Center for Preventive Action

Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder No. 10

November 2022

Climate Change
and Regional
Instability in
the Horn of Africa
Michelle D. Gavin
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CONTENTS
1 Introduction
3 Assessing the Lay of the Land: Demographic, Economic, Political,
and Environmental Conditions in the Horn
7 The Potential for Disorder
12 Consequences Beyond the Region
16 Recommendations
22 Conclusion

24 Endnotes
30 Acknowledgments
31 About the Author

Contents iii
INTRODUCTION
Climate change and climate-induced migration in the Horn of Africa
could seriously exacerbate security risks in the region. The sixth
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
reiterates the grim facts of climate change in Africa. The continent
has contributed little (less than 4 percent) to total greenhouse gas
emissions but has already suffered serious consequences, from bio-
diversity loss to reduced food production. In East Africa particularly,
drought frequency has doubled.1 Yet, between 2010 and 2018, most
Horn countries received less than the average amount of climate adap-
tation funding per capita for lower-income countries, despite rank-
ing at the top of climate vulnerability indices.2 Not only is financing
for adaptation measures insufficient, climate research in the region is
under-resourced.3
For purposes of this discussion, the Horn of Africa region includes
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia (including the internation-
ally unrecognized autonomous Republic of Somaliland), South Sudan,
and Sudan—all of the member states of the Intergovernmental Author-
ity on Development (IGAD) except for Uganda but inclusive of Eritrea,
which has a complicated and somewhat ambiguous relationship with
the subregional organization. This volatile and geostrategically signifi-
cant region is extremely vulnerable to climate change, as it encompasses
vast drylands, numerous pastoralist communities, multiple border dis-
putes, unresolved trans-boundary water-rights issues, and porous land
borders. The region also has a traumatic and politically contentious his-
tory with natural disaster, famine, and conflict, including the 1983–85
Ethiopian famine and the controversial 1992–93 humanitarian inter-
vention in Somalia. In fact, the impetus for forming IGAD in 1986

Introduction 1
 was to address drought and desertification from a regional perspective,
with peace and security issues added to the organization’s mandate in
1996 due to the obvious interconnection of those issues.4 The Horn’s
history informs and sometimes politically distorts perceptions of cur-
rent climate-related threats.
Ongoing conflicts in the region add complexity to any effort to
envision future scenarios. The Horn is not just at risk for conflict and
instability—conflict and instability are its current reality. In Ethiopia,
Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, multiple ongoing conflicts involve
violent clashes between military and militia forces. The region already
hosts nearly 2.9 million refugees and asylum seekers and over 12 mil-
lion internally displaced persons.5 The Horn is currently the site of
one of the world’s worst food insecurity crises; in August of 2022 the
number of highly food-insecure people in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Soma-
lia reached twenty-two million, and some already face famine condi-
tions.6 Although conflict and crisis prevention is at the heart of efforts
to identify interconnected climate and migration risks, for many in the
region, the present is already characterized by insecurity, and the future
by uncertainty.
Demographic, economic, political, and environmental pressures
all intersect in the Horn of Africa, driving popular unrest and resource
competition and destabilizing migration patterns that exacerbate ten-
sions within and between states. Regional disorder will have implica-
tions far beyond the Horn, affecting the politics, security, and relative
power of external actors and constraining the prospects for effective
global governance. The United States and others should act now to mit-
igate those risks.

2 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

 ASSESSING THE LAY
OF THE LAND
Demographic, Economic,
Political, and Environmental
Conditions in the Horn
The Horn of Africa, like most of the continent, is characterized by
rapidly growing and urbanizing populations (see figure 1). Many gov-
ernments strain to deliver adequate social services and infrastructure
to citizens, and those challenges, as well as the need to stimulate job
creation, will only increase over time as these populations grow. Even
without climate-induced resource scarcity, or increased competition
for resources due to migration, the region’s economies would be hard-
pressed to grow at a pace commensurate with their populations.

ECONOMIC SUCCESSES AND STAGNATION

In the last Human Development Index, four Horn countries ranked in

the bottom twenty states in the world (Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan,
and Eritrea), and Somalia was not ranked at all due to insufficient data.
The region’s two most significant economies, those of Ethiopia and
Kenya, illustrate the complexity of economic conditions in the Horn.
Widely considered an economic success story through the 2000s due
to years of impressive growth rates, Ethiopia made real strides in reduc-
ing poverty as an authoritarian development state, with the most recent
data (from 2015) showing that just under a quarter of the population
was living below the poverty line. However, growth was unequal, and
poverty severity increased for the poorest rural Ethiopians even during
the boom years.7 After two years of costly war in Tigray and several years
of drought, the World Bank expects that poverty rates have worsened,
and should the country fail to stabilize, inflationary and debt burden
pressures are likely to unwind some of Ethiopia’s hard-won gains. In
the Horn of Africa’s most dynamic economy, Kenya, over 30 percent
of Kenyans still live below the national poverty line, and inequality

Assessing the Lay of the Land 3

 Fi gure 1. HORN OF AFR ICA POPULAT ION PROJECT IONS

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2022.

remains a difficult issue, particularly for pastoralist communities in the

north where economic conditions have stagnated.8
The situation is far worse in the war-torn economies of Somalia and
South Sudan. In Somalia, 70 percent of people were thought to have
lived below the poverty line in 2021, with the internally displaced pop-
ulation of over two million experiencing some of the deepest poverty.9
In South Sudan, World Bank projections suggest that 80 percent of
the population could currently be living in poverty.10 All of this leads
to fragile food security situations in the best of times, but three years
of drought for some parts of the Horn and floods in South Sudan have
significantly worsened the situation.
In societies that depend heavily on agriculture, climate change
can immediately affect people’s livelihoods and well-being. Except
for Djibouti, where the arid climate is ill suited to farming, agricul-
ture remains an important sector in Horn economies. In Ethiopia,
agriculture—the vast majority of which is rain-fed—is responsible for
40 percent of GDP, 80 percent of exports, and roughly three-quarters
of the country’s labor force, rendering Ethiopia especially sensitive
to changing climatic conditions.11 The World Bank estimates that in
South Sudan, agriculture makes up 60 percent of all employment. In

