47). This section focuses on the
Russia - UN relations and its participation in the UN Security
Council.
The UN is the world’s leading organization, coordinating
issues of international cooperation between states and international
organizations. Following the end of WWII, the winning allies
– China, France, Soviet Union, UK, and USA established it in
1945 as a result of a series of negotiations and agreements held
at successive conferences in Moscow (1943), in Dumbarton Oaks
(1944) and in Yalta and San Francisco (1945). The negotiations
held at these meetings were designed to harmonize the views
of the “Big Three” – USA, UK, and the Soviet Union on the
organization and procedures of the UN, which, unlike the ill-
fated League of Nations, was supposed to ensure world peace by
means of law (Panagiotou 2011: 196; Bourantonis and Panagiotou
2004: 80). They played a key role in the formation of constituent
documents (e.g. UN Charter), the structure of this organization,
developing its goals, objectives and functions (un.org).
Among all the organs and bodies of the UN established,
the Security Council is the executive organ which has the real
power and authority in relation to the most important activities
of the organization. It consists of 15 members, five permanent
and ten non- permanent, elected for two years by the General
Assembly (Bourantonis and Panagiotou 2004: 80). Permanent
members included the original victors of WWII – China, France,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became
its predecessor on the UN Security Council.
The Security Council was established with the primary
objective to maintain the peace and security in the international
arena, and the status quo established after the defeat of Axis
powers and Japan as indicated in the Charter. Permanent members
enjoy an exceptional status not only because of their constancy,
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but also because of their veto power. It is the only organ that may
authorize UN peacekeeping missions or enforcement actions to
maintain and restore international peace and security, as well as
the only body that can make decisions binding on all UN member
states. Chapter VII of the UN Charter for example, explicitly
authorizes the Security Council to “undertake such actions by air,
sea, or land forces that may be required to maintain or restore
international peace and security” (Jensen 1994: 8; Krasno 2004:
4-5).
Russia has always stressed the importance of the UN. Even
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership
fully realized the importance and implications of permanent
membership in the UN Security Council. The presence of the
Soviet Union in the Security Council ensured its national interests
were protected with the right to veto on any major political
decision. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
Andrei Gromyko for example once stated that no international
issue of any consequence can be solved in the UN without or
against the Soviet Union (Panagiotou, 2011: 200). His predecessor
Eduard Shevardnadze, reinforced this point, later stating that
“the most important thing is to preserve the order in which all
decisions relating to the maintenance of international security are
made by the UN Security Council, in which we have veto power”
(Panagiotou, 2011: 203). Both statements illustrate the point that
the stronger the UN and the Security Council was, in terms of
power, scope and authority, the greater the international voice of
the Soviet Union would be (Panagiotou, 2011: 203).
Now, under the leadership of Putin, the UN has gained
an even greater role in his multi-vectoral and multidirectional
foreign policy program. The UN is considered a central collective
mechanism for the formation of a multipolar world order and
regulation of world politics. It serves as the basis of an emerging
international system based on international law, the UN Charter,
and multilateral approaches to global and regional issues.
The Security Council is understood in Russian foreign
policy as one of its principal weapon’s for defending its perceived
interests and to play a significant role in world affairs (Bourantonis
and Panagiotou, 2004: 81). In the post-Soviet period, Russia’s
attitude to the UN Security Council is inextricably linked with
its search for a new role after losing its empire and the status of a
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world superpower. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia

had to put up with the huge loss of population and territories,
weak economy and the massive withdrawal of military troops
from the territory of its former allies. Russia’s economic, military
and political shortcomings directly restricted its international role
and dramatically influenced the course of its new foreign policy.
To compensate for the loss of superpower status and to counteract
marginalization in the international system, Russia views the UN,
particularly the UN Security Council, as the only arena in which
it can regain power in the international arena (Bourantonis and
Panagiotou, 2004: 84).
The balance of power since the end of the Cold War
has shifted away from unipolarity to a more multipolar and
interdependent world. Moreover, the past few years have witnessed
the emergence of a more confident, assertive and confrontational
Russian foreign policy such as demonstrated in Moscow’s support
for Iran’s nuclear program, its decision to sell aircraft missiles
to Tehran over Western and Israeli protests, its invitation to
Palestine’s new Hamas government to visit Moscow, the invasion
of Georgia, in response to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia, its
decision a few weeks later to recognize the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkazia. Although Russia’s unilateral actions have
received criticism and increased the country’s isolation in recent
years, Russian leadership has refused to back down. Recently,
these situations have been exacerbated by conflicts over Syria,
the rest of the Middle East, Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula, and
the East and South China Seas. These situations have undermined
the unity of the Security Council’s permanent members and
thereby reduced its dominance. Russia is not willing to obey the
norms and practices established, controlled and resolved by the
West. The heightened divisions among permanent members of
the Security Council have however increased the opportunity
for other elected members to play a more productive global role
(Langmore and Thakur, 2016: 106-107).
At present, it is difficult to predict how the recent
developments in the global arena will affect Russia’s relations
with the UN, in particular the Security Council. As for Russia’s
relations with the UN, the consequences of these important
changes are twofold: first, Russia no longer turns to the UN
to confirm its superpower status and no longer considers the
Security Council to be its only voice in the international stage;
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second, the erosion of USA unipolarity and the prospect of

more constructive relations between the two countries mean that
Russia no longer needs to adhere to its strategy of “advancing
the Security Council” to balance the power of the one-sidedness
of the USA. The combination of these two decisive factors will
undoubtedly affect the role and importance of the UN in Russia’s
foreign policy and can stimulate a new turn in Russia’s relations
with the UN, in which the organization plays a less strategic and
significant role (Panagiotou, 2011: 212-213).
The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE) is the oldest and leading
international political organization on the continent in the field of
human rights. The official date of the creation of the Council is
May 5, 1949 (coe.int). Historically, the main function of the CoE
was to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Europe through
democracy. Over time, various organs of the CoE have become
forums for tackling a wide range of international or regional
issues, apart from national defense. Its official mandate, the Statute
adopted in 1949, emphasizes the role of the CoE in creating a
greater unity between its members in order to protect and realize
the ideals and principles of their common heritage. Originally
the COE envisioned cooperation in economic and social matters,
which later led to the development of the European Coal and Steel
Community, and then to its successor, the European Economic
Community. The CoE, which is separate from the EU, developed
a specialization in promoting discourse on democracy and human
rights in Western Europe. In addition, it showed a special interest
in states that are in the process of political transition (Stivachtis
and Habegger, 2011: 162-163).
During the Cold War, the Soviets did not make any attempt
to be a member of the CoE. Following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Yeltsin’s government applied to join the CoE in May
1992 with the hope of obtaining a new international identity
with the “club of democratic countries”. After several months of
preliminary discussions, council officials stated that no decision
would be made on Russia’s application before the adoption of a
new constitution and subsequent elections to new parliamentary
bodies in Russia. Although these conditions were met in December
1993, negotiations on the admission of Russia moved slowly.
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The application was approaching the final review when Russian

troops invaded Chechnya in December 1994. In February 1995,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) voted to suspend
its consideration of Russia’s request for membership due to the
use of force by Russian military during the first Chechen war, in
particular against the civilian population, which is a violation of
the CoE’s basic human rights principles.
After engaging in negotiations with PACE, Russia agreed
to allow council officials to visit Chechnya and sign a cease-fire
agreement in July 1995.PACE likewise agreed to resume the
formal consideration of Russia’s application in September “on the
grounds that Russia is henceforth committed to finding a political
solution to the Chechen crisis and that the alleged and documented
human rights violations [would be] investigated” (Jackson, 2004:
25).
In October 1995, former Chairman of the PACE’s committee
on relations with non-members Jean Seitlinger, announced Russia
was on the right path to joining and being accepted to the Council
by mid-January 1996. This decision was based on Russia’s
demonstrated willingness to join the CoE, and to catch up to
Western countries, in terms of its legal structures and adherence
to democratic norms (Smith, 2014: 131). Even though the war
in Chechnya continued, Russia became a member of the CoE on
February 28, 1996 with the idea that Russia was better in than out.
Taking part in European structures was important for
Russia, to institutionalize its foreign policy, and to belong to the
“European Common House”. Russia sought to build a Greater
Europe without dividing lines and had high hopes for the CoE,
both in terms of obtaining support for its political course of action
and overall development of the country, especially its legal field.
With the accession into the CoE, Russia was able to pursue its
political and legal goals. The political goals included providing
Russia with an international platform to participate in all European
affairs, processes, defending its positions, and declaring its national
interests on an equal footing with other European countries as well
as integrate in the global community. As for legal objectives, these
included the integration of Russia into the European legal space
and the reform of Russian legislation based on the implementation
of the CoE legal norms, the adoption of European legal standards,
and respect for human rights.
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Russia therefore committed itself to ratify the European

Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7,
and 11. Furthermore, Russia accepted a series of specific reforms
of its existing law and policy (Jackson, 2004: 25). Joining the CoE
was viewed as an important political gain, testifying to the quality
of the changes taking place in Russia. Despite the condemnation
by PACE of Russia’s actions in Chechnya in 2000, Russia has
nevertheless remained a member and maintained a favorable
attitude towards the CoE. As Andrei Zagorski notes: “The special
value of the CoE for Russia is that it is the only Western European
institution in which Russia wanted to become a full member”
(Smith, 2014: 149). In subsequent years Russia has continued to
reaffirm its commitment to the CoE and has used it as an advisor
of its own legislation, especially in regard to regional cooperation
(Smith, 2014: 151).
However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
created much more troubles in relations with the CoE, too. As a
result, the Council decided suspending Russian membership but
Moscow reacted it and withdrew its membership without waiting
any decision of the Council on March 15. However, next day,
the Committee of CoE Ministers decided to expel Russia with a
declaration that “the Russian Federation ceases to be a member of
the Council of Europe as from today.” (ABC News, 2022).
The Eurasian Economic Union

Russia’s current foreign policy strategy is based on the idea
of a multipolar world order. The concept implies the presence of
several influential centers within the framework of a single global
system. The multipolar model of the international order assumes
the presence of several poles-centers that are comparable with
each other according to their respective potentials (Vasilyeva
and Lagutina, 2013: 82-83). With the process of globalization,
new centers of economic and political influence have emerged,
especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This is in part because of
the West’s inability to dominate the global economy and politics.
For this reason, Russia seized the opportunity to form and fund
the geopolitical project EAEU as will be discussed in this section
(Vasilyeva and Lagutina, 2013: 82-83).
During the 1990’s the Eurasian integration process was
174
slow, with numerous treaties signed by CIS member states to

settle on a regional-type trading bloc (Sergi, 2018: 52). The first
attempt at Eurasian integration came in 1994 with the creation of
the Central Asian Economic Cooperation. Later in 2002 it was
transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization
(CACO), which then merged with EurAsEC in 2005. In 2012
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia transformed the customs union
into a Single Economic Space. In 2014 they signed the Agreement
on the EAEU formation, which came into force on January 1,
2015 (Khitakhunov et al., 2017: 2).
The EAEU is an international organization for regional
economic integration. It was formed to coordinate policies in the
economic sectors defined by the treaty and other international
treaties within the Union such as the freedom of movement of
goods, services, capital and labor. EAEU also seeks to counter
the Western world’s hegemonic status and to reduce China’s
economic dominance in the region (Khitakhunov et al., 2017:
3-4). The Organization also aims to reduce the negative effects of
global instability and strategically position all members in foreign
markets (Ziyadullaev and Ziyadullaev, 2016: 6).
The main organs of EAEU include: The Supreme Eurasian
Economic Council consisting of the presidents of member
countries, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Economic Council
including member countries’ prime ministers, the Eurasian
Economic Commission, and the Court of the EAEU. All EAEU
members share a number of common features: A Soviet history
as part of a single economic entity, language, and institutions,
all of which have made economic integration easier. Eurasian
integration has been particularly strong thanks to the political and
strategic support the idea has received (Khitakhunov et al., 2017:
2).
Amongst the EAEU members, Russia is undoubtedly the
strongest and most advanced (Sergi, 2018: 56; Ziyadullaev and
Ziyadullaev, 2016: 8). The territory and population of Russia is
much larger than the other participants. Russia accounts for more
than 85% of the total GDP. Russia therefore bears the brunt of the
cost in constant concessions and financial assistance to its partners
(Ziyadullaev and Ziyadullaev, 2016: 8-9). However, Russia’s
assistance is calculated and strategic, to convince members
to implement the rules and norms of the EAEU, by providing,
175
for example, direct or indirect subsidies to Belarus and other

small poor countries in the form of cheaper energy and loans,
or politically motivated investments and security guarantees for
Armenia.
In return, Russia receives a tariff structure that favors
Russian industry in partner countries. Putin aims to secure a
geopolitical Eurasian Partnership that will allow Russia to compete
with the European Union for influence in Europe and possibly the
world scene (Tarr, 2016: 18). Some observers view the EAEU
as a purely Russian geopolitical project, a “political platform for
economic integration” aimed at restoring the country’s position
in a multipolar world “as a major power” (Kirkham, 2016: 113).
Existing studies, for example, indicate a discrepancy between
the publicly declared economic goals of the EAEU and unstated
power-driven goals. Although the economic benefits of a single
market are an incentive for all participants, the Russian leadership
also seems to have unidentified political goals such as expansion,
as illustrated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Russia maintains a special interest in the ex-Soviet
republics, not only because many ethnic Russians still live there,
but also because they share a unique relationship and common
culture. Formerly when Vladimir Putin was Prime Minister, he
called the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its empire one of
the greatest geopolitical tragedies of the 20th century, although
he denies trying to reconstitute it. Later in 2011, after announcing
plans to return to the Presidency, Putin called for a stronger
“Eurasian Union” to include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Spechler and Spechler, 2013: 1).
EAEU is regarded by Russia as critical in strengthening’s
its influence in the post-Soviet space. However, instead of
recreating the old centralized state system, Putin’s administration
seeks to create a new system that will affect the former Soviet
republics without assuming responsibility for the official logistical
functions of each state (Sergi, 2018: 57-58). The idea of the
Eurasian Union is not so much the creation of a common strategic
space, but as the formation of a supranational management
system throughout the global Eurasian region, which is intended
to become an important part of the emerging global system of
global governance (Vasilyeva and Lagutina, 2012: 23). In this
regard, the EAEU is viewed as a historic economic and political
176
achievement for the region and Putin’s political agenda. In the

context of geopolitics and geo-economics, this Union serves as
a powerful illustration of what Putin foresaw for the post-Soviet
space, since the Union is partially motivated by the goal of self-
affirmation of Russia. However, given the many advantages, it is
still unclear whether this institution will succeed or simply reduce
in importance (Sergi, 2018: 59).
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The highest mixture of post-Soviet and non-Soviet
countries and societies is currently represented by the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). This section examines the
SCO and Russia’s interests in participating in this organization.
The SCO began as a series of negotiations between 1996-2000
on the delimitation of the border between China and some of
its post-Soviet neighbors (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan). In the framework of these negotiations, this group of
countries was scalled the Shanghai Five. After the initial security
task was completed, it was decided not to dismiss the Shanghai
Five, but rather redirect its efforts to a broader political and
economic dialogue. With the adoption of Uzbekistan in 2001,
the Shanghai Five became six members, transforming into the
political interstate organization known today as the SCO.
Since the mid-2000s, the SCO has further expanded,
providing new members with an observer status: first Mongolia,
and then Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. In 2017, both
Pakistan and India became full members, and the list of observers
and dialogue partners have expanded (Nikitin, 2008: 17-18).
With the departure of a unipolar world order, the SCO has also
expanded its areas of interest, particularly in the area of security.
The security agenda of the organization includes the protection
of borders from common threats such as terrorism, extremism
and separatism, drug trafficking and shared security information.
The current Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
S. Lavrov, describes the SCO as “an authoritative association, a
significant factor in the formation of a new polycentric system of
the world order” (Shilina, 2014: 46).
Within the SCO, both China and Russia play a central and
leading role. However, many Russian analysts describe the SCO
177
as a Chinese, not a Russian, organization. China is regarded as the

dominant great power within the SCO and Russia a junior partner
(Oliker et al., 2009: 104; Crosston, 2013: 287-288). Aware of
this reality, Russian experts explain the importance of China to
Russia at both the micro and macro level. At the micro level,
Russia considers friendship with China as strategically important
in terms of national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty
provided by diplomatic means without military conflict. Likewise
at the macro level, Russia views China as a key ally to prevent
the global hegemony of the USA over the region, while at the
same time seeking to balance China’s influence in Central Asia
to preserve its participation in other structures without direct
involvement (Saraç, 2008: 89-101).
Russia has always viewed Central Asia as its own backyard
and special sphere of influence. Thus, the SCO is regarded as
a soft entry point for Russia to preserve and create its military
influence in the region. Although a competitive dynamic exists
between Russia and China, the SCO acts as a peaceful arena for
the two countries to identify ways to work together. Within the
SCO, an implicit voluntary division of leadership exists between
the two countries: China maintains economic control, while
Russia occupies a position of primacy in security matters. Russia
cannot withstand the emerging economic influence of China in the
region, and therefore embraces the SCO as an effective channel
to maintain friendly relations with other countries in Central Asia
and to keep China in check from dominating and controlling them
(Crosston, 2013: 287-288). At the same time, China understands
the importance of preserving and promoting Russia’s credentials
as a co-leader in the organization, presenting it (whether correctly
or not) as playing role on a par with China in defining the SCO’s
mission and goals (Trotskii, 2007: 31). Should Russia feel side-
lined within the SCO, China recognizes the organization would
lose much of its legitimacy and purpose in the eyes of the smaller
Central Asian members.
Some analysts, however, suggest Russia’s real motive
behind co-founding the SCO was to counter competition with
the USA and NATO (Bailes and Dunay, 2007: 11). As reflected
in Russian foreign policy, it adopts an “anti-hegemonic front”
through the formation of tactical allies and regional blocks to
break the USA hegemony and form a multipolar system in the
178
international stage. In this context, the SCO is seen as a structure

which has the potential to make a serious contribution to the
establishment of a new international order based on collective
leadership in the world.
Despite some members jointly expressing concerns about
the USA involvement and influence in the region, it would be a
mistake to consider the SCO as an anti-American bloc as it would
contradict many of their interests. The SCO has served as a useful
mechanism for members to discuss mutual security concerns
to alleviate interstate conflict in Central Asia, to conduct joint
military exercises and to issue joint statements together and with
the USA. Even if the actual exercises have been limited, and the
depth of strategic and intelligence cooperation between the SCO
states is questionable, these actions have nevertheless been based
on common interests and concerns (Oliker et al., 2009: 103).
Russia’s approach towards the SCO has also been
influenced by internal factors caused from the risk of instability
in Central Asia such as with the outbreak of conflicts in the
region and rise of radical Islamists as a result of the collapse of
existing secular regimes. The Volga, Ural and Western Siberian
regions, are especially vulnerable to external influences (Özkan,
2013: 171). Central Asia serves as a buffer zone not only for
China’s western front, but also Russia’s southern front, especially
against Islamist extremist threats (Crosston, 2013: 287-288).
Furthermore, Russia has sought to maintain its global role in the
international energy markets by keeping the Central Asian energy
sector under control and preventing it from losing its dependence
on Moscow (Nogayeva, 2013: 7). Finally, with the end of the
bipolar world order, Russia is also concerned that the Western-
based liberal democratic model will come to dominate the region,
and instead seeks to spread its own.
The SCO in summary signifies a new platform and model
of cooperation, which seeks to contribute to the changing
configuration of the geo-economic map of the Eurasian continent.
For Russia specifically, the SCO is both economically and geo-
strategically important (Özkan, 2013: 171). It serves Russian
interests in four areas: its influence in Central Asia, maintenance
of Chinese–Russian relations, relations with the USA and world
politics (Bailes and Dunay, 2007: 10). Thus, the SCO represents a
unique form of integration, and demonstrates growing economic
and political potential in a global context.
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The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

