SANTIAGO VS PEOPLE

People of the Philippine Islands vs. Felipe Santiago

Facts:
Felipe Santiago, the appellant, was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Nueva Ecija for the rape of his niece by marriage, Felicita Masilang, an 18-year-old girl from the
municipality of Gapan. On November 23, 1926, Santiago asked Felicita to accompany him
across a river under the pretense of running an errand. Trusting her uncle, Felicita agreed. After
crossing the river into San Leonardo, Santiago led her to a secluded spot obscured by tall grass
and bushes. Here, he expressed his desire for sexual intercourse, which Felicita vehemently
resisted. Despite her refusal and attempts to resist, Santiago forcibly raped her.

After the assault, Santiago took Felicita to the home of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, arriving
around 11 a.m. and staying for several hours. That afternoon, Agaton Santiago arranged for a
Protestant minister to marry the appellant and the victim. Following the supposed marriage,
Santiago gave Felicita a few pesos and sent her home. Felicita confided in her father the next
day, leading to Santiago’s arrest and the initiation of this criminal prosecution.
The trial court concluded that the rape had occurred, dismissing the marriage as fraudulent,
intended to shield Santiago from criminal responsibility, and declared the marriage void due to
a lack of genuine
ISSUES:
Whether the subsequent marriage between the appellant and the victim could absolve the
appellant of criminal liability.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the marriage was a ruse, lacked essential
consent, and was void. It ruled that this void marriage did not mitigate Santiago’s criminal
liability nor offer any legal protection from prosecution.
Doctrine:
The case reaffirms that in order for an aggravating circumstance to be considered in penalizing
a crime, such circumstances must be unequivocally shown as any other crime elements . This
case also establishes that a marriage induced by duress or deceit, particularly in criminal
contexts such as rape, does not mitigate the crime or nullify criminal liability.
QUITA VS DANDAN
### Title: Quita v. Court of Appeals: Distinguishing the Legitimate Heir in the Presence of a
Foreign Divorce ### Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married on
May 18, 1941. Their union did not produce children, and their relationship eventually
deteriorated. Quita filed for divorce in the United States and was granted a final judgment of
divorce on July 23, 1954. Subsequently, Quita married twice but both marriages ended in
divorce. Arturo Padlan passed away on April 16, 1972, without leaving a will. A petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for Arturo’s estate was filed, leading to a legal battle
involving Blandina Dandan, claiming to be Arturo’s surviving spouse, the Padlan children,and
Ruperto T. Padlan, Arturo’s sole surviving brother.
The trial court disregarded Quita’s foreign divorce from Arturo, following the Tenchavez v.
Escaño precedent, and declared Quita and Ruperto Padlan as intestate heirs. However,
upon reconsideration and presentation of birth records, it granted the Padlan children a
share of the estate, excluding Blandina and Ruperto.
Blandina and her children appealed, and the Court of Appeals nullified the trial court’s
decision, citing procedural issues and ordered a remand for further proceedings on the
legitimacy of Quita’s claim as the surviving spouse, emphasizing the unresolved issue of her
citizenship at the time of her divorce from Arturo.

Issues:
1. Whether Quita, having obtained a divorce in the United States and subsequently
remarried, is still considered the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan for the
purpose of inheritance.
2. The impact of Quita’s citizenship on the recognition of the foreign divorce in the
Philippine jurisdiction.
3. Whether the trial proceeded correctly without more extensive hearings on the matter of
heirship, especially considering the controversy surrounding the recognition of the foreign
divorce.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court denied Quita’s petition, affirming the appellate court’s decision to
remand the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court clarified that the remand would
be limited to determining Quita’s right to inherit as Arturo’s surviving spouse,
focusing especially on her citizenship at the time of the divorce. It emphasized that the
procedural rule cited by the appellate court required controversies regarding heirship to be
decided as in ordinary cases, thereby necessitating a hearing.
Doctrine:
The decision reiterated two important legal doctrines:
1. Foreign divorces involving Filipino citizens are not recognized in the Philippines unless
one party was a foreign citizen at the time of the divorce, per the landmark case Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.
2. The citizenship of the parties at the time of the divorce is crucial in determining the
applicability of foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines.

Title: Garcia vs. Recio

### Facts:
The case involves Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino who became an Australian citizen, and Grace
J. Garcia, a Filipina. The couple married on January 12, 1994, in the Philippines. Before this
marriage, Recio had married an Australian citizen, Editha Samson, in 1987 and obtained a
divorce in Australia in 1989. Upon marrying Garcia, Recio declared himself as “single” and
“Filipino.” The marriage eventually faltered, and starting October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the grounds of bigamy, claiming she learned of Recio’s first marriage only in
November 1997. Recio countered that he had disclosed his prior marriage and its
dissolution before their wedding. He obtained another divorce decree from a family court in
Sydney, Australia, on July 7, 1998.
The case ascended from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City to the Philippine
Supreme Court, with Garcia challenging the RTC’s decision which recognized Recio’s
foreign divorce and declared their marriage dissolved. The RTC had ruled without requiring
the presentation of the Australian law governing Recio’s divorce or his legal capacity to
remarry.

