Code Injection Analysis Guide

• Look more indicators of code injection in the memory image test.vmem with Volatility.
o Determine the profile of the memory image.
o Investigate the processes.
o Check the network connections. Any suspicious traffic? If so, how you figured out and why ?
o Using Volatility, use the plugins to determine of code injection is within this process of
svchost.exe.
o Were any APIs hooked within this process?

To analyze the memory image (`test.vmem`) using Volatility for signs of code injection, follow these
steps:

1. Determine the profile of the memory image:

The profile identifies the operating system and service pack level of the memory image. Volatility
needs this to properly interpret the memory structures.
2. Investigate the processes:
Look at the running processes to identify any that might be suspicious or potentially malicious.
3. Check the network connections:
Analyze network connections to detect any unusual or unauthorized connections.
4. Check for code injection in `svchost.exe`:
Use Volatility plugins to detect signs of code injection in the `svchost.exe` process.
5. Check for hooked APIs within `svchost.exe`:
Determine if any APIs within the `svchost.exe` process have been hooked, which might indicate
malicious activity.

Let's perform these tasks step-by-step using Volatility:

1. Determine the Profile of the Memory Image

First, we need to identify the profile of the memory image:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem imageinfo

This command will provide suggestions for the profile. Use the suggested profile in the subsequent
analysis.

2. Investigate the Processes

List all running processes to identify any unusual or suspicious processes:

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 shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> pslist

You can also use `pstree` for a hierarchical view:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> pstree

3. Check the Network Connections

Identify active network connections:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> netscan

Look for any suspicious connections, such as connections to unusual IP addresses or ports.

4. Check for Code Injection in `svchost.exe`

Use the `malfind` plugin to detect code injection:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> malfind -p <PID_of_svchost.exe>

Replace `<PID_of_svchost.exe>` with the actual PID of `svchost.exe` obtained from the `pslist`
output.

5. Check for Hooked APIs within `svchost.exe`

Check for hooked APIs using the `apihooks` plugin:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> apihooks -p <PID_of_svchost.exe>

Again, replace `<PID_of_svchost.exe>` with the PID of `svchost.exe`.

Analysis

Determine the Profile

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 Run the following command to determine the profile of the memory image:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem imageinfo

Example output:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s): Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64
AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/path/to/test.vmem)
PAE type : No PAE
DTB : 0x187000L
KDBG : 0xf80002c0e0a0L
Number of Processors : 2
Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
Image date and time : 2023-06-21 15:32:00 UTC+0000

From this output, we see that the suggested profile is `Win7SP1x64`. This will be used for the rest of the
analysis.

Investigate the Processes

List the processes to identify any unusual or suspicious ones:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist

Example output:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(P) Name PID PPID Thds Hnds Sess Wow64 Start
Exit
------------------ -------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ --------
---------------------- ------------------------------
0xfffffa8001a17430 System 4 0 74 400 ------ 0 2023-06-
21 13:42:35 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80016b1940 smss.exe 224 4 2 29 ------ 0 2023-06-
21 13:42:35 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8002225b30 csrss.exe 316 308 9 529 0 0 2023-06-
21 13:42:37 UTC+0000
0xfffffa80021d3b30 wininit.exe 384 308 3 78 0 0 2023-06-
21 13:42:37 UTC+0000
...
0xfffffa80024d9b30 svchost.exe 1220 392 17 497 0 0 2023-06-
21 13:42:43 UTC+0000

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 Note the PID of `svchost.exe`, in this case, `1220`.

Check the Network Connections

Identify any suspicious network connections:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan

Example output:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(P) Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
Pid Owner Created
------------------ -------- ----------------------------- ---------------------- ---------
------ ------ -------------- ------------------------------
0xfffffa8003d9e220 TCPv4 192.168.0.104:49157 93.184.216.34:80 CLOSED
1220 svchost.exe 2023-06-21 13:45:12 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8003d9e220 UDPv4 192.168.0.104:53 *:* CLOSED
1220 svchost.exe 2023-06-21 13:45:12 UTC+0000

Look for connections to unusual IP addresses or ports. For instance, `93.184.216.34:80` could be
suspicious if it’s an unexpected external address.

Check for Code Injection in `svchost.exe`

Detect signs of code injection using `malfind`:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 malfind -p 1220

Example output:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1220
Vad Tag: VadS
Start VPN: 0x0000000077b20000 End VPN: 0x0000000077b21fff
Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Commit Charge: 1
Private Memory: 1
Memory Tag: VadS
Vad Tag: VadS
Start VPN: 0x0000000077b20000 End VPN: 0x0000000077b21fff
Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Commit Charge: 1
Private Memory: 1
Memory Tag: VadS

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 If there are sections of memory with `PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE` permissions, it might indicate code
injection.

Check for Hooked APIs within `svchost.exe`

Identify hooked APIs using `apihooks`:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 apihooks -p 1220

Example output:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Process: svchost.exe Pid: 1220
Hooking Module: ntdll.dll
Hooking Function: NtCreateFile
Hooking Module: kernel32.dll
Hooking Function: CreateFileA
...

Look for any unexpected or unauthorized hooks, which could indicate malicious activity.

Conclusion

By following these steps, you can investigate the memory image for signs of code injection and other
malicious activities. If you find any suspicious processes, network connections, or hooked APIs, further
analysis and remediation steps should be taken.