The role of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) in the global
system of international relations has increased in recent years
and attracted attention as one of the leading zones of dynamic
economic growth. Currently, the APR is one of the main centers of
the world economy drawing increased interests from great powers
such as the USA, China, Russia, and Japan. This section focuses
on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),
which is one of the successful economic forums in the region and
discusses Russia’s attitude towards this organization. In the APR
there is no single dominant international association as is the case
of the EU in Europe. Instead, there are several regional entities
of different formats and focus, of which Russia cooperates with
many of them. However, Russia pays special attention to APEC,
which is mainly engaged in economic cooperation.
APEC was established in November 1989 at the initiative
of Australia with the participation of representatives from 12
countries in the region. The combined economic potential of
the APEC countries has made it possible for this organization to
exert a systemic impact not only on the region, but also on global
processes in the world economy (Sarishvili, 2011; 28). It acts as
a joint multilateral trade and economic forum serving as the only
international intergovernmental group in the world committed to
reducing barriers to trade and investment, without requiring its
members to make legally binding commitments.
The goal of APEC is to cooperate on regional trade and
the of capital investment, thereby increasing the economic
development of the APR. APEC achieves its goals by facilitating
dialogue and making decisions by consensus, giving equal weight
to the opinions of all members. APEC member countries report
progress towards achieving the goals of free and open trade and
investment through individual action plans (IAPs) and collective
action plans (CAPs). Members set their own timelines and goals
and take action on a voluntary and non-binding basis (apec.org)
Today, APEC unites 22 countries, which includes about
40% of the world’s population, 54% of gross national product
and 44% of world trade (Jadan, 2016: 89). Among these 22
countries, the Russian Federation occupies an important place.
In March 1995, Russia filed a formal application to join APEC.
180
Russia has consistently implemented actions aimed at joining the

future ranks of APEC forum participants. To participate in APEC,
first Russia had to fulfill certain conditions, including strong
economic ties with the APR countries and the adoption of the
goals and principles of APEC, as indicated in the APEC Seoul
Declaration. With the support of China, the USA and Japan, the
application of the Russian Federation was satisfied. For Russia,
along with Vietnam and Peru, a transitional period of one year
was defined, after which in 1998 they became full participants in
APEC (Zamaliev, 2010; 2-3).
By joining APEC, Russia thereby reaffirmed its
commitment to close economic cooperation with the APR and
its intention to fully integrate into the system of international
division of labor. APEC identified a number of priority areas for
Russia’s participation:
• the consistent increase in the volume of economic
cooperation with all APEC sub regions, stimulating
geographical diversification of foreign economic
relations of the Russian Federation;
• the active use of imports and attracting foreign investment
from the APEC countries for the socio-economic
development of Siberia and the Far East;
• strengthening Russia’s political and diplomatic presence
in APEC;
• developing the technique of participation in APEC,
the working bodies and projects of the forum at the
governmental and non-governmental levels;
• increasing Russian participation in key areas of the
forum’s activities, including in the fields of energy,
transport, communications, science and technology, and
the use of Pacific resources;
• collection, synthesis and adaptation to the Russian
conditions of the experience accumulated in the APEC
countries in the management of market economies and
the implementation of reforms (Sarishvili, 2011; 33).
APEC occupies an important place in Russian foreign
policy. At the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Putin
emphasized the importance of APEC to Russia:
We greatly value the APEC forum for the ample
opportunities it affords all participants to engage in
181
discussions and coordinate positions on a variety of

economic, social, environmental, and cultural issues.
Our countries strive to cooperate based on principles
of consensus and voluntary participation, mutual
respect and willingness to compromise, regardless of
the political situation. This is what APEC’s unique
spirit of partnership is all about (The Globe and
Mail, 2017).
Since 2017, APEC approved the Russian initiatives for
the development of remote areas and cooperation in the field
of innovation. In addition, representatives of Russia actively
participated in discussions on key issues for APEC on the
development of the digital economy and e-commerce, the
formation of the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area (APCTT) and the
contents of the post-2020 forum agenda. Russia’s work in APEC
has been particularly influential in the areas of the development
of human resources, the increase in women’s economic activity,
and the improvement of the competitive environment in public
procurement. Russia has also received funding for four of
its proposed projects (apec-center.ru). As this section has
demonstrated, APEC is not only a major source of growth for
the global economy, but also continues to serve as a key regional
platform for the Russian economy.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization

The Black Sea is an important area in geostrategic and geo-
economic aspects. This area serves as a meeting point of several
regions, such as Europe, the post-Soviet space, and the Caucasus.
For centuries the Black Sea region was a zone of special interests
of both regional actors and extra-regional powers. When it fell
under the influence of the Russian and Ottoman empires, the
Black Sea region was largely closed off to the rest of the world.
During the Cold War, the region was placed in a critical
juncture of multidirectional interests of geopolitical entities, and
the existence of blocs precluded the possibility of full-fledged
cooperation between the countries of the region (Eshba, 2013: 43).
However, some institutions, such as the Organization of Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) formed. In this regard, the main
topic of this section is the cooperation within the organization and
Russia’s interests in it.
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The BSEC came into existence with the initiation of

Türkiye. In 1990, former Turkish President Turgut Özal sought
to create a Black Sea zone of prosperity and cooperation with the
participation of the Soviet Union, Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria.
However, soon after, the Soviet Union collapsed, which radically
changed the geopolitical map of the region and led to the growth
of new independent states (Baburina, 2013: 37).
Nevertheless, BSEC, as stated on its webpage, “came into
existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political
and economic initiative with the signing of the Istanbul Summit
Declaration and the Bosporus Statement by the Heads of State and
Government of countries in the region on, 25 June 1992” (bsec-
organization.org). It was intended as an informal and flexible
forum of cooperation with the ambitious aims to achieve further
development and diversification of their bilateral and multilateral
cooperation, to foster their economic, technological and social
progress, and to encourage a market economy and free enterprise.
To reach its goals however, participating states
acknowledged that BSEC should be endowed with permanent
institutions and therefore decided to transform the initiative to
a fully-fledged international organization with an international
legal identity (Stribis, 2003: 130). BSEC came into force after its
Charter was signed on May 1, 1999, at which time it acquired an
international legal identity and was transformed into a regional
economic organization (bsec-organization.org). The BSCE’s
mission is:
• to act in a spirit of friendship and good neighborhood
and enhance mutual respect and confidence, dialogue and
cooperation among the member states;
• to further develop and diversify bilateral and multilateral
cooperation on the basis of the principles and rules of
international law;
• to act for improving the business environment and
promoting individual and collective initiative of the
enterprises and companies directly involved in the process
of economic cooperation;
• to develop economic collaboration in a manner not
contravening the international obligations of the member
states including those deriving from their membership to
international organizations or institutions of an integrative
183
or other nature and not preventing the promotion of their

relations with third parties;
• to take into account the specific economic conditions and
interests of the member states involved;
to further encourage the participation in the BSEC process
of economic cooperation of other interested states, international
economic and financial institutions as well as enterprises and
companies (bsec-organization.org).
Today 12 countries – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Türkiye,
Ukraine and Serbia, belong to the organization and demonstrate
the heterogeneity that characterizes the region. In addition,
17 international organizations and observer countries, outside
of the region, participate in the activities of the organization.
Two groups of observers were formed, one consisting of states:
Austria, Belarus, Germany, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia,
USA, Tunisia, France, Croatia, and Czech Republic. The other
group includes four international organizations: Conference on
the European Energy Charter, The International Black Sea Club,
the Union of Associations of Road Carriers in the Region of the
BSEC, the Commission of the European Communities. Their
appearance is explained by the interests of many third parties to
cooperate with BSEC countries as a promising developing region
(Baburina, 2013: 35-36).
Within the framework of the BSEC activities, emphasis
is placed specifically on economic cooperation, and excludes
working out a common political strategy (Eshba, 2013: 43-44).
The BSEC’s founders considered economic cooperation as the
prime aim of this regional initiative. Consequently, some analysts
argue, “The region has lacked a sense of ownership, effective
regional leadership, common threats, and resources” (Friere
2014: 375).Yet others view BSCE as playing a critical role as
a confidence-building mechanism that indirectly enhances the
security situation in the area, marked with unrest and insecurity
(Stribis, 2003: 131-132).
In Russian foreign policy documents, the Black Sea, along
with the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea basin and the Middle East, is
mentioned as a regional priority and of strategic importance as
one of the choice routes for the important of energy flows. The
BSEC is also mentioned as the preferred institutional format for
184
cooperation between the states in the area due to its growing role
in the region, strategic geopolitical position, extensive resource
base and long-term human potential (Freire, 2014: 375). In July
2016 for example, Russia announced its initiative to allocate 1
million US dollars to create a mechanism for the development of
project cooperation in the Black Sea region. Following the 39th
meeting of the BSEC Council of Foreign Ministers held in Baku
December 14, 2018, Russia discussed projects it sought to support
–the construction of a motorway around the Black Sea and new
sea routes, to develop more effective and free trade, tourismetc.
in the region, and to create conditions for the member countries’
economic growth (mid.ru).
The Black Sea region has a huge potential for economic
cooperation. Its natural transport artery associated with the
Mediterranean region, allows goods to be transported cheaply
and in large volumes, which is important for the development of
new markets. In the field of transport logistics development, it is
necessary to develop the integration of water and land trade routes,
which in the future will lead to cheaper transportation, reducing
its time and involving new participants in the economic orbit of
the region (İzvestiya, 2017). Taking into account the growing
trade and the development of tourism between the BSEC member
countries, work continues on the restoration of regular cargo and
passenger ferry communication between the Black Sea ports.
Also, cooperation continues in the energy sector. The synthesis of
the energy strategies of the BSEC member countries is completed.
This is an important practical step for the development of joint
projects, one of which is the creation of the Black Sea Electric
Power Ring. Its implementation could contribute to the formation
of a regional electricity market. The BSEC therefore, may be the
most convenient tool that would enable the region’s countries to
carry out a brand new paradigm of energy transportation.
Although disagreements and conflicts exist between the
BSEC countries, the Black Sea’s importance is irrefutable and
will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Aware of the
BSEC’s importance and potential, Russia will continue to find
ways to strategically position itself in the region.
185
The Commonwealth оf Independent States

On December 8, 1991, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian
Federation and Ukraine concluded the Treaty on the Establishment
of the Soviet Union. This Agreement officially confirmed the
cessation of the existence of the Soviet Union and established in
its replacement the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Within the framework of the Alma-Ata Conference on December
21, 1991, the Protocol to the Agreement on the Creation of the
CIS was established, at which point other states of the former
Soviet Union joined the Commonwealth (Ivanova, 2015: 114).
This section examines the CIS and Russia’s attitude towards it.
In the beginning of the 1990’s the CIS served mainly to fill
the political vacuum caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union
(Sergi, 2018: 52). Originally CIS represented an institutional
means for the stable breakup of the Soviet Union; it also constituted
the organizational vessel for managing member states’ shared
infrastructural, security, economic, and other policy interests
(Willerton et al., 2012: 61).The objective was “the development
and strengthening of relations of friendship, good neighborhoods,
interethnic harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually
beneficial cooperation between member states” (cis.minsk.
by). According to the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment
of the CIS, the sphere of joint activities of the member states
included “coordination of foreign policy activities; cooperation
in the formation and development of a common economic space,
European and Eurasian markets, in the field of customs policy”
(cis.minsk.by).
CIS was established to form a free trade zone, in order to
boost modernization, close cooperation in innovation, food and
energy security, joint ventures and development of intra-regional
cooperation. Cooperation in the humanitarian area remains a
top priority through the development of networks including
institutions of culture, education, science, mass media, and so
on. Members share a common agenda in security that includes
the following threats: terrorism, transnational organized crime,
illegal migration, human trafficking, drugs, and natural disasters.
All internal disputes are to be settled peacefully and political
consultation is to be used concerning worldly issues that might
affect CIS member states (Lomagin, 2016: 131-132). In addition,
special attention is paid to the observance of the territorial integrity
186
and inviolability of the borders of the CIS, and the protection of

human rights.
For 12 states (out of the 15 post-Soviet newly independent
states) that formed the CIS some new factors were added over
the years as unifying vectors. First, a network of inter-state
integrative CIS organs was created: Council of Heads of States,
which is the governing body, Councils of Heads of Governments,
Defense Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministers, Secretaries of
Security Councils, Procurators General, and the Economic Court
to name the most critical ones. In addition to this system of
legislative and decision-making organs, more than 15 agencies
for economic and political cooperation and another 10 inter-state
specialized functional organizations affiliated with the CIS were
added over the years. Second, the attempt to establish a common
legal space was undertaken through the work of the CIS Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly, later joined by the Eurasian Economic
Community (EEC), which elaborated and adopted hundreds of
CIS and EEC model laws and undertook endless campaigns for
the harmonization of legislation in the newly independent states.
Third, Councils of Foreign and Defense Ministers undertook
certain attempts to set up a coordinated common foreign and
security policy towards the external world. Fourth, the relatively
regular CIS summits on the level of presidents served as a common
mechanism for a degree of political coordination (Nikitin, 2008:
11-12).
For Russia, international cooperation in the CIS space is of
major economic and political importance. Not only does Russia
seek to maintain its influence on the territory of the former Soviet
republics, but also to play a leading role, since politically and
economically it is the most powerful state among the members of
this organization.
After being rejected by Europe in 1990’s, Russia changed
its regional priorities in favor of creating a post-Soviet space
(Lomagin, 2016: 136). In 1993, Russia clearly outlines in its
Foreign Policy Concept its priority of creating stable and strong
ties with the countries of the post-Soviet Union. The document
warns against efforts of individual states to exploit the collapse
of the Soviet Union for their own benefit, endangering not only
relations with Russia, but also the rights of Russians living in
these countries. Repeatedly the document labels the situation
187
as crucial to Russia’s development and transformation and calls

on post-Soviet countries to coordinate their activities through
international integration. It discusses the importance of CIS as
a multi-thematic integrating structure, where each member can
regulate the degree of its integration (Leichtova, 2016: 50).
In Russia’s second and third Foreign Policy Concepts
adopted in 2000 and 2008, it reiterates the importance of CIS
as one of its regional priorities. Both documents acknowledge
however the weaknesses of CIS, having not proven to be a full-
fledged, multi-thematic integration project as was planned, and
thus emphasized the importance of creating additional platforms
for cooperation inside or outside the CIS area (Leichtova, 2014:
51).
By the end of twentieth century, however, almost all
CIS members were either in an economic or political crisis, so
cooperation developed extremely slow and unevenly. There are
different reasons why this situation occurred. One of them is that
not all the integrative efforts among newly independent states
were focused at CIS mechanisms. The Commonwealth remained
structurally weak for most of its existence, and many political
encounters among new states took place either on a bilateral
basis, or within other competing or complementing formats, like
EurAsEC, the bloc of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova
(GUAM), and many others.
Another reason is the configuration of the CIS itself,
although the former-Soviet space was territorially preserved,
preferences of integration were diverse amongst members.
Ukraine for example, in the mid-1990s, insisted on changing
the notion of “CIS member state” to a less demanding title of
“CIS participating state,” meaning that not all states of the former
Soviet space were interested or obliged to participate in all
sessions and decisions. As a result, very few CIS decisions have
been co-signed by all 12 heads of CIS states. There are numerous
resolutions for example, that only a hand full of CIS members
signed (Nikitin, 2008: 11-12).
Nevertheless, Russia still prioritizes CIS as was reiterated
in the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. In Article 49 for
example, it states the priority directions of the foreign policy
of the Russian Federation are the development of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with the CIS member states and the
188
further strengthening of the integration structures operating in the

CIS space with Russian participation (www.kremlin.ru). Article
55 further elaborates on the importance of CIS stating:
Russia builds friendly relations with each of CIS member
states on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, respect and
consideration of each other’s interests. To this end, the Russian
Federation:
a) actively promotes the development of interaction of
the CIS member states on the preservation of common
cultural and historical heritage, expanding cooperation
in the humanitarian, scientific, educational and cultural
fields, pays special attention to supporting compatriots
living in CIS member states, improving international
legal instruments of protection their rights and legitimate
interests in educational, linguistic, social, labor,
humanitarian and other spheres;
b) contributes to the expansion of economic cooperation
with the CIS member states, including by improving the
regulatory framework in accordance with the Treaty on the
free trade zone of October 18, 2011;
enhances cooperation with the CIS member states in the
field of security, including joint resistance to common challenges
and threats, primarily international terrorism, extremism, illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their
precursors, transnational crime, illegal migration (kremlin.ru).
Despite the difficulties of consolidating the post-Soviet
space, the process continues to evolve. Earlier criticism of CIS
has decreased. The collapse of the CIS, as formerly predicted
by individual experts, did not take place after Georgia left. The
Commonwealth continues to be a political club of the post-Soviet
states, which suits national elites. Although the CIS has not
become a decisive structure for the integration of the post-Soviet
space, it has filled the political vacuum left in the absence of the
rigid supranational structures that formerly existed, and provides
a platform for the convergence of positions and the adoption of
joint decisions on many sensitive issues of interstate relations
(Chernyavskii, 2011: 31).
The most important outcome within the framework of
the Commonwealth is the acquisition of a joint experience of
189
multilateral cooperation, which over time has moved towards more

productive forms of multi-format and diverse regional integration.
The community has become a platform for cooperation and
collaboration (Chernyavskii, 2011: 32). The CIS experience has
enabled states to launch a many-tiered, multi-speed integration
process in the post-Soviet space and to set up much needed
institutions, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic
Community, the Customs Union and finally the Common
Economic Space (Lomagin, 2016: 131-132).
The extensive experience of post-Soviet development has
led to many changes in the activities of the CIS compared with
the initial period of its existence. The important point is CIS does
not act as a comprehensive merger project, but as a mechanism
for maintaining preferential intra-regional relations and achieving
coordination of the positions of the participating countries
(Chernyavskii, 2011: 32).
Conclusions
After the collapse of the Soviet Union a very active
participation of Russia in international organizations can be
noted. By years passing and Russia’ gaining more experience
in this sphere today can be said, that Russia views international
organizations not as independent subjects, but as instruments for
use by great powers. Russia is not much interested in institution
where it has not controlled position. It creates alternative bodies or
institutions in which it plays a dominant role, such as the Eurasian
Economic Union. Russia likes organizations with the top table,
at which it sits “concerts of powers”, in which Russia with other
great powers can settle world affairs and influence the course of
events in international arena.
The UN and its Security Council, especially the group
of five permanent members with the veto right is a comfortable
area for Russia. Recent developments in the global arena may
influence Russia’s attitude towards the UN and, in particular,
towards the Security Council, but today it is still clear that Russia
turns to the UN to confirm its superpower status and considers
the Security Council one of the platforms to be heard on the
international stage. The CoE, which along with the UN occurred
190
after the World War II, is also one of the important directions in
Russian foreign policy. Russia has a strong feeling and need for
belonging to something, and the Council has given it a platform
where it feels that itself working in a European context. The era
of Putin has confirmed that Russia is quite firmly committed to its
membership in the CoE. It should be noted that now and then the
Russian administration has used the CoE as an advisor on its own
legislation, and especially regional cooperation with the CoE was
viewed by all parties as very positive cooperation.
Within the framework of the CIS a joint experience of
multilateral cooperation has been acquired, which allowed, over
time, to move towards more productive forms of multi-format and
diverse regional integration, such as the EAEU. In the context of
geopolitics and geo-economics, the EAEU serves as a powerful
illustration of what Russian government led by Putin foresaw for
the post-Soviet space, since the Union is partially motivated by
the goal of self-affirmation of Russia. However, given the many
advantages and an equal amount of costs, it is still unclear whether
this institution has succeeded or is simply reduced in importance.
Another important integration process with the big
participation of Central Asian states and other rising powers as
China and India is the SCO. The clearest specific value of the
SCO for Russia lies in regulating the uneasy mix of cooperation,
competition and a gradually shifting power balance that
characterizes its current dealings with China. Russia’s interests
in the SCO form a complex which emphasizes at least four
directions: Central Asia, Chinese–Russian relations, relations
with the USA and the general world politics.
Moving in the direction of regional organizations, of great
importance for Russia and especially for the development and
growing its Siberia and Far East regions is APEC Forum. The
APR region has a high potential for economic growth and is a
source of growth for the global economy, so Russia’s associated
opportunities should not be missed. Understanding that the “turn
to the East” is one of the main vectors of the Russian economy
and Russia should pay close attention to the processes taking
place in the APEC, as one of the key regional platforms.
Another organization which is focused on the economic
cooperation in particular area is the BSEC. The main interests
for the Russian side are cooperation with the BSEC in the field
191
of transport and communications, energy, economic cooperation

among the member states, tourism etc. In addition, Russia
initiated creation of a mechanism for the development of project
cooperation in the Black Sea region and finances it. In this regard,
despite the fact that there are some disagreements and even
conflicts between the BSEC countries, the Black Sea importance
is irrefutable, and Russia is trying to take its place in the region.
The extensive experience of post-Soviet development
has led to many changes in the activities of the CIS compared
with the initial period of its existence. At present the CIS acts
not as a comprehensive merger project, but as a mechanism for
maintaining preferential intra-regional relations and achieving
coordination of the positions of the participating countries.
192
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7.
RUSSIA AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS

Assistant Prof. Dr. Arif Behiç Özcan
Upagul Rakhmanova
Introduction
Globalization is a process that makes people, businesses,
and countries increasingly interdependent and interrelated.
This interdependence includes economic, environmental,
socio-cultural, military, and other major issues. Globalization
generates new opportunities, as well as new problems. To cope
with emerging global problems, states have increasing become
interdependent.
Globalization affects Russian foreign policy in different
ways. Firstly, the pressures and opportunities arising from
globalization shape the goals of Russian leaders in foreign policy.
Russia determines its allies and rivals according to the new types
of relationships that globalization brings. Secondly, with the
increase in globalization, Russian society has transformed and the
state-society relations have changed. In response, Russia tries to
exploit the economic, scientific and technological opportunities
of globalization, while seeking to produce policies to meet the
increasing demands of Russian society. Thirdly, global threats such
as armed conflicts, arms races e.g. weapons of mass destruction,
outbreaks of social violence and ethnic confrontation caused by
terrorism, drug trafficking, mass starvation and epidemics affect
the interests and security of Russia (Melville and Shaklenia,
2005: 30).
In response to global issues, the Russian Federation had
developed a number of policy responses, for the purpose of this
chapter, it will focus on two of them: The National Security
Concept (2000) and the Foreign Policy Concept (2000). Both
documents state the national interests as: combating (international)
terrorism; tackle natural and industrial disasters; expedite
economic development and raise living standards; preserve and
strengthen the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation; strengthen the foundations of the constitutional
system and Russia’s position in the global arena (Haas, 2005: 2).
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In recent years, technological developments, political and

socio-economic consequences resulting from globalization has led
to the revision of Russia’s foreign policy. This chapter examines
Russian foreign policy towards the following major global issues:
terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, environment, global
warming and climate change, arms control and nuclear weapons,
energy supply and security, migration, global poverty, hunger and
sustainable development, human rights, global ethics and global
justice, artificial intelligence, robotics and cyber security.
Russia and Contemporary Conflicts

Terrorism: Globalization has created new threats to
international security and stability. Terrorism is the most striking
of these threats. The events of 9/11 were a turning point in global
terrorism, and the fight against it has since then been at the top of
the international agenda. In the face of terrorist threats coming
from both near and far, Russia has taken a strong stance to fight
terrorism and is engaged in international cooperation efforts to
fight against it. This chapter evaluates Russia’s struggle against
terrorism in two contexts – national and international.
Long before the 9/11 attacks in the USA, Russia viewed
terrorism one of the most serious threats to international peace
and security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Anti-
Terrorism Act was the first law legislated in 1993, then adopted
in 1998 in Russia. The Act defines terrorist organizations and
terrorist movements, identifies the types of counter-terrorist
institutional structures and lists the rights and responsibilities of
citizens. The Act states that the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti
(FSB)/Federal Security Service (FSS) is the principal security
agency in the Federation of Russia and the successor of the
Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (KGB) to combat
terrorism. In 1997, the RF established the National Anti-Terrorist
Committee (NATC), a skilled body responsible for coordinating
and organizing counterterrorism activities of government bodies
at the federal level, level of subjects of RF and local governments.
The Chairman of the Committee is also the Director of the FSS
of the RF.NATC is responsible for developing counterterrorism
measure, participate in international cooperation, prepare
proposals to the President of Russia on the formation of national
policy and the improvement of counterterrorism legislation, and
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increase public awareness of emerging terrorist threats (en.nac.

gov.ru).
President Putin elaborated on the counter-terrorism strategy
by signing a new law – the Federal Law on Countering Terrorism
in March 2006. The law states, “terrorism shall mean the ideology
of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a
decision by state power bodies, local self-government bodies
or international organizations connected with intimidation of
the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions”
(Federal Law No. 35-2006, Article 3).The Law discusses three
main areas that are needed: to increase the power of the Russian
Spetsnaz (Russia’s Special Forces) and security institutions, to
build international cooperation with interested partners – state
and non-state, and to develop civil society mechanisms to reduce
terrorist activity (Rykhtik, 2006: 165).
The official definition of terrorism in Russia is broad,
encompassing a wide range of activities such as the promotion of
terrorist ideas and the dissemination of related information. To be
declared as a terrorist by Russia, an organization must either try to
change the constitutional system by using terrorist methods and/
or be associated with the organizations identified as terrorists by
the international community. If however, an organization defined
by the international community as terrorist organization does not
directly threaten Russia’s security, it will not be perceived by
Moscow as a terrorist organization. Russia for example does not
recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, with which Türkiye
has been fighting for more than 35years (For a list: fsb.ru).
In Russia, several institutions are responsible for combating
terrorism, including the Interior Ministry, General Prosecutor,
FSB, The Defense Ministry (Rykhtik, 2006: 181-183). Among
them, the FSB is particularly important as the main organization for
combating terrorism. The FSB employs around 150,000-350,000
people that fall under the supervision of the President. Some of
the FSB’s primary responsibilities include counter intelligence,
anti-terrorist activity, fighting crime, information security and
also border security (Kosals and Pavlenko, 2018: 334).
For Russia, terrorism is a critical area of cooperation
with regional/global powers such as the USA, China, India, and
Türkiye, and also with international organizations such as the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the United Nations
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(UN), the G8, NATO, and the EU. Before the events of 9/11,
Russia was already aware of imminent terrorist threats. In 1992,
Russian initiated the Collective Security Treaty, a regional security
structure with CIS members. Initially its purpose was to create
a mutual defense alliance amongst CIS members. However, it
remained relatively ineffective and unproductive. Later in
2002 the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS was renamed the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)with the stated
focus on preserving the territorial integrity as well as seeking
closer cooperation with multilateral institutions such the UN, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to support
the efforts of the CSTO to combat international extremism and
terrorism and to start developing coordinated practical measures
aimed at preventing global threats (Ivanov, 2002: 38).
Already in 2000, the CSTO warned the international
community of the growing threat posed by the Taliban. On
October 11, 2000the presidents of the CSTO member states
adopted a statement in which they clearly stated that the main
source of instability in the region was the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan, which had become one of the world centers for
international terrorism and drug trafficking. To combat this new
threat, Putin in 2000 proposed the creation of an International
Center for Combating Terrorism. Russia also requested countries
and international organizations to stop supporting “terrorists”
in the crisis of Chechnya. Some European countries refused to
extradite those requested by Moscow and criticized Russia’s
method of combating terrorism (Sapmaz, 2013: 13). Western
countries did not support Putin’s ideas, since the events in
Chechnya, which Putin linked to the problem of terrorism, had
nothing to do with terrorism. But the 9/11 attacks became a
turning point in the policies of the parties (histerl.ru).
Following the attacks of 9/11, Western politicians and
analysts were surprised by the Russian leadership’s swift response
and wiliness to cooperate with Washington on the “war on terror”.
The leadership of Russia not only expressed solidarity with the
American people, but also supported the United States by voting
in favor of the UN Security Council resolution 1373. Moscow
also agreed to the deployment of Western troops in Central Asia,
an area that Moscow considers a special sphere of its influence
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(Thorun, 2009: 111). Evidence suggests that Moscow hoped to

use the 9/11 attacks and the USA’s reaction to bolster its interests
(Thorun, 2009: 132.)
For the first years of the war on terror, Russia pursued a
balanced and non-confrontational foreign policy. However,
Russia soon after changed its strategy towards the US, since
US policies strengthened Washington’s influence in Asia and
the Middle East and undermined Russia’s sphere of influence
and national interests. To limit Washington’s influence in these
regions, Moscow began creating anti-American organizations and
regional counter-terrorism units.
Nevertheless, Russia consistently upheld the priority of
international law and the central role of the UN in solving major
world problems, which managed to avoid a split in the ranks
of international antiterrorist activities caused by the unilateral
military operation of the USA and its allies in Iraq. Largely as
a result of Russia’s policy, the UN Security Council resolutions
were developed and approved, which helped to find a way out of
the most complicated Iraq crisis and restored the doubtful unity
of the international community, including questions of combating
international terrorism. Russia supported the unanimous adoption
of the UN Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) on the reform
of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The Committee
improved the UN Security Council’s organizational capacity and
the effectiveness of the practical work of states in the fight against
international terrorism. Russia contributed to strengthening the
cooperation of the CTC with the main regional and international
organizations, including the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO
(Uranian, 2016: 45). The fight against terrorism, of course, was
not limited to Afghanistan or Iraq alone. Russia aimed to create
“a global, integrated system of counteraction against international
terrorism” (Ivanov, 2002: 38), which could become a kind of
model for the collective management of international relations in
the globalization era.
Russia took other important steps in the area of
international cooperation against terrorism. Russia, as a founding
member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, participated
in numerous regional counter terror exercises. It also advanced
counterterrorism agendas for the regional organizations. The
government held consultations and signed formal anti-terrorism
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agreements in 2017 with countries such as Belarus, China, India,

Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Türkiye
and Uzbekistan (refworld.org).
Ethnic and religious conflicts: Beginning in the 21st
century, following the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts
have decreased, while intra-state or ethnic and religious conflicts
have increased. These conflicts have reached dangerous levels
for the national security of states, but they have also played an
effective role in reshaping global relations.
To understand Russia’s policy on ethnic and religious
conflicts, it is necessary to mention two main characteristics of
this country. First, Russia has a society that is ethnically and
religiously diverse. As Lovelace reports, “Russia is a multi-
ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a complex federal
structure inherited from the Soviet period that includes regions,
republics, territories, and other subunits” (Lovelace, 2017: 49).
For this reason, Russia is pursuing a national security policy
to prevent possible conflicts within the country and to ensure
national stability. The second important feature of Russia is that
it is a global power. Hence, it has a multi-faceted foreign policy
approach to ethnic and religious conflicts in regions near and far.
Russia’s policy on ethnic and religious conflicts is
shaped by many policies such as security, energy, arms sales,
economic impact, and regional domination. Therefore, Russia
does not always adhere to the same policy about ethnic and
religious conflicts that arise in neighboring countries and more
remote regions. For example, Russia perceives the conflicts in
Transcaucasia and Central Asia from the perspective of national
security and regional dominance concerns. In the Balkans, the
Middle East, and Africa however, Russia views ethnic and
religious conflicts from the mindset of a global actor that responds
in the context of energy security, arms sale, economic impact, and
global political balances. Therefore, it is important to emphasize
that Russia, as a global actor, behaves without a specific framework
towards ethnic and religious conflicts occurring in the world. To
understand the diversity of Russia’s foreign policy responses, the
remainder of this section first examines Russia’s intervention in
the “far abroad” and then in the “near abroad” countries.
The Bosnian War: The Bosnian War, which took place
between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, represented
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the Russian Federations first test of Russia’s policy on ethnic and

religious conflicts. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former republic
of Yugoslavia, is a multiethnic country consisting of Bosniaks
(Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Catholic) and Serbs (Orthodox).
In response to the ethnic-religious conflict, Andrei Kozyrev,
the former Russian foreign minister, warned against making
the Orthodox religion a determinant of Russia’s foreign policy
since he understood that such a policy could backfire in Russia
between Orthodox and Muslim believers causing internal strife.
Furthermore, the Orthodox Church has a deep-rooted tradition
of protecting co-religionists in the Middle East, the Balkans and
other places outside Russia. Nevertheless, due to the nationalist
sentiments, the Yeltsin government limited its participation in
international sanctions and military actions against Serbia (Curtis
and Leighton, 1998: 220).
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: In the 1990s, Russian-Israel
relations initially went from so good under Yeltsin (1991-1999),
especially in terms of trade, to too bad with the Russian Foreign
Minister Primakov (1996-1999) who took a pro-Arab stance in
Russian foreign policy and tended to side with the Palestinian
camp. However, when Putin became Prime Minister in 1999, Katz
argues Russian foreign policy “pursued an evenhanded” policy
toward Israel on the one hand and radical regimes in Iraq, Iran, and
Syria on the other (Katz, 2005: 51). This was reflected in Russia’s
involvement in the Road Map peace process in 2003, initiated
with the USA, the countries of the EU and the UN, referred to as
the “Quartet” with the aim of reaching a final settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The road map built was similar to the
Oslo Accord Agreements (1993 and 1995), and additionally drew
from US Senator George Mitchell’s former efforts in 2001 to get
the peace process back on track. The Road Map consisted of
three phases that prioritized security before the final settlement as
a confidence building measure: first it required support from both
sides for the two-state solution, second the creation of provisional
borders for the Palestinian state, and third, the final agreement for
implementation. Unfortunately, to-date, the Road Map has not
been implemented due to events that later unfolded.
Russia’s “evenhanded” foreign policy approach in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in large part due to Putin’s domestic
concerns over Chechnya and fears about terrorism. Putin came
to see the similarities of the fight against the Chechens as the
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same as Israel’s fight against the Palestinians. Furthermore,

former Prime Minister Sharon and Putin shared similar attitudes
about their Muslim opponents, perceiving them as terrorist you
cannot negotiate with. Both agreed a strong handed approach was
the only way to quash the terrorist, which the West vilified them
for. Additionally, Russian-Israeli arms trade provided another
incentive for Russia to maintain a good working relationship with
Israel (Bogaturov, 2017: 462). However, Russia refrained from
taking an openly pro-Israeli position, and had to tread lightly. On
the one hand, Russian people accounted for a quarter of Israel’s
population and the violence inflicted on them in the Middle East,
was considered as the same as those in the North Caucasus. Yet on
the other hand, Russia wanted to refrain from upsetting Russia’s
millions of Muslims and Palestinian friends by taking an openly
pro-Israeli position.
Syrian Conflict
Syria serves as a third and more recent example of Russia’s
foreign policy response to ethnic-religious conflicts in the “far
abroad”. There are three suggested reasons why Russia entered
the Syrian conflict. First, is Russia’s fear of terrorist activities by
ISIS and other fundamentalist groups and their effects on the large
Muslim population in Russia (Piet, 2014: 174). This fear is not
unfounded as Russian Muslims have left and joined ISIS and other
Anti-Assad forces. Second, is Russia’s desire to reclaim its status
as a global power after having lost its influence following the end
of the Cold War. A third, and related reason, is Russia’s goal to
reemerge as a regional power. Previously, the Soviet Union had
gained influence in Syria in the 1970s, supplying the country with
aid and arms. However, after the Cold War, Russia’s influence
declined. It was not until the mid-2000s that Assad and Putin
began to develop a closer relationship due to the strong ties they
shared during the Cold War. As the Syrian crisis became worse,
Assad requested Putin to send a group of Russian air forces and
navy to Syria September 2015 to support the Syrian armed forces
in the fight against ISIL and other so-called Islamist terrorist
groups. Russian military has not only destroyed terrorists located
in a region far away from Russia but also has prevented the
possibility of restarting and even intensifying Islamic extremism in
the Muslim regions of the Russian Federation (Nazarov, 2017: 31).
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These different examples show us that Russia will only

intervene in an ethnic or religious conflict in the far abroad if
it poses as a threat to Russia’s national security. It has also
demonstrated Russia’s careful calculations to not upset its Muslim
majority, while at the same time appeasing Russian nationalist.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, these three examples have
progressively shown how Russia has reasserted itself as a global
power and be recognized as one.
When however, ethnic-religious conflicts take place in
Russia’s near abroad, such as with the “frozen conflicts” between
the Abkhazians and Georgians, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and the conflicts in
Chechnya, Russian foreign policy responses are different, yet
consistent as the remainder of this section exhibits.
In Russia’s near abroad, Russia’s foreign policy responses
to ethnic-religious conflicts focuses on its national security
concerns and maintaining regional dominance. During the
clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in the Caucasian
region, Russia played a role in supplying weapons to the Abkhaz.
Russia also sent troops to the Turkish-Georgian border during the
crisis period. The main reason for Russia’s support of Abkhazia
was to ensure the entry of Georgia into the CIS. Georgia is a key
country in the transition route of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
which Russia considers as its rival in the transport of Caspian
oil. Russia was perturbed by both Georgia’s support for the
Baku-Ceyhan project and the policy of President Shevardnadze’s
close relations with the West. Russia wanted both Kazakhstan’s
and Azerbaijan’s oil to be transported from the Russian port of
Novorossiysk to international markets (Kasım, 2001: 56-57). For
this reason, Russia has transformed this ethnic conflict into an
opportunity to control the region economically and have military
bases in the region.
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: In the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, Russia intervened the region to increase its influence.
During Elchibey’s presidency in Azerbaijan, Russia supported
Armenian forces in order to play a role in the control of the Caspian
oil and ensure Azerbaijan’s membership in the CIS. However, in
1994, when Aliyev became a president, Russia began to pursue a
more balanced policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Kasım,
2001: 58-59). Both of these conflicts in the Caucasus demonstrate
207
Russia’’s determination to continue its policy of efficiency in the

region with its military might.
Chechen War: The conflict that has affected Russia the
most in the Caucasus, was in Chechnya. This conflict began in
December 1994 and lasted 21 months. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Chechnya declared its independence. However,
Russia refused to accept Chechnya’s secession, fearing it would
cause a dominion effect of other independent movements within
the RF and former President Yeltsin hoped to recover Chechnya’s
valuable oil resources. For these reasons, the Russian army
entered Chechnya December 10, 1994 to “restore Constitutional
Order”. Despite the Russian military’s initial gains, they suffered
huge losses after two years of fighting. Finally, in 1997 a cease-
fire was declared. A peace agreement was signed May 12, 1997
and Chechnya became de facto independent, although officially it
would remain part of Russia. However, after terrorist bombings in
Moscow and other cities connected to Chechen militants, Yeltsin
called for the Russian military to invade and occupy Chechnya in
October 1999. Russia was heavily criticized internationally for
its disproportionate use of force and roll back on the democratic
freedoms introduced after the 1991 Soviet Union collapse.
Fighting ensued till 2009 until another cease-fire was declared
and de facto independence restored. Although Putin succeeded
to pacify and bring stability to Chechnya, two decades of fighting
has created a new hotbed in the region for radical Islamism. At the
same time, it has revived Russia’s external expansion ambitions in
the former Soviet territories.
Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential:
When it comes to Russia’s foreign policy in Central Asia, it has
attempted to solve issues through the framework of international
cooperation and avoided the possibility of direct intervention in
ethnic and religious conflicts. This has been the case in Uzbekistan
and its eastern neighbors, where unresolved territorial disputes and
water issues, have created regional concerns for Russia, with its
potential to trigger international conflicts in Central Asia (Ziegler,
2011: 162-163).
Environmental Problems
Although globalization has brought many positive benefits
to the world, it has also been responsible for global ecological
208
imbalances including environmental, global warming, and

climate change. Each of these is a direct result of human economic
activities. Although Russia is a country that contributes to these
problems, it also participates in many international cooperation
initiatives to solve global ecological problems.
Russia’s environmental is globally significant for many
reasons. First, Russia is the largest country in the world, playing
a huge role in rapid decline of regional and global environmental
problems. Russia the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in
the world, and responsible for most of the air and water pollution
affecting people living in Russia and neighboring countries.
Secondly, Russia is a country rich in natural resources. For this
reason, other countries and international actors, particularly the
EU, have sought to engage Russia in global environmental politics
and help it facilitate the development of domestic environmental
policies (Korppoo and et al., 2015: 2).
Following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the
destruction of lakes from the overuse of irrigation in Central Asia,
Russia, since the 1990s has focused on international regulations
about environmental protection to counter environmental damage
done under the Soviet Union.
There are many actors involved in the development of
policies that address environmental problems in Russia. The
President is the leader of the entire political process, and therefore
environmental policies remain dependent on his/her preferences.
Putin for example, is more reluctant than his predecessor
Medvedev to address environmental problems, despite the
discourse in his speeches. The business community in the country
also plays a critical role in environmental policymaking. However,
without government approval, the business community cannot
take any crucial steps to lead the country towards environmental
modernization. Environmental scientists additionally play a
critical role in the country, however their contribution remains
marginalized by the lack of funding allocated to the scientific
research community by the state. Finally, Russian public opinion
can be considered another important actor. However, when
compared to the West, the Russian public is less interested and
concerned about environmental issues (Korppoo and et al., 2015:
9-17).
209
Despite the discovery of the connection between

deteriorating human health and the destruction of ecosystems
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the term ‘ecocide’ was
invented to summarize the environmental reports of the Soviet
era (Curtis and McClave, 1998: 136), the population continues to
prioritize the economy over the environment. In the post-Soviet
era, environmental policy has not been central to Russian politics
and authority. The population supports a policy that prioritizes
the economy – income, employment and general needs such as
raising the standard of living. Environmental issues and concerns
are considered a secondary concern (Bobylev, 2018: 269). Russia
has also been able to doge the responsibility for some of the
world’s worst environmental disasters, by placing the blame on
“other” countries that were previously states of the Soviet Union
In the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia finally
acknowledged the ecological disasters and called international
cooperation at all levels to avert them. The Concept stated
Russia would follow international standards, amend Russian
environmental laws, and develop a rational ecological policy at
the national level (Lomagin, 2014: 126). Russia was one of the
first countries to sign the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Korppoo, 2006: 24).
However, Russia’s participation was mainly due to the desire to
preserve the status of an industrialized country, while protecting
its transitional economy (Korppoo, 2006: 15).
Since then, Russia’s role and engagement in international
processes to combat global climate change has in recent years
gained momentum. In 1997, Russia participated in the Kyoto
Protocol, which entered into force on February 16, 2005. The
event marked the beginning of a new phase in addressing climate
change problems by the world community. It also came at a
time when Russia was undergoing radical transformations - the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the devastating economic crisis of
the early 90s, the crisis of 1998 (Korppoo, 2006: 24). The signing
of the Kyoto Protocol was the first major success of global climate
diplomacy. The Kyoto Protocol served as the foundation for
further improving the mechanisms for global regulation of climate
change on our planet (Kovalev and et al., 2017: 123, Cramton and
et al., 2015: 52-53).
210
Without Russia’s participation, there would have been

no Kyoto Protocol. Russian experts have since then actively
cooperated with the UN intergovernmental commission for the
study of climate change (Kovalev and et al., 2017: 128). Later
in 2015, under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was replaced
by the Paris Agreement, a treaty calling for a radical reduction of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and climate change measures
by 2020. Although Russia signed the Agreement, did not ratify
it, because there were too many ambiguities and flaws that it felt
could adversely affect its economic growth. Furthermore, Russia
felt some aspects of the Agreement were unrealistic, such as the
call for Russia to bring its emissions below the levels it had in
the1990 levels, a rate the Country had already exceeded at that
time (Bykovsky, 2017: 101-104).
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: Nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons (NBC) have been the subject of many
negotiations and treaties between Soviet Union and the USA
during the Cold War. This section examines Russia’s weapon
potential, its policy on arms control and the treaties to which it
is a party of.
Chart 7.1:
Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2019
Source: https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/nventoriesArsenals2019-1.
png
211
Table 7.1:
Arms of the USA and the Russia
Source: https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/286466.htm, (02.07.2019)
As seen in Chart 7.1 and Table 7.1, Russia is one of the

two countries with the highest weapon capacity in the world. The
Russian government considers nuclear weapons as a source of
global prestige and a fundamental guarantor for Russia’s security.
The country’s permanent place in the UN Security Council, its
nuclear weapons, its membership of the G8, ensures Russia will
remain a great power and continue to play a global role for the
foreseeable future (Baluev, 2018: 148). However, Putin, in official
statements has reaffirmed that the importance of Russian nuclear
forces is more for safety than prestige (Oliker and et al., 2009:
163). As the world becomes less predictable and more dangerous,
Karaganov suggests, “Russia must continue to rely on a rapidly
renewable, albeit downsized, nuclear arsenal as a guarantee of its
national security” (Karaganov, 2005: 457).
The emphasis in military thinking about nuclear weapons
has been continued under Putin’s rule. This approach was first
introduced in the major security document - the National Security
Concept (NSC) of 2000. The NSC states all forces and facilities
available, even nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary, to
reflect armed aggression, in case other means are exhausted. It
also declares that Russia must have nuclear forces for use against
any aggressor state or coalition of states. At the same time, in the
interests of preventing aggression of any scale, including when
nuclear weapons are used against Russia and its allies, a deterrence
212
capability should be maintained (Haas, 2010: 62). The Russian