Issues:
1. Whether the foreign divorce between Recio and Editha Samson was proven sufficiently.
2. Whether Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court partly granted the petition, emphasizing the need for foreign laws and
judgments to be adequately proven in Philippine courts. It stated that while the divorce
decree was admitted as evidence, the presence of a restriction in the decree necessitated
further proof of its effects under Australian law. The burden of proof regarding the legal
capacity to remarry lied with Recio, who failed to sufficiently demonstrate this capacity. As
such, the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings focused on Recio’s
legal capacity to remarry. If proven incapacitated, the marriage could be declared null on
the grounds of bigamy.
### Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reiterated that a foreign divorce decree must be proven according to
Philippine law of evidence, requiring both the decree itself and the foreign law allowing the
divorce to be demonstrated. Also, it underscored that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws; they must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO

# Facts:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen, and Richard Upton, an American citizen, were
married in Hong Kong in 1972 and subsequently resided in the Philippines, producing two
children. The couple was divorced in Nevada, USA, in 1982, after which Van Dorn
remarried. Upton initiated a legal action in the Philippine Regional Trial Court in Pasay City,
contending the couple’s business in Manila was conjugal property and demanded an
accounting and management rights.
Van Dorn filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Nevada divorce decree, which
acknowledged no community property existed between them, precluded Upton’s claim. The
Pasay City court denied her motion, indicating the Philippine location of the property
rendered the Nevada decree irrelevant in this context. Van Dorn’s subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied, prompting her to escalate the matter to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, challenging the lower
court’s decisions.

# Issues:
1. Whether the Nevada divorce decree is recognized and can affect the status of conjugal
property located in the Philippines.
2. Whether Upton is estopped from claiming rights over the alleged conjugal property due
to his assertions in the Nevada divorce proceedings.
3. The appropriate application of Philippine laws and public policy to the case, considering
the foreign divorce.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court granted Van Dorn’s petition, instructing the dismissal of Upton’s
complaint in the lower court. The decision hinged on the validity of the Nevada divorce,
which was recognized based on the U.S. principles binding Upton as an American citizen.
The Court emphasized that Philippine law does not deny the possibility of recognizing a
foreign divorce decree if valid according to the nationals’ law. It concluded Upton, having
represented in the Nevada court that no community property existed and accepted the
divorce decree, cannot claim otherwise in the Philippines. As such, the Philippine court
should not consider Van Dorn as Upton’s wife under Philippine law.
DOCTRINE: The ruling reiterates the principle that foreign divorce decrees valid under the laws
of a
foreign national can be recognized in the Philippines, especially when involving non-Filipino
citizens. Such recognition is contingent upon adherence to the legal standards of the
country where the divorce was procured and does not contravene Philippine public policy.

CAPILI VS PEOPLE

ames Walter P. Capili, petitioner,

vs.
People of the Philippines and Shirley Tismo-Capili, respondents.

G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013

FACTS:

James Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. James was
previously married to Karla Medina-Capili, and without said marriage being legally dissolved,
contracted a second marriage with Shirley Tismo.

James thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili;; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy;; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question.
Meanwhile, the RTC of Antipolo declared the voidness or invalidity of the second marriage on
the ground that the subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the
legal wife is void from the beginning.

James then filed a Motion to Dismiss the criminal case of bigamy, which the RTC granted.
Private respondent filed an appeal in the CA, which reversed the RTC’s decision. James then
filed a MR, but the same was denied. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

HELD:

No, the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has
been legally married;; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In the present case, all the
elements of the crime of bigamy were present.

It is undisputed that the second marriage was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage. The accused may still
be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, the finality of the
judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.

BORJA MANZANO VS SANCHEZ

FACTS:

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966.

However, on 22 March 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda
Payao solemnized by respondent Judge.

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage.

RULING:

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. In fact, in their separate affidavits
executed and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were “separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
(nullifying) impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator was adopted, however, the fine imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez was increased to P20,000.

REPUBLIC VS QUINONEZ
itle: Republic of the Philippines v. Remar A. Quiñonez
Facts:
Remar A. Quiñonez and Lovelyn Uriarte were married on August 16, 1997, and had two
children. Remar worked as a security guard in various locations to support his family. In 2001,
Lovelyn went on a trip to Manila to visit relatives and maintained regular communication
initially. Eventually, communication ceased, and Remar was informed that Lovelyn was living
with another man and would not return due to shame. Despite efforts to locate Lovelyn,
including travels to Bislig City, Lingig, Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila, Batangas, and Cavite, and
consistent communication with her relatives, Remar was unsuccessful. After nearly a decade of
searching, Remar petitioned the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to declare Lovelyn presumptively
dead to remarry under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC declared Lovelyn presumptively
dead, a ruling which became final and executory in summary proceedings. The Republic then
challenged the RTC’s decision on the grounds of Remar’s alleged insufficiency in establishing a
“well-founded belief” of Lovelyn’s death.