4 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

 Sudan that number is 38 percent, in Eritrea 68 percent, and in Soma-
lia 80 percent.12 The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) calls agriculture in Kenya “the backbone of the economy,”
accounting for one-third of GDP and employing over 40 percent of
the total population and 70 percent of the rural population, though
notably, tourism, another vital part of the Kenyan economy, is also
vulnerable to climate change.13

POLITICAL STRIFE

If the economic conditions in the Horn can be described as challenging,

despite the significant gains made in Ethiopia and Kenya since 2000
and the dynamism and innovation apparent in some sectors, then the
political and security challenges are equally daunting. Over the past
twenty-five years, the Horn of Africa has hosted numerous conflicts,
from interstate wars such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea from
1998 to 2000, to internal conflicts such as South Sudan’s civil war from
2013 to 2020. Internationally recognized terrorist organizations have
long operated and conducted attacks in Somalia and Kenya. The region
is home to two UN peacekeeping operations and an African Union
(AU) peacekeeping mission that has been operating for over fifteen
years. Simmering tensions around rights to Nile waters have repeatedly
threatened to erupt into armed conflict.
Indeed, Somalia remains one of the world’s most fragile states, in
which internationally recognized government authorities control a
fraction of the country’s territory, and only with the protection of an
African peacekeeping force (the rest of the country is controlled by
various local authorities, largely autonomous forces, or the al-Shabab
terrorist organization). Eritrea is a notably repressive and highly
militarized dictatorship that has generated an outsized number of
asylum seekers for its relatively small population.14 In Ethiopia, con-
flict between the federal government and regional forces in Tigray has
drawn in Eritrean troops and plunged millions of people into desperate
food insecurity. Meanwhile, clashes in Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia,
and other regions of Ethiopia eat away at the integrity of the state.
Unresolved issues surrounding the desirability of centralized power
and what a just system of land allocation and political representation
entails threaten to prompt further violence. Already, the upheaval has
led to a dubious distinction: over 5.1 million Ethiopians became inter-
nally displaced in 2021, more displacements than ever recorded in one
country in one year.15 Ethiopia is also involved in a simmering border

Assessing the Lay of the Land 5

 dispute with Sudan, where the 2021 coup d’état hijacked a delicate
political transition and pitted military authorities against civilian pro-
testers in addition to reactivating conflict dynamics in Darfur. South
Sudan, whose shaky 2018 peace agreement regularly threatens to col-
lapse, is one of the world’s most prolific generators of refugees.16

ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY

The region is fragile environmentally as well as politically. Although

Ethiopia and Kenya have variable climates with temperate zones, both
countries are predominantly classified as arid and semiarid (85 per-
cent of the country in Kenya’s case), which is also true of Sudan and
Eritrea. Somalia is 80 percent arid and semiarid, making it vulnerable
to drought. In 2011, an especially severe drought killed over a quarter
of a million Somalis. Despite the dry climate, the country also faces
the risk of catastrophic flooding due to increasingly violent cyclones
along Somalia’s long coastline.17 It is unsurprising that the new
Somali president has appointed the country’s first-ever special envoy
for drought and climate change to elevate these existential issues in
Somalia’s foreign policy. Djibouti is 90 percent desert, and rising sea
levels could cause saltwater intrusion into the aquifers that are cur-
rently a lifeline for its population.18 South Sudan is far less dry than
the other Horn countries but still suffers from alternating periods
of drought and flooding; frequent floods increase the risk of water-
borne diseases.19 The Horn’s many coastal communities are also vul-
nerable to the deterioration of marine ecosystems due to years of illicit
waste disposal—often by actors originating far from the region—and
rising temperatures.20

6 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

 THE POTENTIAL
FOR DISORDER
Overall, conditions in the Horn present a perfect storm for climate-
induced disruption and conflict. In Foreign Affairs in 2018, Joshua
Busby and Nina von Uexkull identified the twenty countries most at
risk for climate-related instability and crisis. They noted that a high
level of dependence on agriculture, a history of conflict, and exclusion-
ary political institutions heightened vulnerability. Four of the twenty
they named were in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Sudan).21 The nexus between climate and conflict has long
been understood in the Horn; at the subregional level, IGAD’s conflict
early warning and early response mechanism acknowledges the impor-
tance of flagging conditions that increase the likelihood of cross-border
pastoral conflicts—the same conflicts most directly linked to drought
and communities’ need to find new grazing land. Climate change can,
and likely will, make conflict in the region more probable, whether by
prompting hunger that exacerbates popular desperation and anger
at authorities or perceived enemies, triggering conflict over scarce
water or grazing resources, or prompting mass migration that leads to
resource competition and social dislocation.