Military Doctrine of 2015 claims Russia reserves the right to use
nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types
of weapons of mass destruction against it and or its allies, as well
as in response to aggression against Russia that threatens the very
existence of the state (Article 27). The Doctrine also discusses
an “escalation to de-escalation” strategy, which provides for the
limited use of nuclear weapons to end a large-scale conflict on
favorable terms for Russia (armscontrol.org).
Although the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact
evaporated, the USA has always had a special place in Russia’s
foreign policy. The only thing that has not changed in this process
is the precision of Russia to the relations with the USA. The
current view of the Russian military doctrine on nuclear weapons
is as outlined above. However, because of the international
conjuncture since the Cold War, Russia has signed many arms
control agreements with the USA and other members of the
international community. Some of the most relevant agreements
are listed in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2:
Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties
Source: https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/286466.htm, (02.07.2019)
Each of the major multilateral arms control agreements and

treaties are defined as follows:
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: “The NPT is a landmark
international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and
general and complete disarmament. On 11 May 1995, the
Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have
213
joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.”

(un.org).
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: “The Conference on
Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on a
comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within
the framework of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that
purpose. Although the CD had long been involved with the
issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it establish a subsidiary
body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that body
blocked tangible progress for years” (un.org).
• Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM): “The CPPNM (1987) provides for certain levels of
physical protection during international transport of nuclear
material” (state.gov).
• CPPNM 2005 Amendment: “A Diplomatic Conference in July
2005 was convened to amend the CPPNM and strengthen its
provisions. The amended Convention makes it legally binding
for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in
peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport” (iaea.org).
• Chemical Weapons Convention (CWP): “The CWP (1997)
aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass
destruction by prohibiting the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical
weapons by States Parties. States Parties, in turn, must take
the steps necessary to enforce that prohibition in respect of
persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction” (opcw.
org).
• Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): “The BWC
(1975) the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning
the development, production and stockpiling of an entire
category of weapons of mass destruction” (un.org).
• International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism: “The Nuclear Terrorism Convention’s
(2007) main objective relates to the criminalization of a
number of nuclear and radioactive material related offences,
the establishment of jurisdiction over these offences and the
co-operation among states parties, with the UN and with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in specified matters”
(oecd-nea.org).
214
In addition, Russia has also signed the Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, New START, Nuclear Security
Summits, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (For
further information visit: armscontrol.org) with the USA.
For Russia, there are several reasons for participating in
arms control negotiations with the United States. The first reason
is for the prestige that emphasizes the status of Russia as one of
the two leading world nuclear powers and the capacity to lock
the USA into further nuclear reductions. The second reason is
the concern about the USA’s missile defense plans and prospects
(Oliker et al., 2009: 170). With the new crises of today, the debate
on nuclear weapons and missile systems between the USA and
Russia has again begun to occupy the agenda.
Energy Supply and Security: The rise in production with the
globalization process has increased the need for energy. Having
energy resources and ensuring energy security have become
important goals for international actors. Energy is at the core of
Russia’s national security strategy and a bi-directional factor for
Russian policies. First, Russia is one of the most important energy
suppliers in the world. Selling energy produced in its territory
to the outside world provides Russia with enormous profits.
Secondly, Russia wants to control energy resources in different
parts of the world, especially in Central Asia. Thus, it competes
with other global players in the control of energy resources. In
both respects, the energy issue has a direct connection with other
foreign policy goals of Russia. In this section, the situation of
Russia’s energy resources will be examined, then its policies
related to energy resources in other countries will be discussed.
Besides the many geopolitical interests of Russia in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia, economic priorities occupy
an important place. Russia’s geo-energy interests are met by
transporting Caspian oil to the world market through its territory.
The Energy Strategy of Russia approved in 2009, and projected
until 2030, states one of the most important strategic directions of
the foreign economic activity of the oil complex of the Russian
Federation is the transit of oil from neighboring countries through
Russian territory. At present, Azerbaijan’s oil is transported
through transit pipelines of Russia. Russian export routes for
“black gold” are the northern sea route for the transport of Caspian
oil. Geo-energy interests of Russia are also met by the possibility
215
of full control over the export of Caspian gas. On October 14,

2009, a contract for the sale and purchase of natural gas was
signed between Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the
Azerbaijan Republic. Territorial proximity, the absence of transit
zones and the presence of an already existing gas transportation
infrastructure make an expansion of gas cooperation between
the Transcaucasian Republic and Russia the most commercially
viable option for both partners. Russia is trying to intercept the
“blue fuel” sent to the Nabucco gas pipeline, which supplies
natural gas to Europe by bypassing Russia and directly competing
with the Russian “South Stream” (the project was closed at the
end of 2014) (Muhametov, 2015: 47-48).
A complex network of pipelines connects “production
regions with virtually all of Russia’s centers of population
and industry. Pipelines are especially important because of the
long distances between Siberian oil and gas fields and Russia’s
European industrial centers as well as countries to the west”
(Cooper, 1998: 364). During the presidencies of Putin and
Medvedev, the country renationalized its energy sector and began
to introduce the practice of receiving rents for transporting energy
through its territory. Russia sometimes uses the “tap weapon” to
punish recalcitrant states, as demonstrated by the gas wars with
Ukraine (and to a lesser extent with Belarus) in 2005 and 2008.
The use of energy as an instrument of strategic policy is consistent
with the common goals of Russian foreign policy. On the other
hand, the West occasionally punished Moscow for this reason
(Sussex, 2014: 215).
216
Map 7.1:
Oil and Gas Pipelines from Russia to Europe
Source: https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/photos/000/297/29748.jpg,
(07.06.2019)
Not surprisingly, Russia’s economy is profoundly

dependent on energy exports, as the country has the world’s
largest conventional natural gas reserves, the second largest
reserves of coal and the ninth largest reserves of crude oil. A
significant amount of Russia’s energy resources are exported to
European countries, giving it an extensive influence on these
countries. For example, Ukraine receives 51.6% of its domestic
natural gas supplies from Russia, CIS (37%), Eastern Europe
(31%), Germany (27%), Türkiye (14%), Italy (10%), France (8%)
and others (10%) (Simmons and et al., 2014: 52).
As demonstrated, Russia is a critical country for global
energy. Its energy resources provide large amounts of export
revenue. This income also increases the economic development
and prosperity of Russia. With the energy resources, Russia serves
as an economic and geopolitical power in Europe, the Caspian Sea
basin and Central Asia. For this reason, Russia’s energy security is
also part of the energy security of these regions.
217
Socio-Economic Problems
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has inherited a range of socio-
economic problems. This section focuses particularly on three
areas: migration, sustainable development, and human rights.
Migration: Globalization has facilitated the mobility of
people around the world for many reasons, such as finding a
job, living in a safer place or living in greater economic comfort.
Migrants change the cultural, demographic and economic
structure of a country where they move. Many countries are
positively and negatively affected by migration and Russia is one
of these countries. This section discusses the effects of migration
on Russia and its policy to address this challenge.
Russia has a population of 144.5 million people, 11.7
million of them include international migrants which is 8.1% of
the population (migrationdataportal.org). By 2050, the number
of foreign migrants in the Russian Federation will exceed one
third of the country’s population (Garusova, 2014: 12). As these
numbers indicate, the issue of international migration plays an
important role in the country’s population dynamics. This role
can be grouped under three headings. The first and the most
important is the country’s need for a labor force due to the aging
population of Russia. An unprecedented inflow of migrants into
Russia from the periphery of the Soviet Union occurred in the
early 1990s. Migrants were mainly forced to move due to poor
economic conditions. Labor migration became the dominant form
of migration that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union
in the late 1990s (Malakov and Simon, 2018: 261-262). Labor
immigration to Russia has an inevitable long-term growth trend.
Regardless of quotas, legislative and bureaucratic barriers, it
should be expected that migration in the Russian Federation will
continue for the foreseeable future. According to demographic
forecasts, the processes of depopulation and aging of the Russian
population will markedly continue in the next 15 years. The
country is entering the most difficult period from the point of view
of the demographic situation, since the reserves for increasing
the level of economic activity in young and elderly are almost
exhausted (Volokh, 2012: 10-11).
Second, migration is made up of those who want to live a
safer life due to security problems in the immediate vicinity of
218
Russia. A significant number of people have migrated to Russia

following the crisis in the Caucasus, Crimea, and Ukraine. For
example, over 1 million Ukrainians, as of 2017, have sought
asylum or other forms of legal stay in the Russian Federation
since the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine in April
2014 (unhcr.org). The third role migration has played is based
on the integration process of Eurasia, which is one of Russia’s
important foreign policy approaches. Russia has “demonstrated
its readiness to allow free movement on its territory for capital,
goods, services, and people from participating foreign countries,
having agreed upon the course of creating a new political and
economic union—the Eurasian Economic Union” (Malakov and
Simon, 2018: 263-264). Lomagin identifies “2012 was a turning
point in integration trends in post-Soviet space. The Belarus-
Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union (CU) expanded into the
Single Economic Space (SES), bringing into operation a set of
17 agreements ranging from the coordination of macroeconomic
and fiscal policies to labor migration, energy, and technical
regulation” (Lomagin, 2014: 115). The integration process in the
region encourages people to emigrate and Russia.
Additionally, Russia has made some international and
national regulations against the immigration problem. Russia
contributes to the work carried out by the UN on migrants. In
this respect, the years 1992 and 1993 have been the scene of very
important developments. Firstly, the International Organization
for Migration’s (IOM) office in Moscow opened in 1992. Secondly,
Russia was reclassified as a “country of first resort” for foreigners
fleeing countries outside of the CIS by the UN Convention
on Refugees, which it signed in 1993. This status entails an
international obligation to care for such individuals following the
1951 UN convention. At the same time, illegal immigration in
many areas grew along with declining border security after the
collapse of the Soviet Union (Curtis and McClave, 1998: 162). In
Russia, the function of control, supervision, and compliance with
legal norms are vested in the structural unit of the Ministry of
the Internal Affairs - the Federal Migration Service (FMS). This
executive body accumulates all data, including the data given in
the collections of the Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat),
on migrants passing through border and visa checkpoints,
regulates and controls the setting and removal of foreigners from
migration records, provides state services in the field of migration
219
and keeps current records of migration flows (Rybakovsky and

Ryazantsev, 2005: 4).
Poverty, Hunger and Sustainable Development: The
political geography of Russia has considerably changed after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite this, Russia remains the
largest and an important state in terms of the global ecosystem.
Russia has experienced a complex and difficult transition making
the future uncertain for not only for Russia, but also the world
economy. In addition, problems such as income inequality,
poverty, and hunger, which have emerged with globalization,
have become critical for Russia. In this section, the problems of
poverty and hunger in Russia will be examined, and then Russia’s
approach to sustainable development will be discussed.
An official 2018 Report says, “22 percent of Russians fall
into the ‘poverty zone’, meaning they are unable to buy anything
beyond basic staples needed for subsistence. This study places
nearly 36 percent of Russians in the ‘consumer risk zone,’ with
incomes that allow them to buy decent food and clothes” (rferl.
org). These numbers show that poverty is a very important socio-
economic problem in Russia.
The Russian Federation ranks 21st out of 119 candidate
countries in the 2018 Global Hunger Index (globalhungerindex.
org). Oxfam reports, “20.6 million people earn less than the
minimum subsistence level, and struggle to meet the basic needs
of daily life in Russia.” (oxfam.org). The government needs to
make efforts to transform the country, as many people still do not
have access to basic social services, such as health care.
Sustainable development is a popular concept in the
political language of the West. The Russian word that is used as its
equivalent is the concept ustoichivoerazvitie. It however excludes
the notion of “sustainable” but rather “stable development”. The
Russian interpretation of “sustainable development” can also
be compared with the country’s environmental policy, which
emphasizes “the rational use” of natural resources, rather than
“environmental regulation” (Korppoo and et al., 2015: 12).
Russia’s approach to sustainable development influences the
future of both its country’s and the world’s economy. Within
this framework, important steps have been taken by Russia for
sustainable development. Oldfield and Shaw note, “The Russian
government has approved a series of legislative acts with the stated
220
aim of implementing the provisions of Agenda 21 and applying

the concept of sustainable development domestically, after Russia
was a participant at the 1992 Earth Summit and a signatory to the
conference’s main policy documents, including Agenda 21 and the
Rio Convention” (Oldfield and Shaw, 2002: 392).
Russia makes a significant contribution in strengthening
global financial and economic stability, including the participation
in the so-called Cologne Initiative, a program to reduce the debt
of the least developed countries of the world. Russia supports the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The amount of financial
assistance provided to these countries by other creditors and the
degree of their participation in this Initiative largely depends on the
size of the Russian “discount”. Russia’s contribution to the struggle
against poverty and the socio-economic development of the Third
World states is not limited to large-scale assistance in reducing
their external debt. Russia provides the least developed countries
with broad trade preferences. Virtually all goods produced in these
states are imported into Russia duty-free (Ivanov, 2002: 26).
Economic aid traditionally occupies a prominent place in the
arsenal of foreign policy. One of the main forms of such Russian
assistance to neighboring countries is the provision of loans with
low-interest rates and for long periods. The main form of Russian
assistance to the CIS countries is the supply of energy resources
(especially oil and natural gas) at preferential prices. Their main
recipients are Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus. Price subsidies
from the Russian Federation for the supplied gas and oil allow
the neighboring countries to re-export them to Europe at market
prices, making a profit on the difference in value, which is a hidden
form of economic assistance (Muhametov, 2015: 78-79).
With the help of international norms on the one hand and the
legal changes made in the country on the other, Russian assistance
in the framework of good-neighborliness to near-abroad countries
illustrates how Russia assumes some of the responsibility of global
economic problems. But, given its economic power and place in
the global ecosystem, Russia will need to provide more active
support for sustainable development efforts.
Human Rights, Global Ethic, and Global Justice: After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, political, economic and social
disarray arose in Russia. However, it was hoped that human rights
221
in Russia would improve in the post-Soviet era. The slowdown

in the democratization process in the country has impeded the
development of human rights. Corruption, lack of transparency,
inadequate public participation in politics and increasing
government pressure on the media, has made the country’s claims
of transition towards democratization questionable. Russia’s
problems in the field of global ethics and global justice are also
tied to human rights issues. Although Russia is a party to many
international conventions, it will continue to fall short in global
ethics and global justice as long as it ignores human rights problems
in its country and other countries.
The problems of human rights in the Soviet period remain
practically unchanged today. Although the government denies this
allegation, reports prepared by various international organizations
confirm that significant human rights violations in this country
continue. For example, the Human Rights Watch 2018 World
Report listed nearly 13 pages of human rights violations in Russia
(Human Rights Watch, 2017: 440-453). Freedom of assembly,
freedom to access the Internet, freedom of expression, restricted
activities of non-governmental organizations, violence against
people and discrimination represent just a few examples of the
human rights violations in Russia. In addition, Russia is responsible
for human rights abuses in crisis areas such as Ukraine, Chechnya,
and Crimea (US Department of State, 2018: 1).
Violations of rights, concerning other civilian entities
other than individuals, can be grouped under four headings: the
media, non-governmental organizations, religious institutions,
and the business world. Suppression of freedom of the press and
governmental influence on media production, as briefly discussed
in Chapter 3 are two aspects that must be considered in terms
of the media. As for non-governmental organizations, they face
violent harassment, intimidation and bureaucratic threats that the
executive branch does little to dissuade. Religious groups are no
exception in this situation. The business world faces different
problems. The executive branch of the government forces them
to open themselves up to government intervention. The business
community has no choice, because if they refuse, they may face
nationalizing and prosecution (Bonneville, 2007: 4).
As mentioned earlier, it is impossible to separate human
rights problems in Russia from democratization problems in this
222
country. The OSCE has observed nine elections since 1996,

and most recently the 2016 State Duma elections (osce.org).
However, there is no significant progress in the Russian human
rights report. Putin has created a highly centralized, authoritarian
political system. Even bicameral Federal Assembly depends on
the executive. The 2016 Duma elections and the 2018 presidential
elections were marked by charges of government intervention and
manipulation of the election process, including the exclusion of
essential opposition candidates (US Department of State, 2018:
1). According to Amnesty International Report of 2017-2018,
migrants and refugees were denied protection of their rights in
Russia. It came to the point that some forms of domestic violence
were decriminalized. Harassment, prosecution, and intimidation
of human rights defenders, representatives of religious minorities
and independent NGOs have continued. Amnesty International
reports, “Systematically the right to a fair trial was constantly
violated. Serious human rights violations continue unabated in
the North Caucasus. Moreover, Russia used its veto to block
UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. And to top it all in
Russia there were further restrictions to the rights to freedom
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly” (Amnesty
International, 2018: 310).
International law is the result of the Westphalian system
based on the socio-cultural norms and values of the West. For this
reason, Russia remained far from Western values in the Cold War
era. In the post-Soviet period, Russia has adopted international
law because it has needed to change its political position in the
world. Russia’s situation is interesting for two reasons. Firstly,
the opening of Russia to international law means a radical break
with the traditional isolationism of this country. Secondly, this
process started many years ago but progressed slowly. For the
first time in its history, Russia adopted a constitutional principle
incorporating the generally recognized international norms
concerning human rights into its domestic law in 1992. The 1993
Constitution confirmed the trend of giving a prominent place to
international legal standards in the domestic legal settings. Article
15 of the new Constitution confirms that “the generally recognized
principles and norms of international law and the international
treaties of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal
system” (Danilenko and Stein, 1997: 295-296). Lawmaking
within the country and the internal political activities of the
223
Russian government are carried out according to international