Check the Network Connections ... what are IoC should notice ?

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to network connections in a memory analysis context can be
varied, but some key things to look for include:

1. Unusual Foreign IP Addresses:

Look for connections to IP addresses that are not part of your expected network range or
known legitimate destinations.
Connections to IP addresses in unusual geographical locations, especially those associated
with known malicious activity.
2. Uncommon Ports:
Connections to or from non-standard ports (e.g., anything not typically used for web traffic,
email, etc.).
Usage of high-numbered ports which are not commonly used by legitimate services.
3. Suspicious Domains:

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 DNS requests or connections to domains that seem randomly generated, known to be used
by malware, or not associated with legitimate business operations.
4. Repeated Failed Connection Attempts:
Multiple failed attempts to connect to an external server can be a sign of malware trying to
communicate with its command-and-control (C2) server.
5. Odd Protocols:
Use of protocols not typically seen in your environment, such as IRC (often used by botnets)
or certain peer-to-peer protocols.
6. Established Connections Without Legitimate Processes:
Network connections made by processes that should not typically have network activity or
by processes running from unusual locations.
7. High Volume of Traffic:
Unusually high volume of network traffic, particularly to external addresses, could indicate
data exfiltration.

Practical Steps with Volatility

Using Volatility to check network connections, you can identify these IoCs. Here’s how to perform this
task:

Check Network Connections

Using the `netscan` plugin, we can check for active and recently closed network connections.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan

Example output analysis:

plaintext

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(P) Proto Local Address Foreign Address State
Pid Owner Created
------------------ -------- ----------------------------- ---------------------- ---------
------ ------ -------------- ------------------------------
0xfffffa8003d9e220 TCPv4 192.168.0.104:49157 93.184.216.34:80
ESTABLISHED 1220 svchost.exe 2023-06-21 13:45:12 UTC+0000
0xfffffa8003d9e220 UDPv4 192.168.0.104:53 *:* LISTENING
1220 svchost.exe 2023-06-21 13:45:12 UTC+0000
...

Analysis of the Example Output

1. Foreign Address `93.184.216.34:80`:

Indicator: This could be suspicious if this IP is not part of a legitimate service your network
communicates with. You should check if this IP is related to any known malicious activity.
Action: Look up the IP address using online tools to see if it has been flagged for malicious
activities.
2. Port `49157`:

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 Indicator: High-numbered ports are less common for legitimate services, so connections
on these ports should be scrutinized.
Action: Verify if this port is used by any legitimate applications in your environment.
3. Protocol and State:
Indicator: Established TCP connections and listening UDP ports should be reviewed to
ensure they are expected and legitimate.
Action: Check the purpose of the process owning these connections (in this case,
`svchost.exe`).

Additional Steps

Investigate the Process

Identify details about the process owning the suspicious connections:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist | grep 1220

Example output:

plaintext

0xfffffa80024d9b30 svchost.exe 1220 392 17 497 0 0 2023-06-

21 13:42:43 UTC+0000

Check the command line arguments and loaded modules for the process to see if there are any
anomalies:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 cmdline -p 1220

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist -p 1220

Summary

In summary, network connection IoCs include unusual foreign IP addresses, uncommon ports,
suspicious domains, repeated failed connections, odd protocols, connections by non-legitimate
processes, and high traffic volume. Using Volatility, you can identify these IoCs by analyzing network
connections and associated processes. Any identified suspicious activity should be further
investigated, potentially cross-referencing with threat intelligence databases to confirm the nature of
the threat.

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 in Volatility , what are the plugins to determine code injection in a process? step by step

Detecting code injection in a process using Volatility involves using a variety of plugins that can help
identify abnormal or suspicious behavior within a process. Here are the steps and the specific plugins
to use for this analysis:

1. Identify the Profile of the Memory Image

First, determine the correct profile for the memory image:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem imageinfo

The output will suggest a profile that you will use in subsequent commands.

2. List Processes

Identify the running processes and note the PIDs of any processes of interest:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> pslist

3. Detect Suspicious Memory Regions with `malfind`

`malfind` is used to identify suspicious memory regions that might indicate code injection:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> malfind -p <PID>

Replace `<PID>` with the PID of the process you want to investigate.

4. Examine DLLs with `dlllist`

Check the loaded DLLs to see if there are any suspicious or unknown DLLs:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> dlllist -p <PID>

5. Inspect Process Memory with `vadinfo`

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 The `vadinfo` plugin provides information about the virtual address descriptor (VAD) of a process,
which can help identify unusual memory allocations:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> vadinfo -p <PID>

6. Dump Suspicious Memory Regions with `memdump`

If `malfind` identifies suspicious memory regions, you can dump them for further analysis:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> memdump -p <PID> -r <ADDRESS> -D <OUTPUT_DIR>

Replace `<ADDRESS>` with the address of the suspicious memory region and `<OUTPUT_DIR>` with the
directory where you want to save the dump.

7. Analyze Imported Functions with `ldrmodules`

Check for discrepancies in the loaded modules and the imported functions list:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ldrmodules -p <PID>

Look for any differences in the three lists (inload, ininit, and inmem), which could indicate a hidden
injected module.