Issues:
The legal issue revolved around whether Remar’s efforts to locate his wife constituted a “well-
founded belief” of her presumed death as required under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
purpose of remarriage.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ rulings and found that Remar’s actions did
not satisfy the stringent standard of exerting proper and diligent efforts to locate Lovelyn and
therefore did not establish a well-founded belief of her death. The Court highlighted that there
was no evidence showing the extent of the search, the identity or testimony of Lovelyn’s
relatives Remar communicated with, or any attempt to seek official assistance from authorities
in locating her. The Supreme Court granted the Republic’s petition, reversed the CA and RTC’s
decisions, and denied Remar’s petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Lovelyn for
the purpose of remarriage.

Doctrine:
A “well-founded belief” of the presumptive death of a spouse necessary for remarriage under
Article 41 of the Family Code requires proof of diligent and reasonable inquiries and efforts to
determine the whereabouts of the absent spouse, with evidence supporting such efforts.

TAN VS TAN – ANDAL

itle: Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal: A Case of Void Marriage Due to
Psychological Incapacity
Facts: Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan were married on December 16, 1995. They
had a daughter, Ma. Samantha, but after four years of marriage, the couple separated in 2000
due to Mario’s alleged psychological incapacity. Post-separation, Rosanna maintained sole
custody of their child. Mario initially filed for custody, arguing equal rights over Ma. Samantha,
while Rosanna filed for the declaration of nullity of marriage, attributing Mario’s psychological
incapacity as the cause.

During their marriage, Mario displayed behavior suggestive of psychological issues, such as
unaccounted absences, financial irresponsibility, drug use, and instances suggesting paranoia.
Post-maternity, Mario’s behavior worsened; he did not support Rosanna nor their daughter and
engaged in drug use that led to negligence and paranoid behavior. When these problems
persisted, Rosanna eventually petitioned the Regional Trial Court to commit Mario to a drug
rehabilitation center.
Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia as an expert witness, who diagnosed Mario
with a narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic
features. These disorders prevented Mario from fulfilling his marital and parental
responsibilities. Despite these findings, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision
to void the marriage.

Issues:
1. Whether Mario’s marriage to Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity.
2. Whether the property acquired during their union should be considered communal.
3. Whether the custody of Ma. Samantha was rightfully awarded to Rosanna.

Court’s Decision:
The Court grants the Petition for Review on Certiorari, finding that clear and convincing
evidence supports Rosanna’s claim of Mario’s psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court
holds that psychological incapacity is not limited to medically diagnosed mental disorders but
includes character traits that prevent compliance with essential marital obligations. Property
relations are governed by Article 147, where only properties jointly acquired through the efforts
of the spouses are considered common. In this case, it was proven that Rosanna and her father
funded the construction of the family home, and Rosanna received the contested property
through donation, making Mario ineligible for a share in the property. Custody of Ma.
Samantha is rightfully awarded to Rosanna, as she consistently demonstrated care and support
for the child during their separation.

Doctrine:
1. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code does not require medical or
clinical identification but encompasses clear acts of dysfunctionality in personality that hinder
the fulfillment of marital obligations.
2. Property relations between parties in a void marriage are governed by the rules of co-
ownership in proportion to actual contributions unless proven solely attributable to one party.
3. In child custody matters post parental separation, the primary consideration is the child’s
best interest, which typically aligns with awarding custody to the parent who has shown
continuous support and care.

VALDEZ VS QC RTC

ntonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez married in 1971. In July 1994, their marriage was declared
void by reason of their respective psychological incapacities. Insofar as the disposition of the
properties acquired by the parties during their marriage is concerned, the trial court made the
following pronouncement:

“Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their “family home” and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares.

In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.”

Valdes is questioning the pronouncement of the RTC as he argued that if a marriage is dissolved
under Article 36 of the Family Code, then Art. 147 does not apply, as it should be Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code that should apply.

Valdes also questions whether or not the family court has jurisdiction to decide on the matter
of the ownership dispute between him and Consuelo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct.

HELD: Yes. Art. 147 of the Family Code is the applicable provision. When a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.
Anent the jurisdiction of the family court, in deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on
the settlement of the parties’ common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters.

JONES VS HORTIGUELA
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in December 1914. On January 10, 1918,
Jones secured a passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed for a proceeding
to judicially declare Arthur missing. On October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an
absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until
six months after its publication in the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil
Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of
absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May
6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s
daughter from her first marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of her mother
and that her mother’s marriage to Felix was null and void on the ground that from April 23,
1921 (when the court issued an order for the taking effect of declaration of absence &
publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-year
prescriptive period. With this, the marriage would be null and void and would render her as the
sole heir.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and void. W/N Felix is a legitimate heir of
Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received,
and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. The validity of the marriage
makes him a legitimate heir.

G.R. NO. 94053 March 17, 1993

Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco

FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with
him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November
1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before
the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco
had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the
trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article
41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring
presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did
not explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in
London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
GRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent.
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
Subsequently, Pepito died in a car accident.

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?

HELD:
Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death.