norms (Bogaturov, 2017: 463-464). According to the UN Charter,
the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), the Declaration of the Helsinki Summit in
1992 and other international documents, Russia has the right to
develop humanitarian cooperation with other states at bilateral
and multilateral levels, despite the many humanitarian problems
that continue to exist in the country. Melville and Shakleina
suggest that “over time, this will help create a global community
of states and the effective realization of human rights” (Melville
and Shakleina, 2005: 61).
Technological Problems: Over the past 50 years,
technological developments have exponentially grown
throughout the world. These developments significantly affect the
behavior and actions of individuals, groups, companies, states,
and other international actors. While there are many benefits of
technology(e.g. greater access to information, saves us time, give
us greater mobility, and enables us to communicate and work
more efficiently),there are also many drawbacks (e.g. creates
dependencies on technology, endangers our individual freedoms,
creates data security concerns, technology addictions, and social
disconnection). In this section, the effects of artificial intelligence,
robotics, and internet technology on Russian politics will be
examined.
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: In the post-Soviet
period, Russia has prioritized scientific innovation, allocating
70% of the federal budget to scientific studies. Russia recently,
along with many other foreign countries, has followed the trend
of developing robotics, in the case of Russia it is referred to as the
Fundamental Robotic Systems Research Program (FASO). This
program targets the coordination of researches related to robotics
in the partner organizations. Six areas of basic research have been
formed: mechanics, control algorithms, medical robotics, marine
robotic technology, aerospace robotics, and agricultural robotics.
The development of robotics is included in the list of the priority
areas of technological development in the field of information
technologies that are defined by the government (Raevskaia
and Stogonova, 2018: 112). It is widely agreed that robots are
automated programmable devices designed to perform production
or other tasks aimed at partial or complete replacement of human
labor. In Russia, however, the market volume for industrial
224
robots has been insignificant and demands have decreased for

several reasons including limited demand, obsolete facilities,
and resources along with poor scientific background, economic
difficulties, insufficient government support, etc. Therefore,
this market remains underdeveloped. To fill this void, private
companies and research organizations have successfully engaged
in robotics by holding different kinds of conferences, exhibitions,
and educational projects. One area however that the actively
developed at the professional and state level is military robotics
(Raevskaia and Stogonova, 2018: 111).
Internet: Internet in Russia only begun to be used 20 years
ago. In 1994, the InterNIC international network center officially
registered the national domain ‘.ru’ site for the Russian Federation.
Now Russia has three domain names: ‘.ru’, ‘.rf’, and ‘.su’
(Tregubova et. al., 2014: 101). Russia uses internet technology
to improve the national economy. In 2002, the 9-year Electronic
Russia (e-Russia) Federal Program for the period 2002–2010 was
adopted by the government. This program includes the “provision
of the right to free search, access, transmission, production and
distribution of information, and the expansion of specialist
training and national information, and communication technology
capacity” (Simachev and Kuzyk, 2018: 186). National enterprises
based on internet technologies have also recently increased. The
main goal of these new initiatives is economic development.
In this regard, The National Technology Initiative (NTI) is an
important step because it “is oriented towards the creation of
the technology markets of the future and seeks to develop future
Russian leaders in these markets, emphasizing collaboration
among present generations of Russian students and specialists-
in-training in order to foster new, future-oriented technological
teams” (Simachev and Kuzyk, 2018: 191).
In Russia, the state limits the access of civilians to the
Internet and the use of it. Gorbunova attests, “the government
effectively controls most of the traditional media in Russia and has
taken steps to bring the internet under greater state control, while
prosecuting social media users and adopting highly regressive
legislation on data storage localization, encryption, and cyber
security” (Gorbunova, 2019: 1). In addition, the new Russian
counterterrorism legislation prohibits “preaching, praying, or
disseminating of religious materials outside ‘specially designated
places,’ such as officially recognized religious institutions, as well
225
as unnecessarily expand its oversight, undermining human rights

and cyber security” (hrw.org).
Cyber Problems: Although no one would deny the benefits
the Internet has brought humanity, it has however proven suitable
for malicious use. Individuals, groups, social organizations,
terrorist organizations, advertising companies, and states can and
have abused the use of the internet, resulting in cyber problems
referred to as cyber conflicts. Cyber conflict can be defined as
the use of computational technologies in military interactions,
political (diplomatic) or economic affairs in the realm of the
international system (Valeriano and Maness, 2014: 348-349).
States, such as Russia, can and have used computational
technologies for their purposes as a tool of conflict. For Russia,
cyber conflict is a strategy, which is used from time to time against
an enemy to achieve desired ends. In this context, Russia has been
involved in three important cyber conflicts were against Estonia,
Georgia, and the USA. The Russian government has never
admitted to supporting or committing these attacks. However,
research suggests that Russia supported these attacks.
The pandora’s box of global cyber war was opened by
the Russians (Maness and Valeriano, 2015: 86). Russia’s cyber
experiment, as discussed in chapter 4, started with an attack
against Estonia in 2007. The cyber attack was intended to punish
Estonia for the removal of the memorial of the Bronze Soldier of
Tallinn to commemorate the Soviet soldiers who helped liberate
Estonia from the Nazis in WWII (Andress and Winterfeld,
2013: 12). However, as previously noted, the Estonians saw the
statue as a symbol Soviet oppression for 48 years. The Estonian
case was defined as the “first cyber conflict or cyber warfare”
(Karatzogianni, 2009: 6). Although it remains unknown who
was responsible for the cyber attack, it is generally assumed the
attack derived from Russia, since the IP address originated from
Russia, online instructions were in Russian, and Estonian pleas
to Moscow for help were ignored (Maness and Valeriano, 2015:
101). Then in August 2008, Russia launched cyber operations at
the same time as its physical/military intervention against Georgia.
Substantial evidence also suggests Russia was responsible for
cyber intervention in the American presidential election in 2016,
which has caused friction between Russia and the USA growing
potentially into “new cold war” (Shuya, 2018: 2).
226
Conclusions
Russia has taken some measures against terrorism within
the framework of national laws and institutions. Due to the
international character of terrorism, Russia also accepts that
combating terrorism requires international cooperation. Although
some legal steps have been taken, it will not be possible to get rid
of the terrorist threats without stronger international cooperation.
However, Russia also needs to ensure policies do not jeopardize
the freedoms of its population, neighboring countries. In response
to contemporary conflicts, Russia’s policies are shaped by many
policies such as security, energy, arms sales, economic impact,
and regional domination. Therefore, Russia does not always
adhere to the same policy about ethnic and religious conflicts that
arise in neighboring countries and more remote regions.
Russia was one of the first countries to sign the UNFCCC
in 1992. Russia’s role in international processes to combat global
climate change include the Kyoto Protocol 1997, which entered into
force on February 16, 2005 after being ratified. Without Russia’s
participation, there would be no Kyoto Protocol. Russian experts
actively cooperated with the UN intergovernmental commission
for the study of climate change. Following international
standards, the amendment of Russian environmental laws and the
development of a rational ecological policy at the national level
were envisaged. To solve the most acute environmental problems,
Russian leaders believed that international support would be
provided, and Russia, in turn, would fulfill all its international
obligations in this area.
Although the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact
evaporated, the USA has always had a special place in Russia’s
foreign policy. The only thing that has not changed in this
process is the precision of Russia to the relations with the USA.
The current view of the Russian military doctrine on nuclear
weapons is as outlined in this chapter. However, because of the
international conjuncture since the Cold War, Russia has signed
many arms control agreements with the USA and other members
of the international community.
Energy is at the core of Russia’s national security strategy.
Energy is a bi-directional factor for Russian policies. First, Russia
is an important energy supplier in the world. Selling energy
produced in its territory to the outside world provides substantial
227
profits for Russia. Secondly, Russia wants to control energy

resources in different parts of the world, especially in Central
Asia. Thus, it competes with other global players in the control
of energy resources. In both respects, the energy issue has a direct
connection with other foreign policy goals of Russia.
Russia makes a significant contribution in strengthening
global financial and economic stability, including the participation
in the so-called Cologne Initiative, a program to reduce the debt
of the least developed countries of the world. Russia supports the
IMF for the poorest developing countries. The amount of financial
assistance provided to these countries by other creditors and the
degree of their participation in this Initiative largely depends on
the size of the Russian “discount”. Russia’s contribution to the
struggle against poverty and the socio-economic development of
the Third World states is not limited to large-scale assistance in
reducing their external debt. Russia provides the least developed
countries with broad trade preferences. Virtually all goods
produced in these states are imported into Russia duty-free
In Russia, national enterprises based on internet
technologies have recently increased. The main goal of these
new initiatives, as in previous ones, is economic development.
But in Russia, because the state uses the Internet for its national
purposes, the state limits the access of civilians to the Internet and
the use of it. For Russia, cyber conflict is a strategy, which is used
from time to time against an enemy to achieve desired ends.
228
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8.
RUSSIA AND TÜRKİYE:

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
RELATIONS 1
Prof. Dr. Şaban H. Çalış
Dr. Harun Semercioğlu
Research Assistant Çağlar Söker
Introduction
The relationship between Russia and Türkiye spans over six
hundred years. Although they share some common features e.g.
strong state tradition and a long imperial past, their relationship
historically has not been a friendly one. Until very recently, they
did not approach each other as a friend or an ally, but as a rival, if
not an enemy. Despite a few historical turning points that created
conditions for cooperation in the past e.g. Russian Revolution and
Turkish war of independence, they have generally fought each
other since Russia’s emergence as a nation after the sixteenth
century. Turks, otherwise referred in Russia as Turoks or Tatars,
played the role of dominant other in the construction of the Russian
national identity. The image and the meaning of Turok in Russia
is not much different from the word Moskof which has been used
in Anatolia for three centuries since the time of Sultan Mustafa
III (Mısıroğlu, 1970: 28-58). Beyond a doubt, both nations have
shared ontological concerns about each other for centuries.
To understand Russia’s relationship with Türkiye today, it is
important to analyze their relationship historically from different
perspectives. Until the 15th century, Russians remained under the
control of the Turkic nations, including Huns, Avars, Pechenegs,
Tatars and the Ottomans in the Euro-Asian region. The Russian
existence emerged by wars waged against the Turks or Turkic
communities in general. After the emergence of the Russian knez
(prince), the Russians expanded against the Turkish territories.
They occupied a great part of the Ottoman territories up to
Yeşilköy-İstanbul in the East, up to Erzurum in the West. Apart
from a few minor wars e.g. the Crimean War in 1856, Turkic
1 Some parts of this chapter are based on an article published by Şaban Halis Çalış. For
the article and further references see: Çalış, Şaban Halis (2021). “Ontological Concerns,
Historical Realities and Conjunctural Developments: Continuity and Change in Türkiye’s
Relations with Russia”. bilig – Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World 96: 177-205.
235
nations were unable to defeat them. If the Soviet Revolution did

not erupt in 1917 in Moscow, there is no doubt that Russians would
have occupied Istanbul and most of Anatolia after the First World
War. Russian claims for the leadership of the Orthodox and Slavic
world, tsarist expansionist policies in Euro-Asia, and traditional
Russian ideals of reaching out to warm waters, always created
troubles for the Turks. The Cold War period did not only help but
also exacerbated this situation. Until Putin in Russia, and Erdoğan
in Türkiye came to power, relations between the two nations
constantly fluctuated.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the continuity and change
in relations between Russia and Türkiye in various historical
settings. Beginning in the Middle Ages, the first section focuses
on their relationship primarily during the periods of the Ottomans
and the Tsarist Russia. In the second section, it evaluates their
relationship from the fall of the Tsarist Russia to the end of the
Soviet Union. The third part of the chapter examines developments
in their relations since the end of the Cold War. After this historical
analysis, this chapter discusses current issues, points of cooperation
and conflict between Türkiye and Russia such as Cyprus, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Syria and S-400 missile system. This chapter closes with
a brief appraisal, to underline logical reasons behind the continuity
and change in these relations and suggests a conceptual framework
for further discussions on the subject matter.
The Tsarist Period and the Ottoman Empire

The origins of the Russian nation come from the Eastern
Slavs, as we have seen in the chapter one. Linguistically, Slavs
refers to a group of people who speak Slavic languages in the
Northern part of the Euro-Asian region, stretching from North,
Central and South-eastern Europe Caucasus and Northern Asia.
However, the Slavs as an ethnic entity, represent different and
diverse ethnic communities including Germans, Goths, Turks
(Tatars mostly) and Mongols. The word Rus began appearing in
history after the sixth century AD and then the Russian-Varegs and
the Kievan Rus were established as the first Russian principalities.
(Kluchevsky, 1911: 2; Curtis, 1996: 5-6; Meram, 1969: 10).
Another important development in Russian history was the
acceptance of Orthodox Christianity and the Cyrillic alphabet in
236
RUSSIA AND TÜRKİYE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN RELATIONS
988 by Prince Vladimir I of the Russian-Vareg. Orthodoxy played

a decisive role in the development of the Russian identity and
considered a critical turning point in the separation of Russians
from the rest of Europe after adopting the Slavic language.
Political unity also began under the Kievan Rus Principality and
then later by the Muscovy Knez. As the first and second chapters
of this book discusses, the region occupied by the Muscowits had
no natural barriers to prevent people from coming from the East or
West. Consequently, the history of the Muscowits was influenced
by the Turkic and Central Asian people who invaded this region.
The Tatars for instance, took control of the Knezes of Russia for a
period in the twelfth century.
The transfer of the head of the Orthodox Church from Kievan
Rus to the city of Muscovy in the 14th century marked a turning
point in the history of Moscow, because the city would become
the capital of the Russian states including the Russian Federation
established in 1991. In 1380 when the Moscow Great Knez
won a great victory against the Mongols in the Kulikova battle,
the Russians began to extend their territories towards Nizhni-
Novgorod. After Ivan III (The Great) became the Great Knez in
1462, he took over first the dominion of Novogorad in 1478 and
then he defeated the army of Kazan Khanate in 1487 (Meram,
1969: 10-20; Kurat, 1993: 91-109).
The Kulikova battle marked the beginning of Russia as a free
nation. However, the Ottomans did not accept nor recognize the
Rus Knez as an independent state until the Karlowitz Agreement
in 1699. After the Ottoman Empire’s defeat at the Battle of Vienna
in 1683, the Tsardom of Russia joined the Holy League in 1686.
After, Tsarist Russia continued occupying the Volga and Caspian
region which was the under control of Tatar Khanates. Having
realized the Russian threat, Istanbul supported Devlet Giray, Khan
of Crimea. Khan won a great victory against Russians, but they
restored all what they lost against the Khanate and became one of
the powers that fought against the Ottomans. Making the situation
much worse was the Russian attack on the Azov Castle in 1695.
Later, the Ottomans made the Istanbul Agreement in 1700. With
this agreement, the Russians had a diplomatic victory for the
first time against the Ottomans. Azov and Taganrog were left to
Russia and the Ottomans also provided permission by a Russian
ambassador to stay permanently in Istanbul (Riasanovsky, 1993:
221; Meram, 1969: 26-28, 71; Kurat, 1993: 256).
237
Meanwhile, Russia had destroyed a Swedish army in the

battle of Poltava in 1709 and after the war, the King of Sweden
and Mazepa of Ukraine escaped to the Ottomans. Russia declared
war on the Ottoman Empire because the Sultan Ahmed III
rejected expelling them from his territories. Despite the fact that
the Ottoman Army was in a better position against the Russians
in the war, Baltacı was persuaded by Peter the Great to sign the
Pruth Peace Agreement in July 1711 without a considerable
gain for the Ottomans (Riasanovsky, 1993: 224; Meram, 1969:
88-89; Kurat: 1993, 260-262). Russia soon after, aligned with
Austria to fight against the Ottomans in 1736 and they defeated
the Ottomans. Following the war, the warring parties signed the
Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The Treaty enabled the Ottomans to
recover the lands of Serbia and Oltenia, but Istanbul lost Azov to
Moscow. Nonetheless, it provided the Ottomans with a period of
peace for some thirty years (Lale Devri-Tulip Era) since Austria
and Russia had to deal with Prussia as a new emerging power in
Europe (Meram, 1969: 112-113; Kunt, 1997: 63-65; Kurat, 1993:
276).
The Ottomans closely followed European politics and
what was happening between Russia and Poland. When Russia
intervened in the domestic affairs of Poland in 1768, Istanbul
warned Moscow which led to another war (Riasanovsky, 1993:
265). This war had a devastating effect on the Ottoman Empire
since it lost all its territories from Wallachia and Bogdan to Crimea.
Russia continued invading Ottoman territories up to Bulgaria.
At the end of these wars, the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (Küçük
Kaynarca) was signed in July 1774 (Kunt, 1997: 69-70; Meram,
1969: 127; Kurat, 1993: 290).
Despite of the Küçük Kaynarca Agreement, Russia did not
give up imperialist policies towards the Ottomans and formed a
new alliance with Austria. Together the alliance restarted another
war by attacking the Ottomans to implement the Greek Plan. For
Princess, later Embress Catherine II (the Great), she pursued
assistance from the great powers but persuaded only the Emperor
Joseph II of Austria to go to the war against the Ottomans in
1787. However, Joseph II’s sudden death in 1790, prevented the
Empress from pursuing her plans, despite the Russian Navy and
Army’s advances against the Ottomans after invading the city
of Yaş (Jassy) and capturing Bogdan in 1780. The defeat forced
238
the Ottomans to accept the Yaş Agreement in 1792 and lose both
the Crimea and Özü (Ochakov) castles (Meram, 1969: 143-144;
Kurat, 1993: 291).
At the beginning of the 19th century, Russia continued its
imperialist and expansionist policies in Europe and the Balkans
not only by war, but also through diplomacy and propaganda
machines against the Ottomans. They continued annexing
or occupying the cities and lands once under the control of
the Ottoman empire (Meram, 1969: 168-170). The Ottomans
attempted to fight back by declaring war on Russia, after Russia
refused to give back Wallachia and Bogdan territories. After six
years of war, the Ottoman Army suffered huge losses and was
forced to accept defeat with the signing of The Treaty of Bucharest
in May 1812, bringing an end to the Russo-Turkish War. The
Treaty included the annexation of Bessarabia and access to the
entire northern coasts of the Black Sea by Russia in return for
Wallachia and the remainder of Moldavia to the Ottoman Empire
(Kunt, 1997: 100). This encouraged Russia to follow more
aggressive policies against the Ottomans, sending in more troops
to invade the Balkans, Caucasus and even in Anatolia. Russia also
supported and encouraged ethnic uprisings by the Greeks, Serbs,
Bulgarians and Armenians in the nineteenth century against the
Sublime Porte. Russia was also supported by English and French
squadrons that destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Navarino in 1827.
Russia with a large army of 225,000 soldiers marched towards
Istanbul from the Balkans in the West, and invaded many towns
and cities up to Erzurum, from the Caucasus front. The Ottomans
were forced to accept the Adrianople (Edirne) Agreement in 1829
that granted Greece independence and greater autonomy to Serbia
(Riasanovsky, 1993: 330; Meram, 1969: 177).
As the Ottoman Empire began to weaken, the Eastern Question
came up amongst European powers as they contemplated on what
to do to safeguard their own military, strategic and commercial
interests in the Ottoman sphere. Tsar Nicholas reportedly warned
the British envoy in St. Petersburg, Sir George Hamilton, “Türkiye
seems to be falling to pieces … We have a sick man on our hands,
a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these
days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary
arrangements are made” (Temperly, 1936: 272). However,
European powers could not reach a consensus on whether to heed
239
to Tsar’s advice as they had different aims on the Ottoman Empire.

