Advisory Circular 121 03 Upset Prevention Recovery Training

ADVISORY CIRCULAR
AC 121-03 v1.0
Upset prevention and

recovery training
Date December 2020

Project number OS 99/44
File ref D18/116060
UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING
Advisory Circulars are intended to provide advice and guidance to illustrate a means, but not necessarily the only
means, of complying with the Regulations, or to explain certain regulatory requirements by providing informative,
interpretative and explanatory material.
Advisory Circulars should always be read in conjunction with the relevant regulations.
Audience
The information in this Advisory Circular (AC) is expected to be of general interest to all aeroplane
operators and training providers and of specific interest to:
• Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) holders operating aeroplanes of 30 seats or more, or

above 8,618 kgs Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) under Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs)
82.3 and 82.5 expected to be covered by the future provisions of Parts 119, 121, 135 and
138 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR).
• Training providers conducting operations in accord with Parts 141 and 142 of CASR.
• Other organisations using type rated aircraft and required to have a training and checking
organisation.
Purpose
The contents of this AC reflect CASA's pre-determined acceptable means of compliance with
requirements within the civil aviation legislation for certain aeroplane operators and training
providers to conduct UPRT programs.
Note: At the time of publishing v1.0 of this AC, the only legislative requirements for the conduct of UPRT are within
the Part 121 Manual of Standards (MOS). The UPRT requirements of this MOS do not become effective
until 31 March 2022.
Operators and training providers may propose alternative means of compliance, however, will need
to provide significant explanation of how the proposed alternate means of compliance achieves
equivalent safety outcomes and the proposed alternate means would need to ensure it
encompassed the areas covered under each chapter heading in this AC.
This AC was written to provide guidance on general and specific elements of Upset Prevention and
Recovery Training (UPRT) including:
• Recognition and prevention of developing undesired and upset conditions to ensure that
pilots are trained in the correct recovery responses.
• Instructor training on the uses and limitations of simulation.
• Pilot academic training on aerodynamic and human factors.
Unless specified otherwise, all subregulations, regulations, Divisions, Subparts and Parts
referenced in this AC are references to the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR).
AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 1

• Integration of UPRT considerations into Crew Resource Management (CRM) training

programs.
• Determining whether the Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) proposed for use in a
UPRT program is suitable, such desired training outcomes are achieved and negative
training transfer is avoided.
• The implementation of a UPRT program such that known threats of effective
implementation are removed or mitigated.
For further information

For further information, contact CASA’s Flight Standards Branch (telephone 131 757).
Status
This version of the AC is approved by the Branch Manager, Flight Standards.
Version Date Details
v1.0 December Initial AC.

2020

Contents
1 Reference material 6
1.1 Acronyms 6
1.2 Definitions 7
1.3 References 15
1.4 Forms 18
2 Introduction 19
2.1 Background 19
2.2 Training objectives 20
2.3 Human factors 21
3 Considerations regarding UPRT implementation 22
3.1 Applicability of this AC 22
3.2 Expectations for the first phase of UPRT implementation 22
3.3 Focus of training 23
3.4 Threats to successful implementation 23
4 Training standards for UPRT Instructors 25
4.1 General 25
4.2 Instructors 25
4.3 Training for licence issue 26
4.4 Training for type ratings 26
5 Training program development considerations 27
5.1 Background 27
5.2 Outcomes from a UPRT program 27
5.3 Device requirements 27
5.4 Syllabus development 28
5.5 Knowledge levels 29
6 Preparation for Implementation 31
6.1 Preparation steps expected of operators and training providers 31
6.2 Preparation timelines 31
7 Implementation of a Compliant UPRT program 32
7.1 Overview of requirements 32
7.2 Elements of a compliant program 32
7.3 Need for an integrated program 32

7.4 Elements of an Integrated program 33

8 Flight Simulator qualification 35
8.1 Overview 35
8.2 Statement of Compliance (SOC) 36
8.3 The training focus in evaluation 37
8.4 Instructor operating station requirements 39
9 Envelope protection 40
9.1 Background 40
9.2 Knowledge 40
9.3 Simulation considerations 40
9.4 UPRT considerations 41
10 Subject Matter Expert pilot (SME) 44
11 Icing models 45
12 Adherence to the FSTD training envelope 47
13 The IOS 48
13.1 Feedback to the instructor 48
13.2 The IOS display 48
13.3 Additional IOS functions 49
14 “Train the Trainer”: Training UPRT Instructors 50
14.1 General 50
14.2 Training for the "core group" 50
15 The UPRT Instructor 52
15.1 General 52
15.2 Instructor selection 52
16 Human Factors and UPRT 54
16.1 The importance of human factors training 54
16.2 A human factors example 54
17 UPRT entry control methodology 55
17.1 General 55
17.2 UPRT approvals 55
17.3 Post-implementation oversight 56
18 Helicopter UPRT programs 58
18.1 Reserved 58

19 On-aeroplane UPRT programs 59

19.1 Reserved 59

1 Reference material
1.1 Acronyms
The acronyms and abbreviations used in this AC are listed in the table below.
Acronym Description
AC advisory circular
AOA angle of attack
AUPRTA airplane upset prevention and recovery training aid

AURTA airplane upset recovery training aid
CAO Civil Aviation Order
CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 1998

CBT competency and competency-based training
CPL Commercial Pilot licence
CRM crew resource management
CTPP cyclic training and proficiency program
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EBT evidence based training
EET extended envelope training
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FSTD flight simulation training device

FS flight simulator
FTD flight training device
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IOS instructor operating station
LOC-I loss of control in flight
MPL Multi-crew Pilot Licence
MBT manoeuvre-based training

MOS Manual of Standards
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
QTG Qualification Test Guide

OEM original equipment manufacturer
SBT scenario based training
SARPs standards and recommended procedures

SMS safety management system

Acronym Description
SOC statement of compliance
UAS undesired aircraft state
UPRT upset prevention and recovery training
VTE valid training envelope
1.2 Definitions
Terms that have specific meaning within this AC are defined in the table below.
Term Definition
aerodynamic stall An aerodynamic loss of lift caused by exceeding the critical angle of attack
(synonymous with the term “stall”).
aeroplane upset Traditionally, an upset has been defined as exceeding fixed parameters
(unintentional pitch beyond +25 or -10 degrees or bank angles greater than 45
degrees or speed inappropriate for the conditions).
The AUPRTA Revision 3 (see below) defines an upset as:
• “An undesired airplane state characterized by unintentional divergences from

parameters normally experienced during operations.
• An airplane upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as
inappropriate airspeeds for the conditions”
• Deviations from the desired airplane state will become larger until action is
taken to stop the divergence.
• Return to the desired airplane state can be achieved through natural airplane
reaction to accelerations, auto-flight system response or pilot intervention.
Note: Undesired airplane state is defined in the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
manual, ICAO Doc 9803, 1st edition.
It is important to understand that there is a relationship to the definitions of ‘stall’

and ‘upset’. Although not all aeroplane upset occurrences involve an aerodynamic
stall, an unintentional stall is a form of upset.
Airplane Upset The Airplane Upset and Recovery Training Aid (AURTA) was developed by ICAO
Recovery Training and industry representatives and released in its second edition in 2008. This
Aid publication is foundational to UPRT programs and, as revised, is the core training
and implementation document on UPRT referred to in ICAO Doc 10011.
The third edition, Revision 3, was created by working groups from Airbus, Avions de
transport régional (ATR), Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer and ICAO and added to the
coverage provided by Revision 2. In addition the name was changed to Airplane
Upset, Prevention and Recovery Training Aid (AUPRTA) in recognition of the
importance of the Prevention task and the re-defining of the term “upset” to include
the over-arching concept of undesired aircraft state.
alpha/beta plot An FSTD Alpha/Beta plot provides the instructor with an Instructor Operating
Station (IOS) display of the two-axis envelope provided by the wing angle of attack
(Alpha) on the vertical axis and the degrees of sideslip (Beta) on the horizontal axis.
This display shows the FSTD valid training envelope (VTE).

Term Definition
Note: In the case of Airbus as a data provider, the FSTD validation envelope is
represented as alpha-beta plot for the high lift configurations.
For the clean configuration, Airbus provide two envelopes: one alpha-Mach and one
beta-Mach. The reason is that the envelope becomes narrower when Mach number
increases, and Airbus did not feel that an alpha-beta plot would have been as
useful.
angle of attack The angle between the oncoming air, or relative wind, and a reference line on the
airplane or wing.
civil aviation See section 3 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
legislation
competency based Competency is a combination of skills, knowledge and attitudes required to perform
training and a task to the prescribed standard.
assessment
Competency-Based Training and Assessment is characterised by a performance
orientation, the development of training to specified performance standards and the
development of assessments to determine whether competencies have been
achieved. .
competency A level of performance that is defined as acceptable when assessing whether or not
standards competency has been achieved.
correct trend and A tolerance representing the appropriate general direction of movement of the
magnitude aeroplane, or part thereof, with appropriate corresponding scale of forces, rates,
accelerations, etc. This concept is used during initial FSTD evaluations especially
where only a generic or representative level of fidelity is required.
Refer to ICAO Doc 9625.

crew resource Effective use of all available resources: human resources, hardware, and
management information.
critical angle of The angle of attack that produces the maximum coefficient of lift beyond which an
attack aerodynamic stall occurs.
cyclic training and This term “cyclic” was associated with the former Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 40.2.1
proficiency and related to a continuing program of instrument rating recency and proficiency.
program For the purposes of certain provisions of Part 61 of CASR, the current equivalent
term is ’an approved training and checking system’ with approval under the
provisions of 61.040. Cyclic elements are also associated with Part 121 recurrent
training related to major system failures in section 12.20 of the Part 121 MOS.
deep stall A Deep Stall, sometimes referred to as a Super Stall, is a particularly dangerous
form of stall that results in a substantial reduction or loss of elevator authority
making normal stall recovery actions ineffective. In many cases, an aircraft in a
Deep Stall might be unrecoverable. This phenomenon affects certain aircraft
designs, most notably those with a T-tail configuration. Aircraft with a T-tail design
are often configured with a Stick Pusher system to help prevent the mainplane
angle of attack from reaching a value that could result in a Deep Stall.
developing upset Any time the aeroplane is diverging from the intended flightpath and has not yet
condition exceeded the parameters or condition defining an upset.
distraction The diversion of attention away from the primary task of flying.
engine and Ice accrual on engines and aerodynamic surfaces that can affect the performance
airframe icing and/or behaviour of these systems, and which in the case of lifting surfaces, can

Term Definition
influence the stall angle-of-attack.

engineering An integrated set of mathematical models representing a specific aircraft
simulation configuration, typically used by an aircraft manufacturer or other approved data
supplier for a wide range of engineering analysis tasks including engineering
design, development and certification. It is also used to generate data for checkout,
proof-of-match/validation and other training FSTD data documents.
In cases where the use of engineering simulation data is envisaged, a complete

proposal should be presented to the appropriate Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs).
Such a proposal would contain evidence of the engineering simulation data
supplier’s past achievements in high-fidelity modelling.
Aircraft manufacturers or other data suppliers must be able to demonstrate that the
predicted changes in aircraft performance are based on acceptable aeronautical
principles with proven success history and valid outcomes. This must include
comparisons of predicted and flight test validated data.
Refer EASA CS-FSTD (A) AMC7 FSTD(A).300 and Attachment B to Part II of ICA0
Doc 9625 for discussions on engineering simulation validation data.
engineering A simulator developed by an aircraft manufacturer or other approved data supplier
simulator which typically includes a full-scale representation of the simulated aircraft flight
deck, operates in real-time and can be flown by a pilot to subjectively evaluate the
simulation. It contains the engineering simulation models, which are also released
by the aircraft manufacturer or other approved modeler to the industry for FSTDs.
The engineering simulator may or may not include actual on-board system
hardware in lieu of software models.
evidence-based Training and assessment based on operational data that is characterized by
training developing and assessing the overall capability of a trainee across a range of core
competencies rather than by measuring the performance of individual events or
manoeuvres.
The core principle of EBT is training to competency. It is based on a systematic

approach through which assessment and training are based on the measurement of
how well a trainee demonstrates a set of competencies.
Refer to ICAO Docs 9868 and 9995.

extended envelope For the FAA (refer FAR 121.423) this includes the following manoeuvres conducted
training in a Level C or higher flight simulator which include UPRT manoeuvres but also
include additional elements:
• Manually controlled slow flight

• Manually controlled loss of reliable airspeed
• Manually controlled instrument departure and arrival
• Upset recovery manoeuvres
• Recovery from bounced landing
• Instructor-guided hands on experience of recovery from full stall and stick
pusher activation (if equipped).
flight simulation Flight simulation training device means:
training device
• a qualified flight simulator; or
• a qualified flight training device; or
• a synthetic trainer that is approved under Civil Aviation Order 45.0; or
• a device that meets the qualification standards prescribed by a legislative