8. Check for API Hooks with `apihooks`

Identify if any APIs within the process have been hooked:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> apihooks -p <PID>

9. Investigate Inline Hooks with `ssdt`

Examine the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) for hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ssdt

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 Summary

1. Determine Profile: `imageinfo`

2. List Processes: `pslist`
3. Detect Suspicious Memory Regions: `malfind`
4. Examine DLLs: `dlllist`
5. Inspect Process Memory: `vadinfo`
6. Dump Suspicious Memory Regions: `memdump`
7. Analyze Imported Functions: `ldrmodules`
8. Check for API Hooks: `apihooks`
9. Investigate Inline Hooks: `ssdt`

These steps and plugins will help you systematically determine if code injection has occurred in a
process.

• Look for indicators of a rootkit in the memory image with Volatility.

o Using Volatilty plugins, check for any indicators of a rootkit.
o What is the suspicious driver from the output?
o Obtain the base address of the module and dump the malicious driver.

To look for indicators of a rootkit in a memory image using Volatility, you can use several plugins
designed to detect hidden or suspicious drivers and modules. Here's a step-by-step process:

1. Determine the Profile of the Memory Image

First, identify the correct profile for the memory image:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem imageinfo

Use the suggested profile in the subsequent commands.

2. Check for Hidden Processes and Modules

Rootkits often hide processes and modules. Use the following plugins to detect them:

`psxview`

This plugin checks for discrepancies in process listings from different sources:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> psxview

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 Look for processes that are not listed in all views (e.g., not in `pslist` but present in other listings).

`psscan`

This plugin performs a more thorough scan for processes:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> psscan

Compare the output with `pslist` to find hidden processes.

`modules`

List loaded kernel modules (drivers):

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> modules

`modscan`

This plugin scans for kernel modules, which can reveal hidden drivers:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> modscan

Compare the results with `modules` to find discrepancies.

3. Identify Suspicious Drivers

Look for any unusual or suspicious drivers in the output of `modules` and `modscan`.

4. Obtain the Base Address of the Suspicious Driver

From the output of `modules` or `modscan`, identify the base address of the suspicious driver.

5. Dump the Malicious Driver

Use the `moddump` plugin to dump the suspicious driver for further analysis:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> moddump -b <BASE_ADDRESS> -D <OUTPUT_DIR>

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 Replace `<BASE_ADDRESS>` with the base address of the suspicious driver and `<OUTPUT_DIR>` with the
directory where you want to save the dump.

Example Workflow

Assuming the profile is `Win7SP1x64`, here's a detailed example:

Step 1: Determine the Profile

shell

volatility -f test.vmem imageinfo

Step 2: Check for Hidden Processes and Modules

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 psxview

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 psscan
volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 modules
volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 modscan

Step 3: Identify Suspicious Drivers

Compare the output of `modules` and `modscan` to identify any discrepancies or unusual drivers. For
example:

plaintext

Modules Output:
Offset(P) Name Base Size File
------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0xfffffa8003d9e220 tcpip.sys 0xfffff88001600000 0x1c0000 tcpip.sys

Modscan Output:
Offset(P) Name Base Size File
------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0xfffffa8003d9e220 tcpip.sys 0xfffff88001600000 0x1c0000 tcpip.sys
0xfffffa8003dbf440 unknown.sys 0xfffff88002f5e000 0x50000 unknown.sys

If `unknown.sys` appears in `modscan` but not in `modules`, it may be suspicious.

Step 4: Obtain the Base Address of the Suspicious Driver

From the `modscan` output:

plaintext

unknown.sys 0xfffff88002f5e000 0x50000

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 The base address is `0xfffff88002f5e000`.

Step 5: Dump the Malicious Driver

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 moddump -b 0xfffff88002f5e000 -D

/path/to/output

Summary

1. Determine Profile: `imageinfo`

2. Check for Hidden Processes and Modules: `psxview`, `psscan`, `modules`, `modscan`
3. Identify Suspicious Drivers: Compare `modules` and `modscan` outputs
4. Obtain Base Address: From `modscan` output
5. Dump Malicious Driver: `moddump`

By following these steps, you can identify and extract potential rootkits or malicious drivers from a
memory image for further analysis.

types of hooks in Volatility

In the context of memory analysis and Volatility, hooks are modifications made to the normal control
flow of a system, often by malicious software to intercept and alter the execution of system functions
for nefarious purposes. Various types of hooks can be detected using Volatility plugins:

1. Inline Hooks

Inline hooks involve modifying the first few instructions of a function to jump to a malicious code
segment. This is often used to alter the behavior of critical functions.

Plugin: `malfind`
Detects inline hooks by looking for injected code and inline function modifications.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> malfind

2. Import Address Table (IAT) Hooks

IAT hooks modify the Import Address Table entries to redirect function calls to malicious code. The IAT
is used by a process to locate the addresses of functions imported from DLLs.

Plugin: `iat`

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 Scans for IAT hooks by examining the Import Address Table of processes.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> iat

3. Export Address Table (EAT) Hooks

EAT hooks modify the Export Address Table entries of a DLL to redirect function calls to malicious
code.

Plugin: `ldrmodules`
Can help detect EAT hooks by identifying discrepancies in loaded modules and the
functions they export.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ldrmodules

4. System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) Hooks

SSDT hooks involve modifying entries in the System Service Descriptor Table to redirect system calls to
malicious handlers. This type of hook is often used by rootkits.

