Kants Tanscendental, Empirical, Pragmatic and Moral Anthropology

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156 Claudia M.

Schmidt

Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic,


and Moral Anthropology

by Claudia M. Schmidt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Kant’s critical philosophy is often regarded as standing in a problematic relation


to his works in “anthropology”, or the study of human nature. In the Preface to
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant describes his critical project
as a “Copernican” turn toward the cognitive subject, which might seem to signal
a reorientation of philosophy around anthropology.1 However, both in the first
Critique and in his subsequent works he relegates “empirical anthropology” and
“practical” or “moral anthropology” to the sidelines of his critical projects in cog-
nitive and practical philosophy. Yet Kant’s formulation of his critical philosophy co-
incided almost exactly with the development of his interest in anthropology. During
the 1770s, the “silent decade” in which he formulated his critical philosophy, Kant
initiated a course on anthropology at the University of Königsberg. This course was
among the most popular in his regular schedule, and he offered it annually for twen-
ty-five years until his retirement. He then published a revised version of his lectures
as the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, a text that is one of his most
accessible publications, and might even seem uncharacteristically loose and anecdo-
tal to readers of his other works. Kant also published a number of shorter works on
anthropological topics during this period, and even suggested, in several scattered
remarks, that anthropology in some way encompasses all of the philosophical dis-
ciplines.
Many of the difficulties involved in considering the relation of Kant’s critical phil-
osophy to his anthropological works, and also in interpreting the Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, may be addressed by distinguishing between sev-
eral different anthropological projects in his writings.2 In this article I argue that

1 See KrV: B XVI, XXIIn.


2 Two earlier monographs have argued for the pervasive role of anthropology in Kant’s vari-
ous writings. Van de Pitte claims that Kant outlines a “complete anthropology”, with his
critical philosophy serving as the “pure philosophical core of his fully developed conception
of man, and man’s place in reality”. He then traces Kant’s treatment of human nature,
especially the moral vocation of the human species, as an unfolding theme in his later works,
though without the precise delineation of the different aspects of Kant’s approach that I am
developing here. See Van de Pitte, Frederick: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist. The
Hague 1971, 3 and 116. Firla distinguishes between empirical, transcendental, and applied
anthropology in Kant’s writings, and shows how these may be related to the different as-
pects of his moral philosophy. However, her treatment of “transcendental anthropology” is

Kant-Studien 98. Jahrg., S. 156–182 DOI 10.1515/KANT.2007.008


© Walter de Gruyter 2007
ISSN 0022-8877
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 157

during his critical period Kant developed four distinct but interrelated anthropo-
logical projects, which I call transcendental, empirical, pragmatic, and moral an-
thropology. In the first section I introduce this analysis by tracing the development
of Kant’s anthropological interests, as reflected in his published and unpublished
writings starting in the 1770s. In the subsequent four sections I examine his four an-
thropological projects as they are presented in his various writings. I also consider
some of the questions concerning Kant’s conception and execution of these projects
that arise from the study of these texts.3

1. Kant’s Study of Anthropology

Kant’s interest in anthropology developed gradually during the middle of his ca-
reer. His early writings of the 1740s and 1750s were mainly concerned with general
metaphysics and the principles of the natural sciences, although he occasionally
considered questions concerning human nature.4 However, while reading Rousseau
and the British moralists in the 1760s, he began to explore topics more directly con-
cerned with human nature, including aesthetics, psychology, and moral theory.5 To-

limited mainly to Kant’s discussions of the “original predispositions” in human nature to-
ward various types of action. See Firla, Monika: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von An-
thropologie und Moralphilosophie bei Kant. Frankfurt a. M. 1981. In my view, both Firla
and Van de Pitte overlook Kant’s account of the specifically human dimension of the “self-
knowledge of understanding and reason” in his critical philosophy of cognition, which I in-
clude in his “transcendental anthropology” (AA 15: 395). For an earlier and more general
treatment of Kant’s “philosophical anthropology” see Hinske, Norbert: Kants Idee der An-
thropologie. In: Die Frage nach dem Menschen. Edited by Heinrich Rombach. Freiburg
1966, 410–427.
3 Two important volumes on Kant’s anthropology appeared after this article was accepted for
publication, and thus too late for me to consider here with the detail that they merit: Frier-
son, Patrick R.: Freedom and Anthropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. New York 2003;
and Essays on Kant’s Anthropology. Edited by Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain. New York
2003.
4 See Werkmeister, W. H.: Changes in Kant’s Metaphysical Conception of Man. In: Idealistic
Studies 5, 1975, 97–107; and Antonopoulos, Georges: L’évolution de l’image de l’homme chez
Kant, depuis les premiers écrits jusqu’à l’Opus postumum. In: L’Année 1798: Kant et la Naiss-
ance de l’Anthropologie au Siècle des Lumières. Edited by Jean Ferrari. Paris 1997, 65–71.
5 For an intriguing account of Kant’s activities in the 1760s, including the shifts in his intel-
lectual interests and his changing view of his academic vocation, see Zammito, John H.:
Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Chicago 2002, 83–135 and 179–219. For
Kant’s response to Rousseau see Van de Pitte: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist, 49–69;
Lafrance, Guy: De Rousseau à Kant, à propos do l’anthropologie. In: L’Année 1798, ed.
Ferarri, 33–41; Geonget, Brigitte: L’influence de J.-J. Rousseau sur Kant: mythe ou réalité?
In: L’Année 1798, ed. Ferrari, 43–46; and Kuehn, Manfred: Kant: A Biography. Cambridge
2001. On the influence of various British philosophers in eighteenth century German
thought see Beck, Lewis White: Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors. Cam-
bridge, MA 1969, 306–339; and Kuehn, Manfred: Scottish Common Sense in Germany,
1768–1800. Kingston, ON 1989.
158 Claudia M. Schmidt

ward the end of 1773, Kant reported in a letter to Marcus Herz that he had inau-
gurated a course in anthropology at Königsberg during the winter semester of
1772/73, as a counterpart to his popular lectures in another empirical discipline,
physical geography.6 Kant presented the anthropology course regularly to large
audiences until his retirement in 1797, and then published the Anthropology from
a Pragmatic Point of View in 1798, with a second edition in 1800.7 Kant’s work in
anthropology therefore coincides almost exactly with the development of his critical
philosophy, from his critical turn in the early 1770s, through the publication of
his three Critiques and related works in the 1780s and 1790s.8 The evolution of
Kant’s approach to anthropology is also reflected in a number of his manuscripts
[Nachlass], including his personal notes [Reflexionen] and lecture notes [Collegent-
würfe]; and also in the succession of lecture transcripts [Nachschriften] that were
compiled and circulated by members of his audience over the years.9 He also pub-
lished a number of shorter works in the 1780s and 1790s on various anthropologi-
cal topics, including physiology, medicine, heredity, race, psychology, history, and
pedagogy.
However, Kant’s most dramatic references to the significance of anthropology ap-
pear in a few enigmatic unpublished remarks from the 1770s to the 1790s. First,
in a Reflexion dated by Adickes to around 1776–1778,10 Kant distinguishes the out-

6 Br, AA 10: 145–146. Students entered the university around the age of sixteen, and univer-
sity lecturers at the lower rank [Privatdozenten] were paid directly by the students rather
than the university, so it was in Kant’s interest as a young lecturer to offer accessible courses
with a wide appeal. However, he continued and expanded his popular lectures even after his
appointment in 1770 as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Königs-
berg. See Kuehn: Kant: A Biography, 61–86, 105–110, 204–218, 406–408.
7 The most intensive study of this text is Brandt, Reinhard: Kritischer Kommentar zu Kant’s
Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798). Hamburg 1999. Brandt regards the An-
thropology is a coherent project in which Kant is presenting an empirical study of human
nature that is directed toward pragmatic purposes, which are in turn subordinated to the
moral vocation of the human species. However, Brandt denies that Kant adds anything to
his transcendental philosophy in this text. See Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 7–20.
8 On the development of Kant’s anthropological interests, and on the response to his lectures
and writings in anthropology, see Malter, Rudolf: Anhang II. In: Kant, Immanuel: Anthro-
pologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Edited by Karl Vorländer, 7th ed. Hamburg 1980,
315–375. See also Van de Pitte: Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist; Brandt: Kritischer
Kommentar, 7–48; Wood, Allen W.: Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge 1999, 193–336;
and Louden, Robert B.: Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings.
New York 2000, 62–106.
9 See the Collegentwürfe on anthropology (AA 15: I–II), and the extensive selections from the
Nachschriften on Kant’s anthropology course, which have recently (1997) been added to the
Academy Edition (AA 25: I–II). For an engaging account of such transcripts, and their place
in the student culture of Königsberg, see Ameriks, Karl and Naragon, Steve: Translators’
Introduction. In: Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics. Cambridge 1997, XIII–XLIII.
For a discussion of the anthropology transcripts see Brandt, Reinhard and Stark, Werner:
Einleitung der Herausgeber. AA 25: I, VII–CLI.
10 See AA 14: XL–XLI.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 159

look of someone who has extensive but unreflective knowledge in any particular
discipline, which he calls “cyclopic” knowledge, from someone who also has the
perspective provided by critical philosophy:
Not the strength, but the one-eyed-ness here makes the Cyclop. It is also not enough, to know
many other sciences, but the self-knowledge of understanding and reason. Anthropologia
transcendentalis.11

