THE EARLY SKYMASTER STORY

In recognition of the engine-out controllability difficulties inherent in conventional

twins, Cessna engineers searched for a feasible method of obtaining centerline thrust in
1959. We considered pancake engines driving a single propeller, closely-spaced side-
by-side engines/propellers, and finally, the chosen push-pull engine arrangement. Our
friend Bill Lear urged us to keep the airplane with a fixed landing gear – his reasoning
was that only rich, middle-aged pilots can afford a twin-engine airplane, and often they
are not very proficient pilots due to a lack of spare time to maintain proficiency.

Once again, Don Ahrens was asked to head up the project that would start with
the C-336 and eventually become the Cessna 337, with help from the aerodynamics,
power plant, structure, and electrical groups. Had we had the foresight to anticipate a
retractable landing gear addition years later (in the C-337) we might have selected a
lowing configuration. In hindsight, this would have made a more attractive airplane and
it would have been much more adaptable to a retractable landing gear. However, it
seemed natural to go with a high-wing version for the benefits of better stability, gravity
flow fuel system, and shelter from the elements while enplaning and deplaning. To keep
this rather top-heavy airplane as low as possible, we also dismissed the idea of a
downward-sloping nose so typical of our single-engine models. This later proved unwise
as the airplane appeared to cruise nose-high. In later versions the wing incidence and
cowl shape were modified to improve over-the-nose visibility.

Special attention was given to crashworthiness with the rear engine’s proximity to
the rear seat passengers. Consequently, the rear engine mount was designed to crush
downward and pivot forward with a straight-ahead impact. This principle was confirmed
many years later when a C-336 lost an engine after take-off from the 7,347 foot
elevation, Mexico City Airport, and with a windmilling propeller it struck a large dike in
essentially level flight. Onlookers found the rear engine tilted (as designed) to a lower
location with the propeller still idling. Despite the rather high true airspeed at impact, the
occupants all survived and there was no penetration of the rear engine into the cabin.

To save weight and provide space for control cables to the empennage, wing
struts were used between the wing boom attachment area and the lower fuselage.
These extruded “H” beans were covered with removable sheet metal fairings. Auxiliary
pumps were installed in the leading edge of the wing. Since high speed was not a top
priority, we used a large wing area of 202 square feet and on aspect ratio of 7.2. A
NACA 2412 airfoil was used at the wing root and boom, Tapering to a 2409 section of
the tip. The wing was fitted with powerful flaps located outboard of the twin booms.
These were 30% of wing chord slotted flaps that were 8 feet in length on each side. In
contrast, the Frise type ailerons were only 4.75 feet in length with a 25% chord width.
This was to be an airplane capable of operating from rather small and rough grass fields.

As related in Don Ahren’s SAE report No. S365 entitled “The Cessna
Skymaster”, which was presented in Wichita Kansas on March 8, 1963:

“The wing is of a conventional two-spar design with the front spar at 20%
chord and the rear spar at 60% chord. The brace strut intersects the front spar at
the boom attach point. Main fuel tanks are installed outboard of the booms
(between the spars), and optional auxiliary tanks are installed inboard of the

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 boom. The induced high torque from tail loads is transmitted through a cell
structure consisting of the two spars, a large torque rib at the root, and the
auxiliary fuel tank skin assemblies. Normal wing torque loads are carried by a
torque rib at the outboard end of the main fuel cell area, an immediate torque rib
about midway in the fuel tank region, the torque rib at the strut intersection, and
the upper and lower skins. The main fuel tanks are of metal construction and
designed as two separate tanks in each wing, interconnected for both fuel flow
and venting. “

As one can see, these torque-resisting cells had to be designed not only for carrying the
design loads, but, also, to provide an acceptable amount of rigidity for the empennage.

Newly planned Continental IO-30-A engines rated at 210 hp for take-off at 2800
rpm and 195 hp at 2600 rpm for maximum continuous operation were to be used.
However, an interim geared Continental GIO-300 engine, rated at 190 hp at 3200 rpm
(2400 propeller rpm), was used in the early testing, and the slower-turning propellers
were much quieter than the subsequent direct-drive engines and propellers. The final
IO-360 engines were delivered to Cessna in May of 1961.

