Capital Structure - Group 5 PDF
Capital Structure - Group 5 PDF
combination
•
•
conservative
more on equity
financial stability
navigate market uncertainties
Liabilities Equity
1.2. Examples
higher D/E ratio
HVN’s Capital structure for Q2/2024
capital-intensive
relies on debt
Liabilities Equity
2. Importance
DEBT EQUITY
Cheaper; tax-deductible
ADVANTAGES Not require mandatory payments
-> lower taxable income
Dilutes ownership
Risk of default
DISADVANTAGES -> higher expectations for returns
-> higher costs of borrowing in the future
from shareholders
2. Importance
•
•
DEBT EQUITY
• Raise funds without altering the control structure.
Dilute the ownership stakes of existing
• Burden the company, especially if its cash flows are shareholders
unpredictable.
1. Company life cycle
2. Unique situations
1. Company life cycle
Business Characteristics
Cash flow
Revenue
growth
Assets
Business
risk
Capital Structure Characteristics
Debt
Equity
2. Unique situations
2.1. Capital - intensive businesses
• high levels of leverage
• owned marketing or
service businesses contractual
relationships owners
𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 =
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆
airline industry
1. Internal factors
1.1. Business Model Characteristics
Revenue, CF volatility ↑ ↓
Earnings predictability ↑ ↑
Operating leverage ↑ ↓
1. Internal factors
1.1. Business Model Characteristics
Quickly converted
Interchangeable with Take time to convert to
Definition Unique assets to cash without
another of similar identity cash and may lose value.
losing value.
Money Art pieces Cash Real estate
• Asset-light companies:
⚬
⚬
⚬
⚬
1. Internal factors
↑ ↓ ↑
2. External factors
2.1. Market conditions / Business cycle
• interest rates macroeconomic environment
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝑂𝐹 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑟𝑓) + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑.
•
⚬ expansions
⚬ recessions
Company impact
significant
operational losses.
increasing debt levels
decreasing ability to cover interest payments
Pre-Pandemic Position (2018-2019):
•
2018
financial stability.
VNA 2019
Pandemic Impact (2020):
• 2020
2018
financial distress.
• VJ 2019
2020
more manageable level
2. External factors
2.2. Regulatory constraints 2.3. Industry leverage
• • Companies within the same industry
regulated by government similar capital structures
1. Basic knowledge and application
2. Assumptions
3. Propositions
4. Examples
5. Costs of financial distress
1. Basic knowledge and application
•
•
⚬
⚬
⚬
⚬
2. Assumptions
•
•
Homogenous expectations
• Investors agree on a given investment’s expected cash flows.
No agency costs
• Managers always act to maximize shareholder wealth.
Independent decisions
• Financing and investment decisions are independent of each other.
3. Propositions
Formula 𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑡𝐷
“tax shield”
Reasoning Stakeholders
Government
Debt Equity Debt Equity
3. Propositions
𝐷 𝐷
Formula 𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟0 + (𝑟0 − 𝑟𝑑 ) 𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟0 + (𝑟0 + 𝑟𝑑 )(1 − 𝑡)
𝐸 𝐸
•Cost of equity rises as the company uses more debt
•Higher leverage raises the cost of equity but does not but at a slower rate than in the no-tax case.
change firm value or WACC •As the company’s use of debt increases, its WACC
Implications •The increase in the cost of equity must exactly offset decreases and its value increases.
the greater use of lower-cost debt. •No financial distress/bankruptcy costs, use of debt is
value enhancing, at the extreme, 100% debt is optimal.