Here Kant characterizes the self-knowledge of human cognition as “transcenden-


tal anthropology”, although he does not explain this expression or use it in his pub-
lished works. Next, at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, he summa-
rizes the interests of our reason, including both the speculative and the practical, in
three questions: “What can I know?”, “What should I do?” and “What may I
hope?”12. In a 1793 letter to C. F. Stäudlin, describing the plan underlying his sys-
tem of pure philosophy, he adds a fourth question: “What is a human being?”, and
notes that this question pertains to anthropology, “on which I have lectured an-
nually for more than 20 years”.13 In his lectures on logic from the 1790s, including
the version edited by Jäsche for publication in 1800, Kant restates these four ques-
tions, and then adds that we could regard all of these inquiries as belonging to an-
thropology, since the first three questions are related to the last one.14 Finally, in a
note in his unfinished final manuscript, he writes that the system of rational knowl-
edge arising from transcendental philosophy is required “if one would not make the
rational human being a being that does not know itself”.15

2. Transcendental Anthropology

In this article I adopt Kant’s phrase “transcendental anthropology”, from the Re-
flexion cited above, to designate his account of the a priori principles of rationality

11 AA 15: 395. “Nicht die Stärke, sondern das einäugigte macht hier den Cyclop. Es ist auch
nicht gnug, viel andre Wissenschaften zu wissen, sondern die Selbsterkentnis des Verstandes
und der Vernunft. Anthropologia transscendentalis.” Cf. Anth, AA 07: 227. On this Re-
flexion see Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 17; and Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 66 f. and
199 n. 3.
12 KrV: A 804–805/B 832–833.
13 Br, AA 11: 429. “Mein schon seit geraumer Zeit gemachter Plan der mir obliegenden Bear-
beitung des Feldes der reinen Philosophie ging auf die Auflösung der drei Aufgaben: 1) Was
kann ich wissen? (Metaphysik) 2) Was soll ich thun? (Moral) 3) Was darf ich hoffen? (Re-
ligion); welcher zuletzt die vierte folgen sollte: Was ist der Mensch? (Anthropologie; über
die ich schon seit mehr als 20 Jahren jährlich ein Collegium gelesen habe).”
14 Log, AA 09: 25; cf. AA 28: 533–534. For the textual history of the latter passage from the L2
transcript of Kant’s metaphysics lectures, including its probable derivation from a transcript
of his logic lectures, see Ameriks and Naragon: “Translators’ Introduction” to Immanuel
Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics, XXXf.
15 OP, AA 21: 7. “[…] wenn man nicht den Vernunftigen Menschen nicht zu einem sich selbst
kennenden Wesen machen will”.
160 Claudia M. Schmidt

insofar as these belong to a specifically human subject.16 In the Critique of Pure


Reason Kant introduces the term “transcendental” for the element of our cognition
that “is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of
objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.”17 Kant himself uses this word in his
analysis of cognition, but not his account of practical reason. However, I will use
the term “transcendental anthropology” more broadly, to include not only the a
priori structure of cognition, but also the a priori structure of volition or practical
rationality in the human subject: that is, the subjective but universal and necessary
conditions that must be presupposed for human moral experience.18
Many of Kant’s critics since the eighteenth century have objected to what they
regard as his exclusion of any distinctively human traits from the transcendental
subject of cognition and volition.19 However, in this section we will see that Kant
does indeed include a transcendental anthropology, in the sense I have indicated, in
the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and in his criti-
cal moral philosophy.20
First, Kant describes the human character of the transcendental subject of cogni-
tion in the Critique of Pure Reason by identifying a variety of distinctive and irre-
ducible characteristics of the a priori structures of human cognition, as disclosed
through his transcendental analysis. In the Introduction he maintains that a com-
plete system of transcendental philosophy would contain “an exhaustive analysis of

16 This phrase is also used by Nobbe to describe Kant’s account, in the third Critique, of the
unity of the human being as the transcendental subject of cognition and action. Nobbe,
Frank: Kants Frage nach dem Menschen: Die Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft als tran-
szendentale Anthropologie. Frankfurt a. M. 1995. As noted above, Firla uses this phrase
mainly for Kant’s account of the original predispositions to different types of action, in
Firla: Untersuchungen, 39–69. My use of this phrase is parallel to Kitcher’s use of “tran-
scendental psychology” for Kant’s account of the a priori principles of cognition belonging
to the transcendental subject. However, my usage and analysis differ from hers by explicitly
regarding Kant’s cognitive subject as a human being, and also by encompassing the practical
as well as cognitive faculties of the human subject. See Kitcher, Patricia: Kant’s Transcen-
dental Psychology. Oxford 1990, especially 3–29.
17 KrV: B 25. “Ich nenne alle Erkenntniß transscendental, die sich nicht sowohl mit Gegen-
ständen, sondern mit unserer Erkenntnißart von Gegenständen, so fern diese a priori mög-
lich sein soll, überhaupt beschäftigt.” Cf. KrV: A 11; KU, AA 05: 181–182.
18 For an earlier instance of the use of the word “transcendental” to characterize Kant’s pure
moral philosophy see Beck, Lewis White: A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical
Reason. Chicago 1960, 9n and 262n.
19 See for example Williams, Forrest: Philosophical Anthropology and the Critique of Aes-
thetic Judgment. In: Kant-Studien 46, 1954–1955, 172–178; and Weiler, Gershon: Kant’s
Question ‘What Is Man’? In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10, 1980, 1–23.
20 For a similar argument see Rescher, Nicholas: Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in
Kant’s Theory of Rational Systematization. Cambridge 2000, 64–98. Rescher emphasizes
the apparent contingency of the principles of human cognition in Kant’s account. However,
I would argue that this contingency is mitigated by Kant’s description of the transcendental
principles of cognition as conditions that are necessary for the possibility of experience; or
conditions that must structure the cognition of any being, human or non-human, whose
cognition may be described as “experience”.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 161

all of human cognition a priori”.21 He then identifies “sensibility and understand-


ing” as the “two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a com-
mon but to us unknown root”. These provide the a priori conditions under which
“the objects of human cognition” are first given and then thought.22 In the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic he describes spatial and temporal intuition as a mode of per-
ceiving objects “which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily
pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being.”23 Simi-
larly, in the Transcendental Analytic he argues that the activity of every “human”
understanding is a “cognition through concepts”, which is “not intuitive but dis-
cursive.”24 The task of transcendental philosophy is to trace the “pure concepts” of
cognition to “their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding.”25
The table of categories provides a complete system of these pure concepts, as found
in “human understanding.”26 In the Deduction Kant describes the a priori combi-
nation of representations in the transcendental unity of apperception as the highest
principle “in the whole of human cognition,”27 and identifies the “pure imagin-
ation”, which “grounds all cognition a priori”, as “a fundamental faculty of the
human soul.”28 Finally, he argues in the Transcendental Dialectic that “human rea-
son” produces a system of transcendent concepts and dialectical inferences, in its in-
evitable attempt to apply its principles of understanding and inference beyond the
limits of any possible experience.29
Kant also indicates in these passages that other types of rational beings might not
possess our structures of intuition or discursive understanding.30 First, we cannot

21 KrV: A 13/B 27. “[…] eine ausführliche Analysis der ganzen menschlichen Erkenntniß a
priori […]”.
22 KrV: A 15/B 29. “Nur so viel scheint zur Einleitung oder Vorerinnerung nöthig zu sein, daß
es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntniß gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaft-
lichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durch
deren ersteren uns Gegenstände gegeben, durch den zweiten aber gedacht werden.”
23 KrV: A 42/B 59. “Wir kennen nichts als unsere Art, sie wahrzunehmen, die uns eigenthüm-
lich ist, die auch nicht nothwendig jedem Wesen, obzwar jedem Menschen, zukommen
muß.”
24 KrV: A 68/B 93. “Also ist die Erkenntniß eines jeden, wenigstens des menschlichen Ver-
standes eine Erkenntniß durch Begriffe, nicht intuitiv, sondern discursiv.”
25 KrV: A 66/B 91. “Wir werden also die reinen Begriffe bis zu ihren ersten Keimen und An-
lagen im menschlichen Verstande verfolgen […]”.
26 KrV: B 109 f. “[…] ja selbst die Form eines Systems derselben im menschlichen Verstande en-
thält […]”.
27 KrV: B 135. “[…] welcher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen menschlichen Erkenntniß ist”.
28 KrV: A 124. “Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft als ein Grundvermögen der men-
schlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntniß a priori zum Grunde liegt.”
29 KrV: A 309/B 366. “[…] das wird unser Geschäfte in der transscendentalen Dialektik sein,
welche wir jetzt aus ihren Quellen, die tief in der menschlichen Vernunft verborgen sind,
entwickeln wollen”. Cf. KrV: A VII.
30 Among the possible non-human types of rational beings, Kant notes that we can imagine
other terrestrial rational beings (Anth, AA 07: 322), different finite rational beings on other
planets (KrV: A 825/B 853, Anth, AA 07: 332f, KU, AA 05: 467), immaterial rational spirits
162 Claudia M. Schmidt

judge if the intuitions of other thinking beings are limited by the same formal con-
ditions that give intuitions universal validity for human beings.31 Next, we can-
not explain the “peculiarity of our understanding” in operating “only by means of
the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them”, any more
than we are able to explain the logical functions of judgment, or why space and time
should be the forms of our sensible intuition.32 A rational being that does not pos-
sess our types of intuition would not use these categories to engage in discursive
understanding, since the categories are applied to objects as intuited in time and
space.33 Kant does not consider whether there could be a type of discursive under-
standing that does not intuit objects as given in space and time, or if the logical
forms of judgment that govern our understanding would govern this type of discur-
sive cognition. However, he indicates that we ourselves cannot conceive of a differ-
ent type of intuition or understanding, and that a different type of cognition could
not properly be called “experience”.34
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant distinguishes between mere ani-
mals, a merely rational being, and a human being, by their capacities for responding
to sensual pleasure, goodness, and beauty. Thus, while sensual pleasure can be en-
joyed by animals, and goodness can be recognized by rational beings, beauty can be
appreciated only by a being who possesses both a sensuous and a rational nature;
and, accordingly, only by human beings among the objects of our experience.35 Kant
also attributes to human beings the unique ability, among all the objects in our ex-
perience, to set purposes for ourselves, arising from our capacities for cognition and
action.36 As human beings, we also have a cognitive disposition to organize our rep-
resentations of different laws of nature according to the concept of a purposive
order, which is prescribed as a transcendental principle by reflective judgment. Kant
regards this ascription of purposiveness to nature as a contingent operation of
human cognition, although one that is required by the human understanding in
order to account for the conformity between its pure concepts, which are given a
priori; and particular sets of resembling connections in nature, which are given to us
empirically. Finally, the more specific concept of a natural end, through which we
explain the functional operations of an organism, arises from a “peculiarity” of

