IN T E R N A T IO N A L S E R IE S O F M O N O G R A P H S I N

PURE A ND A P P L IE D M A T H E M A T IC S

G e n e r a l E d iitt o r s : I. N. Sn e d d o n and M. St a r k
E x e c u t i v e E d iitt o r s : J. P. K a h a n e , A. P. R o b e r t s o n and S. U l a m

VOLUME 31

ELEMENTS

OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC
 JAN LUKASIEWICZ

ELEMENTS
OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC

TRANSLATED FROM POLISH

by
OLGIERD WOJTASIEWICZ

PERGAMON PRESS
OXFOR D • LONDO N ■EDINB URG H ■NEW YORK
TO RO NT O • PARIS • BRA UN SCH W EIG

PWN—POLISH SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS

WARSZAWA
 Pergamon Press Ltd., Headington Hill Hall, Oxford
4 & 5 Fitzroy Square, London W.l
Pergamon
Pergam on Press (Scotla
(Scotland)
nd) Ltd
Ltd.,
., 2 & 3 Tev iot Place, Edin
Edinbur
burgh
gh 1
Pergamon Press Inc
Inc.,
., 44 —01 21st Street, Long Isla
Island
nd City, New Yo
York
rk J1
J11101

Pergamon of Canada, Ltd., 6 Adelaide Street East, Toronto, Ontario

Pergamon Press S.A.R.L., 24 rue des Ecoles, Paris 5e
Friedr. Vieweg&Sohn Verlag, Postfach 185, 33 Braunschweig, West Germany

First edition 1963

Reprinted 1966

Copyright 1963
by PA
PANS
NSTW
TWOW
OW E W YD
YDAW
AW NI
NICT
CTW
W O NA UKOW
UK OW E
(PWN — POLISH SCIEN TIFIC PUBLISHERS
PUBLISHERS))
WARSZAWA

Original Title:
Elem
El ement
entyy lo
logik
gikii mat
matem
ematy
atyczn
cznej
ej
WARSZAWA, PWN
Second Edition 1958

Librar
Lib raryy o f Congress Catalog Car
Cardd N o. 63-10013
Printed in Poland

(1487/64)
 CONTENTS

P re
r e ffaa ccee tto
o t h e S eecc o on
n d E d i t i o n ......................................................... v ii
A u t h o r ’’ss P r e ffaa c e tto
o t h e F i r s t E d i t i o n ............................................ ix

I. In
Intro
trodu
ducti
ction
on......
.............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.........
.. 1
1. Trends in Mathematical Logic. Mathematical Logie
V e rs
rs u s P h il
il o so
so p h
hii c aall L o g i c ................................................ 1
2. Theorems and Rules of Inference. The Sentential
Logic and the Term Logic ................................................. 9

II.
II . Th
Thee Se
Sent
nten
enti
tial
al C a lc u lu s ...................................................................... 22
3. Th e Pr im it itiv
iv e Ter ms an d th e A x iio o ms o off th e Sen ten ti tial
al
C a l c u l u s .......
.............
.............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
.............
.............
.........
.. 22
4. Definitions and Rules of Inference in the Sentential
C a l c u l u s ......
.............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
..............
.............
.............
.............
.............
..............
.........
.. 31
5. T h e or
ore m s o off t h e S e n t een n t iiaa l C a l c u l u s ............................... 41

m . Sele
Selected
cted Problems from the M
Metho
ethodolo
dology
gy o f the Senten
Sentential
tial C
Calc
alculu
uluss 67
6. The Consistency and the Independence of Axioms
o f t h e S e n ttee n ttii a l C
Caa lc
lc u
ull u ss.. M a n y
y-- v aall u eed
d Lo
oggic. . . . 67
7. T h e C oom
mp pll e t e n e s s o f t h e S e n ttee n ttii a l C aall c u lu s . . . . 81

I V. The Sentential Calculus with Quantifiers ..........................................

.

92
8. Quanti
Quantifi
fiers
ers.. Rules o
off Infer
Inference.
ence. T h e s e s .......................... 92

V. Aris
Aristotle
totle’’s S y l l o g i s t i c ...
......
......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
......
......
.......
.......
......
.......
.......
......
.....
.. 103
9. A xi
x i o m ss.. D e f iin
n iitt iio
o n ss.. R u llee s o f I n f e r e n c e ...................... 103
10. Th eses of A ris to tle ’s S y l l o g i s t i c .. ....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.. 107

119
The List of Works Quoted ................................................................... 122
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition of Jan Lukasiewicz's Ele Elem m ents of M athematical

athem atical
Logic app eared in 1929 as autho rized lectu re n otes x. Pu blished by
the Association of Students of Mathematics and Physics in Warsaw
University, these lecture notes served two purposes: students of the
F ac u lty o f th e M ath ematical an d N atu r al Sc Scii en
ence
cess u sed
se d th em w h een n
p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e e x a m i n a t i o n i n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of p h i l o s o p h y ; t h e
notes included the latest results obtained by their author, among
th em so me r esu lts th at h ad n o t b een p u b lish ed b ef o r e. Th ir ty y ear s
after, Lukasiewicz’s book has not lost its didactic and scientific
v alu e, an d a t th e same tim e i t h as acq u iirr ed th e v al alu
u e o f an h is isto
to rric
ical
al
document testifying to the role that was played by the researches of
the Warsaw centre in the development of mathematical logic in
th e f ir st d ecade
ecad e af ter W o r lld d W ar I .
The new edition of the Ele Elem m ents
en ts diff
differs
ers from th e first b u t slight slightly.ly.
The corrections made are small and few. The only section that has
b e e n m o d if ie d m o r e e s s e n t i a l l y is S e c tio
ti o n I I I . 7, c o n ta in i n g a p ro o f
of the completeness of the sentential calculus. The proof of com
p
pll e t e n e s s w h i c h i s g i v e n h e r e is m o d e lle ll e d o n L u k a s ie w ic z ’s l a t e r
p
pro
ro o fs . I n i t s b a s i c i d e a i t d o e s n o t d if fe r fr o m t h a t g iv e n i n t h e
first edition, but is markedly shorter. The last section of the
Elem
Ele m enentsts— “ O n R e a s o n in g i n t h e N a t u r a l S c ie n c e s” — h a s b e e n
dropped, too. Included in the first edition as a “Supplement”, it
was not connected with the contents of the remaining sections.
The first edition of the Ele Elem m ents
en ts had no footnotes at all. Thus,
all the footnotes in the second edition come from its editor. Further,
the first edition has been rounded off by a detailed bibliography
of- the works referred to in the Ele Elem m en
ents
ts and of those works hy
Lukasiewicz
Lukasi ewicz whos
whosee subject m atte r pertains to th e probl problems
ems dis discus
cussed
sed
in th e E Elem
lem ents
en ts .
J E R Z Y S i-U P E C K l
 AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The present notes from lectures delivered at Warsaw University

in the autumn trimester of the academic year 1928/9 are entitled
Elements
Elem ents of M aihe aihemm atica
aticall LogLogic ic for they cover only the two simplest
logical systems, namely the sentential calculus and Aristotle’s
syllogi
syll ogististicc *. I h av e ende avou red to pres ent these tw o system s in
my lectures
lectur es in such a w ay th a t th ey m ight be ac acces
cessi
sibl
blee to begi beginner
nners. s.
I h o p e th a t Ch ap ter I V , tto o o , in w h ich I o u tlin
tlin e th e se n ten tial ccal alcu
cululuss
extended b y th e introd uction of universal quantifi quantifiers,
ers, will no t present
any ser seriou
iouss diff difficult
icultiesies to th e re ade r. T he m o s t' diff difficult
icult issues
issues
discussed in these lectures belong to the methodology of the sen
tential calculus. Especially difficult is the proof of the completeness
of that calculus, given in Section III.7, which requires a longer and
careful study. I have, however, included that proof both because of
it
itss ex cep ttio io n aall iim
m p o r ttan
an ce, an d b eca
ecauu se o f th e f ac t th a t in its p r esen t
form it has never been published before.
These lecture notes bring for the first time, in a more extensive
form, some of the results of my long researches on mathematical
lo
logi
gic.
c. I enum erate here the more im po rtan t n new
ew rresults
esults whos
whosee au tho r
ship, I thin k , I m ay ascribe to m ysel yself.f. Th ey are as fo follllows
ows:: 1. Th e
p a r e n t h e s is - f r e e n o t a t i o n o f e x p re s s io n s in t h e s e n t e n t i a l c a lc u l u s
and in Aristotle’s syllogistic. 2. The system of axioms of the sen
te n tia l calcul
calculus us 8 given on p. 2 7-28. 3. Th e way of no ting down proofs
in the sentential calculus and in Aristotle’s syllogistic, and in many
cases
cas es the ve ry s tru ctu re of those proofs. 4 4.. R em arks on “ general
generalizing
izing
deduction” on p. 46. 5. Systems of many-valued logic. 6. The idea
of the proof of the completeness of the sentential calculus, presented
in III.7. 7. The axiomatization of Aristotle’s syllogistic, with com
p l e t e p r o o f s o f t h e la w s of t h e s q u a r e o f o p p o s it io n , t h e l a w s of
conversion, and all the valid modes of syllogisms. 8. Some historical
remarks (e.g., oh the form of Aristotle’s syllogism, on Stoic logic,
on Frege as th e founder of th e sentential cal calcul
culus,us, an d remarks
about Origenes and Sextus).
To th o se r esu lts w h ich I h av e o b tain ed b y my o w n r ef lectio n I
could also add the proof of the consistency of the sentential calculus
and the method of examination of the independence of the theses
of that calculus. But the proof of consistency of the sentential cal-
X a u t h o r ’s pr e f a c e t o t h e f ir s t e d it io n

cuius ha d alread y been given in 1 19

921 b y E. L. P os t in his pa per
“ I n tr o d u ctio n to a G en eerr aall Th eo r y o f Elem en tar y Pr o p o si
siti
tio
o n s” , an d
a method of examining the independence of the theses of the sen-
ten tial calcalculus
culus was first publi published
shed in 192 6 by Bernay s iin n hihiss pap er
“ Axiom ati atisehe
sehe Untersuchung en des Aussagenkal Aussagenkalkuls
kuls der ‘Principi
Principiaa
M athem atica’ ” 3. I h ad concei conceived
ved the same m ethod even befo beforere
1926 as a result of engaging in the study of many-valued logic, and
th an k s to th e su g g eest stiv
ivee r em ar k b y D r Tar sk i th a t th e rresu esu llts
ts o f
m any-valued logi ogicc m ight in some ccases ases be used in proving indepen indepen d
ence (cf (cf. A. Tarski’
Tarski’ss pa pe r “ 0 wyrazie pierwotnym logistyki”
(On the Primitive Term of Logistic), [32], pp. 11 and 12 of the off
p r i n t ) . B y u s i n g a “ m a t r i x ” m e t h o d , w h i c h I h a d d e v is e d , t o e x a m in e
independence, I ha d m ade su re and ha d p ublished, even bef before
ore
Be rnays ( in a repo rt o on n a lecture en titl titled
ed “ D em onstrati
onstration on de la
compatibility des axiomes de la theorie de la deduction” [12]), that
in Whitehead and Bussell’s system of sentential calculus Axiom 1.5,
and in Hilbert’s system, given in [5], Axiom 2 were not independent
of the remaining ones, while all the other axioms in both systems
were ind epen dent of the rem aining one
were ones.
s. I n th a t repo rt I aals
lsoo dem 
on strate d th e independenc e of th e axiom system speci specifi
fied
ed on p. 27
in th e p r esen t lectu r e n o tes.
In Post’s paper of 1921 quoted above, there are certain purely
formal considerations concerning many-valued systems of the sen
tential calculus. In view of this fact I should like to point out that
my system of three-valued logic had been developed before 1921,
since I presented it as early as on June 19, 1920, at a sitting of the
Polish Philosophical Society in Lwow (cf. [11])- My researches on
many-valued logic have since been considerably advanced by the

memb er s o f my Semin ar , D r Lin d en b au m an d M r Wajsb er g . A mo n g

othe r tthings,
hings, Mr W ajsberg has shown th a t th e syst system
em of three-
three-valued
valued
lo
logi
gicc can be axiomatized. These results hav e so far n o t been prin ted 4 4..
W ha t iiss included iin n these llectures
ectures over and abov e the points
en u mer ated ab o v e is n o t my p r o p er ty . So me in f o r matio n I h av e
draw n from booksbooks,, m ainly from Principia Mathematica b y W h i ttee h e a d
and B usse
ussell
ll [3 5 ] and ffrom
rom Frege’
Frege’ss works. Th e example of th e m ath 
em atical proof given in P arag rap h 6 6,, as wel
welll as th e histor
historical
ical da ta
conce rning Axiom 2, given on p. 29-30, co me from V ailati [33] [33],, pp. 518 £f.
A letter from Professor Bernays, of Gottingen, which reached me
in S eptem ber 1 9 2 8 , inf
informed
ormed m e th a t this au tho r ha d simpl
simplifified
ied tthe
he

system
as form of axioms
ulated of the
b y .Dr sentential
Tarski (ef . pp. calculus
(ef 49 and based
98
98)). on implication,
I owe most, however, to the scientific atmosphere which has
developed in Warsaw University in the field of mathematical logic.
 a u t h o r ’s pr e f a c e t o t h e f ir s t EDITION XI

In discussions with, my colleagues, especially Professor S. Lesniewski

and D r A A.. Tarski
Tarski,, an d often iin
n di
discu
scuss
ssion
ionss with th eir an d m y o own
wn
stu d en ts, I h av e mad e clear to my self man y a co n cep t, I h av e
assimilated many a way of formulating ideas, and I have learned
ab o u t man y a n ew r esu lt, ab o u t w h ich I am to d ay n o t in a p o sitio n
to say to whom the credit of authorship goes. It was in such dis-
cussions, for example, if my memory does not fail me, that the
rules were established for using the universal quantifiers in that
system of the sentential calculus which is described in Chap. IV.
When outlining that system, and especially when explaining the
concept of meaningful expression in that system and the rule of
sub stitution, I ha ve availed mysel myselff of the inform ation kindly suppl supplie
ied d
b y D r T a r s k i , w h o h a d p r e s e n t e d s u c h a s y s te m e a r l ie r t h a n I d i d ,
and h ad dis discus
cussedsed it in his cocoururse
ses.s. To be exact, I shall also also add t h a t
I h a v e a d o p t e d t h e t e r m fun
functoctorr from Professor Kotarbinski, and
t h e t e r m meaningful exjpre&Hon from Professor Lesniewski. It is
also to Professor Lesniewski that I owe the critical opinions con-
cerning
cern ing the interp retation of implicat
implication,
ion, as fform
orm ulated ou page 25
of these E Elem
lem en
ents
ts s.
I delivered these lectures, as I usually do, from memory, resort-
ing to notes only in those parts which are expressed in symbols.
T ha t is w hy Mr. Fresb urger, as th e ed itor of these lecture notes, h ad
to tak e g r eat p ain s to mak e r ead ab le w h at w er e o r ig in ally sp o k en
lectures. I avail myself of this opportunity to express to him my
heartfelt thanks for the work he has done. I must also add that
Mr Presburger’s contribution to this publication can also be seen
in some places in the contents of these notes. This refers above all
to the proof of the completeness of the sentential calculus. The
explana tion of the concep t of m eaningf eaningfulul expr
express ession
ion iinn th e senten tial
calculus as well as the rule of substitution in that calculus also owe
to M r.
r . Pr esb u r g er th e ir p r esen t f o rrm,
m, w h ic
ichh iiss mo rree ex act th an th e
one I gave in my lectures.
A s co mp lemen tar y r ead in g s th e r ead er may u se th e tex tb o o k
of m athem atical log logic
ic by H ilbert a nd A ckermann, published iin n 1928:
Grundeiige der theoretischen Logih [ 6 ] . I t mu st b e said th at th is
tex tb o o k h as in n o w ay in fflu luen
en ce
cedd th e co n ten t o f th e p r esen t lect
lectu
ure
notes, with the exception of one terminological point: following its
au th o r s I u se th e ter ms free o r bound variable, instead of real o r
apparent variable, as has been the usage thus far. I should also add
th at I am n o w p r ep ar in g a co mp r eh en siv e mo n o g r ap h w h ich is to
co v er th e w h o le o f th e mo st imp o r tan t p r o b lems o f th e sen ten tial
calculus *.
J A N L U K A S IE W IC Z
Warsaw. February 23, 1929.
 I. INTRODUCTION

1. Trends In Mathematical Logic.

Mathematical Logic Versus Philosophical Logic

1. George
George Boole,
Bool e, an E nglishnglish m athem atician atician who li li ved
in the mid-19th century, is considered the founder of
m at h em at ical
ical l o g ic.
ic. H i s f u n d am en t al w o rk r k , p u b li
l i sh ed in
in
1854,
185 4, is e n titled
titled A n I n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e L a w s o f T h o u g h t [2].
I n h i s an al y si s B o o l e st ar t ed f r o m t h e o b ser v at i o n t h at
the general laws of thought, with one exception, are

strictly
stri ctly analogous to to th e lawlaw s of m athem atical atical algebra.
algebra.
L e t u s c o n s id id e r t h e m a th t h e m a ti
t i c a l l a w o f c o m m u tata 
tiv ity of m ultip ultip li lica
ca ti
tion
on , w hich Boole sym sym boli
bolizes as:
soy = y x \ i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h a t l a w , t h e p r o d u c t o f a n y
two num bers is is n o t changed w hen th th e order of its elem ents ents
is reversed. The letters x a n d y w h i c h a p p e a r i n t h e l a w
o f co m m u t at atii v i ty
t y ar e v ar iab i ab l es wh o se s e v alu
al u es ar e ex 
p re s s io n s t h a t s t a n d f o r a n y n u m b e r s , f o r t h a t la w is
correct for all numbers. Boole also uses variables, but
th e ir values are expressiexpres sions ons stan din g for clas cl asses
ses of ob jects.
I n t h u s d ef i n i n g t h e r an g e o f t h e v ar i ab l es, B o o l e i n t er 
p r e t s t h e e x p r e s s io n x y as denoting the class of objects
t h at b el o n g b o t h t o t h e cl ass x and to the class y . If, for
instance, x is the class of white objects, and y is the class
of sheep, then in Boole’s interpretation x y is the class
of those objects which belong both to the class of white
objects and to the class of sheep, and thus is the class
of w hitehite sheep.
sheep. By interp retin reti n g va ri riab
ab l es and m ultipli
ultipli
cat i o n i n t h i s way B o o l e n o t i ced t h at t h e l aw o f co m m u 
t a t i v i t y : x y ~ y x remains valid if we apply it to classes
of objects. Eor the class of those objects which belong
b o t h t o t h e c las la s s x and to the class y is identical with
2 I. INTRODUCTION

the class of those objects which belong both to the class y

an d t o t h e cl ass x . This fact can be illustrated, which,
b y t h e w a y , B o o le d id n o t d o , b y m e a n s o f c ir ircc le s , i n
a m an n er k n o wn f r o m t r ad i t i o n al l o g i c. I n t h i s i n t er -
p r e t a t i o n a c irc
ir c le s ta n d s f o r a c la s s o f o b je c ts . I f , a s in
Fig. 1 , two circles stand for the
classes x a n d y 7 t h e n t h e p a r t
common to both circles represents
b o t h t h e c la
lass s x y and the class y x .
A p ar t f ror o m t h i s an aloalo g y w i t h
t h e l a w ofo f c o m m u t a ti
ti v i ty
ty o f m u l-l-
tip
ti p li
lica
ca ti
tioo n Boole
Boole po i nted t o m any
o the r sim sim i l arit
arit i es betw
bet w een the
laws p ertaining
ertai ning to clas
classe
sess an d th e laws of m athem atical atical
al gebra, an d thu s founded the algebra of logic.
algebra, ogic. W e will will
n o t, how ever,
ever, be concerned
concerned w it ith
h it in
in a ny g rea ter de tail tail ,
f o r o u r aim
aim is o n ly
l y t o ch a r acter
acter ize
ize t h e stan
stan d p o i n t t ak en
b y B o o le.
le . W ith
it h t h a t e n d i n v ie w w e s h a ll b e c o n c e r n e d
w i t h the p o int a t w hich,
hich, as Boole saw sa w it, th e analogy
w i t h m at h em at ical
ical alg
al g eb r a com
co m es t o an en d .
Following Boole’s interpretation, in the algebra of
logic
ogi c th e law x x = x iiss t r u e f o r an y v al u es o f t h e v ar i ab le
le x .
For the class x x is the class of those objects which belong

bclass
o t h txo. Thus,
t h e c las
lae.g.,
s s x the
an d class
t o t h eofclthose
ass x objects
, an d h en ce fo
which fo rm
rbelong
m th e
b o t h t o t h e c las la s s o f m e n a n d t o t h e c la lass s o f m e n is t h e
clas
cl asss of m en. Y et in m athe m atical atical algeb
algeb ra th th e law
law :
x x = x is not true for every value of the variable x . W e
k n o w t h a t t h e e q u a t i o n x 2 = x , as an equation of the
second degree, has only two solutions, in our case the
values 0 and I. Taking this fact into account Boole con-
cluded that in the algebra of logic all those laws are
v a l i d w h ichich ar e t ru r u e i n m at h em at icalical alg
al g eb r a w h en th
th e
values are limited to the values 0 and 1. For with this
r est r i ct i o n t h e l aw x x — x is tru e for aU values of th e
variable x , since we have: 0 *0 = 0 a n d 1 * 1 = 1 .
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 3

In his a lgeb ra of.of. logic

ogic Boole
Bool e also
also inte rp rete d th e
symbols of zero
zero a n d un it
ityy . Since
Since the y are co n stan t symsym bols,
bols,
they are to be understood as certain constant classes;
according to Boole, “1” stands for the class of all objects,
a n d “ 0 ” for th
th e em pty class
class,, th a t is
is th
t h e clas
classs to w hich
hich
no object belongs. Hence every object belongs to the
class “1”, it is the class of the totality of objects. The
em p ty class,
class, e.g.,
e.g., is the class
class of
of m ou ntains of gold,
gold, th th e
class of square circles, the class of chimeras, etc., for
no ob ject isis a m ou ntain of gold,
gold, no ob ject is a squ are
circle, no object is a chimera. The problem of existence
of th e em p ty class
class en tails
tails c onsiderable diffi
difficu
cu lt
lty,
y, for if
no squ are circl
circles
es ex ist the n i t seems
seems th a t th e clas cl asss of
squ are circ
circlles sho uld n o t exist eithe
eithe r. W e shall
shal l n o t analyse
this issue more closely.
In developing his algebra of logic Boole introduced
logical addition and logical subtraction, both understood
in a specific way. The latter operation will be explained
to serve the purpose of our exposition of the subject.
The class x — y , the difference of the classes x and y, is
the class of those objects which belong to the class x ,
with the exception of the objects belonging to the class y .
If, e.g., x is the class of men and y is the class of Asians,
t h e n x — y is the class of all men except the Asians.
L ikew ise, if a? a? is th e class of m en , th e n 1 —a; —a; is th e class
of all ob jects
jects ex cep t men, th a t iiss the class class ofof non-m
non- m en.
In his algebra of logic ogic Boole
Boole han dled the equ alit alit i es
of class
classeses ju s t li
like
ke m athe m atica
ati ca l equa l i t i es. S tartin
tartin g from
from
t h e l aw: x x = x , or x %— x , as discussed above, by sub-
st r act i n g x 2 from both sides of the equality he obtained
a?2—a? — x — it2, a n d he nc e: 0 = x — x 2, o r x — x 2 = 0 . By
tstring x outside parentheses he obtained the law

x ( 1 —«c) = 0 .
If, fo r instan
instan ce , x is the class of men, then this law states
th a t the clas
classs of th
th e objects
objects bel
bel onging
ongi ng b o th to the class
class
4 I. INTKOUUCTION

of men and to the class of non-men is the empty class.

This law was for Boole an expression of the logical
p r in c ip le w h ich ic h , s in c e A r is t o tle tl e , h a d b e e n k n o w n a s t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I n co n f o rm
r m i t y w i t h t h a t p r in
in cip
ci p le,
l e,
no object may possess simultaneously two contradictory
p r o p e r tie
ti e s , e .g ., b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e a m a n a n d a n o n -m a n .
Boolee ascribed
Bool ascribed to his algeb ra of logi logicc an im m ense im 
p o r ta n c e b e c a u s e h e s a w t h a t w ith it h i t s h e lp h e w a s i n
a positi
position t o prove th e m ost im i m p o rt
rtan
an t l ogical
ogical laws.
The example of reasoning given above shows clearly
th a t B oole’
oole’ss m ethod was p u rely algebraic. algebraic. Boole’
Boole’s work
was continued in the same direction by the American
logici
ogician an Peir
Pei r ce, th th e au tho r of m any p ape rs on m athem atical atical
logic,
ogic, published
published in A m erican erican period
period icals.
icals. I t was on P eirce’s
eirce’s

works
lived inthat the the
second German half of logician
the 19th Ernst Schroder,
century (d. 1902), who
b a s e d h is r e s e a r c h e s ; h e is t h e a u t h o r o f t h e m o s t c o m 
p re h e n s iv e w o rk o n m a t h e m a tic ti c a l lo g ic so f a r , t h e th r e e -
volume study entitled Vorlesungen iiber die Algebra der
L o g i k [28],
Sch roro d er ter
ter m i n at es t h a t t ren r en d i n m at h em ati at i cal lo gig ic
which was based on the applications of the algebraic
m e t h o d x. F o r a lo g ic ic ia
ia n c o n n e c tete d w i t h t h a t t re
re n d m a t h 
em ati
at ics was the m odel of how to proceed in research, resear ch,
an d som eti etim es even an au x il iliary
iary discipli
discipline.ne. Boole
Boole em ployed
fairly
fair ly diffi
dif ficult
cult m athem atical atical theorem
theorem s in order to to prese nt
and prove some of the results he obtained in his logical
research.
res earch. E x terna lly lly th e algeb
al geb ra of logic ogic used m athem atical atical
symboliism. Problem
symbol Problem s w ere ere form
f orm ulated
ulat ed in a m athem atical atical
w ay, e.g.e.g.,, m any references
references w ere m ade in the algebra of
logic to solving logical equations.
2. The founder an d rep resen tative tat ive o f the othe r tr tren
en d
i n m athat h em ati
at i cal lo g ic ic was th t h e G erm erm an m ath at h em atiat i cian
ci an
Gottlob Frege, who Kved in the second half of the 19th
and in the early 20th century. In 1879 he published his
first w ork
or k on m athe m atical logic,
ogic, en ti
titl
tled
ed B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t [3].
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 5

At that time he apparently did not know the works

of B oole
oole an d his foll follow ers.
ers. F reg e’s e’s m ost im p o rtan t
work is G r u n d l a g e n d e r A r i t h m e i i k [4]. Frege set himself
the task of investigating how far it is possible to proceed
i n ar it
i t h m et ic
ic b y m ean s o f r easo n in in g t h a t is
i s b ased ex clu
cl u 
sively on the general laws of thought and does not resort
t o the statem en ts ab ou t em piri pi rical
cal facts.
facts. T he aim ai m of F rege ’s
resear
res earches
ches w as to t o dem on st strat
ratee th e po ssibil
ssibilii t y of founding
founding
all ofof arith arith m etic on llogical ogical law s alone.
al one. To achieve th a t,
F rege h ad to give give com plet pl etee proofs,
proofs, w it itho
ho ut an y gaps
whatever, for if there is a gap in a proof, the suspicion
ar i ses t h at p er h ap s i n t h at p l ace we r eso r t t o so m e ex t r a-
logical premises. It is only when all the proofs are given
i n a c o m p le le te
te fo fo rm
r m t h a t w e c an a n b e s u r e t h a t a r iti t h m e t ic
ic
can be built on logical premises alone.
W hen striving striving to reach h is idea i dea l of th e strictly
stri ctly scienti
scientifi ficc
m a th
t h e m a ti t i c a l m e th t h o d , n a m e ly
ly t h e a x i o m a t i c m et h o d , al 
r ead y u sed b y E u cl id id , F r eg e m ad e Ms tw o p r in i n ci p al d i s
coveriies: h e crea ted ce rtain
cover rt ain new logical system system s, previously
(even in Boole’s works) imperfectly known and under
stood (above all the sentential calculus, expounded in
B e g - r i f f s s c h r i f t ), and was the first, as it seems, to notice
th e differ
difference ence betw een th th e prem i ses on wMeh a reasoning reasoning
i s b ased , an d t h e rules of inference, t h at i s t h e r u l es wh i ch
determ i ne how we are to proceed in in order to p rove a given gi ven
thesis on the strength of certain premises. The difference
b e tw e e n t h e p re m ise is e s o f r e a s o n in g a n d t h e r u le s of
inference is brought clearly into relief when the premises
ar e w r it i t ten
ten i n a sy m b o li lic f o rm
rm : i t t h e n b eco
ec o m es clear
cl ear t h a t
th e rules of i nference ca nn ot also al so b e w ritten
ritten in symbols,
symbols ,
a t lea st if we confine confine ourselves
ourselves to t ho se sym bols which which
o ccu r i n t h e p rem r em i ses.
se s.
The need to use symbolism in logic became clear to
Frege when he noticed the difficulties resulting from
everyday speech. Frege’s logical symbolism could not, as
w as th
t h e case w ith
ith B oole’
oole’ss ssym
ym boli
bolism, be m odell
odell ed on m athe 
2
6 1. INTRODtiCTlON

m atics,
atics, for Fre ge ’s l ogic w as to to serve
ser ve ab ov e all to lay
th e foun da t ions of arith arith m etic; consequen t ly, the use us e of
arith
arit h m etical ssym ym boli
bolism in logi logicc w ould
ould l ead to an am -
b i g u i ty o f s y m b o ls.
ls . T h is is .th e f i r s t d if
iffe
fe re n c e b e tw e e n
t h e t r en d r ep r esen t ed b y Fr eg e an d t h e al g eb r a o f l o g i c.

The second difference results from the first: as he did

n o t u se al g eb rair aicc sy m b o li
lism , Fr eg
e g e w as n o t t em p t ed to to
set logicogic task s w hich hich w ere
er e anal
analogous
ogous to t o m athem atical
atical
p r o b le m s , h e d id n o t u s e m a th e m a t ic a l m e th o d s i n lo g ic
an d t h er ef o r e b et t er u n d er st o o d t h e sp eci f i c n at u r e o f
the logical problems. Finally, the third difference is con-
nected with Frege’s principal objective: since he wanted
to b ase arith arit h m etic
eti c on logic
logicalal found ations
ations he cou ld no t
r eso r t i n h is is r esear
es ear ch t o an y m at h em at ical ical th th eo r em
e m s.

sistsThe in priceless value of precision;

their exceptional Frege’s logical their researches
author worked con-
o u t a t r u l y sci en t i f i c m et h o d o f l ay i n g t h e f o u n d at i o n s
o f m a th t h e m a ti
t i c s , a n d i n t h a t re r e s p e c t th
t h e t rree n d i n lo
lo g ic
ic
i n i t i at ed b y Fr eg e h as m u ch g r eat er ser v i ces t o i t s cr ed i t
than the trend represented by the algebra of logic.
Frege’s logic influenced the English scientists
A . IS". W hitehe ad an d B . B ussell, ussell, th e a u tho rs of P r i n c i p i a
M a t h e m a t i e a [35], vol. 1 of which, containing the study
of m athem atica ati ca l logic,
ogic, ap pe ared in 1910 1910 (second
(second p ri rin
n ti
tinng
in 1925). P r i n c i p i a M a t h e m a t iiee a iiss w ri ritt
tten
en in a speci special
sy m b o l ic ic l an g u ag e, w i t h co m m en ttss o n th t h e t e x t i n E n g li
l i sh .
That work put into effect Frege’s idea that mathematics
should be presented as a system that begins with logic,
on which are based the various branches of mathematics
i n t h e n ar ro ro w er sen sen se
s e o f t h e w o rd
r d . W h i teh
teh ead an d B u ssell ssell
also
al so avail availed, them selves, e spec ially ally in in w h a t concernsconcerns
sym
sy m b o li lism , o f t h e w o rk r k s o f t h e I t al i an m at h em at ici ici an
G. Peano, who in his P o r m u l a i r e d e m a t h e m a t i q u e s strove
t o n o t e d o w n m a t h e m a t ic ic a l th
th e o re
re m s ini n s ym
y m b o lsls h e h a d
i n v e n t e d , a n d t o p r o v e th th e m i n a s t r ic ic t m a n n e r.r. T h e l a s t
volume of his publication appeared in 1908 as F o r m u l a r i o
 TRENDS IN MATHEMATICAL LOGIC 7

matematicoj w ritt ri tten

en in th e artifi
artificial
cial language call
called latino
s i n e f l e x i o n e . The authors of P r i n ci p i a M at hem at i ca
adopted a modified symbolism of Peano, which is simpler
than the intricate notation used by Frege. Yet when it
comes to precision and subtlety in the scientific method,
b o t h P e a n o ’s f o r m u la s a n d t h e w o rk o f W h ite it e h e a d a n d
B ussell
ussell prov e inferiorinferi or to F rege’s
rege’s w orks. or ks. Frege isis the m odern
logici
ogi cian
an m ost pe n etratin etratin g in in finding
finding an d m ost subtle subtl e in
solvi
sol ving
ng the problem problem s th a t re st a t th e roots o f logic. ogic.
3. W h a t i s t h e r elat elatii o n sh i p b etw
etw een m ath at h em ati
at i cal
logic,
ogic, tht h e dev elopm ent of w hich hi ch has been descri descr ibed above,
a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l o g i c f W h e n usu s in
in g th
th e te r m p h ilo s o p h ic a l
logic I have in mind that set of issues which are raised
i n b o o ksk s w r it i t ten
ten b y p h il il o so p h er
e r s, I h av e i n m i n d t h a t

losoph
ogic
ogi c iw hich
hi chlogic
cal we ha isven olearned
is t a hom inogeneous
seconda rydisci
disschoo
sc hool
cipli l. P bh u
pline,
ne, il-
t
contains issues of diverse content. In particular, it en-
croaches upon psychology when it refers not only to sen-
tences in the logical sense of the word, but also to those
p s y c h ic p h e n o m e n a w h ich ic h c o r r e s p o n d t o s e n teten
nces a n d
which are called *‘judg m en ts” o r “propo sit sit i ons” . Com-
b in in g lo g ic w i t h p s y c h o lo g y is a r e s u l t o f a n e r ro n e o u s
inte rp reta tio tio n of th e sub j ect m a tter of logical ogical res e arc h a.
I t is often said th a t logi logicc is is the sci science ofof th e law law s of
thought, and since thinking is a psychic act, therefore
logic should form part of psychology. It might as well
b e a r g u e d t h a t a r ith it h m e t i c is a p s y c h o lo g ic a l d isiscc ip lin
li n e
b e c a u s e i t is c o n c e rn e d w ith it h a d d in g a n d m u ltip lt ip ly in g
n u m b er s an d r ai si n g t h em t o p o wer s, an d t h er e i s n o
d o u b t t h a t ad d i titi o n , m u l ti
ti p l icat
icat io
io n an d r aisi
aisinn g t o a p o wer
are psychic acts. T e t no one clai claim
m s tha t, arit
arith h m etic
eti c isis
p a r t o f p s y c h o lo g y . L ik e w isisee , lo g ic is n o t p a r t o f p s y c h o l-
ogy. The psychological issues connected with the process
o f t h i n k i n g m u st b e i n v est ig
ig at ed b y q u i t e d i ff
ff eren
eren t m eth
eth o d s
from those used in logic.
Philosophical logic also includes certain epistemological
2 *
8 I. INTRODUCTION

p r o b le m s , e .g ., t h e p r o b le m o f w h a t is t r u t h , a n d w h e th e r
t h er e isis an y cr it it er io
i o n o f t r u t h . T e t th th ese m at ter
t er s als
als o
do not belong to logic: as we shall see later, it is possible
t o b u i l d w i t h m ax im i m u m p r ecisi
ecisio o n lo
l o g i cal sy
s y stem
stem s i n w h ich
ich
n o ref
refereren
en ce w h at ev e r wil wi ll b e m ad e t o t r u t h an d f alse
alseh h o o d.
d.
The problem of truth belongs to those epistemological
issues w hichhich a re ex trem trem ely difficu
difficu lt to solve,
solve, hav e so far
b e e n r i d d e n w i t h o b s c u r ity
it y , a n d p r o b a b ly w ill
il l n o t b e
solved soon.
If we remove from philosophical logic all those issues
which belong to psychology, epistemology and philosophy
i n g en er al , t h en wh at r em ai n s wi l l co n st i t u t e wh at i s
called ffo o r m a l l o g i c , containing logical issues proper. And
these issues of philosophical logic do not differ from

t h e iss
issu u es o f m at h em at ical
ical lo g ic,
ic, b u t t h ey ar e t r ea t ed b y
p h ilo
il o s o p h e r s w i th m u c h les
le s s p r e c is io n t h a n b y m a t h e m a t -
ical logicians.
ogicians. P hiloso hiloso ph ical logic, from th e beginning
of m odern ph i l osophy up to ou r tim tim es, has suff suff ered
er ed
a serious
serious declidecline. If one m ay sp eak o f a kinsh ip of m ethod et hod s
used in i n form
for m al l ogic
ogi c an d in m athem atical atical logic,
ogic, this can
only refer to ancient logic. The ancients created certain
l ogical
ogi cal system
syst em s, stillstill ve ry im pe rf rfect
ect b u t which ce rt rtainly
ainly
can be considered the first stages in the development of
con tem po rary syst s ystem
em s of m athe m atical logic. ogic. Cons
Co nse-e-
qu en tl tly,
y, if m athe m atical logic is opposed to t o philosophical
philosophical
logic, this pertains principally to modern and most recent
t i m es. In fac t, the re are n o t t w o logics ogics,, m athem atical
atical
and philosophical; there is only one logic, founded by
Aristotle, completed by the ancient school of the Stoics,
and pursued, often with great subtlety, by medieval
logicians, and it is that logic which is developed by
m athem atical atical logic.
ogic. The reali realiza
za tition
on of th a t u n it ity
y of logic
ogic
is already gaining ground, and some authors cease to use
th e term “ m athem atica atica l l ogic”
ogi c” . The rec r ec en t {1
{1928) book
b y D . H i l b e r t a n d W . A c k e r m a n n b e a r s t h e t i t l e Grundziige
der theoretischen LogiJc [ 6 ] and con tains tains a n exp ositi
ositi on of
 THEOREMS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 9

m athe m atical logic. ogic. If the p rese nt lectures lect ures 3 are e n titl
titled
ed
P r i n c i p l e s o f M a t h e m a t i c a l L o g i c , this is only in order
t o em p h asi as ize w h a t w il l h e t h e i r t rren en d an d m et h o d 4.