Aside from the aerodynamic design challenge, the flight test group had to figure
out the best arrangement of engine controls and methods of identifying a failed engine.
Unlike the conventional twin, there would be no yawing motion to show which engine
had failed. After much controversy between test pilots, we selected conventional singe-
engine push-pull type control knobs and arranged tem to agree with the vertical location
of the engines. The rear engine was elevated, and thus its control knobs were placed an
inch or two above the front engine control knobs. This was awkward and unpopular, but
we decided to try it on the prototype. To aid in identifying a failed ingine, Charlie
Tanner’s power plant group designed a micro switch assembly that sensed fore and aft
engine motion in the rubber engine mounts. With a rearward motion (from the drag of
the windmilling propeller) a red warning light would illuminate in the related propeller
knob. Although the aforementioned microswitch unit multiplied the actual engine
movement by a factor of six, there were still false warnings that would prompt an
unwarranted engine shut-down. Thus the system was removed in favor of pilot
reference to engine and EGT gauge indications of power failure. Fortunately, centerline
thrust (CLT) gave the pilot lots of time to study these gauges and make the proper
choice. Also, the owner’s manual instructed the pilot to verify his decision by
momentarily reducing the throttle setting on the suspected engine to hear no audible
reduction in power.

The fuel system was fairly conventional with the main 46.5-gallon (93 gallons
total) fuel tanks located outboard of the wing booms. Optional 19-gallon (38 gallons
total) tanks were placed in each inboard wing panel. Dual fuel selector valves (including
cross feed positions) were located in an overhead console aft of the windshield.

Perhaps the biggest challenge was cooling the “buried” rear engine. Initially, rear
engine cooling air was obtained by a controllable flap or scoop located in the trailing
edge of the wing. It was installed between the boom and the fuselage and was the main
reason why inboard flaps were not at first incorporated. The requirement for inboard
flaps meant a relocation of this air entry point. Pressure surveys and tuft studies showed
that the boundary layer was very thin and that high-pressure recoveries could be
obtained in the area of the junction of the wing and fuselage. A scoop was installed with

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a throat area of approximately 6 by 7 inches on each side of the fuselage and wing
junction region, and proved quite satisfactory. We started with augmenter tubes in
hopes that the flow through the exhaust nozzles would induce enough cooling air
through the tubes. However, the length of these augmenters was restricted by the
length of the cowl itself and the location of the propeller. The resulting installation
requires a rather difficult air flow path. Tests revealed that by installing a large opening
in the aft portion of the cowling, the combination of normal ram recovery and pumping
action of the propeller (in place of the augmenter tubes) could be adequate to cool the
engine. However, further testing indicated the presence of an undesirable character in
the sound within the cabin, due to propeller blade passage by the rear cowl opening. By
extending the rear propeller hub 4.5 inches and reshaping the rear cowling to approach
the shape of a body or revolution, considerable improvement was realized. Cooling of
the rear engine was then accomplished by the use of a moveable scoop located on top
of the cowl, together with a fan attached to the crankshaft and located in the rear circular
opening of the cowling. This fan was designed under the direction of our helicopter chief
engineer, Charlie Seibel. It uses 20 blades with a pitch angle of 25 degrees at the tip.
Since it is attached to the crankshaft, it operates at engine speed and absorbs about 3
hp at full rpm. The fan has its optimum performance during single-engine operation with
the scoop door open. The entire system results were highly satisfactory during all
phases of single or twin-engine operation.

As we prepare for the first flight,

everyone was taking bets on which engine
would give the best engine-out climb. Dave
Bierman, chief engineer at Hartzell Propeller
Company (and former longtime
aerodynamics research engineer at NACA)
put his money on the rear engine. He
explained “The rear engine propeller has no
blockage behind it, its diameter is two inches
greater, its inflow velocity is favorably
reduced, and it promotes better airflow
attachment to the bluff afterbody of the rear
cowl” as illustrated in figure 1. Later he
proved to be right and collected the
doubters’ money! Test results showed the
rear engine to have a 24% rate-of-climb
advantage over the front engine only
operation.

The author performed some fast taxi runs on the 10,000-foot runway at the
adjacent McConnell AFB on February 27, 1961. I soon discovered the adverse effects
of friction on both the elevator control system and the throttles. Adding to this was the
extremely awkward positioning of the throttle knobs and the resulting inability to make an
inadvertent lift-off to about 5-feet of altitude, and the porpoising motion that ensued are
still memorable. After 1,000 feet of jockeying the elevator control and power (mostly out
of phase) the airplane finally touched down to a reasonably smooth landing. I would
have been much better off to have climbed initially to 5,000 feet altitude to assess those
friction effects! In fact, I later advised Lockheed test pilot Leo Sullivan to do just that
instead of his planned fast taxi tests with the huge C-5A prototype at Marietta, Georgia.