Term Definition
instrument under regulation 61.045; or

• a device that is qualified by the national aviation authority of a recognised
foreign State.
flight simulator Used for aircraft-specific flight training under rules of the appropriate NAA. Under
these rules, relevant aircraft systems must be fully simulated, and a comprehensive
aerodynamic model is required.
flight training Used for either generic or aircraft specific flight training. Comprehensive flight,
device systems, and environmental models are required but a representative motion model
is not a requirement.
flightpath Active manipulation, using either onboard avionics systems or manual handling, to
management command the aircraft flight controls to direct the aircraft along a desired trajectory in
the lateral and vertical planes.
footprint test Where no OEM data is available for the development of some parts of a flight model
(e.g. for expansions to the valid training envelope for UPRT purposes) regulatory
authorities may make provision for subjective evaluations by a suitably qualified
SME for some parts of an evaluation. This evaluation can be used to develop a
“footprint test”, generated from recording the parameters involved in the SME pilot
evaluation of certain manoeuvres assessed on the basis of “Correct Trend and
Magnitude” (CT &M), aimed at seeing whether a non-OEM based model is
satisfactorily close to the aircraft concerned. This recording will preferably be made
automatically and will be the benchmark basis for future evaluations of the device
concerned in the areas referenced in the original SME evaluation. Footprint tests
are intended for use in recurrent evaluations at least to ensure repeatability.
Note that the use of CT&M is not to be taken as an indication that certain areas of
simulation can be ignored. It is imperative that the specific characteristics are
present, and incorrect effects would be unacceptable.
FSTD validation The FSTD validation envelope refers to the domain in which the FSTD has been
envelope demonstrated as being capable of being flown with a degree of confidence that the
FSTD responds similarly to the aeroplane. This is the same as the FSTD training
envelope.
For UPRT events this envelope can be further divided into three subdivisions:
• Flight test validated region.

• Wind tunnel and/or analytical region.
• Extrapolated region.
A Statement of Compliance is required that defines the source data used to

construct the FSTD validation envelope.
A UPRT instructor should be provided with tools at the IOS to ensure that the
training mission takes place within the validation envelope. The IOS information
should be in the form of an alpha/beta envelope providing the instructor real-time
feedback on the simulation during a manoeuvre.
full stall Any single, or combination of, the following characteristics:
• an uncommanded nose-down pitch that cannot be readily arrested, which may

be accompanied by an uncommanded rolling motion;
• buffeting of a magnitude and severity that is a strong and effective deterrent to
further increase in AOA;
• no further increase in pitch occurs when the pitch control is held at the full aft

Term Definition
stop for 2 seconds, leading to an inability to arrest descent rate;

• activation of a stick pusher,
Refer to FAA AC 120-109A.

full-stall training Training manoeuvres in the recognition cues and recovery procedures from a fully
stalled flight condition (including recovery from a stick pusher activation) at angles
of attack beyond the activation of the stall warning system.
Full stall training is an instructor-guided, hands-on experience of applying the stall

recovery procedure and will allow the pilot to experience the associated flight
dynamics from stall onset through the recovery”.
Refer to FAA AC 120-109A.

instructor operating The computer interface panel between the FSTD instructor and the FSTD.
station
For an instructor to provide feedback to the trainee during UPRT sessions,
additional information must be accessible at an IOS display showing the fidelity of
the simulation, the magnitude of flight control inputs and aeroplane operational
limits.
The training provider must ensure that UPRT instructors have been properly trained
to interpret the data provided by these IOS feedback tools.
loss of control in A categorization of an accident or incident resulting from a deviation from the
flight intended flightpath.
manoeuvre-based Training that focuses on a single event or manoeuvre. For example, recovery from
training an inadvertent excursion into the post stick shaker regime. This is a foundational
level of training and typically precedes or is integrated with scenario based training.
manual of The MOS comprises standards (including knowledge, competency, experience and
standards equipment capability) prescribed by CASA, determined to be necessary for the
safety of air navigation. In the circumstance of any perceived disparity of meaning
between MOS and CASRs, primacy of intent rests with the regulations.
negative training Training which unintentionally introduces incorrect information or invalid concepts,
which could actually decrease rather than increase safety.
negative transfer of Negative transfer of training refers to the inappropriate generalization of a
training knowledge or skill to a situation or setting on the job that does not equal the training
situation or setting.
operational flight Aeroplanes are designed to be operated in well-defined envelopes of airspeed and
envelope altitude.
Within these limits, the airplanes have been demonstrated to exhibit safe flight
characteristics. OEM and regulatory test pilots have evaluated the characteristics of
airplanes in conditions that include inadvertent exceedances of these operational
flight envelopes to demonstrate that the airplanes can be returned safely to the
operational flight envelopes.
original equipment OEM is a commonly used abbreviation referring to the source of a particular aircraft
manufacturer component including the aircraft as a whole, flight test data, software and
subsequent modifications.
OEM provided data and recommendations play a very significant role in UPRT. The
guidance on UPRT in ICAO Doc 10011 and the AURTA has been influenced by the

Term Definition
recommendations of the major OEMs of transport aeroplanes. These OEMs may

develop specific guidance for their types. In such instances, OEM recommendations
take precedence.
prevention Actions and awareness to avoid any divergence from a desired aeroplane state.
quality assurance Quality assurance is the activity of providing, through an audit process, the
evidence needed to establish that all activity is being conducted in accordance with
the applicable requirements, standards and procedures. It should be carried out by
a unit which is fully independent of the executive management who have
responsibility for delivering the function being assessed.
For UPRT, the QA system includes all the planned and systematic actions
necessary to provide adequate confidence that all activities satisfy given standards
and requirements, including the ones specified by the training organization in
relevant manuals.
quality A quality management system should be established and maintained by the FSTD
management operator to ensure the correct maintenance and performance of the FSTD. The
system quality management system may be based upon established industry standards
and must be approved by CASA.
A configuration management system will be required by the QMS and should be

established and maintained to ensure the continued integrity of the hardware and
software as from the original qualification standard, or as amended or modified
through the same system.
Quality management focuses on the means to achieve product or service quality

objectives through the use of four key components: quality planning; quality control;
quality assurance; and quality improvement.
quality system Quality system is an over-arching term describing the aggregate of all the
organization’s activities, plans, policies, processes, procedures, resources,
incentives and infrastructure working in unison towards a total quality management
approach. It requires an organizational construct complete with documented
policies, processes, procedures and resources that underpin a commitment by all
employees to achieve excellence in product and service delivery through the
implementation of best practices in quality management.
Note: This definition is specific to ICAO Doc 10011.
safety A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational

management structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.
system
Refer to ICAO Doc 9859.
scenario based Training integrated into realistic scenarios rather than as stand-alone manual
training handling events. For example: a scenario involving crew distraction and an
unexpected stall event conducted during take-off and/or departure. SBT would
normally be used after a pilot demonstrates proficiency in manoeuvre-based
training and during advanced stages of training, such as upgrade training and
recurrent training.
stall An aerodynamic loss of lift caused by exceeding the critical AOA. A stalled
condition can exist at any altitude and airspeed, and may be recognised by
continuous stall warning activation accompanied by at least one of the following:
• Buffeting, which could be heavy at times

Term Definition
• Lack of pitch authority and/or roll control; and

• Inability to arrest the decent rate.
Transport aircraft are typically required to be equipped with some form of stall
protection system. The indication system may include a stick shaker. Many types
also incorporate a stick pusher.
Stall recognition systems are typically unable to take account of the effect of
contaminated surfaces and the effect of non-symmetrical contamination.
The principal source of guidance on stall indications and responses is the OEM.
Also see "Full Stall" definition above.

stall event An occurrence whereby the aeroplane experiences conditions associated with an
approach to stall or an aerodynamic stall.
stall identification The stall identification angle of attack is defined as the point where the behaviour of
angle of attack the airplane gives the pilot a clear and distinctive indication through the inherent
flight characteristics or the characteristics resulting from the operation of a stall
identification device (e.g., a stick pusher) that the airplane has stalled.
Refer to Attachment 1 to Appendix A, FAR Part 60.

stall recovery The manufacturer-approved aeroplane specific stall recovery procedure. If a
procedure manufacturer-approved stall recovery procedure does not exist, the aeroplane
specific stall recovery procedure may be developed by the operator based on the
stall recovery template contained in the FAA advisory circular, AC 120-09A or other
similar EASA document.
stall warning ICAO Doc 10011 defines stall warning as a natural or synthetic indication provided
when approaching a stall that may include one or more of the following indications:
• aerodynamic buffeting (some aeroplanes will buffet more than others)

• reduced roll stability and aileron effectiveness
• visual or aural cues and warnings
• reduced elevator pitch authority
• inability to maintain altitude or arrest rate of descent and
• stick shaker activation (if installed).
standards and Technical specifications adopted by ICAO in order to achieve "the highest
recommended practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and
practices organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all
matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation".
startle An uncontrollable, automatic muscle reflex, raised heart rate, blood pressure, etc.,
elicited by exposure to a sudden, intense event that violates a pilot’s expectations.
statement of A declaration that specific requirements have been met. For a statement relating to
compliance (SOC) the development of a simulator flight model the SOC should refer to sources of
information and show compliance rationale to explain how the referenced material
is used, applicable mathematical equations and parameter values and conclusions
reached.
As an example, traditionally, models based on flight test collected data have been
the preferred data source for the objective evaluation required for FSTD
qualification. It is recognized, however, that strict time-history-based evaluation
against flight test data may not adequately validate the aerodynamics model. As a
result, the SOC-based approach for evaluating the aerodynamics model at angles

Term Definition
of attack approaching the stall was implemented to allow for the aerodynamics
modeller and data provider to develop enhanced exemplar stall models which are
based upon generally accepted engineering and scientific principles.
stick pusher A device that, automatically applies a nose down movement and pitch force to an
aeroplane’s control columns, to attempt to decrease the aeroplane’s AOA. Device
activation may occur before or after aerodynamic stall, depending on the aeroplane
type.
subject matter In order to qualify as an acceptable SME to evaluate an FSTD’s stall characteristics
expert pilot (SME) in the absence of objective testing based on OEM flight test data, both EASA and
the FAA require an SME pilot to meet the following requirements:
• Has held a type rating/qualification in the aircraft being simulated;

• Has direct and significant experience in conducting stall manoeuvres in an
aircraft that shares the same type rating as the make, model, and series of the
simulated aircraft. This stall experience must include hands on manipulation of
the controls at angles of attack sufficient to identify the stall (e.g., deterrent
buffet, stick pusher activation, etc.) through recovery to stable flight;
• Must be familiar with the intended stall training manoeuvres to be conducted in
the FSTD (e.g., general aircraft configurations, stall entry methods, etc.) and the
cues necessary to accomplish the required training objectives.
• An SME cannot be self-proclaimed. The designation of an SME is related to a
certain type of aeroplane and manoeuvres and is linked to the SME’s recency of
experience in the manoeuvres on the aeroplane type.
Refer to the FAA’s NSP Guidance Bulletin 14-01 for description of how an SME
pilot is involved in the Statement of Compliance, confirming the subjective
evaluation of the FSTD by the SME pilot possessing direct knowledge of the
aircraft’s stall characteristics.
surprise An unexpected event that violates a pilot’s expectations and can affect the mental
processes used to respond to the event.
train to proficiency Training designed to achieve performance objectives, providing sufficient
assurances that the trained individual is capable to consistently carry our specific
tasks safely and effectively.
transfer of training The ability of a trainee to apply knowledge, skills, and behaviour acquired in one
learning environment (e.g., classroom or FSTD) to another environment (e.g.,
flight). In this context, “negative transfer of training” refers to the inappropriate
transfer of knowledge or skills to line operations.
undesired aircraft Undesired aircraft states are flight crew-induced aircraft position or speed
state deviations, misapplication of flight controls, or incorrect systems configuration,
associated with a reduction in margins of safety. Undesired aircraft states that result
from ineffective threat and/or error management may lead to compromising
situations and reduce margins of safety in flight operations. Often considered at the
cusp of becoming an incident or accident, undesired aircraft states must be
managed by flight crews (ICAO Doc 9868).
The Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) manual, ICAO Doc 9803, 1st edition
defines an “Undesired Aircraft State” as:
• “An outcome in which the aircraft is unnecessarily placed in a compromising

situation that poses an increased risk to safety. An “Undesired Aircraft State”
occurs when the flight crew places the aircraft in a situation of unnecessary risk.
For instance, an altitude deviation is an Undesired Aircraft State that presents

Term Definition
unnecessary risk. An Undesired Aircraft State may occur in response to a crew

action or inaction (error)”.
Also refer to definition of Aeroplane Upset (above).