The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared
by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding coownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and
its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

DE CASTRO VS ASIDAO
Reinel Anthony B. De Castro vs. Annabelle Assidao-De Castro
**Facts:**
In 1991, Reinel Anthony B. De Castro and Annabelle Assidao-De Castro met and became
sweethearts. By September 1994, they planned to get married and applied for a marriage
license in Pasig City. In March 1995, after the marriage license expired, they executed an
affidavit claiming they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years to bypass
obtaining a new license. Judge Jose C. Bernabe officiated their marriage, but they did not
cohabit following the ceremony. On 13 November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to Reinna Tricia
A. De Castroand assumed full financial responsibility.

On 4 June 1998, Annabelle filed a complaint for support in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
alleging marriage to Reinel and seeking support for herself and the child. Reinel contended their
marriage was void ab initio due to a false affidavit and denied paternity. The trial court declared
the marriage void but recognized Reinna as Reinel’s natural child requiring support. Reinel
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling, affirming the child’s legitimacy and
declaring the marriage valid until properly annulled. Reinel then petitioned the Supreme Court,
arguing the trial court’s jurisdiction to annul the marriage in support proceedings and
contesting the legitimacy of the child.

**Issues:**
1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to annul the marriage during an action for support.
2. Whether Reinna Tricia A. De Castro is Reinel’s daughter and entitled to support.

**Court’s Decision:**
1. **Jurisdiction Over Annulment:**
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the marriage’s
validity within an action for support. This stance was supported by jurisprudence, citing Niñal v.
Bayadog and Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, which both establish that the validity of void
marriages can be determined in collateral suits if essential to the case.

2. **Legitimacy and Support of the Child:**

The Supreme Court found Reinna to be an illegitimate child of Reinel. Evidence included the
birth certificate listing Reinel as the father, testimonies about their relationship, and Reinel’s
admission in an affidavit. Consequently, Reinna was entitled to support from Reinel.

**Doctrine:**
1. **Nullity of Marriage:**
– A marriage’s nullity may be determined in collateral cases, not necessarily requiring an
independent nullity declaration, if such judgment is crucial to resolve the matter at hand (Niñal
v. Bayadog).

2. **Proof of Illegitimate Filiation:**

– Illegitimate filiation can be evidenced similarly to legitimate filiation, including documentation
like birth certificates and admissions in public documents (Family Code Art. 172, 175).

Title: Carlos v. Sandoval: Establishing the Sole Right to Challenge Marital Validity
FACTS:
an De Dios Carlos initiated a suit against Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II)
aiming for the declaration of nullity of marriage between his late brother, Teofilo Carlos, and
Felicidad, alongside issues regarding the status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance,
sum of money, and damages. This action was rooted in the intestate death of their parents,
Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia, who left behind six parcels of land. Discrepancies in the
succession and ownership of these lands following various agreements and the death of Teofilo
Carlos led to a complex legal battle. Initial courts involved include the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Muntinlupa City and the Court of Appeals (CA) which handled appeals and reversed some of
the RTC’s summary judgments. Juan De Dios Carlos then escalated the matter to the Supreme
Court upon dissatisfaction with the CA’s decisions.

### Issues:

1. The legality of declaring the nullity of a marriage through summary judgment without a full
trial.
2. The question of standing in challenging the validity of a marriage: Who is entitled to file an
action for the declaration of nullity?
3. The implications of filiation on inheritance and the proper parties interested in a nullity case.

### Court’s Decision:

The Supreme Court held that:

1. The nullity of a marriage cannot be established through summary judgment or judgment on
the pleadings alone. There must be a full trial to prove the grounds for nullity.
2. The right to file an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage belongs
exclusively to the spouses themselves, highlighting the prospective application of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages.
3. The case was remanded for determination. If respondent Teofilo II is not the biological or
adopted son, Juan De Dios Carlos, as a collateral relative, may have a standing due to potential
succession rights.

### Doctrine:

– A petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage can only be filed by the
husband or the wife, exceptions being cases that commenced before the effectiveness of the
said rule or those under the Civil Code.
– Summary judgments are inapplicable in cases of nullity or annulment of marriages; the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved in court.

OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO

ACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year.
Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment
disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on
defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which
has not yet prescribed.

ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, Aug. 28, 2007

FACTS: On 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got
married on the same day. Another marriage was held in a church in Tondo. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage
license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither
party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with
the local civil registrar of the said place. A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by
petitioner against respondent. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.

ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.

HELD: A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage
contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties
to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the
parties is resident, is just an irregularity. Marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is
issued in a place not the domicile of the parties.

AURELIO VS AURELIO

anilo A. Aurelio vs. Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio (665 Phil. 693; 108 OG No. 16, 1772, April 16,
2012)

**Facts:**

1. **Marriage and Petition Filing:**

– Danilo A. Aurelio (petitioner) and Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio (respondent) were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons.
– On May 9, 2002, Vida filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage at the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 94. She alleged that both she and Danilo were psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations, existing before and during the marriage, thus
seeking a declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

2. **Allegations of Psychological Incapacity:**

– Vida detailed Danilo’s lack of financial support, consistent jealousy, mood swings, refusal to
maintain the family, insensitivity, and humiliation of her.
– Vida similarly exhibited traits of emotional immaturity, low boredom tolerance, self-
indulgence, and a psychological aversion towards cohabiting and caring for Danilo.
– A psychologist diagnosed Vida with Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features
and Danilo with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder and deemed these conditions grave
and incurable.