Eventually the indecisiveness led to the Crimean War in 1853
when the Russian Tsar Nicholas I insisted on further concessions
from the Ottomans as a pretext for being the sole guardian of
the Greek Orthodox and Patriarchate. Behind these demands
however, Russia had greater ambitions to control the Balkans
and the Straits. The Tsar’s demands however were rejected by
England and France that sided with the Ottomans against Russia.
Although England was aware of the “sicknesses,” London was
not ready to let the Ottoman Empire die since this would risk the
security of Eastern Mediterranean region located on the way to
the British dominions in India. In addition, all powers in Europe
were also aware of the fact that Russia’s policies disrupted the
balance of power in the continent. To counter Russia’s aggression
towards the Ottomans, European powers helped the Ottomans to
force Russia to engage in negotiations, resulting in the Treaty of
Paris signed in 1856. Russia agreed to surrender Bessarabia to
Moldavia and give Walachia autonomy under the Ottoman rule.
The Black Sea was declared as a neutral and demilitarized zone,
and shipping in the Danube River became free for all nations
(Meram, 1969: 189-190).
After the Treaty of Paris, the hostile policies of the Tsarist
Russia continued as well as support for separatist, sectarian and
violent uprisings against the Ottomans for over twenty years
until the start of the 1877-78 war, otherwise referred to by
Turks as 93 Harbi. Before the war, Russia and its ally Serbia
begun supporting the rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire and marched
towards Istanbul through Bulgaria, capturing Plevne, Edirne
and then Yeşilköy, now a part of Metropolitan Istanbul city
center. Russians also started a massive attack from the East,
coming from the Caucasus region, capturing Aziziye Bastion in
Erzurum where people created a public resistance and defense
front. However, Russia defeated the Ottomans and imposed the
Treaty of San Stefano (Ayastefanos-Yeşilköy) in March 1878.
Türkiye was forced to recognize the independence of Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro, and provide autonomy to Bulgaria, and
Bosnia. Kars, Ardahan and Batumi however, were entirely left to
the Russians. This agreement confirmed Russia’s success in pan-
Slavic policies particularly in the Balkans, re-confirmed the sick
man image of Türkiye, and made Russia a more powerful actor
240
in European politics (Meram, 1969:196-200; Karal, 2007: 28-34,

64-67; Riasanovsky, 1993: 386-387).
Cooperation between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists

As the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate, Tsar
Nicholas I sought to fill the power vacuum left behind. European
powers, while not exactly on friendly terms with Turks, wanted
to avoid Russia disturbing the balance of power and therefore
followed pro-Ottoman policies at critical times such as in the case
of Crimea. When World War I began in 1914, Russia perceived
it as an opportunity to finish off the Ottoman Empire. However,
the Turks proved in the Dardanelles that they were not ready for
defeat, victoriously defending the Straits and weakening Russia’s
position. The position of the Tsar was further weakened by the
domestic opposition led by the Bolsheviks who succeeded in
dethroning the Tsar and declared the Bolshevik Revolution in
October 1917. After the revolution, Russia withdrew from World
War I in November 1917 (Riasanovsky, 1993: 475). At the request
of the Bolsheviks, peace talks were launched in Brest-Litovsk in
December 1917, joined by the Ottoman Empire and members
of the Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Bulgaria. In March 1918, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk
Agreement losing all territories in Poland, Finland, Lithuania,
Ukraine and the Baltic coasts. Upon the insistence of the Ottoman
government, the Bolsheviks also agreed to remove Russian troops
in Ardakhan, Kars and Batum. After the Russian troops left, the
lands fell, however, under the control of Armenian and Georgian
forces until 1920, when the Turkish army commanded by Kazım
Karabekir, retook and declared them as part of Türkiye.
In the meantime, the Russian Democratic Labor Party was
renamed as the Communist Party of Russia under the leadership
of Lenin. In April 1918, a civil war began, and the Red Army of
the Bolsheviks took control and declared the establishment of the
State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in place
of Tsarist Russia (Armaoğlu, 2002: 182). Then, the Bolsheviks
leaked Russian secret agreements during the WWI. One of them
included the Constantinople Agreement, which took place in
March 1915 between England, Russia and France (The Triple
Entente), discussing the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the
War. According to the Agreement, Russians would take control of
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the Straits, invade Istanbul, some parts of Thrace, and Asia Minor
(Üre, 2018).
The October Revolution however, prevented the Tsarist
Russia from implementing any of secret agreements. Nevertheless,
the Ottomans were still forced to surrender after the Armistice of
Mudros in 1918. However, the Turkish nation did not accept this
and started a national struggle for liberation under the leadership
of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1919. The Turkish Grand National
Assembly (GNA) was established in April 1920 in Ankara to carry
on the liberation war, and one of the first foreign contacts made
was with the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the success of the Bolsheviks
in Russia coincided with the start of the National Liberation
War by the Kemalists in Türkiye. This coincidence represented
a historical moment for both nations to come together because
they were alone and needed friends in the world. On the one hand,
the West was suspicious about Mustafa Kemal and had not yet
been sure about the intentions and directions of the Kemalist
movement. Mustafa Kemal was seen either as a Bolshevik, or an
Islamist or a nationalist separatist at the best. In a similar vein,
the liberal world totally rejected the Bolsheviks as communists
from the very inception of their revolt. Therefore, Lenin and
Kemal as the leaders of the movements had in fact no option than
coming together against their common enemies. The Bolsheviks
discussed this subject in depth, but Lenin decided to support the
Kemalists as a partner of the struggle against imperialists (Benhür,
2008: 278). They wanted to demonstrate that “they were not
alone” in the world. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned in
this rapprochement, they did not in fact give up their ideological
concerns. They, especially Lenin, expected a communist or
socialist revolution in Türkiye as their correspondence with
Türkiye at the beginning of their relation implied.
Therefore, historical coincidences pushed the two nations
into direct contact. The first foreign policy decision of the Turkish
Assembly accepted in May 1920 was to send a delegation to Russia.
Carrying a letter from Mustafa Kemal to Lenin (Benhür, 2006:
44; Şen, 2008: 8), the Turkish delegate reached Moscow in July
1920. The aim of the delegate was to ensure financial and military
support from the Bolsheviks (Atatürk, 2006: 318; Karhan: 2012:
93; Benhür, 2008: 280). The delegate and the Bolsheviks agreed
on general principles, however the signature of the agreement
was delayed due to some points related to concessions demanded
242
by the Bolsheviks concerning some Eastern cities of Türkiye

(Atatürk, 1984: 619). Nevertheless, the agreement was signed in
September 1920 and the Bolsheviks provided the Kemalists with
some financial assistance and military equipment (Zenbilci, 2014:
114).
In a time of need, this vital gesture opened a new chapter
in relations between the two states. In addition, Türkiye
and Russia established embassies by mutual agreements in
Ankara and Moscow (Karhan, 2012: 94). Despite such positive
developments, the Bolsheviks did not welcome the advancement
of the Turkish national forces towards the Caucasus. Türkiye
was seen as violating the conditions set out by the Brest-Litovsk
Agreement by starting a new military campaign to retake some
places in the region. Türkiye justified its new military campaign
to thwart Armenian attacks on Turkish villages in the Eastern
part of Türkiye in June 1920, after the Russian troops left the
region. To keep Türkiye united as stated in the National Oath,
the commander of Eastern Front Troops Kazım Karabekir Pasha
entered Sarıkamış on September 30 and Kars on October 30, and
captured the East of Arpaçay River on November 7, including
Gümrü. After this military campaign, Armenians made peace with
Ankara and signed the Treaty of Gyumri (Gümrü) in December
1920.
However, the Soviet Union had reservations about signing the
Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, since it did not change the Soviets
status in the Turkish Straits but rather it maintained the status quo.
For the Kemalists, the Lausanne Treaty was paramount since it
documented the official recognition and acceptance of Türkiye
as a new and independent state by the international community.
In addition to Russia, Kemalists sought to establish peaceful
relations with former archenemies including France, the United
Kingdom and the USA.
The Bolsheviks, however, were suspicious of Türkiye’s
rapprochement policy with “imperialist powers”, and perceived
Kemalists as “petit bourgeois leaders” whose aim was to change
the country but do nothing more for socialism. Fortunately, Soviet
diplomats in Türkiye offset the growing tension and distrust
between the two countries, suggesting to Moscow “to accept the
‘New Türkiye’ as it is” for collaborative and peaceful relations
with the Soviet Union for decades to come (Somel, 2018: 13).
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Following the Lausanne Treaty, Soviets and the Kemalists

once came together because of the reports of the Soviet diplomats
and international developments, necessitating the two countries
work closely together. The Mosul question in particular, which
was mishandled by the League of Nations under the influence
of Britain against Türkiye, played a great role in this process
for the side of the Kemalists. The political situation in Europe
led to the signature of the Locarno Pact, leave little room for the
Soviets. This pact consisted of a set of agreements initiated in
Locarno in 1925 to provide a framework for peace in Europe, but
the Bolsheviks regarded it as a movement to the detriment of the
Soviet security interests. The successor of Lenin, Joseph Stalin
who came power in 1924, had a different leadership profile and
his policies, including foreign policy, affected his relations with
other countries including Türkiye (Benhür, 2008: 298).
After Türkiye decided to withdraw its delegation from the
League in response to its Mosul policy, the Foreign Minister of
Türkiye, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, met his Soviet counterpart, Georgy
Vasilyevich Chicherin in Paris, where they signed the Turkish-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality on 16 December 1925.
The Treaty consisted of only three articles and three protocols. By
this treaty, both of the countries agreed that they would be free to
cooperate with any other state, provided that they would not take
part of any agreement against each other. They also undersigned
that any problems not anticipated in the agreement, would be
solved by bilateral negotiations between the two countries.
(Kinross, 1999: 477; Yüceer, 2011: 85-86; Karhan, 2014: 95).
Deteriorating Relations: Stalin, Montreux and WWII

Until the end of the 1930s, mutual interests and international
developments kept the two countries together. In April 1932,
Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) Pasha paid an official visit to the
Soviet Union, where he met leaders and some officials, including
President Stalin and Prime Minister Molotov. The visit proved to
be extremely important, as it provided İsmet Pasha with additional
opportunities to observe the Soviet style development model and
industrial facilities (Benhür, 2008: 171-173). He was also able to
convince the Soviets to provide Türkiye with additional financial
support (Ertan, 2011: 216-218). As a result, thanks to the Soviet
244
money and know-how, Kayseri cloth, Ereğli and Nazilli textile

factories began production in 1936 and 1937. The Soviets also
provided many experts in order to run these factories, in addition
to training Turks in workplaces (Kamalov, 2011: 229; Benhür,
2006: 699; Karhan, 2014: 98-99).
However, the Montreux negotiations caused a major setback
between Ankara and Moscow in 1936, when Türkiye aimed
to revise the Lausanne Convention of 1923. According to the
Convention, Ankara’s full sovereignty on the Straits was denied,
posing a great risk for Türkiye’s national security, not only for the
Straits, but also for the entire country. The international climate
of that time, with the support of the British government, enabled
Türkiye to conclude the Montreux Treaty with the participation
of relevant states including Russia (Çalış, 2017: 17-23). Yet
the Soviets maintained a different idea about the Straits from
Türkiye, favoring a policy of control and keeping the Black Sea
closed to the navies of any other powers which contradicted the
expectations of other participants at the Convention. To address
the Soviets concerns, Türkiye tried to follow a policy that kept
all conflicting interests in balance. Despite Türkiye getting
participants to agree to the Soviets point of forbidding the navies
of non-bordering countries to enter the Black Sea, Moscow’s
attitude towards Türkiye nevertheless began to change. Maxime
Litvinoff, the Soviet foreign affairs commissar, made contact with
delegations from Romania and Bulgaria in order to convince
them to set up a common defense alignment dealing only with the
Straits. Likewise, the Soviet press during the Conference accused
Türkiye as a country of “playing the game” of the imperialist
powers. These actions heightened Türkiye’s concerns about
the Soviet intentions. Following the signing of the Montreux
Convention in July 1936, the Soviets continued suggesting
to Türkiye a new agreement for the fortification of the Straits.
However, Ankara meanwhile regarded the Convention successful
and refused to accept establishing another pact dominated by
the Soviets. Türkiye meanwhile gradually improved its relations
with European countries including Britain, enabling Türkiye to
become a member of the League of Nations in 1932, but further
increased tensions between Russia and Türkiye. Moscow began
to believe “Türkiye could not talk with Russia without the consent
of the British” (Çalış, 2017: 22-23).
245
At the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet

Union unexpectedly approached Germans and signed a treaty of
friendship and non-aggression in August 1939. Türkiye however
suspected the two countries sought to partition of Türkiye,
including the control of the Straits, changing the Montreux Treaty,
and invading some parts of Anatolia as was later confirmed in a
disclosure by Hitler in June 1941, after he attacked the Soviets.
To counter this threat, Türkiye launched negotiations with Britain
and France for a tripartite agreement for security which would
be based on mutual assistance and friendship on the one hand.
Ankara did however attempt to restore relations with the Soviets,
but they turned Türkiye’s proposals down and repeated their
historical demands (Oran, 2001: 418-424). In the meantime,
Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. In response,
France and Britain declared war on Germany, while the Soviets
remained neutral. Shortly after, Germans also attacked the Soviet
Union, but Türkiye was able to stay out of the war thanks in part
to the Tripartite Agreement which provided an escape clause in
the agreement preventing Türkiye from entering an armed conflict
with the Soviet Union. Thanks to this clause, Türkiye was able
to declare neutrality during the war. (Çalış, 2017: 24-25; Ertem,
2010: 252-255; Benhür, 2008: 294).
When the Red Army attacked Finland, it confirmed Türkiye’s
fears of Russian imperialist policies. Under the presidency
of Stalin in particular, the Soviet Union continued following
expansionist policies in the region. Stalin’s approach reawakened,
if not exacerbated, Türkiye’s historical Russian phobia. Ankara
nevertheless decided to remain neutral which placed the Allies
in a strategic position, as neutrality created a more stable
and reliable environment for the defense of the Straits and the
southern borders of Russia. It also served as a “protective pad”
against German penetration into the Middle East. Understanding
the importance of Türkiye’s position, Allies jointly declared that
if any European country attacked the Country, they would help
it with any possible means. However, 15 days later, the Soviet
and British troops invaded Iran, and the Soviet policy in the Azeri
occupied parts of Iran deepened Turkish suspicions about the
intentions of the Russians (Deringil, 1989: 128). It was also not
a groundless suspicion since during Stalin’s talks with Anthony
Eden in December 1941, he proposed to suggest to Türkiye the
Dodecanese Islands, some parts of Bulgaria and Northern Syria if
246
it would join the war. The Turkish government regarded Stalin’s

gestures as a carrot to enter the War, while concealing real
plans about the future of the Straits. In the meantime, Türkiye’s
domestic politics and international contacts with the Axis
including the Germans caused a great concern for the Russians.
Some developments, such as Türkiye’s reluctance to go war at a
time of urgent need, its foreign trade with and chromium export
to the Nazi Germany, and its anti-Soviet ideological and popular
discourse which was supported by some official circles in Ankara,
irritated Stalin. After 1943 Stalin brought the case of Türkiye to
all conference tables and persuaded Churchill and Roosevelt that
Türkiye should remain under the Soviet sphere of influence, and
that the Soviets should have certain rights over the Turkish Straits
when the war was over (Çalış, 2017: 27-55).
Although Türkiye had a big army in terms of manpower, the
army contained outdated equipment and arsenal which was no
match to fight modern armies like Germany. This is in part why
Türkiye refused to accept the idea of occupation first by Germany
and then a salvation by the Red Army. Nonetheless, seeking to
appease the Allies and offset the German and Soviet threats,
Türkiye gradually transitioned away from its neutral stance in the
war. In order to demonstrate this, in 1944 Türkiye cancelled all
chromium trade and broke off all relations with Germany, and
declared all pan-Turkist movements as illegal in Türkiye. Türkiye
also allowed the Allies to use the Straits for transportation to the
Soviet Union and closed it off for any ships from the Axis powers.
Finally, Ankara declared war on Germany and Japan on February
23, 1945 (Deringil, 1989: 154-157; Oran, 2001: 396-397; Çalış,
2017: 52-53).
Despite Türkiye’s attempts to appease the Soviet Union,
Stalin instead sought to push Türkiye to the corner, reminding
Allies at the Yalta Conference of Türkiye’s reluctance to be sided
with them during the war and voiced his continued distain of
Türkiye’s control over the Straits. Not surprisingly, a few weeks
later from the conference, the Soviets declared they would not
renew the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1925 unless the
parties came together and solved their problems bilaterally. In
June 1945, Molotov disclosed details of the Soviet intentions on
Türkiye, stating the borders between the two countries must be
changed, the Soviets needed bases, and the Montreux Treaty must
be redesigned to meet Russian interests. Again, to drum up support
247
for the Soviet’s proposed policies, the Soviet media revamped its
anti-Turkish campaign accusing Türkiye of being an opportunist,
failing to declare war when the Allies needed the country most
and instead helped Germany. Georgia and Armenia as the puppet
states of the Soviet Russia joined in on the campaign soon after
(Kuniholm, 1980: 40-42; Weisband, 1973: 197-198)
Despite Moscow’s mounting pressure on Türkiye to
renegotiate the Straits, Britain and the USA refrained from
getting involved in this issue until the beginning of the Cold War.
Although the Western countries gradually tilted their policies in
favor of Türkiye, the Soviet Union did not change their stance
until the death of Stalin and the start of Khrushchev’s presidency
in 1953.
The Cold War Episode: Neighbors at Different Camps

The Truman Doctrine in March 1947 represented a critical
turning point for Türkiye. Thanks to the doctrine, Türkiye now had
become part of the Western world, while at the same time radically
separating from the Soviets. During the Cold War, Türkiye was
shielded from the Soviet Union after becoming a member of key
Western clubs such as the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO
in 1952. Alongside of this, Ankara adapted its domestic and
international policies to align with the general patterns required
from any member of the Western camp. Despite the rise of the
Cyprus problem after the second half of the 1950s, the Johnson
letter, the Cuban missile crisis, the Optimum issue, the Cyprus
War in 1974, and the American military embargo on Türkiye,
at no point did the Turks consider leaving the camp. Instead,
Türkiye always defended Western interests in all organizations
including the Bandung conference and took a leading role in the
establishments of the Balkan and the Baghdad pacts in the region
(Çalış, 2017, 71-132).
Indeed, after 1946, Ankara’s growing relations with the West
hindered developing closer relations between the two countries.
Some Soviet diplomats began complaining about Türkiye’s
Western connections. When Türkiye became a NATO member,
Moscow declared it how it confirmed and demonstrated “an
aspiration on the part of the imperialist states to utilize Turkish
territory for the establishment on the USSR frontiers of military
248
bases for aggressive purposes” (Çalış, 2017: 107-108; Scot, 2001:

629; Kurban, 2014: 258).
Following the death of Stalin, as previously discussed in
this section, the outlook of the Soviet Union towards Türkiye
gradually changed with the start of détente. In May 1953, President
Khrushchev attempted to start a new rapprochement and Molotov
now declared that they would give up any territorial claims on
Türkiye including demands on the Straits and the insistence of
Türkiye’s withdrawal from NATO and any other organization as a
condition for developing relations in any field. Türkiye interpreted
these declarations as a mere show of goodwill and did not give
up its reservations about the Soviets. The Soviets in fact did not
change their position completely towards Türkiye. For instance,
the establishment of the Baghdad Pact led Moscow to accuse
Türkiye of making plans to invade Syria and Iraq to appease the
West. The Lebanon Crisis and the installation of American bases
and missiles in Türkiye further deteriorated relations between the
two neighbors (Çalış, 2017: 107-117).
Towards the end of the 1950s, the impact of détente for
Türkiye became much more visible with the re-emergence of the
Cyprus crisis. The Menderes government signed a trade agreement
with the Soviet Union and Poland, announcing the possibility of
an official visit to Moscow. However, the military coup in May
1960, and subsequent events such as the Cuban missile crisis, the
removal of Jupiter missiles from Türkiye, and the U-2 incidence
prevented any high-level visit until former Prime Minister
Süleyman Demirel in September 1967 (Armaoğlu, 2002: 735;
Best et all, 2012: 301-302). Demirel’s visit indicated a new-multi-
dimensional understanding of foreign policy which was a direct
result of Türkiye’s isolation by the Western countries in the Cyprus
crisis in the 1960s. Although both countries kept ideological
beliefs intact, they nevertheless came together, shared opinions
with each other on international politics, and made agreements
to develop economic relations. Thanks to Soviet investments,
training, technical and educational assistances, Türkiye built iron
and steel plants in İskenderun, aluminium factory in Seydişehir,
oil refinery in Aliağa and sulphur acid factory in Bandırma within
ten years after 1967 (Gençalp, 2014: 327).
In the same period, Cevdet Sunay, as the first president,
visited the Soviet Union in 1969. This was followed by a visit
249
of Alexei N. Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, upon

the invitation of Demirel in order to attend the opening of the
İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory in December 1975. Despite
some problems, including the Soviet support of Greek Cypriots,
the cooperation continued after Bülent Ecevit. During his visit to
the Soviet Union in June 1978, Ecevit met the Secretary General of
the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev resulting in an important
agreement “Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” for
more economic cooperation (Gençalp, 2014: 330-341; Tellal,
2000: 332-343).
However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets caused a
new tension and stirred up painful memories in Türkiye about the
Russians. Beside of this, the Ecevit government was replaced by
Demirel which was supported by an anti-communist, nationalist
and conservative party bloc. Many millions in Türkiye protested
the Soviet invasion and began supporting Afghan Mujahideen in
their fight against communists. Domestically, Türkiye also faced
political problems and entered a period of terror by paramilitary
groups who fought and killed each other in the streets. Using the
domestic problems as an excuse, the pro-NATO Turkish army
staged another coup and did not allow any political parties to be
established until the election of 1983 (Tellal, 2000: 348). The
anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and anti-leftist policies of the military
worsened relations, because the Soviets in return called the coup
makers fascist dictators.
However, the Soviet Union also experienced domestic
problems after the death of Brezhnev in 1982, followed by the
consecutive deaths of Yuri Andropov in 1984 and Konstantin
Chernenko in 1985 as presidents, creating a power vacuum in
Moscow until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. His
perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (openness) policies were
also unable to save the Soviet Union from disintegration, but they
did manage to slow the process down. Until the disintegration,
Gorbachev tried developing friendly and peaceful relations
with the rest of the world including Türkiye. He also decided to
withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This radical change
in the Soviet policies also affected and improved relations with
Türkiye (Çalış, 2017: 192-193; Oran, II, 2001: 158-161).
This change coincided with a political change in Türkiye. In
1983, Turgut Özal came to power. Özal was a pragmatic leader,
250
who initiated export-oriented policies in accordance with his liberal

philosophy. Strategically Özal attempted to change Türkiye’s
foreign policy understanding that had been dominated by security
concerns as well. He was open to the idea for developing trade
with any country including the Soviet Union. Yet until Gorbachev,
hard-liners in Moscow did not approach Özal sympathetically,
accusing him of being a fascist and dictator who took orders from
generals. They also condemned Özal’s recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, since Moscow believed
that this would result in the incorporation of Cyprus into NATO.
When Gorbachev was elected president in 1985, the language of
diplomacy began to change and the substance of the relations with
Türkiye improved gradually. Both Gorbachev and Özal sought
economic cooperation rather than competition in international
relations. Özal visited Moscow in July 1986 and signed several
agreements for cooperation in commercial, technological and
scientific fields. Gorbachev also agreed on financing Ankara’s
hydroelectric plants in Türkiye. In return, Türkiye bought natural
gas and employed more Turkish contractors in the Soviet Union.
Özal’s relations with Gorbachev also bore fruits in the political
field. In March 1991 for example, they came together to sign
a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which had
remained untouched since 1950s. Unfortunately, this agreement
was never put into practice with the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991. On December 25, 1991 Gorbachev resigned, and all
other republics of the Union declared their independence, most
however indicating a willingness to form a Commonwealth of
Independent States. Boris Yeltsin became the new leader of the
Russian Federation (RF), as the heir of the Soviet Union (Oran,
2001, II, 161-166, 372-379; Çalış, 2017: 192-193; Tuncer, 2016:
51).
Relations after the Russian Federation