(KU, AA 05: 467–468), and God (KrV: A 578–591, 631–642/B 606–619, 659–670; KpV,
AA 05: 124–141; KU, AA 05: 482–484). On Kant’s view of the possibility of extraterrestrial
life see Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 188 n. 30 and 212 n. 89.
31 See KrV: A 27/B 43.
32 KrV: B 145 f. “Von der Eigenthümlichkeit unsers Verstandes aber, nur vermittelst der Kate-
gorien und nur gerade durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperception a priori
zu Stande zu bringen, läßt sich eben so wenig ferner ein Grund angeben, als warum wir ge-
rade diese und keine andere Functionen zu Urtheilen haben, oder warum Zeit und Raum die
einzigen Formen unserer möglichen Anschauung sind.”
33 See KrV: B 146–152.
34 KrV: A 230–231/B 283.
35 See KU, AA 05: 210.
36 See KU, AA 05: 233, 431–436.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 163

human understanding, since a possible non-human understanding might be able to


explain all natural objects and events as products of a mechanistic system, without
referring to the concept of a purposive structure.37
Kant thus attributes all of the a priori conditions of objective cognition specifi-
cally to the structure of human subjectivity: indicating that, while these conditions
are universal for our own species, other conscious beings might have other types of
cognition. However, since Kant also describes the human principles of cognition as
conditions for the possibility of experience, the cognition of these other beings
could not be called experience.38
As I am using the phrase, Kant’s “transcendental anthropology” also includes his
account of the a priori conditions of practical reason, as these belong to a human
subject. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argues that the power of choice [Willkür]
in a human being is affected, but not necessitated, by the sensuous impulses that we
share with non-rational animals. This is because human beings, as rational agents,
also attribute to ourselves a capacity for self-determination, independently of the in-
fluences of these impulses, in the requirement of reason by which we formulate the
concept of an “ought” and prescribe it to ourselves.39
This argument seems to indicate an inconsistency in Kant’s view of human
agency, as presented respectively in his systems of theoretical and practical philos-
ophy. In his critical theoretical philosophy, Kant argues that all human actions may
be explained as determined by the empirical character of a person with the co-op-
erating influence of other causes, according to the order of nature; and may there-
fore be predicted with certainty, presumably according to the methods and findings
of empirical anthropology.40 By contrast, practical freedom would be the capacity
to determine one’s own actions apart from the empirical causes that operate within
the deterministic system of nature. In the first Critique Kant concludes that we can-
not prove the reality, or even the possibility, of practical freedom in human agents,
since practical freedom does not conform to the a priori conditions of theoretical
cognition. He concludes, however, that this analysis does not rule out the possibility
that human freedom can be proven on practical grounds, but merely provides a the-
oretical framework in which practical freedom is shown not to conflict with natural
necessity.41
In the Groundwork Kant describes the human being as an organism that is nat-
urally endowed, not only with rational cognition, but also with “the capacity to act

37 KU, AA 05: 405. “Es betrifft also eine Eigenthümlichkeit unseres (menschlichen) Verstandes
in Ansehung der Urtheilskraft in der Reflexion derselben über Dinge der Natur.” Cf. AA 05:
179–181.
38 KrV: A 230–231/B 283.
39 KrV: A 534, 547–548/B 562, 575–576.
40 KrV: A 549/B 577. “[…] so sind alle Handlungen des Menschen in der Erscheinung aus sei-
nem empirischen Charakter und den mitwirkenden anderen Ursachen nach der Ordnung
der Natur bestimmt […]”.
41 See KrV: A 532–558/B 560–586.
164 Claudia M. Schmidt

in accordance with the representation of laws”.42 This capacity is called the will
[Wille]: and, since reason is the faculty by which we derive an action from a law, the
will may also be called “practical reason”. The purpose of practical reason is not to
enable us to satisfy the subjective inclinations arising from our animal nature, but to
bring about a good will by judging and directing the maxims of our actions accord-
ing to moral imperatives. However, the power of choice in human beings is never in-
fallibly determined by pure practical reason, but can yield to our inclinations, or our
“specially constituted faculty of desire”.43
As we have seen, in the first Critique Kant argues that theoretical cognition is un-
able to establish the reality, or even the possibility, of human freedom. However,
in his critical writings in practical philosophy Kant argues that as a rational agent
I must regard my actions as free. In the Groundwork, he argues that I must regard
myself as free because I think of myself as able to act according to principles gener-
ated by my reason.44 In the second Critique, he argues that I must regard myself as
free because I prescribe to myself the moral law, as a principle that often requires me
to act against my inclinations.45 In both texts, however, Kant again maintains that
human freedom can never be the object of theoretical cognition, but can only be
presupposed as a condition of rational volition or pure practical reason.46 We are
thus required to regard the human being from two points of view: as an “appear-
ance” or an object of empirical cognition; and also as an intelligible being or prac-
tical subject. We may accordingly distinguish between the empirical and the intelli-
gible aspect of a human individual, or between homo phaenomenon and homo
noumenon.47
Kant also finds in human nature a propensity “to actively desire what is unlawful
even though he knows that it is unlawful”, which he calls a “tendency to evil”.48 In
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason he argues that anthropology, or the
empirical observation of human actions, leads us to infer that human nature is per-
vaded by an a priori principle of “radical evil” [radicale Böse], or a maxim of evil
action that is universally present and thus subjectively necessary in all human sub-
jects. This maxim belongs to human nature, not because of our natural impulses,

42 GMS, AA 04: 412. “Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung
der Gesetze, d.i. nach Principien, zu handeln, oder einen Willen.”
43 GMS, AA 04: 427. “[…] ein besonders geartetes Begehrungsvermögen des Subjects […]”.
44 See GMS, AA 04: 447–448.
45 See KpV, AA 05: 28–30.
46 See GMS, AA 04: 455–463; KpV, AA 05: 42–57.
47 GMS, AA 04: 457; KpV, AA 05: 42–43; KrV: A 532–558/B 560–586; MS, AA 06: 239. For
an examination of Kant’s theories of the empirical and intelligible character of a human
agent see Munzel, G. Felicitas: Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The ‘Critical’ Link of
Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgment. Chicago 1999.
48 Anth, AA 07: 324. “Da aber doch auch die Erfahrung zeigt: daß in ihm ein Hang zur thä-
tigen Begehrung des Unerlaubten, ob er gleich weiß, daß es unerlaubt sei, d.i. zum Bösen,
sei […]”. Cf. Anth, AA 07: 329, 331–332.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 165

but through our free yet universal propensity as individuals to act from the principle
of self-love rather than the moral law.49
Even more than in his account of cognition, Kant examines the a priori conditions
of human volition by comparing human beings to other possible types of beings.
First, like other animals, human beings are affected by a variety of sensuous incli-
nations.50 However, Kant also compares human beings to other possible types of
rational agents. First, he imagines a rational being that possesses reason as a the-
oretical faculty, but whose volition is determined by instinct. In such a being, reason
would not influence its actions, but only allow it to admire its own constitution.51
We can also imagine a rational being whose will is determined infallibly by reason,
so that any action that this being recognizes as objectively necessary, by the prin-
ciples of pure practical reason, is also subjectively necessary in determining its will.
This agent would possess an absolutely good will, or “holy will”, which we can
attribute to an imaginary finite being, and which is traditionally attributed to God.
By contrast, human beings do not have a holy will, since they can act from maxims
which conflict with the moral law.52 Kant also imagines a “diabolical” being with
an “evil reason”, or an “absolutely evil will”, which would always follow the
maxim of resisting the law.53 We might also imagine two other types of beings not
directly considered by Kant. One is a finite rational agent whose will is subjectively
determined by the moral law, but whose faculty of desire is subject to sensuous in-
clinations that it therefore cannot satisfy through its actions. This agent would have
a holy will, but also sensuous desires that could never become incentives for its ac-
tions. Finally, we can imagine a rational being with sensuous desires but with no ca-
pacity for action, that can only wait, barnacle-like, for its needs or desires to be sat-
isfied. Such a being would be capable of rational cognition, but unable to act in
accordance with either sensuous inclination or practical reason.
Kant therefore develops a transcendental anthropology in his critical philosophi-
cal works, by presenting a systematic discussion of the a priori conditions of cogni-
tion and action that are distinctive to the human subject. He reinforces and supple-

