The Curious Case of Bastar
The Curious Case of Bastar
The Curious Case of Bastar
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Modem Asian Studies 50, 5 (2016) pp. 1619-1644. © Cambridge University Press 201 5
doi: 10. 101 7/S002 6749X1400068 7 First published online 19 August 2015
Abstract
* I would like to thank Henry Farrell, Henry Hale, Emmanuel Teitelbaum, the staffs
of the National Archives of India, British Library, and Deshbandhu Press Library,
and two anonymous reviewers from Modern Asian Studies. Funding for this research
was generously provided by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Konosuke
Matsushita Memorial Foundation.
Note on the documentation of archival sources: All archival material for this article
was collected from the National Archives of India in New Delhi (NAI), the British
Library in London (BL), and the Deshbandhu Press Library (DPL) in Raipur. I use
the following citation formats - for NAI: title, date, department, branch, year, file
number. For BL: title, date, shelfmark, year. For DPL: subject number, bin number,
article number. Sometimes larger files from these archives were numbered, so I also
include page numbers where applicable.
16x9
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1Ô20 AJAY VERGHESE
Introduction
The Pax Britannica is so firmly established that the idea of overt rebellion is
always distant from our minds, even in a remote State like Bastar.
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1621
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1 622 AJAY VERGHESE
specific policies were implemented in Bastar th
revolt: colonial officials took direct control ov
displaced tribais from their land, and they he
succession to the throne, which upset the nativ
I show that the post-independence Indian gove
often in uncannily similar ways, as I detail - most
era policies in the region that had initially led
These decisions in Bastar led to the rise of the con
insurgency, which is only the latest incarnation o
region. The case of Bastar, therefore, reaffirm
British colonialism in producing tribal conflict in
its effects even in areas that never formally cam
direct rule. Importantly, however, the continu
concurrently implicates the post-colonial governm
the root causes of the bloodshed.
Despite its remote location, the political developments in colonial
Bastar that led to persistent rebellion provide important insights for
other states throughout Asia. The British practice of retaining areas
of indirect rule within a colony was taken from India and exported
to later colonial territories such as Burma and Malaya.10 Therefore,
understanding contemporary violence in other post-colonial states
in Asia - ethnic separatism throughout former areas of indirect rule
in Myanmar, for example - can be informed by analysing what first
transpired in Bastar.
This article contains four major sections. In the first two, I discuss the
general history of tribal revolt in colonial and then post-colonial India.
In the final two, I examine these broad trends within the kingdom of
Bastar, again in the colonial and post-colonial periods.
10 Fisher, M. (1991). Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System , 1764-
1858, Oxford University Press, Oxford; and Metcalf, T. R. (ņoo*f).Impenal Connections:
India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920, University of California, Berkeley.
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1623
control of a modern, centralized bureaucracy.11 This led to the
official classification of tribal populations - a chief example was the
institution of the Criminal Tribes Act in 1871, which sought to control
the movement of certain tribes with a history of criminal activity.12
But under the Act all members of a designated tribe were considered
criminals, even if they had never committed a crime, which led to
widespread social stigmatization.
Another major change dealt with forest policies and tribal land
displacement. Colonial rule marked the first time in Indian history
that a government claimed a direct proprietary right over forests.13
This was something the preceding Mughals, for example, had not
done.14 The British state became the conservator of forests when
it passed the Indian Forest Act of 1878. Hundreds of thousands of
acres of forest lands that adivasis had used unfettered for centuries
were suddenly kept in reserve, a practice that did not change for
the rest of the colonial period.15 With British control of the forests
came the concomitant rise of moneylenders, traders, and immigrants,
and the influx of these new intermediary groups led to widespread
adivasi land displacement.16 These are only some of the major changes
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1624 ajay verghese
instituted during the colonial period; myr
such as the introduction of money rather th
transformed the nature of tribal society du
rule.