2. Theorems and Rules of Inference.

The Sentential Logic and the Term Logic

4. In textbo ok s of trad ition

it ion a l logic
ogi c A ri
ristotl
stotle’
e’ss sim
sim plest
syllogism is usually presented in the following form:
All M i s P,
1 All $ is M .
Therefore all S i s P.
To illustrate this, examples like the following are given:

Al l m en ar e m o r t al ,
All Poles are men.
Th erefor
ereforee a ll Po l es a re m ortal.
Aristotle of Stagira, a Greek philosopher who lived
in th e fo u rth ce n tury B.O. (d. 322 322 B. C.)C.), isis considered
considered
the founder of logic and, in particular, the author of
th e syllogi
syllogismsm qu oted ab ov e ®. A risto
risto tle
tle w as in fa c t th e
author of a logical theory which might be called the
theory of syllogism and which, as we know today, is only
a sm all frag m en t of th e whole of logic. ogic. Philoso
Philoso ph ers,
how ever,
ever, w ere ere so fascinated
fasci nated b y A ri ristot
stotle’
le’ss w ork th a t
the y often
oft en asserted
assert ed th a t the w hole
hole of logicogic was con- con-
tained in the theory of syllogism and that that theory
was a complete and perfect discipline. Such a view of
A ristotl
ristotle’
e’ss syll
s yllogis
ogisttic was held by Im m anu el K an t. These
facts testify to the great authority enjoyed by Aristotle,
b u t a t t h e s a m e t im e to t h e d e c lin e o f lo g ic
icaa l th in k in g
in the case of modem philosophers. Aristotle’s work is
v er y r em ar k ab l e; i n h i s o wn t i m e i t was t h e p r o d u ct
of a genius, yet it is but a tiny fragment of what we
know about logic today.
10 I. INTRODUCTION

The p a ttern of a syll syllogism

ogism given u nd er I, as form for m ulated
ulated
in tra d itio
itio n a l logic,
ogi c, isis n o t A risto
risto tle’
tle’ss syll
syllogism.
ogism. I f we
disreg ard c e rtain sligh
sligh t differences,
differences, A ristotle’s
ristotle’s syll
syllogism
ogism
w hich
hich correspond
corr espond s to th t h e trad it
itio
io n a l syll
syllogism
ogism quo ted
abov e can be w ritt ri tten
en dow n as fol folllows:
If all M is P
II and a ll
ll 8 is M ,
t h en al l S is P .

Practically all the historians of logic fail to notice the

d if
if f eren
er en ce b etw
etw een t h e f o rm
r m s I an d I I , ' an d q u o t e A r i s
totle’s syllogism in form I; this is also done by one of
the most reliable historians of logic, the German scholar

Pr an t l , wh o l i v ed i n t h e m i d - 1 9 t h cen t u r y .
The difference between the two forms of syllogism,
as given a bov e, is is ve ry esse ntial. A risto
risto tl tle’
e’ss syl
sylllogism
ogism (II )
is a conditional s entence , wh i ch h as an an t eced en t an d
a co n seq u en t : t h e an t eced en t i s co n t ai n ed b et ween t h e
words “if” and “then” and consists of two clauses con
nected by the word “and”, and the consequent follows
t h e wo r d “t h en ”. T h u s t h e en t i r e sy l l o g i sm f o r m s a single
sentence, a complex sentence. On the other hand, the

traditional
b u t c o n s ists syllogism
is ts o f t h r e e(I)s edoes
n te n c not
e s : tform
h e f iar s single
t tw o sentence,
s e n te n c e s
ar e n o t co n n ect ed b y t h e wo r d “an d ” i n t o a si n g l e wh o l e,
an d t h e ex p r essi o n “t h er ef o r e” d o es n o t , as d o es t h e
expression
expressi on “if ... ... th e n ” , com c om bine
bine t w o sentences
sentences into
a com plex
pl ex sentence.
sentence. W h at is is tht h e diff
dif f erence
ere nce betw een th th e
expressi
expres sions
ons “ therefo re” a nd “if .. .. . tth
h en ” ? T he express
expressiion
“t h er ef o r e” i s u sed wh en we d r aw co n cl u si o n s. I n t h e
exam ple of syll syll ogism
ogism I , as given above , from from the sentences
sentences
“ A l l m e n a r e m o r t a l” l ” a n d “ A l l P o le le s a r e m e n ” w e
d ed u ce t h e sen ten ten ce “ A ll Po les les ar e m o r t al” al ” . T h e i n 
ference is considered correct only if the sentences from
which we start—the premises—are considered correct.
 THEOREMS AW'D RULES OF INFERENCE 11

I f i n sy l l o g i sm I we su b st i t u t e “m an ” f o r M , “ p l a n t ”
f o r P , an d “ Po l e” fo
f o r S , we o b tain th e foll
follow ing syl
sylllogism
ogism :

Al l m en ar e p l an t s.
All Poles are men.

T herefore all Po les are p lan ts.

Ho one, however, would consider that syllogism to be

correct. T he sense sense of inc inc orrectness of th a t syll syllogism
ogism
resu lt
ltss fr
from
om th e falsehood
falsehood of the first prem i se. B u t i f
the syl
sy llogism
ogism is form ulated
ulat ed in th e f orm I w it ith
h th e variables
vari ables
S , M , P , t h i s can n q t m ean t h a t o n e co
c o n si
sid ers
ers th
t h e p r em
em ises
ses
wi t h t h e v ar i ab l es t o b e t r u e: n o o n e wi l l say t h at t h e
exp ression
ression “ All All M iiss P ” is true . T h at express
expr essiion is is neither
true nor false before definite terms are substituted for
t h e v ar i ab l es M a n d P . I f w e w a n t t o i m p a r t se se n se
se toto
sylllogism
sy ogism I, form ulated ulat ed w it ith
h variables,
vari ables, we m us t tre a t
it as a scheme of inference which expresses the following
rule: whoever acce a ccept sentences of the typ e “AM M is P ”
ptss sentences
a n d “A M 8 i s Af Af”” , he is also entitled to accept a sentence
o f t h e t y p e “ A M S i s P ” . I n t h i s ru ru l e w e r e f e r n o t to t h e
acceptance of the sentence “All M iiss P ” , b u t t o t h e
acceptance of a sentence o f t h e t y p e o f “All M iiss P ” .
A n d b y sent sen t en ces o f t h e t y p es o f “ A ll M is is P ” w e u n d e r -
st an d t h o se sen t en ces wh i ch ar e o b t ai n ed f r o m t h e ex -
p r e s s io n “ A ll M i s P ” b y t h e su b sti st i t u t io
i o n f o r t h e v ar iab
iab les
l es
of some
some d efinite
efinit e term
term s.
The difficulties discussed above and pertaining to the
trad ition
ition al syll
syllogism,
ogism, do n o t app ear in th e case of A ri ris-
s-
to tle ’s syll
syllogism
ogism . A ristotle’s
ristotle’s syllogis
syllogism m formform s, as h as been
said,
sai d, a single
si ngle sentence
sent ence w hich is tru e for all th e su b stituti stitutioons
of de finitfinitee term s for th th e va riab
riab l es, regardless
regardless of w hether
after such substitutions the premises become true or false
clauses. For the same substitutions for which syllogism I
was not true, syllogism II is true: i f al l men ar e pl ant s
and all Poles are men, then all Poles are plants.
12 I. INTRODUCTION

Our way of understanding syllogism I enables us

b e t t e r t o e x p la in t h e d iff
if f e re n c e b e tw e e n a lo g ic a l th e o re m
and a rule of inference. In the formulation of a rule of
inference we encounter expressions which have no logical
sense; these are the expressions “whoever accepts”, “is
entitled”. These expressions pertain to the mode of pro-
cedure of the person who makes an inference. In syllo-
gism
gi sm I I , w hich
hich is
is a logical theo rem , no such expressi expressions
ons
occur.
If our way of interpreting the traditional syllogism
i s co r r ect t h en we h av e t o st at e t h at i t s f o r m u l at i o n
g iv
iv en u n d er I is v e r y o b scu re
re an d d o es
es n o t co n v ey t o t h e
reader its actual content. Traditional logic completely
ignored the difference between a logical theorem and

a rule of i nference.
nfer ence. F o r us, th a t d iff
fference
erence is of an essential
essenti al
n at u r e, an d i n t h e f u t u r e we sh al l em p h asi ze i t m o st
strictly in our considerations.
5. A fter
ft er A ristotl
ristotle,
e, logic
ogic in a n ti tiq
q u it
ityy w as devel-
oped in the school school of o f th e S toics 8. Its found er in th e
3rd century B.C. was Zeno of Edition (Citium), and its
most outstanding representative was Chrysippus. The
writings of the Stoics have not been preserved until our
t im es, a nd only fragfr ag m en ts of Stoi
Stoicc logi
logicc ha ve reac hed us.
Th e Stoics
Stoics also
also fo
fo rm u lated
lat ed ce rtain syll
syllogisms,
ogisms, an exam plepl e
of which is the following formula:
I f p j then g.
Ill Kow p.
Therefore g.
Like the traditional syllogism, the syllogism formulated
above is a scheme of inference. In all probability it was
p r e c ise
is e ly u n d e r t h e in flu
fl u e n c e o f t h e S to ic s y llo
ll o g is
ismm th a t
trad itio
itio n a l logic use d to form ulate A risto risto tle’
tle’ss sylsylllogisms
ogisms
as schemes of inference and forgot about the original
Aristotelian form of the syllogism. The rule of inference,
the scheme of which is the Stoic syllogism as given above,
 T H E O R EM
EM S A N D R U L E S O F I N F E R E N C E 13

w ould
ould be: w hoever r ecogni
ecog nizes
zes sentences
sentences of th t h e ty p e “I f p ,
t h e n 3 ” and “p ” , is en ti
titl
tled
ed also
also to
t o r ecognize
ecognize the sentence
sentence
of the typ e “ g ” . Th i s rulerule is
i s w ha t is call
cal l ed the rule of
det achment (or: m o d u s p o n e n s — T r .) , o n e o f t h e s im p le s t
rules
rul es of i nference, to b e m et in e ve ry logical logical system
system .
The following scheme is an example of the application
of that rule:

I f t o d ay i s Fr i d ay , t h en t o m o r r o w i s Sat u r d ay .
N o w t o d a y is F r i d a y .
Then tomorrow is Saturday.
I t is possi
possibl
blee to
t o form ulate a logical
ogi cal t heorem w hichhich
w ould
ould be in a sim i l ar rela tio
tio n to the said rule
r ule as A ri
ristotl
stotle’
e’ss
syllogism is to traditional syllogism. The theorem in

question is:
IV I f (if p , t h e n q) a n d p , t h e n q.
This theorem is a conditional sentence, as is syllogism II.
I t s an t eced en t o b v i o u sl y i s “( i f p , t h en q) a n d p ” , i t s
consequent, q. T h e an t eced en t i s a co m b i n at i o n i n t o o n e
sentence, by means of the word “and”, of two sentences,
the first of which is in turn a conditional sentence.
W ha t is i s the diffdiffer
erence
ence b etwetw een syl sy llogism
ogism I I and
syllogism IV? In both cases variables do occur in the
syllogisms: M } P , 8 i n t h e f o r m e r , a n d p , q i n t h e l a t t e r .
The essential difference as between these variables per-
tains to the values which th t h ey can assume.
as sume. In A ri ristotl
stotle’
e’ss
syllogism only t er ms can be values of th e variables; variabl es;
m oreover,
oreover , this pe rtainrt ain s only to gen eral nam es, i . e., such
as m ay ser v e as p r ed i cat es t o m o r e t h an o n e o b j ect . T h ey
m a y b e s u c h te te rm
rm s a s “ a P o l e ” , “ a p l a n t ” , b u t n o t
individua l term ter m s such as “A ristot
ristotle
le of
o f S tagira” , or em pty
term
ter m s, i.
i. e., which
whic h can no t sserve
erve as predicates
predicat es to an y object,
e.g.,, “ chim era” , “ a squa re circl
e.g. circle”
e” , etc.
et c. O n th
th e other han d,
t h e v al u es o f t h e v ar i ab l es i n sy l l o g i sm I V m ay n o t b e
t er m s. Sh o u l d we su b st i t u t e f o r t h e v ar i ab l es p an d q
14 I. INTOODUCTIOK

s o m e t er m s, e.g
e.g .,
. , “ a m an ” an d “ a p l an t ”, r esp
e sp ecti
ecti v ely
el y ,
we would obtain:
If (if a man, then a plant) and a man, then a plant.
This exp ressi
re ssion
on w onld be n either tru e n o r fal false;
se; m oreover
or eover,,
it w ould
ould no t be a sentencesent ence a t a l l ; it w onld
onld be a m eani
ean ingles
nglesss
expression. Only sentences m a y b e t h e v a l u e s o f t h e
va riab
riab l es in syl
s ylllogism
ogism IY . As in in scheme
scheme I I I , in syll
syllogism
ogism IV
w e m a y s u b s t i t u t e f o r p t h e sen t en ce “t o d ay i s Fr i d ay ”,
an d f o r q t h e sen t en ce “t o m o r r o w i s Sat u r d ay ”, an d we
obtain the following true sentence:
If (if today is Friday, then tomorrow is Saturday)
an d t o d ay i s Fr i d ay , t h en t o m o r r o w i s Sat u r d ay .
Terms and sentences are quite different categories of
expressions,
expressi ons, so th a t in in those cases
cases where we use a term term
m eaningful
eani ngfullly, we m ay n o t use a sentence sentence m eaningful
eaningfullly,
and w here
her e we use a sentencesentence m eaningful
eani ngfullly, we m ay n o t
use a term m eaningfully.
eaningfully. T hus, A ri ristotl
stotle’
e’ss the o ry is con-
cerned w ith ith express
expr essiions in w hichhich term va ri riab
ab l es occur,
occur,
and the logical theory originated by the Stoics is con-
cerned with expressions in which only sentential varia-
b le s o c c u r.
In the light of the difference now under discussion
the logic of the Stoics and the logic of Aristotle are two
different logical theories: the former is a logic of sentences,
and the latter is a logic of terms . This difference is stressed
here because philosophical logic absolutely does not
realize this fact: Stoic syllogisms are usually presented
there as a sort of complement of Aristotle’s syllogisms.
In th e syllsyll ogisti
ogistic of the StoiSt oics
cs no term s occu r a t all, all,
w hereas in in A ristotle’s
ristotle’s syll
syllogist
ogistiic we hav e to do w ith ith
sentences, although sentential variables do not appear
there . W e shall see see la te r th a t th
th e syll
syll ogisti
ogistic of th e Stoics
Stoics
l ogicall
ogicall y precedes
precedes th a t of A ristotl
ristotle:
e: in jus tifyin
tifyin g theorem
theor em s
of th e logi
l ogicc of term s we m us t base oursel
ourselves
ves on theorem s
from the logic of sentences.
 THEOREMS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 15

The logic of sentences, which is not taken into account

in the textbooks of philosophical logic, is a much more
i m p o r t a n t th
t h e o r y th
t h a n t h e t h e o r y o f t h e A r is is to
t o t e li
li a n
sylllo g is
sy is m . I n m at h em at icalical reaso
r easo n inin g t h e t h e o r y o f t h e
Aristotelian syllogism has practically no applications,
whereas there is probably no intricate mathematical
p r o o f w h ic h d o e s n o t r e f e r t o th e o r e m s f r o m t h e lo g ic
of sentences.
T he logilogicc of sent
s entences
ences w as for f or th e first tim
tim e form ulated
as a system in Frege’s B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t ; the authors of
P r i n c i p i a M a t h e m a t i c a cal l ed i t t h e t h eo ry o f d ed u ct i o n ,
w h ic
ic h i s n o t a f o r t u n a t e ttee r m , s in
in ce
c e o ne
n e m i g h t th
th i n k t h a t
it is a theory of deducing in general.
I n t h e l ig ig h t o f i n v esti
est i g at io
io n s b y m at h em at icalical lo g ic,
ic,

A ristotl
ri stotle’e’ss syll
syll og istic
stic is a sm all fragm en t of a m ore general
theory founded by Professor S. Le^niewski and called by
h i m o n t o l o g y 7. T he theo rem s of on tolog tolog y w hich are
ap p lil i cab le
l e t o m athat h em at ics
ics ar e m ain
ai n ly
l y th
t h eo r em s n o t i n -
cluded in A ristotle’ ristotle’ss syllogist
syllogistiic.
6 . To illustrate the issues raised here I shall give the
p r o o f o f a m a t h e m a t i c a l th e o r e m a s a n e x a m p le . I n t h a t
p r o o f I s h a ll a v a il m y s e lf o f o n e a r i t h m e t i c a l th e o r e m ,
an d of logical t heo rem s I shall use only onl y tw o, bo th belongingbelonging
to the sentential calculus; I shall make no reference to
th e the o ry of th e A ristoteli ri stotelian
an syll
syllogism.
ogism. In this exam pl plee
I shall use certain rules of inference, which will give us
an opportunity to become directly acquainted with the
difference between a theorem and a rule of inference, as
emphasized above. The example to be given now will be
a m o d el of o f a co m p let
l etee m at h em at ical
ical p r o o f , sats atii sfy
sf y i n g t h e
cond i t i ons of precisipreci sionon form ulated b y F rege.
I sha l l m ake use of t w o rules rules of i nference:
nfer ence: the rule rul e
o f d e t ach m en t an d t h e r u l e o f su b sti st i tu
tu t io
i o n . T h e ru ru l e o f
d e t ach m en t was f o r m u l ated at ed ab o v e i n co n n ecti ecti o n w i t h
Stoic syllogism III. Let the symbol G b e u sed so t h at
the expression C p q i s an ab b r ev i at i o n o f t h e co n d i t i o n al
16 I. INTRODUCTION

s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e a n t e c e d e n t p a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t q.
T h e r u l e o f d e t ach m en t en t it it les
les n s t o accep t a sen ten ten ce
o f t h e t y p e q on the strength of acceptance of sentences
o f t h e t y p es C p q a n d p .
The role of substitution more or less corresponds to
the principle which in traditional logic was called d i ct u m
de omni { {aa st atem
at em en t ab o u t ev er y th t h i n g ).
) . I n L at in
i n i t g oe
oe s :
q u i d q u i d d e o m n i b u s v a l e t , va l et et i a m d e q u i b u sd a m et d e
s i n g u l i s , w h ic ic h in
i n a n i n f o rmr m a l t r a n s l a ti
ti o n m ig h t b e p u t a s :
wh a t h o l d s o f a l l t h i n g s o f a cert a i n h i n d , also holds of some
a n d o f s in n g s o f t h a t h i n d . W h a t is
i n g l e t h iin is va li lid
d , e .g.,
.g., of all
all
m en, i s also als o v alid of A risto risto tltlee of Stag ir ira.
a. T he ru r u le of
su b st i t u t i o n p er m i t s u s, o n t h e st r en g t h o f a g en er al l y
r eco g n i zed t h eo r em wi t h v ar i ab l es, t o accep t as t r u e
a sen tenten ce o b t ai n ed f r o m th t h i s t h eo r em b y r ep laci
l acinng
va riab
riab l es w itith
h some o the r expressions,
expressions, b u t th t h e expressi
expres sionsons
r ep laci
lacinn g t h e v ar iab
i ab l es m u st b e o f t h e sam e categcat eg o r y as
the variables concerned: sentences are to be substituted for
sentential variables , a n d t e r m s f o r t e r m v a r i a b l e s .
In philosophical logic the principle d i c t u m d e o m n i was
considered the main principle of deductive inference.
This led to the conclusion that deduction always starts
from general sentences and leads to certain less general

sentences.
sent
in ences.
de du ctive T oda
ctive y we know
i nference we from
fr
haomve m toathem
use atica
ati ca l logic
o ther ogi
rulcesth
rules t h aast
w ell
ell as th e rule of s u b stitu stitu ti
tioo n , e.g.,
e. g., th e rule of de-
tach m en t. If these rules rules a re com bined, bined, thethe n, as we shallshall
soon see, we may obtain quite new results, not contained
i n th
t h e p r em
e m i ses.
se s. C o n t rar
r ar y to
t o w h a t i s o f t en t h o u g h t , d e-
duction is not just explanation or realization of those
laws w hich hich w e previou
previou slysly kn ew in some some im plicitplicit w ay.
D edu ctive
ctive inference
inference is a ve ry pow erful erful m ethod of reason-
ing and leads to new discoveries. All mathematics resorts
to that method of inference, and it is well known how
i m p o r tan
t an t m ath
at h em ati
at i cs is
i s fo
f o r t ech n o lo
lo g y an d t h e n at u r al
sciences.
 T H EO
EO R E M S A N D R U L E S O F I N F E R E N C E 17

One of th e theorem s of th e se n ten tial tial calculus,

calculus, to to w hich
hich
we shall refer, is the law of the hypothetical syUogism.
I f t h e s y m b o l C , i n t r o d u ced ab o v e, st an d s f o r an i m p l i -
catii o n , t h e l aw can b e w r it
cat i t ten
ten i n t h e f o ll
llo win
wi n g f o rm
rm :

1 G G p q G G q r G p r.
T h i s l aw i s a co n d i t i o n al sen t en ce t h e an t eced en t an d
the consequent of which are marked by braces below;
t h e an t eced en t an d t h e co n seq u en t o f t h e co n seq u en t
are m arked by braces abov e. Theorem 1 is is usually
usually appliedapplied
when we have two recognized sentences of the type C p q
a n d Ggr. W e f i rst r st m ak e ap p r o p r iat
i at e su b sti
st i t u t io
i o n s in
i n T h eo -
r em 1 . Nex t , o n t h e st r en g t h o f t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t —
in view of the recognition of the antecedent of Theorem 1,
n am el y a sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e C p q — —w w e o b t a i n a s e n te n c e
o f t h e t y p e C C q r G p r ; he re ag ain, in i n view of th t h e recog nition
nition
of its antecedent, namely a sentence of the type G qr , we
o b t a i n b y d e t a c h m e n t a s e n t e n c e o f t h e t y p e Gpr.
Before symbolizing the second logical premise we shall
i n t r o d u ce an ab b r ev i at i o n o f t h e sen t en ce “i t i s n o t t r u e
t h a t p ” j which will be symbolized N p . The premise will
b e w r itte n as
2 C G N ppp.

W e ha ve symbolized,
symbolized, w it ith
h recourse
recour se toto abb reviati
reviati on s
already adopted, the following sentence: “If (if it is not
t r u e t h a t p , t h e n p ) , t h e n p " . Theorem 2 is a conditional
sentence th th e an tece de nt of w hich hich aga in is
is also
also a c ond i t i on al
sentence with an antecedent which is the negation of the
consequent. To understand the sense of Theorem 2 let
us note that it enables us to start from a sentence of the
t y p e G N p p and to obtain in conclusion, on the strength
of the rules of substitution and detachment, a sentence
o f t h e t y p e p . I n f act , a sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e p m u s t
here be true ; should shoul d it no t be true , the n its its nega ti on,
1 8 I . IN
IN T R O D U C T IO N

i.e.j a sentence of the type N p , w o u ld ld b e tr

t r u e. Y et f r o m
t h at sen t en ce an d f r o m a r eco g n i zed sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e
C N p p we wo u l d o b t ai n , o n t h e st r en g t h o f t h e r u l e o f
d e t a c h m e n t , a s e n t e n c e o f t h e t y p e p ; in this way we
would have to recognize two contradictory sentences,
of the types N p a n d p , respectively. Since two con
t rad
r ad i cto
ct o r y sen ten
ten ces
ce s can n o t b o t h b e tr tr u e , th
t h e n o u r assu
assu m p 
t i o n ab o u t t h e t r u t h o f t h e sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e N p m u s t
b e f a ls e ; a n d h e n c e t h e s e n te n c e o f t h e t y p e p is true.
A p art fr f r om these tw t w o premises
premis es from from the dom ain ain of
the sentential calculus we shall refer in the proof to the
foll
ollowing
owin g theotheo rem from the arithm arithm etic
eti c of n a tura l num bers:bers :
i f t h e p r o d u c t o f t w o n a t u r a l n u m b e r s , a - b, is divisible by
th e p r i m e n u m b e r n , a n d i f th e n a t u r a l n
nuum ber a is not

d i v is
is ib
i b l e b y tth
h e p r i m e n u m b e r n , t h e n tth
he natural num ber b
i s d i v i s i b l e b y t h e p r i m e n u m b e r n . It follows from this
theorem that if the product of two natural numbers is
d i v i si b l e b y t h e p r i m e n u m b er n , then the elements of
that product cannot both be not divisible by n . For the
p u r p o s e o f t h e s y m b o licli c n o t a t i o n o f t h i s th e o r e m w e
shall introduce, apart from logical abbreviations, the
f oll
ollowing arith arit h m etical ab brev i ationation : sentences
sent ences of th e typ e
**a iiss divisi
divisibl blee b y th e prim
prim e n um ber w” w” w il l be w ritten
ritten as
“ ( a s P n ) ” 8, an d th e sen t enc e “ a is not divisible by the
p r im e n u m b e r n ” , b ei n g eq u i v al en t t o t h e sen t en ce “i t
i s n o t t r u e t h a t a is divisible by the prime number w”,
willl be w ritten
wil rit ten as “ N ( a e P n ) ” . C o n seq u en t l y t h e t h eo r em
o f t h e ar it i t h m et ic
ic o f n a t u r a l n u m b ers
er s ref
r ef err
er r ed to
t o ab o ve
ve
will have the following form:

3 C (a - b e P n ) G N (a s P n ) (b e P n ) .

The variables a a n d b which occur in this theorem can

t ak e as t h ei r v al u es o n l y n am es o f n at u r al n u m b er s.
N o w , a d o p t in g a s p re m ise
is e s o n ly t h e t h r e e th e o r e m s
given
gi ven abov e (tw (tw o logical
logical an d one arithm arithm etical),
etical) , an d a p
 THEOREMS AND BURES OB INFERENCE 19

p ly in g o n ly tw o r u le s o f in f e r e n c e : t h e r u l e o f s u b s t i t u t i o n
an d t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t , we sh s h al l p r o v e t h e fo
f o ll
llo wi n g
theorem:
G ( a • a eP n ) ( a e P n ) .

if the square of a number a is

Tihvi
d vii ss ib
i btlle
he e ob rye m
a psrtiamt ees ntuhma b
t er, then th hee n u m b e r a i ts
ts e l f a
all s o
i s d i v is i b llee b y t h a t p r i m e n u m b e r . E.g., 36 is divisible by 3,
i s ib
a n d t h e r e f o re
r e 6 , t oo , is
i s divisible
divisible b y 3. The theo rem w hich hi ch
we ar e t o p r o v e is is a m o d er n ized ized fo fo r m o f E u c l i d ’s ’s t h eo r em
g i v en i n h i s E l e m e n t s a s T h e o re re m 1 2 i n B o o k I X . T h e
p r o o f w h ic h w ill il l b e g iv e n h e r e r e p e a t s t h e b a s i c i d e a o f
E u cl i d ’ s p r o o f an d i s u su al l y r ef er r ed t o as an ex am p l e
of a p roof which, am ong o the r thing thing s, refers
ref ers to Th eorem 2.
T h a t th th e o r e m i s tht h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e m o n o g r ap a p h [3[ 3 3]
3]
w r it
i t te
te n b y t h e I t a l i a n l o g ic i c ia
i a n V a il
i l a ti
t i , w h o li
li v e d i n t h e
seco n d h al f o f t h e 1 9 t h cen t u r y .
STow comes the proof. To Theorem 3 we apply the rule
of substitution: for all the occurrences of the numerical
v ar i ab l e b i n t h e t h e o r e m w e s u b s t i t u t e t h e n u m e r i c a l
v ar i ab l e a a n d t h u s o b t a i n th t h e a c c e p tat a n c e o f t h e r e su
s u l ti
ti n g
sentence 4. This step will be symbolized thus:
3 b j a * 4,

4 G (a *a e P n ) G N ( a e P n)
n ) (a e P n ) .
Xex t we ap p l y t o T h eo r em 1 t h e r u l e o f su b st i t u t i o n .
We perform a substitution such that the antecedent of
t h e s e n te
t e n c e t o b e o b t a in
i n e d w il
i ll h a v e t h e s a m e f o r m a s
sentence 4.
1 p j ( a *a e P n ) , q / G N (a e P n ) (a e P n ) , r j ( a e P n ) * 5,
5 GG (a • a eP n ) G N (a e P n ) ( a e P n )

G G G N ( a e P n ) a e P n ( a e P n ) C (a a e P n ) a e P n ) .
( ) * (
The accepted sentence 5 is a conditional sentence the
an t eced en t o f wh i ch i s eq u i f o r m wi t h t h e accep t ed
20 I. INTRODUCTION

sentence 4; hence the consequent of sentence 5 can, on

t h e st ren
r en g t h o f t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t , h e reco
reco g ni
n i zed as
as
sentence 6 :
5 * 04 — 6 ,

6 0 0—Oj V( a e. P n ) (a e -------
-
P n ){a e P n ) 0 (a • a e P u ) ( a e P n ) .
---- - ----------- ------ ------ - ----- ------ ------ -----■ — -- ------- - ----------- ------ ------ - ----- ------ ------ *

T o T h eo rem
r em 2 we ap p ly l y t h e su b s t i tu
tu t io
i o n i n su ch
ch a way
t h a t we o b t ai n a sen ten
ten ce eq u if
if o rm
r m w i t h t h e an t eced en t
of sentence 6 :

2 p j(a e P n ) * 7 ,

7 0 G N (a e P n ) ( a e P n ) ( a e P n ) .

The rule of de t ac hm en t can now be ap plied

plied to sentences
sentences
6 and 7:
6 * 07 — 8 ,

8 0 (a
(a • a e P n ) ( a e P n ) .

Sen t en ce 8 i s t h e t h e o r e m t h a t w a s t o b e p r o v e d .
T he proof of of Theorem 8 as given given abo ve i s an exam ple of
a com plete
plete proof.
proof . In th a t proof,
proof, th t h e recog
r ecog niti
niti on of every
sen t en ce i s j u st i f i ed b y a cer t ai n r u l e wh i ch was ad o p t ed

iant e da d
; vt ahne c seu. bEs ta
tvaenr tyi a tsio
itoenp i si nto
t ot hbee pf or o
uon fd icna nt h baet li
lsi nueb sot fa nt ht ie-
p r o o f w h ic h p r e c e d e s e v e r y s e n te n c e re c o g n iz e d i n t h e
p ro o f.
T h e p r o o f g i v en ab o v e m i g h t b e car r i ed o u t wi t h o u t
the use of symbols, but then it would seem more com-
p l i c a t e d a n d les le s s c le a r . T h e s y m b o ls w e h a v e a d o p t e d
ar e sh o r t er t h an t h e co r r esp o n d i n g wo r d s i n ev er y d ay
language and enable us to see at a glance how a given
theorem is co nstruc nstr uc t ed . M oreov oreover er,, sym bolibolic no tatio tatio n m akes
easier a complete formalization of the proof. The proof
m i gh t b e checked q uite uit e m echanical
echani calll y. A person w ho did
n o t k n o w t h e m ean in i n g o f t h e sym sy m b o ls ls we h av e u sed wo u ld ld
 THEOREMS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 21

b e i n a p o s itio
it io n to c h e c k t h e c o r r e c tn e s s o f t h e p r o o f
if he only knew the rules of inference.
The proof given above is a model of scientific precision.
W h o ev er
e r h as u n d er sto
st o o d i n w h at t h e p r eci ec i sio
sio n of
o f su ch
ch
a formalized proof consists will use different standards
w hen m easu ring ring th e ^pr ^ preecis
cis ion of
of th e proofs he fi finds
nds in
o ther discidiscipli
plines:
nes: m athem atics, atics, physics,
physics , th e n a tu ra l sci- sci-
ences. Not every discipline can today reach such a level
of scienti
scientifi ficc precisi
preci sion
on as h as been achieved
achieved b y m athem atical atical
l o g i c. B u t i t i s a g o o d t h i n g t o h av e a h i g h st an d ar d o f
scientific precision, for we can then properly evaluate the
p re c isio
is io n o f o t h e r p r o o f s a n d s t r i v e t o in c r e a s e i t . T h is
is one of th e g rea test achievem achi evem ents of m athem atica ati ca l logic:
ogic:
it has created a new standard of scientific -precision , so f a r

u n e q u a l e d i n g e n e r a l b y m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d a fo rt iori by other
rtiori
d i sci p l i n es.
 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

3. The Primitive Terms and the Axioms of the Sentential Calculus

7. The sentential calculus is an axiomatic deductive

system. The deductive method, also called the geometrical
method an d k n o w n as ear ly l y as an t iq i q u i ty
t y , u sed t o b e
interpreted in various ways. Blaise Pascal, the eminent
17th-century mathematician and philosopher, in his essay
D e V e s p r i t g e o m e i r ig u e f o r m u l a t e d t h e v i e w t h a t t h e i d e a l

geometrical method consists in defining everything and

substantiating everything. This, however, is unachievable,
as Pascal knew. In order to define an expression we must
make use of other expressions. Since we cannot proceed
t o i n f i n i t y , we m u st ad o p t cer t ai n wo r d s wi t h o u t d e
finition. Thus in every deductive theory there are certain
undefined words which are called the p r i m i t i v e t e r m s o f
t h at t h eo r y . T h e m ean i n g o f a p r i m i t i v e t er m can o n l y
b e e x p la in e d b y e x a m p le s .