49 See RGV, AA 06: 18–25; cf. MAM, AA 08: 115–118; IaG, AA 08: 20–22; KU, AA 05:
431–434. See also Treloar, John: The Crooked Wood of Humanity: Kant’s Struggle with
Radical Evil. In: Philosophy and Theology 3, 1989, 335–353; Wood: Kant’s Ethical
Thought, 283–300; Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 132–139; Anderson-Gold, Sharon: Un-
necessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Albany,
NY 2001; Sussman, David G.: The Idea of Humanity: Anthropology and Anthroponomy in
Kant’s Ethics. New York 2001; and Rossi, Philip: The Social Authority of Reason: Kant’s
Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind. Albany, NY 2005.
50 See KrV: A 533–534/B 561–562; GMS, AA 04: 395–396; KpV, AA 05: 61–62.
51 See GMS, AA 04: 395.
52 See GMS, AA 04: 412–414; cf. KpV, AA 05: 32–33, 82, 122–123.
53 RGV, AA 06: 35. “[…] eine vom moralischen Gesetze aber freisprechende, gleichsam bos-
hafte Vernunft (ein schlechthin böser Wille) enthält dagegen zu viel, weil dadurch der
Widerstreit gegen das Gesetz selbst zur Triebfeder […] erhoben und so das Subject zu einem
teuflischen Wesen gemacht werden würde”. Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 366.
166 Claudia M. Schmidt

ments this project in the Anthropology, especially in his further discussions of


metaphysics, taste, and morality.54 Kant’s account of the a priori conditions of
human subjectivity is a plausible candidate for the encompassing philosophical dis-
cipline that he seems to posit in his Reflexion concerning “anthropologia transcen-
dentalis”, and by raising the question “What is man?” in the Jäsche Logic.
Two of the most influential twentieth-century commentators on Kant’s Anthro-
pology, Heidegger and Foucault, have called attention in different ways to the prob-
lem of establishing the demarcation between Kant’s transcendental and empirical
anthropology. On the one hand, Heidegger criticizes Kant for failing to consider the
ecstases of past, present and future in his account of transcendental subjectivity.
However, he then dismisses the Anthropology as a text in empirical anthropology,
thereby overlooking Kant’s account of the temporal structure of human cognition
and volition in that text, especially his discussions of memory and prediction.55 Fou-
cault also notes that Kant introduced a separation between transcendental and em-
pirical anthropology.56 However, he argues that Kant implicitly extends the domain
of his critical philosophy in the Anthropology by recognizing the finitude and his-
toricity of the human transcendental subject, especially in his discussions of tem-
porality and language.57 Thus, according to Foucault, Kant’s Anthropology serves
to further interpret and expand his transcendental philosophy.

54 See Anth, AA 07: 130, 141–143, 244, 282, 324–333. These passages provide evidence, in re-
sponse to Brandt, that Kant does indeed further develop his transcendental account of cog-
nition and volition in the Anthropology, though this admittedly is not his central concern in
this text. See Brandt: Kritischer Kommentar, 17 f. See also Renaut, Alain: La place de l’an-
thropologie dans la theorie kantienne du sujet. In L’Année 1798, ed. Ferrari. Paris 1997,
49–63.
55 See Anth, AA 07: 182–189. See Heidegger, Martin: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
5th ed. Translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington, IN 1997, 89–173.
56 Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Translated
by A. Sheridan. New York 1970, 340 f.
57 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 191–196. Foucault’s essay was the introduction to his translation of
Kant’s Anthropology, a translation submitted to the Sorbonne in 1960 as his “complement-
ary thesis”, along with his dissertation, Foucault, Michel: Folie et déraison: Histoire de la
folie à l’âge classique. Paris 1961. Published in English as Madness and Civilization. Trans-
lated by R. Howard. New York 1965. Foucault’s translation of the Anthropology was pub-
lished in 1964, but the Introduction was left unpublished and is required to remain so under
the terms of his will, though the manuscript may be studied in the Centre Michel Foucault at
the Bibliothèque du Salchoir in Paris. For further discussions see Zöller, Günter: Michel
Foucaults Dissertation über Kants Anthropologie: Bericht und Beschreibung. In Kant-Stu-
dien 86, 1995, 128f; Miller, James: The Passion of Michel Foucault. New York 1993, 142;
and Terra, Ricardo: Foucault lecteur de Kant: de l’anthropologie à l’ontologie du présent. In
L’Année 1798, ed. Ferrari, 159–171.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 167

3. Empirical Anthropology

Although Kant occasionally refers to empirical anthropology in his critical philo-


sophical writings, his most thorough empirical study of human nature appears in
the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Important aspects of his empiri-
cal anthropology are also developed in his lectures on education, published after his
retirement by F. T. Rink as Kant’s Pedagogy; and in several shorter works from his
critical period.
In the first Critique Kant describes a “complete anthropology” as a projected
counterpart to the “empirical doctrine of nature”.58 This complete anthropology in-
cludes the study of the conscious states of a human subject as given to inner sense: a
study that he also calls “empirical psychology” [empirische Psychologie].59 How-
ever, empirical anthropology also includes a study of the “moving causes” of human
action, as given through observation or outer sense.60
In the third Critique Kant regards the study of our physical and emotional re-
sponses to the sublime and the beautiful as belonging to empirical anthropology.
He then describes the empirical study of human nature, by introspection and obser-
vation, as a “psychological” or even a “physiological” enquiry. By “physiological”
here he does not mean a study of the biological correlates of conscious states, but
rather a study of the sequences of intuitions in inner or outer experience.61 This
study may be distinguished from a “rational physiology” of the mind, which exam-
ines the a priori structure of the transcendental unity of apperception. Instead, em-
pirical anthropology explores the already-structured succession of human con-
scious states.62
In the Preface of the Anthropology Kant uses the term “physiology” in a different
sense. Here he states that “A systematic treatise comprising our knowledge of man
(anthropology) can adopt either a physiological or a pragmatic point of view.” Of
these, “physiological knowledge of man investigates what nature makes of him”,
while pragmatic anthropology examines “what man as a free agent makes, or can

58 KrV: A 848/B 876. “Es ist also bloß ein so lange aufgenommener Fremdling, dem man auf
einige Zeit einen Aufenthalt vergönnt, bis er in einer ausführlichen Anthropologie (dem Pen-
dant zu der empirischen Naturlehre) seine eigene Behausung wird beziehen können.”
59 In this article I will not consider Kant’s more specific discussions of rational psychology and
empirical psychology, or the critical debates over their relation to each other. For a valuable
treatment of this issue see Hatfield, Gary: Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psychol-
ogy: Psychology as Science and as Philosophy. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant,
edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge 1992, 200–227.
60 KrV: A550/B 578. “In Ansehung dieses empirischen Charakters giebt es also keine Frei-
heit, und nach diesem können wir doch allein den Menschen betrachten, wenn wir lediglich
beobachten und, wie es in der Anthropologie geschieht, von seinen Handlungen die bewe-
genden Ursachen physiologisch erforschen wollen.”
61 See KU, AA 05: 277, 286; cf. KrV: A 347/B 405.
62 See KrV: A 846–848/B 874–876.
168 Claudia M. Schmidt

and should make, of himself.”63 In the Anthropology he thus seems to be identifying


“physiology” as a biological discipline, and then indeed sets aside the physiological
approach, including any questions concerning the biological states that might be
correlated with our cognitive and affective faculties, as beyond the scope of his in-
vestigation, and perhaps even beyond our cognitive grasp. Instead, he is concerned
in this text with pragmatic anthropology; or the knowledge of human nature arising
from social observation, since this is the part of anthropology that is pragmatically
useful.64 However, one might object that a knowledge of human biology, along with
the knowledge arising from the observation of human behavior, both belong to the
empirical study of human nature; and should thus be distinguished, as two types of
empirical inquiry, from a study of either the pragmatic or moral principles that
might direct our use of this knowledge.65
The Anthropology is largely concerned with empirical anthropology: or with
classifying, describing, and in some cases explaining the conscious states of human
subjects as given through inner sense, and the observable actions of human individ-
uals as given to outer sense. Indeed, the Anthropology is organized as a survey of
the empirical faculties and characteristics of the human species, as these are given to
us through introspection and observation.
Kant divides the Anthropology into two Parts: the “Anthropological Didactic,”
which he subtitles “On the Way to Know the Inner Nature as well as the Outer Na-
ture of Human Beings,” and the “Anthropological Characteristic,” which he sub-
titles “On the Way to Know the Inner Nature of Human Beings from their Outer
Nature.”66 Interestingly, Kant apparently considered alternative titles for these divi-
sions, judging by the marginal notes in his surviving manuscript of the published
Anthropology. In these notes he describes the Anthropological Didactic as asking
“What is a human being?” and the “Anthropological Characteristic” as asking
“How to know the individuality of each human being”. He then identifies the
former as a “Doctrine of Elements” and the latter as a “Doctrine of Method”. These
terms reflect his more usual distinction between a Doctrine of Elements and Doc-

63 Anth, AA 07: 119. “Eine Lehre von der Kenntniß des Menschen, systematisch abgefaßt (An-
thropologie), kann es entweder in physiologischer oder in pragmatischer Hinsicht sein. –
Die physiologische Menschenkenntniß geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die Natur aus
dem Menschen macht, die pragmatische auf das, was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sich
selber macht, oder machen kann und soll.” Cf. Anth, AA 07: 136, 166, 176, 214, 286; Br,
AA 10: 145 f.
64 See Anth, AA 07: 119.
65 Kant discusses human biology in several shorter works, including his review of Moscati’s
study of human and animal posture (AA 02: 421–425), along with his own essays on race
and the inheritance of physical characteristics (AA 02: 427–443; AA 08: 89–106, 157–184),
his comments on Sömmering’s discussion of the brain (AA 12: 30–35); and his essays on
medicine (AA 08: 5–8; SF, AA 07: 97–116).
66 Anth, AA 07: 125, 283. “Anthropologische Didaktik: Von der Art, das Innere sowohl als
das Äußere des Menschen zu erkennen”; and “Die anthropologische Charakteristik: Von
der Art, das Innere des Menschen aus dem Äußeren zu erkennen.”
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 169

trine of Method in his critical writings, and might indeed provide a better indication
of the structure of the Anthropology than the published headings.67
Kant entitles the three books of the Anthropological Didactic “On the Cognitive
Faculty” [Vom Erkenntnißvermögen], “On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeas-
ure” [Das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust], and “On the Faculty of Desire” [Vom Be-
gehrungsvermögen] as this includes the emotions and passions.68 He begins the
much shorter Characteristic by examining theories of temperament and physiog-
nomy that have sought to explain the characteristics of individuals; and then con-
siders various characteristics that he believes may be attributed to the two sexes and
to different nations. In his section on the different races he considers the dual ten-
dencies in human genetics toward homogeneity and diversity. He concludes the
Characteristic by considering the character of the human species as a whole, includ-
ing its historicity and its moral vocation.
In the Preface Kant indicates that we derive the data for empirical anthropology
from two methods of study: our observation of others, and self-observation. How-
ever, both are subject to two difficulties. First, human beings tend to become evasive
if they realize that they are under observation. This is readily apparent in our ob-
servations of other people, who often become embarrassed when they notice that
someone is watching them, and may even attempt to deceive the observer. However,
Kant maintains that we cannot observe our own inner states effectively through in-
trospection if we are agitated by strong emotions, and can attain only a limited in-
sight into ourselves even in our calmer moments. Second, particular circumstances
of place and time tend to obscure the object of anthropological study, by producing
habits that may be regarded as “another nature.”69 Kant thus implies that empirical
anthropology is a study of our “first nature”, or an empirically accessible universal
human nature, insofar as we can distinguish this from the second nature of “ha-
bits”, in others or ourselves, arising from the influence of a specific social and his-
torical context. However, Kant himself frequently considers the influence of such
conditions over human cognition and activity in the course of his study.70