upset prevention A program of theory and practical training providing exposure to aeroplane upset
and recovery conditions as defined in the Airplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Aid
training Revision 3.
valid training This refers to the region within which a simulator has been verified as offering
envelope adequate fidelity for training and within which UPRT activity should take place. This
includes the areas of the simulation model validated by the flight test and wind
tunnel data.
v-n diagram The V-n diagram on UPRT compliant Instructor Operating Stations depicts the
variation of load factor with speed. The V-n diagram offers a visual depiction of the
boundary of safe operation beyond which there is the risk of structural damage.
1.3 References
Regulations
Regulations are available on the Federal Register of Legislation website https://www.legislation.gov.au/
Document Title
Part 60 of CASR Synthetic Training Devices
Part 61 of CASR Flight Crew Licencing
Part 61 MOS Flight Crew Licencing Manual of Standards
Part 91 of CASR General operating and flight rules
Part 119 of CASR Australian air transport operators—certification and management
Part 121 of CASR Australian air transport operations — larger aeroplanes

Part 121 MOS Australian air transport operations — larger aeroplanes
Part 135 of CASR Air transport operations - small aeroplanes
Part 141 of CASR Recreational, private and commercial pilot flight training, other than certain
integrated training courses
Part 142 of CASR Integrated and multi-crew pilot flight training, contracted recurrent training and
contracted checking
Regulation 217 of CAR Training and Checking Organisations

International Civil Aviation Organization documents

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) documents are available for purchase from http://store1.icao.int/
Document Title
ICAO Doc 9625 The Manual of Criteria for the Qualification of Flight Simulation Training
Devices (ICAO Doc 9625 4th Edition, 2015) addresses the use of Flight
Simulation Training Devices (FSTDs) representing aeroplanes (Volume I) and
helicopters (Volume II). The methods, procedures and testing standards
contained in this manual are the result of the experience and expertise
provided by Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) and aeroplane and FSTD
operators and manufacturers. The 4th Edition of Volume 1 includes UPRT
requirements for FSTDs.
ICAO Doc 9683 The Human Factors Training Manual (ICAO Doc 9683) provides guidance
material for the design of training programs to develop knowledge and skills
in human performance. The material in this manual is essentially an edited
compilation of the series of ICAO Human Factors digests. Its target audience
includes senior training, operational and safety personnel in industry and
regulatory bodies.
ICAO Doc 9803 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) manual, International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Doc 9803, 1st edition.
ICAO Doc 9841 The Manual on the Approval of Training Organizations (Doc 9841) provides
information and guidance on the implementation of the Standards of Annex 1
(Personnel Licensing) related to the approval of training organizations. The
first edition was focused exclusively on flight training entities. The latest
edition is significantly expanded in scope and now deals with the approval of
training organizations which provide training services for the issue of an
aviation personnel licence or rating. This manual should be used in
conjunction with Annex 1.
ICAO Doc 9859 ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM).

ICAO Doc 9868 Guidance material on the different means used to assess competence can be
found in the Attachment to Chapter 2 of the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services — Training (ICAO Doc 9868). This manual specifies training
procedures for aeronautical personnel. It contains procedures for the
development and implementation of competency-based training programs
and the methodologies to successfully introduce aeroplane UPRT at the
commercial pilot and MPL levels, as well as providing UPRT in a flight
simulation training device at the commercial air transport pilot and type rating
level.
ICAO Annexes 1, 6 and These have been revised to include UPRT and references to related ICAO
19 material.
ICAO Doc 9995 Guidance material to design flight crew training programs can be found in the
ICAO Doc 9995, the Manual of Evidence-based Training.
ICAO Doc 10011 Guidance on UPRT can be found in the Manual on Aeroplane Upset
Prevention and Recovery Training (ICAO Doc 10011). ICAO has developed
training requirements for UPRT on-aeroplane training at the commercial pilot
and multi-crew pilot level and training in a flight simulation training device at
the airline transport pilot and type rating level. These are promulgated in
Annexes 1 and 6 as well as in ICAO Doc 9868, with an applicability date of 13
November 2014.
Note: ICAO is considering revisions to Doc 10011 to increase the focus on
competency based training.

Document Title
ICAO Doc 10070 (in ICAO Manual on the Competencies of Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors.
draft form as at 2016)
AURTA and AUPRTA The Airplane Upset and Recovery Training Aid (AURTA) was developed by
ICAO and industry representatives and was released in its second edition in
2008. This publication is foundational for the development of UPRT programs
and, along with later revisions, is the core training and implementation
document on UPRT, ICAO Doc 10011. Revision 3 (released in 2017) was
created by working groups from Airbus, ATR, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer
and ICAO and saw the name changed to Airplane Upset, Prevention and
Recovery Training Aid (AUPRTA) in recognition of the importance of the
Prevention task and to include transport category straight wing turbo-prop
aeroplanes and regional jet types.
www.icao.int/safety/LOCI/AUPRTA/index.html
A .pdf version may be found at:

https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/4173.pdf
Advisory material
CASA's advisory circulars are available at http://www.casa.gov.au/AC.
The ACs referred to below will only be effective in relation to compliance with the new Flight Operations regulations
(Parts 91, 103, 105, 119, 121, 131, 133, 135 and 138) which commence on 2 December 2021.
CASA's Civil Aviation Advisory Publications are available at http://www.casa.gov.au/CAAP.
The CAAPs referred to below are only effective until the commencement of the new Flight Operations regulations
(Parts 91, 103, 105, 119, 121, 131, 133, 135 and 138) on 2 December 2021.
Document Title
AC 119-01 Safety management systems for air transport operations
AC 119-12 Human factors principles non-technical skills training assessment for air
transport operations
CAAP SMS-01 Safety management systems for regular public transport operations
CAAP SMS-2 Integration of Human Factors (HF) into Safety Management Systems (SMS)
CAAP SMS-3 Non-Technical Skills Training and Assessment for Regular Public Transport
Operations
CAAP 215-1 Guide to the preparation of operations manuals
Other references
• EASA
− EASA’s standards are contained in CS-FSTD (A) Issue 2 released in 2018. The
Explanatory Note to Decision 2018/006/R “Update of flight simulation training
device requirements” for UPRT was released with the changes from Issue 1.
• UK CAA

− https://www.caa.co.uk/Commercial-industry/Pilot-licences/Training-
organisations/Upset-prevention-and-recovery-training-on-flight-simulation-training-
devices/
− http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/InformationNotice2016044.pdf
• FAA
− Appendix A to FAR Part 60—Qualification Performance Standards for Airplane Full
Flight Simulators
− FAA AC 120-111 CHG 1- UPRT
− FAA AC 61-138 ATP Certification Training Program
− FAA AC 120-109A (CHG 1) Stall Prevention and Recovery Training
− FAA FSTD Directive No. 2
− FAA Qualification Guidance Bulletin 11-05 “FSTD Evaluation and Qualification for
UPRT Tasks” and similar bulletins for other extended envelope training tasks.
− Flight Simulation Training Device Qualification Standards for Extended Envelope
and Adverse Weather Event Training Tasks
− FAA AC 120-71B on crew monitoring
− An Evaluation of Several Stall Models, a paper presented at the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics Modeling and Simulation Technologies conference
in 2014
− An overview of the occurrence of stalls in Australian operations can be found in the
ATSB report “Stall warnings in high capacity aircraft: The Australian context 2008
to 2012”
− IATA UPRT Implementation Guidance Material and Best Practices 2nd Edition
2018
− Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) International Committee on Aviation Training in
Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) Reports
1.4 Forms
CASA’s forms are available at http://www.casa.gov.au/forms
Form number Title

TBA UPRT application

2 Introduction
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Between 2001 and 2011, aeroplane accidents resulting from a loss of control in flight
(LOC-I) event were the leading cause of fatalities in commercial aviation. LOC-I
accidents often have catastrophic results with very few, if any, survivors.
2.1.2 The causes of inflight Loss of Control, whether transitory or extended, are many and
include:
− loss of Situational Awareness (especially through distraction but also complacency)
− wind shear or Clear Air Turbulence
− structural or power plant damage caused by, for example, a bird strike, severe
turbulence, or collision with another aircraft
− intended or unintended mishandling
− attempted flight with total load or load distribution outside of safe limits
− mismanagement of pressurisation systems
− inadequate de-icing before take-off
− airframe or engine icing
− attempting to manoeuvre an aeroplane outside its capabilities
− in-flight fire
− fuel exhaustion or starvation
− false instrument readings
− wake turbulence
− malicious interference.
Refer: https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/loss-control
2.1.3 Following a conference in June 2009 on aeroplane upsets and LOC-I, the Royal
Aeronautical Society (RAeS) initiated a study to investigate the LOC-I phenomena and
make recommendations on mitigating strategies, notably with respect to potential
improvements to international civil aviation standards and guidance material. This work
was undertaken by the RAeS International Committee on Aviation Training in Extended
Envelopes (ICATEE), with ICAO support.
2.1.4 ICATEE concluded that most effective way to defining training solutions is to first clearly
delineate the training needs, which can be defined as the difference between the
current capabilities of an individual and the desired performance objective.
2.1.5 Analysis of LOC-I accident data indicated that contributory factors can be categorised
as being any, or a combination of, the following:
− aeroplane systems induced
− environmentally induced
− pilot/human induced.
2.1.6 Of the three factors, pilot-induced accidents represented the most frequently identified
cause of the event, principally resulting from one or more of the following reasons:
− application of improper procedures, including inappropriate flight control inputs

− one or more flight crew members becoming spatially disoriented

− poor aeroplane energy management
− one or more flight crew pilot members being distracted
− improper training.
2.1.7 In response to the 1996 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
recommendations relating to LOC-I accidents, in 2004 a Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) sponsored working group developed the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid
(AURTA-Revision 1). This document is now in its third revision. To reflect the criticality
of recognition and prevention it has been re-named, Airplane Upset Prevention and
Recovery Training Aid (AUPTRA).
2.1.8 The release of the AURTA followed NTSB recommendations that pilots should possess
a thorough understanding of airplane performance capabilities, limitations, and high-
altitude aerodynamics. Following publishing of the AURTA, industry began attempting to
curb LOC-I through UPRT programs.
2.1.9 Following the ICATEE work, with reduction in LOC-I accidents a high priority, ICAO
developed UPRT Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 1 -
Personnel Licensing and Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). These prescribe that:
− UPRT shall be integrated in aeroplane type rating program (or immediately after)
− UPRT is recommended for Commercial Pilot licence (CPL) and is mandatory for
Multi-crew Pilot Licence (MPL) and Type Rating training
− Operators shall establish and maintain UPRT ground and flight training programs.
2.2 Training objectives

2.2.1 A UPRT program should include clear training objectives stating what the trainee is
expected to perform, the desired learning outcomes and the CBT focus of the training.
2.2.2 To meet the requirement for a compliant UPRT program, the training required by CASA
will follow the prescription in Section 208 of the United States' "Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010’’.
2.2.3 Section 208 prescribes that for the FAA's Part 121 carrier's flight crew members must
be provided with ground training and flight training or flight simulator training:
a. to recognise and avoid a stall of an aircraft or if not avoided, to recover from the
stall
b. to recognise and avoid an upset of an aircraft or if not avoided, to execute such
techniques as available data indicate are appropriate to recover from the upset in a
given make, model, and series of aircraft.
2.2.4 Previously, a significant proportion of upset events (and hence a key UPRT focus)
involved the traditional understanding of “upsets” as relating to physical conditions
(unintentional pitch beyond +25 or -10 degrees, bank angles greater than 45 degrees or
speed inappropriate for the conditions). Recovery training was initiated only after
exceeding these parameters, without paying attention to the reasons of these
diversions.

2.2.5 Current thinking (refer AUPRTA Revision 3) now includes a wider definition of upsets
and uses the established concept of undesired state and the pilot's awareness of this,
regardless of airspeed or specific pitch and/or bank angle parameters.
2.3 Human factors

2.3.1 Human factors training is central to a successful UPRT program. FAA research (AC
120-111 Change 1) shows that in many loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) incidents and
accidents, the monitoring pilot may have been more aware of the aeroplane state than
the pilot flying. Training should emphasise crew interaction (including augmented flight
crews) to identify and vocalise any divergence from the intended flightpath. A
progressive intervention strategy is initiated by communicating a flightpath deviation
(alert), then suggesting a course of action (advocacy and assertion) and then directly
intervening, if necessary.