POPULAR UNREST

Climate-induced scarcity, migration, or natural disaster can push

already dissatisfied and frustrated populations to mass mobilizations,
which could lead to, or be met with, violence. Dynamics that have
little to do with climate change could set the stage, including ineffec-
tive service delivery, historical grievances, perceptions of corruption
in government, or persistent insecurity—all factors present in various

The Potential for Disorder 7

 degrees inside the countries of the Horn. However, climate change’s
consequences will put additional pressures on populations and their
governments, likely beyond their capacity to cope without some degree
of upheaval. The region has ample precedent for factors such as rising
food prices to trigger serious unrest. It could take the form of popula-
tions demanding a change in government, just as hikes in bread prices
sparked the 2018 Sudanese revolution. Rising tensions and household
stresses can be channeled into anger at outgroup populations and create
ethnic resentments, as is happening in Ethiopia. There, history, the het-
erogeneous nature of the population, and the competitive character of
the ethno-federalist model all create vulnerability to this type of disor-
der. In Somalia, popular frustration with ineffective government has
exacerbated radicalization and bolstered the fortunes of al-Shabab, the
al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization that controls large swaths of
the country. Popular discontent can topple dictators, but without effec-
tive governance, it can also empower extremists.
Likewise, prospective violent backlash from existing governments
with well-established records of repression, including those in Eritrea,
South Sudan, and Sudan, can turn an episode of unrest into a full-
blown crisis. Because borders in the Horn are porous and many ethnic
communities sprawl across national boundaries, the risk of civil con-
flict spreading from one state to another is significant.

RESOURCE COMPETITION

The Horn of Africa is home to many pastoralist communities vulnera-

ble to increasing competition and violence when scarcity of grazing land
and water access force deviation from typical patterns of livelihood.
Herder-farmer conflicts in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan have
intensified as climatic conditions grow more extreme. When elites take
advantage by exacerbating those tensions for political gain, as has hap-
pened in some of Kenya’s most violent and sophisticated cattle-raiding
episodes, the fallout can be unpredictable, as heavily armed communi-
ties and ineffective policing shift power dynamics on the ground.
The Omo-Turkana Basin that stretches across the Ethiopia-Kenya
border is the largest lake basin on the continent not governed by any
cooperative water agreement and has been the site of repeated ten-
sions as communities migrate in response to resource scarcity and
government interventions.22 Likewise, the Shabelle and Juba rivers that
originate in Ethiopia are vital to Somalia’s viability, but Ethiopian devel-
opment plans could significantly affect the flow of water downstream

8 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

and collaboration on water management has been minimal.23 Even
where open interstate conflict seems unlikely, the prospect that states
will protect their water resource interests by supporting armed proxies
among neighbors is far more probable and has precedent in the region.
Otherwise, the future could hold geopolitical tensions borne of suspi-
cion about how one country’s weather modification efforts could affect
its neighbors. (Ethiopia is already experimenting with cloud seeding.24)
The water resource issue surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renais-
sance Dam, known as the GERD, is one of the largest concerns for
Horn of Africa security experts. Long-standing disagreements over the
allocation of Nile waters were revived in 2011, when Ethiopia began
constructing the dam, a cherished national project primarily funded by
the Ethiopian population itself. With just over half of Ethiopia’s citizens
enjoying access to electricity, the GERD, with its projected capacity
of more than six thousand megawatts, is central to realizing the coun-
try’s development ambitions.25 When completed, it will be the largest
hydroelectric project on the continent. Its popularity in an otherwise
fractious domestic environment has given it great political significance,
limiting Ethiopian leadership’s political leeway to deviate from filling
the dam during the next four to six years despite the concerns of neigh-
boring countries.
Egypt, where the Nile is the primary source of fresh water, is
already dealing with water scarcity due to population growth, climate
change, and inadequate investment in water infrastructure, and sees
the GERD as an existential threat to its population’s security.26 After
decades of relying on a 1959 agreement with Sudan that allocated Nile
water rights to the two countries, with no regard for Ethiopia or other
riparian states, Egypt has struggled to find consensus with upstream
governments to the south regarding a more equitable set of rules for
managing Nile waters. Each country presents its own requirements:
Egypt desires guarantees that Ethiopia would release sufficient water
to meet Egyptian needs in drought years; Ethiopia wants to maintain
the reliable power supplies necessary for a viable economic future; and
Sudan requires predictability to manage its own water infrastructure.
The Nile Basin Initiative, a ten-country intergovernmental partnership
formed in 1999 to coordinate sustainable management and develop-
ment of Nile waters, has not proven an effective forum for resolving
the most pressing issues associated with the GERD; neither has the
African Union thus far, though the UN Security Council supported
continued AU mediation efforts in its first statement on the issue in
September 2021.27 Egypt has been unable to prevent Ethiopia from

The Potential for Disorder 9

 proceeding with ongoing construction and using the GERD; the third
phase of filling the dam proceeded as scheduled in August 2022.28
Egypt’s concerns regarding the GERD, and the stake that many
external actors have in ensuring the Egyptian state does not collapse,
increase the risk of direct interstate conflict, indirect proxy attacks, or
sabotage. Despite a 2015 “declaration of principles” committing all
parties to peaceful resolution of disputes about the dam, both Cairo
and Addis Ababa have used saber-rattling rhetoric and made intensive
efforts to woo influential Sudanese actors to their respective sides. The
dispute fuels external support for competing factions within Ethiopia
and Sudan, contributing to the fragility of those states.29
Some analysts argue that the resolution (or lack thereof) of the
GERD dispute will set a template for the region’s trans-boundary water
management in the decades ahead.30 The issue’s influence could extend
well beyond the region; the reservations that India’s permanent repre-
sentative expressed about the UN Security Council’s 2021 statement
of support clearly indicate discomfort with the notion of the Security
Council’s involvement in trans-boundary water disputes.31 Nonethe-
less, a future in which states sharing water resources undermine and
destabilize each other is a profoundly unattractive proposition.

