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Foreign Supreme Courts

Korea, South
Malaysia
Singapore
United States of America

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722 Phil. 161

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 176419, November 27, 2013 ]

GMA NETWORK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. CARLOS P. PABRIGA, GEOFFREY F.

ARIAS, KIRBY N. CAMPO, ARNOLD L. LAGAHIT AND ARMAND A. CATUBIG,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assailing the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2006 and the subsequent Resolution[2] dated January 22, 2007
denying reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 73652.

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On July 19, 1999, due to the miserable working conditions, private respondents were forced to
file a complaint against petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City, assailing their respective employment circumstances as
follows:

NAME DATE HIRED POSITION

Carlos Pabriga 2 May 1997 Television Technicians
Geoffrey Arias 2 May 1997 Television Technicians
Kirby Campo 1 Dec. 1993 Television Technicians
Arnold Laganit 11 Feb. 1996 Television Technicians
Armand Catubig 2 March 1997 Television Technicians

Private respondents were engaged by petitioner to perform the following activities, to wit:

1) Manning of Technical Operations Center:

(a) Responsible for the airing of local commercials; and
(b) Logging/monitoring of national commercials (satellite)

2) Acting as Transmitter/VTR men:

(a) Prepare tapes for local airing;
(b) Actual airing of commercials;
(c) Plugging of station promo;
(d) Logging of transmitter reading; and
(e) In case of power failure, start up generator set to resume program;

3) Acting as Maintenance staff;

(a) Checking of equipment;
(b) Warming up of generator;
(c) Filling of oil, fuel, and water in radiator; and

4) Acting as Cameramen

On 4 August 1999, petitioner received a notice of hearing of the complaint. The following day,
petitioner’s Engineering Manager, Roy Villacastin, confronted the private respondents about the
said complaint.

On 9 August 1999, private respondents were summoned to the office of petitioner’s Area
Manager, Mrs. Susan Aliño, and they were made to explain why they filed the complaint. The
next day, private respondents were barred from entering and reporting for work without any
notice stating the reasons therefor.

On 13 August 1999, private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a letter to Mrs. Susan
Aliño requesting that they be recalled back to work.

On 23 August 1999, a reply letter from Mr. Bienvenido Bustria, petitioner’s head of Personnel
and Labor Relations Division, admitted the non-payment of benefits but did not mention the
request of private respondents to be allowed to return to work.

On 15 September 1999, private respondents sent another letter to Mr. Bustria reiterating their
request to work but the same was totally ignored. On 8 October 1999, private respondents filed
 an amended complaint raising the following additional issues: 1) Unfair Labor Practice; 2)
Illegal dismissal; and 3) Damages and Attorney’s fees.

On 23 September 1999, a mandatory conference was set to amicably settle the dispute between
the parties, however, the same proved to be futile. As a result, both of them were directed to file
their respective position papers.

On 10 November 1999, private respondents filed their position paper and on 2 March 2000, they
received a copy of petitioner’s position paper. The following day, the Labor Arbiter issued an
order considering the case submitted for decision.[3]

In his Decision dated August 24, 2000, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint of respondents for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice, but held petitioner liable for 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

Respondents are, however, directed to pay the following complainants their proportionate 13th
month pay, to wit:

1. Kirby Campo P 7,716.04

2. Arnold Lagahit 7,925.98
3. Armand Catubig 4,233.68
4. Carlos Pabriga 4,388.19
5. Geoffrey Arias 4,562.01
P28,826.14
10% Attorney’s fees 2,882.61
GRAND TOTAL P31,708.75

All other claims are, hereby, dismissed for failure to substantiate the same. [4]

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, and held thus:

WHEREFORE, we make the following findings:

a) All complainants are regular employees with respect to the particular activity to which they
were assigned, until it ceased to exist. As such, they are entitled to payment of separation pay
computed at one (1) month salary for every year of service;
 b) They are not entitled to overtime pay and holiday pay; and

c) They are entitled to 13th month pay, night shift differential and service incentive leave pay.

For purposes of accurate computation, the entire records are REMANDED to the Regional
Arbitration Branch of origin which is hereby directed to require from respondent the production
of additional documents where necessary.