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 The actual C-336 maiden flight on February 28, 1961 was anticlimactic after that
hair raising fast taxi lift off. Excerpts from the author’s flight report were:

1. Take off acceleration was rather spectacular and both engines over
speeded momentarily to 3800 and 3900 rpm respectively. Fuel
pressure readings were low on the no. 1 engine by comparison to the
no. 2 engine.

2. Controllability in the climb and traffic pattern circuit was very good.
The only problems were synchronizing the engines rpm’s and
manifold pressure since the flight test types of engine gauges are
inherently difficult to interpret.

3. Longitudinal stability appeared to be slightly weak in climb and cruise

configuration, partially due to the high friction in the elevator system.

4. Power off stalls at 24% MAC showed a lack of elevator effectiveness

in the flaps up condition and complete stalls were obtainable on only
20 and 30-degree flap positions. Pitching moments were very severe
with 40-degree flaps, preventing the airplane from slowing down
below 110 mph.

5. A check of airplane pitch with a windmilling aft propeller showed no

visible effects. However, pulling back the front engine to idle rpm
gave the customary nose-down pitch as we have on our single-engine
airplanes.

6. Landing approach was made with 15-degree flaps and the airplane
decelerated rather slowly in the flare-out. Touchdown was made in a
slightly tail-low position with good control.

7. In general, the airplane is much better than expected in vibration,

visibility, and seating comfort. Stability and control were about what
we expected; that is slightly marginal on elevator power and
longitudinal stability. It is believed that all of the problems
encountered can be worked out readily in the development stage.

We suffered with the friction problems while the C-336 engineers designed a
replacement of the round-robin cable routing for the elevator in the form of driving that
control from “one boom” cable routing. This later removed seven pulleys of the cable
cross-over system and eliminated most of the objectionable friction.

The twin rudder control system is routed completely around the aircraft, with one
cable going down the left boom and the second sown the right boom. A cross-over
cable through the horizontal stabilizer completes the system. Elevator tab cables are
installed through the right wing strut and down the right boom.

The unacceptable engine control arrangement was redesigned to use a C-310

style placement of side-by-side throttle, propeller, and mixture control levers. Now the
pilot had to relate the left lever to the front and the right lever to the rear engine. If one

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visualized the front engine as his primary engine it seemed reasonable to assume that
the left lever was a primary lever.

In the meantime we explored the flight characteristics of this rather

unconventional airplane and quickly found some inadequacies. These included
deficiencies in elevator power, longitudinal trim power, and vertical tail area. The large
flaps created strong nose-down pitching motions that could not be fully trimmed out in a
glide. Unlike conventional airplanes, there was no flap-induced downwash over the
horizontal tail to give a compensating pitch-up motion to the airplane. Thus we had to
bite the bullet by adding flaps between the fuselage and the booms. They reduced the
flaps down trim change felt by the pilot by 65%. In addition, they reduced the minimum
speed at forward C. G. by 9 mph and permitted an additional 6% MAC forward extension
of the C. G. envelope. Our initial misgivings concerning inboard flaps were not justified
because they have had no adverse affects on the inflow to the rear propeller. Elevator
effectiveness was increased by adding more area in a more “constant energy” location
at each extremity. Minimizing those elevator cut-out areas was obtained by restricting
the rudder travel to only 15 degrees inboard while retaining the original 21 degrees
outboard deflections.

To further enhance longitudinal trim power, we reduced the maximum flap setting
from 40 to 30 degrees except that the inboard flaps retained the greater setting. Finally,
we lengthened the elevator trim tab span to provide more trim capability. One particular
problem surrounding longitudinal trim power requirements was associated with power-
off, power on changes, particularly as the elevator was operating in the high energy. A
variety of elevator tab spans and chores were tested in an attempt to reduce the high
stick forces. Shorter spans, while reducing stick forces, drastically reduced the ability to
trim power-off. A promising solution would be that resulting in rapid trim changes at high
tab angles. A differential bell crank in the tab control mechanism was the answer. This
permitted rapid motion at high tab settings and relatively slow motion near the neutral
setting. In other words, the tab control is very sensitive at high deflections and very
insensitive during the cruise settings.

