Leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) will meet in Kazan, Russia

from October 22-24 for the 16th BRICS Summit. BRICS will welcome its five new members
(Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), with at least 24 other
prospective members joining the summit. As BRICS expands and looks to become a more
influential player in world affairs, India faces the increasingly complicated task of continuing
to deepen ties with the United States and play a leading role in Russian- and Chinese-
dominant global forums, like BRICS.
Jagannath Panda, head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the
Institute for Security and Development Policy, discusses India’s views on BRICS expansion,
what its membership in the grouping says about India’s foreign policy and how it impacts ties
with the U.S.
In 2024, five new countries joined BRICS, and dozens of other countries have
expressed interest in joining. Where does India stand on BRICS expansion and does
its position differ from that of Russia and China?Panda: Kazan marks the first BRICS
summit since its expansion and will also include other Global South nations that have
expressed interest in joining. While BRICS expansion has brought attention to its collective
economic power, the grouping currently has very little in the way of an organizational
structure or achievements. Hence, this summit may include deliberations on the challenges of
integrating a larger, more diverse membership and deepening cooperation within the
grouping, perhaps through a “partner country” and “observer country” model.Discussion of
subsequent expansions are premature, India will continue to be cautious and reserve
judgment in this area realizing the significance that China holds in the grouping. India’s
support for the recently added members to the BRICS forum was rooted more in backing
members that could add economic vigor to the grouping such as the UAE, its own strategic
partnerships with the newly added countries, and a desire to see greater global
representation. In the future, too, India is likely to support states, including those in Southeast
Asia, with similar interest-based criteria, disregarding states with a clear “anti-India” agenda
such as Pakistan.

India sees BRICS and its expansion as a multipolar base to expand its economic outreach in
the Middle East and beyond.

For New Delhi, BRICS provides significant leverage for promoting India’s global leadership
aspirations, as well as strategic autonomy and multipolar vision both in the West and the
Global South. The optics of India as a bridge between Western (like the Quad) and non-
Western forums, or even a participant in both, creates a favorable impression about its
bargaining capacity. Not to mention, the opportunities to maneuver a wide range of states for
its multi-aligned foreign policy objectives at a time when its economic power appears to be on
the rise. Access also allows greater coordination potential in regions such as Central Asia or
West Asia where China is stronger than ever.
New Delhi expects that the expansion of BRICS will further boost India’s strategic position
across the world (particularly in the Middle East). While many consider BRICS a China-driven
multilateral Eurasian project, for India it is an important part of its foreign policy matrix. In
other words, India sees BRICS and its expansion as a multipolar base to expand its economic
outreach in the Middle East and beyond.
What are the key items on the agenda for the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan,
and what should observers be watching for from India?

Panda: Russia holds the presidency of BRICS this year. That Russian President Vladimir Putin
is hosting the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan — the capital of Tatarstan in the Russian
heartland of the Volga region — is in itself a statement. The location showcases Russian
affluence and an identity that is a blend of both East and West and hosting the summit there
advances Moscow’s effort to project itself in a better light and demonstrate that it is not
entirely an isolated country internationally. The crisis in the Middle East, rather than the war
in Ukraine, is likely to dominate the conversation, as a large section of the Global South has
strongly condemned Israel’s actions following Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack.
India’s stance on Israel has differed somewhat from other BRICS members. In the latest
vote at the U.N. General Assembly on a resolution calling for the end to Israel’s occupation of
Palestinian territories, India and Ethiopia were the only two BRICS countries that abstained,
while all others were for the resolution. While India’s position on the Middle East conflict is
unlikely to play a role in the summit — divisions are not uncommon among BRICS members —
it may matter for longer-term competition with China to be viewed as a leader of the Global
South. China has been heavily critical of Israel over the last year, hosted rival Palestinian
factions for reconciliation talks, and aligned itself with the Arab world and much of the Global
South on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The development of a BRICS-centric financial system remains a top priority, particularly as
two member countries (Russia and Iran) now have various sectors including the economy and
military hindered by Western sanctions. This ties into broader efforts toward economic
sovereignty and stability within the group, especially amid global shifts toward de-
dollarization.
But the new BRICS currency seems unfeasible for now. India would be cautious of “de-
dollarization” or even using local currencies for trade, depending on the viability of the
partner state. While rupee-ruble trade has increased, Indian financial regulators are
still wary of granting licenses to Russian banks. Earlier this year, India’s top banker, Reserve
Bank of India Governor Shaktikanta Das, dismissed “de-dollarization” as a “media creation.”
The summit will, however, look to enhance the grouping’s New Development Bank as a viable
alternative to Western financial institutions for financing sustainable projects in Global South
economies.
Russia has outlined a broad-based agenda for the Kazan summit. But the focus is likely to be
on the strategic-political agenda, in particular advancing multipolarity and multilateralism and
coalescing a middle power-led opposition to the Western-led liberal order. While India does
not have an anti-West agenda, this vision of a multipolar world is consistent with its interests
to increase its own capabilities and influence — which necessitates some reduction in Western
dominance — but is not as firmly rooted in Russia and China’s anti-West rhetoric.
The BRICS summit will bring Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi together in person. Do
you expect any breakthroughs in the difficult relationship between China and
India?Panda: The BRICS summit provides a rare opportunity for direct dialogue between
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a time when mutual
distrust is palpable. The two leaders could address their essential concerns over the
prolonged standoff at their border and trade imbalances in a multilateral setting, where both
leaders can explore cooperative avenues under the BRICS framework.

