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History and the Social Sciences

Author(s): George Q. Flynn


Source: The History Teacher , May, 1974, Vol. 7, No. 3 (May, 1974), pp. 434-447
Published by: Society for History Education

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History and the Social Sciences

GEORGE Q. FLYNN
Texas Tech University

HISTORIANS may end up in the ashcan of history. There is a fear


among students, especially among graduate students, that their
profession may well be outmoded before they have completed their
training. They sense a professional loss of purpose in an age and in a
society where purposeful knowledge is at a premium. Not surprisingly,
many of these students will begin to think in terms of more profitable
and relevant careers in the social sciences. These young men and
women cannot be reassured by cliches about history giving perspective
to the social scientist. Little glamour seems attached to assembling a
grab-bag of illustrations which social scientists can draw upon in their
more meaningful work. The past, being imperishable, will survive, but
will it interest more than a few eccentric antiquarians, artists, and
novelists poking around in search of inspiration?
The purpose of the following essay is not to dispel such fears, but
rather to explain the roots of this frustration within the profession and
to consider the prospect of saving history as a discipline through an

Mr. Flynn is Associate Professor of History at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas.
He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 1966 and has taught previously
at Seattle University, Indiana University, and the University of Miami in Florida. He is
the author of American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 1932-1936, has com-
pleted a manuscript on "American Catholics and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1936-1945," and is
currently working on a study of manpower mobilization during World War II.

434

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 435

alliance with the social sciences. Hopefull


a union seems so attractive and by exam
the merger has been fruitful we may als
of what distinguishes each discipline. By understanding these
distinctions we may better appreciate the cost of too close a union and
even become more optimistic about the future of history on its own
terms. What follows, then, is a description of recent historiographical
trends and an essay into methodology; one cannot understand the
problems of the former without a consideration of the latter.
But to understand the momentum in the profession toward greater
cooperation with the social sciences, we must first appreciate some
trends which constitute the climate of the times. Only an irresponsible
mentor would pretend to his students that all is well in the profession.
The problem is deeper than the current saturation of the market with
young historians. More fundamental is a climate which questions the
very value of historical study. Two of the most popular books for college
students in recent years-Future Shock and The Greening of
America-both make the same threatening point.' Modern man stands
on the verge of a totally new age, an age so different in consciousness
and pace of change that it will be literally "unprecedented." The past
will cease to be a guide to the future and one of the most enduring
cliches of our profession will fall useless.
Of course, such notions of a "new age dawning" have frequently
appeared in the past; some of us may remain confident as long as we see
copies of H. G. Well's Outline on the prestige bookshelf of our friends.
But more discerning students fear that the discipline may be losing
ground in academia itself. Even where the beleaguered notion of an
"academy" has survived, history must contend for a place in the core
curriculum with some amorphous monster called social studies. Cast
into the market place of academic electives, history must compete on
the basis of topicality. In high schools the discipline has frequently been
replaced by a more relevant course aptly named "contemporary
problems."
On a more materialistic level the historian may be pushed toward
the social sciences by the difficulties he confronts in his quest for
research funds. In 1965 the federal government saw fit to appropriate a
modest sum to establish the National Endowment for the Humanities
(NEH) to aid institutions and individuals "engaged in the production
and dissemination of humanistic knowledge." Apparently, the study of
the humanities was justified as having some value to a society, even if

' Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York, 1970), has already gone through over fifteen
printings. Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York, 1970) is doing almost as
well.

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436 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

no one wanted to become very explicit on how i


humanistic studies did have something worthwhile t
nation's well being, it was surely worth the risk of a modest
appropriation. This rather utilitarian dimension, however, remained
largely submerged until recently. Congress in 1970 made the point of
encouraging "particular attention to the relevance of the humanities to
the current conditions of national life."2 Obviously, if all this meant was
that humanists must concern themselves with the world in which they
live, we could dismiss it as just another truism. But both Congress and
the NEH had something more practical in mind, as witness the call for
project proposals "bearing on urbanization, minority problems, war,
peace . . . civil liberties and the wider application of humanistic
knowledge and insights to the general public interests."3 (One can
picture a reject letter from the NEH reading as follows: "We are sorry to
return your poem Mr. Eliot, but when we accepted it we were under the
impression that 'The Wasteland' dealt with the problem of television
contributing to juvenile delinquency. Better luck next time.") Such a
directive leads one to believe that NEH money will be used to fund the
work of social scientists who can show us how to apply the eccentric
ravings from our poets, who will continue to work out of garrets.
Those history students who have attended recent historical
conventions know that their mentors have felt the impact of this call for
relevance. Various meetings in the last few years have been the scene of
a struggle for power and for access to its modern symbol-the public
address system. Staughton Lynd, Howard Zinn, and others of the New
Left take a direct approach to the needs of the day. Not only must
historians become more committed to solving social problems, but the
study of history itself must become a tool for the promotion of social
change.
Despite this climate, most historians and students have rejected
such an activist approach as bordering on pamphleteering. No doubt
they recall the unfortunate experiences of Charles Beard and Lord
Bryce in explaining World War I. Most historians still feel capable of a
respectable compartmentalization of their historical interest and their
role as concerned citizen. Still the confusion exists; the lack-of-
relevance charge affects students as well as men such as Lynd and Zinn.
Doubtless the only relevance which would claim respectability with
some radicals would be manufacturing Molotov cocktails. But a more
attractive and acceptable means of accommodating this climate
appears in the form of the social scientist and his work.