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara
quickly adapted to the new circumstances and recognized the
independence of new states established after the Soviet Union
including the Russian Federation (RF). In 1992 Foreign Minister
Hikmet Çetin and Prime Minister Demirel went to Russia and
Demirel returned to Türkiye with “the Treaty on the Principles
of Relations Between the Republic of Türkiye and the Russian
251
Federation,” which established the foundations of the two

countries current relations. President Boris Yeltsin later that year
participated in the Istanbul Summit of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (Oran, 2001, II: 546-550).
During this period however, there were two significant
problems that hindered relations: the rise of pan-Turkist and
Islamist movements in Türkiye and the emergence of new Turkic
states in the Central Asia and Caucasus following the dissolution
of the Soviet Union which awakened nationalist and religious
feelings towards the Turkic world. Türkiye felt responsible to
lead the newly emerged states and integrate them into the new
world order. The West also encouraged Türkiye to serve as a role
model of a secular state against the rival religious models of Iran
and Saudi Arabia. Turkish politicians such as Necmettin Erbakan,
Alparlan Türkeş, Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel took a
leading role in developing strong and intimate relations with
these newly emerged states, countries and communities all over
the world. Özal declared the twenty first century as a century of
the Turks, while Demirel believed in the rise of “a Great Turkish
World from the Sea of Adriatic to the China Wall.” Türkiye used
soft power instruments such as “the Great Student Exchange
Program” projects of Demirel which aimed at providing higher
education in Turkish universities for more than ten thousand
students from Turkic states. TİKA (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma
Ajansı) also led many economic, social and cultural projects to
support the development of these countries and communities, and
to sustain their independence (Oran, 2001: 543-546; Altunışık,
2017: 161-180).
The Russian Federation watched with unease what was
happening in the region and followed Türkiye with great concern.
Some neo-Euro-Asian intellectuals and politicians such as
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Aleksandr Dugin harshly criticized
Türkiye. The ideas of Zhirinovsky, for instance, illustrate the
meaning of ontological concern some Russians have towards the
Turks (Service, 1998: 184-185). However, the RF did not want to
create any official problems in their relations so refrained from
saying anything directly. Instead, the RF used Türkiye’s relations
with the Turkic world and the connections of some of its citizens
with Islamic groups fighting in the Chechen war as an excuse
for their support of the PKK. Some politicians, such as Deputy
Minister Samsurov Yart, participated in a conference which was
252
organized jointly by the RF Ministry of National and Regional

Policy and PKK’s mouthpiece Kurdistan Information Office in
Moscow in February 1994. Despite Türkiye’s objections, the RF
allowed the so-called Kurdish Parliament to hold a meeting in the
Russian Duma (Çelikpala, 2007: 274).
Foreign policy strains continued until the change of
leadership in both countries at the beginning of 2000s. In
Russia Vladimir Putin took power from Boris Yeltsin in 2000.
Türkiye also experienced a change in power when the Justice and
Development Party (AK Parti) won elections in November 2002.
In March 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister
who strongly believed in developing closer relations with the RF.
When the two leaders first met in Moscow, Erdoğan discussed
the blue-stream project, producing attack helicopters, financial
cooperation, trade and commerce, and anti-terrorism (Milliyet,
25.12.2002). Later in December 2004, Putin came to Ankara,
representing the first Russian president to visit Türkiye in 32
years. It was indeed a turning point in the history of cooperation
between Russia and Türkiye. During the visit, Putin signed with
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was the Turkish president at that
time, “A Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship
and Multidimensional Partnership” stressing the advancement
of their bilateral relations to a “multidimensional partnership”.
Putin declared that the two countries shared similar opinions on
many issues including Iraq, Caucasus, Middle East and terrorism
(Özbay, 2011: 76; Çelikpala, 2007: 281-282; Erşen, 2011: 103).
However, the relationship between the two countries since
then has been tested several times and come to often critical
junctures such as the shutdown of a Russian aircraft in 2015 and
the assignation of the Russian Ambassador in Ankara in 2016.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will analyze current issues,
cooperation and conflict areas which have deeply affected Russia-
Türkiye relations.
Current Issues, Cooperation Points and Conflict Areas

The Cyprus Issue: From the inception of the issue, Russia has
supported the Greek Cypriots for historical, cultural and religious
reasons. Furthermore, the Soviets had a strong connection with
the Greek leftist movements during the Cold War which further
253
cemented a pro-Greek understanding. Soviet foreign policy also

did not support the idea of the Republic of Cyprus taking part in
the Western block (Kamel, 2014: 205). However, when Türkiye
reacted to the Johnson letter concerning the Cyprus problem, a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union began in the second half of
the 1960s, as we have touched upon in the previous pages. During
this process, the Soviets did not reject Türkiye’s first operation to
save the Turkish Cypriots from a massacre in 1974. However, they
reacted to the second one, protesting Türkiye’s further operations
in the Island (Tellal, 2000: 320-343; Gençalp, 2014: 341).
The Soviets also found it unacceptable when the Turkish
Cypriots declared independence in 1983. The Turkish military
coup in 1980 did not help, but furthered tensions with Russia,
as the Greek side deepened their relations with the Russians
including security and defense. In addition, the Greek Cypriots
made an agreement with the RF for the acquisition of the Russian
S-300 missiles in December 1996 (Celikpala, 2009: 277; Ozbay,
2014: 47). Then in 2004, Russia vetoed the Annan Report on
Cyprus in the UN Security Council which Türkiye as well as the
Turkish Cypriots supported since it sought to find a solution to the
problem.
In sum, while Türkiye’s relations with Russia have grown,
the Russian position on the Cyprus issue remains a contentious
issue that has remained unchanged since it first arose in the
1950s. Russia continues to support the Greek Cypriots against the
thesis and policies of the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye including
maritime zone disputes.
Central Asia and Caucasus: The demise of the Soviet
Union and the rise of the Turkic republics in the Central Asia
and Caucasus region created problems related to economic
competition and ideological rivalry in the region. The RF seeks to
remain influential in the region, however views Türkiye as a threat
since it has succeeded to develop influence and closer relations
with the Turkic republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus
region. Therefore, the RF wants to avoid Türkiye as becoming
“a big brother” or new “rival” to take over Russia’s role in the
region (Büyükakıncı, 2004: 17). Therefore, any initiative made by
Türkiye towards the independent Turkic states and Muslims and
Turkic communities within and outside of the Russian Federation
has remained closely monitored.
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As an export-oriented country, Türkiye aims to increase its

economic policies and trade with the Central Asia and Caucasus
region. As of the end of 2021, however, Türkiye’s to the five Turkic
states has reached just over 7 billion US dollars (Kazakhstan
1.28 billion dollars; Azerbaijan 2.34 billion; Uzbekistan 1.84
billion; Turkmenistan 984 million and Kyrgyzstan 749 million
(Turkish Statistical Institute/TUIK, 2022). To counter Türkiye’s
efforts, Putin started a very aggressive economic policy towards
the same countries when first coming into power. He also
intensified political and military cooperation in the region. The
RF for example, opened in 2003, a military base in Kyrgyzstan.
In 2015, the RF took a leading role in establishing the Euro-Asian
Economic Union (EAEU) as a Russian project, aiming to integrate
economies of the old Soviet republics. After coming into power,
Putin began visiting these countries and signed agreements which
helped Russia to keep them under control. In return, the leaders
of the region have become very sensitive to Moscow who have
paid great respect to Putin. To illustrate a recent example, Kasım
Cömert Tokayev, the new president of Kazakhstan, made his
first foreign visit to Moscow in April 2019, declaring the aim to
increase relations with the RF. This example highlights a policy
pattern that many other countries in the region are following. The
Turkic leaders of the region, in a similar manner, have been careful
not to irritate the RF when establishing any relation with Türkiye.
On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine has the potential to
change their attitudes towards Russia, despite the fact that Putin
sent troops to Kazakhstan to empower Tokayev in 2022 to take
the control of public demonstrations in the country.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Problems:
Another contentious issue is about Armenians, which has
negatively affected Türkiye’s relations with Russia since the
Ottoman Empire. Although the historical roots of the problem
have already been noted, it is worth discussing the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict in more detail at this point. The region of
Nagorno-Karabakh came under Russian control after the Ottoman
Empire collapsed at the end of World War I. However, the Soviets
provided the region autonomy in 1923 and attached it to the
Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Russia also supported Armenian
migration to the region and this policy changed its demographic
composition in favor of Armenians, a population that had
previously been dominated by Azeris of Turkic descent. Prior to the
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demise of the Soviet Union, the Armenians requested the region

of Nagorno-Karabakh be attached to the Republic of Armenia in
1987, but the request was rejected on the grounds that the borders
of the Soviet Republics could not be changed. Following this
rejection, Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast (district)
unilaterally took a decision to unite with the Republic of Armenia
and this decision was endorsed by the Armenian Parliament in
December 1989. This unilateral declaration started a war in the
region between the Turkish Azeris and Armenians. To make
the situation worse, the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers
committed a massacre against the Azeris in Khojaly (Hocali) in
February 1992. As a result of this conflict, more than one million
Azeri had to migrate from their homeland mostly to Azerbaijan.
Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and Armenia supported the
Armenians and the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh troops occupied
seven nearby provinces belonging to the Azeris until May 1994,
when a ceasefire was declared by the Minsk group which was
established by the OSCE to solve this problem in March 1992
(Kamel, 2014: 193).
In response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara
has criticized the involvement of Armenia and Russia. Also,
Turkish people from all segments of society have organized
demonstrations in favor of the “Azeri brothers”. The new
Russian Federation which openly supported the Armenians, are
not content with this kind of declarations and demonstrations,
and they reject accusations of any involvement in the killings and
massacres. At this critical stage, Heydar Aliyev, the father of the
current president, İlham Aliyev, returned to power in place of the
pro-Turkish and anti-Russian Ebulfeyz Elchibey in Azerbaijan
with the support of the Russians. Aliyev had been known as one
of the most influential men of the communist era, therefore it is
unsurprising that he has kept strong connections with the RF as
well. In the eyes of the Turks, this involvement from the side of
the RF has demonstrated that traditional Russian policy towards
the Turks remains the same as it was in the past. Nevertheless,
Aliyev as an experienced politician was able to manage both of
Türkiye and Russia in order to reduce growing tension in the
region (Celikpala, 2009: 273; Yapıcı, 2014: 130).
Until 2021 no progress was made on the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue mainly because none of the parties changed their positions
essentially, despite some minor border clashes between Armenia
256
and Azerbaijan. However, the Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan

territories on 27 September 2020 sparked another war in the
region. On the same day, Azerbaijan declared a martial law in order
to respond it and on 14 October Azerbaijani army began fighting
back to save all the occupied territories from Armenia. During
the war, Russia and Türkiye had closely followed developments
while keeping their previous positions on the support of warring
factions unchanged essentially. Ankara supported Azerbaijanis
with all means including providing military equipment such as
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and unmanned combat air vehicle
(UCAV). It is believed that this military support greatly helped
Azerbaijan to win this war which was lasted for 44 days. Ankara
also played its role in diplomacy to keep Russia not making
interventions to the side of Armenia despite the fact that at the
beginning of the war Russian Foreign Ministry had declared to
provide “all necessary assistance” to Armenia if the war spilled
over into Armenian territory since Erivan is a member of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. The fact that the UN’s
thought about the rights of Azerbaijan in the region were usurped
by Armenia according to international law prevented the global
and regional actors from intervening in this conflict. Mainly due
to the Türkiye’s position, Russia did not directly intervene in the
war which was ended on 10 November with an interim peace deal
under the patronage of Russia. Accordingly, Armenia accepted
to leave all occupied Azerbaijan territories except for Nagorno-
Karabakh region, with Russian peacekeepers guaranteeing
safe passage through the region of Lachin (Semercioğlu, 2021:
58). Since then, the future of the peace in the region is not yet
clear enough to reach for a final peace agreement. However,
it is still possible to say that the positions of both Türkiye and
Russia remain essentially unchanged in the region. As Türkiye is
developing stronger relations with Azerbaijan, Russia keeps its
pro-Armenian stance in diplomacy at the least.
Chechnya, Georgia and Other Conflicts in the Caucasus: The
military intervention of the RF in Chechnya has been another hard
issue affecting relations between Russia and Türkiye since the end
of the Cold War. When Chechnya declared independence in 1991,
as discussed in Chapter 6 in detail, the RF launched a massive
and brutal military operation against the Chechnyan nationalists
in December 1994 (Kamel: 183-185). Moscow believed that if the
movement was not suppressed, it would create a “bad example”
257
for other ethnic minorities waiting for separation from “mother

Russia”, and this would jeopardize its national unity and security.
Moscow was aware of the strategic importance of the Caucasus
not only for military, but also for the security of energy resources
and supplies. Additionally, the RF deployed its 58th Army in the
region in June 1995 that violated openly the Conventional Armed
Forces Agreement (CAFA). Until 2007, when Putin appointed
Ramzan Kadyrov as the president of Chechnya, the conflict caused
many casualties, including Chahar Dudayev, Aslan Mashadov and
Ahmad Hadji Kadyrov, the father of Ramzan Kadyrov, the current
president. When other problems related to the countries and peoples
of the region such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia were
added to the Chechnyan and Armenian conflicts, the RF became
more critical about Türkiye’s policies towards the region (Uyar,
2018: 296-304; Kanbolat, 2001: 167-169; Kamel, 2014: 186-197).
In the case of Georgia, it has the right to follow an independent
foreign policy, and to establish any kind of relations free from
the intervention of any country. The Republic of Geogia has
found Türkiye supportive of its effort and transition to a liberal
economic and political system, encouraging its integration with
the Euro-Atlantic institutions and organisations including the
European Union and NATO. In addition to economic and political
partnerships, Georgia is of an exceptional importance to Türkiye’s
energy security, since it is located in the route of Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan natural gas pipeline. Therefore, not only the Georgians but
also the Turks have been very sensitive to any intervention from
the Russian side to the region. NATO and the EU’s involvements
in Georgia has likewise closely been followed by the RF with great
concern (Yılmaz and Yakşi, 2016: 38) not less than in the other
cases.
The Annexation of Crimea and the Occupation of Ukraine: As
a peninsula on the Northern coast of the Black Sea, Crimea which
is legally an autonomous republic of Ukraine, is another point of
conflict with the Russians. In the 13th century, Crimea was a part
of the Golden Horde and two hundred years later the Crimean
Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th
century. The Russians invaded it in 1783 and took over control.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimea became
an autonomous republic attached to Ukraine on the condition that
the RF Black Sea Fleet continue using Crimea’s port of Sevastopol
as a base.
258
After the turmoil and chaotic events, which started in 2013,

the Russian troops once again invaded Crimea. In March 2014,
The RF annexed the Crimea, following a referendum only the
Russians in Ukraine participated in and voted in favor of the
Crimea joining “mother Russia”. Although the international
community rejected the referendum, and some countries decided
to impose sanctions on Russia, Moscow did not step back from
the annexation. However, for the security of the Black Sea, the
autonomous Crimea attached to Ukraine created a new status
quo that favored Türkiye, therefore its annexation by the RF
destroyed the strategic equilibrium and made the RF a hegemonic
power in the Black Sea. Immediately after the referendum,
Türkiye protested Moscow’s decision with the support of public
demonstrations both inside and outside of Türkiye. The problem
of Crimea still carries a great potential of future conflicts for
the region and runs the risk of ruining the recent rapprochement
between the two countries (Aktürk, 2016: 2).
Despite the fact that Türkiye does not change its Crimean
policy concerning the Russian annexation, the war on Ukraine
which was started by Russia on 24 February 2022 puts Türkiye’s
relations with Moscow in a more fragile position. As a NATO
country Türkiye tries hard to comply with the embargo policies
of the western world against Russia, Erdoğan’s government has
so far succceded in neutrality policy in this war while keeping
relations with both of the warring countries. On one hand,
Ankara has applied the Montreux convention on the passage of
warships against Russia but on the other it has not yet stopped
selling unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and unmanned combat air
vehicle (UCAV) to Ukraine, despite of Russian discontents.
However, Türkiye still has closer relations with Russia and has
not yet joined most of some embargo decisions including closing
airspace to the Russians and natural gas pipelines from Russia.
Türkiye officially follows a policy of balancing between Kiev and
Moscow, but Erdoğan’s recent declarations have more pro-Putin
ingredients. In addition, Erdoğan’s direct personal contacts with
Putin can be justified with the hope that Ankara plays a peace-
maker role in this war. However, Türkiye’s anti-western and anti-
NATO discourses continued without any change as Erdoğan’s
declarations concerning the enlargement of NATO demonstrate
it particularly. On the membership applications of Sweden and
Finland, Türkiye’s reactions which are essentially related to the
259
terrorism policies of the Nordic countries have the potential

to further question Türkiye’s credentials in the NATO if not
managed successfully. The coming days will show whether this
policy produces a result that is in line with Türkiye’s economic
and political expectations from Russia. However, there is no
doubt that Putin must have been very pleased with this policy in
the short run.
Problems in Syria: Since the start of the Syrian crisis in
2011, it remains one of the most critical issues affecting relations
between the RF and Türkiye. Both countries share different
historical connections with Syria. After the end of the Ottoman
Empire, France occupied Syria and established a mandate regime
in Damascus soon after the First World War. The question of
Syria’s borders therefore remained unsolved until 1938 when
Hatay (Alexandretta) decided to join Türkiye with the help
and pressure of Ankara. The Syrian nationalists however never
accepted this unification. After the Baath Party came to power, the
Hatay region became a hot issue between Ankara and Damascus.
Yet, the Soviets took advantage of Syria’s estranged
relationship with Türkiye and extended a powerful hand to the
Baathist Hafez Assad (the father of Bashar) who preferred a pro-
Soviet policy in the region in return. In addition, the Syrian army
was designated and donated by the Soviets. Following the Soviets,
Hafez also supported the PKK and its terrorist activities against
Türkiye. Scarcity of water in the region created another point of
conflict between Türkiye and Syria, and the Soviets continued to
support the Hafez Assad regime on this subject as well.
Later, when Bashar Assad became his father’s successor,
he attempted to improve policies between Syria and Türkiye.
However, the start of the Syrian uprising created a rift between
Türkiye and Syria, causing Bashar Assad to once again shift
Syria’s allegiance towards Russia. Assad and Putin became close
allies in the region when Moscow unconditionally supported the
current Syrian regime and rejected any solution without Bashar
Assad. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Türkiye from joining
the RF and Iran in seeking to find a sustainable solution at the
Astana Accord made in 2017.
Additionally, two major incidents related to the Syrian crisis
has worsened relations between Moscow and Ankara. The first
one was related to the destruction of the Turkish Air Force F-4 in
260
June 2012 and the bombs that killed five civilians dropped by the
Assad forces in October 2012 in the Akçakale district of Şanlıurfa
(Milliyet, 2012). Türkiye reacted by protesting the involvement
of both Syria and Russia in these bombings and tightened up
“the rules of engagement” for its security on its borders (Yeltin
and Işık, 2017: 43-44). There have been many other incidents
where Türkiye’s air space has been violated by the Syrian and
Russian forces that claim they are fighting against the terrorist
groups of the DAESH/ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).
However, Ankara knew Syria and Russia were more concerned
about attacking anti-Assad forces than ISIS, observed in Assad’s
attack of anti-Assad Turcoman civilians living in the Bayırbucak
area next to the borders of Türkiye. Despite Türkiye’s warnings,
the Russian and Syrian forces have ignored the Turkish “rules of
engagement” further aggravating their conflict with Türkiye.
The second major incident which caused tension with
Moscow, was the Russian warplane that was shot down in
November 2015, that violated several times the Turkish air space,
despite warnings. Vladimir Putin called the incident a “stab in the
back” and responded promptly by a group of sanctions against
Türkiye including imports, building contracts, chartered flights,
holiday packages, and visa-free travel. He also instructed tighter
control over Turkish air carriers in Russia (The New York Times,
28 November 2015). In addition, Russia also made some other
changes in his policies towards Türkiye, such as intensifying
bombings on Turcoman groups, introducing a pro-Armenian
bill to not deny the 1915 events as genocide, supporting pro-
PKK Kurdish organizations like YPG, PYD and SDG in Syria,
deploying more S-300F missiles positioned off Latakia, breaking
off all military communications and any contact with the Turkish
side, and even blaming Türkiye of trading oil with the ISIS
militants.
Despite these huge problems and growing tensions, Türkiye
and Russia were able to come together and solve their problems
and misunderstandings with the start of Astana Process in 2017.
The presidents of both countries have played a large role in
restoring their relations. The first step was initiated by President
Erdoğan with a diplomatic letter directly to President Putin in
June 2016, expressing sympathy and “deep condolences” to the
Russian family of the victims who died after the shutdown of the
Russian aircraft in 2015. After the July 15th coup attempt by the
261
FETO terrorist organization, Al-Jazeera reported from Erdoğan