3 Considerations regarding UPRT implementation
3.1 Applicability of this AC

3.1.1 The contents of this AC reflect CASA's pre-determined acceptable means of
compliance with the regulatory requirements for certain aeroplane operators and
training providers, to provide UPRT programs as laid out in the civil aviation legislation.
3.1.2 Operators and training providers may propose alternative means of compliance,
however, will need to provide significant explanation of how the proposed alternate
means of compliance achieves equivalent safety outcomes and the proposed alternate
means would need to ensure it encompassed the areas covered under each chapter
heading in this AC.
3.1.3 CASA has adopted a phased approach to UPRT implementation. In the first phase
CASA will require a UPRT program for the following:
− Part 121 operations for aeroplanes 30 seats and above and MTOW greater than
8,618 kgs
− any other operations as directed by CASA where a safety requirement becomes
apparent.
3.1.4 Requirements for UPRT for an implementation phase covering operations not included
in the above, will be developed and promulgated at a later date following consultation and
significant industry involvement.
3.2 Expectations for the first phase of UPRT implementation

Note: The 2021 dates listed below only apply to pilots that are conducting active line operations. For a
pilot who was not conducting active line operations, for example due to COVID-19, then an operator would
be expected to propose an alternative schedule to CASA in relation to these pilots.
3.2.1 For domestic and international operations, all pilots should have:
− completed a UPRT theory course (including CASA on-line training)
or
− commenced, or re-commenced participation in an operator's UPRT theory program
by the end of 31st March 2021.
3.2.2 Operators and training providers should identify and remove negative training as soon
as practicable. Before commencement of any UPRT program the initial group of
instructors must complete a "Train the Trainer" course acceptable to CASA1. The
operator should also inform CASA of the specific instructors that will be conducting
UPRT2. From 1 April 2021 an operator or training provider delivering any part of a
1
In this context, acceptable to CASA means that the operator has provided CASA with details of the
course and CASA has not issued a formal legal direction to the operator that the course is unsuitable.
2
CASA will not be formally approving UPRT instructors. However, noting the criticality of this training,
operators should inform CASA (whether via specific listing of instructors in an operator manual / exposition
or via written communication to CASA) of the specific instructors. If CASA determined that certain
instructors were unsuitable for the nominated role, CASA would be required to issue legal directions to the
operator that certain instructors were unsuitable.

UPRT program must have a sufficient number of instructors trained using an acceptable
course to deliver theory and practical UPRT programs (refer Section 14 of this AC).
3.2.3 For international operations, all pilots should have commenced or re-commenced
participation in a UPRT practical handling course by 31 March 2021.
3.2.4 For domestic operations, all pilots should have commenced or re-commenced
participation in a UPRT practical handling course by 31 December 2021.
3.2.5 Operators and training providers should have a UPRT program by 31 March 2022.
3.3 Focus of training

3.3.1 Continued emphasis on stall and recovery training is warranted in training programs to
undo years of applying incorrect stall or upset recovery procedures and use of training
devices incapable of adequately representing the characteristics of the aeroplane in the
post-stall warning regime.
3.3.2 Operators should review current training practices, as un-noticed or un-addressed
negative training poses a threat to flight safety. Part of an operator's UPRT
development and implementation program should include advising CASA of the
outcome of such training reviews and ensuring they document and follow their proposed
mitigation procedures.
3.4 Threats to successful implementation

3.4.1 Clearly identified threats to standardised UPRT implementation include:
− untrained instructor with insufficient knowledge about UPRT theory and practical
training
− trained but under-supervised instructor deviating from standardised methods and
practices without notice by management and/or QA processes
− inappropriate, inadequate or poorly focused syllabi with emphasis on, for example,
minimising altitude loss during stall recovery and/or training concentrated in an
invalid or very small part of the flight envelope
− training that does not adequately focus on manual handling
− unsuitable use of flight simulation training devices and lack of real time feedback
information at the IOS
− lack of appropriate theory and practical human factors training
− extending simulated training beyond the capabilities of the aeroplane or instructor
− programs that do not allow the pilot to connect the UPRT theory elements through
to the practical elements in a robust and thorough manner
− programs that do not allow or encourage training to proficiency, enabling the pilot to
practice certain exercises to develop both cognitive and “muscle memory” skills
− training providers waiting to upgrade their devices before doing anything further
− training providers trying to cram their whole UPRT program into a single course,
rather than integrate modules within the suite of initial and recurrent training
programs

− an inflexible syllabus that is not upgraded, as better and more focused information
becomes available (for example via the operator’s SMS after training and accident
reports)
− lack of robustness in post-implementation governance and/or oversight by the
regulatory authority.
− post-implementation "drift" if under-supervised instructors move away from the
UPRT standards and syllabus requirements initially approved.

4 Training standards for UPRT Instructors
4.1 General
4.1.1 UPRT programs will be competency-based training only, except for some UPRT-related
elements of type rating and licence programs which may require demonstrated
competency in a proficiency test. This will not include proficiency requirements for
manoeuvres beyond the initial stall indication.
4.2 Instructors
4.2.1 Regardless of background, all instructors providing training in a UPRT program
(including UPRT training in a Part 142 Type rating program) must successfully complete
instructor qualification training (i.e. via an acceptable "Train the Trainer" course, in
accordance with the applicable requirements in ICAO Docs 9868 and 10011) (refer to
Section 14 of this AC).
4.2.2 In accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 1, CASA, having issued a pilot
licence, shall not permit the holder thereof to carry out flight instruction required for the
issue of a pilot licence or rating, unless such holder has received proper authorisation
from CASA. Proper authorisation shall comprise one of the following:
− a flight instructor rating on the holder’s licence
− the authority to act as an agent of an approved organisation authorised by CASA to
carry out flight instruction
− a specific authorisation granted by the State which issued the licence.
4.2.3 Forthcoming amendments to the Part 61 Manual of Standards (MOS) are expected to
add the requirement for all Part 61 instructors involved in aeroplane type rating training,
to be trained to deliver UPRT-related theory and practical elements as required,
including in-seat demonstrations in a qualified flight simulator (refer to Section 15 of this
AC).
4.2.4 Training organisations wishing to conduct on-aeroplane UPRT training will need to
obtain a specific approval under the provisions of Part 141 or 142 and must comply with
the requirements listed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of ICAO Doc 10011. Special attention
must be given to the training, qualifications, competencies, safety and risk management
relating to on-aeroplane UPRT instruction and training program management.
4.2.5 For training and checking programs for operations involving aeroplanes with 30 seats or
more or MTOW above 8,618 kgs (this will be simulator training), operators are required
by the Part 121 Manual of Standards to provide induction and recurrent UPRT training.
This will require instructors specifically trained to deliver UPRT. These instructors may
be either of the following:
− the holder of the training endorsement mentioned in Item 4 (multi-crew pilot training
endorsement) and / or Item 5 (type rating training endorsement) of Table 61.1235
of CASR
− until the commencement of Part 121 of CASR — a check pilot approved for the
instructional tasks under the provisions of CAAP 217-1(0)

− after the commencement of Part 121 of CASR — a pilot who has been specified in,
and has completed the acceptable course of training specified in, the operator’s
exposition.
4.3 Training for licence issue

4.3.1 Initial UPRT training for MPL will be conducted by qualified instructors within Part 142
organisations.
4.3.2 Initial UPRT is not yet required but is recommended for CPL trainees. If provided, it
should be conducted by qualified and approved instructors within Part 141 or Part 142
training organisations.
4.4 Training for type ratings

4.4.1 Part 142 training providers may elect to provide UPRT modules (academic and
practical) within their type rating programs (in the same way that MCC, EDTO or Low
Visibility operations may be included in the syllabus even though not required for the
Part 61 MOS requirements for the type rating). Such training must be in accordance
with the contents of this AC. CASA expects to amend the Part 61 MOS to specify the
elements required for instructors delivering UPRT programs (Refer subsection 4.2 and
Section 15 of this AC).
4.4.2 It would be expected that a type rating UPRT program would include significant
emphasis on the following:
− Causes and Contributing Factors: environmental, failures and pilot induced
− Safety Review and Demonstration (in seat instructor guided)
− Upsets and Energy Management (kinetic, potential, chemical)
− Energy: relationship between pitch, power, performance
− Energy: performance and effects of differing engines
− Recognition: Pitch/Power/Roll/Yaw.
4.4.3 If training for the type rating does not include UPRT modules the trainee will be required
complete those modules in an induction program on entry (or return) to Part 121
operations.
4.4.4 Part 142 course completion certificates must indicate whether or not UPRT modules
were delivered
Note: CASA will regard the implementation of a UPRT training program within a Part 142 training
organisation as a significant change as defined in paragraph 142.030 of the CASR.

5 Training program development considerations
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Many LOC-I accident investigations revealed the affected flight crew had received
misleading information from well-meaning training staff or their organisations. ICAO Doc
9868 notes that some existing training practices were found to be ineffective and a
contributory factor to the inappropriate responses by some flight crews.
5.1.2 For example, in certain cases the methodologies being applied in the training and
checking of a recovery from an approach to stall condition of flight, were based on the
pilot being able to achieve recovery with a minimal loss of altitude. This resulted in
training practices which emphasised the importance of a rapid application of power with
the least amount of reduction in angle of attack (AOA) to minimise the loss of altitude,
rather than appreciating the importance of reducing the AOA to effectively increase the
ability of the wing to restore its capability to generate lift.
5.2 Outcomes from a UPRT program

5.2.1 The elements in a UPRT program will provide pilots with the knowledge and skills to
prevent an upset or if not prevented, to recover from an upset.
5.2.2 Trainees will receive theory and practical competency-based training in the three key
areas that comprise a compliant UPRT package:
− Upset Awareness
− Upset Prevention
− Upset Recovery.
5.2.3 Classroom training will be followed by practical training in the required array of manual
skills in Manoeuvre Based Training (MBT) modules. The training can then move
progressively to Scenario Based Training (SBT) modules. CASA will:
− adopt a case-by-case risk-based approach to the assessment of UPRT programs
for “lower end” multi-crew aeroplanes for which a simulator may not be available
− allow lower level devices (including simulators with motion off) to be used for UPRT
academic training prior to exposure to the full flight simulator.
5.3 Device requirements

5.3.1 Initial and recurrent UPRT programs for type rated aeroplanes must be conducted in a
suitably equipped and approved Level C or D flight simulator.
5.3.2 For the introductory and theory components of a UPRT program, many of the required
UPRT tasks and demonstrations relating to recognition, awareness and prevention, can
be completed in a non-upgraded flight simulator or flight training device.
5.3.3 Recognising that fully developed stalls remain the leading cause of loss-of-control
accidents, training must include:
− significant “hands-on” exposure to stalls that are fully developed

− stalls that are unexpected and involve autopilot disengagement

− where applicable, the provision of stick-pusher familiarisation training including an
in-depth understanding of the system and the activation logic.
5.3.4 One of the strong foundational pieces of the requirement is that training and
demonstrations in approach to and recovery from a fully-developed stall, should only be
completed in training devices with a high level of fidelity in those parts of the flight
envelope.
5.3.5 Most aeroplane types exhibit flight dynamics and control characteristics that are
different at and beyond the stall angles of attack as compared to angles of attack
related to stall warning activation. These characteristics exhibited beyond the stall
indication are almost always degraded in comparison with pre-stall behaviour and are
exemplified by reduced and sometimes negative stability and diminished control
effectiveness.
5.4 Syllabus development

5.4.1 Syllabus development should be in accordance with ICAO Doc 10011 and the Airplane
Upset Prevention and Recovery Training Aid (Rev 3) and follow the guidance for
training programs and related matters in ICAO Doc 9868.
5.4.2 Training developers may also wish to refer to AURTA Revision 2 in so far as the
guidance is not revised in Revision 3. The training elements in ICAO Doc 10011 Table
2-1, are simply a means to develop the appropriate proficiencies and assist in
developing training programs. They should not lead to a tick box approach to
completing a syllabus.
5.4.3 Training providers should consider establishing the entire program over a set of multiple
modules, each with specific exercises. This enables the training to be readily integrated
within ongoing recurrent simulator training sessions. More importantly, it encourages a
training-to-proficiency paradigm rather than attempting to cover all UPRT elements into
a single course.
5.4.4 Training providers should consider an immediate start to training in UPRT theory
(including human factors), reinforced by awareness and prevention exercises, in order
to be ready for more advanced recovery situations in later training modules.
5.4.5 Training providers should develop close relationships with relevant original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs). Manufacturers have typically devoted significant resources to
the development of type-specific UPRT programs and these must be taken as primary.
5.4.6 Operators should work with their aeroplane manufacturer(s) to ensure they have the
manufacturer-approved, aeroplane-specific upset prevention and recovery guidance
and techniques in their exposition or operations manual.
5.4.7 Where a training provider desires to use a different technique from what is published in
ICAO Doc 10011 and/or the AUPRTA, a determination of “no-technical- objection” must
be obtained from the applicable OEM unless that specific technique is published in the
appropriate aeroplane flight manual.