DESTABILIZING MIGRATIONS

Migration can be a sensible adaptation to climate change. However,

sudden, massive migrations can also be profoundly difficult for tran-
sit and recipient communities to absorb. The Horn of Africa currently
hosts over 2.9 million refugees. If Uganda, which hosts many persons
from Horn countries, is included, the number of refugees approaches
4.5 million. An additional twelve million people are displaced, largely in
Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.32 Those large movements
of people will likely continue in the decades ahead; populations will be
even larger, climatic conditions more challenging, and resource compe-
tition fiercer. Although many countries in the region have responded
commendably to those populations in need, the tensions they have pro-
duced to date are instructive. For example, some in the Kenyan secu-
rity services view the large Somali refugee community in Kenya as a
source of instability and potential infiltration by terrorist operatives, a
sensitive issue given Kenya’s painful experiences with terrorism. That
framing has also led to standoffs with other states over international
norms governing refugees, and even expeditionary military strategies
supporting the creation of a semiautonomous buffer region in Somalia

10 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

known as Jubaland, further drawing Kenya into Somali political and
security dynamics. Recipient states’ tendency to conflate large move-
ments of migrants with the security threats emanating from their coun-
tries of origin can exacerbate rather than calm conflicts.
Finally, these types of destabilizing trends reinforce each other.
Cycles of multiple displacements deplete household resources and
resilience; once people are living on the margins with no savings or abil-
ity to absorb shocks, disruptions they could otherwise manage become
grave emergencies. Population movements increase the risk of height-
ened competition for resources in host communities. In a vicious cycle,
the environment is further degraded by conflict and upheaval. That is
why building systems of resilience and adaptation will only get more
difficult should the region tip further toward disorder. Not only does
climate change serve as a threat multiplier to conflict, but conflict can
also interfere with efforts to cope with climate change. Policymakers
will have to grapple with the difficulty of building lasting capacity in
an extremely volatile region. Politics and conflict do not stop while the
world organizes itself to contend with higher temperatures, rising sea
levels, and more frequent and intense natural disasters.
Nevertheless, working to build climate resilience amid instability is
far easier said than done, and many adaptation efforts in the region have
been derailed or even destroyed by the current turmoil. The charcoal
trade in Somalia has, in the past, both contributed to environmental
degradation and profited al-Shabab. Efforts to ban the trade met with
limited enthusiasm when changes in conditions on the ground meant
its profits began to benefit factions aligned against the terrorist group.33
In Sudan, the UN Environment Program’s efforts to bolster national
capacity to address climate-related security risks have been repeatedly
disrupted, first by the 2019 revolution that prompted turnover in the
officials that had been trained, and then by the 2021 coup that again
halted activity.34 In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, hard-won gains in land-
scape restoration and reforestation were rolled back by the conflict that
broke out in November 2020, as the Ethiopian government’s strategy
of siege in Tigray deprived the population of alternative fuel sources
to wood, prompting new deforestation.35 When conflict is unleashed,
efforts to address the climate crisis too often move backward, creating
a dismal cycle.

The Potential for Disorder 11

 CONSEQUENCES
BEYOND THE REGION
In addition to the moral disaster of millions of civilians plunged into
circumstances of violent conflict and life-threatening deprivation, dis-
order in the Horn of Africa creates real risks for contagion and security
consequences far beyond the region.

Bolstering ethno-nationalism. Today, the Horn’s substantial migra-

tion flows occur largely within individual states or within the region.
However, state collapse in countries the size of Ethiopia or Sudan is
bound to trigger sizeable refugee flows that will extend beyond East
Africa—much as the Syrian refugee crisis, which implicated a far
smaller population, was not contained within the Middle East. Result-
ing pressures on Europe could breathe new wind into the sails of ethno-
nationalists and set back efforts to combat democratic decline.

Providing opportunities for malign actors. The strategic signifi-

cance of the region also makes it ripe for opportunistic actors to take
advantage of instability. Violent extremist organizations, most notably
al-Shabab, already operate across boundaries in the region and have
formalized links to global terrorist organizations. The many draw-
backs of previous attempts to address those threats in places with weak
or absent governance do not change the fact that these forces threaten
U.S. interests and those of many other states, to the point of moti-
vating U.S. military forces to reenter Somalia in 2022.36 Particularly
given the importance of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, through
which some 10 percent of the world’s commerce passes, attacks that
compromise maritime security in the region would have global implica-
tions, including for U.S. ability to project power in the Indian Ocean.37

12 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

An increasingly ungoverned Horn also provides lucrative opportuni-
ties for illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, and people.

Influencing major power rivalry. If the era commencing with Rus-

sia’s invasion of Ukraine is to be characterized by intensified geostrate-
gic competition and increasingly audacious disregard for international
norms and laws in pursuit of influence and advantage, an up-for-grabs
Horn of Africa promises to attract multiple suitors. As the U.S. Africa
Command’s deputy commander said, “We clearly know that environ-
mental change is a driver of instability, and we recognize that other
entities—whether we call them competitors or adversaries—are going
to take advantage of that.”38 The region is already the site of intense geo-
political competition, hosting China’s only permanent expeditionary
military presence in Djibouti, as well as U.S., French, Italian, Turkish,
and even Japanese forces. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates play an active, sometimes competitive role in the region’s
political, economic, and security arrangements. Russia is supporting
factions of Sudan’s security establishment to gain a foothold in the
region, including a naval base at Port Sudan. In 2020, the U.S. Institute
of Peace’s Senior Study Group on Peace and Security in the Red Sea
Arena found that “the Horn of Africa is now an integral part of and in
fact the link among the security systems of the Middle East, the Indo
Pacific, and the Mediterranean by virtue of the strategic importance
of and competition for influence over the Red Sea and the states that
border and depend upon it for trade and transit.”39 Disorder in the
Horn promises to accelerate that jockeying for influence, raising the risk
of proxy conflict and potentially benefiting actors such as Russia who

Consequences Beyond the Region 13

 have historically accessed resources and projected power for cheap by
co-opting fragile regimes to expand their presence globally.