It is theory,
a given also notfor possible
the proofto prove
of any allsentence
the sentencesis based of
on the truth of other sentences. Consequently, at the
ou tset of every de duc ti tive
ve the ory w e m ust reco r ecogni
gnize ze w it
itho
ho ut
p r o o f c e r t a i n s e n te n c e s w h ic h a r e c a lle
ll e d t h e a x i o m s o f t h at
theory. In philosophy the term axioms often means sen
tences which, besides being adopted without proof are
directly self-evident. This was Aristotle’s interpretation
of the term “axiom”. On the other hand, the Stoics called
all sentences axioms. In our interpretation, axioms are
sentences which are recognized without proof, but need
not be self-evident. Yet it serves the purpose well so to
ch o o se t h e ax i o m s o f a t h eo r y t h at t h ei r t r u t h i s cl ear
 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND AXIOMS 23

wi t h o u t p r o o f . Mo r eo v er , wh at i s an ax i o m i n o n e d e
ductive system, that is a sentence which in that system
i s accep t ed wi t h o u t p r o o f , m ay i n an o t h er sy st em o ccu r
as a theorem and he provable in that system.
The system of the sentential calculus which is to be
ex p o u n d ed b el o w co n t ai n s t wo k i n d s o f p r i m i t i v e t er m s:
symbols of negation IF and symbols of the conditional
sentence
sent ence O. In th e sen tential calcul calculus,
us, sm all letters of th e
Latin alphabet will be used as sentential variables, i.e.,
variables which can take any sentences as their values.
Capital letters, such as IF a n d C , w i l l b e t a k e n t o b e c o n 
stants, i.e., symbols for which no other expression may
bee s u b s t i t u t e d .
b
T h e ex p r essi o n o f t h e t y p e IF p i s t h e n eg at i o n o f t h e

sentence p . I n E n g l i s h , t h e w o r d n o t , which corresponds

t o t h e s y m b o l IFIF,, i s u su al l y n o t p l aced b ef o r e t h e n eg at ed
sen
se n ten
t en ce. T h e n eg at io i o n o f t h e sen ten ten ce “ t o d ay is i s T h u r sd a y ”
is the sentence “today is not Thursday”. If we want to
p la c e t h e n e g a tin g e x p re s s io n b e fo re t h e s e n te n c e i n
q u e s ti
t i o n w e m u s t u s e t h e m o r e c o m p l ic i c a te
te d p h r a s e “ i t
is n o t t r u e t h a t ” ; i f we d o so so t h e n t h e n eg at i o n of of t h e
sen ten
ten ce u n d er d i scu
s cu ssi
s sio
o n wi
will l b e “ i t i s n o t t r u e t h a t t o d ay
is Thursday”. In that respect-the Greek language is more
co n v en i en t , f o r t h er e t h e n eg at i n g wo r d m ay b e p l aced
bee f o r e t h e w h o le s e n t e n c e ; s u c h a l s o is t h e p o s i t i o n o f
b
negation in Stoic logic.
The expression IIF F p , like every expression containing
variables, is called a fu f u n c t i o n . The function in question
co n si st s o f t wo p ar t s: t h e f u n ct o r IF a n d t h e a r g u m e n t p .
An expression consisting of the functor IF an d o f o n e
argument which is a sentence and stands to the right of
t h e f u n ct o r , i s a sen t en ce. T h at i s wh y we say t h at t h e
fu
f u n c t o r IF i s a s e n te n c e - fo r m in g fu n c t o r o f o n e s e n te n tia l
argument.
The expressions p a n d IF p ar e t wo co n t r ad i ct o r y
sen t en ces. T wo co n t r ad i ct o r y sen t en ces can n o t b o t h b e
3*
24 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

t r u e: i f t h e sen t en ce p i s t r u e, t h en t h e sen t en ce N p m u s t
b e f a ls e , a n d i f t h e s e n te n c e p is false, then the sentence
N p is true. Usually we symbolize a false sentence as “ 0 ” ,
a n d a t r u e s e n te
te n c e a s “ 1 ” . W e m ay th t h er ef o r e w r it
it e d o wn
i n sy m b o l i c n o t at i o n t h e f o l l o wi n g eq u at i o n s: N O — 1 ,
N X = 0 , w h ic ic h a r e t o b e r e a d : the negation of a fals e s en
tence is a true sentence , the negation of a true sentence is
a fcilse sentence.
T h e f u n c t i o n C p g iiss a c o n d i t io
io n a l ssee n ttee n ccee ( i m p l i c a t io
io n )
w i t h t h e a n t e c e d e n t p an d t h e co n seq u en t g ; i t i s r ead
“if p , th e n <?” . T he fu n c to r G iiss w r it i t ten
ten b ef o r e t h e an t e
cedent p a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t q of the i m plicati plication on . In
E n g l i sh , t h e f u n ct o r G h as i t s co u n t er p ar t i n t wo wo r d s,
“if” and “then”. In that respect, too, both Greek and
L at i n co m e cl o ser t o t h e n o t at i o n we h av e ad o p t ed , f o r
in those languages the symbol of the conditional sentence
co n si st s o f o n e wo r d an d st an d s at t h e b eg i n n i n g o f t h e
conditional sentence.
In ou r logic
logicalal sym
sym boli
bol ism we shall alw alw ays w ri rite
te fun
fun ctors
at t h e b eg i n n i n g o f t h e f u n ct i o n s i n q u est i o n . I n t h i s
w ay we av o id i d t h e n eed t o w r itit e t h e p ar en th
t h eses. A sim si m i l ar
n o t ati
at i o n co u ldl d j u s t as w ell
ell b e u sed i n ar it i t h m et ic.
ic. S h o u ldld
w e w r it it e d o w n tht h e s um
u m o f t w o n u m b e rs
rs “ a - b 6” a s “ + 0 6 ” ,

t h e n we co u ld
l d w r it
i t e th
t h e l aw o f asso c i at iv
iv i ty
ty
« +(+ (& + < ? ) = { a + b ) + c

i n t h e p ar en t h esi s- f r ee n o t at i o n as

- \ - a - { - b c = -t--{-a&c

I n r e ad
a d in
i n g t h e l a s t li
li n e w e m u s t b e a r in
in m i n d t h a t e v e ry
ry
symbol f o rm
r m s a s u m t o g e th
t h e r w i t h t w o n u m e ri
ric a l
ex p r essi o n s t h at st an d t o t h e r i g h t o f i t . T h ese n u m er i cal
expressi
expres sions
ons m ay in tu rn be eithe eithe r va ri riables
ables or sums. W e
should read the conditional sentences, such as those given
i n 6 , Section 1.2, in the same way.
 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND AXIOMS 25

The symbol 0 is a functor of two arguments; it forms

an i m p l i cat i o n — h en ce a sen t en ce— o f t wo ar g u m en t s t h at
are sentences; t h e symb o l G i s t h u s a sen t en ce- f o rmi n g
ffu
u n c to r o f tw o s e n t e n t ia l a r g u m e n ts .
The imp lication
lication C p q iiss often identif
identified
ied w itithh th e sentence
sent ence
“if V i s t h en q is”, which, however, is an incorrect inter
p r e t a t i o n . T h e s e n t e n c e q u o t e d a b o v e is m e a n i n g f u l o n l y
i f the variables are tre a ted as term t erm variables, e.g. e.g.,, “ i f
P e t e r i s , t h e n P a u l i s ” . B u t i n t h e i m p l i c a t i o n C pq t h e r e
are only sentential variables. It is also erroneous to iden
t i f y t h e i m p l i cat i o n C p q with the sense of the sentence
“if *p’ is true, then tq > i s t r u e”, f o r t h e l ast - n am ed sen 
t en ce m ean s “i f t h e sen ten t en ce ip'>i s t r u e, t h e n t h e sent
sen t en ce
iqJJ i s t r u e”. Her e t h e v ar i ab l es ar e i n q u o t at i o n m ar k s,
iq

for we have to do with the names of those variables.

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , in
i n t h e s e nt
n t e n c e C p q i t is
i s n o t th
th e n a m e s
of variables which occur, but the variables themselves.
T h e t h i r d er r o n eo u s i n t er p r et at i o n o f t h e m ean i n g o f t h e
sentence C pq is its identification with the meaning of the
sentence “ is a consequence of ‘p ’ this m eans th a t
“ the sentence ‘g’ can be inferred from th e sentence ‘p ‘p ’ ” ,
so t h at h er e ag ai n we h av e t o d o wi t h n am es o f v ar i ab l es
and also with the possibility of inferring something, which

i s nIont oirndheer
r en
t o tb eec
to in
c o tmh ee bm
e ean
te ri n
t te a cgq u
o af i n
t hte
t eed sen tthent ce
w i th Cpq.
he m e a n in
in g
of the sentence C p q let us discuss the cases in which that
sentence is true or false. Retaining the symbols “0” and
“1” as standing, respectively, for false and true sentences,
we have to analyze, according to the falsehood or truth
of the arguments of the implication, the following four
cases:
<700, <701, <710, <711.

F irs t of all,
all, le t us no te th a t <710 = 0 , th a t is, th a t a n
i mp l i ca t i o n wi t h a t ru e a n t eced en t a n d a f a l se co n seq u en t
i s f a l se. For should, e.g., the implication “If Warsaw lies
26 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

o n V i s tut u l a th
t h e n 2 - 2 = 5 ” b e t r u e , t h e n b y r e co c o g ni
n iz in
in g
t h e t r u e sen ten ten ce “W ar saw s aw li l ies o n V i st stu
u l a” we co c o u ld
ld
p r o v e , o n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e r u l e o f d e ta c h m e n t, t h e f a lse
ls e
s e nt
n t e nc
nc e “ 2 - 2 = 6” .
In orde r to to didiscus
scusss tht h e rem aining
aining eases
eases let us analyze
the folfo llowing arithm
arithm etical theorem w hich hich is is an i m plicati
plication on :
If a; is divisible by 9, then x is divisible by 3.
Th is im plicati
plication
on is tru e for all
al l the values of th e nu m er
ical variable x . Hence on substituting a?/16 we should
o b t ai n a t r u e sen t en ce. T h e su b st i t u t i o n y i el d s:
If 16 is divisible by 9, then 16 is divisible by 3.
We h av e t h u s o b t ai n ed an i m p l i cat i o n wi t h a f al se
an t ece d e n t an d a f alse
alse co n seq u en t . I n v iew iew o f su ch ch
exam ples we agree t h a t <700 = 1, i.e. i.e.,, th a t a n i m p l i c a t i o n
with a false antecedent and a false consequent is true.
By substituting: o?/15 we obtain:
If 15 is divisible by 9, then 15 is divisible by 3.
Ho w t h e an t eced en t i s f al se an d t h e co n seq u en t t r u e.
W e th
th er ef o re
r e ag ree
r ee t h a t C 01 = 1 , i .e.
.e. , th
th a t a n i m p l i c a t i o n
wi t h a f a l se a n t eced en t a n d a t ru e co n seq u en t i s t ru e.
By substituting: jz / 18 we o b tain a n im
im plicati
plication
on w i t h

a true antecedent and a true consequent:

If 18 is divisible by 9, then 18 is divisible by 3.
C o n s eq
e q u en
e n tl
tly , w e a g re
r e e t h a t O i l = 1 , ii.. e .,
., t h a t a n
i mp l i ca t i o n wi t h a t ru e a n t eced en t a n d a t ru e co n seq u en t
is true.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e c a n n o t f iin n d a s u b s t it
it u t io
i o n fo
fo r
w hich
hi ch tht h e an teced en t of o f th e im plicati
plication on u nd er discdiscus ussi
sion
on
is true, and the consequent false.
T h is
i s m an n er o f d eter
et er m i n in
i n g t h e t r u t h o r th
th e fal
f alseseh hood
of implications entails certain properties of implications
which seem paradoxical from the point of view of every
day usage. The antecedents and consequents, as discussed
 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND AXIOMS 27

in our example, whether true or false, have some inner

semantic links resulting from the general arithmetical
t h eo r em . B u t i n t h e sen t en t i al cal cu l u s we m ay n o t
impose on the variables such semantic links, which may
b e t a k e n f r o m a n y fie
fi e ld — m a t h e m a t i c s , la w , g e o g r a p h y .
We may not do so for we are unable to characterize those
links in the field of logic, which does not presuppose the
knowledge of any such specialized discipline. We must
therefore recogni
recogn i ze as tru e, e.g.
e.g.,, a n im plication
plication w ith a false false
an t eced en t an d an ar b i t r ar y co n seq u en t , ev en i f t h er e
b e no s e m a n ti c lin k b e tw e e n t h e a n te c e d e n t a n d t h e
consequent. Hence we shall recognize as true the sentence:

I f Lw ow lies on Y istu la, th e n 2 • 2 — 5.

Likewise, we shall recognize as true the sentences:

I f 2 * 2 = 5 , t h e n W ar saw li
l i es o n V i stu
stu la,
l a,
I f 2 * 2 = 4 , t h en W ar saw
s aw l i es o n Vi stu
stu la.
l a.

Putting together all the possible cases, we shall say

g en er al l y t h at a n i m p l i c a t i o n i s t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f e i t h e r
its antecedent is false , or its consequent is true. Su ch an
interpretation of the implication is an extension of the

sense of the expression conditional sentence as used in

eve ryday language,
la nguage, and hence its parado xical properties
properties
in the field of logic.
Our explanations concerning the intuitive sense of
the primitive terms are in no way definitions of those
terms. They are merely c o m m e n t s which make it easier
to grasp the properties of the primitive terms, properties
which result from the axioms of the sentential calculus.
8 . As suggested b y P rofesso r Le^nie
Le^niewski wski,, bo th th e
axioms and the theorems of a deductive system will be
called theses of th a t system
syst em . T he fol
fo l l owing
owi ng three theses
will be adopted as the axioms of our system of the sen-
tential calculus:
28 H . THE SENT ENTIAL CALC
CUUL
LUUS

1 GGpqGGqrGpr,

2 G G N pp p ,

3 G pG N pq.

A p art from
fr om variables,
variables, these axioms
axi oms include
include only
onl y two kinds
of the primitive terms discussed above. The first two
axioms are those sentences which we have resorted to in
Section 1.2 to prove arithmetical theorems. Axiom 1 is
one of tht h e forms of the lam o f hypoth etical s yllogism , forms
wh i ch were
wer e k n o w n t o A r ist
i sto
o t le.
le. T h at l aw m ay ap p ear
more intuitive in the form:

G R G p q G q rG pr .

T h e sy m b o l R , w hich willwill be introdu ced into th e sentential

calculus by a definition, is a sentence-forming functor
of two sentential arguments. Sentences of the type R p q
a r e re
r e a d iip a n d q ” . Th e Symbol
Symb ol K is th e si sign
gn of co n j u n ct i o n
of two
two sentence
sentences. s. The second
second form
for m of the law l aw of h y p o the t
ical syllo
syllogigism
sm is to be rea d: “ I f (i ( i f p , t h e n q, and if q,
t h e n r ) , t h e n if
if p , th e n r ” .
Axiom 1 can be inferred from the second form of the

law of hypothetical syllogism on the strength of the l a w

of exportation:

CGKpqrGpCqr .

This law authorizes us, in the case of an implication that

has in its antecedent a conjunction of two sentences, to
shift one of these two sentences to the consequent. For
instance , fromfr om th e sentence “if a? a? i s eve n a n d x is divisible
b y 3 , t h e n x is divisible by 6”, we may obtain, by the
l aw o f ex p o r t at i o n an d t h e r u l es o f su b st i t u t i o n an d
de tac h m en t, the senten ce “ if a;a; is even, th e n (i(iff a? is divisibl
divisiblee
b y 3 , t h e n x is divisible by 6)”. We shall reach Axiom 1
 PRIMITIVE TERMS AND AXIOMS 29

p r e c is e ly i n t h i s w a y , b y a s s u m i n g t h e s e c o n d f o r m of
pr
the law of the hypothetical syllogism. By substituting in
the law of exportation: p / Cpq, qjCqrf rjCpr, we obtain:

C C K C p q C q r C p rrC
C C p q C C q rrC
Cpr .

Since the antecedent of the sentence thus obtained is the

second form of the law of the hypothetical syllogism,
we assert the consequent, i.e., Axiom 1,
Quite similarly we might reach the second form of
the law of hypothetical syllogism by assuming Axiom 1
and the following l a w o f i m p o r t a t i o n :

GCp G q rCK p g r .

Hence, the second form of the law of the hypothetical

syllogism might replace Axiom 1. We shall not, however,
adopt it as an axiom since we would thus increase the
number of primitive terms in our system of the sentential
calculus by the conjunction symbol K .
The reasoning based on Axiom 2 was known, as
mentioned in Section 1.2, to Euclid. Euclid’s commen
t at o r , t h e Jesu i t C l av i u s, wh o l i v ed at t h e en d o f t h e
1 6 t h cen t u r y , d r ew at t en t i o n t o r easo n i n g o f t h i s k i n d

fand
er enemphasized
ce b ased o n its Ax istrange
o m 2 b ecamstructure.
e p o p uThe
l ar am modeo n g of in
Jesu it
scholars owing to Clavius. In the early 18th century the
Italian Saccheri published his book JJE E u c lid
li d cs ab o m n i
n a e v o v i n d i c a t e s , i n wh i ch h e en d eav o u r ed t o p r o v e
Euclid’s parallel axiom—an issue which long absorbed
t h e a t t en t i o n o f m at h em a t iciici an s Sacch ere r i w an t ed to t o b ase
as e
h i s p r o o f o n Ax i o m 2 an d t o d em o n st r at e t h at E u cl i d ’ s
axiom follows from its negation. Today we know that
such a proo f is no t possi poss i ble.
bl e. T e t S accheri’
accheri’ss investigations
were not lost: by drawing conclusions from the negation
of the parallel axiom he gave rise to non-Euclidean
geometries.
30 ir. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

To exp lain
lain th e sense
sen se of Axiom
Axiom 3 le t ns su bs ti titute
tute for p
an y t r u e sen tent en ce,
ce , sy m b o li
l i zed b y “ 1 ” . T h e ax io
io m m i l
t h en y i el d : C l C & l q .
The rule of detachment will give CNX q . B u t w e k n o w
t h a t N 1 — 0 , so s o t h a t we h av e: GOq, Thus by means of
Ax i o m 3 we m ay asser t an i m p l i cat i o n wi t h a f al se an t e
cedent and an arbitrary consequent. This is in agreement
w ith
it h previous exp lanations
lanati ons concerni
concerning
ng the fu n cto r C,
fo r we ha ve : (700 — 1, 001 = 1.
Axiom 3 can be deduced from the law of exportation
and a certain theorem that was known to the Franciscan
B un s Scotus,
Scotus, one of the m ost em inent m edieval philos philos 
ophers (late
(l ate 13th and ea rly rl y 14th century). ScotSc otus
us asserted
asserted
t h at i f t wo co n t r ad i ct o r y sen t en ces wer e b o t h t r u e, t h en
everything would be possible, for it is not possible that
two c on tradic tory sentences should b oth be true . S cotus’
theorem correspon
corresponds
ds to th e f oll
oll owing
owi ng law
la w in the sentential
calculus:
G K p N p q.

An example of consequence given by Scotus: Socrates

exi st s a n d S o cra t es d o es n o t exi st , hence the stick stands
in the corner , is an application of that law.
B y su b st i t u t i n g i n t h e l aw o f ex p o r t at i o n : q j N p , r j q ,
we obtain
G C K p N p q C p G N p q.

Since the antecedent of the implication thus obtained is

Sco tus’ l aw, we assert, b y the rule of detach m ent, the
consequent which is Axiom 3.
The explanations concerning the three axioms in
que stion, given u nd er 6,
6, Section 1.2,
1.2, an d above, are
intended to convince the reader that they are true. For
according to what has been said about axioms, they need
not be self-evident without explanation.
 DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 31

4 . D efinitions
efinitions and Rules o f Inference in
in the Sentential Calculus
Calculus

9. Our system of the sentential calculus will contain,

not only primitive terms, but also defined terms* To
im p art precisi
precisionon to t o th e concept of defini definiti tion
on let ns con-
si d er an y d ef i n i t i o n cu r r en t i n ev er y d ay u sag e. Fo r i n -
stance, we often encounter the following; a sq u a re —
p a r a lle lo g r a m w i t h e q u a l s i d e s a n d a n g le s .
I n su ch a d ef in in i ti
ti o n , t h e sy m b o l ” i s r ead “ i s”
( or “is the. t he. same a s” ). A d efinition efinition a lway s includes
i ncludes tw o
expressions, e.g., “a square” and “a parallelogram with
eq u al si d es an d an g l es”, wh i ch b y t h at d ef i n i t i o n h av e
the same meaning. One of these expressions, in this ease
“a parallelogram with equal sides and angles”, is adopted
as comprehensible; in traditional logic it is called the
d e f i n i e n s (that which defines). The other expression, in
this case “a square”, is in traditional logic called the
d e f i n i e n d u m ( t h at wh i ch i s t o b e d ef i n ed ) ; i t i s t r eat ed
as incomprehensible before the introduction of the defi-
n i ti
t i o n i n q u esti
est i o n , so t h a t t h e m ean i n g of
o f t h e d ef in
in ien
i en d u m
i s ex p l ai n ed o n l y b y t h e d ef i n i en s. T h e f act t h at t h e
definie
defi niens ns m u st be com prehensibl
prehens iblee even before th e defi- defi -
n i t i o n h as b een i n t r o d u ced , d em o n st r at es t h e i m p o ssi -

b i l i t y of d e fin in g a ll t h e t e r m s o f a t h e o r y , a n d t h e n e -
cessity of adopting certain primitive terms.
Apart from the properties described above, definitions
m u st h av e an o t h er essen t i al p r o p er t y . I f t h e d ef i n i en d u m
o ccu
cc u rs r s iin
n a t r u e sent
sen t en ce, t h e n t h e sen ten
ten ce o b t ain
ai n ed f ro
ro m
t h e f o r m er t h r o u g h t h e r ep l acem en t o f t h e d ef i n i en d u m
b y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d e f in i e n s o u g h t t o r e m a i n t r u e . F o r
instance, if it is true that the diagonals of a square cross
at right angles, then it is also true that the diagonals of
a parallelogram with equal sides and angles cross at the
rig h t angles.
angles. A nd vice ve rsa, if the definiens definiens occurs in i n a tru e
sen ten ten ce, t h e n t h e r ep l acem en t o f t h a t d ef ef in
in ien
i en s b y t h e
ap p r o p r i at e d ef in in i en
e n d u m o u g h t t o y i eld
el d a t r u e sen
s en ten
ten ce.
c e.
32 IT. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

W ha t has now no w been said ab ou t definidefinitt ions,

io ns, was wa s already
al ready
known in traditional logic. Yet research in mathematical
logic has raised another issue connected with definitions.
Are definitions to be mere abbreviations, or can they
also perform a creative role and have an essential share
i n r easo n i n g ? I t h as t u r n ed o u t t h at d ef i n i t i o n s m ay b e
treated so that a definition D makes it possible to prove
a t h e o re
r e m T in which the definiendum of the definition D
does not occur but which nevertheless cannot be proved
without the said definition I ) . In this way the definition D
would play an essential role in the proof and thus would,
like the premises of the proof, contribute a new element.
W ithou t engaging
engagi ng in a ny detailed analysianalysiss n o t bel bel onging
onging
to a general course in logic, I shall only state that in
m y opinion
opinion definiti
definitions
ons c an no t play any creative ro le 1.
I n t h i s r esp ect I sh ar e t h e st an d p o i n t o f t h e au t h o r s o f
P r in c ip ia M athe m atic a and hold that definitions are
theoretically superfluous. If there is a theory in which
definitions do not appear at all, then nothing new should
bee o b t a i n a b l e i n t h a t t h e o r y a f t e r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of
b
definitions, except for the fact that the outward forms
of ce rtain theorem
t heorem s m ay be chang ed as a resu lt of of replacin
replacing g
the defmiens by the definiendum. In my opinion the

advantage to be obtained from definitions may only be

th a t ( 1) definiti
definitions
ons serve serve to ab bre via te certain expressionexpres sionss
bee lo n g i n g t o a g i v e n t h e o r y , a n d t h a t (2)
b (2 ) b y i n t r o d u c i n g
a n ew
e w t er m d efief i n it
i t i o n s m ay , t o g et h er w i th
th t h a t n ew t er m ,
co n t r i b u t e so m e n ew i n t u i t i o n s t o t h e t h eo r y an d t h u s
add to the terms belongi belonging ng to
to the theo ry in i n qu estion
estion termterm s
which have a meaning outside that theory. These merits
of definitions will soon be illustrated by examples.
There is still one issue connected with definitions:
are the definitions belonging to a given theory theses of
t h at t h eo r y ? Her e ag ai n I sh al l ab st ai n f r o m d et ai l ed
considerations and confine myself to the statement that
t h e r eq u i r em en t s f o r m u l at ed ab o v e m ak e m e t r eat d ef i -
 D E F I N I T I O N S A N D R U L ES
E S O F IN
IN F E R E N C E 33

nitions as certain equalities which are theses of a given

t h e o ry
ry , b u t a r e n o t e d d o
oww n o n t h e m a r g in
in o f t h a t t h e o ry
ry ,
as are the rules of inference. The special rule of inference,
called
cal led the ru l e o f rep l a cemen t , permits us to use definitions
so that in any thesis we may replace one side of a given
definition by the other.
10. Th e first definit
defi nition
ion to be given now states th a t
the expressions A p q a n d C N p q have the same meaning.
That definition, with the help of the second of the two
expressions quoted, containing only those elements which
have already occurred in the axioms, enables us to in
troduce into our system of the sentential calculus the
n e w t e r m A , which is a sentence-forming functor of two
sen t en t i al ar g u m en t s. L et i t b e n o t ed f i r st o f al l t h at
this definition shortens an expression consisting of four
letters to one consisting of only three. But the more
i m p o r t an t t h i n g i s t h e n ew in i n t u i t io
i o n wh i ch
c h t h a t d ef in
in it
itio n
introduces into the sentential calculus. The functor A
corresponds to the expression o r in everyday language
an d i s a sy m b o l o f t h e alternation of two sentences.
L et u s st u d y t h e wo r d “o r ” b y an ex am p l e. A p er so n
cal l s u p a f i r m wh o se m an ag er s ar e Pet er an d Pau l an d
ask s wh en h e can f i n d an y o n e o f t h e m an ag er s i n t h e
offf i ce.
of ce. H e is i s told t h a t betw een 12 and 2 p.m. P ete r is is
in the office or Paul is in the office. If the information
is true, then the inquirer will, in the specified period of
time, find in the office at least one of the managers,
t h o u g h h e m ay f i n d b o t h . At an y r at e, i f Pet er wi l l n o t
b e i n t h e offi
of ficc e, P a u l w ill
il l b e t h e r e . W e see se e t h a t if t h e
sentence iip or g” is true, then the sentence “if not p ,
then g” is true. Should the inquirer have been informed
that if Peter is not in the office between 12 and 2 p.m.,
t h en at t h at t i m e Pau l i s i n t h e o f f i ce, t h i s wo u l d m ean
that between 12 and 2 p.m. Peter is in the office or Paul
is in the office. This example confirms that the expressions
A p q a n d C N p q h av e t h e sam e m ean i n g .
34 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

L et i t b e n o t ed , h o wev er , t h at t h e wo r d “o r ” can
al so h av e o t h er m ean i n g s t h an h as t h e f u n ct o r A . I n t h e
sen t en ce “I sh al l g o t o t h e r i g h t o r I sh al l g o t o t h e l ef t ”
we want to exclude the possibility of the simultaneous
truth of the sentences “I shall go to the right” and “I
shall go to th e left” . In th is sens se nsee “ either
eit her ... or” would
p e r h a p s b e m o re a p p r o p r ia t e . B u t o u r d e fin itio n does
n o t i m p ar t su ch a sen se t o t h e f u n ct o r A . Hence, in con
form ity w ith o ur definiti
definition,on, the f oll oll owing
owing symbol
symbolii c equ al
ities are satisfied:
A 0 0 = C N 0 0 = CIO = 0 ,
A 0 1 = C A fO l = O i l = 1 ,
A 1 0 = C N 10 = €00 = 1 ,
A l l = CAT! 1 = 0 0 1 = 1 .

T h u s we see t h at t h e f u n ct i o n Ap q , ca l l ed a l t ern a t i o n ,
i s f a l se
s e o n l y i f i t s b o tth
h a rg u m en t s a rree f a l se, a n d i n a l l o tth
h er
er
cases it is true .
Th e second definition
definition of which we sh all ava il oursel ourselves ves
i n t h e sen t en t i al cal cu l u s, st at es t h at t h e ex p r essi o n K p q
means the same as the expression A fG p A lq . T h e f u n c t o r K
AfG
co r r esp o n d s t o t h e wo r d “an d ” i n ev er y d ay l an g u ag e,

aThe
n d texpression
h u s i s th
t h e sdefining t h e c o n j u n c t iis
y m b o l o f conjunction o n of two sentences.
a negation of the
expression CpAlq. T h e t r u t h o f t h e l ast - n am ed ex p r essi o n
excludes the possibility of the simultaneous truth of the
sentences p a n d q. F o r i n s t a n c e , f r o m t h e t r u t h o f t h e
sen t en ce “i f Pet er i s i n t h e o f f i ce, t h en Pau l i s n o t i n t h e
offf i ce”
of ce ” it fol
fo l l ows th a t th e sentences
sentences “P e ter is in i n th e off
off i ce”
and “Paul is in the office” cannot be simultaneously true.
H e n c e t h e f u n c t i o n K p q , being the- he- neg ationati on of th e ex 
prr e s s i o n GpAfq, is true only if the sentences p a n d q d o
p
n o t ex cl u d e o n e an o t h er b u t ar e si m u l t an eo u sl y t r u e.
This is in agreement with the current sense of the word
“and”, for the sentence “Peter is in the office and Paul
 DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF INFERENCE 35

is in the office” is true only if both its components are

simultaneously true.
O ur definition yields
yiel ds th e foll
fo llowing
owing ssym
ym bolic
bolic equ aliti
ali ties:
es:

K 0 0 = N C O N O = N C0
C01 = N 1 = 0 ,
K O I = K C 0 K 1 = HCOO = H I =- 0 ,
m o = H C1C1 H 0 = H C 11 = H I = 0 ,
m i = h c ih i = n rc i o = h o = 1 .

T h u s we see t h at t h e f u n c t i o n K p q i s ttrr u e o n l y i f b o th i ts
ts
a rg u men t s a re t ru e , and in all other cases it is false .
T h e t h i r d d ef i n i t i o n st at es t h at t h e ex p r essi o n D p q
has the same meaning as the expression C p N q . T h e
f u n ct o r D j which also is a sentence-forming functor of
two sentential arguments, is called the symbol of n o n -
c o n j u n c t i o n (or alternative denial). Ho co n j u n ct i o n i n t h e
grammatical sense of the word corresponds in English
t o t h e f u n c t o r D . No t e t h at t h e co n j u n ct i o n o f t wo sen 
tences is i s d efined
efi ned as the ne ga tion tion of the expression w hich
defines non-conjunction. Hence the expression K p q m i g h t
b e d e f in e d a s h a v i n g t h e s a m e m e a n i n g a s N D p q . R e f 
e re
r e nc
n c e h a s a lr lr e a d y b e e n m a d e to t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t r u t h
of the expression C p N q excludes the possibility of the

sifmt huel t an
o f u neo
c tuosr tDr uis
t h more
o f t hclearly
e sen t en ces p a nby
explained q. The
d the sense
following
equalities:
m o = c o h o = coi = 1 ,

d o i = c o m = coo = i ,
m o = c ih o = c i i = i ,
D l l = C 1H
1 H 1 = CIO — 0 .