Plugin: `ssdt`
Lists the SSDT entries and detects any hooks.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ssdt

5. Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooks

IDT hooks involve modifying the Interrupt Descriptor Table entries to intercept hardware interrupts
and exceptions, potentially redirecting them to malicious code.

Plugin: `idt`
Lists the IDT entries and detects any hooks.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> idt

6. Driver Object Hooks

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 Driver object hooks involve modifying function pointers in driver objects, such as major function
pointers, to intercept and manipulate IRPs (I/O Request Packets).

Plugin: `driverirp`
Lists the major function pointers for driver objects and detects any hooks.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> driverirp

7. Kernel Hooks

Kernel hooks involve modifying pointers within kernel structures to redirect execution flow. These can
be hooks in various kernel structures such as the Kernel Processor Control Region (KPCR).

Plugin: `kpcrscan`
Scans for KPCR hooks by examining the Kernel Processor Control Region.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> kpcrscan

Example Workflow

To systematically check for hooks using Volatility, you can use the following commands:

1. Inline Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> malfind

2. IAT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> iat

3. EAT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ldrmodules

4. SSDT Hooks:

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 shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> ssdt

5. IDT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> idt

6. Driver Object Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> driverirp

7. Kernel Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=<PROFILE> kpcrscan

Summary

Volatility provides a variety of plugins to detect different types of hooks, which can be indicators of
rootkits or other malicious activities. By systematically running these plugins, you can uncover hidden
or malicious modifications to system functions and structures.

To check for hooks using Volatility, give complete commands with the options like -r -p -d

To check for various types of hooks using Volatility, you need to use specific plugins with their
appropriate options. Here are the complete commands with options for checking different types of
hooks:

Inline Hooks with `malfind`

The `malfind` plugin is used to detect inline hooks by searching for injected code and modified
instructions in process memory.

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 shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 malfind -D /path/to/output

`-D /path/to/output`: Specifies the directory to save the dumped memory regions.

Import Address Table (IAT) Hooks with `iat`

The `iat` plugin detects IAT hooks by examining the Import Address Table of processes.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 iat -p <PID> -r

`-p <PID>`: Specifies the process ID to inspect.

`-r`: Prints the raw table entries.

Export Address Table (EAT) Hooks with `ldrmodules`

The `ldrmodules` plugin helps detect EAT hooks by identifying discrepancies in loaded modules and
their exported functions.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 ldrmodules

System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) Hooks with `ssdt`

The `ssdt` plugin lists the SSDT entries and detects any hooks.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 ssdt

Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooks with `idt`

The `idt` plugin lists the IDT entries and detects any hooks.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 idt

Driver Object Hooks with `driverirp`

The `driverirp` plugin lists the major function pointers for driver objects and detects any hooks.

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 shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 driverirp

Kernel Hooks with `kpcrscan`

The `kpcrscan` plugin scans for KPCR hooks by examining the Kernel Processor Control Region.

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 kpcrscan

Example Commands with Options

Here is a complete set of commands to check for various types of hooks using Volatility, with the
necessary options:

1. Inline Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 malfind -D /path/to/output

2. IAT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 iat -p <PID> -r

3. EAT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 ldrmodules

4. SSDT Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 ssdt

5. IDT Hooks:

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 shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 idt

6. Driver Object Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 driverirp

7. Kernel Hooks:

shell

volatility -f test.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 kpcrscan

These commands, with the appropriate options, will help you thoroughly check for different types of
hooks in a memory image using Volatility. Make sure to replace placeholders like `<PID>` and
`/path/to/output` with actual values specific to your analysis.

explain this output in detail :

$ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw --profile=Win7SP0x64 modules -P
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
Offset(P) Name Base Size File
------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0x0000000017fe01a0 ntoskrnl.exe 0xfffff8000261a000 0x5dd000
\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
0x0000000017fe00b0 hal.dll 0xfffff80002bf7000 0x49000
\SystemRoot\system32\hal.dll
0x0000000017fe6950 kdcom.dll 0xfffff80000bb4000 0xa000
\SystemRoot\system32\kdcom.dll
0x0000000017fe6860 mcupdate.dll 0xfffff88000c3a000 0x44000
\SystemRoot\system32\mcupdate_GenuineIntel.dll
0x0000000017fe6780 PSHED.dll 0xfffff88000c7e000 0x14000
\SystemRoot\system32\PSHED.dll
0x0000000017fe6690 CLFS.SYS 0xfffff88000c92000 0x5e000
\SystemRoot\system32\CLFS.SYS
0x0000000017fe7010 CI.dll 0xfffff88000cf0000 0xc0000
\SystemRoot\system32\CI.dll
[snip]

The output provided is from running the `modules` plugin in Volatility, which lists the kernel modules
loaded into memory. Let's break down the details of each field in the output:

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 Command:

shell

$ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw --profile=Win7SP0x64 modules -P

`-f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw`: Specifies the path to the memory image file.

`--profile=Win7SP0x64`: Specifies the profile (operating system and architecture) to use for
analysis.
`modules`: The Volatility plugin used to list kernel modules.
`-P`: Option to show the physical address (this option might be used to show the base addresses
in physical memory rather than virtual addresses).