Increasing resentment toward historic emitters. The United

States, China, and Europe should prepare for the politics of griev-
ance and resentment regarding historic carbon emissions to gain new
currency in the Horn. The reality of the historical record is hard to
ignore; the world’s largest economies bear outsized responsibility for
total carbon emissions and experience fewer of their consequences.
A politically astute leader could deploy those facts in a bid to rally
people around a common enemy, deflect blame for scarcity and suf-
fering, demand compensation, and dismiss other policy priorities and
concerns articulated by those wealthy external powers. Likewise, in a
region as geopolitically competitive as the Horn, external powers them-
selves could find it useful to reinforce convenient messages about who
is to blame for climate-induced hardships and who is responsible for
addressing their consequences.
Other external powers are also at risk. Numerous states, including
India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, have leased
over nine hundred thousand hectares (roughly 2.2 million acres) of fer-
tile land in Ethiopia, both to cultivate biofuels for a green economy and
hedge food security threats in their own societies.40 Many of those same
actors have pursued similar investment strategies in Sudan and South
Sudan. Land tenure can be a politically explosive issue in the region;
many of the country’s current communal conflicts are linked to dis-
putes over access to land. In periods of scarcity, the notion of reserving
fertile land for foreign interests is bound to sow resentment and rein-
force the notion that the international system values African lives less
than the prosperity of wealthier regions.41 As food security issues rise
on the global agenda in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the
temptation for rich countries to hedge against future scarcity by acquir-
ing fertile African land grows stronger, and the importance of state
transparency and institutional arrangements governing land tenure in
the interest of citizens grows ever more important.

Undermining global governance norms. Disorder and deprivation

in the Horn of Africa will also set back efforts to update international
institutions and global governance to reflect African priorities. As
African populations grow, accounting for one-quarter of the world’s
people by 2050, and the anachronisms that give Africa relatively little

14 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

influence in the international system grow increasingly glaring and
unsustainable, it would be tragic if African states lacked the leadership
to assert the region’s equities on the global stage. However, leaders of
states consumed with civil conflict and humanitarian crisis are unlikely
to be effective global champions.

Consequences Beyond the Region 15

 RECOMMENDATIONS
The road ahead in the Horn of Africa will undoubtedly be rocky, but
the United States can take steps to decrease the likelihood of worst-
case scenarios, strengthen regional capacity to adapt to climate
change and capitalize on green-economy opportunities, and maintain
the possibility of beneficial, collaborative relationships in the Horn.
The recommendations below have implications beyond the Horn
region, because addressing the nexus of climate and conflict requires
new thinking about both foreign policy priorities and implementa-
tion mechanisms.

Elevate conflict resolution and peace-building. Climate change

does not just increase the likelihood of conflict; conflict makes build-
ing more resilient societies difficult and can create a downward spiral.
Perhaps the single most important intervention that external powers
can make in the Horn to lessen the likelihood of climate and migration-
induced disorder is to redouble diplomatic peace-building efforts at
the interstate and intrastate levels and sustain them over time. Much of
the violence and instability gripping the region now is not a temporary
phenomenon but rather springs from unresolved questions around
governance, from how to manage heterogeneous societies to how to
mitigate center-periphery tensions. Sustainably addressing those ten-
sions requires supporting African peacemakers and civil society and
bolstering diplomatic capacity, including mediation-support capacity,
in the region and ensuring it has active support at the highest levels in
Washington. External actors interested in stability in the Horn should
also focus on improving policing, which could be as important as, if not
more important than, strengthening military forces in the region.

16 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

Update foreign assistance approaches. USAID’s capacity to
respond nimbly and innovatively to potential crises in the Horn is
severely constrained because of the programmatic directives associ-
ated with most of its budget. The United States risks bankrolling public
health and humanitarian relief initiatives at the expense of the preven-
tative work in natural resource management, community-level conflict
resolution, resilient agriculture, and disaster preparedness that could
help prevent worst-case scenarios from becoming real crises. USAID
has real depth on those issues, as evidenced by the Horn of Africa
Resilience Network it established over a decade ago to strengthen
regional cooperation and outcomes around resilience, but budget and
manpower allocations do not reflect the urgency of that work.42 Across
the board, donors are aware that prevention is essential and are trying
to shift their approach to drought and famine in the region from one
of crisis response to a sustainable development-focused strategy to
build resilience.43 Numerous and largely effective early-warning sys-
tems exist, but local and international capacity to respond effectively
to the signals those systems send is lagging.44 Making this shift suc-
cessful requires flexibility in how resources are used, and that, in turn,
requires intensive congressional involvement and greater trust between
executive-branch agencies implementing foreign assistance programs
and the legislators charged with funding them.

Mainstream and integrate climate sensitivity. Given the far-reaching

consequences of climate change, the United States and other external
actors should continue supporting efforts to mainstream climate sen-
sitivity in bilateral and multilateral programs and interventions on the

Recommendations 17
 continent. The Horn is in the vanguard in this area: in 2020, the UN
Security Council called for climate considerations and risk management
strategies to be integrated into all UN activities in Somalia, and Chris-
tophe Hodder was appointed as the UN climate security and environ-
mental advisor to Somalia, a first-of-its-kind position.45 Ensuring that
peace-building and development strategies are climate sensitive also
requires building new skills and sharing knowledge among foreign policy
professionals, and incentivizing that workforce to develop this expertise.