Consequently, revolts among the indige
routine occurrence during colonialism, es
century. For instance, in 1855 the Sant
Naikdas; in 1873 the Kolis; and in 1895 the
smattering of the total number of confli
over 110 different colonial-era peasant rev
at least 77 since the advent of British rule.1
Colonial administrators, however, only
quarters of the population of India; the r
autonomous princely states. These areas did
same level of tribal discontent or conflict. D
as feudal autocrats, many princes pursue
the same tribal groups that rebelled in B
for example, both the Bhil and Mina trib
the structure of the princely governmen
recognized them as the original inhabitant
were also charged with ceremonially pl
powder mark used during the coronation
the newly crowned king. In Jaipur, the M
guardians of the royal treasury.19 In Tra
groups were given ownership of their lan
improve it, and were shielded by special
imposition of the outsiders who were a m
throughout British India.20 In Jammu and
of the Bakkarwal tribe were employed as t
became an important part of the Dogra go
of the rulers of the Eastern Feudatory Sta
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1625
(although it was not implemented) declaring that tribal groups ought
to be the first claimants to forest lands and should also have the
right to be governed by independent panchayats (village councils).22
Princes displayed much more tolerance for tribal groups, and adivasis
fared better under their rule than that of British administrators
in the provinces. The same encroachments on tribal society that
occurred in British India were largely absent in the princely states;
as Verrier Elwin, famed anthropologist of Indian adivasis , summarized
the situation, it was 'most refreshing to go to Bastar from the reform-
stricken and barren districts of the Central Provinces'.23
Tribal revolts did not end once India gained independence in 1947,
and in some parts of the country they became endemic. In the broadest
sense, the new government did not end a number of colonial policies
that were the cause of tribal revolts - in fact, it exacerbated the
situation. For example, in comparing British and post-1947 forest
policy, Ramachandra Guha notes: 'The post-colonial state has taken
over and further strengthened the organizing principles of colonial forest
administration - the assertion of state monopoly right and exclusion
of forest communities.'24 Richard Haeuber similarly writes: 'Despite
the transition from colonial to independent status, forest resource
management changed little: exclusionary processes accelerated ... to
consolidate state authority over forest resources.'25
Consequently, tribal conflict continued into the post-independence
era, and the Naxalite movement became the face of contemporary
rebellion. Though no one knows the precise constitution of the various
Naxalite cadres, it is widely believed that the majority of members
come from poor tribal groups such as Scheduled Tribes.26 Scheduled
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1626 AJAY VERGHESE
Castes are also involved in the movement. In t
Naxalites are poor peasants.27 Brutal poverty
historically been a major problem among these g
Naxalite leadership has successfully mobilize
grievances. Home Secretary G. K. Pillai confi
that the government and its policies were largel
of Naxalism.28
The term 'Naxalite' encompasses several d
militant groups operating guerrilla campaigns
country. These movements are not necessari
with one another. One of the historic and re
the Naxalites is the former British areas of W
Naxal insurgents also operate in Orissa, Chha
Pradesh (the 'Red Corridor'), and have been a
the Malabar regions of Kerala. By some roug
cadres are currently functioning in roughly
districts.
The Naxalites come from the long and complicated history of
the communist movement in India. The Communist Party of India
abandoned violent revolution and adopted parliamentary politics in
1951, which subsequently led to the creation of a splinter faction, the
Communist Party of India, Marxist. In 1967 another split occurred
and the far-left Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist was
established. Most contemporary Naxalite groups originate from the
Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist. These groups are Maoist,
drawing on the tactics of Mao Zedong's insurgency during the Chinese
Civil War.
There are generally considered to be three historical phases in
the Naxalite movement. During the first, from 1967 to 1975, the
campaign began in West Bengal and spread to the surrounding
regions. The beginning of the conflict is dated to an uprising of
peasants against landlords in 1967 in the West Bengali village of
Naxalbari (providing the name of the movement). The uprising was
led by former Communist Party of India, Marxist member Charu
Majumdar - the nominal founder of the Naxalites - and most of the
27 This is not the case everywhere; for instance, in Jharkhand, many Naxalites
come from the rural elite. See Shah, A. (2010). Alcoholics Anonymous: The Maoist
Movement in Jharkhand, India, Modern Asian Studies 45:5, pp. 1095-1 117.
