CEMOTI

«Sectarianism and Shia Politics in Pakistan, 1979-Present»

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr

Abstract
The Iranian revolution has left a profound mark on Pakistan's politics in general and the role of religion therein, in
particular. The revolution underscored the importance of Islam to sociopolitical change, and provided impetus for Islamist
activism. Iran's drive to establish regional hegemony combined with growing Sunni resistance to its Shia characteristics
produced sectarian conflict. This conflict has fed on regional struggles for power between Iran and its Arab neighbors, and
competition for resources and influence between Sunnis and Shias in South Asia. The result has been a new form of
Islamist politics, one that draws on Islamism in tandem with identity politics. Its force has greatly impacted sociopolitical
relations in the region. The more lasting impact of the Iranian revolution in the region has not been promotion of Islamist
activism, but deep division between Shias and Sunnis, a sectarian discouse of power, and deepening of social cleavages
in the region. VN

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza. «Sectarianism and Shia Politics in Pakistan, 1979-Present». In: CEMOTI, n°28, 1999. Turquie
Israël. pp. 311-323;

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Fichier pdf généré le 28/03/2018

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SECTARIANISM AND SHIA POLITICS IN PAKISTAN

1 979-PRESENT

ValiNASR

Shia politics in Pakistan has undergone great change over the course of the
past two decades, the most notable of which has involved sectarian violence.
Since 1990 assassinations, machine gun attacks on mosques, and explosions
have claimed over 700 lives. One incident, a five day "war" involving mortar
guns, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles in a small town in North-
312 Vali NASR

West Pakistan in 1996, alone claimed hundreds of lives and many more
injured.
Although also culpable, the Shia have been disproportionately affected by
sectarian violence. In a three month period in 1977 75 Shia community
leaders were assassinated in Punjab, and this year, during the ten days leading
to the recent coup in Pakistan, some 45 Shia ulama and community leaders
were assassinated - allegedly on the orders of the military in order to
precipitate a law and order crisis.
The rise of sectarianism and recent changes in Shia politics in Pakistan is
closely tied to the Iranian revolution of 1979. The revolution intensified
Islamic activism across the Muslim world, as it invigorated Islamist
challenges to the authority of secular states, and inspired new ways of
thinking about legitimacy, authority, and conduct of politics.
In Pakistan, its most enduring impact was the radicalization of Shia and
Sunni identities. The Iranian revolution was at the outset perceived by Shias
as a Shia affair, and by Sunnis as an Islamic event. It therefore mobilized
Shia consciousness first. In time Sunnis too, viewed the revolution as more
Iranian and Shia than Islamic. It was then that Sunni identity too was
mobilized in reaction to the revolution and its impact on Pakistan.
Shias constitute 15-25% of Pakistan's population. Unlike Arab Shia
minority communities, Pakistan's Shias have not been an underprivileged
minority. Many of the Muslim League's early leaders and patrons, including
Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the country's founder and first leader), members of
the feudal elite, the top rank of the military the bureaucracy and the judiciary,
and the industrial and entrepreneurial elite have been Shias. In fact, the Shia
community has since before the partition of India been very closely associated
with the Pakistan movement and state.