Respondent is also assessed the attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of all the above awards.[5]

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. On September 8, 2006, the
appellate court rendered its Decision denying the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, based on the following grounds:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED FINDING RESPONDENTS ARE

REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF THE PETITIONER AND ARE NOT PROJECT
EMPLOYEES.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING SEPARATION PAY TO

RESPONDENTS ABSENT A FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING NIGHT SHIFT

DIFFERENTIAL PAY CONSIDERING THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE WHICH
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO SUCH AN AWARD.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES

TO RESPONDENTS.[6]

The parties having extensively elaborated on their positions in their respective memoranda, we proceed to
dispose of the issues raised.
Five Classifications of Employment

At the outset, we should note that the nature of the employment is determined by law, regardless of any
contract expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract and the
stipulations contained therein is to bring to life the policy enshrined in the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor. Labor contracts, being imbued with public interest, are placed on a higher plane than
ordinary contracts and are subject to the police power of the State.[7]

Respondents claim that they are regular employees of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. The latter, on the other
hand, interchangeably characterize respondents’ employment as project and fixed period/fixed term
employment. There is thus the need to clarify the foregoing terms.

The terms regular employment and project employment are taken from Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
also speaks of casual and seasonal employment:

ARTICLE 280. Regular and casual employment. – The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:

Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity actually
exist.

A fifth classification, that of a fixed term employment, is not expressly mentioned in the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, this Court ruled in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,[8] that such a contract, which specifies that
employment will last only for a definite period, is not per se illegal or against public policy.

Whether respondents are regular or project employees

Pursuant to the above-quoted Article 280 of the Labor Code, employees performing activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the employer’s usual business or trade can either be regular, project or
seasonal employees, while, as a general rule, those performing activities not usually necessary or desirable in
the employer’s usual business or trade are casual employees. The reason for this distinction may not be
readily comprehensible to those who have not carefully studied these provisions: only employers who
constantly need the specified tasks to be performed can be justifiably charged to uphold the constitutionally
protected security of tenure of the corresponding workers. The consequence of the distinction is found in
Article 279 of the Labor Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 279. Security of tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

On the other hand, the activities of project employees may or may not be usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, as we have discussed in ALU-TUCP v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[9] and recently reiterated in Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union-ALU-
TUCP v. Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation.[10] In said cases, we clarified
the term “project” in the test for determining whether an employee is a regular or project employee:

It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and scope of the term “project” in
the present context. The “project” for the carrying out of which “project employees” are hired
would ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the employer. Exceptionally,
the “project” undertaking might not have an ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business
of the employer. In this latter case, the determination of the scope and parameters of the
“project” becomes fairly easy. It is unusual (but still conceivable) for a company to undertake a
project which has absolutely no relationship to the usual business of the company; thus, for
instance, it would be an unusual steel-making company which would undertake the breeding and
production of fish or the cultivation of vegetables. From the viewpoint, however, of the legal
characterization problem here presented to the Court, there should be no difficulty in designating
the employees who are retained or hired for the purpose of undertaking fish culture or the
production of vegetables as “project employees,” as distinguished from ordinary or “regular
employees,” so long as the duration and scope of the project were determined or specified at the
time of engagement of the “project employees.” For, as is evident from the provisions of Article
280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier, the principal test for determining whether particular
employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as distinguished from
“regular employees,” is whether or not the “project employees” were assigned to carry out a
“specific project or undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time
the employees were engaged for that project.

In the realm of business and industry, we note that “project” could refer to one or the other of
at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a
particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other
undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. The typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction
job or project of a construction company. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or
 more [distinct] identifiable construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati; a
residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City.
Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and
duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of
employment, are properly treated as “project employees,” and their services may be lawfully
terminated at completion of the project.

The term “project” could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is not
within the regular business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be
identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the
employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times. x x
x.[11] (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)

Thus, in order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent
employees from attaining the status of regular employees, employers claiming that their workers are project
employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time
they were engaged, but also that there was indeed a project. As discussed above, the project could either be
(1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but
which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a
particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. As it was with regard
to the distinction between a regular and casual employee, the purpose of this requirement is to delineate
whether or not the employer is in constant need of the services of the specified employee. If the particular
job or undertaking is within the regular or usual business of the employer company and it is not identifiably
distinct or separate from the other undertakings of the company, there is clearly a constant necessity for the
performance of the task in question, and therefore said job or undertaking should not be considered a project.

Brief examples of what may or may not be considered identifiably distinct from the business of the employer
are in order. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Ylagan,[12] this Court held that accounting
duties were not shown as distinct, separate and identifiable from the usual undertakings of therein petitioner
PLDT. Although essentially a telephone company, PLDT maintains its own accounting department to which
respondent was assigned. This was one of the reasons why the Court held that respondent in said case was
not a project employee. On the other hand, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[13] respondent was hired to repair furnaces, which are needed by San Miguel Corporation to
manufacture glass, an integral component of its packaging and manufacturing business. The Court, finding
that respondent is a project employee, explained that San Miguel Corporation is not engaged in the business
of repairing furnaces. Although the activity was necessary to enable petitioner to continue manufacturing
glass, the necessity for such repairs arose only when a particular furnace reached the end of its life or
operating cycle. Respondent therein was therefore considered a project employee.