We also looked for an interconnect system that would automatically change the
trim tab setting as the flaps were extended and retracted electrically. Bill Seidel,
assistant project engineer, designed a clever device that “semi-automatically” reduced
very heavy out-of-trim elevator forces in
balked landing climb-outs when the flaps were
retracted as illustrated in Figure 2. The
progression of elevator stick force changed
from a landing configuration glide to a balked-
landing-climb and, finally, to a flaps-retracted
climb is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. As
power is applied, the nose-up trim must be
counteracted by a 40-pound push force. Then
as flaps are retracted (removing a powerful
nose-down pitching moment) an additional
push force up to 80-pound is required to
maintain the original trim speed. This test
increment of push force was eliminated very
neatly by Bill’s invention. The elevator trim tab
cables are routed down the right tail boom. A

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flexible shaft connects to one arm of the wing
flap bellcrank and engages a swaged ball on
the tab cable during part of its travel. With
flaps retracted, the pilot can trim the elevator
tab to no more than 10 degrees with flaps
extended, the flexible shaft moves aft,
permitting additional manual adjustment of the
tab to 26 degrees. Conversely, when the flaps
are retracted electrically from 30 to 15
degrees, the flexible shaft automatically drags
the tab cable from the original position to 10
degrees. This relieves the out of trim force to
20-pounds as shown in the aforementioned
graph. In addition, it relieves the pilot from
manually making large trim wheel rotations
during this period of high activity by the pilot.

Slipstream effects or, more accurately, “the reinforced” slipstream in this tandem-
twin suggested no overhanging aerodynamic balance area that would be vulnerable to
varying slipstream velocities. This omission would cause rather heavy elevator forces in
the landing. The addition of an elevator down spring for cruising stability would increase
landing stick forces still further. Therefore, it was necessary to design a unique
downspring optimized for good cruising stability, and which went out of action with large
up-elevator deflections in the landing flare. Subsequently, an “overcenter” spring was
adopted to reduce those stick forces. This proved to be a good solution to
accommodate slip stream velocities ranging from 50% of free stream velocity (propellers
idling) to as much as 250% at full throttle at 74 mph (or an increase by a factor of 3).

Directional stability was adequate in all normal flight conditions. However, in the
balked-landing climb (full flaps and 75% power) when releasing the rudder pedal force
from full-rudder skids, the rudder did not return to center. Therefore, it was necessary to
increase the vertical tail area (in steps) by 25% and eventually, by 40%. These changes
also reduced the adverse yaw in turns. As they were incorporated in August of 1961, R.
L. “Dick” Kemper had taken over the project test pilot duties, and he continued the task
of recommending further refinements to the prototype. He verified the excellent stall
characteristics (better than any conventional twin). Dick also conducted a spin program
since the gross weight at that time was less than 4,000 pounds. He reported excellent
spin characteristics with a desirable steeply nose-down spin attitude and prompt
recoveries within 1/2 turn with opposite rudder to slow the rotation and brisk forward
pressure to break the spin. He noted that the elevator is the predominant recovery
control, and it should be applied briskly and positively for best recovery. By December
1961 the prototype was updated and ready for the final type certification testing. The
type certificate was granted on May 22, 1962. Despite the unconventional design and
the absence of a wind tunnel program, the following table illustrates the remarkable pace
of progress in this Skymaster development:

January 1960 Skymaster configuration approved

April 1960 First engineering prototype started
July 1960 Full-scale mock-up complete
February 28, 1961 First engineering prototype maiden flight

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 March 14, 1962 Second engineering prototype maiden flight
May 22, 1962 FAA Type Certificate
August 1962 Pre-production prototype flown
November 1962 First production airplane
May 1963 First dealer demonstrator delivery

With the absence of interior soundproofing and upholstery, the prototype’s noise
level was deadening. Our acoustics engineer, George Altner, had his work cut out for
him in developing a better muffler (in place of the noisy augmenter tubes) and the most
efficient sound proofing methods. The presence of two engines, one at each end of the
passenger compartment, created noise sources that had to be controlled. A variety of
methods were tested including three bladed propeller, rear propeller shaft extensions,
and acoustical baffles in the rear engine compartment. The rear engine mount,
designed for crashworthiness, was more flexible than desired for vibration isolation. The
rigid requirements of weight, cost, C.G. control, and detail design criteria presented a
difficult obstacle for George. From his experience in the C-310 program, he launched a
noise and vibration reduction effort that seemed overwhelming. He used sophisticated B
& K decibel meters and vibration measuring devices that produced amplitude vs.
frequency read outs on tapes. From these read outs we could pinpoint the source of
particular noises or vibrations such as propeller, engine, wind noise, etc. Many
combinations of sound deadeners, shock mounts (engine and front cowling), and
acoustical baffles were tested and/or adopted. However, this was to be a continuous
program which never silenced the airplane to our single engine airplane standards. The
external noise level was also very distinctive, making the Skymaster readily identifiable
when heard from below.