However, the meeting, if it happens, is unlikely to produce any immediate breakthroughs in

their strained relationship. Although there has been some military disengagement along the
disputed border between India and China following successful diplomatic and military
negotiations, the lack of high-level interaction at the leadership level and
India’s continued stance that the border needs to be addressed before moving forward with
the bilateral relationship, makes it unlikely that the summit will produce any major
breakthroughs.
Nevertheless, any diplomatic progress, even incremental, could lay the groundwork for
reducing regional friction and enhancing cooperation in trade, technology and infrastructure
development within BRICS. In keeping with recent trends, India’s China stance may soften
temporarily due to such a type of leadership meeting, though not permanently as the issues
between the two sides are complex and long drawn.
How does India’s role in BRICS, a group that includes Russia, China, and now Iran,
complicate its deepening ties with the United States?India’s relationship with anti-U.S.
BRICS states like Russia and Iran adds a layer to the already complex India-U.S. dynamics, but
this is nothing new. India has a long-standing policy of strategic autonomy, striving to pursue
its interests in its relations with the United States and countries like Russia and China.India’s
economic rise and push for security ties with the West may grant it further leverage to
moderate the more aggressive stances of China and Russia.BRICS serves as a platform for
India to advocate for multipolarity and alternatives to U.S.-dominated institutions. This would
seemingly hinder Delhi’s deepening security ties with the Washington. But India’s presence in
these China-dominated, non-Western forums may also play a constructive role as U.S.
relationships with China, Russia and Iran become more confrontational, particularly for
shaping out to be completely an anti-West sentiment. India’s economic rise and push for
security ties with the West may grant it further leverage to moderate the more aggressive
stances of China and Russia.Further, India’s diplomacy during the Ukraine war and its
continuing trade with Russia have not significantly hindered U.S.-India ties, and it’s unlikely
that BRICS would pose any additional complications.India’s focus within BRICS has been on
showcasing multipolarity and advocating for equitable global governance, a stance in India’s
foreign policy that the U.S. is well aware of. The inclusion of Iran, while complex, also offers
India a chance to stabilize regional dynamics without directly antagonizing the United States
— a predictable, precarious diplomatic balancing for India, especially given the escalating
Iran-Israel conflict.

On another note, how the addition of new members shifts the nature of BRICS functioning is of
interest to both the United States and India. Although going by past summits’ non-
productive outcomes, a major achievement this time around should not be expected too.
Overall, India’s presence in BRICS can be seen as a strategic asset that adds depth to its
foreign policy without obstructing the development of security ties with the United States.
Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific
Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden. He is also a senior fellow
at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands and a professor at the University
of Warsaw. Dr. Panda is the series editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.
Leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) will gather in Kazan, Russia, next week for the
group’s annual summit, along with an expanded roster of members. This is the first BRICS summit since Egypt,
Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE and joined earlier this year. Russia, which holds the BRICS presidency this year, has also
invited over two dozen other countries, which have expressed interest in joining the group, for the first “BRICS+”
summit. For President Vladimir Putin, hosting this summit is an opportunity to show that Western efforts to isolate
Moscow for its illegal war on Ukraine have not been successful and that Russia has friends around the globe.
BRICS leaders Russia and China aim to construct an alternative to Western-led security and financial architectures
and see expanding the group as an important step to that end. USIP’s Adam Gallagher and Andrew Cheatham explain
why so many countries want to join the group, how BRICS expansion intersects with other global trends and what it
means for the United States.
What’s behind so many countries’ interest in joining BRICS?