Thus the function Dpq is false only if both its arguments

a re t ru e , and otherwise it is always true.
T h e f u n ct o r D, wh i ch d o es n o t act u al l y co n t r i b u t e
any new intuitions to the sentential calculus, is here in
troduced only for theoretical reasons, because it has the
36 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

p ro p e rty t h a t i t c a n s e r v e as t h e o n l y p r i m i t i v e t e r m of
the sentential calculus. This has been demonstrated by
the American logician H. M. Sheffera. In our system of
the sentential calculus there are two primitive terms:
C a n d N , but there is an axiom system in the sentential
calculus which has the functor T> as its only primitive
term ; all all the othe r functors can in th a t system system be defi defi ned
b y m e a n s o f t h e f u n c t o r J>.
The fourth, and the last, definition to be introduced
now states that the expression E p q has the same meaning
as the expression N C C p q N O q p . The functor E is called
the symbol of equivalence. To realize its meaning let us
refer to the definition of conjunction. When in the ex-
prr e s s io n t h a t d e f in e s c o n j u n c t i o n w e s u b s t i t u t e G pq for p ,
p

a n d C q p for q, we obtain the expression that defines

equivalence. Hence the meaning of the expression E p q
is the same as that of K C p q C q p ; i t s t r u t h st at es t h e
occurrence of implications from the first argument to the
second and from the second to the first. The expression
E p q is read: p i f a n d o n l y i f q. For equivalence we obtain
the following equalities:
.0 0 0 = N C C 0 0 N C 0 0 = N G 1 N 1 = JV01
V010 = N O = 1 ,
E 0 1 = N C C O IN C
CIO
IO = NC1N0 = E C U = N1 0 ,
E 10 = N G G 10N C 01 = N G 0 N 1 = N G 0 0 = Arl = 0 ,
j0
j0 1 1 = N G G 1 1 N G 1 1 = N C 1 N 1 = N C 1 0 = NO = 1 .
T h u s we se
s e e t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n E p q i s t rru
ue only if its arguments
are either
either boboth
th false or bot bothh true. W he n one o f tthe he argum ents
i s t ru e a n d t h e o t h er i s f a l se, t h e f u n ct i o n E p q i s f a l se.
The analysis given thus far in this subsection offers
informal explanations of the definitions listed below:
01 Apq — C N pq,

02 K p q -- N G p N q ,
03 E p q — C pN q ,
04 E p q — N G G pqN C qp .
 DEFINITIONS AND BULES OF INFERENCE 37

T h e sy m b o l “ = ” i n th th ese def
d efii n it
i t i o n s st at es t h a t t h e ex 
prr e s s io n s o n i t s t w o s id e s h a v e t h e s a m e m e a n i n g .
p
11. Expressions of the sentential calculus include the
variables p t g, r , .. .. . , an d co nstan ts, prim itive itive or defidef i ned,
wh i ch t o g et h er wi t h sen t en t i al ar g u m en t s ag ai n f o r m
sentences. Every expression which is formed of variables
and which is a sentence, will be called a m e a n i n g f u l e x
p r e s s i o n . This term is left undefined, but the following
theorem will enable us to decide about every expression
formed of variables and of constants of the sentential
calculus, whether it is a meaningful expression or not.
T h e e x p r eess s iio
o n x i s a m e a n i n g f u l e x p rree s ssii o n i f a n d o n llyy
i f o n e o f t h e f o l l o wi n g co n d i t i o n s i s s a t i s f i e d :
1 ) a? is a sm all le tte r,
2) x is the negation of a meaningful expression,
3) x i s an imp li
licati
cation
on w it
ith h a rgum ents which are
meaningful expressions,
4) x i s an al t er n at io
io n w i th
t h ar g u m en t s wh i ch ar e
meaningful expressions,
5) x i s a conjunction w it ith h argum ents which are
meaningful expressions,
6 ) x i s a non -conjunction
-conjuncti on w itith
h argum ents which are ar e
meaningful expressions,
7) x is an equivalence
equivalence w itith h argum ents which are
meaningful expressions.
In conformity with this theorem, if an x is a meaningful
expression, then one of the seven conditions given above
is satisfied. And conversely: if one of the seven conditions
given above is satisfied} then x iiss a m eaning ful expression.
expression.
L e t Z stand for any meaningful expression. The following
symbolic equalities are then satisfied:
~NZ = Z , CZZ = Z , AZZ = Z , KZZ = Z ,

D ZZ* Z , B ZZ= Z .
Let us consider an expression formed of variables and
constants of the sentential calculus, e.g., G N p A K p H q r .
4
38 U . THE SENTENTIAL CA
ALLC
CUU LU
LU S

I t f o ll
ll o ws
w s fr
f r o m t h e t h e o r e m a b o v e t h a t e v e ry
ry s m a ll
l l l e t te
te r
is a meaningful expression. We therefore replace in the
ex p r essi o n n o w u n d er d i scu ssi o n ev er y sm al l l et t er b y Z
an d ap p l y t h e sy m b o l i c eq u al i t i es g i v en ab o v e:

C N Z A K Z N Z Z = G Z A K Z Z Z = C Z A ZZ = G ZZ = Z .
We have thus demonstrated that the expression under
discussion is a meaningful expression.
Let us now suppose that we have to examine the ex-
p r e s s i o n N p K D q r . B y p r o ceed i n g i n an an al o g o u s way
w e o b t a i n N Z K D Z Z = Z K Z . I t i s cl ai m ed t h at t h e ex -
p r e s s i o n u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n is n o t a m e a n i n g f u l e x p r e s s io n .
I n f act , w ere er e i t a m ean i n g fu f u l ex p res
r essi
sioo n , t h e n i n co n f o rm
rm i t y
w ith
it h the theorem above a t lea l ea st one of the seven conditi condi tions
ons
would have to be satisfied. As can easily be ascertained,
none of these conditions is satisfied.
Pr o ceed i n g i n t h i s way we m ay d eci d e ab o u t ev er y
ex pre ssion . th a t consistconsistss only of variables an d con stants
of the sentential calculus whether it is a meaningful ex-
prr e s s i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , w e c a n m a k e s u r e t h a t t h e e x -
p
prr e s s i o n s
p
N pC qqK p , CNqCr, JBpqKpr

are not meaningful expressions, but the expressions

GCqrGNpKqp , D rC pK qp

are meaningful expressions.

In order to formulate the rules of inference in a more
prr e c is e w a y w e s h a l l u s e t h e w o r d eq u i f o rm. W e s a y t h a t p
p
is equiform with p , t h at t h e ex p r essi o n G N p is equiform
with the expression G N p . I n e v e r y d a y language we say
about those expressions which in our sense are equiform,
t h at t h ey ar e t h e sam e o r i d en t i cal . T h i s, h o wev er , i s n o t
correct, since equiform expressions need not be identical.
Equiformity consists only in the similarity of geometrical
forms.
 DEFINITIONS AND KUU3S OF INFERENCE 39

W e s a y t ha t an expr es s iion on @ i s a cor corrr ec

ectt s ub s t iitt ut iion
on of
t h e e x p r e s s i o n a i f a n d o n l y i f /? d i f f e r s f r o m a o n l y i n t h a t
in place of certain variables which occur in a the expression f}
has certain meaningful expressions, such that meaningful
expr es s i ons i n ar e equ i for
f or m w henever t hey cor corrr esespond
pond to
equi f or m var i abl es i n a.
Fo r i n st an ce, t h e ex p r essi o n
(a) GGpqGGqrCpr

following a correct substitution, yields the expression

((3) G Gp
Gp G N p q G G G N p q r G p
prr

o b t a in
i n e d t h ro
r o u g h t h e s u b s t i tu
t u t io
io n q j G S p q , O n t h e o t h e r
hand, the expression

(£') CCpCNpqGCqrCpr

is not a correct substitution of the expression (a), for the

variables in the expression (a) which are equiform with q
do not have in ((3') counterparts in equiform meaningful
expressions. The first such variable has in (£') its counter-
p a r t i n a n e x p r e s s i o n e q u i f o r m w i t h C M p q , a nd th e second,
sec ond,
an expression equiform with q.
Let us now formulate the rules of inferences in our
system of the sentential calculus. There are three such
r u l es: t h e r ul e of s ubs t i t ut i on) t h e rule of detachment, a n d
t h e r ul e of r epl acement which enable us to make use of
definitions.
The rule of substitution', if an expression a is a thesis
o f t h e sy st em , t h en we m ay r eco g n i ze as a t h esi s o f t h e
system any expression which is a correct substitution of
the expression a.
The rule of detachment', if any expressions a a ann d /S

are
io n theses
t io th tohfethe
w i th an tsystem
syst
ece dem
en tand
eq uthe
tif
iheo r express
f or expr
m w essio
th ion
i th nt ha en
is
i s an
we imp
m ayli
lica-
ca-
re -
cognize as a thesis of the system any expression y which
is equiform with the consequent of the implication a .
 4 *

40 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

T h e r u l e o f r e p l a c e m e n t : if an expression a is a thesis
of the system
system , an d an expressi
expr ession on is p a rt of express
expressio ion n a
an d is equiform
equif orm w it ith
h th e rig h t side
si de of one of th e defi
def i nit
ni t i ons
given
give n ab ove or one of its correct su bstituti bstitution
on s, the n we m ay
recogn
re cognii ze as a thesis of the system an y expressi expr ession
on y which
is obtained from expression a t h r o u g h t h e r e p l a c e m e n t
of expression /? by an expression equiform with the left
side of the same definition or by its corresponding correct
su b st i t u t i o n o f t h at l ef t si d e.
T h e r u l e o f r ep l acem en t m ak es u se o f t h at p r o p er t y
of the definition that whatever is true about the definiens
(the right side of the definition) is also true about the
definiendum (the left side of the definition). Note that
o u r r u l e o f r ep l acem en t d o es n o t st at e an y t h i n g ab o u t
r ep l aci n g t h e d ef i n i en d u m b y t h e d ef i n i en s. I t h as b een
deliberately given a weaker formulation, since even in
th a t version it suffisuf fices
ces to m ake a full use of th e definit definitions
ions..
T h e r u l e o f r ep l acem en t en ab l es u s t o m ak e u se b o t h
of definitions and of their correct substitutions. Starting,
e.g., from Axiom 3:
GpCNpq

we may use Definition 01:

A p q ™ GTfpq
an d p r o v e t h e t h esi s:
CpApq .

On the other hand, we may start from Axiom 2:

GGNppp

an d use th e foll
following
owing correct su bs titutio
tit utio n of Definition
Definition 01
01::

A p p = G T lp p
an d p r o v e t h e t h esi s:
CAppp .
 THEOREMS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 41

There are very essential differences between the rule

o f su b st i t u t i o n an d t h e r u l e o f r ep l acem en t . Fi r st , t h e
rule of substitution allows only for replacement of single
small letters, i.e., sentential variables, whereas the rule
of replacement allows for the replacement of expressions
containing a greater number of symbols. The second
difference consists in this, that when applying the rule
of sub stitution
stitution we m us t replace r eplace all equifor
equiformm va ri riables
ables by
equiform expressions, whereas the rule of replacement
m akes i t possible
possible to replace only one expression expression in a thesis,
thesi s,
even if a second expression, equiform with the first,
occurs in that thesis. Thus, e.g., when we have the thesis:
G C N pqC N pq

we may avail ourselves of the rule of replacement and

Definition 01 and obtain both the thesis
G A pqA pq
an d t h e t h eses
C ApqC Npq , G C N pq A pq .

5 . Theorems
Theorems o f the Sentential
Sentential C al
alcul
culus
us

12. We shall now proceed to prove some theorems

of the sentential calculus, in doing so we shall confine
ourselves to the three axioms and the three rules of
inference given above. The proofs will be carried out in
t h e co m p l et e f o r m , wi t h o u t an y g ap s. T h e n o t at i o n ,
however, wil wi l l reso rt to abbrev iations.
iat ions. E ve ry prove d thesis
willl hav e its nu m ber a nd will
wil will be p receded by a p roof li line.
ne.
F o r instance,
inst ance, Theorem 4 wil wi l l be preceded by th e f oll
oll owing
owing
p r o o f lin
li n e :
1 p j G p q , q f G C q r G p r , r j s * 01 — 4 .
A proof line always consists of two parts, separated by
an aster
aster isk
isk . P a r t o n e in
in d i cates,
cates, i n o u r exam
ex am p l e, t h a t t h e
rule of substitution is to be applied to Thesis 1. That
42 n . T H E SENTENTIAL CA L CU L U S

p a r t of t h e p r o o f l i n e w h ic h fo llo
ll o w s t h e a s t e r i s k i n d i c a t e s
t h at t h e su b st i t u t i o n o f T h esi s 1 , o b t ai n ed i n t h e way
indicated above, has the form of an implication whose
antecedent is equiform with Thesis 1, and whose con-
sequent is equiform with Theorem 4, now being proved.
T h u s, b y ap p l y i n g t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t , we m ay p r o v e
Theorem 4.
T h e n u m b er s o f t h o se t h eses wh i ch ar e n o t j u st au x -
iliary, but are for some reasons interesting in themselves,
will be underlined. The axioms are repeated below:
1 G G p q G G q r G p r,
2 G G N ppp ,
3 G pG N pq.

We p r o v e T h eo r em 4 :
1 p j C p q , q j C G q r C p r , r j s * 01 — 4,
4 GCGCqrGprsCCpqs.
T h e ab b r ev i at i o n i n t h e p r o o f l i n e can b e ex p an d ed q u i t e
mechanically. By carrying out the indicated substitutions
in Axiom 1 we obtain
GGGpqGGqrGprGGGGgrCprsGCpqs .

T h e an t eced en t o f t h e su b st i t u t i o n o b t ai n ed i s i n f act
equiform with Thesis 1, and hence we may recognize
Thesis 4, which is equiform with the consequent of the
su b st i t u t i o n o b t ai n ed .
We now prove the next theorem:
4 q f G q r , rf C sr , sfGG sqG pC sr * G4 p f s , s/G pG sr — 5,
5 GGpGqrCGsqGpGsr.

W e m ay w r it
i t e t h e p r o o f i n g r eater
eat er d et ail
ai l . T h e su b st it
i t u t io
io n
of Thesis 4, indicated in the first part of the proof line,
h as t h e f o r m
C G C G G q r C s r C p C s r C C s q C p C s r C G p G q r C G s q C p C s r.
 THE0EEM3. OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 43

T h e an t eced en t o f t h i s su b st i t u t i o n i s eq u i f o r m wi t h t h e
following substitution of Thesis 4, indicated in the second
p a r t o f t h e p r o o f lin
li n e :

CGCCqrGsrGpCsrGGsqGpCsr .

H enc e w e m ay recognize recognize Thesis Thesis 5, w hich is equiform equiform w ith ith
t h e co n seq u en t of of t h e f i rst
r st su b st it
i t u t io
i o n . I n t h i s p r o o f we
t wi ce ap p l y t h e r u l e o f su b st i t u t i o n , an d o n ce t h e r u l e
of de t ach m en t . T hesi hesis 5 i s im p o rt rtanan t because on its it s
strength, if we have a recognized sentence of the type
GpC qr a n d a n i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e t y p e Gsq, i n t h e f i r st
sen ten
ten ce we m ay r ep lace l ace t h e sen tenten ce q b y t h e sen t en ce s
a n d a c c e p t t h e s e n t e n c e o f t h e t y p e GpCsr.
W e sha l l n o t h erea fter ft er exp an d th e proof li nes in in detai
detaill .
W h a t is is w r iitt t e n d o w n in in t h e p ro
r o o f l i n e c a n a lw lw a y s b e
ch eck ed q u i t e m ech an i cal l y b y m ak i n g su r e t h at t h e
expression symbolized by the first part of the proof line
i s equifor
equiform m w ith ith th e express
expre ssiion sym boli bolized by the second se cond
p a r t.
4 s f G C C p r s C C q r s * C lp fG q r , q fC pr , rfs — 6 ,
6 C O p q G C C p r s G O q r s.
5 p j G p q } q f C C p r s , rfC C q rs , s jt * C6 — 7 ,
7 CCtCCprsGGpqGtGCgrs.

H aving prov ed Theses 4-7 we are now in.

in . a positi
posit i on to
deduce Thesis 8 :

7 tjC p q , p j q , r fs 1s /G p s , qjr * C l r js — 8 ,
8 CCqrCCpqCCrsCps.

Thesis 8 is called sorites . It is a generalization of the law

of the hypothetical syllogism, i.e., Axiom 1. By means
of Thesis 8 one may, on the strength of the recognized
implications of the type Gqr, Gpq , Grs, prove the impli
cat i o n o f t h e t y p e C p s .
44 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

ISTot-e th a t in p rov ing theo rem s we ha v e so fa r re so rted ,

apart from the rules of inference, only to Axiom 1, but
neither to Axiom 2 n o r t o Ax i o m 3 .
1 qjGNpq * 03 — 9 ,

9 GGCJSfpqrGpr.
Thesis 9 would become more intuitive if we applied to it
Definition 0 1 on the strength of the rule of replacement.
We wo u l d t h en o b t ai n t h e t h eo r em
CG ApqrCpr .

By this theorem, on the strength of a true implication

whose antecedent is an alternation one can prove an
implication whose antecedent is equiform with the first
ar g u m en t o f t h at al t er n at i o n , an d t h e co n seq u en t r em ai n s
u n ch an g ed .
9 r f C G G N p p p G G q p p * C6 p [ N p , r [ p , s ffp
p — 10 ,
10 G pG
pG G G N p p p G G q
qppp .

1 0 p j C G N p p p * G2 — 0 2 p j G G N p p p — 1 1 ,
11 GCqGGNpppCGNppp.

I n t h e s eco
ec o n d p a r t o f t h e l as t p ro
r o o f l i n e ab o v e, th
th e d o u b le
le
ap p l i cat i o n o f t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t h as b een m ar k ed ,
9 p j t , q[
q[GG G N p p p , r j G G N p p p * O i l q f N t — 12 ,
12 GtGGNppp.

7 p j N p , r / p , s j p * 0 1 2 — 13 ,
13 0 GNpqGtCGqpp .
1 p [G N pq } q jG t C G g p p * 013 — 14 ,
qjG
14 GGGtGCqpprGCNpqr.

14 t j N G G q p p , r [ G G q p p * 02 p j G G q p p — 15 ,
15 G G N p q G C q p p.
 THEOREMS OP THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 45

Thesis 15 makes it possible to prove a sentence of the

t y p e p on the strength of accepted sentences of the types
G N p q a n d Ggp.
Thesis 2 o f o n r ax i o m sy st em m i g h t b e r ep l aced b y
Thesis 15; the axiom system consisting of theses 1, 3 and
15 would suffice to build the sentential calculus.
13.. The theorem
13 t heorem s prove d so
s o fa r are intro
intr o d u ctory theses.
thes es.
We shall now prove a series of theorems containing the
p r i m i tiv
ti v e t e r m G.
9 q j p , rfp * C2 — 16 ,
16 G pp .
Thesis 16 is called the l a w o f i d e n t i t y . In philosophical
l ogic this nam e den otes to a ce rt
rtain
ain i nd efinit
efi nitee t heorem

p
t hear tta ii n
n i no g
u r to t eem
sy stem
st r m st.h A
e tltaw
e n t ioofni dis
e ndt it
irtaywref
rnef h
eresr et ot osen
ers setnhten
teenfces.
a cs.t
ce
I t can al so b e f o r m u l at ed i n a st r o n g er f o r m , n am el y as
the thesis: B p p . T h e llaw aw o f i d e n t it i t y in i n t h e f o rmrm o f T h esi esis
1 6 isi s o ft ftenen crit
crit i cized.
ci zed. I t i s clai
cl aim m ed th a t th e law la w of ide n ti tity,
ty,
as a tautolog y, is i s of no im i m po rtanc
rtanc e w ha t eve r; th e sentence sentence
“ i f t o d a y is i s W e d n e sd sd a y , th
th e n t o d a y i s W e d n es e s da
d a y ’*
’* is
o f n o u se i n an y i n f er en ce t h at wo u l d b e o f i n t er est . I t
would in fact be so if we wanted to avail ourselves of
Thesis 16 in proving a sentence p b y m e a n s o f t h a t
sentence p . Thesis Thesi s 16, how ever, ever , m ay o ccur in reasoning
as a prem i se. W e m igh t , for for ins
ins tance , assum e only Thesis Thesis 15 15
and Thesis 16 in order to prove our Axiom 2. The proof
line of such a proof would run:
1 5 q j N p * <716 pjJSTp — 2 .
I n t h i s w ay t h e law
l aw o f i d e n t it
it y can p l ay an essen
ess en ti
t i al r d le
le
in proofs.
9 r J C C q p p * <7
<715 — 17 ,
17 CpGCqpp.
5 p l q , q j O N p q , r j q , s f p * G 17 p j q , q j N p — C
C33 — 18 ,
18 CqCpq.
46 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

Thesis 18, as proved above, called the l a w o f s im i m p l i fi

fi c a t i o n ,
p o i n t s t o t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e s y m b o l C r ef er r ed t o i n
Sect i o n I I . 3 . B y su b st i t u t i n g i n T h esi s 1 8 an y t r u e sen 
t en ce f o r q, e.g e.g .,
. , “ 2 - 2 — 4 ” , a n d b y ap p l y in in g t h e r u l e
o f d e t a c h m e n t w e o b t a i n G p ( 2 - 2 = 4 )).. T h u s a n im im p li li
c a ti
t i o n w i t h a t ru
r u e c o n s e q u e n t a n d a n a r b i t ra
r a r y a n t ecec e d e n t
is true.
We shall now engage in certain considerations con
nected with Thesis 18, which will show by an example
that by means of deductive reasoning we may pass from
ce rtain theorem s to m ore ge ne ral ones (cf. cf. p. 16 16 above).
Bet us assume the truth of the thesis

18! CpGpCrCsr.
We prove:
1 8 x p j O p G p C r C s r * C l 8 X— C18X—
C18X— 182 ,
182 CrCsr.

Th esis
esis 183 differ
differss from Th esis esis 18 on l y b y th e shape of
th e v ariables, a n d iiss tth
h ere fore also
also th e law of sim
sim plifi
plificat
catii on.
We prove farther:

182 rj CrCsT j sj q * O l 8 2 — 1 8 s ,
183 G q C r G s r.

jG q C r G s r , s j p * 0 1 8 3 — 1 8 4 ,
182 r jG

18* GpCqCrCsr.

1 8 . q ]p * 1 8 . ,

18J C pC pC rG a r .

Thesis 184, through substitutions, has yielded Thesis 18x,

b u t a t t h e s a m e t im e T h e s is 1 8 4 is m o re g e n e r a l t h a n
Th esis
esis 18x
18x.. Y et b y assum ing on l y T hesis hesis 18x
18x we m ay,
b y r e s o r t in g t o t h e r u l e o f s u b s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e r u l e o f
de tachm en t , prove Thesi Thes is 184
1 84.. T hus we see see th a t by com-
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T I A L C A LC
LC U LU
LU S 47

b illi
il lin
n g t h e r u l e o f s u b s t i t u t i o n w ith
it h t h e r u l e o f d e ta c h m e n t
we m ay r each co n cl u si o n s t h at ar e m o r e g en er al t h an t h e
p r e m i s e s 3. T w o s u c h th e s e s a s 18 18x x a n d 1 8 4, o n e o f w h ic ichh
can be p roved only i f th t h e o the r i s assumassum ed, an d conversel
conversely, y,
t h e o t h er can b e p r o v ed o n l y i f t h e f i r st i s assu m ed , ar e
called inferentidUy equivalent. I t also also folfolllows fromfrom our
exam ple th a t th e l aw of sim si m pli
plifificat
catii on is inferen
inferen ti tiall
allyy
equivalent to Thesis 18x.

3- P H , * 01
188 — 19 ,
19 CCGpgrGqr.
T h e su b st i t u t i o n p
pjJ S fp in Thesis 19 would yield
jJS

GGGNpqrGqr

which, after the application of Definition 01, would i n

turn yield
CCApqrCqr
t h a t is
is a t h eo r em an alo
alo g o u s to
t o t h a t o b t ain
ai n e d fr
fr o m T h esis
esis 9.
9.

19 p j N q , q j p , r jC
jC G p q q * 0 1 5 p f q t q j p — 20 ,
20 GpGGpqq.

Thesis 20 is usually considered an equivalent of the Stoic

syllogism m o d u s p o n e n s , given un d er 5 in S ection 1.2,
1.2,
Thesis 20 cannot, however, replace the rule of detachment.
5 P lq
l q , q l G q r , s f p * 020 p j q , q j r — 21 ,
21 CGpGqrCqCpr .

T h esi
esis 2 1 i s t h e v e r y i m p o r tan
t an t l a w o f c o m m u t a t i o n . From
t h e th
t h e o re
re m “ I f x is divisible by 2 , then (if x is divisible
b y 3 , t h e n x iiss divisi
divisible
ble b y 6 )” we m ay , o n t h e str st r en g t h
o f t h e l aw o f co m m u t at i o n , o b t ai n t h e t h eo r em “I f x
is d ivisi
ivisible
ble b y 3, th e n (if (if a? is divisible by 2, then x is di
visible by 6 )” .
2 1 p ( G p q , q j G q r , r j G p r * 01 — 22 ,
22 G G q r G G p q G p r.
48 II. TUB SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

By applying the law of commutation to Thesis 1 we have

obtained^ as Thesis 22, another form of the law of the
syllogism.
1 p j C p G g r , qjC qC pr, r.
r.jjs * 021 — 23 ,

23 CCCqCprsCCpCqrs.
23 q [ N p , r j q , a j C G G p q p p * 015 qjGpq — 0 3 — 24
24 ,
24 G G G p q p p.

Thesis 24 was known even to Peirce. It makes it possible

t o p r o v e a sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e p o n t h e st r en g t h o f
a sen t en ce o f t h e t y p e C G p q p .
2 1 p f C p q , q f C C p r S j rrjj C G y r s * 06 — 2
255 ,

25 GCCp rsCGp q GCq rs .

2 5 p j C p q , r j p , e f p , q j r * 02 4 — 26 ,
26 CGGpqrCCrpp.

2 6 r j q * 27 ,
27 GCGpqqGGqpp.

Thesis 27 enables us to replace, in an expression of the

t y p e GCpqq , the sentence p b y t h e sen t en ce q, and vice

versa.
al t er n atIti o nis wi
connected
t h t h e ai dwith
o f t hthe possibility
e t er of defining
m 0 alone:
A p q = i G C pqq.

Using such a definition we might, on the strength of

Thesis 27, prove the l a w o f c o m m u t a t i v i t y o f a l t e r n a t i o n :
CApqAqp ,
1 p j G C p g r , q j C G r p p , r f s * 026 — 28 ,
28 O0 0 Grp p sGCG p q rs .

2 8 e( GG p rr * 027 p j r , q \ p — 29 ,
e(GG
29 C C C p q r C C p r r.
 T H E O R E M S O F T H E S E N T E N T I A L C A L CU
C U L US
US 49

Thesis 29 i s im
Thesis i m p o rtan t because, as A. T arski ha s shown,
when combined with Thesis 1 and Thesis 18 it forms
a system of thre e sentences th a t is is suffi
suff i cient
ci ent to
t o p rove
ail those possible theses of the sentential calculus which
co n t ai n O as t h e o n l y co n st an t . P. B em ay s n o t i ced t h at
T h esi
es is 2 9 can b e r ep laced
laced i n t h a t sy
s y stem
st em b y t h e sim
sim p ler
ler
Thesis 24.
2 9 r j G p q * 016 p f C p q — 30 ,
30 C C p C p q G pq .

Thesis 30 occurs as an axiom in the axiom system of the

sen t en t i al calcu
calcu lu
lu s f o rm
r m u l ated
at ed b y D . H i l b e r t 4. 4. I t was
al read
read y k n o w n t o Sex t u s E m p ir i r iicu
cu s, p h y si cian
cian an d p h i 

losopher
W e shall who nowlived prov
about A.D. 200.
e several t heorem s w hich hich m ay
b e r e g a r d e d a s le m m a s i n t h e p r o o f o f T h e s is 3 5 .
7 tjG G pq r, s jr t qjs * 0 2
299 — 31,
31 GGpsGGGpqrCGsrr .

21 p j C p s , q j G G p q r , r j G G s r r * 031 — 32 ,
32 G G G p q r G G p s G G s r r.

32 q j r , rrjj G q G p r * 018 qjG pr , p l q — 33 ,

33 GC ps C Gs GqC pr C qC pr .

21 p j G p s , qj C s G qC pr } r jGqG
j GqG pr * 033 — 34 ,
34 C Gs C qGpr C Gps GqGpr .

34 sjG q r , g/O^gr * 022 — 35 ,

35 GGpGqrCGpqGpr.

Thesis 35 occurs as an axiom in the first axiom system

of the sentential calculus, given by Frege in his B e g r i f f s -
s c h r i f t [ 3].
3] . I t differ
differss from
from Thesis 22
22 only in th a t the
a n t e c e d e n t p is added to it.
50 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

14. We shall now formulate a number of theorems

which contain the symbols (7 and JJS
Sf, but no defined terms
of the sentential calculus.

21 q f N p , r j q * <73 — 3 6 ,
36 CNpCpq.

pjJSfp j
1 pj * 036 — 37 ,
37 CGGpqrGNpr.

27 p ( l ) f p , q j p * 0 2 — 38 ,
38 GCpSfpJHp .

37 p j N p , q l p , r j p * 02 — 39 ,
39 CJSrUTpp .

9 q / N N - p , r j N S f p * 038 p j N p — 40 ,
40 GpNNp .

T h ese
e sess 39
39 an d 4 0 f o r m t h e v er y i m p o r t an t law of double
negation. The following types of inference are based on
t h i s l aw: i t i s n o t t r u e t h at C o p er n i cu s was n o t a Po l e,
therefore Copernicus was a Pole; Copernicus was a Pole,
t h er ef o r e i t i s n o t t r u e t h at C o p er n i cu s was n o t a Po l e.

1 p f N N p , z i p , r j q * (739
(739 — 41 ,
41 GCpqCNNpq.
1 p j C p q , q j GHf Np q * (741
(741 — 42 ,
42 CGGNNpqrCCpqr.
42 r j G G q N p N p * 015 p / N p — 43 ,
43 GCpqCGqNpNp .
5 p j G p q , q j G q N p , r ( N p * 043 — 44 ,

44 GG sGqNp pG
GG pq qG
GsNp .
5 p f G N p q , q j G q p , r f p * 03 5 — 45 ,
45 CGsGqpCCNpqGsp .
 THEOREMS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 51

4 4 s \N
\ N q * (736 p f q , q f N p — 46 ,

46 GGpqGNqNp .

44 sfq> ql&q * plqq»qlNp —

pl 47 ,

47 GGpNqGqNp .
45 s j N q * 036 p f q , q j p — 48 ,
48 GGNpqGNqp .
45 s f q , q f N q * 03 p f q , q j p — 49 ,
49 GG NpNqGqp .

Theses 46, 47, 48, 49 form the four l a ws o f t ra n sp o si t i o n .

Thesiss 4 6 perm it
Thesi itss ns to recognirec ognize ze an im im plicati
plication on of the
t y p e G N q N p o n th t h e s t re
r e n g t h o f a n i m p lil i c a ti
tio n o f t h e t y p e
Cp q . T o p u t i t g en er all all y , th
t h e law
law s o f t r an sp o si ti t i o n p er m i t
u s, o n t h e st r en g t h o f an accep t ed i m p l i cat i o n , t o accep t
an i m p l icat
icat io
io n w h os o s e an t ece d en t is co n t rad r ad i ct o r y t o t h e
consequent of the former implication, and whose con-
seq u en t i s co n t r ad i ct o r y t o t h e an t eced en t o f t h e f o r m er
implication. By applying Thesis 46 to the sentence “if
today is Thursday, then tomorrow is Friday” we obtain
t h e sen ten
ten ce “if“i f ' to m o r ro ro w i s n o t F r iid d ay , t h e n t o d ay is
not Thursday”.
Theses 18, 21, 35, 39, 40, 46 occur as axioms in the
first axiom system of the sentential calculus, given by
Fr eg e i n h i s B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t [[3]
3].. Y e t Thesis
Thesis 21 is su p er-
fluous as an axiom, for it can be proved by Theses 18
and 35 5.
In Section
Secti on 1.2, 1.2, we ha ve dedu ced from Thesi Thes is 2
a m at h em at ical
ical p r o o f b elo elo n g in
in g t o th
t h e categ
cat eg o r y o f w h a t
is called a p a g o g i e p ro o f s. B y m ean s o f t h e l aws o f
transposition we can formalize certain apagogie proofs
w h ich
ich ar e m o st f req l y u sed . T o p r o v e a t h eo r em T
r eq u e n t ly
the following reasoning is often employed: the falsehood
o f t h eo r em T iiss ass a ssu u m ed , wh ich
ich i s tan
t an t am o u n t t o t h e
assu m p t io
io n of
o f t h e tr
t r u t h o sen ten
ten ce N T . A conclusion W .
52 II- t h e s e n t e n t ia l c a l c u l u s

of which it is otherwise known that it is false, is drawn

f r o m t h at assu m p t i o n ; t h u s, i t i s k n o wn t h at sen t en ce
N W is true. Since the assumption has resulted in a false
conclusi
concl usion,
on, i t m u st be false.
false. H ence sentence N T is false,
and therefore sentence T is true.
In th e sen tential calcul
calculus us the reasoni
rea soning
ng given
gi ven above
would be: in Thesis 48 we make the substitutions p j T ,
q f W , and we obtain
CCNTWGNWT .

Sin ce i t is
Sin i s d e m o n str
st r ated
ated i n t h e p r o o f t h a t C N T W , w e
a p p l y t h e r u l e o f d e t a c h m e n t a n d o b t a i n C N W T . Since
t h e a n t e c e d e n t N W of the last implication is accepted,
we again
again app l y th e rule of de t ach m en t and ob t ain thesi thesiss T .
1 p / C N p q y q l G N q p * 04 8 — 50 ,
50 CCCNqprCCNpqr.
22 q jC
j C q r y r j C N r N q * 046 p f q y q j r — 5 1 ,
51 GCpCqrCpGNrNq.
22 q jC j C r N q * 047 p ( q y q j r — 52 ,
j C q N r , r jC
52 GGpCqNrGpCrNq.
50 r jC
j C C p q q * 015 p j q , q j p — 53 ,
53 GCNpqCCpqq.
21 p j G N p q , q j G p q y r j q * 053 — 54 ,
54 GGpqGGNpqq .

Theses 53
Theses 5 3 and 5 4 are rem arkable in th a t the y pe rm i t us
to recognize the sentence q on the strength of two recog-
nized implications of the types C p q a n d C N p q (with
equiform consequents and contradictory antecedents).
Consequently, a sentence implied by two contradictory
sentences is true.
Theses 18, 2 1 , 2 2 , 30, 3, 54 appear as axioms of the
sen tential
tential calcul
calculus
us in
in an articl
art iclee b y D. H ilb e rt6.
rt6. One of
 t h eo r ems o f t h e s e n t e n t ia l c a l c u l u s 53

the m , how ever, nam ely Thesis

Thesis 30,
30, is supe rf
rfluous,
luous, since
since
it can he prov ed b y m eans of the rem aining
aining ones
ones 7.
4 4 s ( C p N q * (747
(747 — 55 ,

55 0 CpqCCpNqNp .

Thesi s 55 pe rm its
Thesis its us to recognize
recognize a sentence of the typ e
N p o n t h e st r en g t h o f sen t en ces o f t h e t y p e G p q a n d
C p N q , T hus a sentence w hich i m pli pl i es twtw o. co ntrad icto
icto ry
sentences is false. The apagogic reasoning based on Thesis
5 5 was know n in i n an ti
tiqq u it
ityy . T he C hrist
hri stii an a u tho r O r igenes
ge nes,,
wh o li li v ed ini n t h e t h i r d cen t u r y A .D ., g iiv v es a n ex am p le,
l e,
seemingly of Stoic origin, of the following consequence:
i f y o u kn k n o w t h a t y o u a r e d e a d , t h e n y o u a r e d e a d ; if if

ya o
ndu kc o
nno se
swe qtuheant tl
tl yy oyuo ua r ed o d n
e aodt , ktnhoewn tyhoaut ayroeu naorte ddeeaadd;.
The first premise is based on the assumption that all
knowledge is true, and the second, on the assumption
t h a t if
if o n e k n ow o w s so m eth eth in
i n g th t h e n o n e i s n o t d ead . I n
conformity with the conclusion drawn, no one can know
t h a t h e is is d ead . W e d i rect r ect th t h e r ead er ’s
’s at ten
t en t io
io n t o
Thesiss 55 because it is often
Thesi oft en claiclaim m ed th a t tw tw o sentences
sentences
of the types G p q a n d C p N q cannot both be true. This
errr oneous view
er view resu l ts from from the fac t th a t people peopl e forget
forget
t h at a t r u e i m p l i cat i o n m ay h av e a f al se an t eced en t .
1 p f G N p q , q jG G p q q * <753 — 56 ,
56 GCGGpqqrCONpqr .

56 g/r, v(GGpqGGqrr * (73

(732 g / r , s f q — 57 ,
57 GGNprGCpqGCqrr .

1 p J G j f p r , q jC G p q G C q r r , r f s * C57 — 58 ,

58 C G G C pq C GqrrsC GN p r s ,
58 sJCGqrGGpqr * (721 p j G p q , qfGqr — 59 ,
59 GGqrGCp qr .
G G N pr GGqrGCpqr
 5

54 II. THE SEN

SENTEN
TENTIAL
TIAL CALCULUS

Theses 19, 37, 59 form a system of theses which suf-

fices to prove all the theorems of the sentential calculus;
h en ce t h at sy st em i s i n f er en t i aJl y eq u i v al en t t o o u r t h r ee
ax i o m s. T h e t h eses q u o t ed ab o v e ar e i n t er est i n g i n v i ew
of their structural relationship: they are, respectively, of
the type 8: C a f i , G a y , CyCfia.

22 q j C N p r , r fC
f C C q r C C p q r , p j s * 059 — 60,

60 CCsCXfprC$CCqrCCpqr.

6 0 s jC p r j pfJifp
pfJifp * 0 4 1 q j r — 6 1 ,

61 C C p rC qrC C N p q r .
r C C qr

Thp esis
jy esiasn d61p differ
dif
arfers
e sr ep
from Thesis
Thesi
l aced s ect
r esp 59 ion
v ellyy in
b yt hpa ta th
n de Nsentences
sent
p . ences

1 q j N N p , r jq * 0 4 0 — 6 2 ,

62 CCNNpqCpq.

21 r j p * 018 q { p , p j q — 6 3 ,

63 CqCpp.

4 8 p / g , 2 / G p p * 063 q l ^ q — 64,
64 GN C ppq.