As a consequence, Shias have at times been viewed by Sunnis as a
privileged minority - although the percentages of urban and rural poor is
higher in the Shia community. The sociopolitical status of Shias in Pakistan
became increasingly a point of contention as Pakistan's politics became
anchored in Islamic concerns from the late 1970s onwards.
In an Islamically conscious polity, whose definitions of orthodoxy and
Islamicity were drawn from puritanical Sunnism, Shia status was increasingly
open to challenge, especially since similar challenges to the status of
Ahmediya had bore fruit and helped mobilize support for Sunni Islamism.
In fact, by the late 1970s many among the Shia feared that Pakistan was
moving in the direction of declaring Shias a non-Muslim minority - as it had
done with the Ahmediya in 1 974 - thus excluding Shias from the mainstream
and positions of power.
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 313
It was against this backdrop that the initial impact of the Iranian revolution
was felt in Pakistan. The Iranian revolution empowered South Asian Shias,
initially at the symbolic level, but ultimately in tangible ways in society and
politics.
First, it was evident that, a Shia religious leader had carried out the most
spectacular Islamist victory to date against a secular state. In so doing
Ayatollah Khomeini had fulfilled a long-standing promise of Islamism -
largely a Sunni phenomenon up to that point - and proved to be the most
intractable and vigilant defender of Islamism. In fact, Khomeini quickly
dominated Islamism as he defined its goals and identified its enemies.
There is no doubt that for a period of time he was widely popular in South
Asia and was viewed as the undisputed leader of Islamism. This catapulted
Shi' ism to the forefront of the Islamist struggle for power, and gave them
confidence in asserting the claims of their faith and the interests of their
community before the dominant Sunni order. That after the revolution Iran
became the vanguard force in Islamist politics gave Shias a sense of pride - a
community that was worried about being declared "non-Muslim" now had
claim to leadership of Islamism.
For this reason, South Asian Shias were quick to claim the Iranian
revolution as a Shia event, and in so doing they undermined the more
universalist claims of the revolution in Tehran as an "Islamic" rather than a
purely "Shia" phenomenon.
Second, the Iranian revolution provided South Asian Shias with a strong
source of support before Sunni challenges to their sociopolitical standing. It is
an open secret in Pakistan that Ayatollah Khomeini warned General
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq - the military ruler of Pakistan - in no uncertain
terms regarding threats to the position of Shias in Pakistan. At one point in
1980 Khomeini told a Pakistani reporter during an interview that, "if Zia
continued to harass the Shias, he [i.e., Khomeini] would do unto him [i.e.,
Zia] what he had done to the Shah." The Shia community believes that had it
not been for Ayatollah Khomeini's intercession and pressures from Iran, the
Zia regime would have effectively marginalized that community.
The consequence of both Iran's direct support for South Asian Shias, and
the feeling of empowerment that the revolution brought to that community
changed the political attitudes and mode of operation of Shias. Palpable
changes in Shia posture vis a vis the Sunni community, the state, and the
interests and politics of the Shia community then set the stage for the more
lasting impact of the revolution.
The Iranian revolution introduced new forms of sociopolitical organization,
leadership, and mode of activism to South Asian Shi' ism. The revolutionary
314 Vali NASR