Gallagher: Over 30 countries have either formally applied or expressed interest in joining BRICS. These include
Southeast Asian states Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam; NATO member Turkey; major oil and gas producers like
Algeria; the world’s biggest Muslim country, Indonesia; Nigeria, which has the largest population in Africa; and the
world’s eighth most populous country, Bangladesh.
There are clear economic benefits to joining this burgeoning group of emerging economies. The 10 countries
(including Saudi Arabia, who has been invited but now formally accepted) that now make up BRICS represent 45
percent of the world's population, 28 percent of the world's economic output and 47 percent of global crude oil.
Intra-BRICS trade is one area that the group has found its footing. A joint statement coming out of the June 2024
BRICS foreign minister’s meeting encouraged “enhanced use of local currencies in trade and financial transactions”
among BRICS members. This was a trend that was already on the upswing between 2017-2022, with a 56 percent
increase in intra-BRICS trade in that timeframe. Western sanctions on Russia led to a further surge.
“Trade in goods among BRICS economies has considerably outpaced trade between the BRICS and G7 nations,
leading to greater intra-BRICS trade intensity,” notes a report from the Boston Consulting Group. Those interested in
joining BRICS believe membership will lead to increased trade and investment.
Western sanctions and the U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency are also part of the story. The dollar’s
dominance as a reserve currency and in trade for commodities like oil gives Washington immense influence over the
global financial system. Countries impacted by U.S. sanctions and export controls — like BRICS leaders Russia and
China, new members like Iran and wannabes like Venezuela — want to weaken the dollar’s power in order to evade
sanctions and tamp down U.S. influence.
Unsurprisingly, China has been at the forefront of this de-dollarization effort. China’s renminbi has overtaken the U.S.
dollar as the primary currency for Chinese-Russian trade and Beijing is coordinating with several major Middle East
oil producers to ramp up the use of yuan to settle oil transactions. Using local currencies for intra-BRICS trade,
however, is often viewed as an interim step to a loftier goal: a common BRICS currency. For now, most analysts see
this effort as either unfeasible or a distant prospect. At this year’s summit, Russia is expected to propose new
measures for an “alternative payment system” that would further sidestep the U.S. dollar.
For China and Russia, attenuating U.S. influence over the global financial system is part and parcel with building an
alternative to the broader U.S.-led international order. It’s no surprise that U.S. adversaries like Russia and China want
an alternative international system.
But many Global South countries also believe the current order disadvantages their interests and privileges wealthy
Western countries’. They saw inequities in the COVID response, and believed rich countries hoarded lifesaving
vaccines. Global South countries have also accused the U.S. of hypocrisy over its positions on the wars in Ukraine and
Gaza and suggest that the West only applies international law and norms when it suites their interests, rendering the
need for what they perceive as a more fair international order.
While dissatisfaction with the current international order is the dominant narrative surrounding BRICS expansion,
there are other prospective members, like Malaysia, and current members, like India, that want to maintain balanced
relations across the globe and are looking to cement their strategic autonomy. For these countries, it’s not about taking
sides. Some countries also believe BRICS membership will give them a greater voice and representation in
international politics. It’s not all about anti-Western ideology.
How is BRICS intersecting with global trends?