6 1 p / g , r / g , q jN
j N G p p * 016 p j q — 0 6 4 — 6 5 ,

65 CCNqNCppq.

Theses 62 and 65 will be useful in Section III.7.

4 8 qjCpq * 0 3 6 — 66,

66 GNGpqp.
46 P/2> 2 / 0 p g * 0 1 8 — 6 7 ,
67 CNCpqNq.
 THEOREMS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 55

Theses 6 6 an d 67 d em o n str
st r ate
ate t h a t th
th e fal
f alse
sehh o o d of
o f an
implication entails the truth of the antecedent of that
i m plicati
plication
on an d th e falsehood
falsehood of th e consequent.

4 8 p f q , q /C
/ C p N q * (718 q f N q — 68,

68 CNCpNqq,

Thesis 6 8 dif
differ
ferss from
from Thesis
Thesis 67
67 only in
i n th a t the sen
tences q a n d N q are replaced, respectively, by the con
tradictory sentences N q a n d q.
51 q j G p q , rj q * (72
(720 — 6 9 ,
69 GpGNqNGpq.

Thesis 69 is connected with Theses 6 6 a n d 67 j it shows

that the truth of the antecedent and the falsehood of the
consequent of an im plicati
plication
on en tail
tai l th
th e falsehood
falsehood of th a t
implication.
52 q j C p N q , rrff q * (720 q j N q — 7 0,
0,
70 GpCqNGpNq.

Th esis
esis 70 differ
differss from
fr om Thesis
Thesis 69 only in
i n th a t sentences
N q a n d q are replaced, respectively, by sentences q
and N q.
70 p j G p p , qjGqq * (716
(716 — (716
(716 p f q — 7 1,
1,
71 N G G ppN G qq.

Thes is 71 i s a n ex am ple
Thesi pl e of a theorem th a t begins begins w i t h
the functor N .
15. W e n o w g iviv e a n u m b er o f t h eo r em s i n w h ich
ich t h e
symbols of alterna ti
tio
o n occur alongsi
alongsidede th e p ririm
m it
itive
ive t erm s.
First we recall the definition of alternation.

Ol A pq — G N pq .
3 * 01-72,
72 O pA p q .
 5*

56 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

The proof li l i ne of Thesis

Thesis 72 indica tes th a t in Thesis
Thesis 3
w e hav e replaced,
replaced, in conform
conf orm it y w i th the role of replace
replace
m ent, the express
expressii on equif equi f orm w it
ith
h the righ t side
side of
Definition 0 1 by an expression eqniform with the left
side
side of th a t d efinit
efinitii on .
18 p/J
p/J Vp * 0 1 -7 3 ,
73 GqApq.
By Theses 72 and 73 every sentence implies an alterna
tion, one of the arguments of which is the sentence in
question, and the other argument is an arbitrary sentence.
2 * 01 g/p- 74,
74 G Appp.

I n t h i s p r o o f we h av e n o t r eso r t ed d i r ect l y t o Def i n i 

tion 01, but to one of its correct substitutions. Thesis 74,
t o g eth
et h er w i t h t h e su b st it
i t u t io
i o n q j p of Thesis 73, yields the
law of tautology for alternation, which, using the sym
b o l E m ight by n o ted dow n as a singl singlee thesis:
thesis: E A p p p .
48 * 01-01 p f q , q j p - 7 5 ,
75 G ApqAqp.

In the proof above we have twice applied the rule of

replacem ent: w e ha v e first availed avail ed oursel
ourselvesves direc
dir ec tl
tlyy of
D efinit
efi nition
ion 01,
01, an d th e n of its co rrect su b stituti
sti tutioo n . Thesis
Thesis 75
is the law of co m m uta tivity of alterna tion ti on ; i t st at es t h at
t h e o r d er o f t h e ar g u m en t s wh i ch o ccu r i n an al t er n at i o n
may be changed.
22 p f E f p * 0 1 - 0 1 g /r
/ r - 7 6,
6,
76 G G qrC A pqA pr.
21 qfEFq * 01 p f q , q jr • 0 1 p f q , q j C p r • 77,
77 GC pA qrA qG pr .
77 p jN
j N p * 01 q ( A q r • 01 qjr - 78,
78 G A p A g rA q A p r.
 THEOREMS OP THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 57

Theses 73, 74, 75, 76, 78 form the axiom system of the
sen tential
tenti al calcul
calculusus prese nted in P r i n c i p i a M a tth i e a [35
h e m a t ie [35].
].
That axiom system is preceded by the following defini-
tion of implication: C p q = A N p q , f o r t h e p r i m i t i v e t er m s
o f t h at sy st em ar e A a n d JJO OT. I n t h i s w a y a d e fif in e d t e r m
occurs in the axioms themselves. Thesis 78 can be proved
b y m e a n s o f t h e r e m a in in g a x io m s , a n d a s s u c h is s u p e r -
fluo
fl uo us as a n axiom 9.
9 * 01*79,
79 CC ApqrCpr.

19 p j W p * 01*80,
80 CCApqrCqr.

61 * 01*81,
81 G C p rC
rC C q r C A p q r .

Thesis 81 enables
Thesis enabl es us to acc ep t , on the stren g th of sen-
tences of the type: C p r a n d Cqr, a s e n t e n c e o f t h e t y p e
C A p g r . Theses 7 79
9 , 80 and 81 m ay be ad op ted as axiom axiom s
of the sentential calculus if we adopt A and 27 as the
p r i m i t i v e t e r m s a n d a d m i t t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f d e f in e d te r m s
in axioms. The said theses are structurally related, for

they are, respectively, of the type Ca/?, C a y , C f i C y a 10.

53 * 01 *8 2,
82 CApqCCpqq.

37 r ( q * 01 8 3 ,
83 CCCpqqApq.

Theses 82
Theses 82 and 83 dem on strate,
strate, as m enti
entione
one d above
(cf.
cf. the rem ark to Thesis
Thesi s 27),
27), the ad m issibil
issibilit
ity
y of the
the
following definition of alternation: A p q = G C p q q .
1 6 p j C N p q * 011 *84 ,
84 CApqCNpq.
58 n . TH E SENTENTIAL CAL
LCCU
ULLU
USS

T h e sy m b o l “I ” w h ichi ch o ccu rsrs inin t h e p r o o f l i n e in

i n d i cat es
t h a t in
i n t h e a p p r o p r ia
ia t e s u b s t it
it u t i o n o f T h e si
s is 1616 w e
replace on l y tthh e firs t expressi
expres sion,
on, equiform
equiform w it ithh th e rig ri g h t
side of the definition. Thesis 84 corresponds to the Stoic
scheme of inference, called modus toTlendo ponens , which
the Stoics used to symbolize as follows:
p o r q.
It is not true that p .
Therefore q.

16 p j G N p q * 0 1 1 1 - 8 5 ,
85 CCNpqApq.

41 * 01 p /iy p - 8 6 ,

86 G C p q A P f p q.

62 * 01 p l& p •87,

87 CANpqCpq.

Theses 86 a n d 87 d em o n st rat
rat e t h e ad m i ssib
ssib i li
li t y o f a d e
finiti
fi nitio
on of i m plica
pli ca t ion such as is ad op ted in P r i n c i p i a
M a t h e m a t i c a ((cf
cf.. th e rem ark to Thesis 78 78 above).

C p q * 087 — 8 8 ,
±6 p f A N p q , q jjC

88 GNGpqNANpq.

46 p j C p q , q j A P f p q * 086 — 80,

89 GNANpqNGpq.

85 qilifp * 016 p j N p — 9 0 ,
90 A p lS fp .

Thesis 90 is a symbolic expression of the l a w o f t h e e x

c l u d e d m i d d l e , w h ich
ich st ates
ates t h a t o f tw o co n t r ad i cto
ct o r y
sen t en ces at l east o n e i s t r u e. T h e sen t en ce t o d ay i s

t h eo r ems o f t h e s e n t e n t ia l c a l c u l u s f>9

W ed n esd ay o r t o d a y is i s n o t W ed n esd ay ” is
i s an a p p l icat
icatii o n
of Thesis 90.
16. Th e foll
follow ing seriseries of theorem s includes, in a d d i
t io
io n to
t o t h e f u n ct o r s w h ich
ich h av e alr
alr ead y o ccu r red
red , also
also t h e
f u n c t o r K . The definition of conjunction is repeated here:

02 K p q = N G p N q .

70 * 02-91,
91 CpCqKpq.

21 r j K p q * C91
C91 — 92 ,
92 GqGpKpq.

Theses 91 and 92 enables us to accept, on the strength

of two accepted sentences, the conjunction whose ar
guments are the sentences in question.
66 qfNq * 02 -93 ,
93 C K pqp.

68 * 02-94,
94 CKpqq.

Theses 93 and 94 enable us to accept, on the strength

of an accepted conjunction, any of its arguments.
3 0 q f K p p * 091 q j p — 9 5 ,
95 G pK pp.

Thesiss 95 an d th e su b stitu
Thesi stitu ti
tioo n of Thesis
Thesi s 94, q / p , give the
law of tautology for conjunction-, it might be symbolized
as one thesis: E K p p p .
1 p fK
fK p q , q fp * 0 9 3 — 9 6 ,

96 GGprGKpqr.
1 p fK p q * 094 — 97,
97 CCgrGKpqr.
60 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

Theses 96 and 97 enable ns to recognize an implication

o f t h e t y p e G K p q r on the strength of an implication of
t h e t y p e G p r o r Cqr.

5 p fG K p q r , q fC q K p q , r jC q r , s jp
* 022 q j K p q , p j q — 0 91
91 — 9 8 ,
98 qrr .
CG KpqrCp Gq

21 p fC K p q C q r , q j C K p q q , r j G K p q r * 095 p j K p q — 0 9 4 — 9 9 ,

99 C G K p q G q r C K p q r.

1 p j O p r , q jC K p q r , r js * 096 — 100,
100 0 0 G K p q r ssG
G G p r ss..

100 r jC
j C q r , ss// G K p q r * 099 — 101,

101 0 C p Cq
Cq rG K p q r .

Theses 98 and 101 are the l a w s o f e x p o r t a t i o n a n d i m p o r

t a t i o n , referred to above (cf. p. 28-29).

101 p j G p q , q jG q r , r f G p r * 01 — 102,

102 CKGpqCqrCpr.

101 p j C q r , q j C p q , r j C p r * 0 2 2 — 1 03
03 ,
103 r G p q C p r.
G K G q rG

T h e law
law o f i m p o r tat
tat io
io n en ab les
les n s t o g iv
i v e t o t h e l aw o f
th e syll
syllogism
ogism th e form of Thesis Thesis 1 0 2 or Thesis 103.

101 g j C p q , r jjq
q * 0 20
2 0 — 1 04
04 ,
104 GKp Gp q q.

Thesis 104 corresponds to the Stoic scheme of inference

called m o d u s p o n e n s .
101 r j K q p * 092 q j p , p f q — 1 0 5 ,
105 G K p q K q p.
 THEOREMS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 61

Thesis 105 is the l a w o f c o m m u t a t i v i t y o f c o n j u n c t i o n .

101 qfUTp, r j q * 0 3 — 1 0 6 ,
106 CKpAFp{ jf
jf.

As mentioned above, Thesis 106 was known t o D u n s

Scotus.
1 0 1 q / XTq , rjN C p q * 0 69
XTq 6 9 — 1 07
07 ,
107 GKpNqNCpq.

47 p j K p & q , q j C p q * 0107 — 108,

108 GGpqNKpNq.

108 q j p * 0 16
1 6 — 1 09
09 ,

109 N K pN p.
Th esis
esis 109
1 09 is a sym bolic bolic form ulation
ulation of thth e law of con-
tr adiction , which states that two contradictory sentences
cannot both be true. The sentence “it is not true that
( to
to d a y is
i s W e d n e s d ay
a y a n d t o d a y i s n o t W e d n e sd
sd a y )”
)” i s
an application of Thesis 109.
88 q / N q * 02 *110 ,

110 CKpqNANpNq.

8 9 q f N q * 02 *111,
111 CNANpNqKpq.

Thes es 110
Theses 110 an d 111
111 d em on st
strat
ratee th e adm i ssibil
ssibilii t y of the
following definition of conjunction: K p q — N A N p N q .
47 p j K p q , q f A N p A f q * 0 1 1 0 — 1 1 2 ,
112 CANpNqNKpq.

48 p j A N p N q , q j K p q * O l l l — 1 13
13 ,
113 CNKpqANpNq.
Theses 112 and 113 are d e M o r g a n ' s l a w s , wh i ch st at e
62 II. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

t h a t t h e r e i s a b i lat
lat er a l i m p l icat
icat io
io n b et ween t h e n e g at io
io n
of the conjunction of two sentences and the alternation
of the negations of those sentences.
65 * 02 q j l Sg-114,
114 G N C p qK p N q .

107 p f N p * 01 *115,
115 C K N p N q N A pq.

114 p / R p * 01-116,

116 G N A p q K N p iN
iN q .

Theses 115 and 116 also are d e M o r g a n ’ s l a w s ; they state

t h a t t h e r e is
i s a b i llat
at er a l im
im p li
l i cati
cat i o n b etw
etw een,
een , t h e n eg ati
at i o n
o f t h e al t er n at i o n o f t wo sen t en ces an d t h e co n j u n ct i o n
of the negations of those sentences.
17. T he foll
follow ing seri series of theo rem s w ill also also includ e
S h ef f er’ s symb o l , or symbol of a l t ern a t i ve d en i a l . Its defini
tion is now recalled:
03 D p q = G p N q .
38 * 03 2/P-117,
GDppNp.
117
11 7
18 q f N p * 03 q j p -118,
118
11 8 GNpDpp.

These s 117
Theses 117 and 118 118 de m on str
strate
ate th
t h e ad m i ssibil
ssibilii t y of the
following definition of negation by means of the symbol
o f al t er n at i v e d en i al :
N p = D pp.
47 +03-03 p ) q , g / p - 1 1 9 ,
119 G D p q D q p.
Thesis 119 is the l a w o f c o m m u t a t iv
i v i ttyy of a lltt eerr n a ttii v e
denial.
denial.

THEOREMS O F TH E SENTEN TIAL uAL

LCCULUS 63

55 * 03-120,
120 GGpqCBpqNp.
120 * 03 p j D p q , q i p ' 121 ,
121 OCpqDDpqp.
1 p f G p q , q lD
l D D p g p * (7121 — 122,
122 C G D D p q p rC
rC C p g r .
122 r j D p D p q * (7119 p j D p q , q f p — 1 2 3 ,
123
12 3 C C p q D p B p q.
68 * 03-124,
124 GNBpqq.

22
q!NDpq<s rjq * (7124 — 1 2 5 ,
1 25 CGpNDpqGpq.
125 * 03 q f D p q - 126 ,
126 CDpDpqGpq,

Thes es 123
Theses 123 an d 126 12 6 d em on strat
st ratee th
t h e adm i ssibil
ssi bilii t y of the
f ol
olllow ing d efinit
efini t ion of im plicati
plication on b y m eans of th t h e sym bol
o f al t er n at i v e d en i al al o n e:
G pq = B p D p q .

S h e ff
ff e r h a s s h o w n 11 t h a t a l l t h e t e r m s o f t h e s e n t e n t i a l
cal cu l u s can b e d ef i n ed b y m ean s o f al t er n at i v e d en i al .
I t c a n b e se s e en
e n fr
f r o m t h e r e su
s u l ts
ts o b t a in
in e d a b o v e th
th a t th e
t er m s o f t h e sen t en t i al cal
c alcu
cu llu
u s w h ich
ich ap p ear i n o u r sy stemstem
can b e d ef i n ed b y m ean s o f t h e sy m b o l o f al t er n at i v e
d en i al:
al: f o r n e g at io i o n an d i m p l icat
icat io
io n t h i s ca n b e seen seen
d irectly fromfrom Theses 117, 118, 123 an d 126; a ltern ltern ation ,
co n j u n ct io
io n an d eq u i v alen
alen ce ar e d ef in in ab l e b y m ean s o f

n eg at io
io n an d i m p l icat
icat io
io n , w h ich
ich can easil
easil y b e red
red u ced t o
alternative denial.
T h e Fr en ch l o g i ci an J. Mo o d g av e a si n g l e ax i o m
of the sen tential
tenti al calcul
cal culus,
us, w itith
h altern ative den i al as
64 I T . T H E S E N T E N T I A L CA L CU L U S

t h e o n ly
ly p r iim
m i t i v e t e rm
r m 12 K icod’s
icod’s axiom
axi om is is ve ry com
p lic a te d a n d n o t v e r y in tu itiv e . I n o u r n o ta tio n i t c a n h e
w ritten
ritten dow n as ffol olllows:
D D p D qr D D tD ttD D s q D D p s D ps .

I n st ea d o f t h e u su a l r u le
le o f d et ach m en t , f o r m u l ated
at ed w i t h
resp ec t to im plicati
plicationon , K i cod’s
cod’s system
system con t ains ai ns th e rule
r ule
w h ich
ich p e r m i t s u s t o a ccep t t h e ex p r essi ess i o n y o n t h e
stren g th of th e recognized
recognized expressi
expression on D a D f i y a n d t h e
recognized expression a.
18..
18 T he la st seriseries of t heo rem s of th e se n ten ti tial
al cal
cal
cu lu
lu s in
in clu
clu d es t h eo rem
r em s t h a t co n t ain
ai n t h e sy m b o l o f e q u i
valence, i n t r o d u ced ab o v e b y Def i n i t i o n 0 4 :

04 E p q = N G G p q N G q p .
1 6 p fN G G p q N G q p * 041*02 p f G p q , q fG q p 11*127,

127 G E pqK GpqGqp.

16 p f t f C G p q N G q p * 02 p f G p q , q(Gqp I* 0411*128,
128 GK GpqGqpEp
pqq.

T h eses
es es 12
1 2 7 a n d 1 2 8 sh
sh ow
o w w h a t h as a l r ead y b een p o i n ted
t ed
out above, namely that the following definition of equi
v a le
le n c e m i g h t b e u s e d :
B pq = K G pqG qp,
66 p f G p q , q f N C q p * 04*129,
129 GEpqGpq.
6 8 p fG p q , qfGqp * 04-130,
130 C Ep qC qp.

T h eses
ese s 1 29
29 an d 1 30
3 0 p e r m i t u s to
t o accep t , o n th
t h e st r en g t h
of an accepted equivalence of two sentences, the impli
cat i o n b et ween o n e o f t h ese t wo sen t en ces an d t h e o t h er .
7 0 p f G p q , q f G q p * 04*131,
131 CGpqGGqpEpq.
 THEOREMS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 65

Thesis 131
Thesis 1 31 pe rm i ts us to acce pt the equivalence
equivalence of t w o
sentences on the strength of two implications holding in
t w o d i recti
recti on s betw een t he se tw o sentences.
sentences. W hen Thesis
Thesis
1 3 1 i s ap p l i ed t o t h e t h eo r em s p r o v ed ab o v e, a n u m b er
of law s are ob tainetaine d w hich
hich hav e th e form of equivalequivalences.
ences.

131 q j p * 0 1
166 — 0 16
1 6 — 1 32
32 ,
132 Epp.

The sis
sis 132
132 is th
th e l a w o f i d e n t i t y i n t h
hee f o rm o f a n eq u i vva
a len
l en ce
ce..

131 p f G p G q r , qjGqGpr * 021

02 1 — 021 p f q , q j p — 1 3 3 ,
13 3 E G p G q rrG
G q G p r.
r.

Thesis 133 is the l a w o f e o m m u t a M o n i n t h e f o r m o f a n

equivalence.

131 p j G p G p q , q j Cp q * 030 — 018 q f Cp q — 1 34

34 ,

134 EG pC pqG pq.

131 q j l f N p * 0 40
40 — 0 4
499 — 1 3 5,
5,

135
13 5 EpN N p.

Thesis 135 is the l a w o f d o u b l e n eg a t i o n i n t h e f o rm o f

an equivalence.

131 p j C p q , q j C N q N p * 0 4 6 — 0 4 9 p f q , q j p — 1 36
36 ,
136
13 6 E C p q G H fq N p .

Thesis 136 is the l a w o f t r a n s p o s i t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f a n

equivalence .

131 p j G p q , q f A N p q * 0 86
8 6 — 0 87
8 7 — 1 3 7,
7,

137
13 7 EG pqAN pq.
131 p j G p G q r j q j G K p q r * 0 10
1 0 1 — 0 98
9 8 — 1 38
38 ,

138 E G p C qrG K pqr.

66 I I . T H I S S E N T E N T I A L CA L CU L U S

T h e laws o f i m p o r tat
tat io
io n an d ex p o r tat
tat io
io n are
ar e w r it
it ten
ten d own
o wn
in one sentence, namely Thesis 138.

131 p f N p , q j D p p * 0 11
1 1 8 — 0 1 1 7 — 1 39
39 ,

139 jW N p D p p .
131 p f C p q , q jD
j D p D p q * 0 12
1 2 3 — 0 1 26
2 6 — 1 40
40 ,
140 E C pqJD pD pq.

Theses 137, 139, 140 are equivalents of the possible de-

finitions mentioned above.
We sh al l n o w p r o v e a n u m b er o f t h eses i n wh i ch d e-
fined symbols do not occur. They will prove useful in
Section I I I . 7 13.
4 0 p ( G p p * C 16 — 1 4 1,
1,
141 N N C pp.

5 p j C N C p q r , q jC
j C N q N C p q , r jC
j C N q r , ssjj p

* 022 q jN
j N C p q , p j N q — 069
06 9 — 142,
142 G C J tf C p q r G p C N g r .

G N G p q G N q r, q j C N G p q N q , r jC N C pqr
2 1 p jjG

* 035 p j N C p q , q j N q — 0 6 7 — 1 4 3 ,
143 0 G N C p q C N q rC N C p q r.
2 5 p f N G p q , r j C J P q r , s f G N G p q r , q j p * 01
0 1 43
43 — 0 66
66 — 1 4 4 ,
144 GGp C N q r G N C p q r .

22 qjGq r, rI
rIGC
GC rs Cqs * 01 p f q , q j r , r j s — 1 4 5,
rsCqs 5,
145 CCpCqrCpCCrsCqs.

C p C C rrss C q s , r j C C r s C p C q s
l p j G p C q r } q JJC
* 0145
0 145 — 0 21 , q ( G r s , rjCqs — 1 4 6 ,
 146 CCpCqrCCrsCpCqs.

III. SELECTED PROBLEMS FROM

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTI
SENTENTIAL
AL
CALCULUS

6. The Consistency and the Independence of Axioms of the Sentential Calculus.

Many-valued Logic

19. I n the n ex t tw
19. tw o secti
secti ons w e shall he concerned
w i t h p r ob
o b le
le m s t h a t d o n o t b el
e lo n g t o t h e s y st
ste m o f t h e
sen tential calcul
calculusus itsel
itself,
f, b u t are p r o b l e m s i n w h i c h th e
s ent ent i al cal cul us i s an obj ect of i nves t i gat i on, and t hus
belong to the methodology of that system. These issues,
t h em selv
selv es o f g r ea t i m p o r tan
tan ce , h av e n ev er b een r aised ai sed
in philosoph
philosoph i cal logi logicc an d ha ve developeddevel oped en ti tirely
rely in
conn ectiect i on w i th m athe m ati atica
ca l l ogic.
ogic. O ur analysis
analysis will will n o t
t ak e t h e f o r m o f f o r m al i zed an d co m p l et e p r o o f s, as wer e
u sed ab o v e i n p r o v i n g t h eo r em s o f th t h e sen t en t ial
i al calcu
calcu lulu s.
T h e p r o o fsfs t o b e p r esen t ed b elo elo w m i g h t b e fo fo r m ali
al i zed
w i t h i n so
s o m e a x io
i o m a ti
t i c s y s te
te m , b u t t h a t w o u ld ld b e e x -

trem ely diffi

trem dif ficucu lt.
lt. O ur proofs
proofs w il l be carried o ut as is i s usu ally
ally
d o n e inin m at h em at ics,ics, i .e.
.e. , we sh all
al l st a r t fr
fr o m assu
ass u m p ti tio n s
whose truth will be dictated by intuition. Our purpose is
only to convince the reader of the truth of the theorems
given.
T h e f i rs
r s t p r o b le
le m t o b e d e a l t w i t h is i s t h a t of of th e
cons i s t ency of the axioms of the sentential calculus. It
w i l l b e sh own o wn t h a t i f we st a r t f ro ro m o u r ax io io m s an d
p r o c e e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r u le s o f in f e r e n c e , w e c a n
nev er prove tw o sentences, sent ences, one of w hich hi ch has th e form for m a,
a n d t h e o t h e r N a , and thus are contradictory. This is
v er y i m p o r t an t , f o r sh s h o u l d we p r o v e tw t w o co n t r ad i cto
cto r y
sen t en ces, we wo u l d h av e t o r eco g n i ze t h e t r u t h o f b o t h
68 III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

these sentences, since we recognize the truth of every

sentence that is provable in the sentential calculus. But,
in conformity with the principle of contradiction, two
contradictory sentences cannot both be true. The possi
b i l i t y o f a r r i v in g a t a c o n t r a d ic tio
ti o n w o u ld t h u s u n d e r m in e
the fou nd ation ation of ou r systemsystem ; ce rt rtain
ain theses
thes es of the systemsystem
could then be false sentences, and the sentential calculus
would lose its value as a theory in which only true sen
tences are provable. The inconsistency of our system
would also entail another consequence. Should we prove
two theses of the forms, respectively, a a n d N a , t h e n
we could apply to .Axiom 3 the substitution p j a an d
t h u s o b t ai n
CaCNaq.

By applying detachment twice we could prove thesis q.

B y su b sti
st i t u t in
i n g f o r q a ny m eaningful expres
expressi
sion
on we w ould
ould
thereby prove it. Hence in an inconsistent system every
meaningful expression would be a thesis of that system,
which would completely obliterate the difference between
the falsehood and the truth of meaningful expressions.
In order to carry out a proof of consistency of the
system of the sentential calculus let us draw attention

to the fact that in our system definitions are merely ab

b r e v ia tio
ti o n s a n d d o n o t p la y a n y e s s e n tia
ti a l ro
r o le i n t h e p ro o fs
fs..
T he rule of replacem
replacem ent p erm i t s us to replace replace in in any thesis,
thesis,
th e defi
def iniens
niens b y th e defi def iniendum
ni endum . W e could could prove th a t,
in o ur systs ystem
em , from
from an y thesis
t hesis th a t contains
contains a defi def iniendum
ni endum
we m ay also also dedu ce a thesis
thesis in w hich
hich th th e said definiendum
definiendum
i s replaced
r eplaced by th e ap pro priate defi definiens
niens.. In this thi s w ay, in
our system of the sentential calculus every proof has its
counterpart in which no defined terms occur. Hence if
our system were inconsistent, i.e., if we could prove in
it two contradictory sentences of the form, respectively,
jjS
S a n d -/V/5, w e c o u ld a ls lso
o p r o v e tw o s e n te tenn c e s c o n ta in in g
no defined
defined term s, ha ving th e form , respe respe ctive
ctive ly, a an d JV'a,
 CO N S I S T E N CY O F A X I O M S . M A N Y - V A L U E D L O G I C 69

where a w o u ld ld d if
i f f er
e r f r o m a t t h e m o st b y h av i n g a cer t ain
ai n
definie
defi niendum
ndum replaced by the correspondi corresponding ng defi
definiens
niens.. B u t
no defined
defined term s w ould oul d occur in th e proofs of sentences sentences
o f t h e f o r m a an d N a . Thus to prove the consistency of
our system
system it suf su ff ices
ce s to to de m on strat
st ratee th a t the definit
definitii on-
free system of the sentential calculus is consistent. Such
a system
system differdifferss from
from o u r system
system only in in- th a t it includes
ncl udes
n o r u l e o f r ep l acem en t , an d t h e r u l e o f su b st i t u t i o n i s
restricted to meaningful expressions that contain no de
fined terms.
Th e ba sic ide a of a proof of c onsistencyonsistency of th e d efinit
efinitiion-
free sentential calculus consists in constructing a certain
p r o p e r t y <p0 which satisfies the following three conditions:
1) property <pa is an attribute of every axiom;
2) if an expression has property <p0> t h e n e v e r y s u b 
stitu ti
tioo n of th a t expressi
expression (containing
(containing no defined
defined term
term s)
h a s p r o p e r ty
ty <p0; if any two expressions have property <p0,
t h e n t h e e x p re re ss
s s io
io n o b t a in
in e d f ro
ro m t h e m o n t h e s tr
tr e n g t h
o f t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t al so h as p r o p er t y <p0',
3) two contradictory expressions, i.e., of the forms a
a n d JO fa, respe ctive
JOfa, ctive ly, c an no t b o th h av e p ro p e rty <p0.
C ondit
ondi tion 2) can be form f orm ulated
ulat ed m ore briefl
bri efly
y b y statin
statin g
t h a t p r o p e rt
r t y <p0 is hereditary with respect to the rules of

inference of the definition-free sentential calculus.

I f we succ
su cceeeed d in
i n i n d i cati
cat i n g a p r o p er ty
t y <p0 w hich satisfies
satisfies
t h e t h r ee co n d i t i o n s st at ed ab o v e, t h en t h e sy st em u n d er
inv estigation
estigati on is, of course,cour se, n o t incinc on sisten
sisten t, since
since every po s
sibl
si blee t hesis of th e system
system ha s p rop erty <p0 . T he la tte r fol folllows
from conditions 1) and 2). Every thesis of the system is
derived from axioms after a finite number of applications
of rules of inference. Since every axiom has property q>9
a n d p r o p e r t y <p^ i s h e r ed i tart ar y w i t h r esp e ct to t o t h e r u l es
o f i n fer
f eren
en ce
ce,, th
t h e n t h a t p r o p er tyt y m u st r each ev ery er y t h esis.
esis.
Sh ould, th e n , tw o expressions
expressions of the form form s o an d JV JVa,
r esp ect i v el y , b e t h eses o f t h e sy st em , t h ey wo u l d b o t h
h a v e t o p o ss
ss ess
es s p r o p er ty
t y <pQ) b u t this is im im possibl
possiblee in view
view
 6

70 111. m e t h o d o l o g y o f t h e s e n t e n t ia l c a l c u l u s

of condition 3). Therefore the system of the sentential

ealcnlus cannot be inconsistent.
W e sha ll now in d ic a te a p ro p e rty <p0 w hich satisfies
the three conditions in question. Let us consider the
symbolic equalities pertaining to negation and implication,
and given on pp. 23-24 above. They will be symbolized in
an abbreviated form as the following table:

0 0 1 N

0 I 1 1
1* 0 1 0

The symbols
symbols in the first column
column of th e tab le are the values
o f t h e ar g u m en t o f n eg at i o n o r t h e v al u es o f t h e f i r st
argum ent of imp li licati
cation;
on; th e values of th e secon second d argum en t
of implication are in the first row of the table. The four
values of imp licati lication
on corresponding
corres ponding to th e respective com
b in a ti o n s o f t h e v a lu e s o f t h e a r g u m e n ts a re t o b e fo u n d
in the two lower rows of the two middle columns, and the
values of negation, in the last column of the table.
I n th e p r o o f o f c o n s i s t e n c y w e n e e d n o t tr e a t th e s y m b o l s
“ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” a# falsehood
falsehood an d tru th . F o r us u s they are symbols
whose meanings are reduced to the role assigned to them

by Lt hete ut asb lneo w

a b oex
v eam
. i n e Ax i o m 1 . L et u s su b st i t u t e f o r
the variables p , q , r some of the symbols “0” and “1”,
so that equiform symbols are substituted for equiform
variables, e.g., p/1, g/0, r/0. The result is
(70 1 0 0 COOC IO.
IO .
L et u s r ed u ce t h e ex p r essi o n o b t ai n ed o n t h e st r en g t h
o f t h e t ab l e ab o v e:
OCIO
OCIOOO
OOO
OOOIO =*= C0C10 = 0 0 0 = 1 .
The expression under investigation has, after complete
reduction, changed into the symbol “1”. It can easily be
ascertained that for every substitution of the symbols 0

CO N S I S T E N CY O P A X I O M S . M A N Y - V A L U E D L O G I C 71

and “1” for variables in Axiom 1 tlie resulting expression

changes, after a reduction in accordance -with the table
above, into the symbol “ 1” . The num ber of such such sub 
stitutions will be finite, in the present case it will be
23 = 8 . I n g en er al , i t can b e d em o n st r at ed t h at f o r an
expression containing n diversiform variables the number
of such substitutions will be 2 n .
T h e p r o p e r t y t h a t , f o r ev er y su b s t it
i t u t io
i o n o f t h e sy m b o l
“ 0 ” or “ l ” for the variables, vari ables, this express
expressii on, after re 
duction in conformity with the table given above, always
changes into the symbol “ 1 ”, is exactly the property <p0 for
which we are searching.searching. The symbol “ 1” , which is m arke d
w itith
h an asterisk above, is called called th e designated value.
It is now to be demonstrated that the given property
93,1 sat
satii sfi
sfi es the thre e conditions
condit ions in question.
question. F irst, p rop erty
<p0 m u s t b e t h e p r o p e r t y o f o u r a x i o m s . I t h a s b e e n m e n 
t io
io n ed ab o vev e t h a t Axi
Ax i o m 1 h a s p r o p e r t y 9?0 • I f we in terp re t
the symbols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” as f al seh o o d an d t r u t h , r esp ec
tively, we see that if an expression has property q>0 this
is equivalent to the given expression changing into a true
sentence for all the substitutions for the variables.
I t can b e v er i f i ed d i r ect l y t h at t h e r em ai n i n g ax i o m s
al so h av e p r o p er t y <p0. F o r A x i o m 2 we h av e o n l y t wo
substitutions, p j 0 a n d p ( 1 , which can easily be checked:
CCiVO
iVOOO = <7(7
<7(710
100
0 = COO = 1 ,
C C N 1 1 1 = (7(7011 = (711 « 1 .
Fo r Ax i o m 3 t h er e ar e 2 2 = 4 substitutions.
substitut ions. L et one o f
t h em , p j l , q / 0 , be checked by way of example:
c i c m o = (71(700 = O il = 1 .
The checking of the remaining three substitutions is left

to the reader.
W e now consider condition
condit ion 2 ): property <jjpp0 is
is he red it
itary
ary
with respect to the rules of inference of the definition-free
sentential calculus. Suppose that the expression W h a s
6*

72 1 11
11 . M E T H O D O L O G Y O F T H E S E N T E N T I A L CA L CU
CU L U S

p r o p e r t y <p0 a n d t l i a t t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n p j a is performed,
where a is a meaningful expression that contains no
d ef i n ed t er m s. Su p p o se f u r t h er t h at t h e r esu l t i n g ex -
prr e s s i o n P d o e s n o t h a v e p r o p e r t y <p0j
p 0j i.e., that after
a cer t ai n su b st i t u t i o n i t ch an g es o n r ed u ct i o n i n t o t h e
sy m b o l “0 ” . A f ter t er th
t h i s su b st it
i t u t i o n t h e ex p ress
ressii o n a changes
o n r ed u ct io i o n i n t o a cer t ai n symsy m b o l. l . L et u s no
n o w su b st i tu tu t e
for p in th e expressi expres sion on W th e symbol into which a has
changed, and for the remaining variables, such symbols
r esp
es p ect iv iv el y as w e h av e su b st i t u t ed i n t h e ex pr p r ess
e ssii o n P .
For such a substitution the expression W wou ld also al so have
to change into th e sym bol “0” , w hich i s impossib imposs ible le.. Hence
ex p ress
ressii o n P can n o t ch an g e i n t o “0 ” f o r an y su b st i tu t u t io
io n
whatever. Thus, every substitution of an expression that
h a s p r o p e r t y tpQ also possesses that property.
Suppose now that certain expressions of the form
G a p an d a h a v e p r o p e r t y <p0. Should expression p n o t
h a v e p r o p e r ty
t y <pQ, t h en f o r a cer t ai n su b st i t u t i o n i t wo u l d
change into “ 0 ” . F or a correspondi
corr esponding ng sub stitution
sti tution a would
change into the symbol “1”, since it has property <p9.
Consequently, the expression C a p would change into “ 0 ”
in conform ity ity w ith
it h ou r table (O 10 = 0 ). T ha t, however,
is not possible, since the expression G a p h a s p r o p e r t y <pQ.