Democratize climate awareness and prioritize gender inclu-

sion. The United States should support local efforts to raise aware-
ness among the diverse populations of the Horn about the global
climate crisis and the local action to address it. A recent analysis of
conventional and social media revealed that African societies, includ-
ing those in the Horn, are deeply concerned about climate issues and
inclined to support policies that address and prevent the worst conse-
quences of climate change.46 This is a strong basis from which to build
an agenda with broad support. The stronger and more widespread
the baseline of shared facts and understandings about climate-related
issues, the greater the likelihood of popular support for mitigation
and adaptation interventions. Particularly in societies such as Ethi-
opia, where identity is closely linked to land, climate change–related
policies can be exquisitely politically sensitive, requiring significant
consultation and consensus.
Including women and girls’ perspectives and contributions in
conversations about climate and adaptation strategies is especially
important. As the African Union noted in March 2022 when member
states adopted a common position regarding gender inclusion’s impor-
tance in climate action, women’s livelihoods in the region tend to be
especially climate sensitive, and women often face barriers to access-
ing land and credit, making them particularly vulnerable in situations
where climatic conditions change household circumstances.47 Effective
community-level climate policy options will invariably require the
insight and buy-in of women, who play a substantial role in the agricul-
tural sector.
A widely shared understanding of the challenge could also lessen
the efficacy of efforts to scapegoat specific populations in situations of
resource scarcity. However, external powers eager for influence in the
region, including the United States and China, should also prepare for
popular anger regarding their carbon emissions and as-yet-insufficient
support for African states suffering the consequences of climate change.

18 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

Be responsible climate actors. To mitigate risks, powers such as the
United States should work assiduously to reduce their carbon emis-
sions and to fulfill their adaptation and resilience financing pledges. The
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 makes important headway toward the
former goal, but much work remains to mobilize resources and honor
international commitments. Developed economies have failed to meet
the target of mobilizing $100 billion a year starting in 2020 and failed
to devote a sufficient portion of the resources they did commit to adap-
tation efforts in the most vulnerable countries.48 The United States has
stood out as particularly laggardly, and although the Joe Biden admin-
istration has made new pledges to increase U.S. financing of adaptation
to $3 billion a year by 2024, that is still an insufficient commitment from
an economy as sizeable as that of the United States to meet global tar-
gets.49 The politics of mobilizing more significant support for adaptation
and resilience efforts abroad are unquestionably difficult, and helping
lawmakers understand the link between traditional security threats
and climate-induced disorder will be an important piece of the puzzle.
When it becomes clear to leaders that loss and damage in the Horn and
elsewhere will have costly consequences for the United States, it will
be easier to reckon with African efforts to institutionalize financing
to cope with the climate disasters that are, at this point, unavoidable.
The best antidote to resentment of the West is a serious effort to lead
a meaningful international response with resources and action, not
just rhetoric.

Acknowledge African energy needs. Climate sensitivity cannot

mean insisting that an aversion to carbon emissions tightly constrain
the goal of increasing access to power in the region, which is essential
to the job creation and economic growth required to accommodate
growing populations. The hypocrisy of continuing to develop fossil fuel
projects domestically while refusing to finance them abroad in places
such as the Horn, where access to power is scarce, is not lost on policy-
makers or citizens in the region. Although the clean-energy potential of
the Horn (and its proven performance in states such as Kenya, where
already 90 percent of electricity in use comes from green sources) is
exciting and deserving of attention and support, with geothermal,
solar, hydropower, and wind prospects of significance, the overall
energy mix will have to include some fossil fuel projects.50 Major global
powers should shoulder the burden required to bring down total emis-
sions even while acknowledging that Africa’s share, for the foreseeable
future, will increase.

Recommendations 19
 When it comes to the GERD, that means balancing long-standing
U.S. commitments to Egyptian stability with acceptance of Ethio-
pia’s genuine energy needs, and recognition that African states cannot
be expected to subordinate their interests today to anachronistic,
colonial-era regimes that simply ignored their equities. After the Donald
Trump administration’s ill-fated intervention in GERD diplomacy, the
United States lacks the credibility to lead the charge for a negotiated
agreement.51 It can, however, continue to encourage mediation and
support the African Union’s capacity to be effective, as well as address
other external powers’ concerns about the relative costs and benefits of
international involvement in this issue and discourage interventions that
promote forum shopping and diffuse diplomatic energy.

Ensure adequate support for Somaliland. Somaliland is suffer-

ing from the consequences of climate change and increased drought
frequency, which are driving up rural-to-urban migration and putting
additional pressures on the state.52 Somaliland’s ambiguous legal status
should not act as a barrier to accessing appropriate international sup-
port, including from the Green Climate Fund, and participating in
global forums for sharing best practices and adaptation agenda-setting.
As the most stable part of Somalia and a potential developing democ-
racy, Somaliland’s continued success is an important element of any
lasting strategy to build accountable, stable political systems in the
most volatile part of the Horn.

Support subregional and African institutions and civil society.