67 AA 07: 412. “Anthropologie 1ster Teil Anthropologische Didactik Was ist der Mensch? 2ter
Teil Anthropologische Characteristik Woran ist die Eigenthümlichkeit jedes Menschen zu
erkennen. Der erstere ist gleichsam die Elementarlehre die zweite die Methodenlehre der
Menschenkunde.” Cf. AA 07: 354–356. See Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 70 f.
68 Anth, AA 07: 127, 230, 251.
69 Anth, AA 07: 121. “Ort und Zeitumstände bewirken, wenn sie anhaltend sind, Ange-
wöhnungen, die, wie man sagt, eine andere Natur sind […]”.
70 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 130–131, 133, 170–171, 191, 208–210, 306–308, 311–320. Kant had al-
ready shown an interest in the varieties of human thought and culture in his 1757 announce-
ment for his lectures in physical geography (AA 02: 1–12). See Hinske: Kants Idee der
Anthropologie, 415. On Kant’s approach to the cultural context of human experience
see Arens, Katherine: Kant, Herder, and Psychology. In: Herder Today: Contributions from
the International Herder Conference, 1987. Edited by Kurt Müller-Vollmer. Berlin 1990,
190–206.
170 Claudia M. Schmidt

In addition to introspection and direct observation, Kant suggests that we may


also draw upon various types of secondary sources for anthropology. These include
travel literature, along with “world history, biography, and even plays and novels”.
Although its depictions of situations and individual characteristics are fictitious and
often exaggerated, imaginative literature may be used in anthropology because its
elements are drawn from observing “actual human conduct”, and therefore “corre-
spond to human nature in kind”.71
Kant explicitly refers in the Anthropology to data arising from both introspection
and observation, including these types of secondary sources. First, he reports
the presumably shared insights of self-observation by using “I” or “we”.72 Next,
he offers observations concerning the behavior of human beings, both in general
[der Mensch], and as members of various groups, such as children, women, and
nationalities.73 Finally, he occasionally offers examples from imaginative literature,
travel reports, and history.74 It is therefore inaccurate to describe the Anthropology
exclusively as a work of either introspective psychology or social-scientific observa-
tion.75
Kant also considers the scientific status of anthropology.76 In his critical philo-
sophical writings, Kant reserves the term “science” [Wissenschaft] for a systematic
body of knowledge developed from a priori principles.77 However, in the Preface of
the Anthropology he evidently uses Wissenschaft to signify a systematically or-
dered body of empirical knowledge. He initially remarks that it might be difficult
for anthropology to attain the rank of a formal science, because of the imperfec-
tions in its methods of introspection and observation. On the other hand, he also
describes anthropology as a “generally useful science”, which could even be “sys-
tematically formulated” by developing an exhaustive list of headings for re-
searchers to use in cataloguing their empirical observations of human beings: a list

71 Anth, AA 07: 121. “Endlich sind zwar eben nicht Quellen, aber doch Hülfsmittel zur An-
thropologie: Weltgeschichte, Biographien, ja Schauspiele und Romane. […] so wie sie etwa
ein Richardson oder Molière entwarf, ihren Grundzügen nach aus der Beobachtung des
wirklichen Thun und Lassens der Menschen genommen werden müssen: weil sie zwar im
Grade übertrieben, der Qualität nach aber doch mit der menschlichen Natur übereinstim-
mend sein müssen.”
72 See for example Kant’s account of attention: Anth, AA 07: 132–140.
73 See Anth AA 07: 127–128, 303–320.
74 See Anth, AA 07: 180–181, 198–199.
75 Weiler and Kitcher both suggest that Kant’s empirical anthropology is based largely on ob-
servation rather than introspection: see Weiler: Kant’s Question ‘What is Man?’ 16; and
Kitcher: Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, 11. For a discussion emphasizing both aspects
of his project see Firla: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Moral-
philosophie bei Kant, 18–39.
76 On Kant’s remarks concerning the “scientific” character of anthropology see Brandt: Kri-
tischer Kommentar, 37–43; and Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 66–68.
77 See KrV: B VII–XLIV.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 171

that he might have been intending to initiate in his own divisions of the Anthro-
pology text.78
The content of Kant’s empirical anthropology can be indicated by a summary of
his main topics in the text. In Book I, “On the Cognitive Faculty”, he describes the
empirical development and expressions of human self-consciousness; the scope and
variations in our power of attention; the operation of the five senses; the effects of
novelty, change, contrast, and even intoxicants on our cognition; the empirical ac-
tivities of wit and imagination; the variations among individuals in our capacities
for memory and prediction; and the different types of cognitive disorders and tal-
ents. In Book II, “On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure”, he examines the feel-
ings of sensory pain and pleasure; along with aesthetic pleasure or taste, which is
partly sensuous and partly intellectual, and its relation to morality.79 In Book III,
“On the Faculty of Desire” he divides the manifestations of desire into two types:
momentary affective states, or “emotions” [Affecten]; and affective dispositions or
“passions” [Leidenschaften]. He then examines both types of desires in their physi-
cal, phenomenological, and cognitive dimensions; their degrees of strength in dif-
ferent individuals; their influence on human health, and their effects on the mind
and will (and vice versa). In the “Anthropological Characteristic”, as we have seen,
he considers the various qualities by which we attempt to characterize individuals
and groups. Kant concludes the Characteristic, and the Anthropology as a whole,
with a general characterization of human species: we are a species of animals who
are capable of making ourselves rational; endowed with technical, pragmatic and
moral predispositions; and constantly engaged, both individually and collectively,
in addressing problems that arise in our natural and social existence.80
There are many evident weaknesses in Kant’s empirical anthropology. First, he
rarely indicates the sources for any of his generalizations, such as introspection, di-
rect observation, conversational reports, or published documents. Secondly, he does
not explain or justify the methods that he uses to derive generalizations concern-
ing human nature from either introspection or observation. Indeed, in the case of
introspection, he initially advises us against attending too persistently to our own

78 Anth, AA 07: 121–122. “Eine systematisch entworfene und doch populär […] in pragma-
tischer Hinsicht abgefaßte Anthropologie führt den Vorteil für das lesende Publicum bei
sich: daß durch die Vollständigkeit der Titel, unter welche diese oder jene menschliche,
ins Praktische einschlagende beobachtete Eigenschaft gebracht werden kann, so viel Ver-
anlassungen und Aufforderungen demselben hiemit gegeben werden, jede besondere zu
einem eigenen Thema zu machen, um sie in das ihr zugehörende Fach zu stellen; wo-
durch die Arbeiten in derselben sich von selbst unter die Liebhaber dieses Studiums ver-
theilen und durch die Einheit des Plans nachgerade zu einem Ganzen vereinigt werden; wo-
durch dann der Wachsthum der gemeinnützigen Wissenschaft befördert und beschleunigt
wird.”
79 Anth, AA 07: 239.
80 Anth, AA 07: 321–333. On this passage, in relation to Kant’s other discussions of the orig-
inal predispositions toward action in human nature, see Firla: Untersuchungen, 39–69; and
Sussman: Idea of Humanity, 181–227.
172 Claudia M. Schmidt

thoughts and feelings as mere subjective states, since he believes that this practice
leads to emotional and cognitive disturbances. On the other hand, he concedes we
must observe “various acts of the representative power” to pursue critical inquiries
in logic and metaphysics.81 He also appeals to his own introspective experience in at
least one domain, by presenting his efforts to counteract his hypochondria as evi-
dence that the mind is able to counteract its morbid feelings.82 In the Metaphysics
of Morals he advises us to engage in moral self-examination, even though we can
never attain a completely accurate insight into our own motives.83 He thus recom-
mends several types of introspection in various contexts, including reflective episte-
mological analysis, an experimental assessment of one’s own successes or failures
at cognitive and emotional self-discipline, and a retrospective review of one’s own
emotional and volitional history.
Next we may consider Kant’s use of external observation as a method in anthro-
pology. While he argues in the first Critique that we must regard the human indi-
vidual, from a theoretical point of view, as part of the deterministic system of na-
ture, Kant does not provide a systematic account of the principles involved in the
naturalistic explanation of human action.84 That is, he does not clearly indicate how
such inward factors as beliefs, desires, and emotional dispositions and such out-
ward factors as heredity and environment are to be related to each other in provid-
ing an account of individual actions.85 He also does not examine critically the prin-
ciples by which we attribute beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions to social groups,
or to individuals as members of a group. Kant’s silence concerning the sources of his
anthropological data, along with his lack of critical attention to the principles by
which he attempts to explain the actions of individuals and groups, are reflected in
his many superficial, patronizing, and methodologically unreflective generaliz-
ations, especially concerning women, nationalities, and races. For example, he
claims that women are motivated almost exclusively by a desire to influence men,
especially their husbands or potential husbands, by charm, frailty, or scolding. He
thus fails to examine more deeply the underlying concerns of women in these rela-
tionships, the social constraints that have rendered women dependent upon men,