that the two pilots who shut down the aircraft were arrested on
suspicion that they had links to the FETO as a further gesture of
goodwill towards Russia (Al-Jazeera, 2016).
Understanding Türkiye’s position, Putin also has played a
positive role in attempting to restore relations and eventually lifted
most of the sanctions related to the aircraft incident. Although
many serious problems left unsolved in Syria, the Astana process
has proven effective in restoring cooperation between Türkiye
and Russia along with Iran.
S400s, Military Technology and Scientific Co-Operation:
One significant point of cooperation between Russia and
Türkiye, has been Türkiye’s purchase of the S-400 Long Range
Air Defense Missiles from the Russian Federation. The contract
made in 2017 states a total of two S-400 systems (one is optional)
will be supplied from Russia, starting with the delivery of its first
part in the first quarter of 2020. In addition to the missiles, Russia
has agreed to transfer technology and make scientific cooperation
on the subject matter (TRT Haber, 2017). This agreement
however has caused some unease for the USA, who think that
the Russian missile system is incompatible technologically and
with the interests of Türkiye and its NATO allies. However,
Türkiye asserts that it needs the S-400 Russian missiles and the
Patriots missiles from the USA to have an effective and deterrent
defense system in the fragile region. Initially, Türkiye sought the
Patriot missiles from the USA on many occasions, however the
US government failed to offer Türkiye any substantial offer as an
ally. Therefore, Türkiye decided to move forward with the S-400
deal. The subject of F-35 fighter jets further complicates the
issue, and instead of persuading Ankara to go along with the USA
and NATO allies, critics of Türkiye have had the reverse effect
of pushing Ankara towards Moscow. President Erdogan believes
that “Türkiye’s purchase of S-400 missile defense system from
Russia has ‘nothing to do’ with NATO, F-35 fighter jets or
security of the US. Hopefully, we will deal with this issue with
common sense, logic and interests, the same way we dealt with
issues in the past” (TRT World, 2019). At this point, it is possible,
however, to say that the S-400s will be continue to remain a hot
issue, testing relations not only with the US but also with the RF
in the upcoming days.
262
Economic Relations, Foreign Trade, Investments and

Tourism: The policy of establishing a high level of economic
partnership began well before the end of the Cold war. Already
in the 1960s, as previously discussed, Demirel and Özal sought to
expand economic development with the Soviets until its demise
in 1991. After the Cold War, the new Russian Federation declared
in 1992 that it accepted all agreements previously made and
signed in “the Agreement on the Principles of Relations Between
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Türkiye”. Following
this agreement, The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was
established and since then, foreign trade between these two
countries has increased at an unprecedented speed from about 1.5
billion US dollars in 1992 to over 32 billion in 2021, as is shown
in the table 8.1.
Table 8.1:
Türkiye’s Foreign Trade with the RF (1992-2021) as of $
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT BALANCE
1992 441.886.236 1.040.816.301 -598.930.065
1993 504.665.010 1.542.329.837 -1.037.664.827
1994 820.229.744 1.045.389.027 -225.159.283
1995 1.238.224.503 2.082.376.492 -844.151.989
1996 1.510.005.326 1.921.139.118 -411.133.792
1997 2.056.547.228 2.174.258.117 -117.710.889
1998 1.348.002.243 2.155.006.116 -807.003.873
1999 588.663.804 2.374.132.817 -1.785.469.013
2000 643.902.938 3.886.583.276 -3.242.680.338
2001 924.106.727 3.435.672.619 -2.511.565.892
2002 1.172.038.590 3.891.721.401 -2.719.682.811
2003 1.367.590.908 5.451.315.438 -4.083.724.530
2004 1.859.186.551 9.033.138.484 -7.173.951.933
2005 2.377.049.944 12.905.619.879 -10.528.569.935
2006 3.237.611.322 17.806.238.758 -14.568.627.436
2007 4.726.853.152 23.508.494.288 -18.781.641.136
2008 6.483.003.596 31.364.476.862 -24.881.473.266
2009 3.189.607.392 19.450.085.570 -16.260.478.178
2010 4.628.152.963 21.600.641.439 -16.972.488.476
2011 5.992.633.393 23.952.914.321 -17.960.280.928
2012 6.680.777.245 26.625.286.056 -19.944.508.811
263
2013 6.964.209.480 25.064.213.832 -18.100.004.352

2014 5.943.014.110 25.288.597.271 -19.345.583.161
2015 3.588.330.986 20.401.756.568 -16.813.425.582
2016 1.733.218.007 15.160.962.297 -13.427.744.290
2017 2.734.315.893 19.514.093.954 -16.779.778.061
2018 3.401.194.206 21.989.776.017 -18.588.581.811
2019 3.852.993.806 22.453.026.441 -18.600.032.635
2020 4.164.184.889 17.086.212.040 -13.922.027.151
2021 5.289.848.440 27.598.784.620 -22.308.936.180
Source: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul, (23.06.2022)
As Table 8.1 reveals, foreign trade works in favor of Russia.

The reason behind the deficit of trade comes from Türkiye’s
need for energy, mostly dependent on Russian natural gas. The
consumption of gas, which was only 3 billion m3 in 1990, reached
approximately 60 billion m3 in 2017 and increased by 20 times
within 31 years (Yardımcı, 2011: 160-161; Republic of Türkiye
Energy Market Regulatory Authority/EPDK, 2022). Looking
only at the numbers of foreign trade is misleading. To understand
the RF and Türkiye economic relations as a whole, it is important
to take into consideration a range of other factors. In addition to
foreign trade for example, there are many Turkish companies
in Russia with a large share of the contracts and investment of
money in several sectors with a considerable amount of turnover.
As of 2019, the number of Turkish companies exceeded 1500 in
total that invested more than 10 billion US dollars in this country.
Turkish contracting firms have also completed 1,946 projects
worth approximately 68 billion US dollars in the RF (Turkish
Embassy in Moscow, 2019). Also, the numbers of Russian
tourists who visited Türkiye increased from 477 thousand to over
7 million in 19 years from 2000 to 2019 as it is shown in Graphic
8.2. Despite the temporary drop in the numbers of the tourists
in 2015 and 2016, because of the aircraft crisis in November
2015 and Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, Türkiye has had a steady
flow of visitors from Russia since the end of the Cold War.
Russian visitors and Turkish companies have caused historically
conditioned stereotype images concerning both of these nations to
change and forced their leaders to think twice before making any
drastic political decision.
264
Graphic 8.1
Tourist Numbers (2000-2021)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Source: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/turizmapp/sinir.zul?, (23.06.2022)
Conclusions
Relations between Russia and Türkiye goes back to the rise
of the Russians as a distinct ethnic community. When the Russians
began appearing in history, Turkic peoples dominated Euro-Asian
steppes. The first and most important reason behind the historical
Russian policies towards Turks was because of their dominance
in the region. Another important reason is related to their religious
identities. For many centuries, this difference was used to justify
the wars taking place between the two nations. Russia’s relations
with the Ottomans was mostly characterized by conflicts and
wars, simply because the Ottomans created a barrier on the way
of expanding towards the South, reaching warm waters, reviving
Byzantium in Istanbul, and realizing a greater unity among Slavic
peoples. Then, Russia caused the destabilization of the Ottomans
until the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917.
The October Revolution and the success of the Bolsheviks
in Russia coincided with the start of the National Liberation
War by the Kemalists in Türkiye. This coincidence pushed both
leaders to come together to struggle against imperialist powers.
The Soviet Union and the new Türkiye needed to demonstrate
that “they were not alone” in the world. As far as the Bolsheviks
were concerned, they expected something from the Kemalists
ideologically, but they established cooperation between the two
states at the beginning of 1920s and the Bolsheviks supported
265
the Kemalists financially and militarily. Although they had some

problems in practice, the historical understanding which was
based on anti-imperialist coalition would help both countries to
sustain peaceful relations with each other for a decade up to the
second half of the 1930s.
The Soviet Union’s relations with Türkiye deteriorated for
several reasons. First, Türkiye’s relations with Britain and its
membership in the League of Nations was perceived by Russia as
Türkiye’s waltz with the imperialist system and powers. Second,
the Montreux Treaty did not please the Soviets since they wanted
to set up a common system which would be established by the
Black Sea states to deal with the defense of the Straits. The
Soviets accused Türkiye of “playing the game” of the imperialist
powers. They also demanded in the conference to be given full
freedom to cross their ships across the Straits for coastal states
and to limit the passage of non-coastal states as far as possible.
The third reason was the Tripartite Agreement between Türkiye,
Britain and France just before the start of the Second World War.
Fourth reason was related to Türkiye’s wartime policies including
its neutrality, relations with Germany and letting pan-Turkist
circles attempt some anti-Soviet activities.
During the Cold War, the relations between the Soviet Union
and Türkiye had many highs and lows. No doubt, the Soviet
Union’s imperial attitude hindered these relations. Secondly,
ideological approaches from both sides shaped their foreign
policies and this caused conflicts between them. In a bipolar
international system, Türkiye chose the liberal western side,
participated in all western organizations including NATO, and
became a staunch ally of the USA. The Soviet Union regarded
western organizations as a threat, who conspired against its own
existence, and the US was perceived of as their arch enemy. In
the second half of the 1960s, when the Cyprus issue became a
point of conflict with the West, particularly the USA, Türkiye
was left alone in international affairs. After the Cyprus issue and
the Johnson letter, Türkiye attempted to follow a more multi-
dimensional foreign policy and approached the Soviet Union to
develop particularly economic relations.
Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize the new
Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and with whom it started economic relations. Political and
266
economic instabilities of both nations and the region left behind

by the Soviet Union however hindered the progress until the
beginning of 2000s, when Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan in Türkiye came to power. Since then, they have
faced problems, but they have solved them, as much as possible,
through leadership and summit diplomacy, and by focusing on
issues that mutually benefit both nations.
267
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270
CONTRIBUTORS
ŞABAN HALİS ÇALIŞ received his BA from Ankara University
Faculty of Political Sciences in 1986. He obtained his MA
degree from Reading University (UK). He completed his Ph.D.
at the University of Nottingham (UK) in 1996. Presently, he is
a professor in the International Relations Department at Selçuk
University in Konya, Türkiye. In addition to many papers which
have appeared in such journals as Mediterranean Quarterly,
Central Asian Survey, Turkish Studies, and Perceptions, he is the
author of Türkiye-AB İlişkileri / Turkey’s Relations with the EU,
(Nobel, 2021); Hayaletbilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler / Haunthology
and Imagined Identities (Çizgi, 2022), Turkey’s Cold War (I. B.
Tauris, 2017), and Ideas, Ideologies and Norm: Decosntructing
the Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy (Nobel, 2021). He was
Vice-President of the Turkish Higher Education Council between
2011 and 2015. He has represented Türkiye in international
organisations, including the Bologna Follow Up Group. Email:
[email protected]; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6360-
3787.
VANESSA TINKER is a lecturer at the Department of

International Relations, Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, Poland. She
holds a Ph.D. in International Conflict Analysis from the University
of Kent, United Kingdom. She has over ten years of international
experience as a researcher, teacher, trainer, coordinator and
manager of peace and conflict studies-based programs in Türkiye,
the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe. She is a specialist in
international conflict analysis, gender mainstreaming, peace
education, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation. Some of
her most recent publications relating to peace and conflict studies
include: “The Role of Education in Turkey’s Intractable Conflict
and Failed Peace Process.” In Building the Future of the State:
Tradition, Reality, Progress, edited by Joanna Marszałek-Kawa.
Toruń, Poland: Adam Marszałek Publishing House, (2021);
“Turkey-US Relations in the Context of the Syrian Conflict: From
Cooperation to Confrontation,” Przegląd Strategiczny (Strategic
Review) 13 (2020); “Peace Education as a Post-Conflict Peace-
Building Tool,” All Azimuth, 2016; and “Education for Peace:
The Politics of Adopting and Mainstreaming Peace Education
Programs in a Post-Conflict Setting (Academica Press 2015).
271
Email: [email protected]; ORCID: http://orcid.
org/0000-0003-0955-4299.
SEZGİN KAYA works as associate professor in the fields of

Russian foreign policy, international terrorism and security and
is currently a faculty member in the Department of International
Relations at Bursa Uludag University. He has also taught Strategy
and Use of Force courses at the Turkish Military Academy in the
past and has national and international publications in these fields.
E-mail: [email protected]; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0002-1535-5491.
VAKUR SÜMER is a faculty member of the Department of

International Relations, Selçuk University, Turkiye. He served
as the Director of the Eurasian Research Institute, Khoja Akhmet
Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University between 2017-
2022. He has published articles in journals including Uluslararası
İlişkiler, Water International, Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development; and he has written and edited books with
Springer, I.B. Tauris, and written numerous book chapters. His
areas of research include water issues, transboundary rivers,
environmental politics, Central Asia, and Turkey’s accession
to the European Union. Email: [email protected]; ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7015-5660.
İRFAN KAYA ÜLGER graduated from Ankara University,

Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International
Relations in 1989. He completed master’s degree in 1995 and
PhD in 2002 at the University’s Social Sciences Institute. He
received the title of associate professor in 2008 and the title of
professor in 2017. He is an expert on the European Union and
the Balkans, has 11 books at national and international level and
articles that have been scanned in many national and international
indexes. Dr. Ülger has been the head of the International Relations
Department of Kocaeli University since 2015. Email: ikulger@
gmail.com; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000- 0002-7655-155.
TARIK OĞUZLU is a professor, currently working as a faculty

member of the Department of Political Science and International
Relations and the Dean of the Faculty of Science and Literature at
272
Istanbul Aydin University. He received his Ph.D. in International
Relations at Bilkent University in 2003, and his Master of
Science in International Relations at the London School of
Economics and Political Science in 2000. He was granted the
Jean Monnet Scholarship of the European Commission in 1999.
He has academic articles published Political Science Quarterly,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and
Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler.
He is the editor and writer of many books including Kubicek,
Paul; Parlar Dal, Emel ve Tarık Oğuzlu. 2015. Turkey’s Rise as
an Emerging Power. Londra and New York: Routledge. Email:
[email protected]; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
5422-6203.
DEMET ŞEFIKA MANGIR is an associate professor in

International Relations at the Department of International
Relations of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative
Sciences, Selçuk University, Türkiye. She is the author of books,
book chapters and numerous articles published in national and
international refereed journals. She continues her research in the
fields of International Relations, Central Asia, Caucasus, Eurasia,
Human Rights and International Law. Email: demetacar@selcuk.
edu.tr; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2542-8551.
EDILIIA ABDYKADYROVA is a research assistant in the

Department of International Relations of the Faculty of Economics
and Administrative Sciences, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University,
Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, she is PhD student in the Department
of International Relations at the Selçuk University, Türkiye. She
is working on International Relations, Small States, Central Asia,
Foreign Policy. Email: [email protected];
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6049-8232.
ARIF BEHIÇ ÖZCAN received his doctorate from Selçuk

University in international relations with his thesis titled Eastern
Policies of the Ottoman Empire in the Period of Westernization
(2011). He is assistant professor of International Relations at
Selçuk University, Türkiye, and teaches Political History, Public
Diplomacy and the Middle East at undergraduate, graduate
273
and doctoral levels. Currently, his main research interests are
diplomacy, political history, Turkish Foreign Policy and the
globalization. E-mail: [email protected]; ORCID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-0215-7322.
UPAGUL RAKHMANOVA is a PhD student from Department

of International Relations, Selçuk University, Türkiye. She
holds BA from Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Kyrgyzstan
and MA from Çukurova University, Türkiye, in International
Relations. Her research interest lies in the areas of women’s right,
cybersecurity and water problems. Currently, she is working on
her PhD dissertation ‘‘Impact of Water Problems in Central Asia
on the Foreign Policy of Kyrgyzstan’’. Email: upagul@gmail.
com; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4207-8474.
HARUN SEMERCİOĞLU was born in Tekirdağ and graduated

from Turkish War College in 1991. He received a MA degree
from 9 Eylül University, Department of Labor Economics and
Industrial Relations in February 2007. He completed his PhD in
International Relations, Selçuk University in March 2020. Dr.
Semercioğlu continues his studies in academia on international
economy politics, Turkish foreign policy, international security
and leadership. He has many articles in international and national
journals, book and book chapters, conference presentations. He
works as a manager in a company, and also is a visiting professor
in Hasan Kalyoncu University. Email: [email protected];
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4732-5032.
ÇAĞLAR SÖKER is a research assistant in the Department

of International Relations at Selçuk University. He studied
International Relations as an undergraduate at Gazi University
and graduated in 2014. He received his MA Degree from Selcuk
University in 2017. He is a PhD candidate and continues his
doctoral studies at Selcuk University. Email: caglarsoker@gmail.
com; ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7162-3403
274
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Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University,

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E-mail: [email protected].
Foreign policy is a complex phenomenon that must be understood

as the outcome of many factors, many of which have roots in the
past, but are also connected to the present and the near future.
Russian foreign policy in particular illustrates this reality. The
aim of this book is to underline the four major factors that affect
Russian foreign policy. First, Russia is the state of tsars since
the Middle Ages with grandiose expectations and expansionist
policies. Second, Russia is the largest country in the world with
huge natural resources. Three, Russia still keeps its great power
status in international politics, mainly due to its nuclear weapon
capabilities. Four, Vladimir Putin, as the president of the Russian
Federation, attempts to re-construct a new Russia not far away
from that of the heritage and image of the tsars and Soviet leaders.
278

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA: FROM TSARS TO PUTIN

This edition is published by Eurasian Research Institute Almali

Phone: +7 (727) 279 97 94 Fax: +7 (727) 279 24 26

© Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this

1. The Foreign Policy of Russia:

2. Russians and Russia in World Politics:

3. Material and Ideational Foundations of Russian

4. The Making of Russian Foreign Policy 103

5. The Russian Federation’s Relations 135

6. Russia in International Organizations 163

7. Russia and Global Problems 199

8. Russia and Türkiye:

The Russian Federation is one of the great powers with the

Prof. Dr. Muhittin Şimşek

As with most academic books, this book began as a

Prof. Dr. Şaban Halis Çalış

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA:

came at a great cost. Russian leaders, otherwise referred to as

[N]ot much has significantly altered Russia’s principle

Vladimir Putin and The Rise of Neo-Tsarism

like a racist pundit as he is denying the borders, history, and even

recent invasion of Ukraine is another exemplary example of the

We visited the exhibition dedicated to the 350th birth

Therefore, to understand Russian foreign policy, it is

Russians and Russia: Society, State and Identity

At the beginning of the 20th century, it became more obvious

Material And Ideational Bases

on the part of Russian leadership, dating back to the rise of tsars.

superpower that must still be taken seriously in world politics.

Domestic Politics, Administrative Structure and

of the RF and the composition of Russian government together

the rise of Putin in politics. As for the other players of politics,

Great Power Connections

ideas and global brands, Russia is no match of the United States,

to war. Accordingly, Russia and China openly support the idea

Russia in International Organizations

Mangır and Abdykadyrova’s analysis demonstrate that

Russia and Global Problems

negotiations with the United States, has remained dependent on

Russia’s Near Abroad and Neighbourhood Policies:

related to the personal friendship and direct relations between

Arbatova, Nadezhda. (2019). “Three Faces of Russia’s Neo-

RUSSIANS AND RUSSIA

a range of security concerns, the three most important being

The Emergence of Russian Nation

formation of Russian culture and state.

Empire achieved its great power status. The Moscow State

The Formation of the Russian State

became affiliated as a metropolitan to the Byzantine Patriarchate.

turns into a giant by eating its neighbours” (Tilly, 1995: 261-266).

Modernization Movements and the Search for Identity

structure remained one of the most important problems of the

Reform processes regained speed under the reign of

The European System of States and Russia

doctrine became the guiding principle of European diplomacy,

Like her predecessor, Catherine II prioritized Russia’s

In the period following these developments, Russians

The Fall of Tsarist Russia in World Politics

solutions and incorporated them into a network of mutual agreements