Cheatham: The BRICS summit comes at a pivotal moment as the United States sees its decades-long dominating
share of global leadership on the decline. The world is experiencing a significant paradigm shift in the distribution of
global power, which will have extensive consequences for international peace and security.
Amid Russian revanchism and a rising China, terms like "great power competition" or “the new Cold War” are often
used to describe the current global dynamic. Yet, this framing is increasingly inadequate. The rise of middle powers is
reshaping global politics. We are witnessing not just the rise of a few challengers to the U.S. and its Western allies,
but a broader "rise of the rest."
Multipolarity is the first trend that must be considered when thinking about BRICS’ growing relevance. From the
perspective of leaders across the Global South, multipolarity offers the most secure means of limiting hegemony,
which, if unchecked, poses a threat to their vision for international norms and global security. In this multipolar world,
the majority of states will work to encourage fluid alignments and discrete partnerships to help ensure power remains
diffuse. For now, this trend signals a period of upheaval in the current world order, with uncertain outcomes as to how
the balance of power will ultimately settle.
A stable and peaceful multipolar world will require a functioning multilateral system that is fit to tackle the unique
challenges of the 21st century. Unfortunately, we are seeing another trend of an increasingly dysfunctional and inept
multilateral institutions, centered around the United Nations system. The U.N. Security Council, a relic of the post-
World War II power structure, no longer reflects contemporary global dynamics. Calls for reform, while progressing,
go largely unheeded as the great powers cling to their vetoes.
Meanwhile, peacekeeping missions are underfunded and politically stalled, leaving conflict-affected countries mired
in violence, lawlessness and human suffering. The international development system is similarly broken, with many
countries trapped in debt crises and unable to leap into the digital and green economies. Peacemaking and U.N.
mediation efforts have also floundered, with protracted conflicts persisting. Accountability for war crimes
has similarly eroded since the lofty visions of the 1990s and the creation of International Criminal Court in 2002.
Humanitarian systems are overwhelmed and underfunded, as aid workers face increasing violence and insecurity.
Finally, the rise of authoritarianism and the resurgence of "civilization states" — which prioritize civilizational
identity over Western political norms, favoring sovereignty and cultural continuity over international rules — reflect a
global shift toward centralized governance that undermines adherence to Western notions of the rule of law.
Much has been written of the democracies in decline and the rise of authoritarianism. The World Justice Project’s
2023 Rule of Law Index shows that more than 6 billion people live in countries where the rule of law is declining.
However, this data should be considered alongside the rise of civilization states like China.
Other BRICS countries like Russia, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran embody the concept of civilization states by emphasizing
cultural and historical legacies over modern political models. One constant throughout the history of ancient
civilizations was the dominance of rulers over subjugated populations, with little regard for the rule of law as we
understand it today. At the “international” level, civilizations like this harken back to an era when territorial conquest
was the norm. Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine is a stark reminder of this.
The resurgence of civilization states and authoritarianism contributes to a further breakdown in the rule of law at both
national and international levels, where norms that should transcend individual leaders are increasingly eroded. This
revival should be particularly alarming, as it signals not only a retreat from democratic values but also a weakening of
global legal structures that maintain peace and accountability.
The trends discussed in this year’s BRICS meeting highlight a world grappling with the rise of multipolarity, declining
multilateral institutions and the growing dominance of authoritarian civilization states, signaling a profound shift away
from the democratic and legal norms that have long underpinned the international order.
What does this mean for the U.S.?

Gallagher: Washington should take these trends and developments seriously, but without alarmism. An expanded
BRICS could be a more formidable player on the international scene — or it could paralyze the group’s decision
making, as more countries with their own interests push their own agendas. While de-dollarization would reduce U.S.
influence, a BRICS currency or any other alternative is unlikely to emerge anytime soon, even as trends point to
diminishing reliance on the dollar.
An expanded BRICS could be a more formidable player on the international scene — or it could paralyze
the group’s decision making, as more countries with their own interests push their own agendas.

Outside of Russia and China, many of the BRICS+ countries want good relations with the U.S. and the West, too.
Saudi Arabia, for example, has been negotiating a deal with the U.S. to receive security guarantees from Washington
in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. India, a founding BRICS member, has dramatically deepened its
security ties with the U.S. in recent years. Vietnam and the United States inked a comprehensive strategic
partnership deal last year.
Still, BRICS is emerging as an alternative to Western geopolitical dominance and a powerful voice for Global South
countries. At a time of immense flux and change in global politics, the U.S. should take stock of what’s driving states’
interests in alternatives to the international order it has led since the end of World War II. The world has seen
an alarming rise in conflict in recent years. Multilateral institutions that were constructed decades ago have shown
they are unable to adequately address this trend. A new multipolar era requires a revamped multilateral system to
tackle today’s thorniest challenges, from war and climate change to pandemics and disruptive technologies like AI.
There is widespread agreement that such reform is needed. At this year’s U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. expressed
its support for Security Council reform, including the addition of two permanent seats for African countries. Taking
seriously Global South countries’ concerns over their lack of voice and representation at the head of the international
table is a good start.