'Maoists looking at armed overthrow of state', Times of India , 6 March
2010; available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.c0m/2010-03-06/india/
281 i9932_i_maoists-indian-state-forest-land, [accessed 25 June 2015].
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1627
peasants involved in the revolt belonged to the Santhal tribe. By 1975
the initial rebellion was effectively stamped out. Then, from 1975
until the early 2000s, the various Maoist groups became severely
fragmented and had limited success in carrying out attacks against
the Indian government. Beginning over the last decade, however, the
movement reorganized successfully under new leadership and has
now come to pose a major threat to Indian political stability. The
culmination of the rebirth of the movement came in 2004 when two
of the largest Naxalite factions, the People's War Group and Maoist
Communist Centre, joined together to form the Communist Party of
India, Maoist. In 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that
Naxalites were 'the single biggest internal security challenge ever
faced by our country'.29 He later also admitted that the Government
of India was losing the war against them.30
Naxalites were estimated at one point to control one-fifth of the
land mass of India.31 In many of these swaths of territory they
operate parallel governments, grouping together villages into new
districts, selecting administrators, and setting up police stations,
schools, and even courts where oppressive landlords and moneylenders
suffer retribution. The insurgents are said to be armed with advanced
weaponry such as AK-47S, improvised explosive devices, and even solar
panels to charge electrical equipment. Their attacks are sophisticated,
well-organized, and extremely deadly.32 The rebels are also aided in
that they operate in the deepest parts of India's jungles, areas which
are often impossible to visit. In Bastar, for example, as far back as 1881
the deputy superintendent of the census for the Central Provinces
wrote to his superiors that 'there is little prospect of a Census being
possible [in Bastar]' and also noted that the figures from 1871 were
'manifestly incorrect'.33 Even today, travelling from Jagdalpur, the
capital of Bastar district, to its surrounding villages can be difficult.
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1628 AJAY VERGHESE
The violence in the Naxalite insurgency has b
past several years. According to conflict dat
Incidents Tracking System,34 which is ope
Counterterrorism Center, 1,920 people died f
during the years 2005-2009, while another 1,4
Indian government has responded to this movem
terrorism campaign, begun in November 2009
troops are involved (Operation Green Hunt). T
have continued their attacks relentlessly.
Given that princely rulers often enforced l
adivasis , and that the Naxalite movement began
in former areas of direct British rule, what acc
historical conflict in Bastar? How is it that this small and isolated
princely kingdom became ground zero for tribal violence in both
colonial and post-colonial India?
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1629
level of isolation - Deputy Commissioner of the Central Provinces
and Berar Wilfrid Grigson remarked that Bastar was a 'backwater
in Indian history'.36 The entire region is one of the most heavily
forested areas in India (it is the site of the Dandakaranya forest),
and colonial officials often referred to Bastar as one of a number of
'jungle kingdoms'.
When the British finally broke Maratha power in central India in
1818 they subsequently began to enter into a political relationship
with Bastar (a former tributary state of the Marathas), and in 1853
the kingdom officially came under the system of British indirect
rule. Bastar State was included as part of the Central Provinces
administration.
The British immediately began to interfere in Bastar's
administration in three ways: by implementing new forest policies,
displacing tribais from their land, and heavily interfering in succession
to the throne - that is, removing rajas and replacing them with
compliant officials. At first, this interference in the state came under
the pretext of preventing human sacrifice. An official inquiry in 1855,
however, showed that human sacrifice was not a local tradition. The
reporting officer wrote that it was 'pleasing to find that there did not
exist ... a tradition of human sacrifices. In the low country it was
said that these hill tribes never sacrificed human beings and for once
the account was strictly true.'37 A more likely cause of intervention
was the fact that Bastar had extremely large iron ore deposits, as
well as other precious minerals, timber, and forest produce.38 Over
time, British influence in Bastar increased - beginning first with forest
administration - due to efforts to appropriate its natural resources,
and by 1876 colonial administrators effectively governed the state,
the raja ruling in name only.