81 Anth, AA 07: 133. “Die verschiedenen Acte der Vorstellungskraft in mir zu beobachten,
wenn ich sie herbeirufe, ist des Nachdenkens wohl werth, für Logik und Metaphysik nöthig
und nützlich.” Cf. Anth, AA 07: 132–134.
82 See Anth, AA 07: 212–213; SF, AA 07: 97–116.
83 See MS, AA 06: 441–442.
84 Rudolf Makkreel argues that in the Anthropology Kant develops a framework for describ-
ing human nature, but without attempting to present any principles for explaining human
action. See Makkreel, Rudolf: Kant on the Scientific Status of Psychology, Anthropology,
and History. In: Kant and the Sciences. Edited by Eric Watkins. Oxford 2001, 185–201.
However, one might maintain that pragmatic anthropology must presuppose the possibility
of explaining and predicting human actions, since pragmatic counsel is intended to help us
influence the empirical characteristics and actions of human beings.
85 Cf. Anth, AA 07: 217–218, 285–321.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 173

the consequences of this dependence, and the other interests and motivations of in-
dividual women in his own society and throughout history.86
Many of the auditors of Kant’s anthropology lectures were intrigued and de-
lighted by his empirical observations concerning human nature. According to R. B.
Jachmann, “[h]is perceptive observations, which bore the stamp of a deep knowl-
edge of people and nature, were clothed in a delivery filled with wit and geniality,
which charmed every listener”.87 On the other hand, two of the most thoughtful
critics of his published Anthropology, Goethe and Schleiermacher, were disap-
pointed by its superficial and evidently pandering generalizations, especially con-
cerning women, national groups, artists, and wits.88 Kant’s attempts to describe and
explain empirical human consciousness and behavior are perhaps the weakest as-
pect of his anthropological project. However, by engaging in these attempts he at
least establishes a place within his general system of knowledge, as structured by his
critical philosophy, for studying the empirical dimensions of human cognition, af-
fectivity, and volition.

4. Pragmatic Anthropology

As we might expect, Kant explains and develops his pragmatic anthropology es-
pecially in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, although this work is
organized more directly as a text in empirical anthropology. He also contributes to
his pragmatic anthropology in several of his other texts, including his writings on
medicine and the Pedagogy.89
Kant describes “pragmatic” anthropology as the investigation of “what man as a
free agent makes, or can and should make, of himself”.90 This might initially seem
to be a study of individual self-cultivation. However, he later indicates that every
human individual also has a pragmatic predisposition to use other people “skilfully
for his purposes”, which is required for collective activity and thus for civilization.91

86 Anth, AA 07: 303–311. Two recent discussions of Kant on gender, nationality and race,
which call attention to the inadequacy of his empirical data and generalizations, and also to
the tension between these passages and his transcendental and moral universalism, are pro-
vided in Wood: Kant’s Ethical Thought, 1–14, 333–336; and Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics,
82–106.
87 From a letter quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 330.
88 From Goethe’s letters to Schiller and Voigt, and from Schleiermacher’s 1799 review in the
Athenäum, as quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 335–337 and 338–343.
89 On Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, and its relation to his critical project, see Firla: Unter-
suchungen, 384–417; and Wilson, Holly L.: A Gap in American Kant Scholarship: Pragmatic
Anthropology as the Application of Kantian Moral Philosophy. In: Akten des Siebenten In-
ternationalen Kant-Kongress. Edited by Gerhard Funke. Bonn 1991, II.2, 403–419.
90 Anth, AA 07: 119. “[…] die pragmatische auf das, was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sich
selber macht, oder machen kann und soll”.
91 Anth, AA 07: 322. “[…] andere Menschen zu seinen Absichten geschickt zu brauchen […]”.
174 Claudia M. Schmidt

In Kant’s view, pragmatic anthropology therefore seems to be the use of our empiri-
cal knowledge of human nature to influence individuals, either oneself or other
people. However, in the Anthropology he in fact gives more attention to the self-im-
provement of the individual than our attempts to influence others. Pragmatic an-
thropology is thus a “skill” that we may cultivate, like other skills, in order to pur-
sue our specific purposes.92 The pragmatic aspect of Kant’s anthropology was
especially praised by a Dutch general who attended his lectures while in Königsberg:
“It is there that I acquired the principles which have since served to direct me in my
relations with men; and I have recognized their justice by the felicitous application
which I have often made of them.”93
Kant indicates that his goal in the Anthropology is to provide “knowledge of the
world” [Weltkenntnis], which he distinguishes from “an extensive knowledge of
things in the world”, such as animals, minerals, and even human biology. Instead,
pragmatic anthropology seeks “knowledge of man as a citizen of the world”, or of
the human individual as a participant in the social world.94 Even in this context,
however, one might attempt “to know the world” merely as a spectator, by observ-
ing the “play” of human social life; or aspire “to know one’s way about in the
world” in order to engage effectively in the interplay of social life.95 This practical
use of our empirical knowledge is the concern of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology.
This description of pragmatic anthropology, as including the use of other people
for our own purposes, might initially seem inconsistent with a basic principle of
Kant’s moral theory. This is the principle, as stated in the second formulation of the
categorical imperative, that we must always regard the human being, and indeed
every rational being, as “an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or
that will at its discretion”. Here and elsewhere, however, Kant does not rule out
using other people as a means for one’s own ends, as long as we regard the other
person “at the same time as an end”.96 In the Anthropology Kant describes a variety
of pragmatic techniques for influencing the actions of others. However, he con-
demns the inclination of human beings to manipulate others, which is often associ-

92 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 413–420; MS, AA 06: 444–446.


93 From the memoirs of Dirk van Hogendorp, as quoted in Malter: Anhang II, 331.
94 AA 07: 120. “Eine solche Anthropologie, als Weltkenntniß, welche auf die Schule folgen
muß, betrachtet, wird eigentlich alsdann noch nicht pragmatisch genannt, wenn sie ein aus-
gebreitetes Erkenntniß der Sachen in der Welt, z. B. der Thiere, Pflanzen und Mineralien in
verschiedenen Ländern und Klimaten, sondern wenn sie Erkenntniß des Menschen als Welt-
bürgers enthält.”
95 AA 07: 120. “Noch sind die Ausdrücke: die Welt kennen und Welt haben in ihrer Bedeutung
ziemlich weit auseinander: indem der Eine nur das Spiel versteht, dem er zugesehen hat, der
Andere aber mitgespielt hat.”
96 GMS, AA 04: 428. “Nun sage ich: der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen
existirt als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloß als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für diesen
oder jenen Willen, sondern muß in allen seinen sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf andere
vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck betrachtet wer-
den.” Cf. KpV, AA 05: 87, 131–132.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 175

ated with desires for wealth or social status.97 In addition, Kant argues that we each
have a duty to pursue our own perfection by cultivating our talents: a process that is
furthered by the methods of self-improvement offered by pragmatic anthropology.
However, human beings can also use their talents for morally repugnant purposes,
such as cheating others.98 Accordingly, we must regard pragmatic anthropology,
like other skills, as morally neutral; and examine separately the purposes for which
we seek either to influence other human beings or to improve ourselves, as we shall
see below.
Kant’s pragmatic proposals in the Anthropology are generally directed toward
correcting deficiencies or disorders in the cognitive faculties or affective disposi-
tions of human beings; and toward cultivating the talents, promoting the health,
and enhancing the sociability of individuals. Here are some examples of his prag-
matic proposals. We may cultivate control over our power of attention in order to
avoid dwelling upon the physical or behavioral shortcomings of others, since such
notice is embarrassing to them and distracting to ourselves.99 In planning a social
introduction, or recommending a book or play, we should not praise the object too
much, since this raises the expectations of the audience and often leads to disap-
pointment.100 An effective mnemonic device should organize the material to be re-
membered into a clear and orderly system.101 Inventive genius cannot be taught, but
those who possess it must learn “certain mechanical basic rules” [gewisser mechan-
ischer Grundregeln]102 to achieve genuine creativity in a given field. Someone who is
pale with anger is afraid of his own imminent loss of control and should be feared
immediately, while a flushed countenance indicates that its possessor is vindictive
and should be feared in the future.103
Kant concludes the Anthropological Didactic by describing the highest combi-
nation of the morally with the physically good for human beings: this is the union of
“well-being with virtue” in our social interactions, reflecting a disposition that we
call “humanity”.104 Indeed, he proceeds subtly toward the conclusion that the best
setting for cultivating humanity is “a good meal in good company”, and accord-
ingly offers a series of recommendations for a successful dinner party. On his view, a
dinner party should include three to nine people, in a balanced combination of men
and women, advancing in their conversation from news to reasoning to jokes, since
these conditions tend to promote good will and good digestion.105 He also describes
the types and amount of drinks that promote sociability, the importance of accom-
97 See Anth, AA 07: 271–274.
98 See Anth, AA 07: 205; cf. GMS, AA 04: 393–394.
99 See Anth, AA 07: 131–132.
100 See Anth, AA 07: 173.
101 See Anth, AA 07: 183–185.
102 Anth, AA 07: 224–225.
103 See Anth, AA 07: 260.
104 Anth, AA 07: 277. “Die Denkungsart der Vereinigung des Wohllebens mit der Tugend im
Umgange ist die Humanität.”
105 See Anth, AA 07: 277–281; cf. MS, AA 06: 428.
176 Claudia M. Schmidt

modating a variety of culinary tastes, and the rules by which the host should seek to
guide the conversation.106 This type of sociability produces a well-being that pro-
motes virtue, while a solitary mortification of the flesh is, by contrast, a distorted
semblance of virtue.107