elite in Tehran were eager to export the revolution, and given the prevalence
of Islamism in Pakistan's politics, viewed that country as a primary target.
Iran initially approached the established Islamist - Sunni - parties of
Pakistan.
Islamist parties were impressed with the Iranian revolution, but as
mentioned earlier, had not endorsed that model of Islamist activism.
Moreover, it soon became apparent that Iran was interested in more than
sharing its revolutionary experiences with Pakistani Islamists, and through
exporting the revolution it intended to dominate the Islamist scene in Pakistan
and beyond.
Pakistani Islamists viewed the Islamic revolution as a positive step for
Iranians, and perhaps as a good omen for its own efforts in Pakistan.
However, this did not mean that it would acceed to Iran's desire to dominate
Islamism across the Muslim world, which was exactly what Khomeini
believed Iran should do.
Rebuffed in its efforts to control South Asian Islamism, Iran invested more
directly in the Shia communities of South Asia, which for reasons mentioned
above, were more open to following Iran's model, and acceding to its
domination. Soon after the revolution, zealous emissaries of the Islamic
Republic began to organize Shia youth into militant organizations. This led to
the emergence of the Ithna Ash' ariya Student Organization (ISO) and the
Tahrik-i Nifaz Fiqh JaYariya (Movement for Preservation of Ja'fari Law,
TNFJ; later renamed, Tahrik-i Ja'fariya Pakistan [Pakistan's Shia
Movement], TJP) in 1979 in Pakistan, and the emergence of charismatic
"Khomeini-like" leaders among the Shias - notably, Allamah Arif Husaini
(d. 1 988) in Pakistan and Kalb-i [Qalb] Sadiq in India.
The new organizations were inspired by the Iranian revolution, but had their
roots in the threat the Shia felt from the Zia regime and its Islamization
policies. The title of the main Shia organization, TNFJ, bears testament to the
defensive nature of the organization. TNFJ was formed in April 1979 with the
specific aim of protecting Shia interests in the emerging Islamic order. It was
designed to serve as a pressure group to respond to General Zia's Islamization
policies.
Many in the rank and file of TNFJ gravitated toward the Iranian model, and
were encouraged to do so by revolutionary activists that were dispatched from
Tehran. In addition, in 1979 Shia students organized in the form of ISO to
stake their claim on campuses, and to provide an organizational muscle for
the Shia community, a process that bears resemblance to the rise of AMAL in
Lebanon in the 1970s. ISO was closely associated with Iran, and quickly
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 315
became the most militant force on Pakistan's campuses in the early 1980s.
ISO would in time provide TNFJ with its future workers and leaders.
As a result, gradually, TNFJ adopted a more aggressive and confrontational
style after Allama Arif Husayni emerged as the TNFJ's leader in 1984. His
charismatic revolutionary posturing transformed TNFJ into a militant body,
one that advocated radical sociopolitical activism with the goal of bringing
about an Islamic revolution modeled after that of Iran and following
Khomeini's authority —in lieu of General Zia's Islamization initiative.
This aim went beyond protecting Shia interests in the existing order. It gave
organizational activism in Pakistan a new meaning, and also defined the
nature of anti-Shia policies of the state and its allies among Sunni Islamist
groupings. Most notable in this regard was the confrontational style of TNFJ
under Husayni which set the tone for both Shia politics and the Sunni
opposition to it. It would not be until 1992 - after Arif Husayni was
assassinated in 1988, and it had become clear that TNFJ would neither be
able to lead a revolution in Pakistan nor effectively represent Shias in the
democratic process - that the party tempered its stance.
The prospects for a TNFJ-led revolution appeared increasingly dim by the
end of the 1980s, and Shia land lords, politicians, and secular parties such as
Pakistan Peoples Party, which had originally been occluded by TNFJ/TJP,
began to claim the bulk of the Shia vote. Under the leadership of Husayni's
successor, Mawlana Sajjid Ali Naqvi, TNFJ/TJP changed course in the early
1990s.
In 1988 it changed its name to TJP - to suggest its desire for inclusion in
the political process, down-played its connection with Iran, and once again
advocated protection of Shia interests in lieu of Islamic revolution, which it
now advocated as a part of a broader collaborative process with other Islamist
forces in Pakistan. This development in turn produced factionalism in the
organization - especially since 1 995 - and gave rise to radical splinter groups
such as Sipah-i Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) which emerged in 1991 to
continue to promote the revolutionary model among Shias, and to follow
Iran's lead. In this regard, there are interesting parallels between TNFJ/TJP's
history and those of AMAL and Hizbullah in Lebanon.
Sipah Muhammad is today perhaps the most notable Shia organization after
TNFJ/TJP. It was formed in 1991 by ISO activists who believed that both
TNFJ and ISO were too moderate in the face of the growing challenge of
Sunni sectarian militancy. Sipah was formed by the young ulama, Ghulam
Raza Naqvi and Murid Abbas Yazdani, both of whom had received their
seminary education in Qum.
316 Vali NASR