2National Endowment for the Humanities, Program Announcement, 1971-1972


(Washington: GPO, 1971), 5.
3Ibid.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 437

Unquestionably our friends in the so


and their success must be appealing
history. The social scientist has trium
struggle for primacy, while few of us e
triumph has been one of cultural com
superiority. Alfred North Whitehead h
the world distinguished by high acti
culmination, some profound cosmologic
impressing its own type upon the curr
like to suggest, by way of explaining t
the decline of history, that the cosmol
two complementary impulses-one of sc
discipline which can combine the meth
the requirements of social progress w
attention and support of our modern c
social sciences have met these requirem
The methodology of the social scien
victory. While physicist P. W. Bridgem
scientific method as such and turn inste
damndest with one's mind, no holds barred," we can still abstract
certain characteristics of the social science technique which guaranteed
its triumph.5
We should note the careful articulation of a premise or hypothesis,
the establishing of a well-defined technique for testing the hypothesis
through the use of statistical indices, and the erection of test models of
social action. Finally, we note the high degree of cross-fertilization of
concepts from all the social sciences.' This methodology rejects the
historian's idea of open-minded research by emphasizing that well
worked-out models or detailed questions are the only means to real
objectivity. The immediate goal of this method is the verification of a
general principle, which in turn can be used to help predict subsequent
behavior. We need not be reminded that this approach is an attempt to
copy the proven methods of the physical sciences or that the
intellectual godfathers of modern social science, the nineteenth century
positivists, strove to erect a science of man.
That the attempt has met with some success no one can gainsay.
The modern world has virtually redefined itself in concepts articulated

SA. N. Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas (New York, 1933), 13.


5Quoted in Thomas C. Cochran, "History and the Social Sciences," in A. S.
Eisenstadt (ed.), The Craft of American History (2 vols., New York, 1966), II, 109.
'Ibid., 97-99; A. S. Eisenstadt, "American History and Social Science," in Craft of
American History, II, 111; W. H. Walsh, The Philosophy of History: An Introduction
(New York, 1960), 34.

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438 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

by the great social thinkers such as Weber, Freud


Marx. On a less grand scale the work of modern socio
and economics makes life more comprehensible even
We can acknowledge that there is some methodolo
within the social sciences and that they disagree amo
questions of methods. We can point out that the a
physical sciences obviously fails. We can deplore the
of reality manifested by some modern social scientis
deny the very real contributions of this school.7
Indeed, historians may well look to the techniqu
sciences as a means of preservation. Modern historiog
born in the same age of positivism. Comte expecte
they had tightened up their methodological ship, to
role in explaining how the world functioned. At f
compatibility of history and the social sciences seems
has a method which seeks to reach objective concl
repeatedly find valuable use for generalizations of so
types, models, and schematizations.8 The fruits of a
are already around us, especially in the application
techniques. The word is out in graduate school that th
must have competence in a tool of social research-pri
programing and statistical analysis.' With the same s
the same objectives of truth, and with a method that
both fields, we must wonder why more historians hav
examples of Richard Hofstadter, Samuel Hays, Lee Benson, and
Thomas C. Cochran into a social science approach to history.'" With so
7 Ernest Gellner, "Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology," in Patrick
Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (New York, 1959), 494; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The
Humanist Looks at Empirical Social Research," American Sociological Review, XXVII
(December 1962), 771; Cochran, "History and Social Sciences," 91.
SRobert F. Berkhofer, A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis (New York,
1969), is the most readable discussion of how historians may use such concepts.
'H. S. Hughes, "The Historian and the Social Scientist," American Historical
Review, LXVI (October 1960), 25, 26, 31; Cochran, "History and Social Sciences," 96-97.
Hughes and Cochran are the two leading advocates of historians adopting the techniques
of the social scientists, but the movement began with the publication of Theory and
Practice in Historical Study, by the Social Science Research Council, Bulletin No. 54
(New York, 1946). A followup study was published in 1954 as The Social Sciences in
Historical Study, Bulletin 64. Neither bulletin seems to have made much of an
impression on the profession.
10 See the following suggestions of how an historian may use social science techniques
and concepts: Richard Hofstadter, "History and Sociology in the United States," in
Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Hofstadter (eds.), Sociology and History: Methods
(New York, 1968), 3-19; Seymour Martin Lipset, "History and Sociology: Some
Methodological Considerations," ibid., 20-58; a splendid review of recent literature is
included; Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in
Mirra Komarovsky (ed.), Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill., 1957),
114-15.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 439