5. Moral Anthropology

Kant’s pragmatic proposals are directed, as “imperatives of skill”, toward pur-


suing one’s own happiness. However, this pursuit does not constitute the entire
practical value of empirical anthropology. On the contrary, Kant maintains that the
overriding principle of human action, as the self-determined action of a rational
being, is action according to the moral law. While this law is recognized by every
rational being through pure practical reason, Kant indicates that we must also con-
sult empirical anthropology in order to apply the moral law to human beings.108
The “metaphysics of morals” thus requires, as its practical counterpart, a “moral
anthropology”, in which we may consider “the subjective conditions in human
nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of
morals”.109
Kant did not devote any of his writings exclusively to moral anthropology. How-
ever, he examines various aspects of moral anthropology, though not by this name,
in the “Doctrine of the Method of Pure Practical Reason” [Methodenlehre der rei-
nen praktischen Vernunft] in his second Critique, and his “Doctrine of the Methods
of Ethics” [Ethische Methodenlehre] in the Metaphysics of Morals.110 He also dis-

106 See Anth, AA 07: 170–172; 242; 278–281.


107 See Anth, AA 07: 282; cf. MS, AA 06: 469–474.
108 See GMS, AA 04: 388–389, 410–412. I argue elsewhere that Kant implicitly distinguishes
between the “application” [Anwendung] of the a priori moral law to an empirically given
human nature in order to produce a system of duties for human beings, as seen in his
“metaphysics of morals”; and the “application” of the law in cultivating a moral disposi-
tion in human individuals, which is the concern of “moral anthropology”. See Schmidt,
Claudia M.: The Anthropological Dimension of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. In: Kant-
Studien, 2005, 66–84.
109 MS, AA 06: 217. “Das Gegenstück einer Metaphysik der Sitten, als das andere Glied der
Eintheilung der praktischen Philosophie überhaupt, würde die moralische Anthropologie
sein, welche, aber nur die subjective, hindernde sowohl als begünstigende Bedingungen der
Ausführung der Gesetze […] enthalten würde […]”.
In the Groundwork Kant uses the phrase “practical anthropology” for the empirical part
of ethics, as a parallel to empirical physics, and a contrasting but complementary discipline
to the metaphysics of morals (GMS, AA 04: 388–389). He further notes that the meta-
physics of morals “needs anthropology for its application to human beings” [die zu ihrer
Anwendung auf Menschen der Anthropologie bedarf] (GMS, AA 04: 412). However, he
never clearly indicates whether the “practical anthropology” that he mentions in the
Groundwork is equivalent to his later “moral anthropology”, or corresponds more closely
instead to either his empirical or his pragmatic anthropology.
110 KpV, AA 05: 151–161; MS, AA 06: 477–485.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 177

cusses moral education in the Pedagogy; and the moral progress of the human
species in various writings from his critical period.111
In the second Critique Kant considers the methods by which pure practical reason
may be given “access to the human mind and influence on its maxims”, so that “ob-
jectively practical reason” can be made “subjectively practical”.112 The Doctrine of
Method seeks to show how the pure representation of virtue can be made an incen-
tive for the human mind, in order to promote the cultivation of a moral character.
This project however has never yet been widely brought into practice, so experience
cannot show anything about its results.113 In the Metaphysics of Morals he argues
that a virtuous disposition is not innate in human beings, but must be acquired by
pure practical reason as it comes to prevail over our inclinations and becomes con-
scious of the supremacy arising from this freedom. Kant then argues that while the
decision to cultivate virtue is made completely in one moment, the power to act vir-
tuously must be “exercised and cultivated” through moral “asceticism”, in order to
counteract “the inner enemy within the human being”.114 This cultivation of a vir-
tuous disposition proceeds through moral education in children, and an ongoing
process of self-discipline in adults.
Kant develops a discussion of moral education in several of his writings.115 In the
Pedagogy he indicates that the innocence of children is amoral compared to good-
ness in adults, since the latter is attained through virtue, or a self-discipline arising
from reason that is directed toward moral conduct.116 We may promote the “moral
culture” [moralische Cultur] of children by teaching them to formulate and act
upon moral maxims through their own reason: a process that we call the formation
of character. Children should first be taught to follow both the moral and non-
moral rules appropriate to their ages and activities, thereby helping them cultivate
a habit of self-discipline. At the next stage, we should teach children their duties
toward themselves and others, by rules and examples appropriate to their ages,
and show that these duties are directed toward honoring oneself and other human

111 On Kant’s moral anthropology in these passages see Firla, Untersuchungen; and Munzel,
G. Felicitas: Kant on Moral Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the Liberal Arts. In: Review
of Metaphysics, 2003, 43–73.
112 KpV, AA 05: 151. “Vielmehr wird unter dieser Methodenlehre die Art verstanden, wie man
den Gesetzen der reinen praktischen Vernunft Eingang in das menschliche Gemüth, Einfluß
auf die Maximen desselben verschaffen, d.i. die objectiv praktische Vernunft auch subjectiv
praktisch machen könne.”
113 KpV, AA 05: 153. For a discussion of Kant’s account of moral character, and his theory of
its development, see Munzel: Kant’s Conception of Moral Character.
114 MS, AA 06: 477. “[…] die Tugend könne nicht durch bloße Vorstellungen der Pflicht,
durch Ermahnungen (paränetisch), gelehrt, sondern sie müsse durch Versuche der Bekämp-
fung des inneren Feindes im Menschen (ascetisch) cultivirt, geübt werden […]”.
115 For recent discussions of Kant’s views on education see Munzel: Kant’s Conception of
Moral Character, 254–333; Munzel: Kant on Moral Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the
Liberal Arts, 43–73; and Louden: Kant’s Impure Ethics, 33–61.
116 Päd, AA 09: 492.
178 Claudia M. Schmidt

beings. If they disobey these moral rules, they should be punished through cold and
contemptuous treatment, to convey the gravity of their failure to honor human dig-
nity.117
As children reach the age of ten, they may be guided more directly in forming the
concept of duty.118 This process should begin with a moral catechism in which the
teacher asks questions to draw answers from the student’s own reasoning, and then
compiles the results in a formula that can be memorized by the student. This cat-
echism should direct the attention of the student to the nature and the dignity of
duty, in contrast to all incentives based on inclinations.119 After this, we should
draw children into moral dialogue by giving them examples of actions and char-
acters for moral judgment. This type of discussion not only sharpens their power of
judgment, but also promotes respect for the moral law.120 This moral cultivation is
finally tested in their teenage years, when young people must start resisting sexual
temptation, honoring all human beings in spite of their inequalities in civic life, and
developing the skills and dispositions needed for adult life.121
Kant also offers advice for cultivating a virtuous disposition in adults. First, to
maintain and exercise an existing moral disposition, he encourages us to build on
our ordinary propensity to discuss moral topics by considering casuistic problems,
and also by discussing and evaluating real persons and actions.122 Next, we may
help cultivate a moral disposition in immature or delinquent adults by directing
their attention toward their own freedom, in which they may find relief from being
entirely subject to their needs and desires, and instead embrace self-respect as their
highest goal for themselves.123 Finally, in his “Ethical Ascetics” and in the Religion
Kant advises us to cultivate the dispositions of mind to be “both valiant and cheer-
ful” in fulfilling our duties, to compensate for the sacrifice of superficial pleasures
required by the practice of virtue.124 He contrasts moral asceticism, in this sense, to
self-punishment, which arises from self-loathing and produces a secret hatred for
the commands of virtue. On the contrary, he maintains that the discipline of virtu-
ous conduct “can become meritorious and exemplary only through the cheerfulness
that accompanies it.”125

117 See Päd, AA 09: 480–489.


118 See KpV, AA 05: 155–157; Päd, AA 09: 480–485.
119 See MS, AA 06: 478–484; cf. 411–413; Päd, AA 09: 490.
120 See KpV, AA 05: 154–160.
121 See Päd, AA 09: 496–499.
122 See MS, AA 06: 411; KpV, AA 05: 153–154.
123 See KpV, AA 05: 160–161; cf. Anth, AA 07: 294–295.
124 MS, AA 06: 484. “Die Regeln der Übung in der Tugend […] gehen auf die zwei Gemüths-
stimmungen hinaus, wackeren und fröhlichen Gemüths […] in Befolgung ihrer Pflichten zu
sein.”
125 MS, AA 06: 485. “Die Zucht (Disciplin), die der Mensch an sich selbst verübt, kann daher
nur durch den Frohsinn, der sie begleitet, verdienstlich und exemplarisch werden.” Cf.
RGV, AA 06: 23fn.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 179