3. **Procedural History:**
– **Motion to Dismiss:**
– Danilo filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 8, 2002, arguing the petition did not state a
cause of action and failed to meet standards under Article 36 of the Family Code.
– The RTC denied this motion on January 14, 2003, reassured that the petition met the Molina
doctrine requirements and that the matter would be determined on the merits during the trial.
– **Appeal to CA:**
– Danilo’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed on February 21, 2003, was denied on December 17,
2003.
– Danilo then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on February 16, 2004, aiming to reverse
the RTC’s denial of his Motion to Dismiss.
– The CA dismissed Danilo’s petition on October 6, 2005. His subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was also dismissed on October 26, 2004.

**Issues:**
**Sufficiency of Allegations:**
– Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the allegations in the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage were sufficient to support such a declaration under Article 36
of the Family Code.

Court’s Decision:**
**Sufficiency of Allegations:**
– The Supreme Court ruled that the allegations in Vida’s petition were sufficient, affirming that
the petition properly alleged the root cause, severity, and incurability of the psychological
incapacity, as per the Molina guidelines. The allegations were comprehensive, detailing the
incapability to perform essential marital obligations under Article 68 of the Family Code.
Doctrine:**

– **Molina Guidelines (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 1997):**

1. Burden of proof for nullity lies with the plaintiff.
2. Root cause must be clinically identified and proven by experts.
3. Incapacity must exist at the time of the marriage celebration.
4. Incapacity must be permanent or incurable.
5. Illness must be grave enough to disable fulfilling essential marital obligations.
6. Obligations under Articles 68-71 and 220-225 of the Family Code must be proven unmet.
7. Decisions of church tribunals should be respected.
8. Inclusion of Solicitor General and prosecutor is mandated to prevent collusion.

KATIPUNAN VS TENORIO
CASE: Katipunan vs. Tenorio, 38 OG 172, 1937
September 29, 1937
Grounds for annulment – Insanity,
FACTS: Marcos Katipunan brought an action in the CFI of Manila against his wife, Rita Tenorio,
praying
for the annulment of their marriage, on the ground that the defendant was not of sound mind
when he
married her. Represented by her guardian ad litem, the defendant denied the allegations and
alleged
that she was mentally sound when she married the plaintiff, and that she did so freely and
voluntarily;
that since their marriage in 1919, they had been living together as husband and wife until the
defendant
suffered a mental ailment in 1926, for which reason she was confined first in the San Lazaro
Hospital,
where she is at present; that since their marriage in 1919, when they began to live together as
husband
and wife, they have had four children three of whom, Benjamin, David, and Jose, are still living
and are
under the custody of Leonora Katipunan; that if the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant
should be
annulled just to follow the husband's wishes and caprices, the status of their offsprings would
be
reduced to that of natural children, and furthermore, the defendant, who needs care, support,
and
moral protection of the plaintiff, would be so unjustly and inhumanly abandoned without the
protection
of her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not a marriage can still be annulled after one of the spouses becomes insane
several
years after the marriage.
RULING: No. Unless it can be proven that Tenorio’s condition was existing prior to/during the
celebration of the marriage, insanity cannot be a ground for annulment because “every
presumption
goes in favor of marriage’s validity. Insanity occurs after the celebration of the marriage does
not
constitute a cause for nullity. The wife was mentally sound at the time of the marriage.

TEVES VS COMELEC

Title: Edgar Y. Teves vs. The Commission on Elections and Herminio G. Teves
Facts:
Edgar Y. Teves was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district
of Negros Oriental in the May 14, 2007 elections. Herminio G. Teves, a respondent, filed a
petition to disqualify Edgar on the ground that Edgar was convicted of violating Section 3(h) of
R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, by having financial interest in a
cockpit. This interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991. Edgar was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and purportedly carried the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.

The COMELEC’s First Division disqualified Edgar from candidacy and cancelled his certificate of
candidacy. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, which was
denied on the ground of mootness, as he had already lost in the elections.

Edgar then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, raising three main issues: abuse of
discretion by COMELEC for not resolving the main disqualification issue, that the issue is not
moot since it has bearing on future elections, and an abuse of discretion for upholding the
findings that his conviction involved moral turpitude.

Issues:
1. Whether COMELEC committed abuse of discretion by not resolving the disqualification issue.
2. Whether the disqualification issue is moot and academic due to the petitioner losing the
election.
3. Whether the conviction of Edgar Y. Teves for violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 involves
moral turpitude.

Court’s Decision & Doctrine:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the COMELEC’s disqualifications resolutions.
The Court ruled that the issue of disqualification was not moot despite Edgar losing the
election, as it still held implications for his eligibility for future elections.