Colonial influence bred rebellion in Bastar. The state experienced
two important tribal revolts during colonialism, in 1876 and 1910.39
The cause of the first rebellion was trivial enough - the arrival of the
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1630 AJAY VERGHESE
Prince of Wales to India. The diwan of Bastar att
a meeting between the prince and the raja. The
interpreted this as an attempt by the British to
within hours they mobilized in large numbers and p
leaving the state. Though traditionally referred t
conflict in reality was relatively minor and featu
W. B.Jones, chief commissioner of the Central Prov
the incident in a confidential report from 1883:
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 163I
colonial policies combined to create a rising sense of embitterment
among the tribal population.
After the death of Raja Bhairam Deo in 1891, the British began
to penetrate the princely administration ever more steadily. As the
raja's son, Pratap Deo, was only six years old at the time, the British
directly administered the state for the next 16 years. During eight of
these years the state was even governed by Englishmen. This direct
control over Bastar in reality also continued after Pratap Deo became
raja in 1908. Extra Commissioner Rai Bahadur Panda Baijnath acted
as superintendent during the last four years of Pratap Deo's minority,
and then continued to act as diwan after the raja finally took the
throne. E. A. De Brett, officer on special duty in Bastar, wrote about
Pratap Deo's lack of power, noting that he was 'bound in all matters
of importance to follow the advice of his Diwan and has never taken
an active part in State affairs'. The chief commissioner of the Central
Provinces concluded later that 'the Diwan was the virtual ruler of the
State'.44
The 1910 rebellion was much more violent and widespread than
its predecessor. One of the chief instigators of the conflict was Lai
Kalendra Singh, the first cousin of the raja and a former diwan
himself. He had been angling for a return to power after he had
been removed by the British due to 'incompetence'. He mobilized the
adivasis by declaring that if he was returned to the throne he would
drive the British out of Bastar completely. A contemporary report from
a Christian missionary living in Bastar, Reverend W. Ward, sheds some
light on the rebellion:
In the second week of February we first heard of the unrest among the
Aborigines south of Jagdalpur. Vague rumours were afloat but none of a
very serious nature. On the 18th a Christian living among the Prajas -
Aborigines - came to me with the story that the Prajas were all armed and
were moving toward Keslur, where the Political Agent, Mr. E. A. De Brett,
I.C.S., was camping, to make known their grievances . . . A branch of a mango
tree, a red pepper, and an arrow were tied together, and sent to all villages in
the State. The mango leaves stand for a general meeting; the red pepper, a
matter of great importance is to be discussed and that the matter is necessary
and urgent; the arrow, a sign of war.45
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1632 AJAY VERGHESE
The entire state rose in revolt and the existing
only 250 armed police was quickly overwhelmed.
robbery, and arson plagued the entire kingdom. By
additional troops from Jeypore and Bengal ha
rebellion was finally put down. Hundreds of pris
including Lai Kalendra Singh, who was expelled
later died in prison.
The British conducted several inquiries into
1910 rebellion. The chief commissioner of the C
summarized the British government's position i
report that stated:
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1633
colonial authorities. Corporations, like those involved in the timber
trade or iron mining, entered areas where adivasis had lived and were
granted a monopoly right over forest produce. Once a forest area was
officially reserved, adivasis no longer had any claim to these lands
and were charged fees for collecting produce or grazing in these
areas.50 L. W. Reynolds, another officer stationed in Bastar, noted the
singular importance of this policy of forest reservation in promoting
rebellion:
The proposal to form reserves was not finally sanctioned until June 1909
and action giving effect thereto must therefore be nearly synchronous with
the rising. In his telegram of the 17th March 1910 the Chief Commissioner
stated that one of the objects of the rising was the eviction of foreigners.