Kant recommends several other human social practices that tend to promote vir-
tue, such as outward expressions of respect,126 along with friendship127 and a cheer-
ful sociability.128 He also argues that the cultivation of taste, or a disinterested en-
joyment of beauty and the sublime, both in nature and in art, contributes to the
development of virtue.129
Finally, Kant indicates in several of his later writings that the larger context for
individual moral education and cultivation is the imperative, arising from pure
practical reason, that we, as individual human agents, should contribute to the cul-
tural and moral progress of our species.130
In the Pedagogy, Kant argues that children should be educated, not merely for
their future lives as individuals, or even as citizens of a state, but also as members of
the human species, who may contribute to improving the conditions of human life.
Children should therefore receive a progressive and cosmopolitan education, which
includes self-discipline, theoretical instruction, training in various skills, the culti-
vation of social graces, and moral improvement. However, Kant maintains that the
larger task of education is to develop the various talents in human nature, in order
to advance the human species toward its perfection, or the fulfillment of its des-
tiny.131 In the Anthropology Kant describes human beings similarly, as a species of
rational animals who are capable of using their reason to preserve, educate, and
govern themselves in society; and are destined to advance through the ongoing de-
velopment of their technical, pragmatic, and moral capabilities.132
However, Kant also considers several of the perennial problems, both natural and
social, that tend to obstruct the progress of humanity. These include the temporal
discrepancy between sexual maturity and civic maturity; the short productive life of
scientists and intellectuals; and the difficulty of determining who should be assigned
the task of moral education, since no one is free from the evil in human nature.133
Yet while these problems seem to require a response on both pragmatic and moral
grounds, he offers little or no indication here of how we might address them. On the
other hand, in other texts from the 1790s, especially the Pedagogy, Toward Per-
petual Peace, and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant describes

126 See Anth, AA 07: 151–153, 244.


127 See MS, AA 06: 469–474.
128 See Anth, AA 07: 277–282; MS, AA 06: 473–474.
129 See Anth, AA 07: 244f; KU, AA 05: 296–354.
130 On Kant’s view of the progress of the human species see Pieper, Annemarie: Ethik als Ver-
hältnis von Moralphilosophie und Anthropologie: Kants Entwurf einer Transzendental-
pragmatik und ihre Transformation durch Apel. In Kant-Studien 69, 1978, 314–329;
Kleingeld, Pauline: Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants. Würzburg
1995; Wilson, Holly H.: Kant’s Integration of Morality and Anthropology. In Kant-Studien
88, 1997, 87–104; Wood: Kant’s Ethical Thought, 193–336; Louden: Kant’s Impure
Ethics, 140–75; and Anderson-Gold: Unnecessary Evil.
131 See Päd, AA 09: 441–454.
132 See Anth, AA 07: 321–325.
133 See Anth, AA 07: 325–327; cf. Päd, AA 09: 449, 496–499.
180 Claudia M. Schmidt

the roles, respectively, of educational institutions, national and international laws,


and religious communities in promoting the cultural and moral advance of the
human species. He also recommends reforms in these institutions to enhance their
effectiveness, presumably based on his empirical knowledge of human nature and
his pragmatic knowledge of the methods by which we may improve human social
life.
Fulfilling the duties of virtue seems to contribute directly to the progress of the
human species, since these duties consist in cultivating our own perfection and pro-
moting the happiness of others.134 However, Kant argues that human culture ad-
vances not only through the moral intentions of individuals, but also through the ef-
fects of the radical evil in human nature. In the third Critique, and again in the
Anthropology, he argues that human culture has progressed as a result of conflicts
both within and between human societies, in which history has brought good out of
evil by impelling human beings to develop constitutional government and a cosmo-
politan society.135 He therefore maintains, as indicated already in his Idea for a Uni-
versal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, that we are required by pure practical
reason to trace the progress of the human species in history, even if this progress
seems to be overshadowed by our destructive tendencies.136
Kant concludes that pure practical reason, under the guidance of reflective judg-
ment, leads us to regard the development of moral agency in human beings as the
final end of nature. We attribute this agency to each human person as a supersen-
sible being, although we can never judge accurately, even in our own case, if any of
our individual actions are indeed the product of a good will.137
In his reflections concerning moral anthropology, Kant thus indicates that we
may seek to cultivate a virtuous disposition in human beings through specific edu-
cational methods, political systems, religious institutions, and sociable activities.
We accordingly have a duty to promote these activities and institutions. However,
Kant’s account of the influence of historical conditions over the development of
moral character returns us to the question left open by his attempt to consider
human agency within its transcendental, empirical and practical context: Is the
human being to be regarded as a noumenal or as a phenomenal agent? If the human
being is a noumenal agent, then we must apparently deny that any empirical causes,
including social and historical factors, could influence the actions of this agent. If
the human being is a phenomenal agent, and thus subject to empirical influences, we
must apparently deny human freedom.138 The problem of justifying moral anthro-

134 Cf. GMS, AA 04: 421–423; MS, AA 06: 385–388.


135 See KU, AA 05: 429–434; Anth, AA 07: 327–331.
136 See IaG, AA 08: 15–31; cf. SF, AA 07: 83–94.
137 See KU, AA 05: 434–436; KpV, AA 05: 154; MS, AA 06: 447; RGV, AA 06: 20.
138 This problem is underscored by Louden in: Kant’s Impure Ethics: 16–19, 180–182; and by
Anderson-Gold in: Unnecessary Evil, 1 f. For a qualified defense of Kant, see Wood: Kant’s
Ethical Thought, 178–82. This question is the main topic of Frierson: Freedom and An-
thropology in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.
Kant’s Transcendental, Empirical, Pragmatic, and Moral Anthropology 181

pology in the context of Kant’s dual approach to human agency thus remains one of
the most intriguing challenges in his overall anthropological project.

6. Conclusion

In this study I have argued that Kant develops four anthropological projects dur-
ing his critical period, which I have called respectively transcendental, empirical,
pragmatic, and moral anthropology. Although he emphasizes different projects in
his various writings, I have shown that elements of each project are distributed and
combined in many of his texts. In particular, the Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View emerges as a diversified compilation of arguments and conclusions
belonging to all four of his anthropological projects. Accordingly, I recommend as a
hermeneutical principle that we should trace elements of any of these projects as
they appear in each text, rather than characterizing any of his writings in advance as
belonging exclusively to his transcendental, empirical, pragmatic, or moral anthro-
pology.
The combination of these four anthropological projects is already apparent in
Kant’s 1773 letter to Herz, in which he describes his initial plan for the anthropol-
ogy lectures, in contrast to other approaches to this topic among his contempor-
aries:
This winter I am presenting, for the second time, a lecture course on anthropology, which I am
now thinking of making into a regular academic discipline. Only my plan is entirely different.
My intention is to reveal, through this, the sources of all the sciences: of morals, of skill, of so-
cial relations, of the method of educating and governing human beings, hence of everything
practical. I therefore seek phenomena and their laws, rather than the first principles of the
possibility of modifying human nature in general. For this reason I have entirely omitted the
subtle and, in my view, eternally futile investigations concerning the manner in which the or-
gans of the body are connected with thoughts. I am so unceasingly offering observations, even
from common life, that my listeners, from the first beginning to the end, never find it a dry
business, but instead always an entertaining one, since they constantly have occasion to com-
pare their ordinary experience with my remarks. From this, in my view, very pleasant set of
teachings from observation, I am working in the intervals on a preliminary study, for the aca-
demic youth, of skill, of prudence, and even of wisdom: a study which, together with physical
geography, is distinct from all other instruction, and may be called knowledge of the world.139

139 Br, AA 10: 145 f. “Ich lese in diesem Winter zum zweyten mal ein collegium privatum der
Anthropologie welches ich ietzt zu einer ordentlichen academischen disciplin zu machen
gedenke. Allein mein Plan ist gantz anders. Die Absicht die ich habe ist durch dieselbe die
Qvellen aller Wissenschaften die der Sitten der Geschiklichkeit des Umganges der Methode
Menschen zu bilden u. zu regiren mithin alles Praktischen zu eröfnen. Da suche ich alsdenn
mehr Phänomena u. ihre Gesetze als die erste Gründe der Möglichkeit der modification der
menschlichen Natur überhaupt. Daher die subtile u. in meinen Augen auf ewig vergebliche
Untersuchung über die Art wie die organe des Korper mit den Gedanken in Verbindung
stehen ganz wegfällt. Ich bin unabläßig so bey der Beobachtung selbst im gemeinen Leben
daß meine Zuhörer vom ersten Anfange bis zu Ende niemals eine trokene sondern durch
182 Claudia M. Schmidt

Kant’s study of the “sources of all sciences” would evolve into what I call his tran-
scendental anthropology; his discussion of “phenomena and their laws” would be
developed in his empirical anthropology; and his investigation “of the method of
educating and governing human beings” belongs to his pragmatic anthropology,
and points toward his moral anthropology. His distinction between these four pro-
jects would become clearer during his critical period, although he would continue to
combine different elements of these projects in his various writings, especially in the
published Anthropology.

List of the English Translations

I have quoted from the following translations of the indicated works by Kant,
with my own occasional revisions. Any translations from Kant’s other writings,
cited in the Academy edition, are my own.

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. The


Hague 1974.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Im-
manuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 41–108. Cambridge 1996.
Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Immanuel Kant:
Practical Philosophy, 133–271. Cambridge 1996.
Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood.
Cambridge 1997.
Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews.
Cambridge 2000.
Correspondence. Translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge 1999.
Lectures on Logic. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young. Cambridge 1992.
Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. In: Immanuel Kant: Practical
Philosophy, 363–603. Cambridge 1996.
Kant on Education. Translated by Annette Churton. Boston 1900.
Opus Postumum. Edited by Eckart Förster. Translated by Eckart Förster and Mi-
chael Rosen. Cambridge 1993.
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Translated by George di Giovanni.
In: Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology, 57–171. Cambridge 1996.

den Anlaß den sie haben unaufhörlich ihre gewöhnliche Erfahrung mit meinen Bemer-
kungen zu vergleichen iederzeit eine unterhaltende Beschäftigung habe. Ich arbeite in Zwi-
schenzeiten daran, aus dieser in meinen Augen sehr angenehmen Beobachtungslehre eine
Vorübung der Geschiklichkeit der Klugheit und selbst der Weisheit vor die academische Ju-
gend zu machen welche nebst der physischen geographie von aller andern Unterweisung
unterschieden ist und die Kentnis der Welt heissen kan.”

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