It was determined that moral turpitude involves “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty or good morals”; however, not every criminal act constitutes moral turpitude. The
Court found Edgar’s interest in a cockpit, although illegal following the LGC of 1991, was not
inherently vile or against good morals. Hence, it concluded that the crime Edgar was convicted
of did not involve moral turpitude.
Doctrine: Not all criminal acts involve moral turpitude. In determining whether a crime involves
moral turpitude, courts consider all the circumstances surrounding the crime’s commission. An
act criminalized by statute is not necessarily of itself contrary to moral justice, modesty, or good
morals.

REPUBLIC VS VILLACORTA
Facts:
Melvin T. Villacorta and Janufi Sol P. Villacorta met in 1996 at Southwestern University in Cebu
City and became sweethearts until their breakup in 2000. Melvin later heard rumors of Janufi
dating someone else, but when they reconciled in March 2001, she denied any such
involvement. In April 2001, Janufi revealed her one-month pregnancy to Melvin, who initially
doubted paternity but was assured by Janufi of his fatherhood. The couple later married on
August 14, 2004, following the birth of their first child, Mejan Dia, on December 1, 2001, and
their second child, Javen Mel, on October 18, 2004.
During their marriage, disputes over Mejan Dia’s paternity led Melvin to conduct a DNA test in
2010, the results of which showed a 0.0% chance of Melvin being the biological father. Janufi’s
text messages to Melvin in January and March 2011 conveyed no intention to deceive but
acknowledged a one-time indiscretion that led to the pregnancy. On March 15, 2011, Melvin
filed a petition for annulment on the grounds of fraud.

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City annulled the marriage, citing Janufi’s fraudulent
concealment of pre-marital infidelity and pregnancy with another man. The Republic, via the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
for failure to file the appellate brief within the designated period.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the OSG’s appeal due to the late
filing of the appellate brief.
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in annulling Melvin and Janufi’s marriage on the
ground of fraud under Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(2) of the Family Code.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, reversing
the decision of the Court of Appeals. The High Court found that the OSG had filed its motion for
extension of time to file an appellate brief in a timely manner, and the actual appellate brief
was filed within the extended period requested.

The Supreme Court held that the annulment granted by the Regional Trial Court was not
consistent with the provisions of the Family Code since the concealment of a pregnancy by
another man must exist at the time of the marriage to constitute fraud under Article 45(3) and
Article 46(2). In this case, Janufi was not pregnant at the time of the marriage, and her infidelity
prior to marriage does not constitute a valid ground for annulment. The High Court emphasized
that fraud as a ground for annulment is narrowly construed and exclusive to the situations
enumerated in the Code.

Doctrine:
To annul a marriage on the grounds of fraud under Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(2) of
the Family Code, the fraudulent concealment must pertain to a pregnancy by a man other than
the husband, existing at the time of the marriage. Non-disclosure of premarital relations that do
not result in a pregnancy at the time of marriage does not constitute fraud warranting an
annulment. Technical rules of procedure should not be rigidly applied so as to defeat the ends
of justice.

ALmelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were
married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this
was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida
complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.
She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw
Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their
conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr. Valentina del
Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that
she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had
a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even
before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of
Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the
marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to
fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s
peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and
proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.

ANYA VS PALAROAN
Title:** *Aurora A. Anaya vs. Fernando O. Palaroan*: A Case of Failed Marriage
Annulment Due to the Non-Disclosure of Pre-Marital Relationship
**Facts:**
This case revolves around an appeal concerning the dismissal of a complaint for annulment
of marriage filed by Aurora A. Anaya (plaintiff-appellant) against her husband, Fernando O.
Palaroan (defendant-appellee). The marriage, solemnized on December 4, 1953, became
contentious when Fernando sought annulment in January 1954 citing force and intimidation
for his consent—a claim dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila in September
1959, affirming the marriage’s validity.
Subsequently, during negotiations for the counterclaim settlement post-verdict, Fernando
disclosed his pre-marital relationship with a close relative. Aurora then sought annulment of
their marriage on grounds of “fraud” in obtaining her consent due to Fernando’s failure to
disclose this pre-marital relationship, alongside a claim for moral damages.
Fernando denied the allegations and argued against Aurora’s action based on estoppel and
the absence of a cause of action, given her earlier affirmative stance on the marriage’s
validity. In a reply, Aurora added new allegations, claiming Fernando courted her with no
intention of fulfilling marital duties.
Before proceeding to trial, the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, upon review, identified
legal insufficiency in Aurora’s fraud claim based on precedent (Brown vs. Yambao), leading
to a motu proprio dismissal of the complaint after deeming Aurora’s ensuing memorandum
inadequate.
*Issues:**
1. Whether the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship by Fernando constitutes fraud
under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, justifying annulment.
2. Whether Aurora’s additional allegations in the reply introduce a new cause of action
warranting reconsideration of the dismissal.
**Court’s Decision:**
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. It concluded the non-disclosure did not meet the
fraud criteria for annulment under Article 85, No. 4, and Article 86 of the Civil Code. The
latter limits “fraud” to specific cases excluding any misrepresentation concerning character.
chastity, rank, or fortune.
Regarding Aurora’s further claims in the reply, the Court clarified these allegations
constituted a new cause of action, improperly introduced at this stage of the proceeding.
Even if considered, the claim based on the secret intention not to perform marital duties,
discovered after the marriage, would be barred by the four-year prescriptive period for such
actions.
**Doctrine:**
The case reaffirms that fraud, as a ground for marriage annulment under Article 85, No. 4,
of the Civil Code, is narrowly defined within specific parameters outlined in Article 86. Only
explicit forms of deceit stipulated—misrepresentation of identity, concealment of a criminal
past, and non-disclosure of pre-marital pregnancy—are actionable. Additionally, inserting a
new cause of action in a reply is procedurally improper.