When it comes to stabilizing the political environment in the Horn,
the influence of external actors pales in comparison to local leadership
and the potential of regional commitment to manage trans-boundary
tensions. IGAD, for all its flaws, inefficiencies, and evasions, is the
only game in town at the subregional level; various proposed alterna-
tives that include Gulf actors around a Red Sea arena would introduce
a degree of economic inequality unlikely to serve the interests of Afri-
can stability and prosperity. Stabilization will take time and political
will among member states to make IGAD a more effective forum for
addressing the many peace and security issues bedeviling the region.
More immediately, however, IGAD is also an essential mechanism
for managing the complex trans-boundary issues raised by climate
change and climate-induced migration. The IGAD Protocol on the free
movement of people and transhumance can be an important building
block for constructing rule-based guardrails to manage the inevitable

20 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

migratory flows of the future.53 The Kampala Ministerial Declaration
on Migration, Environment and Climate Change, signed by IGAD and
East African Community members in July 2022, establishes important
priorities and commitments that should inform the support that part-
ners provide.54
The African Union acknowledges the risks posed by climate
change in its peace and security architecture, but its ten-year Climate
Change Strategy and Action Plan expressly frames climate resilience
as “a central aspect of achieving sustainable development,” illustrat-
ing how climate discourse is sometimes stovepiped into either security
or development channels, and proactive approaches are sometimes
divorced from peacemaking agendas.55 The African Union’s media-
tion efforts need ongoing support to manage flashpoints in the region.
In addition, the AU’s African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group is doing
important work to develop evidence-based recommendations and
policy playbooks for AU member states to cope with the consequences
of climate change, ensuring technical capacity is a shared resource.
That too merits support.
In addition, numerous African scientists, activists, and community
leaders are working on research, policy proposals, and citizen-led ini-
tiatives to address the climate crisis affecting livelihoods and stability
in their communities. Regional organizations such as the Pastoral and
Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa, and broader groups like
the Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance, are both closer to the prob-
lem and more sensitive to the constraints governing local and national
policies. Support for those African voices is one of the most important
investments external actors can make to identify viable paths to sustain-
able peace in the region.

Recommendations 21
 CONCLUSION
The contentious issues currently driving conflict in the Horn of Africa
are unlikely to be resolved quickly, and increasing pressures—including
climate pressures—will ensure that new challenges continue to emerge
when states and communities eventually resolve current conflicts.
Ultimately, African leadership will be the most consequential factor
in determining whether the future of the Horn is one of disorder or
cooperative adaptation and innovation in a new green economy. When
former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asserted that climate
change was partly responsible for the horrifying violence that erupted
in Darfur in 2003, activists feared he let Sudanese leaders off the hook,
painting a picture of natural disaster rather than state-sponsored geno-
cide.56 His point was not to obscure decision-makers’ responsibility,
however, but to illuminate how environmental stressors contribute
to conflict, and, critically, how those factors have to be considered in
a politically negotiated peace. Leaders can either prioritize resilience,
conflict prevention, and conflict resolution or they can use resource
competition or in-group–out-group dynamics to stoke tension and dis-
tract citizens from other issues, including from government failures.
Politics matter, and in no scenario are they put on hold while climate
resilience strategies take root.
For external actors with real stakes in the Horn’s stability, encour-
aging the politics of peace, and the regional mechanisms that support
conflict prevention and resolution, should be a top priority, along
with offering practical assistance to increase resilience over time. Deft
diplomacy and a greater appreciation for the interests of actors on the
ground can also help avert unnecessary conflict. For the United States,
playing an effective supporting role will require significant domestic

22 Climate Change and Regional Instability in the Horn of Africa

effort to better organize U.S. foreign policy tools, prioritize resources,
and strategize on longer time horizons to avoid being too late to make
a difference. Ultimately, real climate leadership will also require ambi-
tious new foreign policy thinking that centers global regeneration as a
top-tier priority.

Conclusion 23
 ENDNOTES
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Panel on Climate Change, February 27, 2020, http://ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment
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Panel on Climate Change, February 27, 2020, http://ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment
-report-working-group-ii, ch. 9, p. 1296.
3. Catherine Wong Yue Cao, “How Can Climate Finance Work Better for Fragile and
Conflict-Affected Regions?” PreventionWeb (UN Development Program, February 17,
2022), http://preventionweb.net/news/how-can-climate-finance-work-better-fragile
-and-conflict-affected-regions.
4. “The Greater Horn of Africa on the Edge: Visualizing Climate Stress and Insecurity,”
Statement by Camlus Omogo (Director), Conflict Early Warning and Early Response
Mechanism of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, accessed June 8, 2022,
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_meeting.pdf.
5. “Drought in the Horn of Africa: New Analyses Flag Mounting Risks, Need to Support
Rural Families,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, February 11,
2022, http://fao.org/newsroom/detail/drought-in-the-horn-of-africa-new-analyses-flag
-mounting-risks-need-to-support-rural-families/en.
6. “Horn of Africa ‘Cannot Wait’: WFP Scales Up Assistance as Historic Drought Raises
Famine Threat—Somalia,” ReliefWeb (World Food Program, August 19, 2022),
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7. “Ethiopia Poverty Assessment: Poverty Rate Declines, Despite Challenges,” World Bank,
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8. “Poverty and Equity Brief: Sub-Saharan Africa: Kenya,” World Bank, April 2020, http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7
-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_KEN.pdf.

24 Endnotes
9. “Poverty and Equity Brief: Africa Eastern & Southern: Somalia,” World Bank, April
2022, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93
-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_SOM.pdf.
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2022, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93
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%20dependent%20on,percent%20of%20the%20country’s%20workforce.
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ture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate)—Sudan,” World Bank, January
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/kenya/agriculture-and-food-security#:~:text=The%20agricultural%20sector%20is
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15. Jacky Habib, “Ethiopia Set a World Record for Displacements in a Single Year: 5.1 Million
in 2021,” NPR, May 28, 2022, http://npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/05/28
/1100469734/ethiopia-set-a-world-record-for-displacements-in-a-single-year-5-1-
million-in-20.
16. “Refugee Data Finder,” UNHCR, accessed June 13, 2022, http://unhcr.org/refugee
-statistics/download/?url=e7C00Y.