An extensive static load test was performed with the tail booms, vertical tails, and
horizontal tail tested as an assembled unit. The resulting bent (difficult to calculate
moment distribution simply) presented a structural problem in the vertical tails as a result
of side load condition. The transition from a high rigidity in the horizontal tail to a
comparatively low rigidity in the booms created a design problem. The incorporation of
an external stiffener, similar in appearance to a strake, was the solution that provided
adequate moment distribution.

In addition, an extensive fatigue program was conducted on such areas as

landing gears and attachments, wing struts and attachments, engine muffler, and door
mechanisms. A complete program of impact testing was conducted by installing a static
test fuselage in a large pendulum. Mass was distributed, as required, throughout the
fuselage. The entire assembly was raised at varying heights and was then released to
crash into a barrier in order to determine the impact resistance of the main landing gear
and nose gear. Complete impact testing on the rear engine was also conducted. In this
case, the engine mount design proved itself. Under horizontal impact testing, the engine
mount structure collapsed in a downward arc, thus protecting the passengers from a
directly forward moving mass.

Performance and specifications for the C-336 as presented in the owner’s

manual are shown below:

Gross Weight 3,900 lbs

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Speeds, Best Power Mixture:
Top Speed 183 mph
Cruise, 75% power at 7,000 ft 173 mph
Range, Normal Lean Mixture:
Cruise, 75% Power at 7,000 ft 745 mi
92 Gallons, No Reserve 4.3 hrs
172 mph
Cruise, 75% Power at 7,000 ft 1,040 mi
128 Gallons, No Reserve 6.0 hrs
172 mph
Optimum Range at 10,000 ft 945 mi
92 Gallons, No Reserve 7.7 hrs
123 mph
Optimum Range at 10,000 ft 1,315 mi
128 Gallons, No Reserve 10.7 hrs
123 mph
Rate of Climb at Sea Level:
Twin Engine 1,340 fpm
Front Engine Only 355 fpm
Rear Engine Only 420 fpm
Service Ceiling:
Twin Engine 19,000 ft
Front Engine Only 8,200 ft
Rear Engine Only 9,500 ft
Absolute Ceiling:
Twin Engine 20,400 ft
Front Engine Only 9,500 ft
Rear Engine Only 10,800 ft
Take-Off:
Ground Run 625 ft
Total Distance Over 50 ft Obstacle 1,145 ft
Landing:
Landing Roll 655 ft
Total Distance Over 50 ft Obstacle 1,395 ft
Stall Speed: Flaps down, Power Off 60 mph
Empty Weight (approximate) 2,320 lbs
Baggage Allowance 365 lbs
Wing Loading: pounds/sq ft 19.4 lbs
Power Loading: Pounds/HP 9.3 lbs
Fuel Capacity: total
Standard Tanks 93 gal
Optional Auxiliary Tanks 131 gal
Oil Capacity: total 5 gal
Propellers:
Constant Speed, Full Feathering, Diameter 76 in
Power:
Two Continental Fuel Injection Engines IO-360-A
210 rated HP at 2800 RPM (take-off)
195 rated HP at 26.5” MP and 2800 RPM
(Maximum Continuous)