LAPUZ VS EUFEMIO
*Lapuz vs. Eufemio: The Doctrine of Personalis Moritur cum Persona in Actions for Legal
Separation**
### Facts:
The case initiated when Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio on 18 August 1953. Carmen sought legal separation on the grounds of
abandonment and adultery. The couple was married on 21 September 1934, lived together
until 1943 when Eufemio allegedly abandoned Carmen, and had acquired properties during
their marriage. Upon discovering Eufemio cohabiting with another woman in 1949, Carmen
initiated legal proceedings. Eufemio countered by seeking a declaration of nullity of their
marriage due to a prior existing marriage he had under Chinese law and customs.
As the trial was in progress, with Eufemio scheduled to present additional evidence, Carmen
died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Subsequently, her death was reported to the
court. Eufemio moved to dismiss the action for legal separation on the grounds of Carmen’s
death and her filing beyond a permissible time frame set by law. Carmen’s counsel moved to
substitute her with her father, Macario Lapuz, a motion that Eufemio opposed. On 29 July
1969, the court dismissed the case, citing the action’s abatement due to Carmen’s death, a
decision that was upheld despite an appeal for reconsideration.
The dismissal led to the filing of the present petition for review by certiorari before the
Supreme Court of the Philippines after the juvenile and domestic relations court’s decision.
Eufemio, despite having counterclaims, did not pursue them and instead sought affirmance
of the order dismissing both the petition for legal separation and his counterclaim for
annulment.
# Issues:
1. Does the death of a plaintiff in a legal separation action abate the action?
2. Can an action for legal separation be continued by the heirs or legal representatives of
the deceased petitioner?
3. Do property rights involved in the action for legal separation survive the death of the
action due to the plaintiff’s demise?
## Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the juvenile and domestic relations court’s
decision, holding that an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff as
it is considered a purely personal action. The Supreme Court clarified that legal separation,
being personal, stops with the person’s death and cannot be continued by heirs or legal
representatives. It further explained that any property rights claimed as part of the legal
separation are contingent upon the decree of legal separation; hence, without such decree,
these rights or claims do not arise. The Supreme Court also deemed Eufemio’s counterclaim
for annulment moot and academic post-Carmen’s death, thereby dissolving the marriage,
making further proceedings unnecessary.
### Doctrine:
The Supreme Court reiterated the *actio personalis moritur cum persona* doctrine,
emphasizing that personal actions, such as those for legal separation, abate upon the death
of the person involved. It distinguished between actions pertaining to personal status and
those involving property rights, affirming that property-related claims emerging from legal
separation proceedings cease to exist in the absence of a final decree
SANTOS VS CA
G.R. No. 112019, January 4 1995 [Article 36; Psychological Incapacity]

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and
thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the
couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's parents into their
family affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her
contract will expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to
contact her or get in touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for
more than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c)
incurability.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings
presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a
nullity of marriage.

DELA CRUZ VS DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their
properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged
their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited
the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when
he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in
the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short
visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her
husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor
of the concubine.

ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been
an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the
family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully
and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has
been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant
or the witness himself.

SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and
utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.

ONG KENG VS ONG

Facts:
The case involves a petition for legal separation filed by Lucita G. Ong against her husband, Ong
Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong.
The couple was married on July 13, 1975, at the San Agustin Church in Manila and had three
children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Article 55, paragraph 1 of
the Family Code before the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 41.
Lucita alleged that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation,
and grossly abusive conduct, detailing numerous instances of physical abuse and verbal insults.
A significant incident occurred on December 14, 1995, when William physically assaulted Lucita
and pointed a gun at her, prompting her to leave their home.
William denied these allegations, claiming their quarrels were merely verbal disagreements and
that Lucita left the conjugal home without justifiable cause.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lucita, decreeing legal separation and ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties.
William appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC's decision. His motion for reconsideration
was also denied, leading to the present petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding evidence that the petition for legal separation was
instituted by Lucita for the sole purpose of removing William's control and ownership of their
conjugal properties?
Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding evidence repudiating Lucita's claim of repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct by William?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, affirming the decisions of the RTC and
the CA.
The Court found that the factual findings of the lower courts were adequately supported by the
records.
William failed to show that the case fell under any exceptional circumstances warranting a
review of factual findings.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, especially when the CA upholds the findings of fact
of the trial court.
Detailed and credible testimonies from Lucita and her witnesses, including her sister Linda Lim
and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, established that William inflicted repeated physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct upon Lucita.