In the case at bar, as discussed in the statement of facts, respondents were assigned to the following tasks:

1) Manning of Technical Operations Center:

(a) Responsible for the airing of local commercials; and
 (b) Logging/monitoring of national commercials (satellite)

2) Acting as Transmitter/VTR men:

(a) Prepare tapes for local airing;
(b) Actual airing of commercials;
(c) Plugging of station promo;
(d) Logging of transmitter reading; and
(e) In case of power failure, start up generator set to resume program;

3) Acting as Maintenance staff;

(a) Checking of equipment;
(b) Warming up of generator;
(c) Filling of oil, fuel, and water in radiator; and

4) Acting as Cameramen[14]

These jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual business of the employer company and
are not identifiably distinct or separate from the other undertakings of the company. There is no denying that
the manning of the operations center to air commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR men, maintaining the
equipment, and acting as cameramen are not undertakings separate or distinct from the business of a
broadcasting company.

Petitioner’s allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch-hitters (which means
that they were employed to take the place of regular employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave)
does not change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered projects within the purview of the law. Every
industry, even public offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave.
Such tasks, whether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be considered separate and
distinct from the other undertakings of the company. While it is management’s prerogative to device a
method to deal with this issue, such prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems wherein employees
are not ingeniously and methodically deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.
We are not convinced that a big corporation such as petitioner cannot device a system wherein a sufficient
number of technicians can be hired with a regular status who can take over when their colleagues are absent
or on leave, especially when it appears from the records that petitioner hires so-called pinch-hitters regularly
every month.

In affirming the Decision of the NLRC, the Court of Appeals furthermore noted that if respondents were
indeed project employees, petitioner should have reported the completion of its projects and the dismissal of
respondents in its finished projects:

There is another reason why we should rule in favor of private respondents. Nowhere in the
records is there any showing that petitioner reported the completion of its projects and the
dismissal of private respondents in its finished projects to the nearest Public Employment Office
as per Policy Instruction No. 20[15] of the Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE].
 Jurisprudence abounds with the consistent rule that the failure of an employer to report to the
nearest Public Employment Office the termination of its workers’ services everytime a project or
a phase thereof is completed indicates that said workers are not project employees.

In the extant case, petitioner should have filed as many reports of termination as there were
projects actually finished if private respondents were indeed project employees, considering that
the latter were hired and again rehired from 1996 up to 1999. Its failure to submit reports of
termination cannot but sufficiently convince us further that private respondents are truly regular
employees. Important to note is the fact that private respondents had rendered more than one (1)
year of service at the time of their dismissal which overturns petitioner’s allegations that private
respondents were hired for a specific or fixed undertaking for a limited period of time.[16]
(Citations omitted.)

We are not unaware of the decisions of the Court in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
Ylagan[17] and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno[18] which held that the employer’s failure
to report the termination of employees upon project completion to the DOLE Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the workplace within the period prescribed militates against the employer’s claim of project
employment, even outside the construction industry. We have also previously stated in another case that the
Court should not allow circumvention of labor laws in industries not falling within the ambit of Policy
Instruction No. 20/Department Order No. 19, thereby allowing the prevention of acquisition of tenurial
security by project employees who have already gained the status of regular employees by the employer’s
conduct.[19]

While it may not be proper to revisit such past pronouncements in this case, we nonetheless find that
petitioner’s theory of project employment fails the principal test of demonstrating that the alleged project
employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which were
specified at the time the employee is engaged for the project.[20]

The Court of Appeals also ruled that even if it is assumed that respondents are project employees, they would
nevertheless have attained regular employment status because of their continuous rehiring:

Be that as it may, a project employee may also attain the status of a regular employee if there is a
continuous rehiring of project employees after the stoppage of a project; and the activities
performed are usual [and] customary to the business or trade of the employer. The Supreme
Court ruled that a project employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a
regular employee when the following concur:

1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after cessation of a project;

and

2) The tasks performed by the alleged project employee are vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer.
 The circumstances set forth by law and the jurisprudence is present in this case. In fine, even if
private respondents are to be considered as project employees, they attained regular employment
status, just the same.[21] (Citation omitted.)