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 The aviation industry considered the C-336 to be a landmark airplane from a
safety standpoint. The editor of Air Facts Magazine, Leighton Collins (a great promoter
of aviation safety), asked for a unique demonstration. He wanted to be a passenger on
a flight to the nearby long runway at Strother Field. Then he wanted to take the pilot
seat and make his first flight using
only the rear engine. Thus he
would act as a single-engine pilot
flying a twin on only one engine.
We worked that plan, and he was
delighted to take in flight pictures of
that stationary propeller in front of
him for a subsequent magazine
article with a side bar stating “The
newest thing in thirty years”. Like
all of us, he thought that we had a
winner in this revolutionary
airplane. In 1963 the author prepared a Society of Automotive Engineers paper no.
781D entitled “Centerline Thrust For Twin Engine Aircraft” and presented it in Detroit,
Michigan on January 17, 1964. This paper focused on the controllability and engine out
advantages in CLT airplanes.
Sketches of the thrust/drag
vectors with an engine out are
shown in Figure 4 with
comparative take off profiles and
graphical comparisons of total
take-off distances in Figures 5
through 8. The flight path shown
by the solid line in Figure 5
indicates the normal twin-engine
climb-out path, and the dotted
lines represent (schematically) two possible flight paths with an engine failure. In the
speed range marked “area of decision” the pilot chores are compared in the following
paragraphs:

1. The conventional twin will yaw sharply in the direction of the failed
engine, and if the speed is below Vmc it will also roll in that direction.
2. Counteract yaw and roll with full opposite rudder and partial opposite
aileron while maintaining at least Vmc speed and a constant heading.
3. Decide whether to terminate or continue the take off. Assuming that
the take off is to be continued, retract the landing gear.
4. Identify the failed engine, remembering that “idle foot identifies idle
engine”.
5. Feather the windmilling propeller.
6. Trim the rudder tab to counteract asymmetric thrust.
7. Accelerate to Vy climb speed (or Vx speed with obstructions ahead).
8. Climb over any obstructions at the end of the field.

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 9. Maneuver around obstructions while circling the field for an
emergency landing.

All of the foregoing chores must be

accomplished in moments of great
excitement (if not panic), and any
mismanagement of these procedures can
result in either a loss of control or a serious
loss of performance.

The CLT twin in this same situation

requires no special technique or
proficiency other than:

1. Ascertaining that the

airplane has reached a
minimum safe single engine climb speed.
2. Cleaning up the airplane (landing gear retraction and propeller
feathering).
3. Accelerating to a suitable climb speed.
4. Climbing over the obstacle.

I this case, the most serious penalty for mismanagement would be the inability to
climb over the obstacle. Consequently, every take-off in a CLT twin requires no more
“pre-take-off” preparation than in a single engine airplane.

In comparing the last two take-off profiles, one can see that the CLT twin’s
engine-out take-off distance advantage is amplified as the airspeed at engine cut is
reduced from 1.2 Vs to 1.1 Vs in this case the conventional twin has no alternative but to
discontinue the take-off because the engine cut occurs at an airspeed lower than
minimum control speed (Vmc). In contrast, the CLT airplane is able to continue with the
take-off since its Vx speed is very close to the 1.1 Vs speed. These comparisons are
illustrated convincingly in Figure 8, showing numerical distances as a function of engine-
out speed.

Despite these enormous safety advantages, the C-336 was not a success in the
market place. Potential customers disagreed with Bill Lear’s prophecy that high speed
was not important. Many pilots ridiculed the safety features, implying that they are

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macho pilots capable of handling engine-out emergencies in conventional twins. The
rather staid appearance of the airplane could not compare with the sleek lines of the C-
310 and other twins of that era, and this was a drawback. And, finally, to our great
disappointment, the safety record of the C-336 was not very impressive. We learned
that in very hot weather the rear engine would occasionally die while taxiing out for take-
off. All too frequently, the pilot would be unaware of this loss, and, skipping the pre-take-
off engine run-ups, he would inadvertently take-off on the front engine only. Several bad
crashes occurred in this situation. We were obliged to revise the owner’s manual
instructions to request, “advancing the rear engine power first to insure its operation”.
Another problem was the temptation to show off the engine-out flying qualities to friends
over high-elevation territory, and then have difficulties in restarting the engine as the
airplane slowly descended on one engine. And, of course, the airplane had more than a
normal share of “low-proficiency” pilots to add to these woes.

In reflection of these problems, deliveries of the C-336 were only 197 units of the
1963 – 64 model years at a price of $39,950.00. To the FAA’s credit, however, they
later developed a simple “centerline thrust” rating for pilots flying the C-336 and C-337,
in late 1991 the author was asked to ferry a beautifully maintained C-336 a short
distance. While refreshing my memories of its stall characteristics, I was amazed at the
gentle stall behavior and the low stall speed. The same was true in the subsequent
landing flare and touchdown. My only embarrassment was forgetting that the fuel
selector valves were located up in the ceiling instead of on the cabin floor or sidewalls!

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