Output Explanation:

Columns:

1. Offset(P):
This is the offset of the module in the memory image. It's a relative address within the
memory image file where the module is loaded.
Example: `0x0000000017fe01a0`.
2. Name:
The name of the module or driver loaded into memory.
Example: `ntoskrnl.exe`.
3. Base:
This is the base address where the module is loaded in virtual memory. It shows where the
module starts in the address space of the process.
Example: `0xfffff8000261a000`.
4. Size:
The size of the module in memory, indicating how much space it occupies.
Example: `0x5dd000`.
5. File:
The path to the file on disk from which the module was loaded.
Example: `\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe`.

Detailed Breakdown of the Output:

1. `ntoskrnl.exe`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe01a0`
Base: `0xfffff8000261a000`
Size: `0x5dd000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe`
Explanation: This is the main Windows kernel image. It handles core system functions and is
critical to the operating system's operation.

2. `hal.dll`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe00b0`

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 Base: `0xfffff80002bf7000`
Size: `0x49000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\hal.dll`
Explanation: This is the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) which provides a layer of abstraction
between the hardware and the operating system.

3. `kdcom.dll`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe6950`
Base: `0xfffff80000bb4000`
Size: `0xa000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\kdcom.dll`
Explanation: The kernel debugger communication DLL, used for communication between the
debugger and the kernel.

4. `mcupdate.dll`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe6860`
Base: `0xfffff88000c3a000`
Size: `0x44000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\mcupdate_GenuineIntel.dll`
Explanation: A module for updating the system's microcode, which can include processor
updates.

5. `PSHED.dll`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe6780`
Base: `0xfffff88000c7e000`
Size: `0x14000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\PSHED.dll`
Explanation: This DLL is related to the Platform-specific Hardware Error Driver (PSHED), which
helps with handling hardware errors.

6. `CLFS.SYS`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe6690`
Base: `0xfffff88000c92000`
Size: `0x5e000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\CLFS.SYS`
Explanation: The Common Log File System (CLFS) driver handles logging for various system
operations.

7. `CI.dll`:

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe7010`
Base: `0xfffff88000cf0000`
Size: `0xc0000`
File: `\SystemRoot\system32\CI.dll`
Explanation: This DLL is related to code integrity, which is used to ensure that code loaded into
the system has not been tampered with.

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 Summary

This output provides a snapshot of kernel modules loaded into memory at the time the memory dump
was captured. Each module has a base address, size, and file path associated with it, which helps in
identifying loaded drivers and system components. By examining this output, you can detect
anomalies such as unauthorized or suspicious modules that could indicate potential rootkits or
malicious activities.

explain in more detail :The output shows the offset of the LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structure,
which is a virtual address by default but can be specified as a physical address with the -P switch
as shown below. In either case, the Base column is the virtual address of the module's base in
kernel memory (where you'd expect to find the PE header).

In the context of Volatility and analyzing memory dumps, the `modules` plugin lists kernel modules
and drivers loaded into memory. The output of this plugin provides several pieces of information
about each module, including its offset, base address, size, and file path. Here's a detailed explanation
of the terms and concepts used in the output, especially focusing on the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY`
structure and address types:

LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY Structure

LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY: This is a Windows kernel structure used by the loader to manage

loaded modules (executables, DLLs, and drivers). Each loaded module has an entry in a linked list
maintained by the Windows kernel, which includes various details about the module, such as its
base address, size, and other attributes.

Explanation of the Output

1. Offset(P):
This column shows the offset of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure in the memory dump.
Virtual Address by Default: By default, the offset shown is the virtual address of the
`LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` in the address space of the process.
Physical Address with `-P` Switch: If you use the `-P` switch, Volatility will convert this to
a physical address, which is useful if you are analyzing raw memory dumps and need to
correlate physical memory addresses directly.
2. Base:
This column shows the base address of the module in virtual memory.
Virtual Address: The base address is where the module starts in the kernel’s virtual
address space. This is where the module's PE (Portable Executable) header is located and
where the module's code and data reside.
Purpose: This address helps you locate the module in memory and can be used to access
the module's content directly for further analysis.

Example of the Output

Consider the output for a module:

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 plaintext

Offset(P) Name Base Size File

------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0x0000000017fe01a0 ntoskrnl.exe 0xfffff8000261a000 0x5dd000
\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe

Offset(P): 0x0000000017fe01a0
This is the offset of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure for `ntoskrnl.exe` in the memory
dump. By default, this is a virtual address within the kernel's address space.
Base: 0xfffff8000261a000
This is the virtual address where `ntoskrnl.exe` is loaded in memory. This base address
points to the start of the module's code and data sections. This is where you’d expect to find
the PE header of the module.
Size: 0x5dd000
This is the size of the `ntoskrnl.exe` module in memory.
File: \SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
This is the path to the module file on disk.

Usage

Locating Modules: The base address is critical for locating the module's starting point in
memory, which can be used to examine the module's contents, verify its integrity, or investigate
any anomalies.
Identifying Loaded Modules: By comparing the list of modules and their base addresses, you
can identify which modules are loaded and detect any unauthorized or suspicious modules.
Mapping Addresses: Knowing the base address helps map virtual addresses to physical
addresses if needed, especially when cross-referencing with other memory analysis tools.

Summary

The `Offset(P)` column represents the offset of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure, which by
default is shown as a virtual address.
The Base column represents the virtual address where the module is loaded in memory.
The `-P` switch can be used to convert offsets to physical addresses, but for most purposes, the
virtual address provided is sufficient to locate and analyze modules in memory.