Soon after its formation Sipah Muhammad became the most heavily armed
Shia organization, and its penchant for violence placed beyond the pale in
both TNFJ/TJP and ISO. The Sipah quickly became active in sectarian
violence, taking responsibility for bombings and assassinations. It also
became embroiled in criminal activities, which it used to finance its campaign
of violence against Sunni sectarian forces.
Sipha Muhammad activists come from rural backgrounds, are attached to
small rural seminaries, and some receive military training in Afghanistan.
The new organizational activism among Shias after 1979 also
institutionalized a new pattern of communal leadership. This leadership
modeled itself after the Iranian revolutionary elite, and sought to replicate the
role of the Iranian ulama in Pakistan's Shia community. In so doing, it sought
to replace the landed elite and mainstream politicians as the spokesmen of the
community - as had Imam Musa Sadr in Lebanon. The rise of "Khomeini¬
like" revolutionary leaders, however, presented some problems.
First, the traditional community leaders —the landed elite and mainstream
politicians - commanded significant resources at their disposal to limit the
reach of the TNFJ and ISO. In particular, the Shia landed elite proved
successful in keeping the new Shia activism outside of rural areas. Second,
the Iranian model faced obvious limitations in a society wherein Shias are no
more than 15-25% of the population. The ultimate impact of an ulama-based
and sectarian charismatic revolutionary leadership on Pakistan as a whole
would be quite different from its impact on Iran.
Finally, there existed a strong source of resistance to the dominance of the
Iranian model in the person of Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Kho'i who was a
senior Shia cleric who lived in Iraq and was openly critical of the Iranian
revolution and its interpretation of the role of religion in politics, especially
the vilayat-i faqih). Kho'i enjoyed strong support across South Asia through
the network of his students who served as ulama and community leaders. In
fact, many of TNFJ's leaders, including Arif Husayni, were his students.
Ayatollah Khomeini was never able to replace Kho'i completely. In 1989-
90 this author found many Pakistani and Indians refering to Kho'i with the
same lofty titles that Tehran reserved for Khomeini. In fact, every time Iran
pushed for an elevation of Khomeini's status, South Asian Shias would
accord the same status to Kho'i as well - although Kho'i did not command
the resources available to Iran in propagating Khomeini's authority. Kho'i
was routinely referred to as "na'ib Imam", continued to receive the lion's
share of zakat and khoms funds, and many Shias insisted that whereas in
political matters they followed Khomeini, in religious matters they followed
Kho'i. Kho'i thus limited the extent of Khomeini's control over Pakistani
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 317
Shias, and the degree to which they would commit to a revolutionary
movement.
In addition, South Asian Shias have shown resistance to Iran's attempts to
institutionalize the revolution as a foundational event of Shia history on par
with Karbala - rather than a mere re-enactment of it - and arrogating to
Khomeini the status reserved for the infallible Shia Imams. The Iranian
revolution continues to be seen in South Asia as a political event devoid of the
"mythology" that Iran seeks to ascribe to it.
Conversely, there existed circumstances that favored the institutionalization
of Khomeini's authority. For instance, in the Northern Territories of Pakistan
- the area that straddles the boundaries of India, Pakistan and China along the
silk route and the disputed borders of Kashmir - the Shias constitute a sizable
portion of the population. This region also has a strong Isma'ili presence. In
parts of this region, such as the Hunza Valley, Shias and Isma'ilis
predominate and live in close proximity of one another.
The Isma'ilis vest great authority in their spiritual and communal leader, the
Aga Khan, and view him as a charismatic leader (a living Imam) who
commands unwavering obedience. His authority has exceeded that which has
been enjoyed by Shia ulama and approximated that of infallible Shia Imams.
In Hunza Valley the Aga Khan model led local Shias to more readily accept
Khomeini's claim to unchallenged and absolute authority. In a way, Khomeini
was accepted as an "Imam" by Shias here insofar as he was seen as a Shia
Aga Khan. This in turn saddled Khomeini's authority with unforseen demands
and responsibilities. For, the Aga Khan's authority among Isma'ilis is not
primarily political, nor is it tied to a revolutionary struggle. It is rather
sustained by generous investment by the Aga Khan Foundation in the
advancement of the community. Local Shias expected from Iran similar
patronage, and in time began to compare their "Aga Khan" with the Isma'ili
one. The disagreement over the functions and duties of the living Imam in the
end limited Iran's control over Shias of the Northern Territories.
All said, a new mode of organizational activism and religiopolitical
leadership surfaced in Pakistan pursuant to the Iranian revolution. Although it
has not dominated the politics of the Shia community, it has greatly
influenced its internal politics as well as role in Pakistan's politics. More
important, these changes have produced reactions from Sunnis, thus setting in
motion more fundamental changes in Islamism and sectarian relations in
South Asia.
318 ValiNASR