obvious a path to salvation from the c


historians have failed to pursue it. In con
come to understand more of the nature o
sciences.
One fundamental problem preventing compatibility of history and
the social sciences revolves around the confusion over how an historian
approaches the past. Despite its origins in the positivist revolt, history
has always had a strong idealistic and romantic quality to it. Most
recently articulated by R. G. Collingwood, this school insists that the
historian comes to know the past by literally rethinking the ideas of
historic figures. All history becomes the history of thought. Unlike the
social scientist, who looks at phenomena, the historian looks through
them. As W. H. Walsh puts it, "Whereas nature is all on the surface,
history has both inside and outside."" Obviously, this technique uses
the concepts of the social sciences as they shape the intellectual mode
in which the historian works. But the approach is not empirical.
Of course, even those of us who are not idealists, in the Collingwood
frame, can find many other traditional reasons to deny any affinity with
the social scientist. Many have noted that the historian values the
unique, in Marc Bloch's words, "the thrill of learning singular things.""
But the social scientist strives to apprehend the general, the trend, the
law. The historian is confronted with a dead record. His data is thrown
up to him by a fickle past. Whereas the social scientist can manipulate
his subject, can change its complexion, because in reality he is creating
the phenomenon to be studied, the historian must shuffle the cards he
is dealt. Whereas the historian deals with the past as lived and cannot
arbitrarily close his classifications, the social scientist must hypothesize
a closed system if he is to make use of his artificial models.'3
Nowhere is the artificiality of the social science approach revealed-
more powerfully than in the area of quantification. Ironically, perhaps,
nothing else has contributed as much to the respectability of social
science as the development of mathematical methodology. Here
predictions of probability flow readily from statistical projections,
especially in the areas of voting trends and public opinion. Historians
have already proved that these techniques can produce new historical

" Walsh, Philosophy of History, 56; Hughes, "Historian and the Social Scientist,"
22; R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York, 1956), especially part V.
12 Quoted by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Inscrutability of History," as excerpted
in Robin Winks (ed.), The Historian as Detective (New York, 1968), 524-25.
"3 Lipset, "History and Sociology," 22, 23; Samuel P. Hays, "New Possibilities for
American Political History: The Social Analysis of Political Life," in Lipset and
Hofstadter (eds.), Sociology and History, 222; Eisenstadt, "American History and Social
Science," 122; Walsh, Philosophy of History, 21.

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440 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

insights." Yet, quantification has also led many histor


suggestions of a union between history and the social sciences.
Undoubtedly, some of this reaction is sheer fear bred of ignorance on
our part. The thought of returning to the classroom to learn how to
handle statistics is admittedly a frightening one. But quantifiers have
contributed to this antagonism by dramatizing the artificiality and
narrowness of their concern while simultaneously presenting their
conclusions with an arrogant air of finality. Such an attitude has
produced a reaction. Arthur Schlesinger, for example, has even written
that the really important factors in the past can never be quantified. He
argues that almost all important questions are important "precisely
because they are not susceptible to quantitative answers."'" Indeed, the
quantifiers have achieved distinction through an intellectual coup. At
its foundation, quantification rests upon the notion of philosophical
materialism. As David H. Fischer puts it, they commit the fallacy of
thinking that those things count most which count best." Yet, only a
very narrow range of topics are capable of quantification, and the very
decision on how to erect a quantitative technique must be made
without benefit of numbers. The historian must attempt to give the
past some integrity and wholeness. If he merely counts, he will surely
fail. Of course, if he does not know how to count, he may also fail."
The study of public opinion is a case in point. Historians often
lament the absence of such data as Messers Harris and Gallup now
provide daily to our newspapers. Yet on closer investigation one
wonders if such data about the past would materially revise our
historical understanding. Clearly historical polls would enlighten us on
how people in the past answered the questions of pollsters. The danger
is that such data would be confused, as it is today, with an expression of
what people would do if they really had the power to act. The opinion
does not lead to historical consequences in any direct fashion. Of
course, this does not deny that such opinion may have important