Understanding these details helps in investigating loaded modules, identifying hidden or malicious
modules, and performing a thorough forensic analysis of memory dumps.

base + offset = location of File correct ?

Not exactly. The `Base` and `Offset` values in the Volatility `modules` plugin output do not directly add
up to provide the location of the file on disk. Here’s a clarification of how these values are used and
interpreted:

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 Understanding `Base` and `Offset`

1. Base Address:
The `Base` address in the output represents the starting virtual address of the module in
memory. This is where the module's code and data are loaded in the kernel's address
space.
2. Offset(P):
The `Offset(P)` value indicates the offset of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure within the
memory dump. This structure contains metadata about the loaded module, such as its base
address and size.

How to Use These Values

Base Address: This is where the module begins in memory. For example, if `ntoskrnl.exe` has a
base address of `0xfffff8000261a000`, this tells you where in virtual memory the module is
loaded.
Offset(P): This is an address within the memory image that tells you where the
`LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure for the module is located. It is useful for locating where the
module's metadata is stored in the memory dump but does not directly relate to the module’s
file location on disk.

Example of Calculation and Usage

Suppose you have the following output:

plaintext

Offset(P) Name Base Size File

------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0x0000000017fe01a0 ntoskrnl.exe 0xfffff8000261a000 0x5dd000
\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe

Base: `0xfffff8000261a000` is the virtual address in memory where `ntoskrnl.exe` is loaded.

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe01a0` is where the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` for `ntoskrnl.exe` is located
in the memory dump.

Locating the File on Disk

The `File` column in the output provides the path to the module's file on disk, not something derived
from the base address and offset. The path `\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe` tells you where the
file can be found on the file system.

Summary

The `Base` address is where the module's code and data are loaded in memory.
The `Offset(P)` is the location of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure within the memory dump.
The `File` column provides the location of the module file on disk.

The `Base` and `Offset(P)` do not directly combine to give a file location but are used for different
aspects of memory analysis:

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 Base Address: For locating and analyzing module contents in memory.
Offset(P): For locating the module's metadata structure in the memory dump.

The file path (`File` column) is what tells you where the module is located on disk.

base + offset = ?

Let's clarify the concepts of `base` and `offset` and address how they relate to each other in the
context of the Volatility output and memory analysis:

Base Address

Base Address: This is the virtual address where the module is loaded in the system's memory. It
represents the starting point of the module in memory. For example, `0xfffff8000261a000` for
`ntoskrnl.exe`.

Offset

Offset: This represents the location of the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` structure within the memory
dump. It is an address within the memory image that Volatility uses to identify where the
metadata for a module is stored.

Relation Between Base and Offset

The base address and offset in Volatility's `modules` output are used for different purposes:

1. Base Address: Used to locate where a module starts in the virtual address space of the kernel.
2. Offset: Used to locate the metadata entry for the module within the memory image.

The relationship between the two is not a simple addition to yield a meaningful address. They serve
different roles:

Base Address: Points to the start of the module in memory.

Offset: Points to where Volatility found the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` in the memory image.

What Happens if You Add Base and Offset?

Adding the `base` and `offset` values does not yield a useful address in the context of Volatility
output. They are different types of addresses:

Base Address: A virtual address in the kernel's memory space.

Offset: An address in the memory dump file.

Example to Clarify

Given the output:

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 plaintext

Offset(P) Name Base Size File

------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0x0000000017fe01a0 ntoskrnl.exe 0xfffff8000261a000 0x5dd000
\SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe

Base: `0xfffff8000261a000` (virtual address where `ntoskrnl.exe` is loaded).

Offset(P): `0x0000000017fe01a0` (location of `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` in the memory image).

Adding these two values:

`0xfffff8000261a000` (Base)
`0x0000000017fe01a0` (Offset)

Results in:

shell

0xfffff8000261a000 + 0x0000000017fe01a0 = 0xfffff8000261a000 + 0x17fe01a0 = 0x100017fdd000

The resulting value, `0x100017fdd000`, does not represent a meaningful address in the context of
memory analysis.

Correct Usage

Instead of adding these values, you should use them for their intended purposes:

Base Address: To locate and analyze the module's code and data in the memory.
Offset: To locate and inspect the metadata entry for the module within the memory image.

Summary

Base Address and Offset are not meant to be added together.

Base Address: Locates the start of a module in memory.
Offset: Locates the `LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY` in the memory dump.

Understanding these addresses and their distinct roles is key to effective memory analysis.

explain this output in detail: $ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw --

profile=Win7SP0x64 ssdt
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
[x64] Gathering all referenced SSDTs from KeAddSystemServiceTable...
Finding appropriate address space for tables...
SSDT[0] at fffff8000268cb00 with 401 entries
Entry 0x0000: 0xfffff80002a9d190 (NtMapUserPhysicalPagesScatter) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0001: 0xfffff80002983a00 (NtWaitForSingleObject) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0002: 0xfffff80002683dd0 (NtCallbackReturn) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0003: 0xfffff800029a6b10 (NtReadFile) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
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 Entry 0x0004: 0xfffff800029a4bb0 (NtDeviceIoControlFile) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0005: 0xfffff8000299fee0 (NtWriteFile) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0006: 0xfffff80002945dc0 (NtRemoveIoCompletion) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0007: 0xfffff80002942f10 (NtReleaseSemaphore) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0008: 0xfffff8000299ada0 (NtReplyWaitReceivePort) owned by ntoskrnl.exe
Entry 0x0009: 0xfffff80002a6ce20 (NtReplyPort) owned by ntoskrnl.exe