The Escalation of Sectarian Conflict

Changes in Shia politics eventually produced sectarian conflict between

Shias and Sunnis. The scope of this conflict expanded over time to produce a
distinct form of politics of identity, one that extended beyond Islamist
ideology and politics. It was argued above that by empowering, mobilizing
and organizing Shias the Iranian revolution bolstered communal and sectarian
feelings among the Shia. However, what is noteworthy is that the revolution
also entrenched similar feelings among Sunnis, and as such contributed to the
rise of militant sectarianism, which has since the late 1980s become the
scourge of South Asian Muslim politics and a significant social cleavage in
the region.
First, the Iranian revolution and greater Shia activism in South Asia
coincided with ascendance of Islamism in the Subcontinent. In Pakistan
Islamist ascendancy was encapsulated in the state's Islamization drive. That
drive, however, was at odds with the demands of Pakistan's Shias. Zia's
Islamization was largely a Sunni affair, and hence viewed Shia activism as a
threat. This became apparent when Shias refused to submit to Zia's zakat
law, and following large-scale and violent demonstrations by some 25,000
Shia demonstrators from across Pakistan on July 5, 1980 - which shut-down
the capital, Islamabad— received exemption from it. That Shia demonstrators
defied martial law ordinances to rally against the zakat law, and that they
increasingly relied on support from Tehran to organize and assert their
demands even created certain unhappiness in the military.
As a result, the exemption from the zakat law was followed by introduction
of a provision to the constitution which made condemnation of the first three
caliphs of Islam (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) - reviled in popular Shia
ceremonies - a legal offence. It is, moreover, argued that the martial law
administrator of Punjab, General Ghulam Gilani deliberately turned a blind
eye to growing Sunni militancy, and the rise of armed bands centered in
madrasahs after 1980, to address the "problem" of Shia resurgence. The
result was anti-Shia militancy and violence, which reared its head first in
Karachi in April 1983, when Sunni militants attacked two Shia Imabarahs
(Shia place of worship associated with commemoration of martyrdom of Shia
Imams), precipitating serious clashes.
The state's capitulation to Shia demands was seen by advocates of
Islamization as nothing short of constricting the Islamic state and diluting the
impact of Islamization. State-led Islamization was in effect being reduced tp
"Sunni" Islamization which undermined the universalist claims of the ehtire
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 3 19
process. Many among Sunni Islamist activists argued that Pakistan's Shia
were in no position to carp about "Sunnification" of Pakistan since Iran had
made Shia law into state law with no exemptions afforded to its Sunni
minority.
The formation of TNFJ and ISO in 1979 were seen as signs of hardening of
Shia identity - which led Sunni Islamizers to conclude that owing to the
Iranian revolution they would not be able to win over Shias and integrate
them into their promised Islamic social order.
Also problematic was the fact that Pakistanis who wished to distribute their
inheritance according to Shia law - which favors women more - or avoid
paying zakat to the government declared themselves Shias. Many Shia
families who had been close to Sunnism gravitated back to their faith for the
same reasons. The apparent rise in the number of Shias - and the faith's
newly acquired position as a haven from state-led Islamization - was
disheartening to General Zia and his Islamist allies. Sunni activists sought to
undermine exemptions given to Shias by claiming that the Ahmediya were
using these exemptions by declaring themselves to be Shia, and adopting Shia
names. The Ahmediya connection was useful in that it blurred the boundary
between Shias and the much despised Ahmediya, and served as an
introduction to relegating Shi' ism to the same status that was ascribed to the
Ahmediya.
As a result, anti-Shia tendencies began to surface among Sunni Islamist
groups. The Zia regime looked to militant Sunni organizations in order to
counter the rising tide of Shia militancy. One of the first of such organizations
was the Sipah-i Sahabah Pakistan ( Sipah Şahaba).
Saudi Arabia and Iraq too were concerned about Shia activism in Pakistan
and what they saw as Iran's growing influence there. The two Arab countries
were then involved in a bitter campaign to contain Iran's revolutionary zeal
and limit its power in the region. In so doing, Saudi Arabia looked to self-
styled Islamist thinkers and more important, the Ahl-i Hadith ulama. The Ahl-
i Hadith is a puritanical school of Sunni Islam, which much like Wahhabism,
has been strongly opposed to Shi' ism. Saudi assistance helped establish new
Ahl-i Hadith madrasahs , and to provide an inroad into the Afghan war for the
Ahl-i Hadith through such madrasahs as that of Mawlvi Husain Jamalu'l-
Rahman in NWFP and southern Afghanistan. Hence, proliferation of
madrasahs and the greater power and prominence that comes with it became
tied to involvement with the Saudi Arabian sectarian project.
With Saudi encouragement, self-styled Islamist thinkers and the Ahl-i
Hadith ulama, such as Allamah ihsan ilahi Zahir, the chief of Jairfiat-i
Ulama-i Ahl-i Hadith, mounted a strong anti-Shia campaign through
320 Fia/z NASR
publication of books and pamphlets, sermons in mosques and activism