Hence expression p m u s t h a v e t h a t p r o p e r tty y to o . T h e

p ro p e rty .
pr is t h u s 'h e r e d i t a r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o d e t a c h m e n t .
We pass to condition 3): the expressions a a n d J a
c a n n o t b o t h h a v e p r o p e r t y <p0, for if, for any substitution,
a changes into “1”, then in conformity with onr table
{AT = 0) th e expression N a for the same substitution
changes into “0”.
W e h a v e t h u s d e m o n s t ra r a te
t e d t h a t t h e g iv
i v e n p r o p e r ty
t y <p0
satisfies the three conditions in question. In view of
prr e v i o u s c o n s i d e r a t io n s i t fo llo
p ll o w s t h a t our system of the
sentential calculus is consistent.
20. The second issue pertaining to our system of the
sentential calculus is that of the independence of the axioms
 CO N S I S T E N CY O F A X I O M S . M A N Y - V A L U E D L O G I C 73

we have formulated above. T h e i n t en t i o n i s t h at n o n e o f

the three axioms can he proved by means of the remain
ing axioms and the rules of inference as adopted in the
sy st em . Fo r sh o u l d an y o f t h e ax i o m s b e p r o v ab l e b y
means of the remaining ones, it would thus become super
fluous as an axiom and could be included in the system
as a theorem. Superfluous axioms are to be avoided.
The axiom systems of Frege, Whitehead and Bussell,
an d Hi l b er t , as m en t i o n ed ab o v e, d o n o t sat i sf y t h e
requirement of independence since, as has been indicated
in* th e foregoing,
foregoing, eac h of the the se system s con tains one
d e p e n d e n t a x io
io m . I t w il
i l l b e d e m o n s t ra
r a te
t e d t h a t m y s y s te
te m
of axioms is a system of theses each of w hich is is inde pe nd en t
of the others. The method of the proof of independence,
which will be described here, was first published
b y P . B e rn a y s th is m e th o d w as k n o w n t o m e
bee f o r e .
b
I t foll
foll ows easily
easily from the comm ents on th e p roof of
consistency that to prove the independence of the axioms
in our system it suffices to prove the independence of
the axioms of of th e definit
definition-ion-frfree
ee sen tential calcul calculus.
us. F o r if
the re were a proof o f an axiom by m eans o f the rema ining ini ng
ones, then there would also be a proof of that axiom
t h a t wo u ld
l d n o t co n tai
t ainn an y d efiefi n ed t erm
er m s; t h u s t h e ax io
io m
in question w ould also al so be dep end ent in the definit definition-
ion-
free sentential calculus.
The proof of the independence of the axioms of the
definition-fr
definit ion-freeee sen ten tial calcul
calculus us is in some re spec ts sim il ilar
ar
to the proof of consistency. For instance, to prove that
Axiom 1 is independent of Axioms 2 and 3, we shall
co n st ru
r u ct a cer tai
t ai n p r o p er t y q>x th a t satisf
sat isfies
ies th e foll
followi
owingng
three conditions:

1) pproperty
2) r o p er t y ^px isi s hereditary
< an a t t r i b uwith
t e o frespect
Ax io
io m to
s 2theanrules
d 3;
of inference of the definition-free sentential calculus;
3) property rpx is not an attribute of Axiom 1.
74: H I. METHO
ODD O L O G Y O P T H E S E N T E N T I A L C A LC
LC U LU
LU S

I f t h er e ex i st s a p r o p er t y <px that satisfies these three

conditions, then Axiom 1 is independent of Axioms 2
and 3. For by conditions 1) and 2) every consequence
of Axioms 2 and 3 has property <pL L.. Hence if Axiom 1
were a consequence of Axioms 2 and 3, it would also
have to possess property y x . This, however, is impossible
in v iew of cond ition ition 3).
3). Th us from th e existence of p ro p -
er t y q>! follows the independence of Axiom 1.
P r o p e r t y <px is defined by a table analogous to the
tab le used in the p roof of o f consis
cons iste
tency.
ncy. T e t in this case ca se
t h e v ar iab
i ab l es t ak e o n th
t h r ee v alu
al u es: “ 0 ” , “ 1 ” , “ 2 ” . I f an
expression has property <px , t h en f o r an y su b st i t u t i o n o f
the symbols “0”, “1”, “2” for the variables it always
changes into “1” after reduction in conformity with the
table given below.

0 0 1 2 IV

0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
2 1 1 0 2

Apart from the equalities for implication and negation

already known, this table also yields other equalities,
e.g., 0 2 0 = 1, 0 1 2 = 0, A 2 = 2.
In order to check condition 1) we have to check 3”
substitutions for an expression containing n diversiform
variables. Hence for Axiom 2 we have to check three
substitutions. Let us examine, by way of example, the
substitution p/2; it yields:

O G N 2 2 2 = CC
CC22
222
2 = C01 = 1 .

F o r Axiom
Axiom 3 we ha ve to chec k 32 — 9, su b stitu tion s.
Fo r i n st an ce, t h e su b st i t u t i o n p / l , q f2 yields:
 G 10
1 0 N 12
12 = G1 G0 2 = 0 1 1 = 1 .

CONSISTENCY OF AXIOMS. MANY-VALUED LOGIC 75

I t can easieas i l y be veri

ver i fied,
fied, th a t for all o ther sub stitu
tions we also get “ 1 ” after reduction. This verification
i s l ef t f o r t h e r ead er .
L et us examine condition
condition 2 ), w hich states th a t pro pe rty
i s h er ed i t ar y . T h at p r o p er t y <px i s h er ed i t ar y wi t h
respect to su bstitution can easily easily be shown
sho wn by a reasoning
reasoning
analogous to that used in the proof of consistency. Let us
now consider two expressions, of the form CajH and a,
wh ich
i ch h av e t h e p r o p er t y p x . Suppose that for some sub
stitution expression § d doe
oess no t change into “ l ” , i . e., e. ,
changes into “ 0 ” or “ 2 ”. For the corresponding sub
stitution, a changes into “1”, for a h a s p r o p e r t y <pt . Hence,
in view of ou r ta ble (CIO CIO = 0, <712 = 0), 0), th e expre ssion
Ca/? would change into the symbol “ 0 ”. This, however,
is impossible since the expression Cafi h as p r o p er t y <px .
H enc e /3 /3 m u st alsals o hav e pro p erty <px . P r o p e r t y <px is thus
hereditary with respect to the rules of inference of the
definiton-free sentential calculus.
Finally, it can easily be ascertained that Axiom 1
d o e s n o t h a v e p r o p e r t y (px, i.e., that on reduction it does
n o t ch an g e i n t o t h e sy m b o l “ 1 ” for all substitutions.
For a certain substitution Axiom 1 changes, after reduc
tion, into the symbol “ 0 ” . This is is the followi
following ng su b sti
tution: p j 2 , g / 0 , r / 2 , which yields:

<7C20<7C02<722 = C l CIO = CIO = 0 .

Since property <pz satisfies the three conditions for

m u l at ed ab o v e, A x i o m 1 i s in
i n d e p e n d e n t o f A x i o m s 2 a n d 3.
To prove the independence of Axiom 2 we consider
th e p ro p e rty g?2, defined
defined b y th e tab le below.

c 0 1 TV
0 1 1 0
1* 0 1 0
76 III. METHODOLOGY OP THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

An expression lias property <p2 if, for every substitution

of the symbols “ 0 ” an d “ l ” f o r t h e v ar iab iab les
les i t alway
alway s
changes into the symbol “ 1 ”, following a reduction per
form
for m ed in-
in- accordance w ith the tab le given above.
I t can easi
eas i l y b e seen
seen t h a t Ax io
io m s 1 an d 3 h av e p r o p 
e r t y <p2. F o r Axiom 1 this f oll ollows
ow s from
from the fact th a t
the said axiom includes implication symbols only, and for
implication the table gives the same equalities we had
in the proof of consistency. Further, it follows from the
t a b l e a b o v e t h a t N p = 0 regardless of the value of p ;
likewise, GO GOq q — 1, O p l = 1. Henc e, for f or Axiom
Axiom 3 we have,
regardless of the value of the variables:

G p C N p q = C pC O q = G p l = 1 .

It can also easily be ascertained, just as it was in

the proof of consistency, that property <p2 is hereditary
with respect to the rules of inference. On the other hand,
Axiom 2 d o es n o t h av e p r o p er t y <p2, for on substituting
p j 0 we h av e
C G N 000 = 0 0 0 0 0 = 010 = 0 .

W e h a vvee t h u s d emo n st ra tted

ed tth
h e i n dep
d ep en d en ccee o f A x i o m 2
ffrr o m A x i o m s 1 a n d 3 .
To prove the independence of Axiom 3 we formulate
p r o p e r t y 973, defined by the table below.

€ 0 1 nr

0 1 1 1

1* 0 1 1

An expression has property <p2 if, for every substitution

of the symbols “ 0 n a n d “ 1 ” for the variables, it always
changes into the symbol “ 1 ” following a reduction in
co n f o r m i t y wi t h t h e t ab l e ab o v e. I n t h e p ar t p er t ai n i n g
to implication, this table does not differ at all from the
to implication, this table does not differ at all from the

CO N S I S T E N CY O F A X I O M S . M A N Y - V A L U E D L O G I C 77

tab le used in th e proof o off consi

c onsist
stency,
ency, an d hence Axiom
Axio m 1
h a s p r o p e r t y <pz . Axiom 2 also has property <pz fof o r v e h a ve
ve :

GGWOOO = C C 10 0 = 0 0 0 = 1 ,

GGN111 = 00111 = O il = 1 .
I t can al so easi l y b e seen t h at p r o p er t y <pz is hereditary
with respect to the rules of inference. On the other hand,
Axiom 3 does not have property <pZ Zii si
since
nce th e sub stituti
sti tution
on :
p j l , qjO yields

G i c m o = o i o io
io = o i o = o .

W e h a ve t h u s d emo n st ra t ed t h e i n d ep en d en ce o f A xi o m 3
f r o m A x i o m s 1 a n d 2.
fr
This com pletes
pletes th e proo f of of indep end ence of ou r
system of axioms: n o a x i o m i n o u r s y s ttee m o f tth
h e s e n ttee n ttii a l
calculus is a consequence of the remaining axioms.
21. The proof of the independence of the axioms of
the sentential calculus included the use of a table with
three values: “ 0 ” , “ l ” , “ 2 ” . I n p r o v in
in g th
t h e in
i n d ep
e p e nd
n d e n ce
ce
of the various theses of the sentential calculus one often
h as t o u se t ab l es t h at co n t ai n t h r ee o r m o r e d i f f er en t
values. Attention has been drawn to the fact that in
p r o v i n g c o n s i s t e n c y a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e i t is n o t n e c e s s a r y
t o t r eat t h e sy m b o l s “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” as standing for false
and true sentences, respectively. However, one may wish
t o k n o w wh et h er t h e t h i r d sy m b o l u sed i n t h e p r o o f s o f
independence, can also be interpreted logically, as can
the symbols “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ” .
I n car r y i n g o u t t h e p r o o f o f i n d ep en d en ce we h av e
demonstrated that every thesis of the sentential calculus
h a s p r o p e r t y <p0 0ll which we consider to be the charac

teristicinvestigation.
under property of For the attruethesentences
root of the of logic
the calculus
we use
t h er e i s t h e assu m p t i o n t h at ev er y sen t en ce al way s h as
one, and only one, of the two logical values: falsehood

78 III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

an d t r u t h . T h i s assu m p t i o n i s u su al l y n o t f o r m u l at ed
explicitly, but is a basic assumption made in logic. This
prr i n c i p l e o f t w o v a l u e s i n o u r lo g ic c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e
p
p rin c ip le of c o n tra d ic tio n a n d t h e p rin c ip le of t h e e x 
cluded middle interpreted as follows: no sentence is both
true and false (the principle of contradiction), and every
sentence is either true or false (the principle of the ex
cluded
cl uded m i ddle).ddl e). I t is only
onl y in th a t se
sens
nsee th a t these princi
principlples
es
may be considered basic laws of logic.
The principle of two values offers us a criterion for
checking meaningful expressions of the sentential cal
culus without proving them by means of axioms. For
in conformity
conformity w ith it h th a t principl
principle,e, tot o check
check the t he general
genera l
truth of a meaningful expression we have precisely to
determine w he ther all the sub stitutions stitutions of th a t expres expressi sion,
on,
in which the variables adopt one of the two values, false
h o o d o r t r u t h , “ 0 ” or “ 1 ”, change into true sentences.
In other words, in order to check whether a meaningful
ex p r essi o n i s t r u e we h av e t o m ak e su r e wh et h er i t h as
p r o p e r t y y 0.
We m i g h t , h o wev er , ad o p t a st an d p o i n t at v ar i an ce
w ith
ith th e princi
principle
ple of two values in log logii c. W e m ight assume
that a sentence, in the logical sense of the term, might
h av e v al u es o t h er t h an f al seh o o d an d t r u t h . A sen t en ce,
of which
which we do n o t know w hethe r it i s fal false
se or true, m ight
have no value determined as truth or falsehood, but
might have some third, undetermined, value. We might,
for instance, consider that the sentence “in a year from
now I shall be in Warsaw” is neither true nor false and
has a third, u ndeterm ined, value, which whi ch can be symbol
symbolii zed
as W e m ight go still still fu rthe r an d ascribe
ascribe to sentences
sentences
infinitely many values contained between falsehood and

truth. In that case we would have an analogy with the

calculus of probability, in which infinitely many degrees
of probability are ascribed to events. In this way we
should o btain a b und le of m any -valued logi
lo gics
cs:: a three

CONSISTENCY OF AXIOMS. MANY-VALUED LOGIC 79

val ued logic, a fo f o u r - v a l u e d logic, etc., and finally a logic

o f i n f i n i t e l y m a n y v a l u e s . S y m b ol
o l s o th
t h e r th
th a n “ 0 ” a n d “ 1 ”
used in the proofs of independence would thus correspond
to the various degrees of truth of sentences in logics with

th
t h ee mcorrespondi
corr
et hesponding
o d o f png
r o vnum
i n g bers
t h e iof values.
val
n d ep enues. I ohav
d en ce f t eh eses
developed
devel
o foped
the
sentential calculus precisely in connection with the study
of many-valued logic.
In three-valued logic we would have to give a table
for implication and negation, analogous to the one we
have in two-valued logic. The following table seems the
most intuitive:
0 O i l N

0 1 1 1 1
* i l l i
1* O i l 0

In this way, in three-valued logic every meaningful ex

p r e s s i o n w h i c h , f o r a l l t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e s y m b o ls
“ 0 ” , “ i ” , “ 1 ” f o r t h e v ar iab i ab les,
l es, al
a l way s chan ch ang
g es i n to
to t h e
symbol “1” following a reduction in conformity with the
tab le above, is true. I t can easily easily be verifi verified
ed th a t in

three-valued logic, interpreted in this way, our Axioms 1

and 3 are true. On the other hand, Axiom 2 is not true,
for on substituting: p/i, we have

c c N m = c c m = C ll** = * .
I t f o l l o ws f r o m t h e t ab l e ab o v e t h at ev er y t h eo r em o f
three-valued logic also is a theorem of two-valued logic
(but, of course, not vice versa). Thus three-valued logic
is a 'proper part of two-valued logic.

Three-valued logic can be formulated as an axiomatic

system, as was our system of two-valued sentential
calculus
calcul us 2. I f th a t w ere done,
don e, th en in p roving theorem s
we would not have to refer to the table given above.

80 III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

In the logic of infinitely many values it is assnmed

that sentences can take on infinitely many values, re
p r e s e n t e d b y r a t i o n a l n u m b e r s x t h at sat i sf y t h e co n 
d it
i t i o n 0 < x < 1. O bviousl bvi ously,y, no table can be b u ilt for f or
such a logic, since it would have to consist of infinitely
many rows and columns. The properties of implication
and negation in the logic of infinitely many values are
defined as follows, it being assumed that p a n d q are
r a t i o n a l n u m b e r s i n t h e i n t e r v a l [ 0 , 1 ]:
if p < q , t h e n C pq = 1 ;
i t p > q , t h e n Cpq = 1— + q ;
N p — 1 —p .

The properties of implication and negation, as given in

three-valued logic, follow from these equalities. It can
al so b e seen t h at i f t h e ar g u m en t s o f i m p l i cat i o n an d
n eg at i o n ar e n o t o u t si d e t h e i n t er v al o f t h e r at i o n al
n u m b er s [ 0 , 1 ], neither are the values of implication and
n eg at i o n o u t si d e t h at i n t er v al .
I n m any -value d logi logicc the fol fol l owing
owing definit
definitions
ions are
adopted:
Apq * *== OCpqq,

K pq = N A N p N q ,
B pq — KGpqCgp .

These definiti
definitions ons of altern ation an d equivalence equivalence hav e
b e e n d is c u s s e d a b o v e . T h e d e f in i t i o n o f c o n j u n c t i o n is
b a s e d o n D e M o r g a n ’s law la w s .
The logic of infinitely many values is a proper part
of two-valued logic; in most cases those theorems of
two-valued logic on which are based certain forms of

apagogic reasoning are

The relationship not valid
between in infinite-valued
the many-valued logicslogic.
and
two-valued logic resembles that between non-Euclidean
geometries and Euclidean geometry. Both non Euclidean

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULTJS 81

geom etrietries
es an d m any -valued
-val ued logi
lo gics
cs are co nsistent
nsistent system
syst em s,
al t h o u g h t h ey d i f f er f r o m E u cl i d ean g eo m et r y an d t wo 
v al u ed l o g icic r esp ect iv
iv el y . W i th
th o u t p r eju
eju d i ce t o t h e i ssu
ss u e
w h ich
ich lo g ic,
ic, i f an y , i s t ru
r u e, we m ay p o i n t o u t t h a t t w o 
v al u ed l og
o g ic
ic h as t h e ad v an t ag e o f b ein
ei n g m u ch simsim p ler
l er t h a n
are m any -valued logics ogics.. B u t, in an y case, case, m any-valued
any-valued
logics
ogics hav e prov ed useful usef ul b y developing
devel oping th th e m ethod
et hod o f
i nv estiga
estiga ting
ting independen ce, a m ethod et hod w hichhich I could
could dem 
o n strate here only onl y in a v ery lim lim itited
ed w ay 3.

7. The Completeness of the Sentential Calculus

22. In the preceding section we discussed two-valued

lo gi
g ic a n d s tat a t e d t h a t i t is
is o u r in
in t e n t io
io n t h a t p r o p e r ty
t y <p0j
0j
defined in the proof of consistency, should be the charac
teristic property of the sentential calculus. In connection
w i th th e p roof of consist consistencyency it was also also dem on strat st rated
ed
th a t ev ery thes is of the se n ten tial calculus calculus h as p ro p e rty <p0.
The issue now arises whether every expression that has
p r o p e r t y <p9 is a thesis of the sentential calculus, in other
words, 'whether every expression which we hold to be
true in conformity with the principle of two-valuedness
of logic, is a co nsequen ce of ou r system of axiom s. E or
i t m ay b e t h at o u r sy st em o f ax i o m s i s t o o weak t o p r o v e
al l t h e sen t en ces h av i n g p r o p er t y g?0 . This would be true,
for instance, of a system consisting only of the first two
axioms: Axiom 3, while possessing property <p0 , would be
n o t d ed u ei b l e f r o m su ch a sy st em o f ax i o m s.
B u t t h e p r o b lem
lem o f co m p let leten
en ess
e ss can b e f o rm rm u lat
l ated
ed
wi t h o u t an y r ef er en ce wh at ev er t o p r o p er t y <p0 - Suppose
t h a t e v e r y e x p r e s s i o n t h a t h a s p r o p e r t y 9o0 is a th e s is
of our system of the sentential calculus. Let us consider

an ex p r essi oCp
expression n qwh i ch d o es n o t h av e p r o p er t y <po, e.g., the
. O n s u b s t i t u t i n g p j l , qjO, we o b t ai n :
CIO = 0. B y app l ying th e rule of sub stituti stitution
on , we can
can
easily obtain from the expression under consideration

82 III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

another expression which would change into “ 0 ” for all

the. possible
possible su bs titution
titution s. I t suff
su ffic
ices
es to
t o su b stitute p f C p p ,
q j N C p p , which will yield: C C p p N C p p . The expression
N C G p p N C p p , h a v in g p ro p e rty <p0, is b y de finition a th esis

ofo tthe
n h a vsystem.
e p r o p e Thus
t y <p0 we
r ty see that
on being an expression
joined which
to the system, does
enables
u s t o ar r i v e at a co n t r ad i ct i o n wi t h i n t h e sy st em .
By following this example we can easily demonstrate
i n g en er al t h at i f ev er y ex p r essi o n h av i n g p r o p er t y <pQ
is a thesis of the system, then every meaningful ex-
prr e s s io n ( w i t h o u t d e f i n e d t e r m s ) w h ic h is n o t a t h e s i s
p
of th t h e system
syst em , on b eing joined to the system syst em , enabl
enab l es us
to arrive at a contradiction. It follows directly that the
converse holds tru e as well: well: if every m eaningful expression
expression
(w itho
it ho ut defined term s) which is is no t a thesis of the system
syst em ,
on being joined to the system, enables us to arrive at
a c on tradic tion, th e n eve ry expression w ith pro p er ty <j30
is a thesis of the system. For should an expression with
p r o p e r t y <p„ n o t be a thesis of th e system, th e n on being being
jjo
o i n e d t o t h e s y s t e m i t w o u ld h a v e t o r e s u l t i n a c o n -
tradiction; but we know from the proof of consistency
t h at n o ex p r essi o n wi t h p r o p er t y <p0 can in our system
yield a contradiction.
It follows from the above that the answer in the
affirmative to the question raised above is equivalent to
th e foll
fol l owing theorem : ev eryy m ea ni n gf u l expr es ssii on (w ithout
ever ithout
defined terms) eit either
her is a tthesis
hesis o f our system of tthe he senten tial
calculus, or}
or} w hen jo ine d to that system , enab
enable
less us to
arrive at a contradiction. If this theorem is true then we
say that our system of the sentential calculus is a complete
s ys t em.
The first proof of the completeness of the sentential

calculus was given by the American logician E. Post

in 1921. Another proof of completeness was offered in
W arsaw b y A. T arski 4. The proof of complete
completeness
ness to be
given below differs from the two mentioned above.

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 83

In order to prove the completeness of our system of

th e sen tential calcul calculus us it is neces
nec essa sary
ry,, to dem on strate
strat e th a t
there are no meaningful expressions (without defined
terms) which are not consequences of the system and
at t h e sam e t i m e d o n o t l ead t o a co n t r ad i ct i o n o n b ei n g
jo
j o i n e d t o t h e s y s t e m . S u c h e x p r e s s io n s w ill
il l h e c a lle
ll e d i n d e
p e n d e n t e x p r e s s io n s.
I t i s assu m ed t h at sm al l Gr eek l et t er s, wh et h er wi t h
subscribed indices or not, stand for any meaningful ex-
prr e s s i o n s o f t h e s e n t e n t i a l c a lc u lu s w h ic h d o n o t c o n t a i n
p
defined symbols. It is also assumed that the term thesis
may stand either for any of Axioms 1, 2 or 3, or for any
expression which can be derived from these axioms by
means of the rules of substitution and detachment alone.
The concept of equivalent expressions , important for
further analysis, is also introduced.
Def . l a. The expressions a and fi are equivalent if and
only if the implications Cap and Cfia are theses.
b.. The expression a is equivalent to the expressions f$x
b
a n d /?3 i f a nd o nly i f the
the im
im p lica tion s Caf$t , Caf
Cafii2 an d
C@x Cfi2a a re th e se s 5.
The relations thus defined will be noted symbolically:

(a) ,
(b) &

A num ber of o f l emm as concerni

concerning
ng the concept o f equiv-
alent expressions will now be given:
L . l . T he follow ing equivalences
equivalences are true (they are ac-
companied by the numbers of theses from which a given
equivalence follows):

(a )
(a) C a G f i y ^ C f i C a y, (2 1 )
(b))
(b a C N a N C pp , (3, 65)
(c) C N N ay ~ C ay , (6 2 , 4 1 )

84: III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

(d) CNCaPy~CaGNf$y, (142, 144)

(e) G C a P y ~ C N a y , G fiy. (37, 19 , 59)

D etail
etail ed proofs
proofs of th
t h e first an d th
t h e last of these
these eq uiv-

alences
al ences w ill be
equivalences aregive n here; th e proofs of th e rem aining
analogous.
B y s u b s t i t u t i n g p i a, qj
qjff i , r j y in Thesis 21, and then
p/j
p /j8, qja, r(y in th e sam sam e thesis,
thesis, we sta st a te th a t the foll
ollowing
owing
two implications:

GCaCfiyCfiGay and CCfiCayCaCpy

are theses;
Th i s, w it
ithh D ef. la , lead
lead s to e quivalence
quivalence (a).
a).
~Now let the following substitutions be made in Theses
37, 19 and 59: p/a, g/£, r f y . Thus the implications

CCCaPyGNay, GCCaPyCfiy and OGNayGGPyGGafiy

are the
the ses. This, w it
ithh D ef. lb , lead
lead s to eq uivalence (e)
(e)..
L .2 a, I f
(1 ) a~/3 and P~y
then

(2 ) a ~ y .
P roof. I t foll
ollows from
from assum ptions
ptions (1 ) th a t th
t h e i m pli
pl ica-
tions
Cap, Gfictj Gf3y aan
nd <7y/S

are theses. We substitute in Thesis 1 : p/a, qjfi, rfy , and

n ex t : p / y , qfft, rja. On ap p l y i n g t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t
to the expressions thus obtained and to expressions (3)
we st at e t h at t h e i m p l i cat i o n s

Gay and G ya
are theses. Hence, equivalence (2) is true.

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 85

L. 2b. I f
(1 ) a'--'
a'--'/?
/? and P~Ynyt
t h en
(2) a ~ y XTy %
%..

Proof. If f oll
oll ows from assum ptions
pti ons (1
(1) th a t th e implica
impli ca
tions
(3) Cap, Cfia, CPyx, C0y2, and CyxCy

are theses. In Thesis 1 w e s u b s t i t u t e p j a , qjf qj f t , r f y x , a n d

n e x t p j a , q j p, r j y z . O n a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e o f d e t a c h m e n t
to the expressions thus obtained and to expressions (3)
we state that the implications

(4) Cayx and Cayz

are theses.
We now substitute in Thesis 146: p j y x , q ly * , r IPt s l a -
On ap p l y i n g t h e r u l e o f d et ac h m en t t o t h e ex p res
ressi
sio
on thu s
ob tained
tai ned and to expressi
expres sions ons (3)
(3) we sta te th a t the express
expr essio
ionn
C y x C y a a is a thesis. T his, a n d t h e fa c t th a t expressions
expressions (4 (4)
are theses, leads to the equality ( 2 ).
L. 3. I f
(1)
then
f i~ y

(2 ) CanCan^^ x... Ca1

CanCan Ca1P
P ‘-^ C a n Can
Can__ 1... Gaxyy .
Gax

Proof. Th e proof of th is lem m a is by induction.

F o r n — 1 the equivalence ( 2 ) has the form

(3) Caxp^Ca^y.

I t fol
f olll ows from
from assum ption (1
(1 ) an d from
from Def. la
that the implications
(4) Cfiy and Cyfl
are theses.
7

86 III. 3U3THODOliOCrIf OI' TUB SBKTBNTIAL CALCULUS

We substitute in Thesis 22: q j§ j § 9 r { yyff p j a x , a n d n e x t

qj y, r ( f i , pf ax. O n a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e o f d e t a c h m e n t t o t h e
expressions thus obtained and to expressions (4) we state
that the implications

GGaxfiGaxy and GC a^ yGa^ ^

are theses. T his,
his , an d Def. l a , leads to equivalence
equivalence (3).
Thus, for n = 1 t h e l e m m a i s t r u e .
L et Jfc be a ny n a tu ra l num ber. The t ru th of the foll
foll ow-
ing equivalence is assumed:
Gakk_ 1. . . Ga x y .
G a k G a k_ 1. . . Gaxp ~ G a k Ga

Hen ce t h e i m p l i cat i o n s

(5) G G ak Gctk_x... G<xx fiGc

Gct tk G a k_x... Gaxy ,
fi Gctk
CGak GaGak^ x... , CcqyCafc Ga
k^ x. Gak_k_ x... C oifi

are theses.
these s. W e again su b stitute in ThesisThesis 22: q! q!Gak
Gak Cak
Cak_ _ x„.
Gax
axp,
p, rlG<xk Ca
Cak_1..
k_1...G k+ltt a n d n e x t : qjGak, Cak_x...
.G al y , p l a k+l
Gax
axy,
y, rlC ak Gak_x...
Gak_x... Ga
Gaxfi,
xfi, p j a k+ x. On ap p l y i n g t h e r u le
k+x. le o f
d et ach m en t t o t h e ex p r essi o n s t h u s o b t ai n ed an d t o
expressions (5) we state that the implications
GGak+1 Cg^ . . . G a i^G a k+1 Gak ... Gaxy ,
Gaxy
G G a k+1 Ga
Gakk ...
...CC al yG ak+x C
ak+ Caa fc...
.. . Ga
Gaxx /?

are theses. Hence the equivalence

Gakk ... 0a* ft ~ Ga
Ga k+1 Ga Gak+ 1 Ga k..
k+1 k.... 0% y
is true. The inductive proof of equivalence (2) is thus
completed.
L . 4 . I f th e seq u en ce i x , i„ i s a n y p e r m u t a t i o n o f
t h e n u m b e r s 1 , 2 , ..., n , t h e n

(1) Gai i C a
aii t . .... G a iin
nP ~ G a x G
Gaa 2. ..
.. C a n f } .

Pr o o f . I n t h e p r o o f o f t h i s l em m a t h e f o l l o wi n g t h eo r em
f r o m t h e t h eo r y o f p er m u t at i o n s wi l l b e u sed :

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 87

B y p e r f o r m i n g i n th e s e q u e n c e 1 , 2 multiple
adjacent transpositions we can obtain any permutation of
the numbers of that sequence 6.
L e t & b e a n a t u r a l n u m b e r less t h a n n . F r o m e q u i v -
alence (a) of Lemma 1 it follows that
Ga k+1 Gak <?«* +2• • • G an
Gak+1 an P ~ G a
ak
k ®ak
ak++l < ? < * *+ 2 “ * *

T h i s eq u i v al en ce an d t h e p r eced i n g l em m a l ead t o t h e
equivalence
Gax ... Ga k_ x Gak
Gak+
+1 Ca k Cak+2... C an fi
~ C a x..
x.... Gak_
Gak_ 1Gak
Gak Cak+
Cak+1.„ .

T h i s, L . 2 a, an d t h e co m b i n at o r i al t h eo r em q u o t ed
above easily lead to equivalence (1 ).
23. The following lemma is of particular importance
f o r f u r t h er an al y si s:
L . 5 a. I f

a n d t h e exp ressi o n 0 i s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t , t h en exp ressi o n a

i s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t.
b. I f

(1 ) 0 ^ 0!, 03
a n d n ei t h er § x n o r 0 2 i s i n d e p e n d e n t t h e n e x p r e s s i o n a i s
not independent.
Pr o o f . On l y p a r t b o f t h e l eme m m a wi ll
l l b e p r o v ed , the
p ro o f o f p a r t a b e in g le f t to t h e re a d e r.
Fr om t he assum pt i on t hat expr essi ons 0Xand 02 ar e
n o t i n d ep en d en t i t f o l l o ws t h at ei t h er b o t h o f t h em ar e
t h eses o r t h at at l east o n e o f t h em , wh en j o i n ed t o the
system, leads to a contradiction.
F r o m D ef.
ef . l b an d (1
(1) i t f o ll
ll o ws
w s i m m ed i atel
at el y t h a t
in the former case expression a is a thesis and thus
is not an independent expression. It also follows from
Def . l b an d (1
(1) t h a t the j o i n in
in g to t h e sy stem
st em of
of
7*

88 III. METHODOLOGY OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS

expression a en t ai l s t h e j o i n i n g t o t h e sy st em o f b o t h
expressions & and /?2. Thus, if the joining of one of these
expressions leads to a contradiction in the system, then
t h e j o i n i n g t o t h e sy st em o f ex p r essi o n a also entails

a c o npossible
two t r a d i c t i ocases,
n i n t hexpression
e s y s t e m ; ah einsc en oitn itnhdeepl aen
t tde en
r ot .f t h e
E v e r y m e a n i n g f u l e x p r e s s io n o f th e s e n te n tia l c a lc u lu s
having the form
I CaxCal ...CanNCpp

w ill b
bee cal d an exp r es s i on o f f or m I . T h e e x p r e s s i o n s
calll eed
al}} Oa,..., an w ill be called the anteceden ts o f exp ression I .
al
I t f o ll
llo ws f ro
r o m eq u iv
i v alen
al en ce ( b ) o f L em m a 1 t h a t

L . 6 . E v e r y m e a n i n g f u l e x p r e s s i o n o f th e s e n te n ti a l c a lc u lu s
i s equi val ent t o a cer t ai n expr es s i on of f or m I .
Def. 2. A n e x p r e s s i o n o f f o r m I i s c a l l e d s i m p l e i f a n d
o nly i f eac
eachh o f its antecedent is a single variable or th
thee n ega tion
ti on
of a single variable.
For instance,
GpCNqNCpp, CrCsCtNCpp, GNqCqNGpp

are simple expressions.

L . 7. N o s i m p l e e x p r e s s i o n <pis
pi s a n i n d e p e n d e n t e x p r e s s i o n .
Proof. Let ns consider two cases:
a. The antecedents of the expression p include con
tradictory expressions.
b . N o tw o a n t e c e d e n t s o f t h e e x p re s s io n 9? a re co n
tradictory.
I t foll
ollows easil
easi l y fr
from
om L . 4 th a t in case case a th e expressi
expression on q>
i s eq u i v al en t t o a cer t ai n su b st i t u t i o n o f T h esi s 3 , t h at
i s t o an ex p r essi o n wh i ch i s n o t i n d ep en d en t . I t n o w
f o ll
llo ws f ro
ro m L . 5 a, t h a t i n t h e case
cas e u n d er co n sidsid er ati
ati o n
the lemma is true.
I n case
ca se b f o r ev er y n o n - n eg a t ed v ar i ab l e t h a t o ccu
ccu rs
rs
i n t h e an t eced e n t s o f t h e ex p ress
r essii o n q> we su b st i t u t e t h e

THE COMPLETENESS OP THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 89

expression G p p , an d f o r ev er y n eg at ed v ar i ab l e wh i ch
occurs in these antecedents, the expression N G p p . I t c a n
easi l y b e seen t h at sn ch a su b st i t u t i o n can b e m ad e.
On ap p l y in
in g r ep eat ed l y t h e r u le
l e o f d et ach m en t t o t h e
expression thus obtained and to Theses 16 and 141 we
obtain one of the following three expressions:

N G pp, J S fG G p p G p p , N C LfC p p N G p p .