'"See especially the following: Robert P. Swierenga (ed.), Quantification in


American History: Theory and Research (New York, 1970); D. K. Rowney and J. Q.
Graham (eds.), Quantitative History (Homewood, Illinois, 1969); Charles M. Dollar and
Richard J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to Statistics (New York, 1971), which is almost
unintelligible without a background in math; Stephan Thernstrom, "Quantitative
Methods in History: Some Notes," in Lipset and Hofstadter (eds.), Sociology and
History, 59-78; W. A. Aydelotte, Quantification in History (Menlo Park, California,
1971).

'~ Schlesinger, "Humanist Looks," 770-71.


' David Hackett Fischer, Historian's Fallacies (New York, 1970), 90-94, for a
discussion of this fallacy.
'~ Hays, "New Possibilities," 223.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 441

historical effects by influencing men who do


subject entirely."
Another apparent stumbling block to co
social sciences and history consists in that
historian is concerned with the past and the
present or future. I must admit to a general
simple terms of the distinction. The social sci
that all study is applied or present-oriente
known it changes the culture." He could argu
knowledge is to extend the range of huma
particular time. Even the antiquarian, who su
for its own sake, does so to satisfy some p
drive or need. Rather than such distinctions
makes more sense to point to the rigid ut
scientist as foreign to the more humanistic a
Obviously, both schools study the past, but t
it with a view of discovering laws which will allow a degree of
prediction-the hallmark of true science. The historian, by contrast,
has no such explicit quest before him, as he knows too well that the past
is a chancy thing, recalling the warning of scripture: "I returned and
saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the
strong . . . but time and chance happeneth to them all."
The traditional resistance by historians to becoming social
scientists thus rests upon differences in method, in character of data,
and in goals of the discipline. We should therefore not be surprised that
relatively few historians have followed the examples of Benson and
other quantifiers. Yet the dilemma remains unresolved, since the
survival of the historical profession may well depend on its
accommodation with the social sciences. While the injunction to either
ride the tiger of science or end up inside may be too blunt, historians are
hard pressed to come up with more feasible and satisfying alternatives.
There are a number of different approaches or proposals which enjoy
some support today. We may find it enlightening to examine each
proposal, consider its strong points and weaknesses, and finally offer
some recommendations.
One popular alternative may be labelled the no-nonsense or
common sense school. A million undergraduates can remember hearing
the cliche that a study of the past gives us perspective or that "unless

1' I find myself qualifying the argument of Schlesinger that only responsible opinion
interest historians. To the degree that irresponsible opinion leads to action, which it may
if perceived as important by a responsible actor, it is a proper subject of study. Se
Schlesinger, "Humanist Looks," 769.
19 Margaret Mead, "Anthropologist and Historian: Their Common Problems,
Amertcan Quarterly, III (September 1951), 12-13.

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442 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

we remember the past we are condemned to relive it."


stop trying to be too theoretical when the values o
obvious. These men insist the problem is solved bec
problem. After all, history has always succeeded in burying its
detractors. One might note, however, that it also buries its
practitioners, of all schools.
Others find a solution by rejecting the notion of all reality being
capable of empirical study. In what might be labeled a romantic
posture, historians emphasize the poetic contributions our discipline
can make. One scholar even suggests that "historians are really
performing the role of troubadours, bards, Meistersingers ... in
recalling the folk to past deeds of heroism."" These men agree with Don
Quixote, who tells us that too many facts are the enemy of truth.
At the other extreme we have those who follow the ideas of Edwin
Fenton and his methods of the social studies. Briefly stated, Mr. Fenton
seeks to abstract from history its conceptual kernels. I find his outline of
how the historian thinks chronologically a fascinating study.2' One can
also applaud his attempts to convey this method, rather than a box full
of facts, to the student. Too long have we simply force-fed the students
facts and ignored method. Unfortunately, at some point it becomes
doubtful that mere method, abstracted from the frame of facts, from
life as lived, can be called history. Mr. Fenton can demonstrate his
methods and concepts by using any series of facts, including those
taken from Tolkien's The Ring Trilogy.
A more reasonable approach, and one that is perhaps the most
sophisticated and attractive of the day, comes from a group of
American historians whom I propose to call the "pluralists." This group
includes men who have already contributed a great deal to the
reconciliation of history and the social sciences. Men such as Hays,
Hofstadter, Cochran, and Potter are the most well-known of this group.
They have dismissed the old cliches used to avoid confronting the issue.
To these men all knowledge rests upon a utilitarian base, as it
inevitably shapes the present world of consciousness. The pluralists
also point out that the distinction of the social scientist looking for laws
and the historian seeking the unique is misleading. The historian does
not reject laws. In fact, his substitution of historical context for the
model technique of the social scientist rests upon an acceptance of some
basic regularity inhuman existence. Without such regularity there can
be no intelligible discussion of the past. As W. H. Walsh points out, the