I believe it to be the case that in connection with the exploitation of the
forests Messrs. Gillanders, Arbuthnot and Company, who have a contract
in the State, have introduced a large number of workmen from Bengal
. . . the [tribes] resent the introduction of these foreigners. It is not
unnatural.51
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1634 AJAY VERGHESE
(It is a most unfortunate fact that the best teak areas and
well cultivated Maria [Gond] villages coincide)**
Aside from new forest policies, the British also co
govern the state through various machinations,
had been disastrous in 1910. In 1922 Rudra Pratap
a male heir, and his daughter, Profulla Kumari
the throne as a child. One British administrator noted: 'She is about
eleven years of age and no reference is made as to her eventual fitness
to rule, but this is unimportant as she could always rule through
a Manager or Dewan.'55 Bastar therefore experienced yet another
minority administration. Then, in 1936, when the Maharani of Bastar
died suddenly of surgical complications in London, the British installed
her eldest son, Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo, on the throne, although he
was only seven years old at the time. The Maharani's husband, Raja
Prafulla Bhanj Deo, who was the first cousin of the ruler of the nearby
Mahurbhanj State, had been passed over as a possible successor. This
was an attempt to continue directly ruling the state instead of turning
over power to the queen's consort. In fact, colonial administrators
in charge of the guardianship of Pravir Chandra were themselves
confused as to the justification behind his minority administration.
Administrator E. S. Hyde commented:
It is her [the Maharani's] desire that Profulla should have the title of
Maharaja and that he should share her role as Ruling Chief, being co-equal
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1635
with her and succeeding her as Ruler in the event of her death before him,
her son not succeeding to th cgaddi [throne] until his death.57
Despite this, Prafulla - who had been educated and gained high marks
at Rajkumar College in Raipur - was deemed 'exceedingly vain and
filled with self-conceit ... he is a man of very questionable moral
character and completely unstable'58 and was denied the throne.
Prafulla had also been very popular with tribal groups in Bastar. E. S.
Hyde noted a meeting between adivasis and Prafulla in 1936 after he
had been passed over for control of the kingdom:
First of all the Mahjis told Prafulla that they had confidence and trust in him
and that he was their 'mabap' [mother and father]; to this he replied that
he could do nothing for them, that he had no powers. He was willing to do
anything for them but ... he could do nothing.
Even before the death of the maharani in 1936 there had been a
movement to install Prafulla as the hereditary raja, in 'joint rulership'
of Bastar with his wife; later came an attempt to at least establish a
council of regency and make him the regent.60 Both movements were
squashed by the British. They believed that Prafulla was responsible
for several anti-British pamphlets that had appeared over the past
several years in newspapers throughout India. Administrators noted,
however, that 'there is no actual proof as the printer's name is absent
from the pamphlets'.61 The British eventually even removed Prafulla
as the guardian of his children and deemed that he should not be
allowed to enter Bastar State.62
The British found fault with almost all of the occupants of the throne
of Bastar, and managed to have them removed from power in order
to clear the way for direct colonial administration of the kingdom. Lai
Kalendra Singh was removed as diwan because colonial authorities
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1636 AJAY VERGHESE
came to realise he was 'totally unfit to be trusted w
Rudra Pratap Deo was a Very weak-minded and st
considered unfit to exercise powers as a Feudator
Bhanj Deo was an agitator, unstable, and neede
from his own children. And by the dawn of inde
administrators were already beginning to have se
the abilities of his son, Pravir Chandra, who was
throne.
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1637
groups, often with assistance from corrupt local officials, were able to
privately reserve forest and village lands, and buy forest produce at
below-market prices.