centered in madrasahs. They formulated the first anti-Khomeini critiques
from within Islamist/Islamic circles, but more important began to produce a
new style and language in criticizing Shi' ism, one that depicted that branch of
Islam as outside the pale of the religion, and began to successfully transform
doctrinal and theological disputes into communal ones.
The line of attack became increasingly focused on Shias as a people and not
Shi' ism as an interpretation of Islam. Zahir's book, Shias and Shi 'ism,
published in Lahore in 1980 and subsequently translated into Arabic and
English and distributed across the Muslim world by Saudi Arabia became the
most celebrated effort in this genre.
It became customary for sectarian leaders to name their sons Mu'awiyah
(d.680) and Yazid (d.683)— the first two Umayyad caliphs whom the Shias
hold responsible for the martyrdom of their early leaders, Ali ibn Abi Talib
and Husain ibn Ali, and who had not heretofore enjoyed respect among
Sunnis either. In fact, eulogization of the two Umayyad caliphs soon became
an important part of the new language of anti-Shi' ism, implying that having
opposed and killed the two Shia leaders — the first of whom was the fourth
caliph and the son-in-law of the Prophet, and the second the Prophet's beloved
grandson, facts that are difficult to gloss over for Sunnis who are dedicated to
exact emulation of the Prophet's life —they ought be venerated by Sunnis as
defenders of the faith against infidels. A popular Sipah Sahaba slogan in its
campaign during Shia Muharram commemorations was: "Shi*a kafir... Yazid
kay münkir " (Shias are the infidels, when was Yazid a denier [of truth of
Islam]).
The titles of the new genre of anti-Shia books that would dominate the scene
from this point on attest to the change in attitudes toward Shias: Revolt of
Shias Against the Qur'an or Shias's Revolt Against Islam. In 1994 Sipah
Sahaba would increase tensions when one of its leaders, A' zam Tariq, would
openly assail Shia Imams. This was a new chapter in Sunni polemics against
Shi'ism, one which is not free of controversy, as many Sunnis hold the family
of the Prophet {ahl al-bayt) in high esteem. Sipah Sahaba would then
introduce the Namus-i Sahabah (Honor of the Companions of the Prophet)
bill in the National Assembly, which sought to add the name of the four
Rightly-Guided caliphs to the list of those covered by the Blasphemy Law.
The intention was to greatly limit the scope of popular Shia commemorations
during which aspersions are cast on the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar,
and Uthman) for usurping Ali' s right to the caliphate. This was to lay the
grounds for declaring Shias as a non-Muslim minority.
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 321
The Ahl-i Hadith's anti-Shia campaign eventually precipitated a
confrontation with the militant Shia organizations, which soon turned violent.
Shia activists sought to silence the Ahl-i Hadith ulama through a number of
bomb blasts, most notably one on March 23, 1985 that killed Zahir, who had
become the most vocal anti-Shia and anti-Khomeini among Ahl-i Hadith
ulama. It became evident that the Ahl-i Hadith did not possess the
organizational capacity, nor the social base, to confront the more sizeable
Shia community and its more formidable organizations. Although Ahl-i
Hadith ulama, such as Sajjad Mir, and Ahl-i Hadith students and
organizations like Irshad'u Da'wah (Guidance and Call [to Islam]), and its
militant off-shoot, Lashkar-i Tayyibah (Army of the Pure), continue to play a
prominent role in articulating Sunni sectarianism, the Ahl-i Hadith were soon
overshadowed by Deobandi organizations that surfaced to carry on with the
anti-Shia campaign.
In 1984 the Deobandi alim, Muhammad Manzur Nu'mani of Lucknow in
India wrote Irani Inqilab: Imam Khumayni awr Shiayyat (Iranian Revolution:
Imam Khomeini and Shi' ism). The book, which was prefaced by the rector of
Nadwatu'l-Ulama of Lucknow, Sayyid Abu'l-Hasan Ali Nadwi, accepted the
claims of the Iranian revolution to represent true Shia faith, and Ayatollah
Khomeini's to be the undisputed leader of all Shias — although most Indian
and Pakistani Shia ulama then were students of Kho'i who flatly rejected the
validity of Khomeini's views and the ideology of the Iranian revolution—only
to point to the revolution's excesses as proof that Shi' ism was outside the pale
of Islam. Owing to the high rank of its Deobandi and Nadwi authors, the book
quickly made a stir. It was translated into English in India, Arabic and
Turkish; and was soon also published in Pakistan in both Urdu and English.
Copies are provided to all that would like at the Saudi Embassy here in
Washington. The book made Deobandis central to the ongoing sectarian
confrontation in Pakistan.
Nu'mani's views were shaped in the context of Shia-Sunni conflict in
Lucknow, and his arguments drew on the tradition of anti-Shi' ism in the
Deobandi school of thought. Deobandis had always maintained a belligerent
attitude toward Shi' ism. In Pakistan, politics within the Deobandi community
was pushing it in the direction of anti-Shia sectarianism. The growing
importance of anti-Shi' ism to Deobandi politics opened the door for the rise
of militant sectarian organizations from amidst Deobandis.
In 1 983 Deobandi ulama launched anti-Shia movements in Karachi with the
financial backing of Iraq. These efforts would, however, pale before the Sipah
Sahaba which was formed in Jhang, in Pakistan's Punjab by Mawlana
Haqnawaz Jhangvi (d.1989), a local Deobandi alim of low rank.
322 Vali NASR