5.4.8 The most fundamental take home message for training sequences near, at or beyond
the stall, is recognition and deliberate action to reduce AOA, thereby “unloading the
wing”. Emphasis needs to be on:
− the recognition, prevention and when needed, recovery methods, rather than undue
focus on how the aeroplane entered the condition
− pilot understanding of the difference between attitude and AOA as this difference is
often misunderstood.
5.4.9 UPRT should include instructor guided practice of manual handling at the edges of the
flight envelope.
Note: Training using procedures from one type may have a detrimental effect if carried over to a different
type even if there are superficial similarities.
5.5 Knowledge levels

5.5.1 Care must be taken at the early stages of UPRT implementation not to assume the
existence of a comprehensive level of UPRT-related knowledge, particularly at the type
rating and recurrent training levels.
5.5.2 Accident data strongly indicates even highly experienced flight crews exhibited signs of
shortcomings in understanding and reacting to their predicament, indicating potential
knowledge deficiencies. It is realistically impossible for pilots to recognise and respond
correctly to an undesired aircraft state, without having practical knowledge of the
performance and handling characteristics available (or not available) to them throughout
the entire operational flight envelope.
5.5.3 Trainees should be knowledgeable about aerodynamic effects at both high and low
altitudes. The FSTD training should be accomplished at both high altitude (within 5,000
ft of the service ceiling of the aeroplane) and at low altitude (10,000 ft above mean sea
level) to re-enforce the academic training described. High-altitude training should be
conducted at normal operational cruise altitudes.
5.5.4 Some stalls and upsets are not associated with inaccurate information (such as an
unreliable airspeed indication) and can be instantaneous and require deliberate inputs.
Once positively identified, the recovery from these types of stalls and upsets, is often at
a slower rate than the initiation of the problem. These situations can be extremely
challenging, requiring recognition and recovery without creating stresses beyond
certification limits.
5.5.5 It is known that when an upset occurs in actual flight, pilots often do not respond as they
were trained. In such instances, the common belief is that “startle” and “surprise” were
critical factors. In time-critical events, an incorrect reaction may worsen the situation
and make recovery (both mentally and aerodynamically) more challenging. Fatigue and
emotional stress can exacerbate this situation.
5.5.6 The tools pilots require to manage such sudden onset situations are knowledge and
training to analyse and to resolve the problem. These tools should include
procedures/techniques to recognise the stall event/upset and apply recovery in an
appropriate manner.

5.5.7 Unfortunately, many airline pilots, including instructors, have not been in an actual stall
since the single-engine flights in their early training. Compounding this, the aviation
community has had a history of erroneously emphasising “minimum loss of altitude”
over immediate AOA reduction.

6 Preparation for Implementation
6.1 Preparation steps expected of operators and training providers

6.1.1 Establishment of a UPRT implementation program team should involve the following:
− design and implementation of the operator’s UPRT program and implementation
schedule
− provision for the UPRT core group to undergo high-level UPRT academic and
practical training and a CASA approved “Train the Trainer” course
− conduct of a gap analysis of actual versus desired UPRT status, with the aim of
identifying and removing negative training and reporting on progress through the
training organisation’s SMS and/or quality management systems
− development of the operator’s type-specific UPRT programs for each fleet and
training program (in cooperation with the OEMs) and submission for review by
CASA
− completion of the initial instructor-training program for each fleet including
assurance of capability for delivery of standardised instructor-guided hands-on
experience of recovery from full stall (and stick pusher activation, if so equipped) on
a compliant FSTD with a UPRT capable IOS
− commence awareness and prevention within existing or extended validation
envelopes
− development and operations of the post implementation governance program
including QA and SMS activities.
6.2 Preparation timelines

6.2.1 Refer to Section 3.2 of this AC.

7 Implementation of a Compliant UPRT program
7.1 Overview of requirements

7.1.1.1 The requirements for a UPRT program are found in Chapter 2 of ICAO Doc 10011. The
training elements and the appropriate training media are outlined in Chapter 3 of Doc
10011. Both areas are amplified in the AUPRTA.
7.1.1.2 The recommendations in Doc 10011 provide a comprehensive training program
framework to mitigate the risk of LOC-I accidents. However, the material may include
training elements which could be affected or invalidated by future aircraft-specific
technology or other developments of an operational nature.
7.1.1.3 Although consulted throughout development of Doc 10011, aeroplane OEMs may at
some point develop differing guidance regarding procedures to address these areas of
training. In such instances, OEM’s recommendations take precedence over any
differing information contained within more general guidance material.
7.2 Elements of a compliant program

7.2.1.1 The LOCART initiative determined that the approach in mapping out a UPRT program
should focus its design into satisfying three distinct areas/objectives:
7.3 Need for an integrated program

7.3.1 Effective UPRT program development and supporting regulatory frameworks require an
integrated comprehensive approach to ensure standardisation in the levels of
knowledge and skill sets within the pilot community.
7.3.2 An integrated UPRT program should comprise the following UPRT components:
− academic (theory) training — designed to equip pilots with the knowledge and
awareness needed to understand the threats to safe flight and the employment of
mitigating strategies
− practical training — designed to equip pilots with the required skill sets to effectively
employ upset avoidance strategies and, when necessary, effectively recover the
aeroplane to the originally intended flight path.
7.3.3 The practical training component should cover all elements, further broken down into
the two distinct subcomponents in ICAO Doc 10011 Tables 2-1 and 3-3 (as revised)
involving:

− FSTD training on specific or generic aeroplane types to build on knowledge and

experience and
− application of training to the multi-crew crew resource management (CRM)
environment, at all stages of flight, and in representative conditions, with
appropriate aeroplane and system performance, functionality and response.
Instruction should only be provided by appropriately qualified instructors.
Note: On-aeroplane training during CPL(A) or MPL training will be the subject of specific approvals. Such
training will be carried out in suitably capable light aeroplanes and conducted by appropriately
qualified instructors. The aim will be to develop the knowledge, awareness and experience of
aeroplane upsets and unusual attitudes, and training in how to effectively analyse an upset event
and then apply correct recovery techniques. CASA will develop specific requirements for on-
aeroplane training at a later date.
7.4 Elements of an Integrated program

7.4.1 The following are the deliverables CASA will expect from the theory and practical
components of an integrated UPRT program:
− provision of comprehensive academic training covering the broad spectrum of
issues surrounding aeroplane upsets, at the earliest stages of commercial pilot
development, during type rating training and throughout the professional career, at
scheduled recurrent training intervals
− provision of UPRT manual handling programs for MPL licensing levels on light
aeroplanes, which are capable of performing the recommended manoeuvres while
maintaining acceptable margins of safety
− provision of UPRT conducted in non-type-specific FSTDs when introducing multi-
crew operations at the CPL(A) or MPL licensing level
− provision of training scenarios involving conditions likely to result in upsets, as part
of regular initial type rating and recurrent training exercises in type-specific FSTDs
− implementation of standards that require UPRT to be delivered by appropriately
qualified and competent instructors
− implementation of standards that require UPRT in FSTDs to be conducted in an
appropriately qualified device using the highest level of fidelity available
− provision of conditions under which FSTD instructors are trained and able to
provide feedback in real time, using UPRT- specific debriefing tools of the instructor
operating station (IOS).
7.4.2 Bridging training for existing holders of relevant type ratings and existing instructors
may be conducted within a CAR 217 or a Part 142 organisation (or training and
checking system for future Part 121 operator). These bridging programs, including
those for instructors and pilots within “cyclic” programs, will be subject to CASA
approval (as CAR 217 changes require approval and Part 142 changes will be regarded
as a significant change).
7.4.3 Existing instructors involved in any form of pilot training in Part 141 and 142 operations
will be expected to eventually upgrade their knowledge and skill sets. The requirements
for instructor competencies in UPRT will be prescribed in a future amendment to the
Part 61 Manual of Standards Guidance on the detail of the expected required standards
may be found in ICAO Documents 9868 and 10011.

7.4.4 The IATA Guidance Material and Best Practices for the Implementation of Upset
Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT). 2nd Edition (2018) offers useful guidance
for UPRT implementation and should be read in conjunction with the AUPRTA and
ICAO Documents 9868 and 10011 when the implementation plan is being developed.

8 Flight Simulator qualification

“Unless the UPRT FSTD’s simulation model satisfactorily represents the aeroplane’s
behaviour and performance during an aerodynamic stall, training demonstrating
conditions beyond the critical angle of attack can create harmful misperceptions about
such an event and the recovery experience".
ICAO Doc 10011 section 4.1
8.1 Overview
8.1.1 Most current flight simulators can be used satisfactorily to conduct unusual attitude
recovery training tasks, awareness and AOA related training and a significant portion of
recognition, prevention and upset training not involving full stalls. Until now only
approach-to-stall training was necessary in FSTDs and as such, FSTD data packages
did not necessarily concentrate on flight characteristics at angles of attack beyond the
first indication of a stall.
8.1.2 While current simulators are typically capable of supporting brief excursions beyond the
initial stall indications, until UPRT upgrades began, simulation flight models were
usually found to be deficient in adequately representing the post-stall indication regime.
8.1.3 Before being upgraded for UPRT, most simulators have not provided the cues and
performance degradation needed, to train in recognition of an impending aerodynamic
stall or in recovery techniques from a stalled condition. Instead the simulators presented
dynamic characteristics in the stall and post-stall regimes that were easier to recover
from than in the actual aeroplane. In particular, the wing drop that may accompany a
stall was seldom modelled.
8.1.4 The use of a simulator beyond the capabilities and fidelities necessary to complete the
required training, can pose a significant threat to the achievement of the desired
outcomes and ultimately, a threat to flight safety.
8.1.5 The development and utilisation of a “type-representative post-stall aerodynamic model”
to support demonstrations beyond the critical AOA is necessary, for such
demonstrations and practice to be properly conducted.
8.1.6 The need to have FSTDs qualified for UPRT (including full stall) brings with it the
requirement for fidelity levels adequate to support recognition cues, performance and
handling qualities of a developing stall, through and beyond the stall identification AOA
and recovery.
8.1.7 As the buffet associated with a developing stall may exceed the expectations of pilots
and instructors not ordinarily exposed to buffet beyond the initial stall indications, care
(such as thorough briefings and mandatory use of seat belts during stall training) should
be taken to avoid physical injury within the simulator.
8.1.8 Many current FSTDs lack enhanced instructor feedback tools to allow for a complete
and accurate assessment of the trainee’s performance. Until the progressive
implementation of upgrades to simulators is complete, these fidelity and IOS limitations,
if not fully appreciated by training program designers and instructional staff, can result in
the serious and long-term repercussions of trained flight crews and instructors with
significant misunderstandings of upset events.

8.1.9 Traditionally flight test has been the preferred data source for FSTD objective
evaluation and it is expected that best endeavours will be made by FSTD modellers to
secure flight test data. However even if the traditional array of flight test data is
available, strict time-history-based evaluations against that data may not adequately
validate the aerodynamic model in an unsteady and potentially unstable flight regime,
such as stalled flight.
8.2 Statement of Compliance (SOC)

8.2.1 As objective testing requirements do not prescribe strict tolerances at angles of attack
beyond the stall identification, in lieu of objective tolerances, an SOC will be required to
define the source data and methods used to develop the stall aerodynamic model, and
hence construct the FSTD validation envelope.
8.2.2 The SOC must verify that each UPRT feature programmed at the IOS and the
associated training manoeuvre, has been evaluated by a suitably qualified SME pilot.
The SOC must confirm that the recovery manoeuvre can be performed such that the
FSTD does not exceed the validation envelope, or when exceeded, that it is within the
realm of confidence in the simulation accuracy.
8.2.3 Where it is impractical to develop and validate a stall model with flight-test data (e.g.,
due to safety concerns involving the collection of flight test data past a certain AOA), the
data provider is expected to make a reasonable attempt to develop a stall model
through the required AOA range, using analytical methods and utilisation of the best
available data.
8.2.4 The FSTD operator must declare the range of AOA and sideslip where the aerodynamic
model remains valid for training.
8.2.5 For stall recovery training tasks, satisfactory aerodynamic model fidelity must be shown
through at least 10 degrees beyond the stall identification AOA.
8.2.6 The model must be capable of capturing the variations seen in the stall characteristics
of the aeroplane concerned (e.g., the presence or absence of a pitch break, deterrent
buffet or other indications of a stall where present on the aircraft).
8.2.7 Where OEM-supplied flight test-based data is not available or is incomplete, alternative
sources of data used to construct the FSTD validation envelope may be acceptable
(and documented in the SOC) using the following hierarchy of preferences:
a. stall models developed using the aeroplane OEM’s engineering simulation
b. wind tunnel or established analytical methods to extend stall modelling sufficiently,
to achieve an exemplar full stall and recovery
c. input from an SME pilot with full-stall experience in the aeroplane being simulated
d. unpublished sources acceptable to CASA (e.g., calculations, simulations, video or
other simple means of flight test analysis or recording).
Note: If engineering simulator data or other non-flight-test data are used as an allowable form of reference
data the data provider must supply a well-documented mathematical model.
8.2.8 The SOC must address, and the aerodynamic model must incorporate, the following
stall characteristics where applicable (with explanation of methodology):