20 Eisenstadt, "American History and Social Science," 117.


2" See Edwin Fenton, The New Social Studies (New York, 1967), which is a report on
what is happening around the country in this area.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 443

historian accepts much of the philos


science.
Instead of emphasizing differences, the pluralists point to a
number of important areas of convergence between history and the
social sciences. One hears repeatedly from this group that the
dichotomy of history being either a science or an art is too simple. Such
a distinction errs in implying a tension between these two areas of
human endeavor." Similarly, the argument that the historical method
is science and historical expression is art fails to appreciate that the
character of presentation "is already implicit in the presupposition of
the investigation itself.""3 Another important contribution made by the
pluralists springs from their insistence that historians can make good
use of the concepts of the social sciences. Even if we cannot master the
model or statistical techniques of the computer, we can still use the
ideas emerging from social research. The concepts of Freud and Weber
have already demonstrated their ability to illuminate aspects of the
past. Sir Lewis Namier has shown what can be accomplished by a
quantitative approach to politics; Hofstadter has done the same for the
notion of status revolt.24
Such injunctions, however, do not mean that the pluralists seek to
submerge history in social science. They are not trying to destroy the
uniqueness of the historian. Using the concepts of sociology does not
mean that one becomes a sociologist. Indeed, the pluralists envision a
much nobler task for the historian than he has had. Instead of merely
grubbing after past details, the historian may also serve as the grand
mediator between science and art-humanizing one and formalizing
the other. Modern historiography has an opportunity to occupy the
throne left vacant with the demise of theology and philosophy."2
Such a breathtaking opportunity should surely inspire us all. Yet I
suspect our troubles are not over. Despite the glamour of the pluralists'
program, their very real insights into the historical process, and my own
sympathy for their position, I think they fail to resolve a number of
important questions.
Part of the problem springs from fundamental questions
confronting the social sciences themselves. Unless historians are aware
of these problems we may find ourselves deserting a death bed to enter a
psychiatric ward. The confusion of purpose in history may simply be

"2 Hughes, "The Historian," 20; and for a more elaborate discussion of the same
point, see his History as Art and as Science (New York, 1964).
" Hughes, "The Historian," 20.
"4 Schlesinger, "Humanist Looks," 770.
" See especially John Higham, History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965), 141-
144.

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444 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

compounded by a similar confusion in the social sc


which springs from the problem of an outmoded i
established the goals of the social sciences, but f
scientists explicitly accept the ideology of positivis
working for a grand harmony of nature. Social sci
questions of purpose to lose itself in techniques. W
social scientist's attention to quantitative methodol
to the antiquarian's concern with the past for its ow
avoid any embarrassing doubts about ultimate go
thought that one would go through the incredib
involved in much modern social research without s
mind strikes me as simply untenable.
Paradoxically, it is precisely the short-range u
dimension of social science which makes it so attract
From its very birth the goal of social science ha
practical knowledge. It sought not merely to under
its own sake but to change it, to reform it. Social u
lead to social improvement. This character of th
remains and explains their extreme compatibilit
society. Both society and discipline revel in the my
modern sociologist, Robert K. Merton, writes: "
acquire the knowledge needed to cope with the man
the inveterate capacity to contract.""' The social sci
utilitarian. Nothing could suit American culture be
Yet within this superficial compatibility lurk a n
problems. The reform goal of social science can
degree that the society observed manifests the reg
predict. The truly logical social scientist must a
philosophical materialism and determinism as B
heroicly done. The notion of autonomous human beings acting
arbitrarily would place an impossible burden on the task of erecting
social laws. The tension between such determinism, implicit in all
social science, and the cultural and legal foundations of American socie-
ty should be obvious.
Another way to view the same problem is to note the contradiction
between the implicit teleology of the social sciences' reformism and
the notion of an open society. Obviously, one cannot define a notion
of social progress, a directional concept, without some notion of a goal
or destiny. Yet, social scientists reject such questions of ultimate goals
as metaphysical or philosophical. Furthermore, American society rests
upon the powerful myth that various individuals and groups may
" Eisenstadt, "American History and Social Science," 120.
27 Quoted in ibid., 116.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 445