H ence, using ThesisThesis 64, 64, we easil

easil y infer th a t in in case b th e
jo in in g t o t h e s y s te m o f t h e e x p r e s s io n tp results in a con-
tradiction, and so in that case, too, the expression <p is
n o t i n d ep en d en t .
Def. 3. L e t <p a n d ip be a n y. e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e f o r m I .
T h e exp ressi o n <p i s si sim
m p l er t h a n t h e exp ressi
ressioo n y> i f
a n d o n l y i f ei tth h er tth
h e exp ressi
ressio o n <p i s w ri t ten
ten w i t h ffewer
ewer
symb o l s t h a n t h e exp ressi o n y or these two expressions are
w ri t ten
ten w i t h t h e sa me n u m b er o f sym b o l s a n d t h e exp r essi o n <p
has a great
greaterer n um be r o f antecedent
antecedentss tha n has the ex pres sion ttp p.
Thus, for instance, the expressions
G qN G p p , rK G p p ,
G q G rK G p G N q N G pp

are respectively simpler than the expressions

GNJSfqNGpp, GGtrGqGrNCpp, GNCpqNGpp.

Xi. 8 . A n y e x p r e s s i o n <p o f t h e f o r m I w h i c h i s n o t a s i m p l e
exp ressi o n i s eq u i va l en t t o o n e o r t wo si mp l er exp ressi o n s .
Pr o o f . I t f o llllo ws easil
easil y f ro
ro m D ef.
ef . 2 an d f ro
r o m D .4 t h a t
the expression <p is equivalent to a certain expression of
form I
(1) Opy
i n w h i c h t h e a n t e c e d e n t yy>
> is neither a single variable nor
th e n ega t i on of a singl
singlee va riab
riab l e. C onsequentl
onsequentl y, th t h e expres-
sion yj m u s t h a v e o n e o f th
t h e f o ll
llo win
wi n g th
t h r ee f o rm
r m s:
 N N a, N G aP, G ap.

90 H I . M E T H O DO
D O L OG
OG Y O P T H E S E N T E N T I A L C A L C
CUULU
USS

It follows from equivalences (c) and (d) of Lemma 1 that

in the first two cases expression (1) is equivalent to one
sim
sim pler expression,
expression, an d from from equivalence
equivalence (e) of th e sam sam e
lemma it follows that in the third case expression (I)
is e qu ivalent to to t w o si
sim
m pler
pler express
expressii ons. H ence the lem m a
f o ll
llo ws frfr o m t h e st atem
at em en t t h a t ex p ress
r essiio n <p i s equ iv
al en t t o ex p r essi o n ( 1 ) , an d f r o m L . 2 a an d L . 2 b .
T h e l em m as g i v en ab o v e m ak e i t p o ssi b l e t o p r o v e:
Theorem. T h e syst em o f t h e sen t en t i a l ca l cu l u s , based
on the aodoms
1 pq G G g r G p r ,
0 G pq

2 GGNppp,

3 CpGNpq,
a n d i n wh i ch t h e ru l es o f su b st i t u t i o n a n d d et a ch men t a re
v a l i d , is a complete system.
Pr o o f . I t w ill b e sho
sh o wn t h a t ev ery er y m ean in in g f u l ex
e x p r ess
e ss

i on w riritt
tten
en exclusi
exclus i vely
vel y w i t h variables
variables an d th e symbols C
a n d T l either is a consequence of Axioms 1, 2, 3, or, when
jo in e d t o t h e s y s te m , r e s u l t s i n c o n t r a d ic to r y e x p r e s s io n s
i n t h a t sy stem
stem ; h en ce, we sh all al l s h ow
o w t h a t n o m ean in in g fu
fu l
expression is an independent expression.
Suppose that contrary to what we intend to prove,
independent expressions exist. If this is so, then by L.6
an d L . 5 a t h er e al so ex i st i n d ep en d en t ex p r essi o n s o f t h e
f o r m I . I t fof o ll
llo ws f r o m L . 7 t h a t t h ey can n o t b e si s im p le
le
expressions. Thus the assumption of the existence of
inde pe nd en t express
expressii ons en tail
tail s th e exist
exi stence
ence of indep end 
e n t express
expre ssiions of form for m I w hichhich are n o t sim sim ple
ple ex
pre
p re s s io n s .
N o te f u r t h e r t h a t t h e e x is te n c e o f i n d e p e n d e n t e x 

p re s s io n s o f fo r m I . e n ta ils
il s t h e e x iste
is te n c e o f t h e s im p le s t
of such expressions, i.e. such that none of these ex
prr e s s io n s is s im p le r t h a n i t . F o r i n e v e ry n o n - e m p ty s e t
p
of expressi
expressi ons the re is
is an expressi
expression
on th a t is
is w ritten
ritten w it h

THE COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS 91

a n u m b er o f sy m b o l s wh i ch i s n o t g r eat er t h an an y o t h er
expression of that set. Among the expressions of form I
w r it
i t te
t e n w i th
th t h e s am
a m e n u m b e r o f sy
s y m b o ls
ls th
th e r e m u s t
b e o n e w h ic h h a s a n u m b e r of a n te c e d e n ts g r e a t e r t h a n ,
or the same as, the remaining expressions.
T h e n l e t <p b e an i n d ep en d en t ex p r essi o n o f f o r m I
which is not a simple expression, and let no expression
s i m p l e r t h a n <p b e an i n d ep en d en t ex p r essi o n . B u t b y
L . 8 expression <p i s eq uiva lent to t o one or two simpler
express
expr essioions.
ns. This, w it ith
h L .5 a an d L. 5b, sho shows ws th a t the
expression <p i s n o t i n d ep en d en t . T h u s t h e assu m p t i o n
or the existence of independent expressions leads to
a co n t r ad i ct i o n . Hen ce t h e t h eo r em i s t r u e.
 IV. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS
WITH QUANTIFIERS

8. Quantifiers. Rules of Inference. Theses

24. The system of the sen ten ti

24. tial
al calcul
calculusus expou nded
above contains sentential variables and constant functors.
B u t t h e sen t en t i al cal cu l u s can b e ex t en d ed b y t h e i n 
t r o d u c t io
io n o f v a r iab
iab l e f u n ct o rs
r s an d w h a t ar e call
call ed q u a n
tifiers. One such system, containing the sentential cal
culus, is S. Le^niewski’s p r o t o t h e t i c s 1. T o acq u ai n t t h e
reader with the concept of the quantifier we shall outline
here the sentential calculus enriched with quantifiers.
T h e t er m “ q u an t if i f ier
ier 55 w as u sed
s ed b y Pei rce
r ce in
i n h i s p ap er
of 1885 [26]. We shall first of all explain the meaning
of the un i versal qu an t ifier ifier,, symbolized
symbolized b y P eirce eir ce as f j .
I f <p(p) stands for a sentence of the sentential calculus,
co n t ain
ai n i n g t h e v a r iab
iab l e p , t h e n t h e ex p res
r essi
sioo n o f t h e f o rm
rm
[]p<p(p) i s r ead : “f o r ev er y p , p i p ) ” . Fo r i n st an ce, t h e

expression of the form [ J p C p q is read: “for every p ,

i f p , t h e n g” g” .
B y u si n g t h e sy m b o l s o f f al seh o o d an d t r u t h , “0 ”
an d “ 1 ” , we can co m p r eeh h en d thth e m ean inin g o f t h e u n i v ersal
er sal
q u an t i f i er . We u se t h e ex p r essi o n “f o r ev er y p , <p{p)"
t o s t a t e t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n “p i p ) ” t u r n s o u t t o b e t r u e
for all concrete substitutions for the variable p . Since,
h o wev er , t h e sen t en t i al v ar i ab l e p can t ak e o n o n l y t wo
values: “ 0 ” or “1 ” , it suff suff ices
ce s to
to de m on strat
st ratee th
t h e sim
sim ul
ul
t ane ou s tr u th of th e sentences
sentences <p <p{0) an d y (l) , th a t is is the
t r u t h o f t h e ex p r essi o n u K<p(0)<p(K<p(0)<p(l)”l)” }' t h u s we h av e:
[]p<p (p ) = K<p (0) q>(1). For instance, f j p p = --E EDI = 0;
 — K C 0 0 C 1 1 = -E ll == 1. T he un ive rsal q u an tifier
tifier

QUANTIFIERS. RULES OF INFERENCE. THESES 93

i s n o t a f u n ct o r , as ar e C , A , etc. An expression in which

th e qu an tifier
ti fier isi s n o t directly
directly fol
fo l l owed b y a singl singlee variable,
variable,
b u t is f o llo
ll o w e d b y a c o m p o u n d e x p r e s s io n , is m e a n in g l e s s
for us. Thus, for instance, the expression [JJ^qGqq is

meaningless.
I n t h e m ean i n g f u l ex p r essi o n f j p G p q those variables
which are equiform with the variable that directly follows
th e q uan tifier,
tif ier, are called
called variables bound b y t h a t q u an ti t i f ier
ier .
A v ar iab
i ab l e t h a t is
i s n o t b o u n d i s call
call ed p e e . I n t h e m e a n in in g -
ful expression G f J p G p q p n o t al l t h e v ar i ab l es t h at ar e
equiform with p are bound: the last variable equif orm
w i t h p is frfree,
ee, becau se it does no t belong to the m eaningful
expression C p q that directly follows the expression f j p .
If in an expression containing a quantifier there is still
a free variable, it can in turn be bound by a quantifier.
H en ce t h e ex p ress r essii o n fJ
f J p G J J p G p q p i s m ean ini n g f ul
ul . I n t h a t
expressi
expres sion
on the re are four bo un d variables variables equifor
equi form m w it ith h p.
B u t t h e f i r st an d t h e f o u r t h o f t h ese v ar i ab l es ar e b o u n d
b y th e . f i r s t q u a n t i f i e r , b e lo n g i n g t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n i n
q u est i o n , wh i l e t h e seco n d an d t h e t h i r d ar e b o u n d b y
the second quantifier. The expression under consideration
also includes one free variable, q, w h i c h m a y b e b o u n d ,
yielding the meaningful expression [ J q J ~ [ p G f l C p q p .
The meaningful expression G q f j p p contains only one
free va riable g, g, so
so th a t th e expression
expressi on f j q G q f J p p i s m eaning-
ful. Yet the expression f ] p C q [ ] p p is meaningless, for the
f i r st q u an t i f i er d o es n o t b i n d an y o t h er v ar i ab l e t h an t h e
one that follows it directly. In a meaningful expression
ev er y q u an t i f i er m u st b i n d at l east t wo v ar i ab l es. T h e
expressions f j p , f ] p q , [ J p I I p P 31 6 no* meaningful.
316
In order to decide decide wh ether an expressexpressii on is a m eaning-
ful expressi
expres sion on of the sen tential
tenti al calcul
calculusus w it
ith
h th e universal
univer sal

quantifier we may use the following theorem: i f <p{p {p)) iiss

a m eaningful expr es s ion that contains at leas t one pee
variable equiform with p, then the expression of the form
fjp p ip ) w a m e a n i n g f u l e x p r e s s i o n ; in the meaningful

94 IV. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS WITH QUANTIFIERS

expression thus obtained the variables equiform with p

ar e al r ead y b o u n d v ar i ab l es.
E x am p l es h av e b een u sed t o ex p l ai n wh at ex p r essi o n s
w it
ithh th e un iversal quan ti tifi
fier,
er, are m ean ingful express
expression ions. s.
B y u si n g t h e q u al i t y : f] p < p ( p ) = K<p(Q)q>(l) f o r m u l at ed
above we can check every meaningful expression, we
h av e seen t h at t h e ex p r essi o n f ] p p is false, and the ex-
prr e s s i o n f ] p G p p is true. We also have:
p

G f j p p p — CKOlp — COp .

T his ex pre ssion is u n iv er sa lly tru e , fo r COO = 1, C01 C01 — 1.

Thus the expression G f j p p p (which contains one free
v ar i ab l e) i s u n i v er sal l y t r u e. On t h e o t h er h an d , t h e
meaningful expression f J p G p q with one free variable q
is not universally true, for on substituting q / 0 we obtain

fJ p G p O = K C 0 0 C 1 0 = # 1 0 =
fJ 0 .

L et u s n o w ex am i n e t h e ex p r essi o n C p f jp j p p : on substi-
t u t i n g f o r t h e f r ee v ar i ab l e p ( 0 we have

G O f J p p = C0 # 0 1 — COO = 1 .

On su b st i t u t i n g p j l w e h a v e

G l fj p p = G 1K 01 = CIO = 0 .

The expression C p f j p p is remarkable for behaving like

t h e f u n ct io
i o n # wh i ch
c h also
also g iv
iv es
es

# 0 = 1, # 1 = 0 .

T h u s t h e sy m b o l o f n eg at i o n can b e d ef i n ed b y m ean s
of implication and the universal quantifier, in the follow-
ing way:
 N p — C p fjp p .

QUANTIFIERS. RULES OF INFERENCE. THESES 95

Together -with the universal quantifier we may in

trod
tr od uce th e existential qu antifier The expressi
expres sion
on o f
t h e f o r m ]?p<p(p) is read: “for some p , <p <p(p)” - The ex
(p)”
prr e s s i o n “ f o r s o m e p , q > ( p ) ” i s used when we want t o
p
m a k e s u r e t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n “(pip)” proves true for
the substitution of a certain sentence for the variable p .
In t hat case at l east one of t he expressi ons 9 (0 ),gp(l) is
true, so that, in other words, the expression A<p A<p(0)<
(0)<p(l)
p(l)
is true; this yields the following symbolic equality:
£p<p(p) = J $ ? (0 M 1 ) ,
whi ch i n t u rn give
givess
£ p p == A 0 1 = 1 , ^ J p C p q — A C O q C lq = A l C l q — 1

(regardless of the value of q ) .

Further, the application of De Morgan’s laws gives

^TJPPiP) “ (0 ) 9 (1 ) = X-?^
X-?^93
93(0
(0)^
)^9?
9?(l
(l)) = £ p N * p { p ) .

Thus we see that the expression J¥ J ¥ f] p < p (p ) is equivalent

to the expression ^pN<p{p)„ I n f a c t , i f i t i s n o t t r u e t h a t
for all th e sub stit
stitution
ution s of concrete sentences
sentences for the
variable p , <p(p) proves t rue t hen for some subst i t ut i on
p(p)

for t he vari abl e p the expression <p(p) proves false, which

means t hat t he expressi on N Ncc p { p ) proves true.
2 5. T he s en ten tial calculus
cal culus w ith qu antifiers
antifi ers ca n be
formul at ed as an axi omat i c syst em. An axi omat i c syst em
of the sentential calculus with the universal quantifier
will be outlined here, with only implication and the
universal quantifier being adopted as primitive terms.
isTegation will be defined as mentioned above.
Five rules of inference will be adopted. The first two
of them wiwill l be the rules
rules of su bs titution
titution an d o f detach m ent.
The latter is the same as in the quantifier-free sentential
calculus. To the former, however, certain reservations
must be added. In the sentential calculus with a quantifier

96 IV- THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS WITH QUANTIFIERS

t h e r u l e o f su b st i t u t i o n p er m i t s u s t o su b st i t u t e m ean i n g 
ful expres
expressi sions
ons w ith unive rsal quan ti tifier
fiers,
s, b u t su bstitution
bstitution s
m ay be m ade for free fr ee vari
variables
ables only.
only. Thus, on sub stitutingstituting
p I C q r t M v e o b t ai n f r o m t h e ex p r essi o n

Gflppp
the expression
crippGqfjqq-

Let us examine the expression G f J p G p q q wi t h t h e

free variables q. We note that regardless of the value
of q we have: GOq ~ 1 , C lq
l q = q , K l q = q. Thus, regardless
of the value of q we have:

C r ip
i p C P M = C K COC O qC
q C lq
l q q = O K l q q = Gqq .
The expression C[~JpCpqq is thus universally true. Let us
s u b s t i t u t e i n i t q j Gq p . This will yield the expression
G f J p G p C q p G q p which is not universally true, for on
substituting for the free variables: pjQ p jQ , q /1 we obtain

G f ] p G p G l p C 1 0 = GKC0G10C1G11G10

= GK
KCCO
OOOC
CUU O = G K 1 1 0 = G 10 = 0 .

B y su b st i t u t i n g q j Gq p we h av e p assed f r o m t h e t r u e ex 
prr e s s i o n Gj~JpGpqq to the false expression C f j p C p C q p C q p .
p
T h i s h as b een d u e o n l y t o t h e f act t h at a cer t ai n f r ee
variable of the substituted expression Oqp, n a m e l y t h e
variable equiform with p , has become a bound variable
after the substitution. In order to avoid the possibility
of transition, on the strength of the rule of substitution,
from a true sentence to a false sentence, we introduce
a restriction on the rule of substitution, such that every

rvariable
em ai n sowhich
af t er ist hfree
e su in
b st the
i t u t isubstituted
o n h as b een expression
m ad e. must
A p a r t fr
fr om
o m t h e r u les
les o f su b st it i t u t io
i o n an d o f d et ach m en t
we a do pt two rules
rules for han dling the universal qua ntifi
nti fier.
er.

QUANTIFIERS. RULES OF INFERENCE. THESES 97

The first of them, called the r u l e o f j o i n i n g t h e q u a n t i f i e r ,

m i l b e r e fe
fe r re
r e d t o a s r u le
le B J . M u le B J p e r m i t s n s , o n th e
s tr
t r ength of a thes is of thet he for m G a ft {p)
{p) w hich is an im plica tion
whos e cons equent
e quent contains
contai ns the fr eeee var iiable
able p an d whos e

antecedent does not contain any free variable equiform with

p , to a c c e p t a s a t h e s i s a n e x p r e s s i o n o f th e f o r m G a f j p f i ( p ),
i , e ., to join the quantifier to the consequent of the thesis in
question . F o r in in stan
st an ce, o n t h e st r en g t h o f th t h e t h esis
esis GqCpq
we m ay accep t as a t h esi s t h e ex p r essi o n G q f f p C p q .
Likewise, on the strength of the expression G f f p p G p q
we m ay accep t t h e ex p r essi o n G [ ] p p f ] p G p q .
B u i e B J c a n b e j u s ti t i f ie
i e d b y m e a n s o f t h e t h e si sis b e 
longing
lo nging to t o th e sen tential calculcalc ulus:us: G C p q C G p r G p K q r , which
h as n o t b een p r o v ed , b u t w h ich i ch can easil
easil y b e ch eck ec k ed ,
e.g.
e. g.,, by th e zero- zer o-one
one verificati
verif ication on m ethod . T h a t thesis
p e r m i ts u s , o n t h e s t r e n g t h of s e n te n c e s o f t h e f o r m
G p q a n d Cpr , t o accep t a sen ten t en ce o f t h e f o rm rm C p K g r .
Hen ce, i f we h av e a t h esi s o f t h e f o r m Gaf3 af3 (p ) , where a
d o es n o t co n t ai n an y f r ee v ar i ab l e eq u i f o r m wi t h p , t h e n
b y s u b s t i t u t i o n w e o b t a i n t h e t h e s e s : Ca/3( Ca /3( 0 ), <7a/S(l).
T h e s e i n t u r n y i e l d G a K p { 0 ) / ?( l ) , t h at i s G a f j p p ( p ) .
B u i e B O , t h e r u l e o f o m i t t i n g t h e q u a n t i f i e r , which is
t h e seco n d r u l e o f h an d l i n g t h e q u an t i f i er , i s i n a way
a c o nv n v e rs o f t h e r u l e B J . On the strength of a thesis of the
rs e of
fo
f o r m C a [ f p f } ( p ) ( w h e r e a m a y c o n t a i n a fr e e v a r ia b le
e q u if
if o r m w i tth l e B O p e r m i t s u s to a c c e p t a s a t h e s i s
h p ) , r u le
an expr es s ion of the for m Ca(${p). F o r i n s t a n c e , o n t h e
st r en g t h o f t h e t h esi s G f j p p f f p p w e m a y a c c e p t t h e
thesis G f f p p p .
B u i e B O can b e j u st i f i ed b y m ean s o f t h e t h eses o f
the sentential calculus: G G p K q r C p q a n d G G p K q r G p r ,
which permit us to recognize sentences of the form G p q
a n d G p r o n t h e st r en g t h o f a sen t en ce o f t h e f o r m C p K q r ,
T h u s, a t h esi s o f t h e f o r m Ca[ Jp@(p), i.e., C a K p { 0 ) f i ( l )
yields theses of the form Ca(${0) and Gafi{ 1). T h e lasfc
two sentences yield the universally true sentence Cafi(p).

98 IV . TH E SENT EN TIAL C A L C U L U S " W IIT

T H Q U A N T I F IIE
ERS

The last rule of inference in the sentential calculus

with the universal quantifier is the rule of replacement,
wh i ch ad m i t s t h e d ef i n i t i o n

(D) N p — Cp[[pp .

T h e ru l e o f rep l a cemen t p ermi t s u s t o rep l a ce, i n every t h esi s

o f t h e s y s t e m , t h e r i g h t s iid o n , or of one
d e o f a g i v e n d e f i n i t iio
o f i ts
t s p r o p e r s u b s t i ttu ons , by the lep side of that defini
u t iio
t io
i o n , o r o f i t s a n a l o g o u s su b st iitt u t iio
on .
26 . As th e system of axiom
26. axiom s of th e senten ti tial
al calcul
cal culus
us
wi t h t h e u n i v er sal q u an t i f i er we ad o p t t h e sy st em o f
T a r s k i a n d B e m a y s ( re r e fe
f e rr
r r ed
e d t o o n p . 4 9)
9 ) , w i th
th C a s
t h e o n l y p r i m i t i v e t er m . T h e seco n d p r i m i t i v e t er m , [ ] ,

does not occur in the axioms. The axioms are as follows:

T1 QqGpth

T2 GGCpqpp,

T3 CGpqGGqrGpr,

A number of theorems will be deduced from these axioms

b y m e a n s of t h e fiv e ru le s of in fe re n c e , f o r m u l a te d a b o v e .
I n p ar t i cu l ar , we sh al l p r o v e o u r ax i o m sy st em o f t h e
ordinary sentential calculus.
The following three theses of the ordinary sentential
calcu
cal cu lu
l u s can b e p r o v ed b y A x io
io m s T l , T 2,
2 , T 3 ( th
t h e p ro
r o o fs
fs
will not be given here):
T4 Gpp,

T5 G Gp G qrGqG pr ,

T6 G Cq rG Cp q Cp r.

We now write down the proof line of Thesis 7:

T 2 g / /7
/7 p p * D - T 7 ,
T7 GCNppp.

QUANTIFIERS. RULES OF INFERENCE. THESES 99

I n t h e p r o o f li
li n e ab o v e, t h e ast
aster
er isk
i sk i s p reced
r eced ed b y t h e
following sentence derived from T2 by substitutions
G G G pf [p p pp .

We use the Thesis

substitution definition of negation
7, which to obtain
is the second from
axiom of this
our
system of the ordinary sentential calculus. We continue:

T4 p IU p p * BO •T 8,
T8 C flp p p .

In the proof given above we obtain, through substitution,

the sentence
c IIp p U pp

from which, on applying rule RO, we obtain Thesis T8.

T 6 q l f j p p , rjq * CT8 p j q — T 9 ,
T9 GGp [ J p p G p q .

I n t h i s p r o o f t h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t h as b een ap p l i ed
to the following substitutions of T6 and T8:

G C n P P q G C p flP P G pq, G []p p q ,

T9 * D • T 1 0 ,
T10 GNpGpq.

T 5 p j N p , q j p , r j q * CT10 — T i l ,
T il GpGNpq.

Thes i s T i l is th e th ird axiom of our sys

Thesi syste
tem
m of the o rdi-
nary sentential calculus. Thus all three axioms of our
system of the ordinary sentential calculus occur as theses

in the sentential calculus with the universal quantifier.

In the sentential calculus with the universal quantifier
we may, from every thesis <p(jp), containing at least one
free variable p , obtain a thesis of the form ff]] p < p ( p ) b y

100 IV. THE SENTENTIAL CALCULUS WITH QUANTIFIERS

jjo
o in in g t h e u n i v e r s a l q u a n t if i e r a t t h e b e g in n in g . B y w a y
of example, we shall demonstrate this for the thesis G pp.

T 1 q j G p p ^ p j q * CT4 — T1 2,

T12 G g C p p.
T12 * BJ-T13,
T13 <7g//p G p p .

Since the antecedent of Thesis T12 does not include any

variable equiform with p , r u le
l e B J m a y b e a p pl
p l i e d.
d.

T13 q{C pp * CT4 — T1 4,

T14 n*0pp-

Thus by means of the thesis G p p we have proved T14.

If two diversiform free variables occur in a thesis, they
b o th m a y b e b o u n d b y u n iv e rs a l q u a n tifie rs s ta n d in g a t
the beginning
beginning of th a t the
thesi
sis.
s. This wil wi l l be shown
sho wn by p roving
T18 by means of T1 as an example.

T1 qjG qC pq, p jr * C T 1 — T 1 5
5,,

T15 CrCqCpq.

T15*RJ-T16,
T 16 CrfJqCqCpq.

T16 * 35J T 1 7 ,

T17
T1 7 G r n v fl^ G p q -
T17 rjC p p * C
CT4
T4 — T 18,

T 18 [I p I hG qC pq.

The procedure used in proving T14 and T18 may also

b e u s e d i n t h e c a s e o f e x p r e s s io n s c o n t a i n i n g a n a r b i t r a r y
number of diversiform free variables. When proceding in
t h e r ev er
e r se
s e o r d er to
t o t h a t o b ser
s erv
v ed ab o v e,
e , we m ay el im
i m i n ate
at e

Q U A N T IF
I F IIE
E R S . R U L E S O F IN
IN F E R E N C E . T H E S E S 101

t h e u n i v er sal q u an t i f i er s st an d i n g at t h e b eg i n n i n g o f
a thesis. Thus expressions of the forms <p{p) a n d [ ] p < p (p )
are inferentiaUy equivalent within our system of the
sentential calculus with the universal quantifier.
Th e expres
expressisions
ons f} f } q C p q a n d GpJJqq, t h e l a t t e r o f w h icic h
i s d er i v ed f r o m t h e f o r m er t h r o u g h t h e sh i f t i n g o f t h e
q u an t i f i er st an d i n g at t h e b eg i n n i n g , t o t h e co n seq u en t
of that expression, are not only inferentiaUy equivalent
b u t s i m p l y e q u i v a l e n t . T h i s w ill
il l b e d e m o n s t r a t e d b y
p ro v i n g T 24 a n d T 27. F o r t h i s p u r p o s e w e s h a ll u se t h e
following two theses of the ordinary sentential calculus,
wh i ch wi l l n o t b e p r o v ed h er e:

T19 CG pC qrC N C p N q r .

T20 C C N C p N qr C p C q r .

Theses T19 and T20 are equivalents of the laws of im

p o r ta tio n a n d e x p o rta tio n . T h e ir u n d e rlin e d p a r ts a r e
co n ju
j u n cti
ct i o n s w r i tt
t t en b y m ean s o f im
im p l icat
icat io
io n an d n eg ati
ati on
on .

T 4 p I F I q Cp z * s o *r a i ,

T21 G f Jq
Jq C p q C p q .

T 1 9 p l l J a C p q , q j p , t f q * CT21
CT21 — T2 2,

T22 GNCYl9.Gpq.Npq.

T22 * R J - T 2 3 ,
T23 G N G fJ q C p q N p f ] q q .

T h e v ar i ab l e q o ccu r s i n t h e an t eced en t o f T 2 2 , b u t i t
i s b o u n d , so
s o t h a t r u le
l e B J m a y b e a p pl
plie d .

T 2 0 p j f ] q C p q , q l p , r f f ] q q * CT23
CT23 — T 24 ,
T24 G f Jq C p qG pf l qq .
8

102 I V . TH
T H Jf i S Jf
Jf i N T
Tii f i N T
Tll A U C A L C U L U S W I T H Q U A N T IF IE S

To prove T27 no reference need be made to T19 and T 2 0 :

T 4 p [ f j q q * BO ♦T
♦T 25 ,
T25 O f[q q q .

T 6 q j[ jq q t r jq * CT25 — T26,
T26 w p flq q C p q *

T26 * B J • T 2 7 ,
T27 C G p fJ q sH iC p q .

We confine ourselves to these few theses, which give

a very general idea of the universal quantifier. Quantifiers
p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t ro le i n b u il d in g a x i o m a ti c sy ste m s , i n
p a r t i c u l a r if t h e v a r ia b le b o u n d b y t h e q u a n ti f ie r is a n a m e
variable. M athem ati atical
cal ttheorem
heorem s usuall
usually y require th e use o off
quantifiers for their symbolic formulation.
 V. ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC

9. Axiom s. Defini
Definitions.
tions. Rule
Rules
s o f Inf
Inference
erence

27. Only sentential variables occur in the sentential

calculus; neither names nor name variables appear in it.
I n t h e p r esen t c h ap t er we sh s h al l b e co n cern
cern ed w i th
t h a cer t ain
ai n
theory of name variables, we shall present Aristotle’s
syllogistic as an axiomatic system. True, as has been
mentioned above, Aristotelian logic has little application
i n r easo n i n g s u su al l y m et , y et t h e ax i o m at i c sy st em t o
bee p r e s e n t e d h e r e is o n e o f t h e s i m p le s t k n o w n a x i o m a t i c
b
system
syst em s of nam e variables.vari ables. I t i s abov e all in view view of th e
dominant role which used to be, and in philosophical
logic still is, ascribed to Aristotle’s theory that I intend
t o ax i o m at i ze t h at t h eo r y an d t h er eb y t o assi g n i t i t s
p r o p e r p l a c e i n loglo g ic,
ic , a n d t o s h o w h o w i t o u g h t t o b e
ex p o u n d ed i n a p r eci se way
In our system the following letters of the Latin alpha
b e t : a , b , m , wil wi l l be used as nam e variables.
vari ables. Two p rim 
i t i v e t er m s: X XII a n d I , ar e ad o p t ed , b o t h o f t h e m b ein
ei n g
sentence-forming functors of two name arguments.
An expression of the form TJdb is read “all a i s &”
an d is is called
called a . uni ver s al af f i r mat i ve s ent ence . As in A ris
totle’s logic, empt y names may not be t he val ues of our
n a m e v a r i a b l e s , i.e., such names as “square circle”. If this
restriction
restricti on were no t observed,
obser ved, we would ha ve to recog recogni
nize
ze
certain false theses of the theory we are going to present.

An expression of the form l a b is called a p a r t i c u l a r a f f i r

mative sentence and is read “some a i s th e restriction
restri ction
o f t h e v ar i ab l es t o n o n - em p t y n am es b ei n g v al i d i n t h i s
case too.
8*

104 V . A RI S T O T L E ’ S S Y L L O G I S T I C

T h e f u n ct o r s TJ a n d l may he interpreted by circles,

as was done in the 18th century by the German mathe
matician L. Euler. If one circle stands for objects a, and
t h e o t h er f o r o b j ect s b, t h en t h e ex p r essi o n U a b m ay b e

interpreted by the following figure:

Likewise, the expression Ja

J a b m ay b e i n t er p r et ed b y .
the following figure:

The p ri
rimm it
itive
ive term s given above occur in the f oll
oll owing
owing
four axioms of our system:

SI Uaa.

S2 la a .

S3 CKU mbU amU ab.

S4 C K X fm blm ala h .

Axiom SI is read “all a iiss a ” , an d Axiom

Axi om S2 is
is read “ some
so me
a is a”. These sentences are true for all the values of the
v ar i ab l e a which are non-empty names, e.g., “all men
ar e m en ”, “so m e m en ar e m en ”. T h eses SI an d S2 d o

AXIOMS. DEFINITIONS. REXES OF INFERENCE 105

not explicitly appear in Aristotle’s works, but they were

recognised by bis disciples.
Th e n e x t tw
t w o axioms are A ristotle’
ristotle’ss syl
s ylll ogisms,
ogisms, w ritten
ritt en
in the form of conditional sentences (cf. 1.2 above).
m b a
Axiom
a i s 5” . S3 isn read:
W he i n terp“If
in all b y E
re ted isu ler’s
ans dcirc
ler’ cial
rclll es, is m,syllo
this then
syl logi all
gism
sm
would yield:

Axiom S4 is read: “If all m is b a n d s o m e m is a, then

some a is 6”. The following may serve as an example:
“All Poles are men, some Poles are scientists, therefore
so m e sci en t i st s ar e m en ”. T h e i n t er p r et at i o n b y E u l er ’ s
circles would be as follows:

I n o u r sy st em we ad o p t t wo d ef i n i t i o n s, wh i ch d ef i n e
t h e f u n ct o r s O a n d Y (these are sentence-
sentence-forming forming func
f unc tors
o f t wo n am e ar g u m en t s) :
El O ab — N U a b .
E2 Yab = m a b .

T h e ex p r essi
ess i o n o f t h e f o rm
r m Oab, call
called
ed a p a r t i c u l a r n e g a t i v e
sentence , is read: “some a is no t 6” 6” ; th e expressi
expres sion on of
the form Taft, called a univer s al negative s entence , is read:

1 06 V. AKISTOTI/E’S SYLLOGISTIC

“ n o a is 6” 6” . These definiti
defini tions
ons becom e iin n tuitiv e w hen
ap p l i ed t o ex am p l es: t h e sen t en ce “so m e m en ar e n o t
Po l es” m ean s t h e sam e as t h e sen t en ce “i t i s n o t t r u e
t h at al l m en ar e Po l es”, an d t h e sen t en ce “n o ci r cl es

tarr uee sqt huat

ar es”
so m m
e ean s es
ci r cl t h earsam
e sqe u as t h e sen t en ce “i t i s n o t
ar es”.
T he a xiom atic ex position position of A ristotelianrist otelian logilogic,c, as offered
offered
in this book, is based on the sentential calculus as an
ear l i er t h eo r y , an d p r esu p p o ses t h e t r u t h o f al l t h e t h eses
b e l o n g i n g t o t h a t c a lc u lu s . T h u s A r i s t o t l e ’s l o g ic is n o t
a primitive logical theory, and for its foundation requires
a cer t ai n ear l i er t h eo r y t h at i n v est i g at es sen t en ces i n
general, without engaging in the study of the details of
t h ei r st r u ct u r e.
I n t h e sy stem
stem h er e ex p o u n d ed , m ean in i n g f u l exp
ex p res
r essi
sioons
are all those expressions which are obtained from a mean
ingful expression of the sentential calculus by the re
p l a c e m e n t o f a l l it
i t s s e n t e n t i a l v a r ia b le s b y so m e e x p re s sio n s
of the form: TJab, l a b , O a b , T a b .
Three rules of inference will be used. The rule of sub
stitution, known from the sentential calculus, will here
bee m o d i f i e d so t h a t w e m a y , i n t h e t h e s e s o f t h e s e n t e n t i a l
b
calculus, substitute for sentential variables meaningful
expressions which, apart from constants of the sentential
calculus, contain terms of Aristotle’s logic. In the theses
o f o u r sy st em , o n l y n am e v ar i ab l es m ay b e su b st i t u t ed
for name variables.
T h e r u l e o f d et ach m en t r em ai n s as i t i s i n t h e sen 
tential calculus. Finally, the rule of replacement enables
n s t o u se t h e d ef i n i t i o n s D1 an d D2 , as g i v en ab o v e, b y
replacing in the theses of our system the expressions that
are equiform with the right sides of these definitions or
the substitutions of such expressions correspondingly by
the left sides of the definitions in question.
 Before proceeding to pro ve theses of A ristotle s syllo
syl lo
gistic we shall specify those theses of the sentential cal-

t h e s e s o f a k x s t o t l e ’s s y l l o g is t i c 1 07

cuius which will he used directly; some of these theses

have heen proved when discussing the sentential calculus,
while the others can easily by justified by means of the
zero-one verification method.