[snip]

SSDT[1] at fffff96000101c00 with 827 entries

Entry 0x1000: 0xfffff960000f5580 (NtUserGetThreadState) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1001: 0xfffff960000f2630 (NtUserPeekMessage) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1002: 0xfffff96000103c6c (NtUserCallOneParam) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1003: 0xfffff96000111dd0 (NtUserGetKeyState) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1004: 0xfffff9600010b1ac (NtUserInvalidateRect) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1005: 0xfffff96000103e70 (NtUserCallNoParam) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1006: 0xfffff960000fb5a0 (NtUserGetMessage) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1007: 0xfffff960000dfbec (NtUserMessageCall) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1008: 0xfffff960001056c4 (NtGdiBitBlt) owned by win32k.sys
Entry 0x1009: 0xfffff960001fd750 (NtGdiGetCharSet) owned by win32k.sys

The output of the `ssdt` plugin in Volatility is used to examine the System Service Descriptor Tables
(SSDTs) present in the memory dump. SSDTs are critical components of the Windows operating system
that manage system service calls from user-mode applications to kernel-mode code. Here’s a detailed
breakdown of the output:

Command:

shell

$ python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw --profile=Win7SP0x64 ssdt

`-f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw`: Specifies the path to the memory dump file.

`--profile=Win7SP0x64`: Defines the profile to match the memory dump’s operating system and
architecture (Windows 7, Service Pack 0, 64-bit).
`ssdt`: The Volatility plugin used to list the System Service Descriptor Tables (SSDTs) and their
entries.

Output Explained:

General Information:

Gathering all referenced SSDTs from KeAddSystemServiceTable...: This line indicates that
Volatility is locating all SSDTs by searching for references to the `KeAddSystemServiceTable`
function, which is used to manage the SSDTs.
Finding appropriate address space for tables...: Volatility is determining where the SSDTs are
located in memory.

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 SSDT Entries:

SSDT[0] at fffff8000268cb00 with 401 entries:

`SSDT[0]`: This is the first SSDT found.
`fffff8000268cb00`: The base virtual address where this SSDT is located.
401 entries: The number of entries in this SSDT.

Entries of SSDT[0]:

Entry 0x0000: 0xfffff80002a9d190 (NtMapUserPhysicalPagesScatter) owned by ntoskrnl.exe

Entry 0x0000: The index of the entry in the SSDT.
0xfffff80002a9d190: The address of the function in kernel space.
NtMapUserPhysicalPagesScatter: The name of the system service function.
owned by ntoskrnl.exe: Indicates that this function is part of the `ntoskrnl.exe` module.
Subsequent entries follow the same format, showing other system service functions like
`NtWaitForSingleObject`, `NtCallbackReturn`, etc.
[snip]: This indicates that not all entries are shown in the output. The output has been truncated
for brevity.
SSDT[1] at fffff96000101c00 with 827 entries:
`SSDT[1]`: This is the second SSDT found.
`fffff96000101c00`: The base virtual address where this SSDT is located.
827 entries: The number of entries in this SSDT.

Entries of SSDT[1]:

Entry 0x1000: 0xfffff960000f5580 (NtUserGetThreadState) owned by win32k.sys

Entry 0x1000: The index of the entry in the SSDT.
0xfffff960000f5580: The address of the function in kernel space.
NtUserGetThreadState: The name of the system service function.
owned by win32k.sys: Indicates that this function is part of the `win32k.sys` module.
Subsequent entries show functions like `NtUserPeekMessage`, `NtUserCallOneParam`, etc.

Detailed Breakdown:

1. SSDT Base Address:

This is where the SSDT starts in memory. It’s a pointer to the table that contains system
service function pointers.
2. Entries:
Each entry in the SSDT corresponds to a system service function provided by the kernel or
system components.
The entries show the function addresses, which are used by the operating system to
perform system calls.
3. Ownership:
The output specifies which module (e.g., `ntoskrnl.exe` or `win32k.sys`) owns each
function entry. This helps identify which system component is responsible for each service.
4. Function Addresses:
The addresses listed are where the actual implementation of each system call resides in
kernel memory.

Practical Uses:

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 Detection of Rootkits: Malicious rootkits may hook or modify entries in SSDTs to hide their
presence or alter system behavior. Comparing the SSDT entries to known good values can help
detect such modifications.
System Analysis: Analyzing SSDT entries can provide insights into system services and their
locations, which is useful for understanding system behavior and identifying anomalies.

Summary:

The output from the `ssdt` plugin lists System Service Descriptor Tables and their entries,
including function addresses and module ownership.
It provides a snapshot of how system services are managed and can be used for forensic
analysis, including detecting malicious modifications or understanding system behavior.

comparing how the two sycalls (sys_kill in the pristine system and sys_kill in the infected system)
to see how a hook looks like in Volatility by using linux_volshell and linux_check_syscall

To compare the `sys_kill` syscall between a pristine system and an infected system using Volatility,
you can use the `linux_volshell` and `linux_check_syscall` plugins. This will help you identify any
hooks or modifications that may indicate the presence of a rootkit or other malicious activity.