↑ ↓
𝐷 20,000
𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟0 + 𝑟0 − 𝑟𝑑 = 0.1 + 0.1 − 0.05 × = 𝟏𝟏. 𝟐𝟓%
𝐸 80,000
4. Examples
20,000 80,000
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑑 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑊𝑒 𝑟𝑒 = × 0.05 + × 0.1125 = 10%
100,000 100,000
4. Examples
1,000 9,000
𝑉 =𝐷+𝐸 = + = 𝑈𝑆𝐷 100,000
0.05 0.1125
4. Examples
𝐷 18,000
𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟0 + 𝑟0 + 𝑟𝑑 1−𝑡 = 0.12 + 0.12 − 0.06 1 − 0.30 × = 0.15375 = 15.38%
𝐸 22,400
4. Examples
𝐷 𝐸 18,000 22,400
𝑟𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑟𝑑 1 − 𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒 = × 0.06 × 1 − 0.3 + × 0.15375 = 10.39%
𝑉 𝑉 40,400 40,400
6,000(1 − 0.30)
𝑉𝐿 = = $40,400
0.1039
5. Costs of Financial distress
heightened uncertainty
various obligations diminished earnings power actual current losses.
• two components
Include costs arising during periods in which the company is near or in bankruptcy:
o Forgone investment opportunities
Indirect o Reputational risk
cost o Impaired ability to conduct business
o Costs arising from conflicts of interest between managers and debtholders
(agency costs of debt)
5. Costs of Financial distress
5.2. Probability of Financial distress
•
⚬ corporate governance structure
⚬ quality management team.
o 𝑉𝐿
o 𝑉𝑈
o 𝑡
o 𝑡𝐷
o 𝑃𝑉
1. Static Trade-off theory
MM (With taxes) 𝑽𝑳 = 𝑽𝑼 + 𝒕𝑫
↑ with
↑ leverage
𝑽𝑳 = 𝑽𝑼 + 𝒕𝑫
Static Trade-off −𝑷𝑽 (𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔)
MM (No taxes) 𝑽𝑳 = 𝑽𝑼
• trade-off
⚬ Leverage benefits:
⚬ Leverage risks
1. Static Trade-off theory
• practical application
recorded on the
Current
balance sheet
determined by the market
Optimal Target
2. Market value vs. Book value
•
3. Target weight & WACC
•
maintain
over the long term
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
•
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑊𝑑 =
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
Example
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑊𝑒 = 1 − 𝑊𝑑 =
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
3. Target weight & WACC
𝐸 𝐷
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = × 𝑟𝑒 + × 𝑟𝑑 × (1 − 𝑇𝐶 )
𝑉 𝑉
𝐸 𝐷
o o
𝑉 𝑉
o 𝑟𝑒 o 𝑟𝑑
o 𝑇𝐶
Assume Vinamilk:
• Equity: $70 billion Debt: $30 billion
3. Target weight & WACC
• Cost of equity 7% Cost of debt 3%
• Tax rate 20%
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 30 30
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 Weight of Debt: 𝑊𝑑 = = = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎
30 + 70 100
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 70 70
𝑊𝑑 = Weight of Equity: 𝑊𝑒 = = = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟎
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 70 + 30 100
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 WACC:
𝑊𝑒 = 1 − 𝑊𝑑 =
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 0.70 × 0.07 + 0.30 × 0.03 × 1 − 0.20
= 0.049 + 0.30 × 0.03 × 0.80
𝐸 𝐷
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = × 𝑟𝑒 + × 𝑟𝑑 × (1 − 𝑇𝐶 ) = 0.049 + 0.0072
𝑉 𝑉 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓𝟔𝟐 𝒐𝒓 𝟓. 𝟔𝟐%
4. Pecking order theory
=> Thus, the cheapest financing source is retained earnings, followed by debt, and then equity.
Internal Financing →
Debt Financing →
Equity Financing →
1. Debtholders and Shareholders
2. Preferred Shareholders
3. Management and Directors
1. Debtholders and Shareholders
1.1. General idea
Means of interests
Priorities
Strategies
1. Debtholders and Shareholders
1.2. Conflicts
• •
•
• •
•
1. Debtholders and Shareholders
1.2. Conflicts
•
•
•
1. Debtholders and Shareholders
1.2. Conflicts
•
⚬
⚬
•
2. Preferred Shareholders
2.2. Disadvantages
•
•
3. Management and Directors
• •
•
3. Management and Directors
Monitoring
costs
Bonding
costs
Residual loss
Incentive
mechanism
Corporate
governance
o non-profit organizations
o governmental agencies