Exceptional insight into this continuing maltreatment of adivasis
even after independence comes from the writings of Devindar Nath, an
Indian Administrative Service officer and collector of Bastar District
in the 1950s. He notes how adivasis were often cheated out of their
land, relating a story from 1955:
For instance, in 1920 Raja Rudra Pratap Deo was briefly banned from
entering his state when he returned from a trip abroad. The main
reason was because he, on three occasions, refused to meet with the
British Resident stationed in Bastar, which was considered a sign of
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1638 AJAY VERGHESE
his instability. He apologized, stating that a family
been ill at the time. He was also surprised by the Br
The post-colonial Indian government attacked P
similar reasons. The first step came in 1953 when th
government had the prince's property taken fr
under the Court of Wards, which they argued wa
Pravir Chandra was insane. The prince was, by mo
an enigmatic and bizarre man. His British car
'he has always been delicate'.69 His father Prafu
a 'young PuPPy whom the British have ruined'.7
G. B. Pant once wrote in a letter to a Madhya Prades
people say that he was almost an idiot. I cannot say
correct; but there is no doubt that he is erratic and
But the Indian government also made numerou
against him. For example, the secretary of the
complained in May 1953 that 'the Maharaja h
enormous beard and his hair had come down rig
The nails of his fingers are very long. He looks
[renouncer] . . . His is not a presentable appea
subsequent meeting the secretary also wrote: 'H
said that he has taken to the practice of Yogic ex
that he was too young for that and that he had bet
a decent family life.'73 Finally, he recounted a co
raja in 1953:
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 163g
be disrespectful but said that his inability to be present at the President's
arrival was due to his illness. He was then down with high fever.74
The adivasis have seen and read the articles appearing in certain news-papers
regarding the Maharaja's derecognition. They have taken a serious view and
are stirring up agitation . . . There was a similar move at the time of the
death of his grand-father Shri Rudrapratap Deo and the adivasis stirred up
a violent agitation, but the British Government was wise enough to put his
mother on the Gaddi. History will repeat itself now.75
74 Ibid.
75 H. S. Kamath, I.C.S., Chief Secretary to Government, Madhya Pradesh to The
Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 16 February 1962,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Political III Branch, 1961, #5/5/61 -Poll-Ill. , Vol. 1.
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1640 AJAY VERGHESE
unable to quell the disturbance because the adivas
him as their king. Thirteen protestors were kil
violence. Thousands of signatures were collected
Chandra to power, and G. B. Pant bemoaned tha
continue to cherish their traditional feelings of res
the erst-while Princes.'76
The second major conflict occurred in 1966. On
year Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo was gunned down
on the steps of his palace. Though the police and
claimed that it was the adivasis that had been con
palace who had led the revolt, most were in fact arm
and arrows. A subsequent investigation by Justic
discredited this theory and blamed the police.77
To this day the so-called 'police action' is highl
and it is widely believed that Pravir Chandra's de
assassination. Though only a small number of adiv
rumours still abound that hundreds or even thou
The adivasis in the former Bastar State today co
Pravir Chandra. Since, 25 March has been styled
'The Day of Sacrifice'.79 While both the British g
new Congress government had a plethora of com
ruler of Bastar after another, the only group no
their adivasi subjects.
The continuation of colonial-era policies in B
political space for the Naxalites. They became an im
when they entered the Bastar area in the early
villagers around their economic grievances - one
promises was higher wages for collecting tendu leav
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 164I
earliest Naxalites came from tribal movements in Andhra Pradesh,
and they began a 'Go to the village' campaign in the Bastar area
to enlist tribal support. Two of the main initial recruiting grounds
for the Naxalites in Bastar were hostels and schools, especially
special schools for adivasis. Youth hostels had also been an important
recruiting ground for communists during the Telangana mobilization
in the 1940s. The two main groups operating in Bastar now are the
Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist and the People's War
Group.