− degradation in static/dynamic lateral-directional stability

− degradation in control response (pitch, roll, yaw)
− uncommanded roll acceleration or roll-off requiring significant countering control
deflection
− apparent randomness or non-repeatability
− changes in pitch stability
− stall hysteresis
− mach effects
− stall buffet
− angle of attack rate effects
− engine effects (power reduction/variation, vibration, etc. if applicable).
8.2.9 Where known limitations exist in the aerodynamic model for particular stall manoeuvres
(such as aircraft configurations and stall entry methods), these limitations must be
declared in the SOC.
8.2.10 The SOC will only be required at the time the FSTD is initially qualified, as long as the
stall model remains unmodified from what was originally qualified.
8.3 The training focus in evaluation

8.3.1 From the training perspective the requirements for the evaluation of stall training
manoeuvres are intended to ensure adequate levels of fidelity for the following:
− type specific recognition cues of the first indication of the stall (such as the stall
warning system or aerodynamic stall buffet)
− type specific recognition cues of an impending aerodynamic stall
− demonstrate aircraft performance degradation in the stall
− recognition cues and handling qualities from the stall break through to recovery that
are sufficiently similar to the characteristics of the aeroplane being simulated, to
allow successful completion of the stall recovery training tasks.
8.3.2 The FSTD validation envelope may be thought of as the entire realm in which the FSTD
may be flown as a function of AOA and sideslip and with a degree of confidence that
the FSTD responds similarly to the aeroplane. The envelope can be divided into three
subdivisions:
− Flight test validated region: The region of the flight envelope validated with flight
test data, typically by comparing the performance of the FSTD against flight test
data through tests incorporated in the Qualification Test Guide (QTG) and other
flight test data utilised to further extend the model beyond minimum requirements.
Within this region, there is high confidence that the simulator responds similarly to
the aircraft.
− Wind tunnel and/or analytical region: This is the region of the flight envelope for
which the FSTD has not been compared to flight test data, but for which there has
been wind tunnel testing or the use of other reliable predictive methods (typically by
the aircraft manufacturer) to define the aerodynamic model. Within this region,
there is moderate confidence that the simulator will respond similarly to the aircraft.

− Extrapolated: The region extrapolated beyond the flight test validated and wind
tunnel/analytical regions. It is a “best guess” only and within this region there is low
confidence that the simulator will respond similarly to the aircraft.
8.3.3 For simulators upgraded to capability for high-AOA modelling the model must support
stall training manoeuvres in the following flight conditions:
− stall entry at wings level (1g)
− stall entry in turning flight of at least 25degree bank angle (accelerated stall)
− stall entry in a power-on condition (required only for propeller driven aircraft)
− aircraft configurations of second segment climb, high altitude cruise (near
performance limited condition), and approach or landing.
8.3.4 In lieu of objective testing for the high-altitude cruise and turning flight stall conditions,
these manoeuvres may be subjectively evaluated by a qualified SME pilot and
addressed in the required SOC.
8.3.5 Objective testing for characteristic motion vibrations is not required where the FSTD’s
stall buffets have been subjectively evaluated by an SME pilot.
8.3.6 Where aerodynamic modelling data is not available or insufficient to meet the
requirements of FAA Directive 2, CASA may limit qualified engine and airframe icing
manoeuvres to scenarios where sufficient aerodynamic modelling data does exist.
8.3.7 During the initial evaluation, a footprint test should be documented with an associated
SME pilot subjective “sign off” of the model, as being fully representative. For the
purposes of stall manoeuvre evaluation, the term ‘representative’ is defined as a level of
fidelity that is type-specific of the simulated aeroplane, to the extent that the training
objectives can be satisfactorily accomplished.
8.3.8 Where correct trend and magnitude is used it is strongly recommended that an
automatic recording system be used to ‘footprint’ the baseline results, thereby avoiding
the effects of possible divergent subjective opinions on recurrent evaluation.
8.3.9 It is imperative that specific characteristics are shown to be present, and incorrect
effects would be unacceptable. (e.g. if the aeroplane has a weak positive spiral stability,
it would not be acceptable for the simulator to exhibit neutral or negative spiral stability).
8.3.10 Numerical tolerances are not applicable past the stall AOA but must demonstrate
correct trend through the recovery.
8.3.11 The provisions for high AOA modelling should be applied to evaluate the recognition
cues as well as performance and handling qualities of a developing stall, through the
stall identification AOA and stall recovery.
8.3.12 In lieu of mandating such objective tolerances, an SOC should define the source data
and methods used to develop the aerodynamic stall model.
8.3.13 The provisions for the evaluation of full stall training manoeuvres should provide the
following levels of fidelity:
− aeroplane-type-specific recognition cues of the first indication of the stall (such as
the stall warning system or aerodynamic stall buffet)
− aeroplane-type-specific recognition cues of an impending aerodynamic stall.

8.3.14 Where correct trend and magnitude is used, it is strongly recommended that an
automatic recording system be used to footprint the baseline results, thereby avoiding
the effects of possible divergent subjective opinions on recurrent evaluations.
8.3.15 Where qualification is being sought to conduct full stall training tasks in accordance with
FAA Directive 2, the FSTD operator must conduct the required evaluations and
modifications as prescribed in Directive 2 and report compliance to CASA’s Flight
Simulation Team on the UPRT application form. At a minimum the operator must supply
the following information:
− a description of any modifications to the FSTD necessary to meet the requirements
of Directive 2
− statements of Compliance (High Angle of attack Modelling/Stick Pusher System) –
as per Table A1A, Section 2.m., 3.f., and Attachment 7 to FAR Part 60
− statement of Compliance (SME Pilot Evaluation) – See FAR Part 60 Table A1A,
Section 2.m. and Attachment 7
− copies of the required objective test results.
8.4 Instructor operating station requirements

Refer to Section 13 of this AC.

9 Envelope protection
9.1 Background
9.1.1 For many decades, aeroplanes have been equipped with various devices and systems
capabilities aimed at modifying natural aerodynamic characteristics, and/or protecting
the aircraft from exceeding defined aerodynamic or structural limitations. These devices
and systems have included:
− yaw dampers
− rudder load limiters
− mach trim compensators
− flight control software (with roll and pitch protection functions)
− stick pushers
− powered elevators (for stall recovery, e.g. DC-9).
9.1.2 In addition, there are systems to aid the pilot in normal flight activities and handling
tasks. These include:
− powered controls
− auto-throttle
− auto-pilot
− powered control trims.
9.2 Knowledge
9.2.1 Trainees should understand envelope protection systems and associated failure modes
relevant to UPRT and how these systems can cause or contribute to an upset, or simply
increase the likelihood of an upset. Upset-inducing failures/malfunctions related to
systems, instruments, power and automation should be incorporated into training
whenever applicable, if specified or approved by the OEM.
9.2.2 Trainees should be made particularly aware of the insidious nature of inaccurate
information (e.g. unreliable airspeed, failures of stall and icing alerting devices,
degradation of envelope protection systems), so they are trained to recognise the
problem/error, prevent an upset and maintain control of the aeroplane.
9.3 Simulation considerations

9.3.1 To adequately support UPRT activity a compliant simulator must demonstrate an
acceptable level of capability and fidelity in areas of the training envelope beyond the
protection and operational limits where history (and OEM advice) show that unexpected
or inadvertent flight may occur. In addition, the IOS must be capable of readily providing
feedback to the instructor on control inputs and the position of the aeroplane in relation
to the flight envelope.
9.3.2 History has shown that system failure (full or partial) or flight with some form of
degraded control capability is often the precursor to an upset event. These situations
can include:

− mechanical or systems failure (either directly or through the failure of a supporting

system such as an air-date computer)
− inappropriate pilot actions (e.g. pulling circuit breakers during pilot-initiated fault
diagnosis in-flight other than as directed by a Non-Normal Checklist)
− aircraft inadequately de-iced before departure
− incorrect performance calculations (e.g. entering incorrect Zero Fuel Weight)
− inappropriate aircraft loading leading to out of envelope centre of gravity
− incorrect configuration for phase of flight.
9.3.3 Unless specified as a required training exercise by the OEM, for aeroplanes so
equipped, there is no UPRT requirement to disable or override the stick pusher to get
closer to or beyond the aerodynamic stall. The ICAO standard is that the aerodynamic
model must extend to at least 10 degrees beyond the stall identification AOA, which is
generally the stick pusher activation on stick pusher equipped aircraft. This standard is
central to the FAA FSTD Directive 2 (refer paragraph 9.4.7 below).
9.3.4 While training requirements only go to stick-pusher activation then recovery, in practice,
pilots may overshoot beyond the activation AOA, possibly a significant overshoot,
hence the need for simulator fidelity well beyond the stick pusher.
Note: From observations, most instructors state that, regardless of previous academic training, pilots
usually resist the stick pusher on their first encounter.
Note: Usually, trainees immediately pull back on the control yoke/stick rather than releasing pressure. This
issue has been a factor in a number of LOCI accidents.
9.3.5 Notwithstanding paragraph 9.3.4, CASA expects UPRT training providers to liaise with
OEMs to ascertain the usefulness of development of relevant scenarios, where for
demonstration purposes only, the disabling of appropriate envelope protection systems
(for example by the failure of an input mode such as the pitot-static system) might allow
the introduction of demonstrations of approach to, and recovery from, stall in various
degraded modes. The primacy of the aeroplane OEM must be recognised in this, and
operators must not independently develop their own training protocols and practices for
this critical flight regime.
9.3.6 Safety considerations may mean that that the collection of data or obtaining SME
experience beyond the pusher activation, will be very limited. However, simulator
modelling beyond the stall indication AOA does not necessarily require flight test
validation data. Wind tunnel and analytical methods may be used to develop an
adequate representative model.
9.4 UPRT considerations

9.4.1 The model validity range must extend to 10 degrees AOA beyond the stall identification
AOA, with the protection systems disabled or otherwise degraded (such as a degraded
flight control mode as a result of a pitot/static system failure).
9.4.2 Training may not necessarily extend far into this range unless the OEM requires that
protection systems be disabled for training purposes.
9.4.3 An assessment of the FSTD’s stall characteristics should be accomplished by an SME
pilot (see section 10) and where possible, should be complemented with aircraft OEM

or other suitable documentation (such as flight test reports or aircraft certification data)
that fully describes the stall characteristics of the simulated aircraft.
9.4.4 For “fly-by-wire” aircraft the FSTD should be evaluated in both “normal” and “non-
normal” control modes. Reversion to degraded control laws (such as secondary,
alternate, or direct control laws) should be conducted with consideration of potential
failure scenarios that may be encountered in an operational environment, or as
necessary to support the operator’s training requirements.
9.4.5 If necessary, an SME pilot will be expected to initiate “fine-tuning” of the operations of
the aerodynamic model in the particular FSTD. This might include:
− minor longitudinal stability adjustment before stall
− adjustments to “roll-off” due to asymmetric stall
− adjustments to a randomiser algorithm.
9.4.6 For aeroplanes equipped with a stick pusher, the SOC should verify that the stick
pusher system has been modelled, programmed and validated, using the aeroplane
manufacturer’s design data or other approved data source. At a minimum, the following
characteristics should be addressed in the SOC:
− stick pusher activation logic
− stick pusher system dynamics, control displacement, and forces
− stick pusher cancellation logic.
9.4.7 The model must also be capable of simulating the dynamics of the aeroplane
concerned as a result of a pilot initially (and possibly very forcefully) resisting the stick
pusher in training.
9.4.8 Simulators may be used to demonstrate the activation of a stick pusher system,
however, training providers are cautioned that the range beyond stick pusher activation,
may not accurately represent the aeroplane unless the post-stick pusher regime is
properly modelled and evaluated.
Attachment 7 to Appendix A of FAR Part 60:
“The model validity range must also be capable of simulating the airplane dynamics as
a result of a pilot initially resisting the stick pusher in training. For aircraft equipped with
a stall envelope protection system, the model validity range must extend to 10 degrees
of angle of attack beyond the stall identification angle of attack with the protection
systems disabled or otherwise degraded (such as a degraded flight control mode as a
result of a pitot/static system failure)”.
9.4.9 The FSTD sponsor/FSTD manufacturer may limit maximum buffet based on motion
platform capability/limitations or other simulator system limitations.
9.4.10 Tests may be conducted at centres of gravity and weights typically required for airplane
certification stall testing. Tolerances on stall buffet are not applicable where the first
indication of the stall is the activation of the stall warning system (i.e. stick shaker).
9.4.11 As the pitch down from stick pusher activation or the buffet associated with a
developing stall may exceed the expectations of pilots and instructors not ordinarily
exposed to buffet beyond the initial stall indications, care (such as thorough briefings
and mandatory use of seat belts during stall training) should be taken to avoid physical
injury within the simulator

9.4.12 The stall model should be evaluated by an SME pilot with knowledge of the cues
necessary to accomplish the required training objectives, and experience in conducting
training and stalls in the type of aeroplane being simulated.
9.4.13 The purpose of the subjective evaluation is to provide an additional layer of protection to
ensure FSTD fidelity. The intent is for the simulation to be qualified initially only once by
an SME. Objective recording can then be made and used without an SME for initial or
recurrent qualification of FSTDs for the same aeroplane make, model and series.