Endnotes 25
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Aquifer (Republic of Djibouti, Horn of Africa),” Water 11, no. 11 (2019): 2347, http://
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Put Somalia’s Ocean Resources at Risk,” Horn Observer, June 11, 2021, http://
hornobserver.com/articles/1047/Environmental-degradation-and-lack-of-protective
-laws-put-Somalias-ocean-resources-at-risk. The decaying oil tanker FSO Safer anchored
off Yemen also threatens to spew over a million barrels of oil into the Red Sea with
devastating implications for Eritrea and Djibouti in particular.
21. Joshua Busby and Nina von Uexkull, “Climate Shocks and Humanitarian Crises: Which
Countries Are Most at Risk?” Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2018, http://foreignaffairs
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27. “Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
(GERD),*” Security Council Report, September 15, 2021, http://securitycouncilreport
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-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd.php.
28. Giulia Paravicini, “Ethiopia Completes Third Phase of Filling Giant Nile Dam,” Reuters,
August 12, 2022, http://reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-completes-third-phase-filling
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/default/files/2020-10/senior_study_group_on_peace_and_security_in_the_red_sea_arena
-report.pdf.

26 Endnotes
30. Luca Miehe, “Damm-Dilemmata: Wie der Nilstreit Afrikas Energiewende prägen
könnte,” Munich Security Conference, October 5, 2021, http://securityconference.
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praegen-koennte.
31. Devirupa Mitra, “UNSC Watch | India Faults Council’s Statement on Water Dispute, Says
Not Under Its Purview,” Wire, September 20, 2021, http://thewire.in/diplomacy/unsc
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Reduce the Risks?” Climate Diplomacy, July 2020, http://climate-security-expert-network
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38. Cara Bousie, “U.S. Africa Command hosts Security Implications of Climate Change
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-Hi-Res.pdf.

Endnotes 27
 43. “Outsmarting La Niña: Lessons and Recommendations for Strengthening Resilience
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-032122.pdf, p. 5.
44. As Alex de Waal has noted, the world has sufficient capacity to prevent famine, even in
cases of drought or other climatic events that cause massive crop loss. However, that
preventative capacity requires political decision-making, and in the Horn, the politics of
food security can be toxic. The shadow of history, and the failures of previous Ethiopian
governments, can make sounding an alarm about food security especially difficult for
Ethiopian leaders, as an ability to deliver the population from hunger is one of the most
important sources of political legitimacy in the Ethiopian political context. Misguided
attempts to ensure regime security could cause leaders to wait too long to respond to
early-warning indicators and reach out for external assistance.
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Mission to Somalia,” Climate Diplomacy, August 26, 2021, http://climate-diplomacy
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and%20Ministers%20of%20Interior%20and%20Labour%20Khartoum%2026%20
Feb%202020.pdf.

28 Endnotes
54. “Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment, and Climate Change.”
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55. “African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan,”
African Union, http://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/41959-doc-CC_Strategy_and
_Action_Plan_2022-2032_23_06_22_ENGLISH-compressed.pdf.
56. Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur,” UN Secretary-General, June 16, 2007, http://
un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-06-16/climate-culprit-darfur.

Endnotes 29
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Paul B. Stares, director of the Center for Preventive
Action, for leading the effort to work through the implications of cli-
mate change for stability in specific regions and for encouraging schol-
ars and practitioners from diverse backgrounds to exchange ideas and
communicate across disciplines. The participants in the Council on
Foreign Relations and Geneva Center for Security Policy’s June 2022
workshop on climate change and regional instability were tremen-
dously helpful, not just in commenting on an earlier draft of this paper,
but in surfacing new ideas and bringing fresh perspectives to these
issues. Luca Miehe’s thoughtful comments and insights were invalu-
able. Colleagues at the Council on Foreign Relations, including Deputy
Director of Studies Shannon O’Neil, Managing Director of Publica-
tions Patricia Dorff, Cassandra Jensen, Natalie Caloca, Aliza Asad,
Jacob Ware, and Alexandra Dent all helped to review and improve this
paper. I also wish to thank the individuals in the U.S. government, the
UN Environment Program, and in governmental and civil society roles
in the Horn of Africa who patiently answered my questions and shared
their expertise over the course of my research.

30 Acknowledgments
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Michelle D. Gavin is the Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She has over twenty years
of international affairs experience in government and nonprofit roles.
She was formerly the managing director of the Africa Center, a multi-
disciplinary institution dedicated to increasing understanding of con-
temporary Africa. From 2011 to 2014, she was the U.S. ambassador
to Botswana and served concurrently as the U.S. representative to the
Southern African Development Community. Prior to that, Gavin was
a special assistant to President Barack Obama and the senior director
for Africa at the National Security Council. Before joining the Obama
administration, she was an international affairs fellow and adjunct
fellow for Africa at CFR. She has worked in the U.S. Senate, where
she was the staff director for the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions’ subcommittee on African affairs, director of international policy
issues for Senator Russ Feingold, and legislative director for Senator
Ken Salazar. Gavin earned a BA from Georgetown University’s Walsh
School of Foreign Service and an MPhil from Oxford University.

About the Author 31

 Center for Preventive Action

Discussion Paper Series on Managing Global Disorder No. 10

November 2022

Cover photo: Internally displaced Somali woman Habiba Bile

stands near the carcass of her dead goat on May 26, 2022,
Climate Change and
Regional Instability
following severe droughts near Dolow in Somalia’s Gedo region.
(Feisal Omar/Reuters)

Council on Foreign Relations

cfr.org

58 East 68th Street 1777 F Street, NW

in the Horn of Africa
New York, NY 10065 Washington, DC 20006
tel 212.434.9400 tel 202.509.8400 Michelle D. Gavin