From the 1980s to the 2000s, the Naxalites enlisted tribal support
in Bastar by highlighting the failure of development efforts in
the region to improve the lives of adivasis . On the surface there
appear to be many attempts at reform. In Bastar alone there
is an absurd number of overlapping development organizations:
the Community Development Programme, Community Area
Development Programme, Whole Village Development Programme,
Drought Prone Area Programme, Hill Area Development Programme,
Intensive Rural Development Programme, Tribal Area Development
Programme, Intensive Tribal Development Programme, and the
Bastar Development Authority. However, while various development
projects have raised money for the Indian government as well as
private corporations, adivasis have reaped few benefits. For example,
every year some 50 million rupees is spent on development schemes
in Bastar, but forest and mineral wealth in the region generates
almost 10 times as much for the government.81 Another example
is the Bailadilla iron ore mine in Dantewada, which is one of the
most profitable in India but employs no local adivasis .82 By the late
1980s - despite numerous development efforts - only 19 per cent of
the villages in Bastar were electrified, and there was only one medical
dispensary per 25,000 villagers.83 Similarly, only 2 per cent of land
in the entire Bastar region was irrigated.84 An Economic and Political
Weekly piece on Bastar summarized the situation in 1989:
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1642 AJAY VERGHESE
development programmes, exploitation by middle-men
corruption among the officials are the most common
of them even acknowledged the failure of the political p
champion the cause of the adivasis.85
Conclusion
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THE CURIOUS CASE OF BASTAR 1643
driven mostly by poor adivasis , is still strongest today in areas of former
British rule.
Given these two facts - that tribal revolts mostly occurred in British
provinces, and that princely rulers enforced liberal tribal policies - it
is surprising that a major centre of tribal conflict throughout both the
colonial and post-colonial period is the princely state of Bastar. What
accounts for the immense historical conflict in this small and remote
princely kingdom?
Using a wide variety of primary sources, I detailed that Bastar State
experienced extensive British interference during the colonial period.
Colonialism in Bastar led to the implementation of new forest and
landholding policies, the dismissal of several popular rajas from power,
and ultimately the rise of tribal rebellion in the region. The case
of Bastar therefore reaffirms the negative impact of British rule on
India's indigenous communities. While Bastar experienced extensive
colonial interference, it may not have been alone. Recent historical
work suggests that the roots of the Telangana conflict in Hyderabad
State, for example, may also have been due in large part to British
policies imposed on the niżami
But the case of Bastar also implicates the post-colonial government
in continuing and even exacerbating many colonial-era policies that
had initially led to rebellion - for example, removing another of
Bastar's rajas from power in the early post-independence period.
Furthermore, the socio-economic grievances that originated during
the colonial period have not dissipated in recent years, and Bastar
remains one of the least developed regions of eastern India. Existing
development projects have been beneficial to the state and private
interests, but have done little to assist adivasis specifically. This
explains the rise of Naxalism in the area, which is only the latest
incarnation of a long history of tribal revolt. The colonial past,
therefore, continues to cast a long shadow over the ongoing tribal
rebellion in the vast jungles of the Indian republic.
As British administrators began to colonize other parts of Asia in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they took with
them the belief that maintaining some form of indirect rule was
imperative to governing successfully. This was a lesson culled from
the Indian experience. And so colonial officials created the Shan
States, Chin Hills, and Kachin State of 'Native Burma' and placed
86 Bhukya, B. (2010). Subjugated Nomads: The Lambadas under the Rule of the Nizams ,
Orient Blackswan, Hyderabad.
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1644 AJAY VERGHESE
them under indigenous rulers.87 In Malaya they
the 'Unfederated Malay States' and placed them
of sultans.88 Contemporary conflicts continue t
these regions - in modern Myanmar, for exampl
indirect rule have seen a number of ethnic sepa
since independence.89
The history of political developments in Bas
colonialism can provide insights into explaining s
conflicts across British colonial Asia. The case of Bastar foremost
prompts a fundamental question: was indirect rule in the British
empire truly indirect, or was it merely a facade hiding the creeping
influence of colonial administrators? If Bastar provides a preliminary
answer, colonialism may be responsible for violence occurring even
beyond the borders of direct rule. And whether the post-colonial
leaders of states like Myanmar and Malaysia have dealt better with
their colonial inheritances than the politicians of modern India is
a question that will go a long way towards determining whether
contemporary violence persists.
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