Step-by-Step Process:

1. Identify the Profile and Memory Dump:

Ensure you have the appropriate memory dump files for both the pristine and infected systems
and that the correct profiles are used for each.
2. Run `linux_check_syscall` on Both Dumps:
This will list all the syscall table entries, allowing you to locate `sys_kill`.

Pristine System:

shell

$ python vol.py -f pristine_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_check_syscall

Infected System:

shell

$ python vol.py -f infected_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_check_syscall

3. Compare the `sys_kill` Entries:

Look for differences between the `sys_kill` entries in the pristine and infected systems.

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 Example of Output:

Pristine System:

yaml

Entry 62: 0xffffffff81067890 (sys_kill)

Infected System:

yaml

Entry 62: 0xffffffff81234567 (sys_kill) (hooked)

In the example above, the `sys_kill` syscall address differs between the pristine and infected
systems, indicating a potential hook.

4. Use `linux_volshell` to Investigate Further:

Launch Volatility’s interactive shell to investigate the differences in more detail.

Pristine System:

shell

$ python vol.py -f pristine_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_volshell

Infected System:

shell

$ python vol.py -f infected_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_volshell

5. Examine the `sys_kill` Function in Both Systems:

Inside `linux_volshell`, disassemble and examine the `sys_kill` function for differences.

Pristine System:

shell

Volshell> db 0xffffffff81067890

Infected System:

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 shell

Volshell> db 0xffffffff81234567

Interpreting the Output:

Pristine System:
The `sys_kill` function should match the known good implementation of the syscall.
Infected System:
If the address points to an unexpected location or the disassembly shows unexpected
instructions, this indicates that the `sys_kill` function has been hooked.

Summary:

1. Run `linux_check_syscall` on both pristine and infected systems to list syscall table entries.
2. Compare the `sys_kill` entries between the two systems to identify any differences.
3. Use `linux_volshell` to further investigate the differences by disassembling the `sys_kill`
function in both systems.

By following these steps, you can identify hooks and modifications in syscalls that indicate potential
rootkit activity or other forms of malware in the infected system.

examples of use linux_volshell

`linux_volshell` is an interactive shell within Volatility that allows you to examine and manipulate the
Linux memory image in a detailed manner. Here are some examples of how to use `linux_volshell`
for various investigative tasks, including checking for syscall hooks.

1. Starting `linux_volshell`

Start `linux_volshell` with the appropriate profile and memory dump file:

shell

$ python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_volshell

2. Basic Commands

List Available Commands:

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 shell

Volshell> help

Display Information about the Current Context:

shell

Volshell> ctx

3. Inspecting Processes

List All Processes:

shell

Volshell> tasks

Switch to a Specific Process Context:

shell

Volshell> tasks
Volshell> cc <task_struct_address>

Replace `<task_struct_address>` with the actual address of the task struct from the `tasks` command.

4. Inspecting Memory

Display Memory at a Specific Address:

shell

Volshell> db <address>

Replace `<address>` with the actual memory address.

Disassemble Code at a Specific Address:

shell

Volshell> dis <address>

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 Replace `<address>` with the actual memory address.

5. Example: Investigating a Syscall Hook

Check the Syscall Table:

First, use `linux_check_syscall` to find the address of the `sys_kill` syscall in both pristine and
infected systems.

shell

$ python vol.py -f pristine_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_check_syscall

...
Entry 62: 0xffffffff81067890 (sys_kill)
...

$ python vol.py -f infected_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_check_syscall

...
Entry 62: 0xffffffff81234567 (sys_kill) (hooked)
...

Start `linux_volshell` for the Infected System:

shell

$ python vol.py -f infected_memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_volshell

Examine the `sys_kill` Function:

1. Disassemble the `sys_kill` function at the suspected hooked address:

shell

Volshell> dis 0xffffffff81234567

2. Compare it with the pristine system `sys_kill` address:

shell

Volshell> dis 0xffffffff81067890

6. Investigating Modules

List Loaded Kernel Modules:

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 shell

Volshell> modules

Dump the Address Range of a Module:

shell

Volshell> module <module_name>

Replace `<module_name>` with the name of the module you're interested in.

7. Example: Checking for Rootkits

List Hidden Processes:

Use a combination of `linux_pslist` and `linux_psscan` to find hidden processes.

shell

$ python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_pslist

$ python vol.py -f memory_dump.raw --profile=LinuxProfile linux_psscan

Compare the outputs to identify discrepancies.

8. Advanced Memory Inspections

Dump a Memory Region to a File:

shell

Volshell> dump -p <physical_address> -l <length> -f <filename>

Replace `<physical_address>`, `<length>`, and `<filename>` with the respective values.

Summary

Here’s a summarized step-by-step guide to use `linux_volshell` for comparing the `sys_kill` syscall
in pristine and infected systems:

1. Run `linux_check_syscall` on both pristine and infected systems to identify `sys_kill`

addresses.
2. Start `linux_volshell` with the infected system memory dump.
3. Disassemble the `sys_kill` function at the identified addresses in both pristine and infected
systems.
4. Compare the disassembly to identify any hooks or modifications.

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 This approach helps in identifying malicious hooks in syscalls, which is a common technique used by
rootkits to hide their presence or intercept system calls.
‫ يمكن أن تصدر عن‬ChatGPT ‫ لذلك يجب التحقق من المعلومات المهمة‬.‫بعض األخطاء‬.

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