parade conflicting programs and work


protective curtain of an "open society."
teleology in any final sense to remain f
notion how can we establish the rules o
All of these remarks merely emphas
its philosophical dilemmas by merely
social sciences. Indeed, to the degree t
social science movement of the ninetee
these problems. For example, the his
dilemma. He must assume that human
causality rests upon an extra-historical
the historian must confront the problem
and also assuming some causality. The h
of law in history; yet without some
generalizations become impossible. So
such a problem by arguing for the
technique explains events not in term
context-how a particular event fits wit
an approach, however, rests upon an op
begs the question. How can I tell whe
begins? Am I not forced to see the mos
circumstance the meta-history of To
historian confronts the problem of un
notion of man. His study of man in the
this object. Without some connecting th
and man in the past we can make no sen
of man in history is clearly a universal
The dilemma remains. We cannot sim
social sciences. The act itself might win
the utilitarian bias of our culture. One
apply history to this and that problem.
out as frauds in no time. More importan
a repudiation of the integrity of the
exploitation for reform purposes. "If y
social happiness, ye labor in vain," t
Furthermore, there appears to be little sense of philosophical
satisfaction in joining the social scientists, a group equally confused
about fundamental questions.
But perhaps the dilemmas on the practical level and philosophical
level are intrinsically connected. The problem is how to preserve some
sense of historical integrity on a philosophical level which will not make
history totally irrelevant on the practical level. To become a social
2" Walsh, Philosophy of History, 23.

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446 HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

scientist may satisfy our practical problems onl


philosophical ones. Such compartmentalization w
would like to suggest that two things are needed
broader concept of knowledge and a more liberal id
knowledge. Many of my colleagues have already arg
more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are
philosophy." We may skirt the swamp of roman
seems imperative that we stress the value of insight
view of particulars or through measurement, but f
whole. Not by dissecting the past, but by reconstru
with it, does the historian achieve a sense of artist
nature of reality. He resembles the novelist in
Nevertheless, he never forgets that it is not fiction
its facets. One will never understand the glory of R
the French Revolution by a statistical analysis of
Such events and institutions are not similar to s
which the accumulation of parts leads to a whole. W
achieve vision by multiplying monographs."9 The w
events is greater than the sum of its parts, even if a
ever be distinguished. Such wholeness cannot be
truly spiritual leap of the intellect.
Directly related to this vision of truth as whole
overcoming the narrow view of knowledge as useful
rests upon a rather strenuous vision of knowledge. Unless one is
searching, defining, perspiring, one is not really knowing. Knowledge is
observable activity, preferably the solving of some problem. Yet there is
another side to true knowledge. This side may not solve a problem but it
may lead to satisfaction of the soul and mind. It may leave us
contented. This type of knowledge does not ignore problems; instead it
confronts those which are at the very bosom of life. How often has a
study of the past led not to a plan of action for the present but merely
to a keener sense of human irony. Joseph Pieper, the German
philosopher, is helpful here as he argues against a theory of knowledge
as work and for a theory which strives not for mastery, "but in seeing
what is and the whole of what is; in seeing things not as useful or
useless, but simply as being." Such a goal may seem excessively
philosophical to many, but I suggest that the real value of history is its
ability to make us think philosophically, to think about the bosom of
life-its purpose and meaning, its comedy, its errors, its tragedy. Whpt
is the profit of such thinking? As Carl Becker once wrote: "the value of

"2 Note the provocative distinction between existential history and symbolic history
made by Page Smith, The Historian and History (Vintage, 1966), 202-209.

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THE HISTORY TEACHER 447

history is . . . not scientific but mora


deepening the sympathies, by fortifying
not society, but ourselves, a much m
desperately our culture needs such a res
senses are bombarded with thousands
soon all come in with the same intensit
another as television, newspapers, rad
pound into our brain the overwhelming
very terror of the future unless we a
history can help us temporarily withdra
program it. The prospects, however,
themselves assume the task of magnifie

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