10 Subject Matter Expert pilot (SME)

10.1.1 To qualify as an acceptable SME to evaluate a FSTD’s stall characteristics, an SME
must meet the following requirements:
− have held a type rating/qualification in the aircraft being simulated
− have direct and significant experience in conducting stall manoeuvres in an aircraft
that shares the same type rating as the make, model and series of the simulated
aircraft. This stall experience must include hands on manipulation of the controls at
angles of attack, sufficient to identify the stall (e.g., deterrent buffet, stick pusher
activation, etc.) through recovery to stable flight
− be familiar with the intended stall training manoeuvres to be conducted in the FSTD
(e.g., general aircraft configurations, stall entry methods, etc.) and the cues
necessary to accomplish the required training objectives
− cannot be self-proclaimed. The designation of an SME is related to a certain type of
aeroplane and manoeuvres and is linked to the SME’s recency of experience in the
manoeuvres on the aeroplane type.
10.1.2 Where the SME’s stall experience is on an airplane of a different make, model, and
series within the same type rating, differences in aircraft specific stall recognition cues
and handling characteristics must be addressed using available documentation. This
documentation may include aircraft operating manuals, OEM flight test reports, or other
documentation that describes the stall characteristics of the aircraft.
10.1.3 Where an SME pilot with the required qualifications is unavailable for a specific aircraft
type, an FSTD operator should justify how equivalent safety outcomes will be achieved.
This justification must include the following:
− demonstration that a suitably qualified pilot meeting the experience requirements of
this section cannot be practically located
− alternative methods to subjectively evaluate the FSTD’s capability to provide the
stall recognition cues and handling characteristics needed to accomplish the
training objectives.
10.1.4 SME pilots can be a valuable resource. They will be knowledgeable of the flight
characteristics of the particular aeroplane and have significant stall experience in the
aeroplane. However, the knowledge of an SME pilot will not be accepted as sufficient to
build a model "from scratch". The use of an SME pilot requires the existence of a well-
developed solid baseline model ready for small adjustments.

11 Icing models
11.1.1 In-flight icing is one of the environmentally-induced causes of aeroplane upsets. It
represents a serious hazard (refer AUPRTA Section 6.6). By disturbing the smooth flow
of air on the aeroplane icing will increase drag, decrease the ability of an airfoil to
produce lift and degrade control authority.
11.1.2 The lift distribution characteristics along the wing may be affected by even trace
amounts of ice contamination.
11.1.3 Unexpected handling characteristics can be expected with ice build-up. During the
progression of a stall condition, flow separation on the contaminated aerofoil may be
affected and the pitch and/or roll characteristics may be different from those of an
uncontaminated wing.
11.1.4 Historically, the effects of icing were typically simulated by adding weight to the
simulated aircraft without incorporating abnormal aerodynamic characteristics (such as
aerodynamic changes as a result of ice accretion) or altered engine performance.
11.1.5 Studies of airplane accidents where loss of control (LOC) was attributed to icing, have
suggested that existing FSTD icing models that do not capture additional effects may be
inadequate for training.
11.1.6 Requirements for FSTD qualification for UPRT have been developed to define
aeroplane-specific icing models that support training objectives for the recognition and
recovery from an in-flight ice accretion event.
Note: Refer FAA Guidance Bulletin 11-04 FSTD Evaluation and Qualification for Engine and Airframe
Icing Training Tasks.
11.1.7 Icing models must be upgraded to simulate the aerodynamic degradation effects of ice
accretion on the aircraft lifting surfaces. These effects should where possible, be
consistent with performance degradations that accident investigation agencies have
extracted during the investigations of icing-related accidents and incidents.
11.1.8 Systems (such as the stall protection system and auto-flight systems) must respond
properly to ice accretion, consistent with the simulated aircraft. A description of the anti-
ice system operation will be required to assist both instructors and trainees in
interpreting FSTD behaviour.
11.1.9 Where a particular airframe has demonstrated vulnerabilities to a specific type of ice
accretion (due to accident/incident history) which may require specific training (such as
supercooled large-droplet icing or tail-plane icing), ice accretion models should be
developed that address the training requirements.
11.1.10 Ice accretion models and the associated training cannot replicate all possible icing
situations but should:
− demonstrate the cues necessary to recognise the onset of ice accretion on the
airframe, lifting surfaces and engines
− have the capability of providing procedures for use of on-board anti-icing equipment
and monitoring and maintaining appropriate airspeeds in icing conditions
− provide exemplar degradation in performance and handling qualities to the extent
that a recovery can be executed

− provide procedures for responding to decaying airspeed situations, stall protection

system activation and early stalls that can occur without stall protection system
activation.
11.1.11 FSTD capability for stall-related training must also include the ability to simulate stall
conditions and changes in handling characteristics arising from failures in ice-alerting
systems. Trainees should be made particularly aware of the insidious nature of
inaccurate information arising from such failures, to ensure they are trained to:
− recognise the error
− prevent an upset
− maintain control of the aeroplane.
11.1.12 An objective demonstration is required to demonstrate that ice accretion models as
described in the SOC, have been implemented correctly and demonstrate the proper
cues and effects as defined in the approved data sources.
11.1.13 An objective demonstration should include two tests to demonstrate engine and
airframe icing effects as follows:
− The first test should demonstrate the FSTDs baseline performance without ice
accretion.
− The second test should demonstrate the aerodynamic effects of ice accretion
relative to the baseline test.
11.1.14 The outcome of the tests will include descriptions of the icing effects being
demonstrated. These effects may include, but are not limited to, the following effects as
applicable to the particular airplane type:
− decrease in stall angle of attack
− changes in pitching moment
− decrease in control effectiveness
− changes in control forces
− increase in drag
− change in stall buffet characteristics and threshold of perception
− engine effects (power reduction/variation, vibration, etc. where expected to be
present on the aircraft in the ice accretion scenario being tested).
11.1.15 Evaluation requirements define a minimum level of fidelity required to adequately
simulate the aircraft specific aerodynamic characteristics, of an in-flight encounter with
engine and airframe ice accretion as necessary, to accomplish the required training
objectives.
11.1.16 OEM data or other analytical methods must be utilised to develop ice accretion models.
Acceptable methods may include wind tunnel and/or engineering analysis, coupled with
tuning and supplemental subjective assessment by an SME pilot.
11.1.17 The SOC should explain the relevant source data, such as aeroplane OEM’s subjective
evaluation guidance material, to the FSTD operator for evaluation of the implemented
model.

12 Adherence to the FSTD training envelope

12.1.1 Most FSTDs can be used satisfactorily for AOA-related training and for a significant
portion of upset training not involving full stalls. As long as the simulated aeroplane
remains within its valid training envelope (VTE) (the aeroplane flight envelope data
provided by the OEM and used for the FSTD qualification) for AOA and sideslip, upsets
that subsequently have large (AOA or sideslip) excursions can be represented faithfully.
12.1.2 Use of FSTDs in regions of the flight envelope beyond the FSTD’s ability to provide
accurate fidelity, can result in a negative training experience and high risks. As an
example refer to the American Airlines A300-600 accident in 2001,
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
12.1.3 The FAA Handbook on Air Transport makes each operator responsible for ensuring that
the simulators used beyond the “normal” events can accurately support the inclusion of
added activities (see FAA HBAT 95-10).
12.1.4 While various levels of training devices may be appropriate for the illustration and
practice of a variety of elements of UPRT, they should always be qualified appropriately
for the delivery of UPRT-specific training.

13 The IOS
“The instructor must be provided with minimum feedback tools for the purpose of
determining if a training manoeuvre is conducted within FSTD validation limits and the
aircraft’s operating limits” FAA FSTD Directive 2 and FAR Part 60 Table A1A.
13.1 Feedback to the instructor

13.1.1 For the instructor to provide feedback to the trainee during upset prevention and
recovery training (UPRT), additional information should be accessible that indicates the
fidelity of the simulation, the magnitude of trainee’s flight control inputs and aeroplane
operational limits that could potentially affect the successful completion of the
manoeuvre(s). Specifically, this means that instructors should have available and be
properly trained, to effectively utilise IOS tools that convey:
− when the simulator model is no longer valid
− when the aeroplane operational envelope is exceeded
− when inappropriate control inputs are used
− information to support adequate de-briefing, for example, whether and how far
recovery went into the extrapolated envelope beyond the flight data validated
envelope.
13.1.2 Incorrect recoveries from upsets in simulation can result in:
− excursions outside of the FSTD training envelope
− excursions outside the aeroplane’s operational envelope
− inappropriate flight control inputs such as excessive rudder pedal inputs.
13.1.3 An IOS can be as simple as a low-cost hand-held tablet which gives the instructor the
ability to activate the scenario, monitor pilot actions, then have immediate information
regarding control inputs and forces.
13.1.4 Until IOS representation of the FSTD Training Envelope is provided, operators must
ensure instructors are not training beyond the FSTD training envelope. Pro-active
identification and removal of negative training should be undertaken even ahead of
formal UPRT program development and approval.
13.2 The IOS display

13.2.1 FSTDs qualified for full stall training tasks must meet the instructor operating station
(IOS) requirements for upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) tasks (as
detailed in ICAO Doc 9625, 4th Edition, Volume 1, Part II, Section 3.3). The IOS must
clearly display:
− FSTD validation envelope. The FSTD should employ a method to record the
FSTD’s fidelity with respect to the FSTD validation envelope.
− Flight control inputs. The FSTD should employ a method for the instructor/evaluator
to assess the trainee’s flight control inputs during the upset recovery manoeuvre.
− Aeroplane operational limits. The FSTD should provide the instructor/evaluator with
information concerning the aeroplane operating limits

13.2.2 The IOS should represent load factor and speeds with a boundary of operational load
and airspeed limits. This display should be constructed in accordance with OEM data
and should incorporate OEM operating recommendations.
13.3 Additional IOS functions

13.3.1 If available, IOS selectable dynamic upsets must provide guidance to the instructor
concerning the method(s) used to drive the FSTD into the upset condition, including any
malfunction or degradation in the FSTD’s functionality required to initiate the upset.
Note: The unrealistic degradation of simulator functionality (such as degrading flight control effectiveness)
to drive an airplane upset is generally not acceptable unless used purely as a tool for repositioning
the FSTD with the pilot out of the loop.

14 “Train the Trainer”: Training UPRT Instructors
14.1 General
14.1.1 This material is adapted from IATA’s Guidance Material and Best Practices for the
Implementation of Upset Prevention and Recovery Training.
14.1.2 When starting a UPRT project, operators should first select an individual or a team to be
charged with the design and implementation of the program. This team should form the
core-group of instructors to set up the UPRT program. As an example, operators with
several fleets might select two instructors per fleet as core instructors.
14.1.3 The core-group of FSTD Instructors will have to complete an acceptable “Train-the-
Trainer” course with the aim of qualifying them to deliver UPRT and enabling them to
train the remaining regular instructors of the operator. As an example, the initial course
for core-group FSTD instructors may include:
− identification of negative training and risk mitigation strategies
− pre-studies in UPRT theory
− academic instructor training
− on-aeroplane UPRT (if relevant)
− human factors
− FTSD training (use and limitations of simulators including the IOS).
14.1.4 The operator may build an “in-house” "Train-the-Trainer" course (preferably supported
by the operator’s own or visiting experts, i.e. training captains with previous experience
as test pilots, etc) or send the core-group to an experienced UPRT provider. The
capabilities of such a provider and the course content, should be discussed with CASA
before committing to the training course.
14.1.5 ICAO Doc 10011 Chapter 5 and FAA AC No: 120-111 Change 1 Chapter 2.5, describe
training elements and subject areas of instructor training that will assist in ensuring the
adequacy of UPRT instructor preparation and minimise the risk of negative transfer of
training.
14.2 Training for the "core group"

14.2.1 On-aeroplane training for the core-group instructors is not a requirement. However, it is
recommended to allow the core-group to acquire first-hand experience of the success-
critical human factors during recoveries of upsets. The core-group will later train the
operator’s regular FSTD instructor staff, who normally do not possess this experience
and who will have to rely on the expertise of the core-group to compensate for this gap.
14.2.2 FSTD instructor training for the core-group should include a part where the instructor
flies the recovery manoeuvres as a trainee, and a second part where he/she practices
teaching under supervision. Such instructor training does not necessarily need to be
type-specific. Once qualified, the core-group will develop the operator’s type-specific
UPRT programs for each fleet (in cooperation with the OEMs) and finally submit them
for approval to CASA.