Sipah Şahaba proved far more capable and willing to engage the militant
Shia organizations. It built on the Ahl-i Hadith rhetoric, demanding that Shias
be declared as kafirs (infidels). The senior Sipah Sahaba leader, A' zam
Tariq, for instance, declared that, "agar Pakistan main musalman bun kar
rahna hey, tu Shi a ko kafir kehna hey (if Islam is to be established in
Pakistan, then Shias must be declared infidels). More important, Sipah
Sahaba incited violent riots in Jhang, and later in Multan and Kabirwala in
southern Punjab, Peshawar (NWFP) and Karachi (Sind). One of its splinter
groups, the Lashkar-i Jhangvi, retaliated for assassinations carried out by
Shias with assassinations of its own, the most important of which was that of
the Iranian cultural attaché in Lahore in 1 990.
Sipah Sahaba has sought to involve Iran directly in the sectarian conflict.
When Mawlana Jhangvi was assassinated in 1989, Sipah Sahaba chose to
retaliate by killing Iran's cultural attaché in Lahore - as opposed to attacking
a Pakistani Shia target. Again, in 1997 when a bomb blast killed and injured
several Sipah Sahaba leaders and members in a court house in Lahore, the
party's response was to set Iranian cultural centers in Lahore and Multan on
fire. Sipah Sahaba' s actions have been directed at portraying Pakistan's
Shias as agents of a foreign country, mobilizing Pakistan's Sunnis against
Iran, and complicating relations between Islamabad and Tehran, all of which
served Iraqi and Saudi policies in the region. The anti-Iranian aim of Sunni
sectarianism became clearer in September 1997 when five Iranian military
personnel were assassinated in Rawalpindi.
With the rise of the Taliban, who like Sipah Sahaba are Deobandis, and
who hail from the same madrasah structure and networks - and even training
camps in NWFP and southern Afghanistan - the scope of Sipah Sahaba' s
strategic and political ties with Persian Gulf regional politics has expanded,
and its penchant for violent action increased.
The impact of the Taliban on Shia organizations and sectarian conflict in
Pakistan became more clear with its victory over the Shia Hizb-i Wahdat
(Party of Unity) in August 1998. The Taliban massacred thousands of Shias
in Mazar Sharif, and later in Bamiyan. Thousands more of Hazara Shias
escaped to Quetta in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. Not only did the
predicament of Afghan Shias animate Pakistani Shias - who saw in the
Afghan case a vindication of their worst fears of Sunni militancy - but many
were prompted to reaction by the Hizb-i Wahdat. The Hizb which is based in
the Hazara region of Afghanistan had maintained close ties with Pakistan's
Shia organizations, and helped train many of their activists, especially in
Sipah Muhammad.
Sectarianism and Shia politics in Pakistan 323
In addition, the Taliban victory in Hazara precipitated a serious conflict
between Iran and Afghanistan that brought the two to the brink of the war.
The tensions escalated sectarian violence in Pakistan, and convinced the Shia
community that its "Sunni problem" was part of a broader regional conflict.
These developments brought Iran and Pakistan's Shias closer, especially as
Pakistan's support for the Taliban may translate into a more concerted state
support for Sunni militancy with the aim of limiting the regional Shia
resistance to the Taliban assumption of control over Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Iranian revolution has left a profound mark on Pakistan's politics in

general and the role of religion therein, in particular. The revolution
underscored the importance of Islam to sociopolitical change, and provided
impetus for Islamist activism. Iran's drive to establish regional hegemony
combined with growing Sunni resistance to its Shia characteristics produced
sectarian conflict. This conflict has fed on regional struggles for power
between Iran and its Arab neighbors, and competition for resources and
influence between Sunnis and Shias in South Asia. The result has been a new
form of Islamist politics, one that draws on Islamism in tandem with identity
politics. Its force has greatly impacted sociopolitical relations in the region.
The more lasting impact of the Iranian revolution in the region has not been
promotion of Islamist activism, but deep division between Shias and Sunnis, a
sectarian discouse of power, and deepening of social cleavages in the region.