Anent this issue of attainment of regular status due to continuous rehiring, petitioner advert to the fixed
period allegedly designated in employment contracts and reflected in vouchers. Petitioner cites our
pronouncements in Brent, St. Theresa’s School of Novaliches Foundation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[22] and Fabela v. San Miguel Corporation,[23] and argues that respondents were fully aware
and freely entered into agreements to undertake a particular activity for a specific length of time.[24]
Petitioner apparently confuses project employment from fixed term employment. The discussions cited by
petitioner in Brent, St. Theresa’s and Fabela all refer to fixed term employment, which is subject to a
different set of requirements.

Whether the requisites of a valid fixed term employment are met

As stated above, petitioner interchangeably characterizes respondents’ service as project and fixed term
employment. These types of employment, however, are not the same. While the former requires a project as
restrictively defined above, the duration of a fixed-term employment agreed upon by the parties may be any
day certain, which is understood to be “that which must necessarily come although it may not be known
when.”[25] The decisive determinant in fixed-term employment is not the activity that the employee is called
upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of the
employment relationship.[26]

Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts, we emphasized in
Brent that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy or
morals.[27] We thus laid down indications or criteria under which “term employment” cannot be said to be
in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely:

1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or

2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or
less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. [28] (Citation
omitted.)

These indications, which must be read together, make the Brent doctrine applicable only in a few special
cases wherein the employer and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering into the contract.
The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is
in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less
protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required
for the protection of the employee. These indications were applied in Pure Foods Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[29] where we discussed the patent inequality between the employer and
employees therein:

[I]t could not be supposed that private respondents and all other so-called “casual” workers of
[the petitioner] KNOWINGLY and VOLUNTARILY agreed to the 5-month employment
contract. Cannery workers are never on equal terms with their employers. Almost always, they
agree to any terms of an employment contract just to get employed considering that it is difficult
to find work given their ordinary qualifications. Their freedom to contract is empty and hollow
because theirs is the freedom to starve if they refuse to work as casual or contractual workers.
Indeed, to the unemployed, security of tenure has no value. It could not then be said that
petitioner and private respondents “dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.

To recall, it is doctrinally entrenched that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving
with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence that the dismissal was valid.[30] It is therefore the
employer which must satisfactorily show that it was not in a dominant position of advantage in dealing with
its prospective employee. Thus, in Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela,[31] this Court
rejected the employer’s insistence on the application of the Brent doctrine when the sole justification of the
fixed terms is to respond to temporary albeit frequent need of such workers:

We reject the petitioner’s submission that it resorted to hiring employees for fixed terms to
augment or supplement its regular employment “for the duration of peak loads” during short-
term surges to respond to cyclical demands; hence, it may hire and retire workers on fixed terms,
ad infinitum, depending upon the needs of its customers, domestic and international. Under the
petitioner's submission, any worker hired by it for fixed terms of months or years can never
attain regular employment status. x x x.

Similarly, in the case at bar, we find it unjustifiable to allow petitioner to hire and rehire workers on fixed
terms, ad infinitum, depending upon its needs, never attaining regular employment status. To recall,
respondents were repeatedly rehired in several fixed term contracts from 1996 to 1999. To prove the alleged
contracts, petitioner presented cash disbursement vouchers signed by respondents, stating that they were
merely hired as pinch-hitters. It is apparent that respondents were in no position to refuse to sign these
vouchers, as such refusal would entail not getting paid for their services. Plainly, respondents as “pinch-
hitters” cannot be considered to be in equal footing as petitioner corporation in the negotiation of their
employment contract.

In sum, we affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that respondents are regular employees
of petitioner. As regular employees, they are entitled to security of tenure and therefore their services may be
terminated only for just or authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove any just or authorized cause for
their termination, we are constrained to affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that they
were illegally dismissed.

Separation Pay, Night Shift Differential and Attorney’s Fees

Petitioner admits that respondents were not given separation pay and night shift differential. Petitioner,
however, claims that respondents were not illegally dismissed and were therefore not entitled to separation
pay. As regards night shift differential, petitioner claims that its admission in its August 23, 1999 letter as to
the nonpayment thereof is qualified by its allegation that respondents are not entitled thereto. Petitioner
points out that respondents failed to specify the period when such benefits are due, and did not present
additional evidence before the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.[32]

In light, however, of our ruling that respondents were illegally dismissed, we affirm the findings of the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals that respondents are entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. We quote
with approval the discussion of the Court of Appeals:

However, since petitioner refused to accept private respondents back to work, reinstatement is no
longer practicable. Allowing private respondents to return to their work might only subject them
to further embarrassment, humiliation, or even harassment.

Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, the grant of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for
every year of service is proper which public respondent actually did. Where the relationship
between private respondents and petitioner has been severely strained by reason of their
respective imputations of accusations against each other, to order reinstatement would no longer
serve any purpose. In such situation, payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement is in
order.[33] (Citations omitted.)

As regards night shift differential, the Labor Code provides that every employee shall be paid not less than
ten percent (10%) of his regular wage for each hour of work performed between ten o’clock in the evening
and six o’clock in the morning.[34] As employees of petitioner, respondents are entitled to the payment of
this benefit in accordance with the number of hours they worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., if any. In the
Decision of the NLRC affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the records were remanded to the Regional
Arbitration Branch of origin for the computation of the night shift differential and the separation pay. The
Regional Arbitration Branch of origin was likewise directed to require herein petitioner to produce additional
documents where necessary. Therefore, while we are affirming that respondents are entitled to night shift
differential in accordance with the number of hours they worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., it is the
Regional Arbitration Branch of origin which should determine the computation thereof for each of the
respondents, and award no night shift differential to those of them who never worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m.

It is also worthwhile to note that in the NLRC Decision, it was herein petitioner GMA Network, Inc.
(respondent therein) which was tasked to produce additional documents necessary for the computation of the
night shift differential. This is in accordance with our ruling in Dansart Security Force & Allied Services
Company v. Bagoy,[35] where we held that it is entirely within the employer’s power to present such
employment records that should necessarily be in their possession, and that failure to present such evidence
must be taken against them.

Petitioner, however, is correct that the award of attorney’s fees is contrary to jurisprudence. In De los Santos
v. Jebsen Maritime, Inc.,[36] we held:

Likewise legally correct is the deletion of the award of attorney's fees, the NLRC having failed to
explain petitioner’s entitlement thereto. As a matter of sound policy, an award of attorney’s fees
remains the exception rather than the rule. It must be stressed, as aptly observed by the appellate
court, that it is necessary for the trial court, the NLRC in this case, to make express findings of
facts and law that would bring the case within the exception. In fine, the factual, legal or
equitable justification for the award must be set forth in the text of the decision. The matter of
attorney’s fees cannot be touched once and only in the fallo of the decision, else, the award
should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural. In the absence of a stipulation,
attorney’s fees are ordinarily not recoverable; otherwise a premium shall be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not awarded every time a party wins a suit. (Citations omitted.)

In the case at bar, the factual basis for the award of attorney’s fees was not discussed in the text of NLRC
Decision. We are therefore constrained to delete the same.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2006 and the subsequent
Resolution denying reconsideration dated January 22, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73652, are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees in the affirmed Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 9-23; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justices Isaias P.
Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.

[2] Id. at 25-26.

[3] Id. at 10-12.

[4] Id. at 188-189.

[5] Id. at 175-176.

[6] Id. at 42-43.

[7] Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. Philippine National Oil Company-
Energy Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011, 646 SCRA 658, 665.

[8] 260 Phil. 747 (1990).

[9] G.R. No. 109902, August 2, 1994, 234 SCRA 678, 684-686.

[10] Supra note 7 at 668-669.

[11] ALU-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 9 at 684-685.

[12] 537 Phil. 840 (2006).

[13] 357 Phil. 954 (1998).

[14] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[15] This has been superseded by Department Order No. 19, series of 1993, which likewise imposed on the
employer a duty to report terminations of project employment in the construction industry to the DOLE.

[16] Rollo, p. 17.

[17] Supra note 12.

[18] 534 Phil. 306 (2006).

[19] Maraguinot, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 580, 606 (1998).

[20] Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013.

[21] Rollo, pp. 17-18.

[22] 351 Phil. 1038 (1998).

[23] 544 Phil. 223 (2007).

[24] Rollo, pp. 378-382.

[25] Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, supra note 8 at 757.

[26] Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, 471 Phil. 355, 372 (2004).

[27] Id.

[28] Romares v. National Labor Relations Commission, 355 Phil. 835, 847 (1998); Philips Semiconductors
(Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, id. at 372-373.

[29] 347 Phil. 434, 444 (1997).

[30] Dacuital v. L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation, G.R. No. 176748, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA
702, 716.

[31] Supra note 25 at 373.

[32] Rollo, pp. 384-387.

[33] Id. at 20.

[34] Labor Code, Article 86.

[35] G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 694.

[36] 512 Phil. 301, 315-316 (2005).

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