Thl Cpp.

Th2 G C p q G G q r C p r.

Th3 G Cp q CNq Np.

Th4 GGpNqOqNp.

Th5 G G N p q G N q p.

T h6 G G K p q r C p G q r.

T h7 GG K p q rC q G p r.

T h8 GCKpqrCKpNrNq.
Th9 GGKpqrGKNrqNp.

ThlO G C K p q r C G sp G K s qr

Thll CCKpqrGCsqGKpsr.

Thl2 GGKpqrGGrsGKqps.

10. Theses of Aristotle’s Syllogistic

28. We now proceed to prove theorems of Aristotle’s

syllogistic. In doing so we shall refer exclusively to theses
of the sentential calculus and the axioms, definitions,
and rules of inference of Aristotle’s syllogistic, as given
ab o v e.
T h e f i r st g r o u p o f t h eo r em s t o b e d eal t wi t h ar e t h o se
t h eo r em s wh i ch ar e u su al l y t r eat ed i n a sch em at i c way
a s t h e s q u a re
r e o f o p p o s i ttii o n . T h i s i s a sq u ar e a t t h e v er ti
ti ces
c es
of which are written the four functions of syllogistic;
ab . T h e f i r s t a r g u m e n t o f a n y o f t h e
U a b , l a b , Y a b t O ab
fo u r fun ctors of syllogi
syllogiststicic is called
called subject , and the second,
e. T h e f u n ct i o n s wr i t t en at t h e v er t i ces o f t h e
t h e p red i ca tte.

108 v . a k i s t o t u e ’s s y l l o g is t ic

square of opposition have eqniform subjects and eqniform

p r e d i c a t e s . T h e s e f u n c t i o n s a r e p l a c e d so t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l
sentences, namely the universal affirmative sentence and
t h e u n i v er sal n eg at i v e sen t en ce, ar e at t h e u p p er v er t i ces

of
n amthe
el y tsquare
h e p a r t of
i cu lopposition;
icu ar af fi
f i rm ivthe
r m at iv se nparticular
e sen t en ce an d tsentences,
ten h e p a r t ic-
i c-

ular negative sentence, are at the lower vertices of the

square. The affirmative sentences are at the left vertices
of th e squ are of opp osition,
osition, an d the nega
negattive*
ve* sentences,
sentences,
at the right vertices.
Certain relations of implicational consequence can be
st at ed b et ween t h e f u n ct i o n s o f t h e sq u ar e o f o p p o si t i o n
o r t h ei r n eg at i o n s. We say t h at t h e relati
relation
on of contradicti
contradi ction on
h o l d s b et ween t h e f u n ct i o n s wr i t t en at t h e en d s o f t h e
same diagonal of the square of opposition. Every function
from the square of opposition implies the negation of the
function which is its contradiction, and conversely, the
n eg at i o n o f an y f u n ct i o n f r o m t h e sq u ar e o f o p p o si t i o n
implies the function which is its contradiction. The re-
lations of contradiction between the functions of the
square of opposition will be proved as theses from S5
to 812, inclusi
inclusively.
vely. In view of th e p rope rt
rties
ies of im plication
plication
i t f o ll
l l o ws f ro
r o m t h ese t h eses t h a t sen tten
en ces o f th
th e f o r m U ab
a n d O ab can n o t b o t h b e t r u e o r b o t h b e f al se; l i k ewi se,

THESES OF ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC 109

the sentences Y a h a n d J a b c a n n o t b o t h b e t r u e o r b o t h
bee f a ls e .
b
T h e r e l a t i o n o f s u b a l t e m a t i o n holds between a sentence
o f th e f o rrm
m l a b a n d a s e n te n c e o f th e f o rrm m Uab. The sen-
tence TJab implies the sentence l a b , but not conversely.
Like
Li kewis
wise, e, the relation of sub altem ation holds betwe en the
sentence O ab a n d th e s e n te n c e Y d b . The relations of
subalternation will be proved as theses from S13 to S16,
inclusively.
T h e relation of contrariety holds between universal
sentences, i.e., sentences of the form U a b a n d Y o b . E a c h
of these sentences implies the negation of the other, but
n o t c o n v e r s e ly . T h u s c o n tr a r y s e n te n c e s c a n n o t b o th b e
true, but can both be false. The laws of contrariety will
b e p r o v e d a s th e s e s S17 a n d S18.
T h e r el at i on of s ubcont r ar i et y holds between particular
sentences, i.e., sentences of the form l a b a n d OaJ>. T h e
negation of each of these sentences implies the other
sentence, but not conversely. Subcontrary sentences can
th u s b o th b e tr u e , b u t c a n n o t b o th b e f a ls e . T h e la w s
of subcontrariety will be proved as theses S19 and S20.
We repeat the axioms and definitions of Aristotle’s
syllogistic and then pass on to proofs.
SI Uaa.
S2 Ia a .
S3 GKU mb Ua
amm Uab.
S4 C K U m b lm a la b .

D1 O ab — N U a b t
D2 Y a b = 2s l a b .
T h l pjJ
p jJ S fU a b * D 1 1 ♦S5,

S5 C OabJT Uab.
T h l p fN U a b * D 1 H • S 6.
S6 ONUabOab.

110 V . A RI S T O T L E ’ S S Y L L O G I S T I C

S5 — S 7 ,
T h 4 p j O d b , q j U a b * 0 S5
87 GUabNOab.
Th5 p j U a b , qjOab * 0 S6
S6 — 8 8 ,
S8 G N O a b U a b.
*S 9 ,
T i l l p j N I a b * D2 I *S
89 CYabNIab.
T h l p j N I a b * D2 II *S10
*S10 ,
810 GNIabYab.
Th4 p / Y a b , q j l a b * OS9 — S l l ,
S ll GlabNYab.
Th5 p j l a b , q j Y a b * 0 8 1 0 — 8 1 2 ,

S 12 GNYablab.

The laws of the square of opposition for contradictory-

sen t en ces h av e b een p r o v ed .

Th7 p j J J a b , q j l a a ,
r j l a b * 084 m j a — OS2 — S13 ,
S1.3 GUablab.
Th3 p j J J a b , q j l a b * OS13
S13 — 8 14 ,
S14 GNIdbNUab.
S14 * D2 *D 1 *
*S
S 15 ,
815 GYabOab.
Th3 p j Y a b , q jO a b * 0S15 — 816,
S16 GNOabNYab.

T h e l aws o f su b al t er n at i o n h av e b een p r o v ed .

S14 * D 2 • S 1 7,
817 CYabNUab.
Th4 * p / Y a b , q j U a b * 0 8 1 7 — SI 8 ,
 SI 8 CUabNYab.

THE SES O P A R I S T O T L E ’ S S Y L L O G I S T IIC

C 1 11

T h e l aws o f co n t r ar i et y h av e b een p r o v ed .
S l4 * D1 *S19,
*S19,
SI 9 CNIdbOab.

Th5 p j l a b , q jO a b * CS19 — S20,

520 GNOabldb.

The laws of subcontrariety have been proved.

Those theorems of Aristotle’s syllogistic which we are
g o i n g t o p r o v e n o w f o r m t h e l a ws o f co n versi o n . These
laws
la ws pe rm it us us to exchange in certain case casess the subjects
and the predicates of expressions belonging to syllogistic,
ei th
t h er w i th
t h o u t o r w i th
th a si m u l tan
t an eo u s ch an g e o f t h e f u n ct o r
in question.
T h 6 p jT J a a , q j l a b , r j l b a
* <7S4 m f a , b j a , a f b — C S 1 — S2 1 ,
521 Glablba.

Thesi s S21
Thesi S21 perm its
it s us to con ve rt th e p artic u lar affirm
affir m ative
ati ve
sentences.
Th2 p j U a b , q f l a b , r f l b a * CS13
CS13 — GS2
GS21 — S2 2,
522 GUablba.

Thesis S22 permits us to convert the universal affirmative

sentences,
sent ences, b u t with a sim
si m ultaneou
ult aneou s change of th e func tor TJ
into the functor I.
Th3 p f l b a , q f l a b * CS21 a(b, bja — S 2 3 ,
523 GNIdbNlba.
S23 * D 2 - S 2 4 ,
524 GYabNIba.
S24 * D2 a l b , 6/o-
6/o- S2 5,
525 GYabYba.
Thesis S25 permits us to convert universal negative
sentences.

112 v. a e i s t o t l e ’s s y l l o g is t ic

2 9 . We n o w p ass t o t h e p r o p er p ar t o f Ar i st o t l e’ s
syllogistic, namely to s yl l ogi s ms . Syllogisms are certain
meaningful expressions which belong to the system under
discussion and have the form of implications. The con

sequent
four of suchU an
functions, implication consists of one of the
a b , l a b , Y a h , O a b , and its antecedent,
of a con junction of two. two. such functions.
functi ons. A ny two functions
functi ons
which occur in a given syllogism have one, and only one,
eq u i f o r m ar g u m en t , so t h at t h r ee, an d o n l y t h r ee, d i -
versiform variables occur in a single syllogism which
contains six variables.
The consequent of a syllogism is called its conclusion,
an d t h e f u n ct io
io n s o ccu rr
r r in
in g i n t h e an t eced e n t ar e call
call ed
t h e p r e m i s e s of that syllogism. That premise which
contains the variable which is equiform with the predicate
of the conclusion always is the first argument of the
conjunction that forms the antecedent of the syllogism.
Ou r Ax i o m S3 :
G K XJmb TJa
TJam
m U ab

m ay ser v e as an ex am p l e o f a sy l l o g i sm . T h at v ar i ab l e
i n t h e sy l l o g i sm wh i ch h as n o eq u i f o r m co u n t er p ar t i n
the conclusion, is called the m i d d l e t e r m . T h e v ar i ab l e
equiform with the predicate of the conclusion is called
t h e m a j o r ttee rrm
m , a n d t h e v a r ia i a b l e e q u if
i f or
o r m w i th
th t h e s u b j e c t
of the conclusion is called the m i n o r t e r m . T h e l a s t t w o
n am es m ay b e j u sti st i fi
f i ed o n l y i n t h e case
cas e o f o u r Ax io i o m S3,
S3,
where in conformity with the interpretation by means of
Euler’s circles the name a i s as i t wer e co n t ai n ed i n t h e
n a m e b.
T h at p r em i se s e o f t h e syl
sy l l o gi
g i sm wh i cch h i n clu
clu d es t h e m aj o r
t er m i s call
cal l ed t h e m a j o r p re r e m i ssee , an d t h at wh i ch i n cl u d es

t h e m i n o r t e r m , t h e m i n o r p r e m i ssee .
I n t h e t e x t t h a t fo
fo ll
ll o ws
w s th
t h e m i d d l e t e r m w il
i l l a lw
lw a y s
b e e q u i f o r m w i t h m , t h e m i n o r t e r m , w i t h a , t h e m aj o r
t e r m , w i t h b. All syllogism are classed into four figures,

T H E S E S O F A RI S T O T L E ’ S S Y L L O G I S T I C 113

according
accordi ng to
t o w he t he r the m i ddle term term occuroccurss as su bject
or as predicate in the premises. The first figure includes
t ho se syll
syllogisms
ogisms in w hich hich tthh e m i ddle term
term is th e sub j ect
i n t h e m a jo
j o r p re
r e m is e,
e , a n d t h e p r e d i c a te
t e i n t h e m in o r

prrhe ich
p
w im
chise
is eth
t h. eT m
h ei d sdele
l ce oter
tnerd mf igi su rteh einpcrlu
eddiecate
s teh oi ns eb os yt hllopgrem
cat rism
is
em m isses.
seis.
n
The third figure includes those syllogisms in which the
m i d d lel e t er m i s t h e su b j ect in i n b o t h p r em
e m i ses.
se s. F i n al ly ly , t h e
fo u rth figu figu re i ncludes tho se syl sy llogisms
ogisms in w hich hi ch th e m i ddle
t er m i s th t h e p r ed i cat e in i n t h e m ajo aj o r p rem
r em i se an d t h e su b j ect
in the minor premise. The classification of the syllogisms
into figures is shown by the following scheme of the
p o s itio
it io n o f te r m s in t h e p re m ise is e s :

I mb II bm III mb IY bm
am am ma ma

I f th t h e m a joj o r te
te r m , t h e m i d d le
le a n d t h e m i n o r t e r m
are in all al l syll
syllogisms
ogisms equiform
equifor m w it ithh b , m , a , respectively,
then it can easily be seen that every figure includes 64
diversiform syllogisms. By joining to each combination
of variables one of th t h e four fun ctors w e o btain 42 = 16,
combinations of premises, and to each of these 16 com-
b i n a t i o n s w e m a y j o i n o n e o f t h e f o u r c o n c lu s io n s . I n t h i s
w ay we o b tain in all 16 *42 = 256 256 diversiform
diversiform syllsyllogism
ogism s.
Y et only 24 24 of them , six in in each figure,
figure, a re tru e syll
syllogisms.
ogisms.
These 24 syllogisms will be the theses of our system.
Since two syllogisms, one belonging to Figure I, and the
o t h e r bel
b elo
o n g in
in g to
to F i g u r e I I I , h av e b een ad o p t ed as ax io
io m s,
S3 and S4 respe ctive ctive l y, th e re a re 22 22 syll
syl logisms
ogisms to b e proved.
Each of the 24 true syllogisms has its name, coming
from traditional logic. Further, in traditional logic the
letters a, i, e , o, are used as symbols of functors, instead
of th e lette rs 27, J , Y , O, resp ec tive
tive ly, as use d in this bo ok.
T he nam es of syll
syllogisms
ogisms are form
form ed sos o th a t th
t h ey con t ain
three vowels equiform with the traditional symbols of
f u n ct o r s as t h ey o ccu r i n t h e m aj o r p r em i se, t h e m i n o r

114. T, ARISTOTLE'S SYLLOGISTIC

p r e m is e , a n d t h e c o n c lu s io n , i n t h a t o r d e r , o f t h e s y llo
pr ll o g is
ismm
in question. Thus, our Axiom S3 is called B a r b a r a , and
Axiom S4, D a t i s i . The traditional names will be given
in parentheses following the syllogisms concerned as they

are proved below.

We shall first prove the remaining five syllogisms
bee lo n g i n g t o F i g u r e I .
b
T h l l p j U ' m b , q j lm
l m a , r j l a b , gf U am
* CS4 — CS22 b j m — S 2 6 ,
526 GKUmbUamlab (B a r b a r i ).

T h 8 p j V m b , q j l m a , r jjll a b * OS4 — S 27 ,
527 G K U m b N Ia b N Im a .

T h l l p jX Im b , q j N I a b , r j N I m a , s j Y b a
* CS27 — CS24 ajbj bja — S28,
528 GKUmbYbaNIma.

T h l 2 p jU a m , q jY m b , r j N I a b , s j Y a b
* OS28 m j a , b j m , a
ajj b — C S 1 0 — S29,
529 G U Y mb Uam Yab ( Gelarent).

Th2 p j K Y m b U a m , q j Y a b , rjOab
* CS29
CS29 — GS15
GS15 — S 30,
530 CKYmbUamOab {Gelaront).

T h l l p jV m b , q jlm a , r jla b , s jla m

* 0S 4 — CS21
CS21 b j m — S 3 1,
1,
531 CKUmblamlab (D a r i i ).
Th9 p j V m b , q j l m a , r j l a b * OS1 — S3 2 ,
532 m aN Vm b.
G K N I a b llm
 S32 a j m , m j a D 2 a j m D 1 S 33 ,
533 GKYmblamOab (Ferio).

THJfiSJES Ol' XKISTOTIJS’S SYLLOGISTIC 115

We shall now prove the six syllogisms belonging to

Figure II.
ThlO p j Y m b , q j V a m , r j Y a b , s j Y b m
* CS29 — CS25 a l b , b j m — S 3 4,
4,
534 G K Yb m U am Ya b ( C eess a r e ) .

T h 2 p j K Y b m U a m , q j Y d b , rjO a b
* CS34-— CS15 — S35,
535 GKYbmUamOah ( Cesaro ) .
T h l 2 p j Y a m , q j V b m , r j Y b a , s jjY
Yab
* CS34 6/a, a f b — GS25 a/6, b f a — S 30
30 ,

S3 0 O K V b m Y a m Y ah
ah ( Gamestres ) .
Th2 p j K U b m Y a m , q / Y a b , r/Oab
* CS36 — CS15 — S37,
S3 7 C K O bm Y am O
Oaab (C a m e s t r o p ) .
ThlO p j Y m b , q j l a m , r j O a b , s l Y b m
* CS33 — GS25 a j b , b j m — S38,

538 CKYbmlamOab (Festino).

Th8 p i U m b , q j U a m , r / C/a6 * CS3 — S 3 9 ,
539 GIT Gm6_2V Ga&
Ga&iV G a m .

S39 m/6, 6/m * D l 6/m *D 1 - S 4 0 ,

540 CKUbmOamOab (B a r o e o ) .

We shall now prove the remaining five syllogisms

bee l o n g in g t o F i g u r e ±11.
b

T h l l p l U m b f q l l m a , r f l a b , s fU m a
* GS
GS4 _ GS1
GS13 a f m , 6/a
6/a — S 41,
541 O K U mb
m b U m a la
la b ( D a r a p t ii)) .

116 v. a k is t o t l e ’s s yl l o g is t ic

T l i l l p j Y m b , q j l a m , r jO a b , s j U m a

* CS33
CS33 — OS22
OS22 a j m , b
bjj a — S42,

S42 G K Yrn b UmaOab ( F e lla

a p tto
on).

T h l 2 p j U m a , q j lm
l m b , r j l b a , s fl
fl a b

* OS4 b j a , a lb — CS21 aj b , b j a — 843,

843 C K I m b U m a lla
ab ( B i s a m iiss ) .

Th9 p j U m b , q jU a m , rjUab * OS3 — S44 ,

544 G K K Uab V a m N U m b .

S44 a jm , mfa * D1 a /^ •D1 *S45,

*S45,
545 CKO mb UmaOa
abb {B o c a r d o ).

T l i l l p f Y m b , q j l a m , rjO a b , s j l m a

* CS33
CS33 — CS21
CS21 a f m t b jja
a — S46,

846 CKYmblmaOab (F&rison).

Finally, we shall prove all the syllogisms belonging

t o Fi g u r e I V.

ThlO p j l m b , q j U m a , r j l a b , s j U b
bmm

* OS43
OS43 — CS22
CS22 aj b, bj m — S47,
547 O K U b m U m a lla
ab ( B a m a l iip
p ))..

M i l l p jU b m , q fY a m , r }Y a b , sjY m a
* CS36 — 0S25 a j m , bbjj a — 848,
548 CKUbmYmaYab {Oalemes).

Th2 p J K U b m Y m a , q j Y a b , r jO a b
* 0848
08 48 — CS15 — S49,
849 O K Ubm Y7
7nna
aOOa
abb {Calemop).

T H E S E S O F A B I S T O T L E ’ S S T I X O G 1STIC 117

ThlO p j l m b , q j X J m a , r j l a b , s j l b m
* OS43
OS43 — CS2 1 a j b , b j m — S 50
50 ,
550 GKIbmXfmalab (Dimatis).

T h l O p j Y m b , q { X fm a , r j O d b , s j Y b m
* CS42 — CS25 a j b , b j m — S 51
51 ,
551 C K Y b m JJ
JJmaOa
maOab
b (JPe
JPe sap
apo)
o),,

ThlO p j Y m b , q j l m a , r j O d b , s j Y b m
* CS46 — CS25 a j b , b j m — S 5 2,
2,
552 GKYbmlmaOdb (Fresison).

Thus, all the true syllogisms occur in our system.

All those syllogisms which are not specified in our system
as theses, are false sentences.
9
 NOTES

Preface to the Second Edition

1 T he title pag e of the firs t editi

editionon of th e Elem ents was as follows:
W ydaw nictnictww a K ola M at atem
em at
atyczno-
yczno-Fiz
Fizycznego
ycznego St Stuch
uchae
aezdw
zdw U ni- ni-
w er sy ttetu
etu W arsz
arszaw
aw sk iieg
eg o
o.. To
Tom m X V I I I . D r Jan Lu k asi
asiew
ew icz Pr o ffeso
eso r
U niw ersytet
ersytetu u W arsza
arszaw
w ski ego. E
skiego. Elem
lem en
enty
ty Logilci M atem atyc
atyczne
znej.
j. S k r y p t
autoryzowany opraeowal M. Presburger. Z cz^sciowej subwencji
S en atu Akadem ieki ekiego
ego Un UniiW. WarWarssz* N akladem K om isji isji W ydaw-
niczej Kola Matematyczno-Fizycznego Sluchaezdw Uniwersytetu
W arszawskiego,
arszawskiego, 19 1929
29 [[P P ub li
lications
cations of th e A ssoci
ssociati
ation
on of Stud en ts
o f M at ath h em at
atii cs an d Ph y sics iin n W arsaw
ar saw U n iv er ersisitt y . V o ll.. X V I I II..
E l em en ts o f M at ath
h em at atic
ical
al Lo g iicc b y D r Ja n Lu k asi asiew
ew icz
icz,, Pr o ffess
essoor
a t W arsaw
ar saw U n iv er ersi
sitt y . A u tth
h o r iized
zed llectu
ectu r e n o tes p r ep a r ed b y M . Pr es-
b u r g e r . P a r t l y s u b s id iz e d b y t h e S e n a te o f W a rs a w U n iv e rs ity it y .
F inanced b y the P ub li lishing
shing Com m ittee of the A ssoci ssociat atiion of Stud en ts
of M athem ati atics cs and Phy si sics
cs iin n W ars
arsaw
aw U niversity,
niversity, 19 1929
29]].

Author’
Author’s
s Pr eface to the Firs t Edition

1 In th e first ed it ion of th e Ele

ition Elemm ents t h e t e rrm
m “ t e o r iiaa d e d u k c jjii ”
( th
th eo r y o f d ed u ct
ctiio n ) w as co n stan tl
tlyy u se
sedd in stead o f th th e terterm m
“rachunek zdan” (sentential calculus). This change, which is in
conformity with the terminology later used by Lukasiewicz, is the
only terminological alteration made in the present edition of the
Elem
Ele m en
ents.
ts.
* The numbers of pages in The Author's Preface refer, of course,
to th e p r esen t ed itio n .
3 F o r de tail
tailed
ed bibli
bibliograp
ograp hical d ata concerning these p ape rs se seee
The List of the Works Quoted a t the end of this book. P o st’ st’ss article
is the re llist
isted
ed un de r [1
[1]] , an d B ernay s’s
s’s arti
article
cle und er [2
[27]
7].. F u rthe r
references to The Inst of the Works Quoted w ill ill be given
given in th e
form of numbers in square brackets.
4 The first m ention
ention pu bli
blished
shed in p rin t an d refer
referri
ring
ng to m an y
valued logics is to be found in The Farewell lecture Delivered by
Professor
Professor J a n Luka
Lukasiewicz
siewicz in the Gr
Great H all of W
Wars
arsaw
aw U niversi
niversity
ty
on March 7, 1918 [10], This proves that his system of three-valued
logicc was co nstruc ted b y Lukasi
logi Lukasiew
ew ic
iczz as early as in 1917. T he
9*

120 NOTES

results obtained by A. Lindenbaum are given in [24]. A proof that

three-v alue d logi
logicc can be axiom ati
atized
zed is off
offer
ered
ed in [34
34]].
* Of. [7 ], p p , 180 f.
8 T h at m onogra
onograph
ph has, u nfortun ately, never been publipublished.
shed.

Chapter I

1 In the years th a t f ol
olllowed the pu bli
blicati
cation
on of the first edit
editiion
of the Ele
Elem m ents
en ts algebraic methods again came to be used in research
on logic.
3 A cam paign ag ainst p sychologi
sychologismsm in llogic
ogic was w aged b y
Lukasiewicz from the very beginning of his activity as a scientist.
For detailed arguments against psychologism see, e.g., the lecture
og ic and Psychology , delivered in 1908 [9].
Log
L
3 I.e., the lectures whose notes becam e the first editi edition
on of the
Elem
E lem en
ents
ts.
4 The relat
relationsh
ionsh ips bet
betww een m athem atical logic and phil philosophical
osophical
logic were often dealt with by Lukasiewicz in his articles from the
p e ri
rioo d 19 2 9 -1
-199 3 7 [1
[14]
4],, [1 9 -2 1 ].
s Lukasiewicz worked as intensively o d A ristotle’s ristotle’s syllogisti
syllogisticc as
on thth e se nten titial
al cal
calculus
culus.. H e w rot rotee a comprehens
comprehensiive m onogr
onograph
aph on
th at su b ject [ 2 3 ] .
* Stoic logilogicc w as di discussed
scussed by Luk asi asiew
ew icz inin g rea ter d eta il
in [18],
7 Le^niewski’
Le^niewski’ss system is descri describedbed in [31]
31]..
8 T he sym bol e is th e p rim itive te rm of Le Le..4n
4niiews
ewski
ki’’s ontology [31].

Chapter II
1 T he role of definit
definitions
ions in de du ctictive
ve system s is discus
discussed
sed b y
Lukasiewicz in greater detail in [13].
2 I n [29].
3 F o r m ore d etailed rem arks se seee [1
[17]
7]..
4 Cf. [5].
8 Th e si
sim
m pli
plifi
ficati
cation
on o f syst
system
em s of axioms given b y o the r autho rs
was discussed by Lukasiewicz in [12].
8 Cf. [5].
7 Cf
Cf.. n o te 5 in th is C hap ter.

and 3neg
T he
ati axioms
ation
on of prim
as iits
ts th e se
it ntentterm
itive
ive ti
tial
ermal s,
calcul
calculus
andusw which
hich ha sgive
hich are altern
given ation
n above
on pp. 55-57, have a similar structure.
 9 Cf
Cf.. n o te 4 in th is C hap ter
ter..
10 T he sy stem base d on thes e axiom s iiss a naly sed in [1
[16]
6]..

NOTES 121

11 Cf. [25].
“ Cf
Cf.. [29]
[29]..
13 These theses a re n o t given in th e first ed ition h e Elem
ition of tth E lemen
ents.
ts.

Chapter XU

1 Cf. [ J ] .
* A n a xiom ati aticc system of three-va lued logic w as b u ilt by
M. W ajsb erg . Cf Cf.. [34]
[34]..
3 T he is issues
sues rai
raised
sed here are ana lysed b y Luk asi asiew
ew ic
iczz m or
oree
comprehensively in [15] and [24].
* P o st’
st’ss proof is given in [27 27]], T arsk i’s
i’s proo f has n o t been
p u b li
liss h e d .
5 I t can easil
easily
y be sseen
een th a t eq uivalen t expr
express
essions
ions are inferenti
inferentially
ally
equivalent, but not conversely {the concept of inferential equivalence
was defined on p. 47). For instance, the expressions p an d q are
inferentially equivalent, but they are not equivalent.
6 Cf.
Cf. [30], p p . 4 a n d 5.

Chapter IV

1 P ro toth etics is ex pou nded in [8]

8]..

Chapter V

1 A rist
ristotle’
otle’ss syllogi
syllogist
stic
ic is extensively de alt w ith b y Lukasi
Lukasiewicz
ewicz
in [22] and [23].
 THE LIST OF WORKS QUOTED

[1]] P . B ern ay s, 1‘A xiom atische TTnte

[1 TTntersu
rsuchu
chung
ng des A ussage nkalku ls
der ‘Principia Mathematics* Mathematische
Mathem atische Z eits
eitseh
ehrift,
rift, X X V ,
1926.
[2] G. Boole, A n InveIn vesti
stig
g a tio
tionn of the L
Law
aw s o f Thoug
Th ought.
ht. London 1854.
[3] G. Frege, B Beg
eg rif
riffss
fssch
ch rift , eine. der mathematischen nachgebildete
Pormelsprache des reinen Denkens. Halle 1879.
[4] Gr. Frege, D ie Grundlag
Gr undlagen en der ArithmetiJc. Breslau 1884.
[5] D . H ilbert, “D ie logi logiscb
scben
en Grundlage
Grundlagen n d er M athem atik” .
Mathem
M athematische
atische A n n a len
le n , L X X X V I I I , 1 9 2 3 .
[6] D. Hilbert, W. Aekermann, Grundziige der theoretischen Logik.
Berlin 1928.
[7] St. LeLe£ni
£niewsk
ewski, i, “ O pod staw acb m atem atyk i” [O[Onn tb e F ou n
dations of Mathematics]. Przeglq/d Filozojiczny, X X X , 1 9 2 7 .
[8] St. Le
Le&ii
&iiewsewskiki,, “ Grundz uge ei
eines
nes neue n Systems der Grundlagen
d e r M a t h e m a t i k ” . Fundamenta Mathematieae, XIV, 1929.
[9] J . Lukasiewicz, “ Lo gika a psycho logia” [Log Logic
ic an d Psycho
Psychology]
logy]..
Przeglqd Filozoficsny, X, 1907.
[10] J. Lukasiewicz, Tresd wykladu pozegnalnego wygloszonego w auli
TJniwersytetu Warszawskiego dnia 7 marca 1918 [ The Tend of
the
the Farewell le
lecc tu re Del
Deliv
ivere
ered
d in the Gr
Grea
eatt H all of Wars
Warsaw
aw
University on March 7, 1918], Warszawa 1918.
[11]
[11] J . Lu kasiewicz, “ O logic© trojw arto icio w ej” [On T hree-va lued
Logic]. B Buu ch F ilo
ilozo
zofic
ficzn
zny,
y, V, 1920.
[12] J . Lukasiewicz, “D em ons tration de la com patibili patibility
ty ddes
es axio
axiomes
mes
de la th^orie d e la dedu ction” . A An
n na tes de la Societe Po
Polonaise
lonaise de
Mathe
M athem m atiqu
atique,
e, 111, 1925.
[13] J . Lukasiewicz, “ S ol a definicji w ssyBt yBtemac
emach h deduk eyjny ch”
[The Kole of Definitions in Deduetive Systems]. Much Filozo Filozo--
ficzz n y , X I, 19
fic 1928
28/2
/29.
9.
[14
14]] J . Lukasiew icz, “ O znaczeniu i potrze bac h llogi ogiki
ki m atem atycz-
nej” [On the Importance and Needs of Mathematical Logie].

Pfauka Polska, X , 192

929.
9.
[15] J. Lukasiewicz, “Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen
Systemen des Aussagenkalkuls”. Syr Syraw
awozd
ozda/
a/nia
nia z pos
posiedz
iedzen
en
 Tovoarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego, W y d z . I l l , X X I I I ,
1930.

THE LIST OP WORKS QUOTE© 123

[16
16]] J . L ukasiewicz, “ E in V oll
ollstandigkei
standigkeitsbew
tsbew eis des zwei
zweiw w ert
ertiigen
Aussagehkalkuls”. Spr Spraw
awozd
ozdania
ania z pos
posiedzen
iedzen Towarsystwa
Tow arsystwa HHJJaulco-
wego Warszawshiego, Wy &z. I ll, X X I V , 1 9 3 1 .
[17
17]] J . Lu kasi
kasiew
ew icz,
icz, “ Uw agi o aksjom acie Nicoda i ‘‘ded
ded ukc ji uogol
uogol--
niaj^c ej’ ” [Notes on N ieod’
ieod’ss Axi
Axiom
om an d o n G en eralizing D e

d u c tion
nego, 1]. Ksiqga pamiqtkowa Polskiego Towarzystwa FUozofiez-
1931.
[18
18]] J . Lukasiewicz, “ Z M stor storii
ii logi
logiki
ki zd ari” [Fr
[From
om th e H ist
istory
ory of
the Logic of Propositions]. Przeglqd Filozoficzny, X X X V I I ,
1934.
[19
19]] J . Luk asi
asiew
ew icz,
icz, “ Z naczenie ana lizy lizy logi
logicznej
cznej d la p oz nan ia”
[The Meaning of Logical Analysis for Cognition]. Przeglqd
Filozoficzny, X X X V I I , 1 9 3 4 .
[20
20]] J . Luk asi
asiew
ew icz, “ L og ist
istyk
yk a a fil
filozofi
ozofia”
a” [Logis
[Logisttic an d Philosophy].
Przeglqd Filozoficzny , X X X I X , 1 19936.
[21
21]] J . Lukasiewicz, “ W ob ronie log istyk i” [In D ef efence
ence of Lo gist
gistic]
ic]..

22]] Stadia
[22 Gnesnensia,
J . L ukasiewicz, “ OXV, 1937.
sylogis
sylogistyce
tyce A rystote lesa” [On A rist ristotle’
otle’ss
Syllogistic]. Sprawozdania Polshiej Akademii Umiej&nosci,
XLIV, 1939.
[23] J. Lukasiewicz, A Aris
risto
totle
tle's
's Syllog
Sy llogistic
istic from
fro m the S tan ta n d p o int
in t of
Modern
M odern FormFo rm a l Logic, Oxford 1951. (The second, enlarged edition
of this book appeared in 1957J.
[24] J. Lukasiewicz, A. Tarski, "Bhdania nad rachunkiem zdad”
[Researches on the Sentential Caleulus]. Sprawozdania z posie
dzen Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawshiego, W y d dzz . I l l , X X I IIII ,
1930.
[2 5 ] J . N icoicod d , “ A R ed u cti ctio
o n in th e N u m b er o f th e P r im im i tiv
tiv e P r o 
p o s it
itio
io n s o f L o g ie ie”” . Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical
Society, X IX , 19 1917
17..
[26
26]] SS.. Ch. Pe ir ce, “ On th e A lgebra of Logic” . A
irce, Amm erica
er ican n Jo u rnrna al
of Mathematics, V II, 18 1885
85..
[27] E. L. Post, “Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary
Propositions”. A Am
m er
erica
icann Jo u rn a l of M athe
athemm atics , X L III, 19 19221 .
[28] E. Schroder, Varies Variesungen
ungen iiber die Algebra der Logik, Leipzig,
B d. 1 — 189 1890,0, B d. 2 — 18 189191,, B d. 3 — 18951895..
[29
29]] H . M. SheffSheffer er,, “A S et of F ive Indep end ent P ostu lat lates
es for Boole
Boolean an
A lgebr
lgebraa w it ith
h A ppli
pplicati
cation
on to Logical C on stant s” . Transactions
stants”
of American Mathematics, XIV, 1913.
[30] W . S ierpihsk i, Z Zas
asaa dy algebry w yzsze
yz szejj [The Essentials of Higher
A lgebr
lgebra], a], W yd. 2, W arszawa-W rocl roclaw
aw 195
1951.
[31] J . Slupecki, “ S t. Lesniew ski’s
ski’s C alc ulus of N am es” . Studia
alculus
Logica
Log ica, H I, 19
1955
55..

124 T H E L I S T O P W O B K S Q U O T ED
ED

[32
32]] A . T arski, «
«*
*0 w yrazi
yraziee pierw otnym logistyk i” [On th e P rim itiveitive
Term of Logistic]. Przeglqd Filozofiezny, X X X I, 1923.
3] G. V a ilati, Scritti. L eip zig —F ire n z e 1911.
[33]
[3
[3 4 ] M. W ajajsberg,
sberg, “ A ksjom atyzacja troj trojw
w ar
arttosci
osciow
ow ego rachun ku
zdari” [An Asdomatization of the Thiee-valued Sentential
Calculus]. Spra/wozdawia z posiedzen Towarzystwa Naukowego
Warszawskiego, W y d z . I l l , X X I V , 19
19 3 1 .
[35 ussell,, Principia Mathematica. Second
35]] A . W hitehead , B . B ussell
edition, Cambridge 1925.