14.2.3 Before qualifying the remaining regular FSTD instructors of the organisation, it would be
beneficial for the core-group instructors to gain experience in the delivery of UPRT by
teaching trainees for a certain time. Ideally this phase would be
supervised/accompanied by an experienced mentor, preferably from the initial UPRT
Train-the-Trainer course.

15 The UPRT Instructor
15.1 General
15.1.1 Instructor training is one of the most critical elements in a UPRT program. Training
should be delivered within an approved Part 142 training organisation or as part of a
training and checking system.
15.1.2 A simulator instructor may have little formalised training in on-aeroplane upset, may
have never been beyond 60 degrees of bank angle, or flown beyond the initial
indications of a stall in an aircraft. Due to lack of formal guidance, many instructors have
been found to teach recovery techniques they personally decided as appropriate,
without any quality assurance to prevent negative transfer of training.
15.2 Instructor selection

15.2.1 UPRT training for instructors will probably represent in whole or in part a new skill set.
Such instructors must have the ability to impart the correct knowledge and skills to be
used in times of distress. Instructors must:
− be selected to ensure the right attributes
− meet the requirements detailed in Chapter 5 of ICAO Doc 10011
− have the prerequisites detailed in Chapter 3 of ICAO Doc 9868
− be able to teach “hands on” human factors/NTS/MCC
− have thorough understanding of CBT for UPRT (refer Appendix to 10011:
Competency Based UPRT)
− have knowledge and practical skills in both handling and human factors.
− have instructor training.
15.2.2 Instructors delivering FSTD based UPRT programs must be fully trained to deliver the
training sequences and understanding in the AUPRTA. Initial and recurrent instructor
training should address, as a minimum:
− Specific additional academic and practical training modules for the initial cadre of
operator senior instructors (may include on-aeroplane training).
− Aerodynamics theory covering all areas of the operational envelope.
− Energy management.
− Demonstration of correct upset recovery techniques including early recognition.
− Improved manual handling skills, monitoring and understanding the consequences
of inappropriate flight control inputs such as excessive rudder pedal inputs.
− Human factors and CRM including progressive intervention strategies.
− Capabilities and limitations of FSTDs and the risks of negative training inherent
when any elements of training go beyond the VTE capabilities of the FSTD.
− Type-specific characteristics and the need to respect the operational envelope.
− Specific guidance on the flight configurations and stall manoeuvres that have been
evaluated in the FSTD for use in training.
− Effective use of the Instructor Operating Station (IOS) for UPRT delivery and for
providing accurate feedback on trainee performance.

− The importance of adhering to the FSTD Upset Recovery Training scenarios that
have been validated by the training program developer, whether using AUPRTA,
ICAO Doc 10011 or OEM recommendations and the consequences of excursions
outside of the validated training envelope.
− Distinguishing between generic UPRT strategies and OEM specific
recommendations.
− The ability to accurately deliver theory and assess levels of understanding while
employing sound instructional techniques.
− The need for a “safety first” attitude and daily practice in simulator training where
buffet levels, unusual attitudes and even the possibility of mechanical failure,
require the routine use of full seat belts, seat locks and security of loose objects.

16 Human Factors and UPRT
16.1 The importance of human factors training

16.1.1 Human Factors (HF) are an integral part of UPRT. The focus of HF integration into
UPRT is to address the pilot behaviours and physiological responses leading up to and
in the event of, a flight path divergence or a sudden upset.
16.1.2 Until recently, initial and recurrent training did not promote and test the capacity to react
to the unexpected. The vast proportion of training has involved standardised and
predictable responses to non-normal events whether they involve weather, systems or
human factors issues such as incapacitation.
16.1.3 This training, though worthwhile, has implicitly excluded “surprise” and “startle” events
and hence has not provided crews with the opportunity to experience events with a
significant “surprise and startle” factor. In particular, the rapid increase in crew workload
and degradation of communications and coordination in sudden events is something
that traditionally trained crews have rarely been exposed to. Analysis shows that in
response to “startle” events, both pilots can attempt to take control and act with little co-
ordination and lose their teamwork focus.
16.2 A human factors example

16.2.1 Most human factors issues required to be included in an UPRT program were
encapsulated in the report on the Air France A330 accident over the Atlantic Ocean.
The report noted that the “startle effect” has typically played a major role both in the de-
stabilisation of the flight path and in the failures of crews to adequately comprehend and
respond to the situation.
16.2.2 The final report recommended that EASA:
− Review the requirements for initial, recurrent and type rating training, in order to
develop and maintain a capacity to manage crew resources when faced with the
surprise generated by unexpected situations.
− Ensure that operators reinforce CRM training, to enable acquisition and
maintenance of adequate behavioural automatic responses in unexpected and
unusual situations with a highly charged emotional factor.
− Define instructor selection and recurrent training criteria, that would allow a high
and standardised level of instruction to be maintained.
− Modify the basis of the regulations, in order to ensure better fidelity for simulators in
reproducing realistic scenarios of abnormal situations.
− Ensure the introduction into the training scenarios of the effects of surprise, to train
pilots to face these phenomena and work in situations with a highly charged
emotional factor, taking into account the unique characteristics of the type being
flown.

17 UPRT entry control methodology
17.1 General
17.1.1 For a new operator, UPRT assessments will be included in the wider assessment of an
exposition under Part 119 or 142. Elements to be considered will follow the guidance in
Chapter 6 of Doc 10011.
17.1.2 For an existing RPT or charter operator implementing their UPRT program prior to the
commencement of Part 119 and 121, or an existing Part 142 training provider, CASA
will work with each operator or training provider, to define an implementation strategy
which will initially involve amendments to the existing training and checking program
which would then become accepted elements of the operator’s exposition. In the case
of a Part 142 training provider, as earlier stated the introduction of the UPRT program
would be regarded by CASA as a significant change. Approval to use an existing or
upgraded FSTD will be managed in accordance with regulation 60.055 of CASR.
17.1.3 The world-wide shift towards systems-based approaches (e.g. SMS and QA) requires
the implementation and maintenance of good governance practices in UPRT by
industry and authorities alike.
17.1.4 The UPRT implementation process should include a re-evaluation of documented
policies, processes and procedures, to confirm that training providers have a well-
articulated and developed SMS and QA (refer Doc 10011, for the specific UPRT-related
definition of a quality system).
17.1.5 This quality-based approach should not be viewed simply as a paper exercise, where
the training provider submits a copy of their quality and safety manuals to CASA for
review. CASA will ensure that the documents are consistently being adhered to by all
training personnel and their clients.
17.2 UPRT approvals

17.2.1 Acceptance of FSTD use in a specific UPRT program is separate to the qualification for
UPRT. Regulation 60.015 of CASR defines ‘user’ and ‘operator’ of a qualified simulator
or FTD as:
− User — the person who has a comprehensive quality system and uses the
simulator or FTD in a training, testing or checking program (refer to the definition in
regulation 60.010 of CASR)
− Operator — the person responsible for the maintenance and operation of the
simulator or device (refer to the definition in regulation 60.015 of CASR).
17.2.2 CASA’s UPRT “Assess and Accept” processes will involve reviewing:
a. the device qualification
b. the training capability of the user.
17.2.3 These 2 items are pre-requisites for program acceptance and are part of the wider
training and checking program acceptance.

17.2.4 In considering whether to grant an approval or modification to an existing approval for a

training organisation to use a qualified device in a UPRT training program, under
regulation 60.055, CASA must take into account:
− the capabilities of the training device
− the differences between the characteristics of the flight simulator or flight training
device and the characteristics of a specific type (or a specific make, model and
series) of aircraft, whether or not the user operates such an aircraft
− the proposed user’s operating and training competencies
− any other matter that affects simulator or device operation or use.
17.3 Post-implementation oversight

17.3.1 The safety consequences of applying poor instructional technique or providing
misleading information are arguably more significant with UPRT than in some other
areas of training. Training must be effectively managed by the applicable quality and
safety management related practices of the training provider, under the thorough
oversight of the organisation’s QA program activities.
17.3.2 The QA system of a UPRT training provider shall ensure that all UPRT instructors are
qualified, competent and current in delivering the course material, and possess the
ability to make accurate performance assessments and recommendations for
remediation whenever necessary. Training delivered under a quality system as
described in Appendix B to ICAO Doc 9841, should prevent instances of inappropriate
or incomplete training.
17.3.3 As an example of the required ‘thorough oversight”, CASA would expect a training
provider to be alert for any signs of developing non-standardisation in instructional
technique or outcomes. Early “lessons learned” in worldwide UPRT program
implementation regarding possible shortcomings by UPRT instructors, include the
following:
− not noticing getting outside simulator envelope
− not diagnosing significant errors (e.g. rolling pullouts, steps out of order)
− not understanding the new instructor operating station
− not training to proficiency
− not understanding what proficiency is.
17.3.4 CASA’s oversight responsibilities include entry control (assess/approve/qualify as
required) processes for training organisations and the continued surveillance of the
training delivery after UPRT program approval. This surveillance aims to ensure that the
training organisation is operating within the terms of its approval, and will include a
review of the QA system, its training records and its operational activities.
17.3.5 The main elements of the UPRT-related training activities that are subject to CASA
oversight include, as applicable, the following:
− staff adequacy in terms of number and qualifications
− validity of instructors’ licences, certificates, ratings and authorizations
− logbooks
− appropriate and adequate facilities for the training and the number of students

− documentation process (e.g. the review and update of the training and procedures
manual), with particular emphasis on course documentation, including records of
system updates, training/operations manuals, etc
− training delivery in the classroom and in simulation devices and, if applicable, flight
instruction or on the-job training, including briefing and de-briefing
− instructor training
− QA practices
− SMS functionality, including pro-active flight data analysis
− evaluation (and checking, where applicable)
− training, examination and assessment records
− aircraft registration, associated documents and maintenance records
− training device qualification and approval.

18 Helicopter UPRT programs
18.1 Reserved

19 On-aeroplane UPRT programs
19.1 Reserved

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ADVISORY CIRCULAR

Upset prevention and

Date December 2020

• Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) holders operating aeroplanes of 30 seats or more, or

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 1

• Integration of UPRT considerations into Crew Resource Management (CRM) training

For further information

Version Date Details

v1.0 December Initial AC.

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 2

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 3

7.4 Elements of an Integrated program 33

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 4

19 On-aeroplane UPRT programs 59

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 5

AUPRTA airplane upset prevention and recovery training aid

CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 1998

FSTD flight simulation training device

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

MBT manoeuvre-based training

QTG Qualification Test Guide

SARPs standards and recommended procedures

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 6

The AUPRTA Revision 3 (see below) defines an upset as:

• “An undesired airplane state characterized by unintentional divergences from

It is important to understand that there is a relationship to the definitions of ‘stall’

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 7

Refer to ICAO Doc 9625.

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 8

influence the stall angle-of-attack.

In cases where the use of engineering simulation data is envisaged, a complete

The core principle of EBT is training to competency. It is based on a systematic

Refer to ICAO Docs 9868 and 9995.

• Manually controlled slow flight

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 9

instrument under regulation 61.045; or

• Flight test validated region.

A Statement of Compliance is required that defines the source data used to

• an uncommanded nose-down pitch that cannot be readily arrested, which may

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 10

stop for 2 seconds, leading to an inability to arrest descent rate;

Refer to FAA AC 120-109A.

Full stall training is an instructor-guided, hands-on experience of applying the stall

Refer to FAA AC 120-109A.

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 11

recommendations of the major OEMs of transport aeroplanes. These OEMs may

A configuration management system will be required by the QMS and should be

Quality management focuses on the means to achieve product or service quality

Note: This definition is specific to ICAO Doc 10011.

safety A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational

• Buffeting, which could be heavy at times

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 12

• Lack of pitch authority and/or roll control; and

Also see "Full Stall" definition above.

Refer to Attachment 1 to Appendix A, FAR Part 60.

• aerodynamic buffeting (some aeroplanes will buffet more than others)

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 13

• Has held a type rating/qualification in the aircraft being simulated;

• “An outcome in which the aircraft is unnecessarily placed in a compromising

AC 121-03 v1.0 December 2020 Page 14