MATUBIS VS PRAXEDES
Facts:

In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered into a
contract wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and that they should not prosecute
each other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their separation.
In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth to their child. In
April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the ground of abandonment and
concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription and condonation/consent.

Issue:

1.) Did the action prescribe?

2.) Did Socorro consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband?

Held:

1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from after the date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC).
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very
admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in
January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.

2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that
given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the
import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only
implied but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery
or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving
of the court's sympathy. (Matubis vs Praxedes, G.R. No. L-11766, October 25, 1960)

People v. Sensano and Ramos

G.R. No. 37720
March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married in 1919. Shortly after the birth of their
child, Mariano went to the Province of Cagayan and remained there for three years. During his
three-year stay, he did not write to his wife nor did he give support to her and the child. Ursula
was poor and illiterate and had no relatives upon whom she could call. Then Marcelo Ramos
took her and the child to live with him.
When Mariano returned in 1924, he filed a case against Ursula and Marcelo for adultery. They
were sentenced to four months and 1 day. After completing the service of the sentence, Ursula
asked for forgiveness from Mariano, to which the latter replied that she can do whatever she
wants and that he wants nothing to do with her. Mariano then left for Hawaii where he stayed
for seven years.
He knew that his wife had lived again with Marcelo. Upon his return to the Philippines, he again
filed a case for adultery. The court of first instance sentenced Ursula and Marcelo to 3 years, 6
months, and 21 days in prison. They contended that the court of first instance erred in not
considering that Mariano had already consented to the adultery.
The Solicitor General contended that Mariano’s absence from the Philippines made it
impossible for him to take any action.
Issue:
Had Mariano consented to his wife’s adulterous acts?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that he told his wife that he had nothing to do with her and that she can do
whatever she wants is considered as consent for the adultery. He did not interfere with his
wife’s relations for seven years despite knowing that the latter was staying again with her lover.
The Solicitor General’s contention has no merit. He could still have taken actions despite his
absence from the country had he wanted to.

BROWN VS YAMBAO
Title:** *Aurora A. Anaya vs. Fernando O. Palaroan*: A Case of Failed Marriage
Annulment Due to the Non-Disclosure of Pre-Marital Relationship
**Facts:**
This case revolves around an appeal concerning the dismissal of a complaint for annulment
of marriage filed by Aurora A. Anaya (plaintiff-appellant) against her husband, Fernando O.
Palaroan (defendant-appellee). The marriage, solemnized on December 4, 1953, became
contentious when Fernando sought annulment in January 1954 citing force and intimidation
for his consent—a claim dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila in September
1959, affirming the marriage’s validity.
Subsequently, during negotiations for the counterclaim settlement post-verdict, Fernando
disclosed his pre-marital relationship with a close relative. Aurora then sought annulment of
their marriage on grounds of “fraud” in obtaining her consent due to Fernando’s failure to
disclose this pre-marital relationship, alongside a claim for moral damages.

Fernando denied the allegations and argued against Aurora’s action based on estoppel and
the absence of a cause of action, given her earlier affirmative stance on the marriage’s
validity. In a reply, Aurora added new allegations, claiming Fernando courted her with no
intention of fulfilling marital duties.
Before proceeding to trial, the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, upon review, identified
legal insufficiency in Aurora’s fraud claim based on precedent (Brown vs. Yambao), leading
to a motu proprio dismissal of the complaint after deeming Aurora’s ensuing memorandum
inadequate.
**Issues:**
1. Whether the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship by Fernando constitutes fraud
under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, justifying annulment.
2. Whether Aurora’s additional allegations in the reply introduce a new cause of action
warranting reconsideration of the dismissal.
**Court’s Decision:**
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. It concluded the non-disclosure did not meet the
fraud criteria for annulment under Article 85, No. 4, and Article 86 of the Civil Code. The
latter limits “fraud” to specific cases excluding any misrepresentation concerning character,
hastity, rank, or fortune.
Regarding Aurora’s further claims in the reply, the Court clarified these allegations
constituted a new cause of action, improperly introduced at this stage of the proceeding.
Even if considered, the claim based on the secret intention not to perform marital duties,
discovered after the marriage, would be barred by the four-year prescriptive period for such
actions.
**Doctrine:**
The case reaffirms that fraud, as a ground for marriage annulment under Article 85, No. 4,
of the Civil Code, is narrowly defined within specific parameters outlined in Article 86. Only
explicit forms of deceit stipulated—misrepresentation of identity, concealment of a criminal
past, and non-disclosure of pre-marital pregnancy—are actionable. Additionally, inserting a
new cause of action in a reply is procedurally improper.

LAPERAL VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria
on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.
Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses
Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden
name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it
violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name
would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:

Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the
issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership
between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could
be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.